### PAKISTAN

#### COUNTRY READER

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Harold H. Saunders 1971 South Asia Specialist, National Security Council, Washington, DC
1974-1976 Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
George G. B. Griffin 1972-1973 Political Officer, Islamabad
1973-1975 Deputy Principal Officer, Lahore
Henry Byroade 1973-1977 Ambassador, Pakistan
Teresita C. Schaffer 1974-1977 Deputy Chief, Economic Section, Islamabad
Steven W. Sinding 1975-1978 Population Officer, USAID, Karachi
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David D. Newsom was born in California in 1918. He graduated from the University of California in 1938 and from Columbia University in 1940. He served overseas in the U.S. Navy from 1942 to 1946 and entered the Foreign Service in 1947. He served in many countries including Pakistan, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Libya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 17, 1991.

Q: What was the situation in Pakistan in the 1948-50 period?

NEWSOM: The partition of India had been accomplished hurriedly. The British, and particularly Mountbatten, was not sympathetic to the creation of Pakistan. That meant that the government of Pakistan, established in August, 1947 in Karachi, was a government without any resources, files, equipment or any of the necessities required to operate. I remember some notes that we exchanged with the new government: we typed not only our note to them, but their reply to us as well on our typewriters because they didn't have any in the Foreign Ministry. Karachi had been a city of 350,000 people before partition; about 125,000 of those were Hindus or Parsi who left for India. In return, 500 to 600 thousands Muslim refugees had flowed into the city. When we arrived, Karachi was an over-crowded city with people sleeping on sidewalks with all of their meager possessions -- little bundles that stood besides them. Some did not rise in the mornings and were carted away.

The remnants of the bitter communal riots between Muslims and Sikhs of the Punjab were still very much in evidence. The day before we arrived witnessed that last communal riot in Karachi with about 125 Sikhs being killed in the center of the city. So Karachi was a city under great stress. The diplomatic corps was housed mostly in one hotel. The American Embassy had been fortunate because it benefitted by a deal that a Parsi had made with the government which protected his house, which was next to our residence, from government seizure in return for him
building three houses for the diplomatic corps behind the residence. We, the Newsoms, got one of those houses because we had a child and that put us on a priority list. We shared that house with another family -- the Josephs -- for three months. The house had no screens, no air conditioning which were almost essential in Karachi and the house was very basic. Karachi was without a doubt a hardship post by American standards, but it was a post where a small group of American Foreign Service people would work well together in the face of adversity. The group was led first by Charge Charles William Lewis, then Paul Alling came as the first Ambassador. He developed cancer shortly after arrival and died within a few months. Hooker Doolittle, who had been Consul General in Lahore, was brought to Karachi to act as Chargé until the new Ambassador arrived.

Hooker was one of the great characters of the Foreign Service. His grand-daughter, I believe still lives in the Washington area. He once told me that he would never be an Ambassador, but that he had a lot of fun in the Foreign Service being independent. He had lost his household effects four times during his career; the first time was in the Russian revolution when he had been Consul in Tbilisi. He had married a Russian lady and spent his honeymoon being evacuated on a destroyer from Tbilisi. Then he had been Consul in Bilbao at the time of the Spanish civil war. Then he was in Tunis when the Germans invaded and in Lahore at the time of partition. He was a man who felt intensely about individuals, sometimes with positive effects as when he gave courageous support to Bourguiba when they were both in Tunis. He recognized that this was a man of destiny in his country and incurred the unending enmity of the French by his support. That was even noticeable in Karachi when we were there. On the other hand, Hooker took a very negative view of Nehru. He wrote a piece of doggerel verse called "Pandit, the Bandit" which reflected his views of the origins of the Kashmir problem. Later on during my Karachi tour, Merritt Cootes came as public affairs officer. He and I figured out that Doolittle must have typed this poem in multiple copies on his typewriter and that he could not have typed more that seven copies. In the interest of US-India relations, we tried to retrieve the copies as they appeared. We thought we had them all. One day, Walter Lippmann came to town and to our amazement and horror we saw Doolittle and Lippmann sitting on a swinging sofa in the garden with Doolittle reading the eighth and last remaining copy of his poem. Doolittle was very much a man of the old school -- charming, but who worked in the morning and then had two or three pink gins for lunch and spent the afternoon bargaining for carpets and other similar activities.

Doolittle was supported was Julian Nugent, who was the DCM, Harold Joseph, Nick Thacher, Tom Simons -- father of our current Ambassador to Poland -- and myself. That was the substantive staff of the Embassy.

Q: Later our relationship with Pakistan became a very political one because we used it as a balance to India in a Cold War context. You were there at the beginning. What was our attitude towards Pakistan and India at the time?

NEWSOM: The attitudes of the Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi reflected the views of their respective "clients". When we got together, the conversation was as argumentative as the discussions between the two countries. Tom Simons, who was the INR man in Karachi, had an academic background and was a specialist in South Asia. He conducted basic research. He had done similar work in Calcutta and therefore had a more balanced view than the partisans. But he
was the exception. The rest of us thought that there was justification for partition in light of the persecution that the Muslims had encountered, but we were of course under the intense emotional barrage of the Muslims refugees who had fled from India.

The relations between Pakistan and the US in those years were difficult because of the public perception in this country, primarily of Gandhi and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder and first President of Pakistan. I remember having to deal with the American press covering Jinnah's death in September, 1948. When Gandhi was assassinated, the American papers were of course filled with highly laudatory comments. When Jinnah died, he was seen as austere, inflexible and a man who had done great damage to India by his insistence of partition. That attitude was not the official attitude, but this view was reflected in the American press -- The New York Times, The Herald Tribune and the other newspapers that we used to receive at the time. Our personal relationship with government officials were good. Washington's attitude was that given the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and given the Azerbaijani events occurring near by, it was in our interest to build good relations with the new state of Pakistan.

My reference to the Azerbaijani events concerns an effort made in 1947 to create an independent republic of Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran, with Soviet support. This would dismembered part of Iran. George Allen, then our ambassador in Tehran, took a very firm position, supported by Washington, that the US would not tolerate such action and we gave the Iranians moral support to squash that drive towards independence. That was one of the first thrusts and counter-thrusts of the Cold War. So Washington had those events very much in mind as we developed our policy toward Pakistan.

We were just at the beginning of our aid efforts. Truman's Inaugural speech, which launched the Point IV program -- a program of technical assistance -- together with our experience from the Greek-Turkish aid programs and the Marshall Plan, was the beginning of our world-wide assistance efforts. Pakistan was an early recipient of economic assistance and attention. While I was in Karachi, negotiations with Harvard University had begun. This contract was to collect a team of economists to review Pakistan's situation and to develop an economic strategy. West Pakistan was a potentially rich area, but partition had disrupted economic development and had changed a lot of the potential. There were also problems with the economic viability and prospects of East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh. So the US was one of the first Western powers to take an interest in Pakistan's economic future. I was not directly involved and don't remember all the details, but Pakistan was certainly one of the early recipients of US assistance in the Third World.

Q: As you developed our information program, did you get any instructions from Washington or were you pretty much left to your own devices?

NEWSOM: A lot, of course, had to be developed locally. I used whatever resources were available. We used the "Wireless File" which was transcribed from a squeaky short wave radio by a local employee. We began to get books and films. I started a monthly magazine called "Panorama" which I believe is still being published. It was about the United States. We got some money for educational grants -- it must have been part of a program just being developed. Our
program was very modest. We benefitted from the large interest in the US that the Pakistani exhibited. Particularly interested was the wife of the then Prime Minister Leaki Ali Khan who was subsequently assassinated. She had been educated in an American girls' school in Calcutta and loved American songs and movies. We had at times to temper her enthusiasm. In 1950, I went to the US as one of her escorts for a trip she took to this country. One thing she always wanted to do was to go to Hollywood. So we arranged for her visit to the Movie-land. We were very conscious of the conservative Muslim society from which she came; we structured the visit so that there would not be any embarrassing occasions. We were to visit Jimmy Stewart who was then making *Harvey*. As we were walking down to the set, some P.R. man came along and said something to the Prime Minister's wife. She nodded agreement and we were suddenly whisked away to a set where Abbot and Costello were making a film on the Foreign Legion. She was a long time fan of the Abbot and Costello. So before I knew it, there she was in between Abbot and Costello, each in a French Foreign Legion uniform having their pictures taken. I could just see what a propagandist could do with that! So I immediately went to the P.R. man and asked him to kill all the pictures that had been taken for the benefit of maintaining good US-Pakistan relations and for the American film industry. She thanked me later because she also had come to the same realization, but had been so carried away by the glory of the moment that she had forgotten who she was.

We had a friendly atmosphere in Karachi in which to work. There was an interest in the US Our facilities were very limited. We were just beginning to learn about the pluses and minuses of information efforts. We learned that the projection of the US was not nearly as important as how US policy was received by the local population. In May 1948, when Israel was created, Pakistan, as a strong Muslim country, reacted very negatively. We had demonstrations in the streets in front of the Embassy. I was sent by the Ambassador to confront the demonstrators and to invite the leaders up to meet with the Ambassador. That was something that probably could not have been done in later years when demonstrations became more hostile and virulent. But in 1948, we were able to have a dialogue with the demonstrators. We had an imaginative administrative officer who sensed that the demonstrators might move to the residence. So we got the Pakistani police to move its kiosk from the residence to the front of the house occupied by the Parsi, who lived next to the Ambassador. Those were the days when things could be done more informally or imaginatively. But US support for Israel as well the perception that the US was not doing enough to get India out of Kashmir limited our influence in Pakistan, although I never encountered the open hostility that I experienced later in Iraq.

American policy towards anti-colonial revolutions was at that time very ambivalent. So it was not easy for us to detach ourselves totally from European powers and policies. We were supporting the re-entry of the Dutch into Indonesia, we were supporting the re-entry of the French into Indochina. North Africa had not yet become an issue, but there were some inklings of independence movements there. Washington liked to stress in this period, which I always felt was of dubious validity, was that we had been a colonial subject at one time and therefore we could sympathize easily with those who were still under the yoke. 1947 and 1948 were very much different from 1776. Our revolution was essentially one against members of the same race. In the post World War II period, race was a significant factor and American support for Europeans was viewed through that prism. There was a general recognition that Roosevelt had tried to convince Churchill to give independence to India, but whatever benefits we got from that
were tempered by some of our actions in the immediate post War period.

It is my recollection that it was a continuing effort to separate in people's minds from the US from the European colonial powers.

Q: The US was a country still in its segregation period. Did our treatment of the blacks get much Pakistan media attention?

NEWSOM: I don't remember that as being a major issue. We were dealing primarily with questions about US support for Israel, the US identification with colonial powers and the perception of a US more sympathetic to India than to Pakistan. Even the USSR's policies were not a major issue at the time.

Pakistan emerged as very sensitive to any comments around the world, including the US, about Islam. That was of course natural in light of its roots. Pakistan was the first country to try to awaken a Pan-Islamic fervor in the world. They sent Chabri Kalakiusiman on a mission to other Muslim countries in 1948 to try to create a Pan-Islamic movement which did not have a particularly anti-American cast.

Q: How was the Pakistan press during the late 40's? Was it open or as in many other parts of the country, was it "for sale" to the highest bidders?

NEWSOM: I think it was a good press. We had good relationships with it. In contrast to the problems I faced in Iraq later, it was a very satisfying experience. Haltap Hussein, the editor of the leading newspaper in Karachi, Dawn, and I became good friends. We didn't always see eye-to-eye and he would occasionally write bitter editorials critical of US actions, but our relationship was not affected. We would periodically be able to place some of our material in Pakistani newspaper. In those years, the press had not become as venal as it may have become later, certainly in other countries.

MERRITT N. COOTES  
Acting Principal Officer  
Lahore (1947-1949)  

Public Affairs Officer, USIS  
Karachi (1949-1951)

Born in Norfolk, VA, in 1909 to a military family, Merritt Cootes entered the Foreign Service in 1932 after graduating from Princeton with a degree in modern languages. During his long career he served in Port-au-Prince, Rome, Lisbon, Moscow, Lahore, Karachi, Lahore, Trieste, Algiers, Florence and San Marino. He was interviewed by Lillian Peters Mullin in September and October of 1991 and later in February 1993.
COOTES: So after two years in Moscow [1945-1947] I was transferred to Pakistan, where they were just envisaging the partition of India into India and Pakistan. We were going to open a Consulate in Lahore. [Mohammed Ali] Jinnah [the founder and first leader of Pakistan] wanted to have the capital in Lahore, because it was much more of a city than Karachi, which was a little fishing port with a population of about 250,000 people. However, Lahore was too close to what was to become the Indian border -- only 15 miles away from Amritsar [Punjab]. So Karachi was the capital. Later, of course, the capital was moved to Islamabad, near Rawalpindi. I opened the Consulate in Lahore. That was extremely interesting, because I was there for the last of the big migrations, with the Muslims moving over from India into Muslim Pakistan. The people involved in the migration movement passed by the former Christian College, which was run by the Presbyterians. It had long been in Lahore and was connected with Lahore University and run by an American married to the sister of the Condons. When the Hindus and Muslims in the Faculty at the university couldn't decide whom to appoint, they made this American the head of Lahore University, because he was neutral. When this last group of Muslims coming from India went by the former Christian College, it took eight hours for them to pass by in a column, four abreast and carrying their possessions on their heads.

Q: This was right on the route?


Q: They were coming from Amritsar?

COOTES: They were coming from Amritsar on their way to the airport. They put up tents for them out there. There were about one million of these Muslims settled out there. Then, of course, we had the threat of a cholera epidemic. So I had the doctor at the former Christian College come down and inoculate all of my servants. I only had 14 servants in those days. When he arrived with a suitcase full of the serum, I said, "My Lord, I've only got 14 servants. I'll have to have my wife go into the compound where the servants live, because the women are in purdah." My wife could go in there. I couldn't, but, of course, the doctor could. He inoculated 44 people in all.

Q: You didn't know you had that many people?

COOTES: I didn't know I had that many. I had 14 servants on the payroll, but...

Q: How many officers were assigned to the Consulate?

COOTES: There were three of us in Lahore at that time. Then, later on the Consul General, Hooker Doolittle, came. He was in Lahore for a time. Then our Ambassador in Karachi died of natural causes. The Department assigned Doolittle down to the Embassy and made him chargé d’affaires.

Q: Who was the Ambassador who died in Karachi?

COOTES: I think that his name was Barnes.
Q: *He was our first Ambassador to Pakistan, then?*

COOTES: He was the first American Ambassador to Pakistan. Maynard Barnes, I think his name was. As I say, he died, and then Hooker Doolittle moved from Lahore down to Karachi. By that time I had been transferred from Lahore to Karachi, so there I was with my old boss again. In Karachi we entertained Robert R. McCormick, the publisher of the CHICAGO TRIBUNE. On this occasion, when we had tea on the terrace, Hooker Doolittle was feeding the Myna birds. Mr. McCormick saw a bunch of sparrows come down and chase the Myna birds away. He commented, "This is Great Britain's contribution to civilization," referring to the sparrows.

It was very interesting to be in Pakistan during those formative years of the Pakistani Government. Under the British the whole Indian subcontinent was run by people who had graduated from British schools and had what they called the "Cambridge Certificate of Education." It amounted to a high school education. They were trained, but they were almost all Hindus. The Muslims were not particularly taught clerical skills. The success of Liaquat Ali Khan was to keep on all of these British who had been training government personnel, because they didn't have the clerical class which existed over in India. Then up in the Punjab, in Lahore, there was that wonderful race called the "Pathans." They are mountain people and they are somewhat reminiscent of our American Indians. Their skin color is not quite red, but it is not quite like the chocolate color of many Muslims. The color is more like "cafe au lait." The Pathans are erect and a very proud race, something like the Cossacks in Russia.

Q: *They're taller, too?*

COOTES: They're taller, and the men are very handsome. They are great fighters, of course. Their center is up in the Northwest Frontier area. Of course, the British never conquered Afghanistan. And when the Russians tried it, they weren't any more successful. They should have had better sense than to go in there.

I spent about a year and a half in Lahore and then almost two years in Karachi. Then I was transferred to Trieste [Italy].

I was loaned by the State Department to the Allied Military Government. You remember, after World War II President Truman felt that Trieste should be established as a Free Territory because it was partly occupied by the Yugoslavs and partly by the Italians. Most of us, although we were there, working for the Allied Military Government, were against the idea because we said, "This is going to be another Danzig." And you know what happened there. Danzig was partly responsible for the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

Q: *Before you went to Trieste, you were in Karachi until 1951?*

COOTES: About three and one-half years in Pakistan, altogether.

Q: *Were you doing administrative work in Lahore and then Karachi?*

COOTES: In Lahore I did a little of everything. For a time I was the only American there. I was
acting Principal Officer and did political reporting. Later on, I had a very, very competent Vice Consul, who did the administrative work of the Consulate. He had previously served in China and had a Chinese wife. There were three officers assigned to the Consulate in Lahore until the Consul General arrived. When we opened the Consulate in Lahore, when the area was still part of India, we had no one to perform the public affairs function. USIS [United States Information Service] kept sending us films, books, and so forth. But they hadn't picked out anybody to assign there to represent USIS. Wonderful films were being shipped up to the Consulate in Lahore. The Pakistanis all spoke English, liked films, but were a little browned off by the British films. When these American films became available, my wife and I learned how to run the projectors we had there. We'd have these gatherings at the Consulate to show these films. We were doing the public affairs job for the Consulate, just the two of us.

Then I was transferred down to Karachi as Public Affairs Officer. I held this job during the two years I was in Karachi.

Q: Were the Pakistanis happy with the partition?

COOTES: Well, they didn't like the idea of splitting the country up, although Mohammed Ali Jinnah said that he recognized perfectly well that, with the departure of the British, there would have to be a partition of the country between India and Pakistan. This created the anomaly of East Pakistan and West Pakistan, 2,000 miles apart. Well, you can't run a country like that and, of course, Bangladesh [the former East Pakistan] separated from Pakistan later on.

Many Pakistanis spoke English very well. They had their own accent, but they spoke English. They liked to continue with English. After all, that was the language of trade. So we really stepped in to fill, in part, the sense of satisfaction which the Muslim people of Pakistan derived from the English language. We Americans were very well regarded. They were all in favor of Americans and American aid. The funny part is that about five years after partition and the independence of Pakistan and a lot of British had left -- their businesses had been taken over by Pakistanis -- someone added things up and found that the British were doing more business with Pakistan as an independent country than they had when it was a British colony. They had overcome their feelings of resentment against their former masters, the British.

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**JAMES W.S. SPAIN**  
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS  
Karachi (1951-1953)  

Chargé d’Affaires  
Islamabad (1969)

*James W.S. Spain was born in Chicago in 1926 and at 18, entered the Army. After a year in Japan, Spain came back and graduated the University of Chicago with a Master’s Degree in 1949. He then entered the Foreign Service, later receiving his Doctorate from Columbia University. He has served in Istanbul, Ankara,*
Tanzania and Sri Lanka. The interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 31, 1995.

Q: You left that and went off to Columbia?

SPAIN: No, I came back to the U.S. I had passed the Foreign Service exam while at the University of Chicago. I was taken in in early 1951 and ended up being assigned as a vice consul in Lahore. The embassy was in Karachi. When I went through Karachi for my two days consultation, I called on the Ambassador. He announced that I was staying there. The ambassador, Avra Warren, threw across the table to me the Fulbright Agreement which was signed the week before and said, “Here, go do what this says!” I looked at it and said, “But, sir, this says there shall be established in Karachi a foundation consisting of...and I am the new vice consul for Lahore.” He said, “No you are not, you are taking over from Bolling. You are USIS.” John Bolling had had one more assignment than I did and I considered him a terribly knowledgeable and senior character. Then Warren added “I need Bolling for something important.”

Incidentally, the first one man USIS in Pakistan, before me, was Bowling and then was David Newsom.

Q: Hmmm! I am interviewing him again this afternoon.

SPAIN: I'd guess he was there 1947 to 1949. He was a one-man operation.

Q: You were in Pakistan from when to when?

SPAIN: 1951-53. This is when I got interested in the Pathans. I had been hooked on Kipling as a boy. I was not particularly fond of Karachi but when I got up to the Frontier, I found a great deal that was real. So willy-nilly, I ended up with the Pathans portfolio in the embassy.

Q: Pakistan was only 3 or 4 years old when you got there. As you saw it, what was the situation like?

SPAIN: Well, There was still a very distinct flavor of the Raj. It was the Royal Pakistan Army, the Royal Pakistan air force and Royal Pakistan navy. All of the commanders were British. It was during my time that the Pakistanis took over. There were a large number of British civilians still left, but they were gradually going. The refugee problem overwhelmed Karachi. It had been a fishing village of a couple hundred thousand people and by then it was probably a million and a half. It is now something like 12 million.

Manners were very British, at least among the educated upper classes. If you were invited out for anything, to a cocktail party, never mind a dinner, after 6:30 you wore a black tie and a white jacket. They were working terribly hard to establish a country with very few resources and enormous bitterness towards Hindu India, which, of course, felt the same way about Pakistan. Hardly anyone didn't have a relative or two killed in the massacres at the time of the partition. We used to debate in the embassy and Pakistanis whether this bitterness was going to grow or be
reduced as the generations went by. At this point all the people over 30 had had close and intimate personal relations with Hindus in the united India in the army or in the university, so they knew the advantages of being one. What was going to happen as the generations passed? My conclusion some 45 years later is that things haven’t changed very much.

Q: Our embassy was in Karachi at that point. Who was the ambassador and what was the embassy like?

SPAIN: It was on the second floor of a building down in the center of the town above an automobile showroom. There must have been about thirty people including dependents. There were only two children. One was Dave Schneider’s. Dave and Ann had a child about three months before we did, so there were two babies there. The Ambassador was Avra Warren, who had previously been Ambassador to Finland and subsequently Ambassador to Turkey. He was very much an old time classic Foreign Service officer who was from Maryland. He ate only wild meat and fish. He wore white duck suits, which he changed regularly, twice a day. He was very old style. But, he was a pretty competent character which I think I recognized even then. His emphasis was entirely on establishing good relations with the establishment. I recall Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, the last prime minister of undivided Bengal who didn’t come to Pakistan until 1951. He was considered very suspect by the ruling Muslim league because he had collaborated with Hindus. By accident my wife and I ran into him, at the only night club in Karachi. He loved to dance. He took to coming to our modest house and while the gramophone played, dancing with Edith. I finally went in to see the ambassador and said, “Hey, we have become really friendly with Suhrawardy,” His response was to the effect that that was the kind of stupid thing that I would do. "Don't you know that if the Governor General was to hear of this..." Then he changed his mind, and said, “Well, wait a minute, we are supposed to keep in contact with the opposition. However, don't ask me to have anything to do with this. If you want to go ahead, okay. If we get into trouble, I will just disown you.”

Q: Since doing these interviews I have found out that hearing how individuals operated while junior officers is often very interesting. They seem to have been able to get away with a lot more than they could as they rose through the ranks.

SPAIN: In my time most ambassadors looked at it very much that way. "Go ahead kids, have fun. "If you really get in trouble, I will disown you so and send you home!"

Q: Were you getting anything from him concerning Eastern Pakistan and the attitude there?

SPAIN: There was a vast difference between East and West Pakistan. It was recognized from the very beginning. All sorts of people had all sorts of explanations. They eat fish, we eat meat; they eat rice, we eat bread; they are short and dark and noisy; we are tall and light and taciturn. There were gestures to try and bring the two wings together. The first president, still called the governor general, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan, were very much from the West. After Jinnah died, which happened a year before I got there, they brought in an East Pakistani as a governor general. Everyone was aware of the problem, but at that point that very few people ever thought of the possibility that the country would break up.
Q: What about the attitude of the embassy as you saw it? Were you reading reports from our embassy in New Delhi? Did you feel sort of like country cousins or unappreciated?

SPAIN: I, of course, was pretty much at the bottom of the heap and for a good part of the time I was at USIS and didn't see the cables. However, my wife's cousin was married to a chap in the embassy in New Delhi, Lewis Lind, the commercial attaché. In those days the plane that brought you from Karachi to Dacca was a DC-3, later a Convair. Karachi-Jaipur-Jodhpur-New Delhi-Calcutta-Dacca took about 14 hours. I had to go to Dacca on USIS business periodically. Edith would come with me and get off at New Delhi to spend a couple of days with her relatives. I would do whatever I had to in Dacca and pick her up on the return trip. On one of those trips, Lewis Lind said that he mentioned to his ambassador that his cousin from West Pakistan was here and he asked if I would be good enough to give him an hour of my time. This was Chester Bowles on his first assignment. I went to see him. He treated me as an equal, asking "if we did this, could you do that?". Bowles and Warren were simply at daggers drawn. Washington would send out something or Washington would have a spokesman say something. Then there would be two exactly opposing cables coming in from New Delhi and Karachi. Although there was some talk, there really wasn't much effort to look at a joint US policy in South Asia, not in the two embassies at least.

Q: What about your work with USIS? What were you doing?

SPAIN: The main thing, which took me the better part of a year, was setting up the Fulbright foundation. This turned out to have some advantages because while I was at the bottom of the heap in the embassy, the Fulbright foundation had its own budget. If I wanted to go up to Peshawar to talk to the university about what kind of professors they wanted next year, etc., I had Fulbright travel money.

I started as a one man USIS, but about a year later USIS had some 25 people, of which I was the lowest ranking. I worked in the cultural field. There was the occasional speech. The office, for most of the time was in the library and I had responsibility managing every couple of weeks the speech presentation by visiting American specialists.

Q: How did you find the attitude of the academic world of Pakistan towards the United States? After all, very obviously, the orientation was towards great Britain as home. Was this a tough nut to crack or were they kind of looking to get away from that?

SPAIN: The younger people I found were particularly eager to get away from it. The old establishment was not unadmiring. Everybody had great expectations of the United States. In their simplest form these centered on the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan was sure we would take its side, and, of course, India felt the same way.

I recall the chairman of the Fulbright Foundation, a marvelous man who had be vice chancellor of Punjab university and was chairman of the public service commission, Mian Afzal Hussein, a very benevolent character. His daughter was at Clark University in graduate school in geography. We started getting an increasing number of young Pakistanis, really Indian Muslims, who had gone off to the US before partition and were coming home. There was a very rigid list
of approved universities for a government or teaching job and there wasn't a single American university on it. They would come and say we had to something about this.

So, I talked with Mian Sahib, who was in a position to do something. He listened patiently and said, “I tell you what. We have a number of British universities -- Oxford, Cambridge, Leeds, London, etc. -- on the approved list. You bring me back four American universities and I will put them on the approved list. Maybe we can put more on later.” I went out of the office with joy feeling this was quite a break through. I sat down and began to realize that I couldn't put down Harvard and not Yale, or Chicago and not California. So, I talked to some of my colleagues and went back. "This is a generous offer of yours, but we can't do it.” Eventually they loosened up restrictions, and as far as I know by the mid to late 1950s, graduates from American universities were not restricted.

Q: Did you have a feel about what American policy was towards Pakistan and what was in it for us at that time?

SPAIN: Not much while I was there. I gathered from reading later that the very beginnings of the alliance were being discussed.

Q: You are talking about CENTO?

SPAIN: After the Dulles speech of 1953, “The Northern Tier” became the Baghdad Pact and then CENTO. But there was no military or USAID or its equivalent. Pakistan’s attitude in terms of Cold War issues was pretty much the same as India’s. It was after I left that the Pakistan-American alliance was forged.

I recall one issue, that I had nothing to do with, but I knew Warren was working on at the time. The US wanted Pakistan to send troops to Korea. The argument was that if you really want to get in bed with the US and get all those lovely hardware goodies, you ought to prove your good intentions now. They never did send any troops to Korea.

Q: It is interesting that they didn't. Turkey did, Ethiopia did. I would have thought Pakistan with both its military tradition and being one up on the Indians might have done that.

SPAIN: That's logical. If I hadn't been there and wasn't familiar with the events from 1951-54, I would share the opinion questions. But in 1952 in terms of world affairs and such issues as Korea and the gestating Cold War, Pakistanis at all levels were just as neutral as the Indians.

Q: You were there until 1953?

SPAIN: The summer of 1953. By then I had gotten very interested in the Pathans. I tried to get the Department to send me to the University of Pennsylvania, where there was a South Asia study program. Instead I was told me to go off to my next assignment which was to be a consular officer in Caracas. I had no Spanish and not much interest in consular work, so I quit and got one of the first year Ford Foundation Foreign Area Fellowships. I went to Columbia and spent the 1953-54 academic year there, mostly reading up on Islam, and central Asia and the Pathans.
used the Ford grant to go off the second year to spend several months in London and then several months in Pakistan-Afghanistan and then came back to Columbia. I got everything but the dissertation completed. Like most American university students I could read French fairly well and had no problem with the graduate examination. You had to have two languages and I didn't have a trace of any other language. The prospect of having to learn a whole new language from scratch to qualify for a doctorate was daunting. A kindly secretary in the public law and government department discovered that Latin was still on the list of approved languages for public law and government. The Jesuits had beaten a certain amount of Latin and Greek into me. The first time Columbia set up the exam in the classics department and I couldn't read the classic Latin. I said that there must be some mistake. I didn't want classic Latin, I wanted medieval Latin. They scurried around and sent me over to the history department where some young man, who I don't think knew what it was all about, gave me a copy of the Gesta Romanorum, the medieval fairy tales. That went pretty well, so my second language for a degree in comparative government and a dissertation about the Pathans was Latin.

Q: When you talk about the Pathans, who were they?

SPAIN: Pathan is a British colonial word. The people call themselves Pashtuns or Pakhtuns or Afghans. I suppose the most accurate word is Afghan, but the trouble with that is that there are a lot of Afghan nationals who are not Pathan. There are about 8-10 million Pathans in Pakistan along the North-West Frontier and another 6-8 million in Afghanistan. They emerged in history in Mogul days. The Moguls kept great history. The language, Pushtu, is more Iranian than anything else, but it is quite different from Persian or Dari, the Afghan Farsi. They were warrior tribes in part because they have always lived in those rocky hills that separate Pakistan from Afghanistan and there wasn't anything to do there other than to raid the fertile flatlands and fight each other. This is what the tribes were doing when the Muslim conquerors Mahmud of Ghazni and Mohammad Ghori swept down from Central Asia in the tenth and eleventh centuries. There is an interestingly highly developed literature and poetry, some of which is very good, although in such a language like Pushu it is not easy to get at it. And a very highly developed code of law, called Pukhtunwali, which translates "the way of the Pathans." This is built around two concepts that are coming back into vogue. One is the rights of the victim and the other one is the collective responsibility. So when somebody kills another and is tried by a jury of his people, it is not did he kill him or did he not, was it malicious, manslaughter or first degree, it is what can be done for the family of the person who had been killed. And it is assumed that the tribe from which the criminal comes shares his guilt to some degree. Kipling's most famous ballad, "East is East and West is West," etc., is set there. It is a romantic tribal society that has been able to maintain itself.

Q: I imagine there wasn't much at Columbia on this grouping.

SPAIN: That's right. What was there was Islam, about which I knew nothing and looms large in their lives, and Central Asia and a surprising amount of 19th century travelers' books. On the Pathans, as such, there was very little, so I spent three or four months at the India Office library and at the British Museum in London, where there was, of course, an enormous amount of stuff. I also visited Oxford and Cambridge to pick brains there.
Q: When you got your doctorate degree, what was your dissertation on?

SPAIN: It subsequently came out in as a book called The Pathan Borderland. It was comparative government, comparison of British and Pakistani administration on the frontier from basically a political science, not an anthropological or an orientalist standpoint. I never really learned Pushtu well.

Q: When you finished up at Columbia, what happened?

SPAIN: My initial intention was to be an academic. Some of the people who were there at the time -- Schuyler Wallace, Lindsey Rogers, and Jay Hurowitz, encouraged me to go that route. But, I decided that I preferred “doing” to “teaching.” So, I came back down to Washington to try to get back into the Foreign Service. The personnel people, of course, laughed at me asking why I quit in the first place. This was the late 1950s. Having left the Foreign Service was the equivalent of a nun jumping over the wall. You were damned forever.

I had come down two or three times from Columbia. At one point word somehow got to a fellow named Bob Amory, who was then the deputy director of CIA, that there was a South Asian, specifically an Afghan expert, in town looking for a job. I was picked up by a couple of characters in a car in front of the old INR building who talked to me. The result was that I could go on the payroll next Monday. It would take five to six months to get clearance and I could spend that time down in the Library of Congress working on my dissertation. All of this was too secret to even tell me what I was going to be doing. It turned out to be totally innocuous, the equivalent of INR, drafting national estimates. I spent six years there. I learned to write.

Harvard Professor Bill Langer was the first director of the office. Sherman Kent from Yale was the second with Bill Bundy as his deputy.

Q: From Columbia.

SPAIN: We lived first out in Annandale and later in a house in Woodley Park in the District, which we kept until a few years ago. This was an interesting job, better in my view than teaching. But, I really wanted to go back to the Foreign Service.

An exchange program between the Office of National Estimates and the State Department Policy Planning Council was set up just after the Kennedy Administration came into power, in 1961. George McGhee was Chairman of the Council. I had met him in the days when I first went to Karachi in 1951. At that time even the newest and lowest had an hour with the assistant secretary. (McGhee was NEA in the Truman administration.) I came to the Council, still on the CIA payroll. At the end of about a year and a half, the Agency was eager to get someone in my slot. In the meantime, George McGhee had gone off as Ambassador to Germany and Walt Rostow had taken over the Council. Roger Hilsman was running INR and he heard that there was this guy on the Policy Planning Council who knew about the Middle East and was looking for a more lasting job. I ended up as director of RNA, the Near East and South Asia office of INR. Pretty soon Hilsman went to the Far East Bureau and Tom Hughes took over INR. I spent two-
and-a-half or three years there.

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Q: You left there in 1969, where to?

SPAIN: I went to Pakistan as Chargé. I had become sort of Mr. Pakistan in the foreign affairs community. Nixon had sent former Senator Keating to India and he had plans for some political figure to go to Pakistan. His ties and preferences were much for Pakistan because during his years in the wilderness when he visited India, they sort of spit all over him not paying any attention to him, but he was treated royally in Pakistan. Keating had been in place for several months and whatever the White House had in mind for Pakistan, that person was delayed. My time was practically up in NEA having been there for three years, and Joe Sisco was coming in and cleaning everything out and reestablishing his own order, so by mutual consent Joe Sisco let it be known that he would be happy to see the back of me. I didn't like Joe as I had Battle and Hart, so it all came together. The Pakistanis were making noises that they weren't getting an ambassador, so Joe suggested I, Mr. Pakistan, be sent there as Chargé. I served for less than six months. Then they dug up Joe Farland, who was a Republican political appointee. I came back.

The Kissinger NSC staff was working on something it called program analysis, a quantitative approach to foreign affairs. One of the subjects was Turkey. I knew very little about Turkey having merely visited there and learning a little in INR. But we put together an interagency group of seven or eight to do an analysis on Turkey. It was very interesting. We compared the costs per soldier on the Turkish front with the costs on the central European front. We had several intercept stations in Turkey and we tried to assess their value. If the Turkish intercept stations produced ten thousand pieces of information a day and the cost of operating them was $100,000, you were paying $10 a bite. That didn't seem bad. But if you took that same ten thousand pieces of information and looked at how many of them ever had any impact on another level, even just being published in somebody’s bulletin, and the number drops to a hundred, each one costs $1000.

When that was finished, the personnel people came up with an assignment as DCM in Tehran. I had no reason to be unhappy with that, except that Douglas MacArthur was there, whom I had never met in my life, but had heard a great deal about.

WILLIAM J. CROCKETT
Administrative Officer
Karachi (1952-1954)

Born in western Kansas in 1914 on a farm, west of Dodge City, Kansas, William J. Crockett graduated from the University of Kansas in 1942 before going to the World War II. After joining the Foreign Service in 1952, he served in Karachi, Rome and was Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on June 20-22, 1990.
Q: So in 1953, you were assigned as administrative officer to our Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan. What did you know about State Department administrative practices?

CROCKETT: Nothing. I had home leave between the Beirut and Karachi assignments, but I didn't see anybody in the Department. I didn't see the country desk officer or anyone in the administrative area. I didn't see anybody or know anything when I left for Karachi. I was so naive. I didn't even know that when transfer orders were issued that it included authorization for transfer of personal effects -- cars, furniture, personal effects -- as well. The only person I knew at all was Henry Ford, who was the Executive Director for the Bureau of Near East Affairs. I had met Ford in Lebanon, as I mentioned earlier. But I didn't see him either. As a matter of fact, I don't think on that home leave that I even went through Washington. As I recall it, I went from Beirut directly to Hastings and then to Karachi.

Q: Who was your supervisor in the Embassy?

CROCKETT: John Emmerson became the DCM soon after I arrived. He was a part of a whole new top team which arrived about four months after I arrived. At about the same time, a new military assistance program was initiated. We also got a new AID director and an greatly expanded assistance program. So this put me one the other side of the fence that I had been in Beirut. I was now responsible for the administrative support to all the other agencies.

Q: What size staff did you have when you got to Karachi?

CROCKETT: There were three Americans in addition to myself. It was a very small Embassy. We had a personnel officer, a procurement officer and a general services officer. We had about ten local personnel. So it was a small administrative section in a small Embassy. But about four months after my arrival, the situation changed dramatically. The American representation in Karachi increased by leaps and bounds as I have mentioned. Having been on the receiving end of Embassy administrative support in Beirut, one of the first things I did was to brief the new Ambassador on the opportunities, the challenges and responsibilities we had for supporting these new American programs. This helped him to focus on how the Embassy staff should behave towards the newcomers. He was very supportive of our efforts to cooperate. I viewed as one of my primary responsibilities, right from the outst, to integrate the new arrivals into the Embassy family to avoid their feelings that they were "outsiders". I talked to the Ambassador about including them in Embassy functions and about including the AID Director in Embassy staff meetings; we made all possible efforts to make the new people part of the whole U.S. effort in Pakistan. The AID administrative officer was Pittman, a wheeler and dealer, but we quickly agreed on the administrative support arrangements. He saw that we were interested in supporting his program and he quickly decided that he would help to provide the necessary resources. Even though the agencies were split in Washington, we got close cooperation locally. AID was very helpful in providing certain resources that just were not available to the Embassy. For example, it was through their assistance that we managed to start an American School in Karachi -- there had not been any kind of English speaking school until then. So thanks to some TCA funds, we converted a building into a school house so that American children and children of other diplomatic families would have a place to obtain and education locally.
The Embassy itself did not grow very much during this period, except for the administrative section. CIA may have grown and there may have been some intelligence officers among the new AID personnel. This was the beginning of a new, closer relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistanis seemed to welcome this new American interest. We were received well; many may have thought that we had the magic potion to cure the local ills. The Government was very friendly. Our Ambassador had very good relations with governmental officials. So our assistance programs got off to a very good start. One of the attractive features for Pakistan of that assistance program was the military aid part of it. They liked that; they supported it ardently and sort of suffered the rest of the assistance as a necessary adjunct. As in Lebanon, the assistance package include aid for rural development.

Q: With military assistance programs normally come large numbers of American military personnel. Was that true in Pakistan as well?

CROCKETT: Yes. But from the beginning, we tried very hard to provide what they needed with administrative support. They also had an administrative officer with whom we dealt closely. I think we had something to offer them and they accepted that. They were happy to be part of a homogeneous American presence and not be separate and apart. So they readily accepted the concept of Embassy administrative support. In many other countries, I suspect, the fig leaf of Embassy administrative support was maintained while underneath, the various groups operated on their own, competing with each other.

Q: Did this spirit of cooperation in administrative matters extend to the substantive side as well? Did the MAAG chief speak to the Political Counselor or the TCA Mission Director to the Economic Counselor?

CROCKETT: I think the Ambassador caused much of that to happen at least formally on a weekly basis. My experience has been that when the picayune things of administration are solved then the people will work together more cooperatively in the substantive areas.

Q: Do you recall any particular problems you had in this mushrooming administrative support effort that you were directing?

CROCKETT: Many of our problems were resolved through the generosity and cooperation of the agencies we supported. We did have a traumatic experience in the year after my arrival. Truman had left office and Eisenhower had become President. Dulles took over as Secretary of State and as you'll remember imposed a dramatic reduction-in-force in the Department soon after taking office. This effected some of my staff who were forced to leave. I later discovered that I was just above the RIF line myself; so this was a rather traumatic experience for all of us and caused some problems for us.

Q: Was housing adequate in Karachi?

CROCKETT: Never, but we stimulated a housing construction program in Karachi. Some enterprising Pakistanis, recognizing the need, began to build housing for the Americans which
they rented to us on a long-term basis, at exorbitant prices. This of course drove up the rental costs in the whole city because we had the allowances and could afford the increased costs. This generated a small construction boom which produced several poorly constructed structures.

There were two other problems in Karachi: one, Karachi had a very poor population, some of which supported itself by robbing American homes. We therefore had to hire and maintain a guard force. We posted guards at every home and then had to hire people to keep the guards awake. Some thought that the employment of the guards guaranteed that the homes would not be robbed because the guards would bribe the thieves to stay away. The other problem stemmed from the number of homeless people in Karachi, who if they saw a vacant wall would put a lean-to against it and become squatters. Once the lean-to was in place, the authorities would not remove them. So we had to have a surveillance crew which went around to all the homes and compounds to knock the sticks down before they actually turned into lean-tos. It was dreadful time; Karachi was filled with refugees who had been forced from their homes by the separation of Pakistan from India. These refugees were homeless and no means of support, no sanitation, no water. It was a dreadful time for these people.

Water was always in short supply. We had to boil our water. We had no screens for the windows that had to be left open because we had no air conditioning. So our living conditions left something to be desired. But thanks to TCA, we managed to import some air conditioners and got some screens. It became an assistance program to the Americans as well as the Pakistanis. These are actions you take outside bureaucratic channels which you could not do if you followed "the book" or the regulations. Such actions, although perhaps extraordinary, are necessary to increase morale and productivity for the whole American presence. The other alternative is to make these items available only to the people of organizations that have the resources, thereby creating tensions and invidious comparisons in the American community. You can be passive on one hand and not do much, or collaborate and share and cause good things to happen for everybody if you are willing to be what I call "a broad Constructionist Administration" -- i.e. you can do anything that is not specifically prohibited by regulations! Regulations bind administrators and are a burden to everyone.

Q: Since this was your first inside contact with the Department's administrative operations, do you remember whether you had any frustrations?

CROCKETT: The main frustration was the lack of Departmental understanding. So I soon learned not to ask. I did what I thought was required and necessary by a situation. I asked for money and tried to get that, but I didn't ask for guidance. I remember the time when one of our secretaries became pregnant after an association with a Pakistani man. She didn't want the child nor was she interested in a permanent relationship with the man. But the Embassy nurse checked with Washington and there was nothing that Washington would let us do. She couldn't even be returned to the United States. The Department would not condone an abortion. One evening, the head of the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital came to my home and told me that we had a pregnant woman in the Embassy. He said that his hospital could not perform an abortion, but that he knew of a local doctor who would perform the abortion. He added that after the abortion was performed, they would take our secretary into the hospital. He said that he knew that the woman didn't want the child. He also said that if he were the father of the woman, he would be pleased if
something were done to relieve her of her burden. So I caused that to happen. That is the kind of assistance I like to provide people; I did not worry that I stuck my neck out to do this. I was more interested in the welfare of the human being than in the Department and its regulations. I don't say this entirely with pride because I am sure that no large organization can tolerate too much of this of independence. If everyone behaved as I did, you would have chaos. So I don't recommend my approach to anybody else, but it was me.

ROY O. CARLSON
Vice Consul
Dacca (1953-1954)

Born in 192 in Illinois, Roy O. Carlson graduated from Boston University in 1944 and received his Master's degree from University of Chicago in 1951. He served in the U.S. Army during the World War II and later joined the Foreign Service in 1952 until his retirement in 1978. During his service, he was posted in Dacca, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Stuttgart. He was interviewed by Michael Springmann in January 14, 1993.

Q: You were in India, Scandinavia, Germany and the Department.

CARLSON: Yes. Pakistan rather than India. It was East Pakistan at the time and is now Bangladesh.

Q: You were in Dacca right after partition and within five or six years of partition.

CARLSON: Yes. We got there about five years after partition. We had only a small consulate, basically the consul, vice consul, (I was the vice consul) and a clerk-steno; plus a small USIS group with a library; plus the beginnings of an aid program which was then called the Foreign Operations Administration. As vice consul I was also admin officer. As a result I spent most of my time, (because the other agencies, USIS and FOA were growing so rapidly) I spent most of my time as a real estate agent and purchaser of furniture and expediter of shipping things in, not shipping things out because nobody had been there long enough to be shipped out.

It was a fascinating time politically because the Bengalis were trying to sort things out after partition.

Q: What is mine is mine, and what is India's is India's and it is in the middle that we had a foot in both worlds?

CARLSON: Bengal had a particular problem because when you see Yugoslavia you think of this right away...the Hindus and the Muslims were interspersed. They didn't live in separate areas. So when Mountbatten drew his line partitioning Bengal into two halves, this entity that was East Pakistan was about 60 percent Muslim and 40 percent Hindu. After the riots and migrations connected with partition were over, it ended up being about 80 percent Muslim and 20 percent...
Hindu. They accommodated that by having...even though people lived together, politics were separate. Certain seats in the parliament were allocated to Hindus and the rest to the Muslim parties of which there were several. There was even a small set-aside for Christians and Buddhists, maybe 1 percent.

The parliament was the remnants of the old parliament of the undivided Bengal. While we were there they had their first real election. There was a lot of speculation about how this would work out because the illiteracy rate was so high. But they conducted what seemed to us to be a fair election. It was so fair that the Muslim League, which was in power at the time, was voted out by 20 to 1. That is, out of 200 seats, they were left with only ten. In many of the districts the proportion literally was 20 to 1 against them. So they had a new government made up of diverse elements opposed to the Muslim League. Now some of these were very old politicians like Suhrawardy, Bashani, and Fazlul Hug, big names in prepartition Bengal. After about three months in office there were bad riots. Jute mill riots. Riots in the Chittagong hills. The central government imposed governor's rule and sent over General Mirza to rule the country.

Q: What sort of riots? Basically dissatisfaction with the economic situation?

CARLSON: No, I was at the Adamjee Jute Mill outside of Narayanganj about three days before the riot. There was a lot of commotion going on. I had a very smart Calcutta man, Hamid, who was my driver and he said to me while we were touring the plant, "Boss, let's get out of here. I don't like what I am hearing." And three days later they killed about 500 of each other. It was rioting between the local people and outsiders that they called Biharis. The "Biharis" weren't from Bihar at all, they were simply other people from elsewhere in Bengal who had come to the mills to work. But it was me against you. They were all Muslim. While I was there, there was no overt Muslim/Hindu problem; that only came during the revolution in 1971.

Q: You did reporting on this I imagine. Did Washington accept what you were telling them or was there this clientism...we don't like what you are telling us; we don't want the unvarnished truth; we want what sounds good and makes the Pakistanis look good?

CARLSON: There was a special problem, I think, in that the Embassy was located in Karachi and the attitude of the officers at the Embassy tended to reflect the attitude of the West Pakistanis, not the Bengalis. I thought this was unfortunate. In fact I once recommended that it might be a good idea for anybody who was going to be assigned to Karachi to perhaps spend a year in Bengal in order to get the other perspective. It was never done. I suppose the administrative costs and problems are too great, but I think it would have stood the Department in very good stead when the revolution came in 1971.

As far as what happened back in Washington, I can't tell you. I spent my first 12 years in the field. My only impression when I came back from my time in Dacca was that the people in the medical division were especially interested to meet me because I had sent reports in on the incidence of cholera in Bengal.

In the last half year I was in Pakistan, I was kicked upstairs into a new job as political/economic officer. That was when the post was expanding and became a Consulate General. I can't tell you
what the Department thought of my work. I do know that certain reports which I later sent in from Stockholm and Copenhagen were appreciated: I heard people say that, people in INR and on the desk. On the other hand, once dropping into the country desk, I was sort of surprised to see, for example, the way the weekly economic review was handled. It seemed to me that nobody really read it. A secretary just took it, clipped out the items and pasted them on a piece of paper and filed them. Again, I am at a disadvantage in answering your question because I never worked on a country desk.

Q: Would you comment on the effectiveness of the staff? Americans and locals at your various posts. Were they working all towards the same goal, or was it, "I want to be a super star and won't cooperate with you, but will do what I want to do?"

CARLSON: A very difficult question to answer as in different posts you get different people with different objectives. It was quite clear that in one of my posts the principal officer was looking out for himself. He was looking out for his own advancement, which he never got, and his own advantage. Luckily, he was replaced with a prince of a fellow who was really looking out for the welfare of the post and the people working there.

Q: I was once talking to the political counselor in Delhi. He had said something that I found rather interesting and I sort of try to apply it wherever I might be. He said that each post takes on about 60 percent of the characteristics of the host country.

CARLSON: Now there is a point to that. As always there is this problem of whether our people in a country are going to be advocates for that country or against that country. My guess is that as a general rule, political officers tend, by the nature of their function, to become advocates of the country that they are serving in, to present the views of that country. Economic officers perhaps less so because they generally have to vent particular grievances at the Foreign Ministry and elsewhere. Perhaps because of these different functions the attitudes are different. Does that make sense?

Q: Yes, it does. When you served in various countries were there any particular issues that the US had with Pakistan, Germany, and the Scandinavian posts?

CARLSON: Well, my knowledge would be mostly limited to the Scandinavian countries because in Germany and Pakistan I was in the consulates. But in the Scandinavian countries I was involved in all the economic issues, and most of our problems with the Scandinavian countries were economic. We were involved in the "sandwich war." The "sandwich war" came in 1960 when the airlines introduced the 707. In order to fill the 707 flights they started tourist class and they agreed that they would only serve sandwiches in tourist class. Well, sandwiches to an American airline meant slapping a piece of cheese or ham between two slices of bread. But to SAS it meant those elaborate Danish open-faced sandwiches. Immediately the American airlines charged SAS with unfair practices because they were serving these wonderful sandwiches in tourist class. That sort of thing.

But to more serious things. We always had shipping problems with the Scandinavians. They, themselves, have some of the same problems now, but then because of a history basically of
union practices over here we had reached the point where most American ships were not flying American flags. They were flying flags of convenience, thereby paying lower wages. Whereas the Scandinavians were still flying their own flags and paying their own crews higher wages. This was a bone of contention.

Also at that time we had lots and lots of aid shipments going abroad. For the most part they were supposed to go on American bottoms and the Scandinavians wanted part of the action.

Q: In your various posts you went from the early fifties when State was pretty much the only foreign affairs agency represented abroad, and at the end there was USIS, Army Intelligence, CIA, Commerce, etc. How effective did you think this expansion of the foreign affairs community was? Was it easier to get things done when State alone was running the show?

CARLSON: This development had already begun when I came in in 1953. So when I was out in Dacca, for example, our biggest agencies were USIS and FOA. They already dwarfed the consulate, itself, at that time. CIA was out there too. In fact I had a hard time explaining to my wife why another "vice-consul" seemed to live so much better than we did.

Q: Did these agencies bring anything to the new order or were they kind of bureaucratic agencies fighting for their own turf only cooperating when it was in their own interests?

CARLSON: When I went out to Dacca we had joint administrative services, so as administrative officer I was doing as much for USIS and FOA as I was the consulate, if not more, due to their larger contingents who also traveled a lot more. I think I may have learned as much about the country in Bengal from my colleagues in USIS and particularly in FOA than I learned at first hand, because by the nature of their work they got all over the province all of the time, whereas, given the amount of the money we had for the consulate, I seldom could get out. Of course the USIS people had all of their usual university, academic community contacts.

Q: How extensive was the CIA presence? Up until I went to Jeddah, as visa officer, I was under the impression that the CIA was represented abroad, but that there were a few people at the embassy and a couple in the consulate. In Jeddah, two-thirds of the people who claimed to work for the Department of State didn't. It was an intelligence community post and not a Foreign Service post. I was just thunderstruck and still can't grasp it. Has CIA gradually expanded its presence, or was there one period when they grew like Topsy?

CARLSON: I don't think we had anything like that degree of CIA presence in Bengal or in Stockholm and Copenhagen. Just a few people under cover of the consulate or embassy. Whatever they had beyond that I don't know. By the way, in all of the posts I worked rather closely with a number of the CIA people and very amicably, particularly on economic matters.

Now, to go back to Dacca. When we were in Dacca, Shaheed Suhrawardy, who had been one of the great political leaders of Bengal before partition...in fact if you look at films about Gandhi you will always see Gandhi meeting with Suhrawardy in Calcutta and trying to put down the riots. Suhrawardy was a politician out of power, but the Embassy wanted us to maintain good relations with him because he was still potentially powerful. We became very close friends. My
wife still has old Christmas cards from him signed Shaheed. He liked pretty women, and after we left Dacca he did become prime minister of Pakistan. Working on the general social level we had ready access to him. In fact we were with him on the evening when important elections returns were coming in.

Q: *What was your general impression of him? How effective was he and what kind of power base did he have?*

CARLSON: Well, Pakistan was a strange country at that time. You know India. India is really a continent. It is more diverse than Europe. Here were these Bengalis, Sundis, Punjabis, all thrown together, separated by 1500 miles, speaking different languages. Joined together only because they tended to be Muslims under the old British India. Suhrawardy was a political power in Bengal, among several other political powers. A clever man. As all good politicians his scruples were not always of the highest. But he was able to become Prime Minister of Pakistan even if only for a couple of years, and for a Bengali that took remarkable political skills.

Pakistan basically broke down in 1971 when Bhutto in the West and Mujib in the East couldn't solve their political differences. It was a tragedy. But it was due to politicians who were not good politicians in the sense of being able to come to some accommodation. The result was that you had the revolution, the civil war, with all of the attendant hardships. So I would say from that point of view Suhrawardy was a "good" politician. He was able to effect coalition government.

**EDWARD E. MASTERS**  
**Political Officer**  
**Karachi (1953-1954)**

*Born in Ohio in 1924, Ambassador Edward E. Masters received his bachelor’s degree from George Washington University and went on to do his post-graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He earned his graduate degree in 1949 and joined the Foreign Service the same year. His posts took him to Frankfurt, Karachi, Madras, and Djakarta. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 14, 1989.*

Q: *Well, then you had a series of assignments: you were in Karachi, as a political officer, from '53 to '54; then you went to Hindi training for a year; and then to Madras as a political officer, from '55 to '58. Sort of to lump these together, what were your most significant experiences that you had while you were in the subcontinent there?*

MASTERS: That goes back a long time. But, I suppose, the most significant thing in Karachi was the visit of Richard Nixon, who was then vice-president. And the move toward the formation of both SEATO and CENTO. These were the days when we thought neutrality was immoral -- everybody should sign up. And Pakistan -- this was while I was in Pakistan -- Pakistan was the pivotal country linking SEATO, which was basically Southeast Asia, and CENTO, which was basically the Middle East or the Near East. So we played a key role in
Pakistan, in moving the government of Pakistan, at that time, toward joining these organizations.

Q: Let me ask a question, because in some accounts the story is that the British insisted on putting India into SEATO, with the United States being very reluctant about it. And then they said, "Well, god, if we had to have India in, we've got to throw Pakistan in." And even though they knew India might not accept -- which it didn't -- Pakistan jumped at the choice. But coming from your particular point of view, the embassy thought this was a good idea?

MASTERS: Yes. Yes, that was the position at the time. As far as I know, everybody in the embassy supported it. I don't recall having heard any dissent.

On your point, I don't remember that any of us in the embassy thought there was a snowball's chance of India joining. India was already moving pretty far left, at that point, and was very critical of the United States. And we were critical of India, for that matter. I would have thought that -- from the U.S. standpoint -- getting Pakistan was more a way to outflank India, to try to counterbalance India, than to try to get India in.

And, also, as I say, to link the two organizations -- SEATO and CENTO. Of course, Pakistan was the only country that was in both of them. It was the bridge between the two.

Q: What was your impression in Karachi? I mean, this was your first real Foreign Service -- sort of line Foreign Service assignment. You were in an interesting country, at an interesting time. How did you feel the embassy operated -- Foreign Service (inaudible)?

MASTERS: One of the very dramatic points was the lack of money. I was one of several political officers, and we had virtually no money to travel. I remember a particular problem: Pakistan was having elections -- I'm not sure whether this was '53 or '54. It was probably '53. The Moslem League was the party in power. It had gotten Pakistan its independence, it was a party of Jinnah, and everybody assumed that it would be continued in power.

At that point, of course, Pakistan included both the east wing and the western part of the country. So we in the embassy were assessing the prospects for the Moslem League -- for the government in power -- in these elections for the whole nation. But we had no money to go to East Bengal. We had a consulate in East Bengal; we did get the benefit of their reporting. But the people in the embassy in Karachi, who were putting this all together and making the final judgment, never were able to go to East Bengal, because of the shortage of travel funds.

Now, that may be rationalization on my part, but anyhow, the net effect was we totally mispredicted the elections. The Moslem League instead of being returned to the majority, came back in a minority status. They were virtually wiped out in East Bengal. And, of course, that changed the whole political context.

JOHN O. BELL
Chief of U.S. Operations Mission, ICA
Karachi (1955-1957)

John O. Bell was born in 1912 and attended George Washington University as an undergraduate where he later received a law degree. He started his career at the State Department at age 19. Upon joining the Foreign Service, he served in Copenhagen, Karachi, and Guatemala among others. Arthur L. Lowrie interviewed him on June 17, 1988.

Q: To continue in a chronological way, after Denmark I believe you went straight to Pakistan?

BELL: I went to Pakistan after about four months in Washington, but I was due to go to Pakistan all the time. I was just held up for some extra work.

Q: As Deputy Chief of Mission?

BELL: I was originally assigned by the State Department to go to Pakistan as Deputy Chief of Mission. I was advised of that when I was in Copenhagen. Before I left Copenhagen I got a call from MSA in Washington asking me if I would be willing to be Chief of the U.S. Operations Mission in Pakistan; they told me that the State Department had already agreed to that. I said, well, I hadn't heard anything from the State Department to that effect. I wasn't sure about it. I had both jobs in Copenhagen and I thought maybe you could do that in Pakistan. It was left in the air until I came back to Washington. I came back to Washington and Jack Jernegan, then Deputy Assistant Secretary in Near Eastern Division, was very clear that it wasn't in any way practical for what they had in Pakistan. I wasn't at all sure that I wanted to go as Director of the US Operations Mission.

I went to see Harold Stassen who was in charge of ICA, with whom I had had a considerable series of arguments when I was in Copenhagen. I was trying to close the Mission before he wanted to close it. We also had some arguments about the implementation of the Battle Act. Anyway, I went to see Stassen and I said, I don't need this job. I'm in the Foreign Service and I don't need a job with ICA. I know that, he said. I said, I'm a Democrat not a Republican. He said, I know that. I said, well I've tried to close the Mission in Copenhagen when you wanted it left open. He said, I know that. He said, I want you to go there. He wanted me to go there. The Department was delighted. It was the first time they had a Foreign Service Officer be Chief of Mission. I think it was the first time. No, I was the first one in Denmark. But, it was the first one in that area. They wanted me to do it, they liked the idea very much.

So, I went there and I wrote HQ after, I guess, a month or so and I said this is the damnedest mess I have ever seen in my life. It really is. We had over 70 different projects which were started out as Point Four type activity which was mostly to exchange or provide information, not money. We built up a humongous Mission here and nobody had any real idea of what it was we are trying to do or where we expected to get. Administratively its awful. The staff is terrible. We just don't have what you need. I was fortunate in a way. The Economic Counselor of the Embassy was Ross Whitman and he and I were old colleagues. He had been Economic man in Norway when I was the Economic man in Denmark. We were friends. So I got him named to be Deputy AID Mission Director, as well as Economic Counselor. This required some negotiating
with the Embassy. Art Gardiner was then the Deputy Chief of Mission in Karachi and he and I agreed that he would be Ross' boss for Ross' Embassy functions and I would be Ross' boss for Ross' ICA functions. Ross would let either one of us know, if the other's demands were too much or if he had a conflict in which case we could all meet and discuss it. Well, we never had to meet, ever. Ross was very smooth. He was darn good. We had a happy relationship. I knew perfectly well what he was up against and he knew what I was up against, so we didn't have to quarrel. We also had Carter Ide who had worked for me in Copenhagen. So we had only three people in that Mission who had had any contact whatsoever with large-scale economic aid.

Aid to Pakistan hadn't started as large-scale economic aid. It had started as a Point Four small technical assistance program. Small in money, large in numbers. But John Foster Dulles was off on his "build a wall against Sino-Soviet imperialism", and they had decided in Washington to provide military aid to Pakistan. It dawned on somebody that this might mean the need for some economic assistance, as well, since they didn't really have very much means to mount and support an army. The US sent a special survey mission out headed by Heinz of the pickle family.

Q: When is this? This is 1955 you arrived?

BELL: In early 1955. That mission came back and said, what Pakistan needs is $60 million. When I went to Pakistan, I had the $60 million to spend and no plan, no program, nothing. I remember asking the Secretary of the Pakistan Economic Ministry, Said Hassan, to give me his ideas of what priorities they had. (They were making up a development plan.) Oh, he said, I've got a long list of projects. Take any one you like. Which ones would you like? There was a list of names -- Multan power dam, such and such, this, that and the other. No details, just names. I said, you must have some priorities in your own mind, don't you? Oh, he said, no we need everything, we need everything. Which in a sense was true. He says, the United States wants to help us. We want to have a big program. You want to have a big program. I said, wait a minute, wait a minute. What I want to have and what my country wants to have is a good program that will really work to help develop so you can support this military program. That's the size we are interested in. Not just big. Also, I said, I can't guarantee you that at some point in time my country's interest will not be so defined. It happens that they are running parallel with yours now. But they may not, and if they don't, I'm working for Uncle Sam, not you. And I'm sure not going to tell you if they change. He looked at me and all right, we'll start over again. Well there was an obvious need, still there was no rational way to use the money. No clearly rational way to use the money. So, we sat down and tried to figure out what to do, Ross, Carter and I. We had some collaboration, very important and growing collaboration, with David Bell and a group from Harvard that were being financed by the Ford Foundation to serve as staff to an embryonic Pakistani Planning Board. We put our heads together with them and eventually we came up with, after about five or six months, we came up with a five-year plan which we went back to Washington with and said IF (about six ifs all of which were no way certain): no flood, no famine, no war, no disaster of any kind and political stability, all these different things, we've got about a 50-50 chance of making this work if you put in about $200 million a year for at least five years. That's big money. You know we were supposed to do it all with $60 million. They liked the idea, the plan. They weren't so enthused about the amount of money, but we did put in close to $200 million the next year, if you counted, as you should, the agricultural surpluses. We were putting about $100 million worth of food into that country. You could get some notion of the nature of the problem when I tell you that in Pakistan they had a
research and experimental farm much like we have, at a place called Montgomery in the Punjab where they see what you can do, you know, how much acreage, how much food you can grow. And they had shown that on that particular farm, you could increase the production of wheat by about 400%. All you needed to get to eliminate a requirement for wheat imports was about 12%. This was scientifically possible. In the United States, you figure, if your research farm does 400%, 200% is a feasible target, half. So let's say we only need 12%, that should certainly be possible. But it took 10 years before they got that requirement all the way down. Ten years. I wasn't there the whole 10 years, but it did. The obstacles, the obstacles. You began to be aware of what some of the obstacles were to economic development. The biggest problem, human resources and institutions. Not money. Money you need, yes. But, its not much use without human resources and institutions and you can't shift them from factories or plants to recipient country. They have to be grown, trained, cultivated and then motivated to want to do it.

Q: You mentioned, last time, something along those lines that in AID it was an effort just to transfer the Marshall Plan experience to the developing world. But, this new recognition, was that something that people like you and David Bell came to in Pakistan in those days?

BELL: That's where it came to me and I think to David Bell, as well, because I know Dave told me that I showed him how to be tough with a country when you needed to be, which I thought was a great compliment. That was the first time it really dawned on me that the success of IRP was due to the Europeans and that third world nations did not have the requirements needed to achieve development so rapidly. Development is not recovery! I hadn't really thought much about it. Why? I was absorbed with Europe. The last thing I had in mind was going to Pakistan. I wanted to go to Athens. On the annual submission of preferences for assignment -- where you like to go? Somewhere warmer I said, Athens or Rome. I went to Karachi it was warmer. It was 123 degrees when we landed there. 83 degrees was the highest it had been in Copenhagen in three years. So we got warmer.

We estimated that out of the 80-some million people then in Pakistan, there were perhaps 2,500 who were politically articulate. And of those very few had any idea of economics. You get a notion of their concept when the Prime Minister (Suhrawardy) at the time, when they finally finished the first draft of the five-year plan by their Planning Board with the Harvard group's help, said, now we don't need the planning board anymore. I said, you are absolutely wrong. The only function of a planning board is to make you aware of the consequences of your political decisions before you make them. Now, you may have to do something for political reasons that you are told is going to be counterproductive. Everybody understands that. People do it in politics in real life all the time. The advantage is that you know what you are doing, or that you have some notion of what you're doing. The plan is just helpful information. He had the concept it was like a floor plan for building a building. All you do is order the materials and do it. Really, that's what he thought.

Suhrawardy had an interesting time. He was not the Prime Minister when I went there, but he was Prime Minister for about the last year I was there. He was not a person that had been expected to acquire office, nor was he very well liked in the foreign community. In particular in the American community he wasn't very well liked. He was a little short guy. He looked sort of like Alfred Hitchcock. He loved western women. He loved to dance with western women. He'd
get very close, which didn't endear him to the hearts of either western women or men. Practically no one had ever had anything to do with him, but there were two people in the American community who did. (He was the Minister of Law at the time.) One was me and one was Burt Marshall. (C. Burton Marshall, who was then in Pakistan working for the CIA.) What I thought was a strange assignment. Not as a spy or intelligence agent. He was trying to help them write a constitution, an American model, which they didn't want to do and never did do because the only model they knew was the British parliamentary system. A country with 2,500 politically articulate people can hardly run a British parliamentary system effectively! It was just impossible. Anyway, both Burt and I had had Suhrawardy to our houses, nothing great but we had had him. So we were exceptions to his general dislike for Americans when he took office as Prime Minister. He wanted to keep allied with America because he knew he was getting money out of it and it was good for Pakistan. It was their only protection against India the way they looked at it. But he wanted to have good relations. Burt Marshall and I actually left at about the same time, were transferred out of there. He went back home.

Q: When was that?

BELL: In 1957.

Q: So you were there three years almost?

BELL: Two years. Suhrawardy gave a farewell party for the two of us. He had about several hundred people. Big party. Big splashy party. The Ambassador was there and the whole group. He (Suhrawardy) gave a little speech bidding us farewell in which he said I'm bidding farewell to the only two Americans I trust. Jesus! You know this is guaranteed to make you popular with your own friends. Neither of us had ever done anything to merit what suggested a sort of cozy relationship. I made some speeches in Pakistan which were sort of interfering in their internal affairs having to do with the lack of an agriculture policy. The lack of an adequate program to deal with their food shortage. Saying that their real enemy wasn't India but salinity and water logging in their irrigated lands. He was furious with that speech. He really was mad. That was about the time that Hollister came out on a visit. We had briefed Hollister to the effect that the President of the country and the Prime Minister of the country were seldom in agreement on anything. Well, the President had the first reception for Hollister, a dinner, and at that dinner he told Hollister, your man here made a great speech, great speech. Hollister didn't know what he was talking about, of course. He'd never heard of the speech. We didn't clear it with Washington. The next day we met with Suhrawardy and he tells Hollister, your boy here is making very bad speeches, causing lots of trouble. I told him that everything I said was true. No its not, he said. They weren't doing anything in East Pakistan about agriculture. He said, yes they are. I said, no they aren't. He said, I'll get the Governor over here. I said okay. A few days later he had the Governor of East Pakistan over to prove I was wrong. I was right and the Governor admitted it. He didn't like that very much but at least he knew I told him the truth which worked most of the time. It was an interesting experience.

It was fascinating to me too, that the occasion for providing the economic assistance in large-scale, the rationale for it was that it was necessary as a form of defense support to enable them to carry out the military program. And, your only logical conclusion when you looked at their
economic dilemma and tried to make a plan for the future was that the worst thing they could be doing was wasting money on the goddamn military. So you found yourself advocating we change Dulles policy. Well, you know there wasn't a prayer of changing Mr. Dulles policy. It has never changed yet. It carried right on through to Vietnam.

Q: Were there significant differences of opinion within the Embassy over the policy?

BELL: I think most of the Embassy recognized that there was this sort of anomaly in our policy where we were pushing for this and forced to do that, which was making this harder and harder, which it did. Of course, the Pakistanis were particularly skillful, especially General Ayub, who took over the government in coup d'etat in 1958. He was a very sophisticated man who had been a Brigadier in the British army and was a typical British officer really, of Pakistani origin. Smooth, intelligent, educated, well-informed. He would do the most beautiful briefing for anybody from the United States of significance that came out, in which he gave a rationale for Pakistan's military program, its force composition and disposition on precisely the same kind of rationale that you would hear from General Gruenther about NATO. A deterrent force.

There is no way in the world the Pakistanis could hope to beat India outnumbered as they were five to one. And with India having the industrial base and Pakistan none, but they could hold until they got help when the Indians launched their attack. Of course, that help was to come from Uncle Sam. Whereas Mr. Dulles' idea was their enemy was Russia. They never thought their enemy was Russia. They never remotely thought their enemy was Russia. Never pretended that it was Russia. But if it made us happy to say that, okay, they wouldn't argue. They were desperately worried about India. You know that it wasn't that long since the partition in 1947 when their estimates ranged from ½ a million to three million people killed in mass fratricide of both sides -- the Muslims and the Hindus killing each other off. They were scared. They were scared of them and are still scared of them. The Pakistan army was in some ways an admirable outfit, but in modern terms it was a joke. No reserves, no reserves. They didn't have enough supplies to fight more than about three weeks if they had a war. It was a joke. What a joke, we're putting all these millions of dollars in. Who's fooling whom? I don't know. I thought it was a stupid policy.

Q: Well you must have continued to deal with Pakistan when you came back? Wasn't two years a little short for that job in Pakistan at that time?

BELL: I don't know. I was the first one that really had that job in the sense of the big economic program. It was long enough to suit me, but I didn't ask to be taken out. I was pulled out and brought back to be the Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia in ICA. Where (I must say I can't remember what it was called it changed names so many times) I was responsible for not only Pakistan but for Israel through India, a sixteen-country program. I remember telling Jim Killen, my successor in Pakistan, the story I told you a minute ago about writing back and saying this is the damndest mess I ever saw, I said if I don't hear from you in about three months saying it's the damndest mess you ever saw I'm going to be very disappointed. Because, there's so much left to do.

Loy Henderson told me I'm sorry about this, but I was going to have you come back and be
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. I said, I'm not qualified. Yeah, yeah, he said, but this is such a great opportunity for the Department. We really need somebody over there that understands our problems. He had been a Near East hand before and he thought it was a great thing. I got over there, I went okay, it's new and it's interesting. Never disliked trying something different.

I found the NESA office, that's what they called it Near East South Asia, had a reputation as the worst office in the place. I became aware of this after a while and I looked at it and I thought well, I don't really think this reputation is justified. But reputations are taken as fact if they are not countered some way. I had a lot of fun with that because I told them (my staff) (I had staff meetings regularly) that everybody tells me that this is the worst office in the place and I don't believe it. From now on we're the best office in the place. Tell everybody. If I want you to change what you're doing I'll let you know. Right now what I want you to do is to tell everybody this is the best office! How it has changed! It's better! You knew perfectly well that if you were getting a memorandum from an office reputed to be the worst, you're going to look for all the errors in it. If you get one from one reputed to be the best, you're going to say what good ideas they've come up with now. Your whole attitude changes. I said even if you don't do a damn thing differently, if you can just get the image change it is important. Not that we won't change things that need change anyway, but image is what we're talking.

Fortuitously, at just about that time came the annual drive for United Givers Fund. You know how they do those things. I told them at that meeting, I want this week, ten days before time, everybody in here to contribute something. Even if it's only the price of a cup of coffee. I see you drinking it all the time. I don't give a damn how much you give, but I want to be able to say we got 100% and I want to be first. Well, we did. It turned out we exceeded their quota, as well, which surprised the hell out of me. I went down to the Deputy Administrator's office and said here's our thing, he said what? You've got it already?! Sure, we got a good office down there. And we started peddling this stuff and people began to do better work because they stopped thinking of themselves as inferior. They weren't really inferior. They just had gotten to believing the propaganda and coasting a bit. I don't think they were being stimulated properly. We got it moving along pretty well and I enjoyed it.

Q: Did you have a lot to do with Congress in that job?

BELL: Oh yes. Yes. My concern with Congress in that job was essentially that I would be responsible for defending the Near East part of the program. I think I mentioned before there was a discussion in the Agency about how aid levels were justified. Congress was saying they didn't have any basis but guesswork and I allowed as how in a meeting that that wasn't so and we could defend it. I was asked to demonstrate same which I did with some help at a subsequent time and Smith (then ICA Administrator) liked it very much and had me do it for Dillon. They decided between them that, yes, we would do this before Congressional committee. House Foreign Affairs Committee, I believe. The one Vorys was on -- the Authorizing Committee. John Vorys, Republican from Ohio was the senior Republican, I believe. I mention him because after I got through this sterling exposition which we worked so hard on, he said I've never been so confused in my life. But it served its purpose whether he was confused or not. He may well have been. At least it was sort of like the confusion which goes on about a lot of things, they were persuaded
that we thought we knew what we were doing, even if they didn't understand it. It wasn't just pulled out of the air. It was pretty hard sometimes because a large factor, political judgement went into it, any case. Like your friends in the Sudan, you start looking at national accounts analysis on the Sudan aid and you end up with the errors and omissions columns bigger than the gain component. They don't have that ...

Dillon was Under Secretary for Economics Affairs at that time. He was a great guy to work for because he gave you lots of responsibility and lots of freedom but he was always available when you needed him. He kept a lot of guys that thought they were pretty smart jumping at the same time. He had John Leddy. He had Graham Martin. He had Charlie Whitehouse. He had Rob Brewster. A whole group of pretty sharp people who had to run to keep up with him. He was very good. It was an interesting job.

Q: Which job?

BELL: The foreign aid coordination job.

Q: After being Assistant Administrator?

BELL: When I went to work for Dillon (after 15 months in ICA). I went to be his Deputy for Foreign Aid Coordination. He was the Coordinator of Foreign Aid which was a task imposed by executive delegation. The President had delegated to him certain Presidential authority written into the aid legislation. So that in this capacity he acted for the President, not for the Secretary of State. So that when I worked for him we were actually working for the President, not for the Secretary of State. We were not there to confine ourselves to a State Department position. A very important distinction. So that if there were issues, which there were all the time, the State Department's view would be represented by whatever bureau was concerned, Far East or Near East or whatever, Europe. And, you would serve as a sort of moderator/judge to make a balanced recommendation as to what ought to be done, taking into account State's views, ECA's views, Defense's views, Treasury's views, Agriculture's views. We had, Christ, something like eight or nine different Government agencies, all of which had some voice in the thing.

Q: It sounds a little like the NSC function, but the NSC wasn't functioning in that regard then?

BELL: Not on this, no. You were planning for the next year. You were engaged in allocating what you'd gotten for the current year and finishing up what had been started before. We were responsible for planning the budgetary presentation. Coordinating all the elements to get this program through the Bureau of the Budget. Then we were responsible for planning the Congressional presentation through both Authorizing Committees and Appropriation Committees in the two Houses. And, then dealing with Conference Committees as need be. The object was to present coordinated executive branch positions which had been worked out in the departmental committee prior to that time so you didn't have to go chasing around your tail or get put off by the Secretary of this saying one thing and the Secretary of that saying something else. Planning a Congressional presentation was really fun. It was just like planning a play. We actually used to train witnesses. I don't mean literally, but try to accustom them to what to expect. Because for a great many people this was a really strange experience. They were all
brought up when America the beautiful where you had a lawyer and he has a lawyer. But when you're a witness before a Congressional committee, boy you're open game, that's all. No protection whatsoever. They can say anything they damn well please, and you're to just sit there and take it. You train them to expect this.

I remember Walter Robertson was Assistant Secretary and as part of the training program we'd have mock sessions. We'd take the part of the committee members and he'd be the witness. He'd give a little statement and we'd go at him. We started to ask him questions about Tibet. Well, what's that go to do with it? You can't say that Mr. Secretary. You've got to answer the questions. What's relevant is what the guy asks you. Not whether you think it's relevant to the issue. That's not very good. Well that's the way it is. Get used to the idea. Don't think these guys are friendly. You may find them friendly on the Authorizing Committee but when you get to Appropriations, they are decided unfriendly. They've got to go back home and say why they spent all the money on those goddamn people over in Europe or Asia or what. They don't get many votes for that. Crowds don't cheer, hurray you gave Israel $3 million this year. Isn't that great? It was interesting and we developed a book really on all these Congressman. What their pet notions were. For example, John Rooney who came from the Brooklyn district. What was Rooney's great interest? Aid for Israel. If Rooney asked you a question about Israel, say something nice about Israel. How much they need the aid. I remember one time he pointed out in the presentation book what he wanted the witness to say. You know he's trying to help himself, he was our friend. He was willing for us to act, he really didn't care what we did in Israel. He just wanted to sound good to his constituency. Politics is different from diplomacy. It's a different world. But, I would say of the Congressmen that I was favorably impressed with most of them. I think they really try to do a decent job. Actually, it almost is as impossible as being President.

Q: Were you satisfied with the way the State Department personnel presented themselves to the Congress?

BELL: I thought in all they did pretty well. Some did better than others. Some are naturally good at it. Dillon was nearly perfect I think. He was the best I've ever seen. Dillon would sit there and look at the Congressman asking a stupid question with his big blue eyes agape as though he was hearing for the first time something wonderful and turn it around to say if I understood what you said, this is a great idea Mr. Senator. He had Monroney from Oklahoma absolutely convinced that Monroney had thought up the whole idea of one of the international funds which came along after. Actually, Monroney didn't even know what he was talking about. Dillon was good. Most of the witnesses were pretty good. I think that Congress would do better, the committees would do better, if they were less concerned with titles of witnesses and more concerned with what their jobs were and they'd find out a hell of a lot more. Drop the level of inquiry. Get the guy that really knows. There's an assumption that if you get a big shot it's going to be better but half the time you're talking to someone whose answers were stuffed in his head the night before or handed to him on a piece of paper at the time.

Q: What was your opinion of the AID personnel? You've seen the Washington personnel. You've seen the regular Foreign Service personnel. Now you'd had direct experience on two assignments with AID personnel. Was there much difference?
BELL: Well, I think you have to say there is a whole category of AID personnel (as distinguished from the old European Recovery Program). A group which had its origins in technical assistance, who are very different. They're basically technicians, sort of one-problem oriented people. The malaria specialist, the highway builder, the fertilizer factory man. They tend to be one track and not to be very useful beyond that. But you get the best malaria guy you can get. He doesn't know or understand anything about India, Pakistan, Muslim religion or the economic situation. He only understands malaria. Those people are just different. It's a different world. The program and planning people in AID, I think it's fair to compare with Foreign Service types. Maybe their administrative people too. I would say they were spottier. They had some brilliant people and some terrible people. I sent home I think five from Pakistan the first six months after I was there, including one that was a brother of a Congressman and made them all stick. That helped morale a little bit. It didn't pay to goof off.

JANE ABELL COON
Political Officer
Karachi (1957-1959)

Jane Abell Coon was born in Dover, New Hampshire, the youngest of four children. Upon graduation from Northland High school, she attended Wooster College in Ohio. She graduated in 1947 and began working for the State Department. It was through the State Department she became a Foreign Service Officer. She has served in Bombay, New Delhi, Kathmandu, Rabat, Kabul and as Ambassador to Bangladesh. The initial interview was conducted by Ann Miller Morin on November 4, 1986. Subsequent interviews were conducted on February 6,12, March 18, April 9 and July 9, 1987.

Q: So you arrived. How did you get to Pakistan in 1957?

COON: I was living in a furnished house with three other women down on Tunlaw Road, and had no furniture, no glassware and cutlery, or anything like that, so I went out and bought twelve place settings of seconds at the China Closet, and some stainless steel. Got together, to the best of my ability, a wardrobe. Went through the travel process in the Department -- in those days there were a couple of women who handled overseas travel. This was before CATO. Do you remember Becky Sanford? They were fairly fearsome for junior officers to cope with when you got ready to go out to your post. I think that's a substantial understatement.

There were, of course, prop planes at those times, and I asked to stop over in Beirut for three or four days and visit a friend. I had to get written authorization to take leave, even in Beirut, from my desk officer, because Mrs. Sanford felt that one went directly to one's post.

So the day before I was leaving Washington, I triumphantly went and picked up my tickets, and I brought them home. I'd never had anything as thick as an international airline ticket, so I thumbed through them and discovered that I had tickets from San Francisco to Sydney, and from Beirut to Karachi. [Laughter] So I hustled back into the Department the next day, and Mrs.
Sanford fairly melted the phone at the other end in the Pan Am office. I got my tickets. But it was a wonder I didn't get on the plane without checking my tickets. I mean, you assume that your tickets are in good order.

So anyway, I took off, went to Beirut, spent a couple of days, went on to Karachi, and I can still remember flying over what seemed to me endless desert. This was in mid-May 1957. Endless, endless desert, and finally somebody pointing out this small patch of white city on the edge of the sea and saying that was Karachi, surrounded by what looked to me like howling desert. Thinking to myself, as my heart dropped, that I was going to spend the next two years of my life here.

Then when we landed it must have been about a hundred and fifteen. It was like walking into an oven. But I was picked up and spent the first ten days, I guess, with the political counselor and his wife, who were a very delightful couple. And then moved into a flat which I shared with the assistant personnel officer.

Q: *Were these embassy quarters*?

COON: Embassy-leased housing. It was the upstairs of a house with the distinguished address of Number One Special Drigh Road. It was neither number one nor was it special.

Q: *Does that mean something in Karachi, to call things special*?

COON: Well, in this particular housing colony, they had numbered the houses by date of construction, not by their position on the street, and this had been the first house built. It rather complicated finding people. [Hearty laughter]

Q: *It must have been awful. You'd have to have little maps*.

COON: You had to have maps. Number twenty-four might be next to number forty-seven, and number one might be next to thirty-three.

Then I promptly came down with typhoid. Paratyphoid. And was hospitalized in the Seventh Day Adventist hospital for a week, where I learned that Seventh Day Adventists sing hymns on Saturday and are vegetarians.

Q: *You hadn't known those things*?

COON: I don't think I'd known all of that. And then recuperated at home, and really started work after that. There was, of course, no training for political officers at that time in terms of what you did as a political officer, so it was a pretty much sink-or-swim. My boss was the political counselor and there were also two first secretaries and a second secretary in the section. One of the two first secretaries was extremely helpful in breaking me in and introducing me.

Q: *How did you happen to get this disease, if you don't mind my going back a bit*?
COON: Oh, paratyphoid? I think I got it, actually, because the political counselor and his wife were having plumbing problems, and the sewage system was dug up in the vicinity of the house, and I think probably it got into the water.

Q: But you hadn't had an inoculation?

COON: I'd had a shot, but typhoid shots are only about 70 percent effective.

Q: I see. I'm glad I didn't know that all these years.

COON: No, they're not a sure thing. They may be better now, but not at that time. I was surprised too, because I just had a shot before I went out.

Q: So what were your first jobs? What were the first things you did?

COON: I suppose the first things young political officers do are biographic reporting, descriptive reporting and a certain amount of answering letters, a lot of just getting around and making contacts and getting to know people and trying to understand the local scene. I was there about six months when -- I guess it was in November -- the Consul General in Dhaka asked that someone be sent over on TDY because his only political officer was leaving, and there was going to be a gap of about a month. Being the most junior and quite clearly the least productive member of the section at that point, they sent me off to Dhaka for three weeks. And that was very interesting. That was a lot of fun.

Q: You were saying that you went over to Dhaka, but I was just wondering, you didn't take the A-100 course. Did they give you any special training before you went?

COON: No.

Q: What about language training?

COON: No.

Q: That must have been a bit of a poser, wasn't it?

COON: English is pretty widely spoken in Pakistan.

Q: What about entertaining? Did you begin to entertain? Did you have an allowance as a second secretary?

COON: I don't remember whether I had an allowance. I did begin to entertain, yes.

Q: What did you do in those three weeks when you were in Dhaka?

COON: I filled in as political officer. I made a lot of calls mostly by cycle rickshaw. It was really almost an orientation to me to the eastern wing of the country. Very, very useful, and of course it
turned out to be of enormous use many years later, that I could say I'd been there in 1957. I remember I was in Dhaka when Sputnik went up.

Q: Oh, is that so?

COON: Yes, I remember that. I went down and visited Chittagong. I stayed with the only other European woman in Chittagong, a WHO nurse. I badly wanted to visit an American dam project up the Karnaphuli River that was just beginning construction, so I arranged to call on the construction company headquarters in Chittagong. I walked into this big, sort of recreation hall. There was an enormous table, just covered from one end to the other with hors d'oeuvres. I thought, "My stars, they're having a party," because there were six or eight engineers there. It took me quite a little while to discover that it was all for me. [Laughter] There were almost no Western women who visited Chittagong, and to have one in town was an event.

They arranged the next day to send me up river on a Bengali launch that was taking some materials for the dam. That was a wonderful trip up the Karnaphuli River. I was met at the other end at the dam site and spent the night up there. They had just begun construction of the housing for the engineers and for the labor, and were just beginning the construction of the dam.

Of course many years later I went back, in 1981. The dam had been intended to have two generators, and I went back for the opening of the third generator, which was a big event.

Q: Did you experience culture shock?

COON: I can't remember that I did. I was so curious and so excited about being at my first overseas post that I just plunged in and thoroughly enjoyed getting to know the country and the people. I felt, after I'd been there a couple of years, that, as a woman, despite the resistance to my coming there, I had really in many ways a distinct advantage. I was in some ways a third sex as far as the Pakistanis were concerned. Their social mores really didn't apply to me, their expectations of me as a woman. But at the same time I was a woman, and I could get into Pakistani families, which was virtually impossible for a man, so that I made a lot of really very good friend in several families.

I also had something of an advantage in terms of getting to know the very tiny handful of Pakistani professional women that existed then. In fact there were about four of them, and we used to have lunch together about once a month, and I learned an enormous amount about their problems as professional women in that society.

And I learned a lot about the culture. I can still remember one lunch when one of the women -- she must have been in her early '30s and had her doctorate from the University of Minnesota -- came in and rather, almost blushingly, which was not her style, announced that she was being married. The instant reaction of all of the other women at the table was, "Have you met him?" Which indeed she had.

Q: She was a very forward woman, wasn't she, to have met her fiancé.
COON: She did not know him well, but she had met him. The family had almost despaired of her getting married because she was so years old.

Q: You mean she was in her ‘20s or something?

COON: I think she may have been as much as thirty.

Q: I see. She was really long in the tooth.

COON: May have been only in her late ‘20s, I'm not sure, but she was long in the tooth.

I think I just learned probably more at that post than any post about the society and how it worked and how families functioned. And despite the fact that women were in purdah, there were frequently very strong women in various families who wielded a great deal of power in family decision making, and family decision making is important in that part of the world. They were the ones for the most part that arranged the marriages, and they had an awful lot to do with issues of inheritance and issues of land and property, although technically the power was in the hands of the men.

Q: Did they also hold the family purse strings? Or I should say, disburse the family money?

COON: I don't know. To some extent I think they did. I did a lot of traveling in Pakistan. I traveled quite extensively in the province of Sindh, which was the southern province of Pakistan, of which Karachi, I believe, was the capital at that time. I went up to Punjab, to Lahore a couple of times, to cover when the political officer there left. I went to Peshawar alone and made my calls on people in Peshawar. It was before we had a consulate or any representation there, and I made all of my calls in the backs of tongas, these wonderful two-wheeled horse carts. Visited Swat.

Q: What is that?

COON: Swat. It's a small area.

COON: Babe Ruth was called the Sultan of Swat.

Q: Yes. And there really is a Sultan of Swat! Swat was really a small princely state north of Peshawar.

COON: That's right. So after two years in Karachi, I applied for Hindi language training, on the grounds that if I got language training, it would be much more difficult for the Department to consign me to other than political work. I did nine months at the Foreign Service Institute in '59-'60 on Hindi, and was assigned to Bombay, not strictly speaking a Hindi language post, but the consular district included Radhya Pradesh, which was a Hindi language area.

The first year I was going to be consular officer, and then I would pick up from the political officer and replace him.
Michael P.E. Hoyt as a young child lived in Europe, giving him a consciousness into the world of foreign affairs. He attended the University of Chicago and after graduation, joined the Air Force for 4 years. After his tour, he then earned his Master’s Degree from the University of Illinois. In 1956, he took and passed the foreign service exam, entering in October of 1956. He has served in Casablanca, Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Douala and Bujumbura. The interview was conducted by Ray Sadler on January 30, 1995.

Q: After you have done this, your first post was as Third Secretary with administrative / consular duties at the U.S. Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan. Did they make you learn Urdu?

HOYT: No. Let me back up a bit because there was a very unusual circumstance with my class. There developed a keen shortage of administrative people, particularly in the budget and fiscal side of the administrative sections of the embassies. They were really desperate and decided to haul out a bunch of us, about a half-dozen of this class. I guess they thought it was so large that they could make accountants out of some of us. It was very unusual; they did it very apologetically. They sent us for 3 months to a budget and fiscal school.

Q: Where was this?

HOYT: At the State Department.

Q: At the Foreign Service Institute, as a special course. So you had a bunch of CPAs running you through the course.

HOYT: I couldn’t balance a checkbook at that point. Of course we were very disappointed because we wanted to go out, at least as consular officers, start our real work. So here we were, not only on the administrative side -- of course under the Wristonization program all the administrative people were made foreign service officers.

Q: This was the Wristonization program.

HOYT: This was the ultimate Wristonization, and they never did it again. They were very apologetic. I'm sure it affected my career because I was working in a field where FSOs just never went.

I went to Karachi and made an accounting assistant. I audited travel vouchers. I was also assistant disbursing officer, writing checks and counting money.
Q: You weren't particularly fond of all of this.

HOYT: No, I wasn't. I later rationalized that it did give me some basic grounding in the running of an embassy. I think that was the good side of it. There was a lot of bad side. Because at that point they also had a program whereby junior officers would rotate jobs in their first assignment. They would spend 6 months on consular duty, 6 months in the economic section, 6 months doing administrative work, etc. But the instructions went out that we were not to be a part of that. I had to stay 2 years in the Budget & Fiscal section. I did manage to go down and relieve the consular officer on several occasions and enjoyed that very much.

As I say, I got a fairly good grounding on the fiscal side of the administration of embassies and consulates which, I think, stood me a good stab when I later on headed 4 consulates or embassies during my career. I regretted it; it was a setback, but I did learn from it and did benefit.

Q: Given the events of 1947, 1948, what had occurred, the splitting of Pakistan and India. The religious disputes, the problems with India, had they begin to surface at this time?

HOYT: Let me address that, this was '57 to '59 and of course Karachi had born the brunt of the refugees -- the Moslem refugees that fled from India. At that point the city was very very overcrowded. It wasn't evident then what is going on in Karachi now. People who are now causing the problems seems to be those ones that did come from India. They were not assimilated. We could tell this even then amongst our friends, a number of them had fled.

Q: Did they isolate themselves from the remainder of the community?

HOYT: Not particularly. A lot of them were wealthy businessmen, and they came and established businesses in Karachi. I think that created some tension. It's a big city but I don't think it was ever reconstructed to accommodate all those people. They wanted to get away from that and established the capital in Rawalpindi later on.

Being in the embassy, working in the embassy, I had very little to do and very little consciousness of the events going on in Pakistan at the time. I just might may comment that the only time we really got out of Karachi was a two-week motor trip through the northwest frontier.

Q: Khyber Pass, Rudyard Kipling

HOYT: Our best friends were people in the CIA who were responsible for liaison with the head of the intelligence, the ISA.

Q: The Pakistani intelligence service. Would that veer into anything that might remain still even today classified? How big was the station?

HOYT: I imagine there weren't more than a dozen that I knew of.

Q: The agency always had the reputation that they had the best communicators.
HOYT: They had the only communicators. Up to the time I left the service, all embassy communications were run by the agency. The only exception in my experience was when I was consul in Ibadan, Nigeria. Then we had the only communication station run by State department communicators. In 15 years this might have changed.

Q: Who was your ambassador in Karachi during that time?

HOYT: I’ll look it up.

Q: Was it a political appointee?

HOYT: It was definitely a political appointee.

Q: While you’re looking that up. Let me just ask. It’s always been, in my judgment, this is a personal opinion obviously, there has always been a lot of resentment by our professional diplomatic corps, by the foreign service association, concerning political appointments. The Earl ET Smith situation in Cuba, that’s the time Fidel Castro came to power. In the case of Smith he was a Florida used car salesman, I guess is one way of putting it. Donald Francis was a single feeds grain dealer at the time the Bolshevik came to power in Russia 1917. Which is an indication that maybe we should have had some professionals there.

Among your colleagues, among the junior FSOs, did this come as a resentment? Did one accept it?

HOYT: Let’s go back, to answer the question it was James L. Langley who was a political appointee in Karachi, a newspaperman, probably did not do very well there. His wife certainly didn’t do very well.

My opinion is not so much resentment, I think most of my colleagues were not so much resentful against political appointees, but against bad political appointees. I certainly served under some bad ones, we can get into that later on, as well as good ones. I must say that most of the good ones I served under were real professionals, been training for the job for years. It seems to me that we shouldn’t exclude, this is getting into an opinion, over the years I think most of us thought that the problem was that there were so many bad ambassadors who were appointed outside. It’s not to say that some of the career ones weren’t.

RIDGWAY KNIGHT
Minister Counselor
Karachi (1957-1959)

Born in France, of American parents, he went to school in New York until he was about nine years old. He later returned to France to obtain his two baccalaureates in Paris. He attended Harvard Business School where he graduated with a MBA in 1931. During his career he served as acting officer-in-
KNIGHT: Then at that time I was sent to Pakistan as number two, as Minister Counselor, which was my only unhappy job in the Foreign Service.

Q: Why was that?

KNIGHT: Well because I happened to disagree with U.S. policy. I happened to feel that the Pakistanis were taking us to the cleaners. The entire aid which we were giving them was being used for developing NATO type, military formations -- which could only be used against India, which was not an enemy of the United States. The Pakistani war effort was not going into developing mountain brigades, the type of units which could be used against the Soviet Union, which was our concern. But when I made these views known to the Secretary of Defense visiting Pakistan, they were not particularly welcomed.

Another aspect of my tour in Pakistan which made it my only unhappy experience in the Foreign Service, is that I had to deal with extensive black marketing going on in the U.S. Mission to Pakistan, and in which the military were very prominent. And it had to be stopped and I was told so in the Department when leaving Washington. The military were cashing in the local rupees into dollars at the official rate, including the Commanding General of the outfit, General Truman. When I refused continuing to do so I became persona non grata from the Pentagon. That nearly ended my career. Fortunately, luck was on my side.

**CHARLES E. MARTHINSEN**  
**Economic/Commercial Officer**  
**Dacca (1957-1959)**

Ambassador Charles Mathinsen was born in New Jersey and raised in Pennsylvania. He attended Gannon College and served US army. After briefly working in the State Department he entered the Foreign Service in 1956. In 1957 he was sent to Dacca, East Pakistan as a Economic/ Commercial Officer. Ambassador Marthinsen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: When you were in Dacca this ’57 to ’59 period, what was Dacca like?

MARTHINSEN: My father-in-law-to-be painted for relaxation and turned out some rather skillful paintings more or less in the Grandma Moses style, American primitive. And he has “A View of Nawabpur Road” which still hangs on a wall at our house. That’s what Dacca was like; chockablock full of pedicabs and cattle and ladies in various stages of being enveloped in burkas and saris and children and birds. Dacca was a mob scene most of the time. Of course, Bangladesh at that time had half the population that it has today. It was considered by AID experts to be heavily overpopulated. When I first went there, sanitation was a problem. Death
rates from cholera and smallpox were extraordinarily high. If the death rate did not exceed 500 in a given week, then there was no “epidemic.” Annually 10,000 people or so would die in floods. Just a few inches rise of water meant a disaster.

Q: Did you experience floods while you were there?

MARTHINSEN: None that affected us in Dacca, but they occurred frequently in other parts of the province. The demand for agricultural land is so great that, as islands of silt appeared in the various rivers, they were immediately turned to farm lands. Such lands were a very dangerous place to live. They could be swept away in the next highly predictable floods. India was building a great barrage north of Calcutta about the time I left. That was supposed to permit some flood control. I hope that has happened, although from what I’ve read, the Bengalis are still dying from other inundations.

Q: What was the government like? It was part of Pakistan.

MARTHINSEN: There was a governor general in Dacca. In my day, it was Faslul Haq.

Q: What was your job there?

MARTHINSEN: I was economic/commercial officer in Dacca. Max Hodge headed the two man office. Mostly we kept track of jute production. I never knew there were so many grades of jute. In those days, the industry was pretty much as the Brits had organized it. We were also following the transportation sector. River transport was extremely important in Bangladesh.

Q: Where does jute come from in East Pakistan?

MARTHINSEN: It is grown in all of the watery bottomlands; the province is mostly watery bottomlands. You don’t get into hills in Bangladesh until you go down to the Chittagong area or Sylhet north central part—that’s tea country. The rest of it is like a billiard table after a night of carousing: flat, green, and wet.

Q: This hemp, could this be used for narcotic purposes?

MARTHINSEN: Not that I know of. Jute is more comparable more to cotton. The business of grading it and processing it or semi-processing it and manufacturing cloth and rugs was the major economic activity.

Q: I hope you had a local employee who knew what was going on.

MARTHINSEN: Oh, yes, our Foreign Service would not exist if it were not for skilled local employees. I had an aide who was terrific. He also was my translator although, happily, many Bengalis spoke English, particularly those in the jute trade and transportation.

Q: What was the consulate general like?
MARTHINSEN: The consulate general--now an embassy--up until very recently was the same as it was when I was there. The office was within sight of the former Nawab’s palace in Motajeel. We were on 4th and 5th or 5th and 6th floors of the Adamjeenagar, a new and relatively, but not totally, watertight building. It was a glass-domed office building that housed State and AID.

Q: Did you get any feeling for the Bangladeshi or East Bengali relationship with the Pakistanis? I’m thinking of the people from West Pakistan?

MARTHINSEN: Absolutely. West Pakistanis speak a different language. Mohammed Ali Jinnah had organized the Pakistan government and chose Karachi as the capital. I think most East Pakistanis believed that they made the money and the West Pakistanis took a commission. The major export of Pakistan was raw jute. I don’t even think much of it was processed.

Q: Was anybody there looking at this as maybe the sea of a rebellion?

MARTHINSEN: Unfortunately, the division of Pakistan into the provinces fostered political difficulties. The sole glue holding the country together was Islam. Fortunately when I was there, there was no serious violence. Though when martial law was declared by Karachi, it had a big effect on East Bengal. A lot of Pushtus, Baluchis, Sindhis and others from the west, came into Dacca to take over the newly created military administration. That turned off the local populace because it meant the end of self-government. Ethnic tensions grew. Prior to martial law, Bengalis had their own parliament and all of the Bengalis followed the affairs of their legislative assembly closely.

Q: Were you able to make friends with people there?

MARTHINSEN: Yes, very easily. The people with whom I had most of my contacts were in the economic departments of the East Pakistan government or in the private business community. Most spoke English. As was true in much of ex-India, they were carrying on pretty much as they had during the days of the Raj. There was no interruption in the flow of jute, much less of mangos and bananas and other products that were traded.

STANLEY D. SCHIFF
Economic Officer
Karachi (1957-1959)

Stanley Schiff was born and raised in New Jersey. During World War II he served in the US Army Air Corps. Afterwards he attended both Rutgers and Cornell Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was assigned as a financial officer to the Karachi embassy in 1957.

Q: You were at the embassy?
SCHIFF: Yes.

Q: Were you the economic officer?

SCHIFF: Yes, with a consular concentration on financial and economic planning activities.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?

SCHIFF: His name was Langley. He was a political appointee from New Hampshire or New England. He had been a newspaper publisher or editor up there. This was a rather exciting period in one way. It was during this time that the first military coup took place. In my first year, what I saw was a country going downhill and a political situation deteriorating. They were having real trouble with self-government. Then the military intervened and there was a military takeover. In my second year that I was there, the military was in control. The planning function – and I was pretty close to the planning organization there – took on a more important role under the military leadership than it had under civilian rule. There was less politics involved in some of the economic decisions, but Pakistan struggled throughout. It was a poor country and remained very poor.

Q: When you arrived, who was the political leader?

SCHIFF: I can’t remember now.

Q: That can be filled in. But it had a regular democracy?

SCHIFF: Yes.

Q: What were you all seeing about this?

SCHIFF: There were two things that I can recall in particular. One was corruption, which was pervasive and which became a corrosive element in society. The other was inflation. This was interesting. The rate of inflation relative to many other countries was quite modest and yet it had a very pronounced effect, particularly on the thinking of the military. They felt their own economic situation was deteriorating. This was identified as one of the causative factors behind the decision to stage the coup, to get more discipline into the country’s economic life.

Q: What was the planning organization, the bureaucracy? Had the British left a pretty solid economic network?

SCHIFF: No, I don’t think so. British rule there was basically concentrated in maintaining law and order. It was not terribly interested in Pakistan’s economic development. I don’t know under what circumstances the planning structure was started, but when I was there, they had a group from Harvard under contract to work with the planning board. They had some very able people in that group. They had developed a pool of real talent among the younger Pakistanis, most of whom had done graduate work in England or in the U.S., some of whom I maintained contact with long after. A few of them became prominent years later in the international institutions in
Washington. One of them became head of one of the offshoots of the IMF. Another one whom I
knew very well, who was a very bright guy, came to the World Bank and ultimately became the
number three man. He was the walking brain, a guy full of imagination and ideas. After another
coup in Pakistan years later, he was asked to come home and served as a minister of planning or
economics. He died rather young at about 60.

Q: Were you in Pakistan at the time of the coup?

SCHIFF: Yes and no. Officially, we were there, but it just so happened that my wife and I had
gotten an R&R trip and we were able to fly out of Pakistan on a military plane to Saudi Arabia
and we ended up going to Greece. It was while we were out of the country with our three kids
still in Karachi being looked after by some close friends that the coup took place. We were able
to learn that the coup had been bloodless and the kids were okay.

Q: Coming back, what was your observation of how the government was working? Was it a
change or was it pretty much the same people?

SCHIFF: The people who were doing the planning, the people in the finance ministry, except for
the minister, remained the same. They had some very able people. Those whom I knew best,
both in the senior ranks of the finance ministry and in the planning, were very able. They all
stayed on.

Q: Was it the problem that the country was poor and that no matter how much you plan, it’s not
planners who are going to change corruption?

SCHIFF: No, it wasn’t. It was among the political leadership where it was assumed or suspected
that the corruption existed. It also undoubtedly existed in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy,
especially among agencies responsible for enforcing regulations. Bribery could always be used
to circumvent regulations. That was always a temptation.

Q: One of the things we can all identify with is localitis. While you were at the embassy, what
was the spirit of looking at India and what was coming out of New Delhi? Did you find you were
all identifying with the Pakistanis?

SCHIFF: Yes. I seem to recall a conversation with our political counselor about something I
might have written that was critical of the Pakistanis, and he said, “Well, in Delhi, our embassy
would never have done that with the Indians, so lay off.” Yes, localitis did exist. Of course, this
also existed here in Washington, not in terms of localitis but in terms of identifying more
favorably with one country as opposed to the other. At that time, the Indians were close to the
Soviets and this was anathema back here. That was a factor. Nehru, who was in office at that
time, was not exactly on the most intimate of terms with the American leadership. My
impression was that American leadership at the highest levels was much more comfortable in
conversation with Pakistanis and felt that there was too much sanctimoniousness on the part of
the Indians.

Q: Both the Americans and the Indians are almost too much alike. They tend to lecture each
other and take a high moral tone, looking down on the other. Did you find this with the Pakistanis?

SCHIFF: No. Our relationship at that time was quite good. Certainly in personal relationships, it was excellent.

DENNIS KUX
Economic Officer
Karachi (1957-1960)

Political Officer
Islamabad (1969-1971)

Ambassador Dennis Kux was born in England in 1931 and raised in New York, New York. He received a bachelor’s degree in history from Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in 1952. He entered the U.S. Army in 1952, where he worked as a prisoner of war interrogator. His Foreign Service career included positions in Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast. Ambassador Kux was interviewed by Thomas Stern on January 13, 1995.

Q: We are now in 1957. You had never had any Foreign Service training. Who told you that it was time to go overseas?

KUX: The system told me. It was understood that I would have a two year assignment in the Department and would then go overseas. I was initially assigned to the Philippines, for no particular reason. I had developed an interest in the Third World, but not in the Philippines. I also remember being offered Cambodian language training -- out of the "blue." I said, "No," because I didn't want to spend so much time on one small country.

What interested me most was South Asia. This grew out of interest in India and the Third World. I was much taken with Nehru and had a certain sense of idealism -- perhaps misplaced idealism - - that this was an area of importance to the United States. I thought that helping people with economic development would be interesting and valuable. In any case, no one really cared about my interests; I was assigned to the Philippines.

First, I was assigned to the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] in one of the A-100 introductory officer training programs. My memory is that it consisted of about six weeks of general orientation. We had a very big group -- maybe 50 or 60 members in the class. Then there was a consular segment of very explicit training for consular work. During the course, I became friendly with a fellow student -- Ed Peach, who was an administrative officer. When I told him that I really didn't want to go to the Philippines, but preferred South Asia, he said: "Look, what you need to do is to go to the Post Management Office of NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] and find out from them whether there are any vacancies in South Asia, because they keep the records." I think he had worked in that office.
So I went around to NEA. Somebody pulled out a little card with posts and names slotted against positions. It turned out there was a vacancy for a Third Secretary/Economic Officer at the Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan. The post management officer confirmed that there was a vacancy there. Then I then went around to Frances Wilson, told her that I wasn't very happy with the assignment to the Philippines, that I was really interested in South Asia and that there was a vacancy in Karachi. She said: "Let me see what I can do about it." About a month later Frances told me: "You're going to Karachi." They probably thought that I was crazy, but that is the way it happened. I eventually formally got a formal note from somebody, confirming my assignment to Pakistan. I assume that Frances stage-managed the whole process.

I remember very little about the A-100 course except that I didn't think it was very good. It was a mishmash. Some of the lectures were good. The focus was on the Washington inter-agency process to which I had been exposed for a couple of years; so that I didn't learn much new. Then, I went to the consular course, which was also not terribly good. They taught one thing -- which was important -- and that was to use the consular section of the "Foreign Service Manual." Basically, the whole program was fairly boring.

In fact, because I was going to Karachi, I got interested in studying Urdu, the main language of Pakistan. I started cutting some of the classes in the consular course and got in touch with the language people at FSI. The linguist who ran the language program for South Asia arranged for me to get training for about a week not learning Urdu but learning how to learn it. In fact, that week of language preparation was probably the most valuable time I spent at the FSI. They taught me how to pronounce the language, how to make the sounds, how to use a "native speaker" in learning the language, and how to take the FSI material and teach yourself. That was very, very valuable. You can't really teach Urdu to yourself. You have to have somebody to work with. However, I learned the system, and the process of studying Urdu. I then went to Pakistan. I did not have any area training at all. The country desk people didn't give you much time either. I was a very junior officer, a Third Secretary in a seven-man Economic Section of the Embassy in Karachi. I think that it was a new position, and nobody was quite sure what I was going to do. But I read up on Pakistan and on India.

As was the custom in those days, I took a ship -- first class -- to Britain, where I had relatives. Then I went by train across Europe, visiting various friends. I flew from, I think, Frankfurt [Germany] to Beirut [Lebanon] and from Beirut to Karachi. They were long flights in those days -- this was before jet aircraft had entered service.

I arrived in Karachi at the end of November. For me, at least, it was hot as hell. It must have been 90 degrees outside. I still remember the ride in from the airport. The poverty was worse than I had seen in Korea and shocked me. I was met at the airport by Stanley Schiff, who was in the Economic Section and driven right to my government-furnished quarters, introduced to other people, and, perhaps, invited to dinner.

For a few days, I was still a bit "shell shocked," from my first impressions of Karachi. Some 10 years after partition with India, there were still a lot of refugees, living in squatter camps along with their animals in dirty mud huts. There was one such camp right outside where I lived. They
were living under very, very poor and very, very dirty conditions. It was depressing.

Karachi was an old, city built by the British that hadn't changed much at all physically after 1947, but its population of approximately 200,000 people had grown to about two million people when I arrived. It was overcrowded. It is pretty much the same city now, except that it has grown to seven to nine million people.

We didn't live in compounds. We lived in housing which was scattered here and there. The Embassy had U.S. government apartments either rented or owned. I lived in a two-story house with four apartments. The apartments had marble floors. There was a secretary from USIS [United States Information Service] upstairs and a communications officer in another apartment. I had a two-bedroom apartment. In those days you had air conditioning only in the occupied bedrooms. The area was then quite nice. Now, that area looks like the Bronx [in New York]. At the time it was what I would call "South Asia Southern California Modern."

It was my first experience with domestic servants. I had five. There was the gardener, the "bearer," the "assistant bearer," and the "sweeper." and a laundryman. Some of them were employed part time. Jamal Din was the "bearer." He was a Punjabi with a turban and mustache and looked like someone from a Hollywood movie on British India. He had started working as a bearer in 1917 -- this was 40 years later, so he was about 60 at that time. He was very much a servant of the "Raj" [British India] and then later for Americans. He was the cook, bought the food, served and ran the house generally. It was amusing. If you have read in books about British India about servants, and the young Englishman, it was sort of like my relationship with him. I ended up owing him money all the time. I figured that this was one way to "keep him honest." He was always "ripping me off" at the market but I liked him and we worked things out.

At the time, in the late 1950s, the U. S. had a very close relationship with Pakistan, because we had an alliance which had been established in 1954. That was really quite controversial. We wanted the pact to bolster the area against the Communists and the Pakistanis were really concerned about India.

A seven officers Economic Section seemed large, but because Pakistan was a U. S. ally, we were concerned about its economic development and wanted to know what was going on. At that point in Foreign Service life, the Embassy was like a "vacuum cleaner" in terms of reporting. Washington wanted to know everything, and we had very extensive reporting requirements. We needed to have a large staff to meet these. Whether it was really needed is another question.

During the first six months I was in Pakistan, we were attached to ICA [International Cooperation Administration] -- the predecessor agency to AID. The head of the Economic Section was also Deputy Director of ICA. We were integrated in the sense that we were located in the same building. However, in fact, we were not integrated. We were doing economic reporting, and ICA was handling the assistance program. We were not in the Chancery. We were located in downtown Karachi with the aid people. My recollection is that this arrangement didn't work out too well. There was little interaction between us and the aid people and we were annoyed that we were not in the Chancery.
My job was to report on various subjects, including transportation, and textiles and agricultural policy -- the part which the Agricultural Attaché didn't do. I had a certain amount of guidance, but for day-to-day activities, I was pretty much on my own. I was given an area to work in, and some suggestions were made that I might do this or do that. After that, I was given a fair amount of leeway. This arrangement worked pretty well for what we were trying to do. The Economic Counselor was Tom Robinson, a very good man. He arrived in Karachi about six months after I did. There was a Commercial Attaché -- Hugh Curry who was quite good. And there was Stan Schiff, a bright financial economist. There was another junior officer named Gordon Chase who also was good. There was a woman officer, Frances Highland. She had an apartment in the house where I lived. She had been, I think, a Foreign Service secretary in China before World War II. She successfully "Wristonized" as an officer. She did industrial reporting -- for example, on petroleum and was quite productive.

I remember one interesting report I did on the textile industry which was then growing rapidly as Pakistan was a major cotton producer. I visited all of the major textile mills, mostly around Karachi, but I also traveled around Pakistan quite a bit. In fact, after I had been there five months, I was told: "Look, we don't know very much about the major irrigation dams and the irrigation system in West Pakistan. Why don't you take a trip and write a report on it." So I got in my car by myself, and drove about 3,000 miles all over West Pakistan. I visited six or seven major irrigation projects. Life was such at that time that even as a Third Secretary of the American Embassy, I could do that. When I went up to Lahore, about 800 miles from Karachi and the capital of West Pakistan, I called on the Chief Engineer, the head of the water program for West Pakistan. He had perhaps never seen an American looking at his operations in such detail, although undoubtedly the aid people had been there. But as far as I could tell, he was pleased by our interest and didn't seem to resent the questions I asked.

The countryside was poor, particularly in the southern area, the Sindh. The area was very arid, mostly desert. If you didn't have irrigation, you couldn't farm. There were certain areas that were covered by irrigation, where the farming results were not bad even though farming techniques were poor. But there were lots of people even on the desert areas. One of the things that always hit me about Pakistan was that you would be driving around and you would stop your car in the middle of nowhere in the desert to eat a sandwich or what have you. Pretty soon there would be 50 people around. It wasn't clear where they came from.

Apart from the density of the population, you were struck by the poverty in the cities -- both in India and Pakistan. That hit me at first, although after a while I got used to it. Otherwise, you couldn't survive. Karachi was somewhat worse than other major Pakistani cities because it had a lot of refugees who fled there in 1947 and were still living in mud huts and squalid conditions a decade later.

For me, at least, Pakistan was a wonderful learning experience about the Foreign Service. The greatest value of what I did at the time was that it provided a good basis for me to become a South Asia specialist. I learned an enormous amount about Pakistan from reporting, traveling around, talking with people. Americans were generally well liked at the time so contacts were relatively easy. I continued to work on Urdu. I took early morning classes at the Embassy, which didn't amount to much. I kept this up and then I hired a fellow at my own expense for further
study in the evening. Surprisingly, none of the American officers in the Embassy knew how to speak Urdu well. A couple of people had taken the FSI course. However, South Asia is unusual in that the educated population spoke English and business is conducted in English. Urdu or Hindi are good only for two things: one is to talk to the "man in the street," who doesn't know English. Two, if you really get fluent at speaking Urdu or Hindi, it is a terrific public relations gesture. People like it. However, you can function as a diplomat without the language in South Asia. You can, for example, read the main newspapers and magazines in English. They carry most everything that is in the Urdu or vernacular press. The civil servants and people in the foreign ministry and business circles all speak fluent English, etc.

But Urdu helps you enormously to get around, especially when you are on your own. In their day-to-day living a lot of the Americans [in Pakistan] were terribly frustrated because they couldn't speak to the common people. Knowledge of English is very limited when you get beyond the elite and the educated. So my knowledge of Urdu was very helpful. Indeed, after about a year, my Urdu was pretty good. I used to go around the countryside, giving talks for USIS [United States Information Service] in Urdu. In the end, I was the only fluent Urdu speaker in the Embassy. The work was interesting -- I enjoyed reporting -- but learning Urdu "made" my tour in Karachi. While there, I was finally promoted after nearly four years in the bottom grade. I think that I spent longer as an FSO-7 before being promoted to FSO-6 than it took me to go from FSO-2 to FSO-1.

On one occasion, I was given an assignment which had nothing to do with economic reporting because I could speak Urdu well. We had gotten wind, somehow, that there was a plot to assassinate Ayub Khan. The Political Counselor asked me to meet the "key man" in the plot who was a fortune teller or a numerologist. This "key man" was linked to a Pakistani religious and political leader who supposedly behind the plot. The Political Counselor said: "Can you go down and meet this fellow and see what you can find out -- without giving away that this is what we were trying to do?"

The reason I was needed was that the fortune teller didn't know any English. I spent several hours having my palm read and my fortune told -- trying to get to know the fellow. I never really found out anything, but it was an interesting experience. I never could determine whether there was a real plot or whether it had just been gossip which was picked up by someone.

As I suggested earlier, we had a large economic assistance program in Pakistan. Basically, we were underwriting the development budget of Pakistan. My feeling about the aid program was mixed. Some of our people were quite good and helpful. A lot of the projects were just a total "mismatch." I found an illustration of this "mismatch" out in the countryside in the Province of Sindh -- maybe 200 miles north of Karachi. We had come to a small government office, like a county headquarters where I met two women ICA experts. I was there for the day, traveling around and looking into irrigation matters. They were home economics teachers from Ohio and their project was to teach home economics to Pakistani women, by getting home economics into the curriculum of the rural schools. The project was a total "mismatch." The AID women were working at one level, with one set of values which had absolutely nothing to do with the values which rural Pakistani women had. The ladies were quite nice, but they were a bit lost. They didn't understand the environment, and that their program couldn't work in that environment. I
think unfortunately that this happened with a lot of our aid programs at the time. The money was committed rapidly, and then the staffs began to think of ways to spend it.

One of the ways to spend it was in the field of education, where the Pakistanis certainly needed help. However, the AID view seemed to be that if we teach home economics in the U. S., then we should teach home economics in Pakistan. I don't think that the Pakistanis knew what these people were talking about. These ladies didn't know what the Pakistanis were talking about.

On another occasion when I was traveling in Sindh perhaps 200 miles north of Karachi, the Pakistani hosts said to me, "Oh, you are from the American Embassy. You must see our aid project. We have a wonderful science laboratory." So we visited the laboratory at a local college. There was lots of equipment on hand -- refrigerators and various other modern things. I noted that the equipment wasn't plugged in. When I asked why, I was told: "Well, there is a little problem. We don't have any electricity." AID had given the Pakistanis some money to equip science labs for local colleges. Nobody apparently bothered to find out if they had electricity. I think that there was a lot of that sort of thing going on.

That is not to say that there weren't a lot of good aid programs. There was the Mangla dam, a big project, but that came after my tour. There were other things that we did well. We were involved in helping the Pakistani Railways. They needed re-equipment. We helped PIA, (Pakistan International Airlines). There we had a contract with Pan American Airways, which brought in a team which "lived" with PIA and showed them how to operate the system. That worked quite well. PIA was much better than Indian Airlines, which modernized itself on its own. So some of the aid projects were good. Some of them were not so good.

What was very important in the mid-1950s was the commodity imports program. This amounted to giving the Pakistanis money to import equipment and commodities at a time when they were short of foreign exchange. We also helped the Pakistanis with food imports under PL 480. Then we had other projects, as we did in India, to help set up, for example, an agricultural training facility, with a longer term American commitment -- not just dumping equipment on them. Under these programs, Americans would be there for five or 10 years. Usually these projects were conducted under a contract with an American land grant college. I think that they worked pretty well. However, it was a rather helter skelter.

The Economic Counselor was at first involved in the program planning. Part of the problem was that he did so much work on assistance programs that he wasn't really running the Economic Section. We had was a very strong director for the aid program -- Jim Killen -- who later became AID director in Vietnam. He was an old trade union type. My impression was that he was rough and nasty, and not very sensitive to the feelings of others -- including the Pakistanis. I had a good Pakistani friend whom I met when I wrote the textile report. He was Textile Commissioner or Deputy Textile Commissioner. He told me about a meeting with Killen where the AID Director "chewed out" the Pakistanis the way you would "chew out" Americans. After Killen left the meeting, the senior Pakistani turned to his colleagues and apologized for having had to suffer the insults of "this American boor." However, he said, Pakistan was a poor country, and they had to put up with these "awful people." That was Killen's style -- a bull in the china shop.
There were other much better people there. With the Pakistan Planning Commission, we had a group from Harvard, headed by David Bell and funded by Ford. They worked closely with the Pakistanis, quite amicably, and had a big impact.

We had an enormous Embassy. There were seven people in the Economic Section and half a dozen people in the Political Section. There was a big aid program. We had a big CIA operation, which I was only vaguely aware of. We had a big military assistance program. The reason we were so very heavily engaged in Pakistan was the alliance relationship we had with them.

I began to develop contacts in the Pakistani ministries. It took me a while. In fact, in the beginning -- during my first six months there -- I was frequently sick. It was a difficult adjustment. Maintaining good health was a problem for Embassy people. I think that 20-25% of the Americans there contracted hepatitis. This was before gamma globulin [an injection against hepatitis] became available. Almost everybody came down with dysentery or malaria. However, I think that once you got through the initial period -- if you got through it -- then you were "fine." At least, that was my experience.

There were psychological problems for the Embassy people which still continue today to some extent in South Asia. Getting through the "health barrier" is in part a psychological phenomenon. A lot of Americans became so concerned or had such bad health problems that they went into a cocoon and never got out into the society. In Pakistan the American establishment was so big that it could be "self-contained." Many people saw a lot of other Americans and didn't have much to do with the Pakistanis.

It was not my experience, though. I was not married at the time and figured that I had not gone to Pakistan to see a lot of Americans. The educated Pakistanis were very pro-American at the time and very sociable. People invited you to their homes. There was one major sports and social club, the Gymkhana Club, which is still there, left over from the British colonial days. "Khana" means "house," and it is a house for "gym." It was right in downtown Karachi, and had tennis and squash courts.

There was much socializing with people from the other embassies and younger Westernized Pakistanis -- and some Americans as well. I met many younger Pakistanis particularly in my second year and felt that I understood something about the country. That was quite gratifying.

Pakistan was essentially a three class society. There were the elite -- the English speakers. Then came the middle class, members of which might or might not speak English. They were basically shop keepers, middle grade military officers, and the lower level bureaucrats. Then there were the poor, who were the vast majority. In the rural areas there was a semi-feudal society. There were big landlords, who were the "big shots" in those areas. They were like feudal lords controlling the villages and the peasants on their large estates.

Pakistani women were in two categories. The Western-educated, emancipated women spoke English. They usually had gone to Western schools, either overseas or at a convent or private school in Pakistan where they studied in English all the way through. However, the wives of many of the Pakistani civil servants were in "purdah" [secluded; they did not circulate outside of the home]. They were not brought to parties or, if they did come, they had nothing to say. They
just sat and giggled with each other. At parties these Pakistani women tended to sit separately, so that they didn't play much of a role.

However, there were women who were well educated. The Pakistanis, as opposed to the Indians, liked to dance and party. I did more dancing in Pakistan than in any other place during my entire time in the Foreign Service. There were a lot of parties, and the Pakistanis were great fun lovers. This was true even though the majority of the Pakistani women did not join the festivities. For example, Ayub Khan's wife did not usually come out into society. She would not attend social occasions even if hosted by the Ambassador. Very often the senior Pakistani officials would not come to Embassy functions with their wives.

As I said earlier, after six months or so, I became acquainted with some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although not a lot. Most of my contacts were with the economic Ministries. I was not dealing with bilateral diplomatic issues, but was reporting on aspects of the economy. When I was doing a report, I would go around to see the people in the appropriate ministries. They were really quite open. The United States was much beloved at that time -- not by everybody, but in general.

My views of the Pakistani bureaucracy were somewhat mixed. At the top they were very efficient. On the whole, they weren't bad. Some of them had been trained in England. Some of the newer people were less well trained. It was mixed bag. The younger Foreign Ministry people had been trained in the US. I had met some when I was at Fletcher where the Pakistanis used to send their junior Foreign Service people. That practice lasted until about 1960. So I had the advantage of knowing some Pakistanis and their families from my own time in graduate school.

At first, the economic section was separate from the Embassy. I got to the Chancery once a week when there was a big staff meeting with the Ambassador, attended by all of the substantive FSO's, perhaps 20 or 25 people. Later the Economic Section moved to the Chancery, which was in a horrible building over a jeep repair shop in the center of town. The jeep dealer had the ground floor and had a repair shop in the back, with an open courtyard. The Embassy had the top three floors. The Economic Counselor had an air conditioner in his office, but that was about it. During the hot season, when it gets to 110 degrees [Fahrenheit], everybody else just suffered. It was pretty bad.

During the first year or year and a half that I was in Karachi, the Ambassador was a man from New Hampshire named James Langley. He was a crusty, conservative newspaperman. I didn't have much to do with him, except for one embarrassing occasion. The DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] for the first year or year and a half was Ridgway Knight, who was really more French than American. He had grown up in France and had a bit of a French accent.

The Political Counselor was Mallory Brown. I didn't realize at first that he was rather ineffective. He had been a well known newspaperman during World War II for the "Christian Science Monitor." Then he joined the Foreign Service -- I'm not quite sure how or why. The thing that he did best was write. The Economic Counselor, Tom Robinson, was good. He had worked for the Department of Agriculture and had grown up on a farm. He was a warm and friendly man who later worked for the FAO in Rome.
The Political Section included Chris Van Hollen and Jane Abell (later Jane Coon) who both became ambassadors in South Asia. There was another Political Officer, David Linebaugh, a very fine officer who was later in a terrible automobile accident from which he never really recovered. There was a Political-Military Officer -- Jules Bassin, for whom I later worked in Personnel.

I think these officers were at the heart of Embassy. I was impressed with them. They were a good group, a well-qualified and hard working. The DCM used to call on the junior officers to do something or other from time to time -- to go out to the airport to meet a VIP, etc. Ridgway Knight's wife was French. She was not very much involved. The Ambassador and Mrs. Langley did not place any demands on the junior officers. I think that the American Embassy community was relatively happy for such a big place, even though there were occasional grumbles. There was a large American School.

About the only source for recreation other than tennis and squash, or horse back riding, was going to the beach at Hawkes Bay, about an hour's drive away on the Arabian Sea coast. People had "beach huts," which were really little houses which they rented. I was part of a group which rented one of them, Chris Van Hollen and Stan Schiff were also owners. Now that I think back on it, it was a relatively amicable group there. There were some problems, but not many, occasional friction between the State Department and aid people, often about housing accommodations. But on the whole, housing was pretty well organized and very good. In comparison to most Pakistanis, Americans lived well.

I didn't get a chance to visit East Pakistan which was a long way away although I traveled all over West Pakistan during my tour. I didn't know it at the time, but the oral history interview of Arch Blood makes clear that there was friction between the Consul General in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, and the Embassy. The Consuls General looked on themselves as sort of "mini-Ambassadors." The Consul General in Lahore, Andy Corry, was like that. He was very knowledgeable about Pakistan, but very protective of his territory. He had been the Minerals Attaché during an earlier tour. Transportation was not so easy in Pakistan in those days. PIA [Pakistan International Airways] wasn't all of that good. You had to go by train, a long, slow trip, so the Consuls were pretty largely left alone. They were on their own, for the most part. They were quite concerned about Embassy people traveling in their consular districts and they wanted to know what they were doing. You had to "clear" all visits to their districts with them.

I remember that the first time I visited Lahore, I stayed in a local hotel. Corry, the Consul General, was rather suspicious of me. However, the next time I visited, he invited me to stay at his place. By then he thought that I was "all right." He was rather "persnickety" but very knowledgeable. The Consul Generals obviously had the great advantage in that the American presence in their consular districts was relatively small. So they had much better contact with the local Pakistani community than the Embassy had.

Talking of policy, many of my Pakistani friends liked the US but not the alliance with us. The Dean at the Fletcher School -- Hayden Williams -- got a job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and came through Karachi when I was there. He was
interested in meeting some "non-official" Pakistanis. By then I had gotten to know a lot of Pakistani journalists and intellectuals well. Basically, they would have liked Pakistan to follow a foreign policy like that of India. They preferred neutralism and didn't like being aligned with the United States. They really weren't concerned about communism at all. Their concern was India. We, of course, were concerned about the Communists and wanted good relations with India. This led to a basic "mismatch" in our alliance relationship with the Pakistanis. When Hayden Williams visited Karachi, we went out to lunch with a Pakistani woman, a friend of mine, who was a journalist. Williams started asking her about the alliance with the U. S. and why Pakistan wanted military aid from us, saying that this aid was to help Pakistan against communism. She said: "No, we don't care about the communists. We need this aid against India." When he asked: "Aren't you worried about communism?" She answered, "No." He was shaken up by this. The Pakistanis were obsessed with the "Indian threat" and you can understand why. We chose to ignore this reality. The Eisenhower administration had the idea of surrounding the communists with alliances and allies. The Pakistanis were one of our allies, and we were going to help them. We were not unaware of Pakistani views, but preferred to just to filtered this unpleasant fact out.

We also created a problem because our presence in Pakistan was so great and so heavy that it almost looked as if we were replacing the British. The intellectuals felt uncomfortable about this. They didn't like the idea of being a "lackey" of the Americans, which is to some extent what they had become. This was the general feeling among the younger Pakistanis that I knew. Certainly, we were welcomed by the Pakistani military, who lived off us and were well equipped thanks to us. The civil servants and the economic people were annoyed by AID Director Killen, but he was just one individual. They were happy enough to take our aid funds.

The younger Pakistanis that I knew were children of well to do families and were well-educated. They were concerned and jealous about India but greatly influenced by Nehru, who was the dominant figure in South Asia. They thought that Pakistan should not be a consumption driven society. There aim was to follow some sort of moderate socialist pattern. They tended to feel that Pakistan was on the wrong path, blaming us, to some extent, for this. However, this feeling was somewhat muffled because they were so scared of the Indians. We were their security shield against India.

They viewed their own military relatively positively. I was in Pakistan when Ayub Khan took over power in October 1958. The civilian government of Pakistan, which had been in control during my first year there, was really a mess. It wasn't functioning. There was a lot of back biting. Right before its collapse there was a big fight in the East Pakistan Assembly, in which the Deputy Speaker was killed after he was hit by an inkwell. The Pakistanis whom I knew were ashamed of the political turmoil. India, by then, had two elections and seemed to be moving ahead. The Pakistanis didn't seem to be able to get their act together.

When Ayub first came into power, I think that there was a rather universal feeling of relief that the country was finally on a firmer footing. Ayub was well received by my friends even though they sometimes might have had relatives who were kicked out of jobs. But Ayub put civilians into office, too. I remember that one of the younger civilians that he put into office was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Martial law meant that the Army was running the show. They could enact laws by the issuance of an ordinance. The government did begin to operate more effectively. Right at the
beginning of the Ayub Khan period three things happened. One, he cleaned up Karachi. He resettled the refugees into new towns. These were quickly built and the refugees were moved into permanent quarters.

Then, they got people to work on time. For the Pakistanis the work day theoretically started at 9:00 AM. But people would not be there until 11:00 AM. Suddenly, it was a military operation and people were on time. But that didn't last all of that long. Ayub Khan also carried out a purge of the government. A number of people were fired for corruption. These were senior government officials, including one man I used to deal with in Civil Aviation. Examples were made of the worst offenders, who they were fired. Ayub also carried out a modest land reform program, which was a big domestic issue in West Pakistan. It was a modest effort, and did not break the back of the big landlord and the feudal system. The lower limit of land which an individual could hold was quite high. There were loopholes, too, so that it didn't affect too many landholders. The Army didn't go after the landlords who weren't badly hurt by the reforms.

During the year that I was there when Ayub was in power, things were running much better. In fact, this happened in Burma and in a couple of other countries where there were military takeovers. There was a feeling at the time that maybe we were too facile in assuming that democracy was the best way for Third World countries. Maybe they needed a period of firmer rule and stability before they could make democracy work.

During the first few years under Ayub, Pakistan went from being an unstable mess to become a country which was seen as promising. The country was uplifted psychologically as well as economically. Pakistanis had a renewed sense of pride. Maybe the economic achievements weren't fully noticed in one year, but people felt more optimistic. They felt better about themselves, than they had before.

In the mid 1950s, we were just developing a corps of South Asian specialists, such as Chris Van Hollen and Dave Schneider. There was a man before him named Morris Dembo and Jane Coon. And then I got into it. Hal Josif was telling me that he was sent for training, I think about 1950. So there were people sent for university or language training who knew a great deal about India or Pakistan, but most of the Embassy were in Pakistan on their first tours -- or perhaps their second tours, at most. This was one of the reasons that you had these cultural "gaps," they often didn't know Pakistani customs.

Being the low man on the Economic Section totem pole, I didn't get involved in many substantive issues. There actually was a lot going on. When I write my book, I will get into some of these things. For example, during this period the Pakistan arms program really ballooned. Nobody could explain how it ballooned. The Pakistanis were very good at getting money from us. We suddenly were very short of money in the military assistance program. President Eisenhower exploded at a meeting of the NSC [National Security Council] on the Pakistan arms program, asking how we had gotten into this damned thing. He asked why we were doing it. However, he said that now that we were into it, we couldn't get out of it.

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Q: In 1969 you were transferred to Islamabad [Pakistan]. Was this at your request? Did you want to get back to your area of specialization?

KUX: The position I held in Bonn was abolished. So I left three or four months before my tour should have been over. In a way the Pakistan assignment worked out in response to my preference. I had put on my "April Fool" form that I would like to go to South Asia. So the Department assigned me to a job in South Asia. I had at an earlier time decided to specialize in South Asia, so that this assignment fit into my career plans very well.

The Political Section of our Embassy in Islamabad was a very different setup than that we had in Bonn. The Embassy in Islamabad had a four or five-man Political Section. I was the second-ranking officer in the Section. We had a Political Counselor, a Political-Military Officer, and I think, perhaps, two others in addition to myself.

Basically, we dealt with three or four major concerns. One was following the internal political situation in Pakistan, which was then in flux. The second issue was India-Pakistan tensions and relations -- more tensions than relations. The third was Pakistan's evolving relationships with the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. Finally, there was our own relationship with Pakistan. We had been a major supplier of military equipment to Pakistan in the past. In 1969 we were not providing Pakistan anything much. Each officer in the Political Section did a little bit of everything. The work wasn't strictly compartmentalized.

When I arrived in Islamabad, we had physically the worst Embassy that I had ever served at, in an old house. The Pakistani Government, by then, had moved the capital from Karachi to Islamabad, 1,000 miles to the North. It was a very nice location, at the edge of the foothills of the Himalaya Mountains. It was higher and cooler than Karachi, but the new town hadn't been built. The Embassy was in an older city called Rawalpindi, some 15 miles away. It was a dreadful Embassy building in a ramshackle old private home. The Political Section had awful quarters. My office was a sort of a closed compartment with no windows in it. The electricity would go off frequently. I was often, literally, in the dark! As the Department hadn't started construction on a new building, we rebuilt the space allocated to the Political Section to improve things. Later we moved to Islamabad and moved in with AID in a much better building. That was a vast improvement.

The first Ambassador when I was there, and he was just there for three or four months, was Benjamin Oehlert. He was a "Coca Cola" executive -- I think a vice president. He was a political appointee and suffered from a bad case of "localitis." That is, he saw his mission in life as improving relations with Pakistan, which, in his view, meant giving them arms. He beat away on this issue unsuccessfully. He was a "Johnny One Note" and did not get along with our Ambassador in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, who was a "Johnny One Note" on a different theme: "Don't give the Pakistanis arms."

We had suspended arms shipments to Pakistan in 1965, when India and Pakistan went to war. We subsequently eased up on this prohibition a bit. In 1967, we allowed the Pakistanis to purchase "non lethal" military items and spares. I don't think that we gave them any credits and we didn't sell them any new item that they could shoot. So by 1969 we had a very small military
assistance program. Ambassador Oehlert wanted this changed. The Pakistanis also wanted our policy changed.

What was very surprising to me, when I arrived there, was how different the attitude of the Pakistanis was toward us from what I remembered to be from my earlier tour in Karachi. Then they liked us, now they thoroughly disliked and distrusted us.

The Pakistani attitude in 1969 was like "night and day," compared to the attitude to 1959. Then we were their great friend. Now we were seen as someone that had betrayed them by not backing them in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India.

My arrival in Islamabad was unusual. I drove overland from Germany, which was quite an experience. It took 21 days. automobile. I drove with a couple of Germans, not with my family. This was something that I had always wanted to do. I ran into a German who had made the trip a couple of times. He said: "Oh, sure, you can do it." My car, a 1966 Mercedes, was nearly wrecked on the trip when we got stuck in a river crossing in Iran. The trip was a real adventure, but we made it. Arriving in Islamabad was bizarre. We got there at about 5:00 PM, after coming the Khyber Pass from Kabul that day. At 6:30 PM I was at a diplomatic cocktail party. After three weeks on the road, that was a bit of an adjustment. Apart from my trouble in shifting gears, what struck me about the cocktail party was that there was only one Pakistani there to say goodbye to my predecessor and to say hello to me. That was very different from the way things had been in the 1950s. The Pakistani was someone at the appropriate level from the Foreign Ministry -- the Americas desk officer.

Oehlert left in June 1969 shortly after I arrived in Islamabad. He was a holdover from the Johnson administration. He was replaced some months later by another political appointee, but a Republican, Joe Farland. He had no experience in the region, but had two previous ambassadorial posts, in Panama and the Dominican Republic. Therefore, he was more sophisticated than his predecessor about the way an Embassy operates.

Ambassador Farland was much less of a proponent of getting arms for the Pakistan and was more relaxed about this issue. He had another weakness. He was a publicity hound. He had been very successful in Panama and the Dominican Republic in the public affairs area. He was a big "PR" [Public Relations] type -- "Uncle Sam loves you, and so forth." After he got to Pakistan, he tried to repeat this success in Pakistan. He was present everywhere. He was popping up publicly two or three times a week, ribbon cutting and making speeches. It was as if he were on a U. S. political campaign trip. He launched a press "blitz." He had a Press Officer, a USIS [United States Information Service] career officer who should have known better but didn't -- and who went along with the Ambassador. So should the others in the Embassy but it isn't easy to tell a opinionated political ambassador that he doesn't know what he is doing.

Pretty soon the Pakistani political opposition -- led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto -- started screaming and attacking Ambassador Farland for "interfering" and being a CIA agent. Farland had been an FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] agent at one time -- so that got translated into a "CIA agent." The opposition press really came out against Ambassador Farland and launched a nasty campaign against him. He took this rather personally but he did pull in "his horns." He told the
Foreign Ministry that if they didn't turn off these attacks, he would resign as Ambassador. He did this without Washington authorization. I remember going with him to the Foreign Ministry, where he left a note, saying that the attacks on the American Ambassador were unacceptable. If continued, they would severely damage relations between the two countries. He told them orally that he didn't need to stay in Pakistan. He had plenty of money, and there were other things that he would rather do. We did not tell Washington that he was doing this. However, he mailed the Pakistan desk a copy of the note that he had left at the Foreign Ministry. That, I think, was our report of what happened.

Pakistan had a military dictator in power even though there was an opposition and some freedom of the press. They were in a transitional period. Ayub Khan had fallen, and Yahya Khan was the leader. He was the head of the Army but was setting the stage for elections and had eased up on press restrictions. However, they still could turn things off, and did. The attacks on Ambassador Farland stopped. Farland also "pulled his horns in." In fact, Farland was more of a public figure than a foreign ambassador can be in Pakistan, especially a US ambassador. In Pakistan, there were sensitivities about Americans being seen and heard too much.

I don't think that I ever gave a public speech in Pakistan during my second tour there. When I was there during my previous tour, I gave many. In 1969, I wouldn't have been invited to make a public talk, and the government would have taken exception if I had given speeches. Farland, at first, just didn't understand this. After he had been "burned" personally, he became more laid back and relaxed.

The Embassy staff was more comfortable with Farland's views on the arms issue than with Oehlert's. In fact, the issue of military assistance pretty much faded from our conversations by the end of my tour in mid-1971. Then there was the crisis over East Pakistan, and we weren't giving them military assistance. The Pakistanis knew that they weren't going to get more military assistance because of the crisis.

The first DCM was Tom Rogers, who left shortly after I got there. Then, Sid Sober was the DCM most of the time I was in Islamabad. He was an area specialist. The Political Counselor was Steve Palmer, whom I had known before. He was not an area specialist, but a very capable officer. He left about six months before I did, and I was the acting Political Counselor.

Pakistani coolness did not last for the whole tour. What changed things was Nixon. Nixon liked Pakistan, and things gradually opened up. Then, about a year and a half through my tour, the Pakistanis held elections in December 1970, and Pakistan became a much freer place until the Bangladesh crisis. While I was still in Islamabad Kissinger came through -- in fact, he arrived just as I was leaving in July 1971. I will get to that later.

As I said, the feeling in Pakistan was that the United States had betrayed Pakistan by not backing them in its war with India in 1965 and by cutting off military assistance. Now it was a question of when the military aid was to be resumed. The Pakistanis felt: "We were your ally; why did you stab us in the back and betray us?" We would make the argument that we were their allies against the communists, not against the Indians. We didn't usually point out that, after all, they had started the 1965 war. The top of the Pakistani Government was hopeful for a resumption of
military aid, and recognized that the country still needed us. We still had a big economic aid program, in the vicinity of $100 million a year. They knew that was important and they hoped that we would resume military aid.

I mentioned the tensions between our Ambassadors in Islamabad and New Delhi. That situation did improve with Ambassador Farland's arrival. A political Ambassador, Kenneth Keating, was assigned to India after Ambassador Bowles and the tensions between our Ambassadors in Islamabad and New Delhi were not as bad as before. However, there still were different views. If you sat in New Delhi, you had one view. If you sat in the Embassy in Islamabad, you had a different view. It was hard to rise above these differences.

I personally made the argument for resumption of military assistance to Pakistan because I felt that this was right thing to do in terms of our relations with Pakistan. In fact, when you look at this issue from the standpoint of U.S. relations with India, this was not the thing to do. From that point of view we should not have provided arms or reestablished a substantial security relationship with Pakistan.

The country had developed a great deal economically from when I was in Pakistan 10 years earlier. Then, for example, you could count on being sick -- frequently. During the 1969-1971 period we didn't get sick. The standard of living and health had improved considerably. Life was a lot easier. Islamabad was a healthier place to be. The climate was better, but it wasn't just that. The Pakistanis had made a lot of progress in public health and in their economy.

Politically, however, they hadn't made much progress. Just before I arrived in Pakistan in 1969, the Ayub Khan era had come to an end. There were a lot of disturbances among students and other groups, who were discontented with the system, which had started very successfully in the late 1950's and continued into the 1960's. However, Ayub Khan stumbled with the war with India in 1965, which was a big mistake on his part. Ayub tried to grab Kashmir. That led to India's striking back and to war.

Ayub was on the downward slope after that. He fell sick in 1966 or 1967 and never fully recovered. In 1968, Pakistan launched what they called "the decade of development." Ayub had been in power for 10 years. Many Pakistanis called it "the decade of decadence." The government had started, as a lot of dictatorships do, in a positive way, but wound up with much corruption. There was a lot of opposition in East Pakistan, which had always felt discriminated against. In the 1965 war, East Pakistan was helpless in the face of India. A big independence movement then started there.

When I arrived in Pakistan in 1969, Ayub Khan had just been kicked out, and Yahya Khan had come in with a new government and announced that it would move gradually toward a democratic system and elections. During the time that I was there, there was a gradual easing of restrictions. There was freedom of the press, and political parties were free to organize. Pakistan held national elections in December, 1970. The results were a big surprise to the Embassy and to the government of Pakistan. In the eastern part of Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, the provincial party, called the Awami League, won 167 out of 169 seats contested. The seat apportionment system then in effect gave the Awami League an absolute majority in the national
Constituent Assembly in Islamabad. It had been assumed that the Awami League would win in East Pakistan, but not by that much of a majority.

In West Pakistan it was assumed that the traditional parties, which were quite conservative and tied to the landlords, would do reasonably well. A new, Left-wing party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, had been organized by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former Foreign Minister who had quit the government, gone with the opposition, and coined the phrase, "Islamic Socialism." This party criticized the government and the U. S. It was thought that this new party would do all right but would not dominate the scene. In fact, that party won 85 of 135-140 seats in the west. So Bhutto's party had an absolute majority in the West, while Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League in the East had almost 100% of the seats. The result of what was regarded as a fair election was a political "earthquake."

I think the economic development program that we funded, over the 10 year period since I last served there, had a significant impact on political activity in Pakistan. But I think that Pakistan is a special case, because it was a new country. It wasn't just a colony becoming independent. It was created out of nothing, really, so that the first 10 years of independence really were a period of nation building.

However, the second 10 years of independence were a period of "national consolidation," which ultimately failed. There certainly was more political activity in the late 1960's than in the late 1950's, because of the "failed politics" of the country's development. In the 1950's, the political parties didn't know what they were doing, they didn't have their act together, and there was an enormous amount of infighting. Then, after Ayub Khan came to power, there gradually developed an opposition to Ayub. It was "anti-regime" politics, which didn't exist earlier. The level of participation in the elections of December, 1970, was very high. It wasn't that the middle class had a greater stake in the outcome and was therefore politically more active. The fact was that the Pakistanis had never had an election before.

In general, in the pre-election campaigning, politics was a subject that was widely debated. Politics were active and alive. They were taken very seriously. At the time the leadership of the country was military, helped by some "technocrats." Our impression was that Yahya Khan, who was the leader, was a pretty limited person -- a bit of a "boozzer" and "womanizer" who was not very bright. He did not have the skill to work out the sort of compromise that would have been necessary to keep Pakistan together. His task was not made any easier by Mujib in East Pakistan, who was a demagogue, nor by Bhutto, who was also a demagogue. Mujib became the undisputed leader in East Pakistan and later the President of Bangladesh.

The Pakistanis were politically aware; they knew what their votes would mean. They were voting for Bhutto in West Pakistan. They were voting for a change from the old regime. The people who were politically educated were pleased that they had a free election. They weren't pleased with the results.

As a political officer, you call on various people. When I called on Mujib in Dacca, he talked to me as if he were talking to 65,000 people in Yankee Stadium. He had a standard speech and he gave it. There certainly were indications that the Bengalis of East Pakistan were unhappy with
West Pakistan Government and with the "deal" that they were getting. However, I didn't anticipate that things would work out the way they did. It need not have happened. It was not a certainty. Mujibur Rahman was not very capable and rather inflexible. He became the "prisoner" of the extremists. There was Yahya Khan, who was very limited, narrow-minded, and was "manipulated," I think.

Bhutto, I think, still wanted to be "Number One" and was unwilling to serve under Mujib. I think that he worked with members of the Army to ensure what happened. Bhutto was very different from Mujib. He was very clever -- perhaps too clever -- and he had a very complex personality. While he publicly and violently criticized the United States in his campaign, he would privately tell Sid Sober and Steve Palmer, who were in contact with him: "Don't worry about that. That's just politics. If I get into the government, I will work with you." Bhutto created a situation which blocked any settlement that would have been acceptable to the East Pakistanis. I think that he did this in league with the Pakistani generals, although it is not entirely clear who did what to whom.

I believe that the Pakistani Army had a "contingency plan" to take over East Pakistan. They started laying the groundwork for that by sending more troops there in early 1971. A series of negotiations were held in the middle of March, 1971, in East Pakistan to try to work out a settlement. During all of this the United States basically took no position. We were in contact with the government, but essentially as observers. We were not involved in Pakistan's internal politics. We hoped that things would work out, but we were not involved. However, a few days before the military crack down we were approached by a man named Daultana -- a conservative political figure, a major landlord and former Chief Minister of the Punjab. He said: "Look, you have to intervene. If you don't, the Army is going to botch the job and there will be real trouble ahead." I remember that we had a big debate in the Embassy on whether we should do something about that request. Our options were to approach the government and say: "Look, you have to make some compromises...". That would have meant intervening politically. We debated this course of action. The one person who wanted to intervene politically was the CIA Chief of Station. His argument was: "Look, we are a great power, and we should be trying to help." I was among those who took a more "State Department" attitude, saying: "We can only lose if we do that. The Pakistanis are 'big boys.' They know what they're doing." The British High Commission in Islamabad, with which we consulted very closely, was headed by a very effective High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard. He took the same view. So we sat on our hands.

On March 23, 1971, the Pakistani Army "cracked down" in East Pakistan. They arrested Mujib and outlawed the Awami League. That set off the Bangladesh crisis which lasted until the war for independence at the end of 1971. In retrospect, I think that we should have intervened. We should have done something. We should have told the Pakistanis that we were speaking to them as friends. We should have said: "Look, you have to try to save your country. You have got to try to work something out with East Pakistan. The use of force isn't going to work."

The Pakistani military probably held the view it had no choice in Dacca, except to "crack down." I think that there, to some extent, they may have been "manipulated," or Yahya Khan may have been manipulated by Bhutto.

Here I will have to get into the details. There was supposed to be a national meeting, I believe, to
write a constitution. This was after the elections of December, 1970. Bhutto refused to participate in the meeting. The Pakistani Army went along with Bhutto, which was not really in keeping with the rules that they had established. The Bengalis had a right to be aggrieved, but what they were demanding amounted to independence. It wouldn't have been "full" independence, but the central government would have been so weakened that it would not amount to much. That wasn't acceptable to the Army.

Of course, the people in East Pakistan were horror-stricken by the military's harsh actions. They paid the penalty and they were bitter and angry. Those Bengalis who were in the government were no longer loyal to it. Many Bengalis who were in West Pakistan no longer felt any allegiance to Pakistan.

What we in the Embassy did not know at the time was that the Pakistani leadership had changed its view of us; it had become much more favorable and we might have had greater influence that we thought possible. The attitude was different because the US opening to Communist China had begun by then. It was reaching its critical stage. I forget the exact date, but right about this time the Pakistanis got the "green light" from Zhou En-lai -- Chinese Communist Prime Minister -- for National Security Adviser Kissinger to come to Beijing. That was entirely unknown to us.

The China episode goes back to 1969, when President Nixon visited Pakistan. He didn't come to Islamabad. He went to Lahore, and I wasn't involved in the visit. He raised the "China opening" with Yahya Khan during this visit. Nixon asked: "Could you do anything? We would like to do something with the Chinese Communists."

So from the summer of 1969 on, the Pakistanis were talking with the Chinese about us. The Embassy was never involved. The channel was from Yahya Khan to the Pakistani Ambassador in China to the Chinese and back the same way, usually not by cable but by diplomatic courier. The channel then ran from Yahya Khan to the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, who took the messages to Kissinger. On the Pakistani side Yahya Khan did not tell his own Foreign Ministry. Only he and one or two people around him who were aware of what was going on.

Yahya Khan came to the U. S. in 1970 for a dinner in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the UN. President Nixon again raised the China opening question with him. So, all through this period this process was going on. It wasn't very rapid, but it speeded up in the spring of 1971, just as the East Pakistan crisis erupted. So we had a greater influence with the Pakistani government than we were aware. Washington might not have approved intervening with the Pakistanis, but the Embassy probably would have done it without asking for Washington approval in advance. It could have been done in a way that would not have created that much of a problem. Before the "crackdown," I think that it might have been handled very tactfully which would not have created any "waves."

The March 23, 1971 came just three and a half months before I left. The Pakistani Army was very brutal when it moved in. It made a large number of arrests and shot many students. The Consul General -- Archer Blood -- in Dacca sent in a "protest" telegram -- Dacca 231. This was an LOU [LIMITED OFFICIAL USE] or Ouo [OFFICIAL USE ONLY] message signed by every member of the staff of the Consulate General. Essentially, this message said that the U. S.
has no major strategic interest in South Asia. Therefore, our national values should prevail -- our concern for human rights and democratic freedoms. It urged U. S. condemnation of the Pakistani military "crack down" and called for support of self-determination in East Pakistan.

When the message came in, I happened to be with Ambassador Farland. The message was sent to the Department of State in Washington, with a copy to the Embassy in Islamabad. Farland shrugged his shoulders and said, "Hmmm." Sid Sober, however, took a very different view. He was very upset. The next day a cable came back from the Department, reclassifying the Dacca cable from OUO or LOU to NODIS [No Distribution Outside the Department of State], which was the highest restriction. Arch Blood had classified the cable somewhat disingenuously. At the very end of the cable he said that he had not signed the cable, because he did not think that it would be appropriate for a Consul General, but he added that he had the highest respect for the members of the staff, whose views he shared. In fact, the cable was distributed in about 85 or 90 copies and was sent all over Washington, which I assume was Arch's intention.

There followed a period of very, very bitter and bad feelings between our people assigned to East Pakistan, who were evacuated later, and our Embassy people in West Pakistan. There were also tensions within the Embassy. The Dacca staff felt that we were backing the Pakistani Government in Islamabad in its repressive activities in East Pakistan, which wasn't really the case. The Embassy didn't share those views, but understood that the Dacca staff would be much more agitated since some of its Pakistani friends had been arrested and killed. The "crack down" happened very fast. It was made worse by the fact that when the Consulate General staff in Dacca had to be evacuated, originally the intention was that our people would fly from Dacca to Bangkok, on an American aircraft which the US Government would charter. At the last moment the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said that they didn't want the Consulate General to be evacuated via Bangkok. They wanted them to fly out by way of Karachi on a Pakistani aircraft. We didn't argue with the Foreign Ministry; our concern was to get our people out of Dacca.

We weren't thinking about whether they flew on an American carrier or a Pakistani plane to Karachi. We really didn't consider that. However, our people in Dacca were furious. The Americans in East Pakistan were furious that they had to fly to Karachi, which was quite far [around 1400 miles in the direct line]. They later said that, on the way to Dacca, the Pakistani airliner had ferried Pakistani troops that had come to butcher their friends. It was as if they were Jews leaving Eastern Europe on a train returning from the "gas chambers."

When the people from the Consulate General in Dacca arrived in Karachi, they were greeted by Sid Sober. There was a lot of tension and a bad scene ensued. The Dacca staff was very unhappy with the way they had been evacuated. They felt that the Embassy had let them down, and that we should have fought with the Pakistani Government.

Then there was tension between the Embassy in Islamabad and the Department in Washington about what stance we should take. The Embassy did not want to go as far as the staff of the Consulate General in Dacca had gone but wanted to take some action that would be clearly critical of the Pakistani Government. At that point the State Department in Washington said: "Do nothing."
A month or so after the "crack down," in Pakistan, the China arrangement with the U. S. suddenly jelled. The White House didn't want any criticism of the Pakistani Government. We never connected the Department's instructions with Nixon's and Kissinger's "opening" to China. However, AID [Agency for International Development], acting on its own, stopped economic assistance to Pakistan by arguing -- in a legalistic way -- that they could not move forward with new programs, given the unsettled conditions. It was amusing, in retrospect, because AID was always pushing for more programs. Now it took the lead in trying to cut back.

Ambassador Farland was eventually made aware of the China developments. He was called back to Washington and briefed. At that time Kissinger worked out a cover story with the Pakistanis. They would say that Kissinger was on a worldwide trip. When he got to Islamabad, he would supposedly get "sick" and would find time to fly into China. The only people in the Embassy who were aware of this were the Ambassador and the CIA Chief of Station.

When Kissinger's trip was announced, Ambassador Farland did something clever. The Director of the AID Mission and the DCM had made previous plans for travel on leave. Ambassador Farland insisted that they keep those plans, even though Kissinger was coming through. So you had the Deputy Director running the aid program. The Political Counselor had already left the post on transfer. That made me the ranking officer in the Embassy. I was the Acting DCM and was appointed Control Officer for Kissinger. I was due to leave Islamabad a day after the Kissinger visit was over. He was in Islamabad the last week I was there.

The Kissinger group was not a large one. It was composed of Kissinger, Hal Saunders, John Holdridge, Winston Lord, Bill Smyser, a staff aide, and maybe one other person. No American or other press representatives. Kissinger first went to India and then came to Pakistan. I knew nothing about the true purpose of the visit to Pakistan. We went through the normal plans for a visit for someone of Kissinger's rank. I think that he was scheduled to be in Pakistan for a day and a half. We set up briefings by the Embassy, calls on Pakistani officials, and followed the usual drill. The whole Embassy was turned upside down. It was difficult for me to manage since I was packing at the same time to leave.

Kissinger arrived. On the way in from the airport I rode with Hal Saunders, who was then with the National Security Council staff. He said: "Everything's OK, but Kissinger has 'Delhi belly' -- you know, diarrhea. He's not feeling well." That was part of their plan. I should have realized it - - maybe I am just gullible -- but it seemed plausible. But I did notice that Kissinger ate a big lunch at the Ambassador's.

We had meetings at the Embassy. He asked lots of questions about what was going on in East Pakistan, what the odds were of India going to war, and what did we think of the situation. We gave our own briefing, our "dog and pony show." This involved a lot of work.

That night Yahya Khan gave a dinner for Kissinger. At about midnight, Ambassador Farland and Hal Saunders showed up at my house, which was unusual. I thought: "Oh, God, Kissinger must really be sick." I was told that Yahya Khan was insisting that Kissinger go up to the mountains. We had to postpone everything for a day. Kissinger was due to leave Pakistan that afternoon. Yahya Khan insisted that Kissinger see sunrise up in the mountains. Ambassador Farland and
Hal Saunders went through a big "song and dance" about all of this. Kissinger was staying at Yahya Khan's guest house. So I asked: "What time do I have to be there? You say that Kissinger's leaving at 4:00 AM. I will be there at 3:30 AM." The Ambassador said: "Oh, no, you don't have to be there." I said, "I have to be there. It is my job." The Ambassador said: "No, no." So finally, I thought: "To hell with it" and didn't show up. Kissinger and most his group left that morning but for China, not the mountains.

Part of the plan was for Ambassador Farland to go up to the mountains with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary. Hal Saunders was the only one in the party who stayed behind in Islamabad. The crew on Kissinger's plane didn't even know what was going on. I remember telling the captain of the plane that the schedule had been changed. Hal even sent a cable to the White House, using CIA communications. It was pretty well done, or else I was very gullible.

The next day the Kissinger party was due back in mid-afternoon. Ambassador Farland and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary arrived back with the Secret Service detachment. They actually had been in the mountains. There were a couple of Secret Service agents with them, one of whom was sick as hell. But no Kissinger. They said: "Oh, God, they took the wrong turn. They stopped to shop for antiques, etc." It was all a sham. What had happened was that the Kissinger party was late, and the Pak pilots had not told anybody. An hour later in came Kissinger with Winston Lord and everybody else. They were full of smiles and made ready to leave for the airport right away.

Kissinger was very clever. As we were going to the airport, he picked up a point in the Embassy briefing and asked me a question related to it. The party was all smiles, and off they went.

Two weeks later I was in Switzerland. My aunt said: "You know, Kissinger went to China! How did he do that when he was in Pakistan?" I nearly fell off my chair!

However, a funny thing had happened the night they were away in China. There was a farewell party for me. The one American newspaperman resident in Islamabad was an AP [Associated Press] correspondent, Arnold Zeitlin. He said that some people thought that Kissinger's "illness" was a little strange. He asked: "What the hell is going on?" I said: "Do you want to know the real story?" He said, "Yeah." I said, thinking I was making a joke: "He has gone to China to meet Zhou En-lai." He said: "You're kidding." I said: "Yes, I am kidding."

I remember that the Deputy Director of the AID Mission thought that there was "something strange" going on. I also found things a little strange, except for the fact that we sent the telegrams to the White House and also to Paris, his next stop. These were part of the "cover," which helped fool me.

ROYAL D. BISBEE
Branch Public Affairs Officer
Lahore (1958-1961)

Mr. Bisbee was born of Missionary parents in India, where he was raised and
schooled. After graduating from the University of Washington, he joined the US Army and spent World War II in Iraq with the Army Intelligence Corps. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947 and served, primarily as Public Affairs Officer, in Bombay, New Delhi, Lucknow, Salonika, Lahore, Freetown, Pretoria and Manila. Mr. Mr. Bisbee was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2010 shortly before his death.

BISBEE: I was due for an assignment back in Washington, to head up the Voice of America programs for the Middle East. Suddenly, I received a call from Washington. Loomis was the man in charge of Voice of America at the time. He said, “Roy, we want you back here.”

I said, “What am I going to be doing back there?”

He told me. Then about a week later, I received a call saying, “Roy, your assignment back to Washington is cancelled. All of your effects are being transferred to Pakistan.”

I said, “What am I going to be doing in Pakistan?”

They said, “We’ll send you information by classified communications.”

It seems that the individual who had been assigned to the job – I can’t remember the name – shot himself. He was a one armed individual. He inadvertently, somehow, shot himself. His brains were all over the ceiling.

The Consul General was Andrew Cory. They gave him a list of a couple of people. I was on the list. He picked me, having known me in New Delhi. He said, “I want him, and I want no one else.”

So I was diverted and sent to Lahore. There I was for the next two years.

Q: What was the position of Lahore at the time?

BISBEE: Lahore was more or less the social capital of the country. Karachi was considered to be the political capital. Karachi was a non-entity as it were. Most of the decisions were made in Lahore.

Q: Rawalpindi, I don’t even know if it existed.

BISBEE: It was not even in the minds of anyone. Rawalpindi was a military backwater. It was a useful backwater for keeping track of the military, but there was no foundation of any kind.

Q: Were you there for two years? Until when?

BISBEE: We were there until 1961.

Q: What was the situation there? What were American interests in Pakistan?
BISBEE: American interests in Pakistan were practically zilch at the time. People were running around pushing atoms for peace, and various things of that nature. I was trying to keep track of Bhutto. That man was slippery.

Q: Bhutto was the Prime Minister.

BISBEE: I put him on various stages for this and that. I kept track of him and invited him to cocktail parties. There was very little you could keep track of him with. He was just a weak man. There was no point in putting any strength behind him.

Q: One of the things that has been a constant motif in Pakistan is the corruption. The Bhutto family has certainly been involved. How did you find the corruption factor there at that time?

BISBEE: In Pakistan there is always corruption because it is tribal. As long as you have tribal elements throughout the area, you are going to have corruption. There is no way to avoid it, all the way from Karachi up through the area. There is no way around it.

Q: Basically, the corruption is a distribution of wealth, according to influence. The tribal leader passed out money to various people in his tribe.

BISBEE: Yes, that is basically it. And we don’t seem to get it.

Q: When we look at something like the situation in Pakistan, corruption is a distribution system in the tribal thing. In the West, it’s an individual gaining wealth and putting it in bank accounts.

BISBEE: I would buy that.

There are various ways of doing that. There are systems involved in Pakistan that you are not going to find in other areas of South Asia. There is a system called hawayi, sending money. There are other names. If I was on my own, an Indian, and I wanted to send money to the United States, and I were a nasty man, I wouldn’t use an American bank account. Why would I do that? I would use the hawayi system.

Q: It’s still in a lot of places, like Korea.

BISBEE: Absolutely.

Q: It’s become very much involved with the terrorism factor of today.

BISBEE: Of course. The same thing with relation to Kandahar and that particular part of the world. What I am thinking about is that we are going to be not sufficiently strong in our own political focus, in controlling that whole central aspect of Afghanistan. It is very important that we cannot forget the emphasis that the Islamists are giving to the pursuance of their creed, and the importance of that particular geographic area. That’s a very important area to them.


**CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN**  
Political Officer  
Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad (1958-1961)

*After receiving a Ph.D. in Political Science from Johns Hopkins University, Christopher Van Hollen joined the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in New Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Murree-Rawalpindi, and Ankara, as well as at the Department of State Secretariat, NATO Affairs (RPM) and the Bureau for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. From 1972-1976 he served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 23, 1990.*

Q: In 1958, you moved to the other side of the border and the dispute. You were assigned to Karachi until 1960 and then to what is now known as Islamabad until 1961.

VAN HOLLEN: That is correct. Between the India and Pakistan, the Department sent me, at my request, to the University of California in Berkeley. I spent an academic year in the South Asia program at the University -- this was a very strong program. I learned a little Hindi and Urdu -- Hindi being the predominant language in North India and Urdu the language in what was West Pakistan. The idea was that having served in India and in the anticipation of serving in Pakistan, it would be useful to have a year of area and language study at California. The Department was very enlightened from that point of view. It was a very interesting year.

After that I was assigned to Karachi which was then the Capital of Pakistan. I was the number two political officer in the Embassy. The Ambassador when I arrived was James Langley and he was followed by William Rountree. Langley, who had been a newspaper editor, was a political appointee from New Hampshire -- he was a Sherman Adams man. He was taciturn. Rountree was a professional of the old school. He was very good Ambassador. Langley had a DCM -- Ridgway Knight -- was also a diplomat of the old school. He was a Western European specialist with a French wife, spoke beautiful French and was probably wondering what he was doing in Karachi. He once told me that he didn't think anybody should go into the Foreign Service who didn't have a private income. He was a great connoisseur of wines. Karachi was not a cultural or intellectual center in those days. Nevertheless, Ridgway Knight was there as the number to 2 to James Langley. Knight and Langley worked together reasonably well.

Then Rountree came in. He was quite a bit different individual from Langley. He got along very well with the Pakistanis.

Q: We in the Foreign Service have the tendency to identify with the country in which we are serving. How did you adapt coming from India who had been Pakistan’s arch rival for many
years? Did you have a different view of India from that of your colleagues in Pakistan?

VAN HOLLEN: It was valuable for me to have served in India. It was valuable for me to have gone to the South Asia program at California because I did get a balanced view that you don't get if you only serve in one of the two countries. South Asia is one case -- duplicated in other areas - - in which a bitter conflict between two countries -- India and Pakistan in this case -- is the key foreign policy and security issue in the region. There were other countries, all smaller, but the India-Pakistan relationship was central and in those days -- the late 50s and early 60s -- Pakistan was seen as almost the equivalent of India in terms of power and strength. The countries had fought at the time of independence and the threat of war was there throughout my stay in South Asia -- the 50s and 60s. There could be some parochialism, but the career Foreign Service officers who were doing political reporting were reasonably balanced in terms of reporting on the issues between the two countries. I don't think the people in New Delhi were over-influenced by Indian rhetoric and the same in Karachi for Pakistani views.

Q: Of course, that the time, we were a little bit aloof and not very happy with the international rhetoric which makes it a little easier to stay uninvolved.

VAN HOLLEN: At that time, we were not deeply involved in South Asia. we were fairly detached.

Q: What then were our main interests in Pakistan?

VAN HOLLEN: Our interests were significant because from the mid-50s, Pakistan was seen as one of the key countries in terms of the containment policy against the Soviet Union and the PRC. Pakistan was a member of the Baghdad Pact, which included the British, Turkey and Iran. The Baghdad Pact was established with strong American support. Pakistan was considered a key member of the Pact. Pakistan was also a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty organization (SEATO) which was set up for a somewhat similar purpose -- the containment of the USSR and the PRC. Therefore Pakistan was seen by some people as the latch-pin in those two security organizations. SEATO included Thailand and the Philippines. Pakistan was the only South Asian country which belonged to both the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO. It was therefore seen as a key country in terms of stemming the advance of communism into South and Southeast Asia. For that reason -- particularly in the Eisenhower administration -- Pakistan rated quite high in terms of American foreign policy interests in that part of the world. Beginning in about 1955, we began to supply Pakistan with a substantial amount of military equipment. This in turn created continuing problems with India because while the US said that it was providing military assistance to Pakistan to meet the communist threat, the Indians -- and privately a number of Pakistanis -- believed that it was actually boosting Pakistan's threat to their country. There is no question that there was a certain ambivalent viewpoint in the sense that many Pakistanis did give lip service to the importance of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO when seeking military assistance from the United States. At the same time, they did recognize that these two organizations, by being the rationale for military assistance, were enhancing Pakistan's strength vis-a-vis India which continued to be its unquestioned enemy more than the Soviet Union or the PRC.

Q: In your reporting, did you feel under any constrains about reporting how the Pakistanis felt?
VAN HOLLEN: I am sure that at the Ambassadorial level there may have been a tendency to play down the fact that the Pakistanis saw the Indians as the key threat. There was also the Congressional angle, as there usually is in some of these cases. In order to get funds from the Congress for military supplies for Pakistan, the Communist threat was an important element. Even though aid was going to Pakistan for this purpose, some Pakistanis, at least privately, admitted that they helped Pakistan vis-a-vis India. Nonetheless, we went through the charade of highlighting the Soviet threat, even though people knew in their hearts that the Pakistanis were receiving their military aid against larger threat.

Q: What was the political situation in Pakistan at the time you were there from 1958 to 1961?

VAN HOLLEN: When I first arrived in Pakistan, there was a coup d'etat in the Summer of 1958, when the government was replaced by a government later headed by Ayub. It was not a democratic government in the true sense of the word. Ayub was a military man. He was one of a number of military men who have usually headed Pakistan. But during the period I was in Pakistan, there was relative stability in the period after the coup that took place in August, 1958. The US relationship with Ayub was quite a good one. I remember that when Ayub came to the United States for a State visit in 1961 or 1962, the State dinner given by President Kennedy was one of the most splendid ones given by any Administration. It was given at Mount Vernon. The guests came down on a boat on the Potomac. The Kennedys really laid themselves out. This was partially because of Jacqueline Kennedy's creativity in terms of providing some variety to these dinners. But it also underscored the importance the U.S. attached to its relationship with Pakistan by giving Ayub a very special dinner. I cite that simply as a reflection in protocol terms of the strong relationship that had developed. That relationship however began to change in the 60s while Kennedy was still in the White House.

It began to change as Pakistan was strengthening its ties to the PRC -- a country with which the U.S. then had a very antagonistic relationship. It changed further with the war between China and India in October 1962 when the United States, at the strong urging of the United States Ambassador in New Delhi, John Kenneth Galbraith, provided military assistance to India in the aftermath of the Chinese attack. This put a strain in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and it was really in the early 60s that there began a cooling of that relationship which was at its closest form for roughly a five-year period between 1955 and 1960. So from 1962 forward, in the late Kennedy and early Johnson administrations, one found something of a cooling in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship.

Q: What was the nature of your political reporting since you were in a military-run state?

VAN HOLLEN: Partly because Pakistan, like India, had grown out of the British colonial system, partly because many Pakistanis spoke English easily, you had easy access -- more constrictive than in India. A political officer could move around easily in Pakistan. This made the assignment very enjoyable. I found it very stimulating and in career terms, I benefitted from developments in Pakistan because at the time I was there, Mohammed Ayub Khan made the decision to move the Capital from Karachi to the North and to establish a new Capital in Islamabad. It was somewhat similar to an earlier decisions by the British-Indian government
when it shifted the Capital from Calcutta to New Delhi or the Australian government when it shifted Capitals from Sydney to Canberra. Ayub felt that Karachi was not truly Pakistani; it was tainted by external influences and corruption. Islamabad, in Punjab Province, represented the real heartland of Pakistan. So he made the decision to move the Capital to Islamabad. In getting ready to move the Capital, he in fact moved a large part of the government, not to Islamabad which had not been yet build, but to the adjacent city of Rawalpindi, which was an important city in the Punjab. So you had a situation in which the Foreign Office stayed in Karachi while most of the government moved 900 miles north to Rawalpindi in anticipation of the building of a new Capital in Islamabad. The U.S. government was faced with an amusing, in someway embarrassing situation. We had just finished building a very large Embassy in Karachi -- a big, impressive building downtown -- just as Ayub reached his decision. This building must be one of the largest Consulate building in the world now. At the time the government shifted temporarily to Rawalpindi said that it did not have enough accommodation in Rawalpindi even for their own bureaucrats, much less for Embassy personnel. But they said that if we were really interested, they would find accommodations for us in a place called Murree, which was in the submountains of the Himalayas -- 40 miles north of Rawalpindi, five thousand feet higher at 7,500 feet. It used to be a British hill station after Pakistan became independent. The U.S., in what some people feel was one of its more misguided moments, accepted the Pakistani offer. I was named by Ambassador Rountree to be "Officer-in-Charge" of what became to be known as the Murree Office of the American Embassy. I was transferred with my wife and my young child, who was born in Karachi, by military attaché plane. We were flown to Rawalpindi and drove to Murree -- about an hour and half drive up into the mountains -- and on George Washington's Birthday, 1960, I raised the flag over the Murree Office of the American Embassy. The ceremony was attended by a small, very cold group of people, including the divisional forest officer, the local magistrate, the general from the nearby cantonment. We had a small office there for about four years. I was only there for 18 months. The purpose of the Murree Office was to maintain some kind of representation between the U.S. government and those elements of the Pakistani government which had moved to Rawalpindi.

Later, when Islamabad was completed, Murree was closed and the Embassy shifted from Karachi. I was there in the interim period which from a career point of view was real plus because I was named the head of a small staff -- five people. I wrote my experiences up for the Foreign Service Journal in the early 60s in an article entitled "Mission to Murree". It was a very unique post in that several times I had tended to forget that I was not the American Ambassador to Pakistan as William Rountree gently reminded me at times. For example, I sent some original telegrams to Washington. We had to do this on a"one time pad" -- a very primitive coding device. He made it clear to me -- in diplomatic terms -- that I should report through Karachi. It was a very unusual post in the sense that to get to the government of Pakistan in Rawalpindi I had to travel an hour and half down the mountain and back an hour and a half -- three hours round trip. When I was down there, if I wanted to spend the night, I would have to use the AID guest house. If I went down for a social function with my wife, it was either drive back late at night on a very winding, difficult road or spend the night in the guest house. It gave me the opportunity as a relatively young officer to run my own post. I think I was seen by Washington to have done a reasonably good job and that helped me in career terms.
Ambassador William M. Rountree was born in Georgia in 1917. He received his law degree from Columbus University. During the war he served in the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. After working in numerous positions in the State Department, he served as ambassador in Pakistan, Sudan, and South Africa. He was interviewed by Arthur L. Lowrie on December 22, 1989.

Q: Well in June 1959, you end your major service in Washington and begin your Ambassadorsial career which was a very long and distinguished one. Just for the record, how did you first get appointed an ambassador? What was the process? You were already an Assistant Secretary.

ROUNTREE: After I had been in the Office of Assistant Secretary for several years, I discussed with Secretary Dulles my desire, at his convenience, to go on to other things. He very kindly said that he had hoped I would remain with him for the remainder of his term in office; but he understood my desire to move to the field. He discussed the possibility of an ambassadorial appointment, mentioning specifically Pakistan. Later he said that he discussed the matter with the President and they would be pleased if I would accept that appointment. I was delighted, and accepted.

Q: You went to Pakistan during a relatively stable period. What were the main objectives of your mission to Pakistan?

ROUNTREE: You're quite right. My service in Pakistan happened to be during what many people would consider to be the best period in Pakistani history. Ayub, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had taken over in a bloodless coup and had organized his government not long before I arrived. He brought to Pakistan a period of stability and a sense of national direction which had been largely lacking before he took over. Our relations with Pakistan during that period were very good. We had one of our largest economic/military assistance programs in operation in Pakistan. They were listening carefully to the advice of our economic advisors and were making good progress in a number of fields. Generally things were moving in a favorable direction. There was, of course, criticism in the United States and elsewhere of the revolution which had brought into power a military regime in Pakistan, but at that time no other form of government could have provided the stability and progress which were evident under Ayub. I had tremendous regard for his ability as a leader.

Q: Did we influence him in his early pledge to return to democracy, or was all that from his own initiative?

ROUNTREE: We had some influence in that direction. It was our hope that Pakistan would, as soon as possible, return to democratic processes. Ayub no doubt felt pressures from his own people to do that. He instituted what he called basic democracies which, step-by-step, brought Pakistan more into democratic processes, but far short of real democratic choices which were the
ultimate goal.

Q: *The US was playing an influential role in Pakistan at that time, how was that done primarily? Was it through you in Karachi, or was it done primarily in Washington, or were there other channels that worked to exert US influence?*

ROUNTREE: There were multiple channels. Our general policies in Pakistan were articulated locally by myself as ambassador. During the period of my assignment to Pakistan, several important events occurred. One was the visit of President Eisenhower, which was enormously successful. It brought about a closer understanding between Pakistani and American leadership than had ever existed before. Eisenhower and Ayub got along extremely well. They talked with great frankness and candor and established a new relationship which was much to our advantage. Later, during the early days of the Kennedy Administration, Lyndon Johnson, who was then Vice President, came out on a visit. Again, relations between President Ayub and Vice President Johnson were excellent from the outset. The two got along extremely well, with the result that it was easier for Washington and Karachi to communicate. Pakistan felt for the first time that the Kennedy Administration was not unduly prejudicial toward India in matters affecting the interests of the two neighboring countries. President Ayub, at the invitation of President Kennedy, visited Washington for very frank and helpful talks.

Q: *What was your impression of Vice President Johnson on this? I'm sure you also had reason to see him on other occasions?*

ROUNTREE: My impression was very good. I thought he was extraordinarily able in foreign affairs. I was delighted with his visit with Ayub Khan and the contributions he made as Vice President to a better understanding between the United States and Pakistan. You may recall that during the Vice President's visit to Pakistan in greeting people on the street, he met a camel driver, a fellow by the name of Bashir. And as he shook hands with Bashir he said, in effect, "If you're ever in Texas, look me up". Reporters picked this up and suggested that the Vice President might want to invite Bashir to come to the United States, which he did. I communicated that invitation to Bashir who, as you might imagine, accepted with great pleasure. He came to the United States and was in the company of the Vice President for a number of days in New York, Texas, Washington and elsewhere. It turned out to be a very successful visit, partly because Bashir, although totally uneducated, made some rather remarkable statements which proved to be invaluable from a public relations standpoint. For example, when I extended the invitation to him in Karachi in the presence of members of the press and made comments to the effect that I was happy to make the presentation, I expected no profound response from Bashir. He surprised me and his audience by saying that he accepted with great appreciation the tickets which I had presented to him and he hoped that I would express his appreciation to his friend Johnson Sahib. He looked forward to going to the United States to visit his friend Johnson Sahib. Perhaps he would be introduced to Kennedy Sahib and that would give him great pleasure, as well. But most of all he looked forward to meeting the American people because he regarded the American people as being leaders of the free world. I was ready to commend my Public Affairs Officer for eliciting such a statement, but he assured me that these were Bashir's own words and that he had nothing to do with the comment. This proved to be true over and over again during Bashir's visit to the United States. Wherever he went with the Vice President, he made extraordinary
comments and served as an excellent representative of Pakistan. His quotes were reported all over the world.

Q: I remember that. Did the Embassy have any trouble tracking him down after this thing snowballed into a state visit?

ROUNTREE: No, no trouble at all. Ayub Khan was a little concerned about Bashir's coming when I talked with him about it before extending the invitation. He expressed his preference that the invitation not be extended because he planned himself to come to the United States soon at the invitation of President Kennedy. He thought Bashir's visit might be treated something like a circus. However, Lyndon Johnson had authorized me to assure Ayub that the visit would be treated in a very dignified fashion. On the basis of this assurance, Ayub agreed that Bashir might come. As it turned out, it was very good in terms of public relations, particularly from the point of view of Pakistan, and it contributed to a nice background for Ayub's own visit: From the camel driver to the President; from the common man to the leader.

Q: How about the U2 incident in May 1960 and the impact that it had in Pakistan, wrecking the Paris summit? I think it had been secret up until then that these U2 aircraft had been even flying out of Pakistan.

ROUNTREE: These flights had taken place for some time under extremely special and secret arrangements with Ayub Khan. In each case before such a flight took place, I had to get his specific approval. And the Gary Powers flight did, in fact, take place from Pakistan. I was asked in mid-April to get permission for this flight and I flew from Karachi to Rawalpindi to talk with the President about it. I communicated his concurrence to Washington. The flight was delayed for several days because of weather and other problems, and actually took place toward the end of April.

Q: I remember Khrushchev kept it quiet for some time that the Soviets had captured Powers.

ROUNTREE: Before the flight actually took place, Ayub was slated to go for a Commonwealth meeting in London. At the same time, I returned to Washington on consultation. I left Washington, I believe it was the last day of April. When I arrived at the airport in London, I was told that the CIA Station Chief wanted urgently to see me. It was early in the morning, as I recall about 7 o'clock, and I went straight to the Embassy to see him. He told me that the U2 plane was down, there had been nothing said about it by the Russians, and they had no word of the fate of the pilot, Gary Powers. I was fully briefed on the situation as it was known, and then went to Ayub’s hotel where I filled him in over breakfast. He took the news very calmly, but expressed the strong hope that we would adhere to the cover story that had been agreed in advance. He asked me to inform President Eisenhower of that, which I did by an immediate telegram to Washington. Both Ayub and I returned to Pakistan, and a good many days went by before there was any announcement by the Soviets. Of course, when it did come it came in a spectacular fashion. Ayub did not seem unduly concerned about this, but Pakistan was subjected to a tremendous amount of Soviet propaganda and threats. You might recall, in particular, the threat of bombing Peshawar, from where the U2 took off. I would say that the decision on the part of President Eisenhower eventually to admit exactly what had happened and to make it a matter of
public record, however necessary this might have been, surprised Ayub and rendered it difficult for him to deal with the Soviets.

Q: Eisenhower didn't do that until they produced Gary Powers did he? First we denied it, which was the cover story.

ROUNTREE: That's right, and then he felt compelled to make it all public. This made Ayub's problem with the Soviets rather difficult. A number of things happened after that which tended to soften Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union. Ayub acceded to a suggestion by one of his young cabinet officers, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Fuel and Power, that he accept a Soviet request to send an oil mission to Pakistan. This had been offered by the Soviets some time before. And so they permitted the Soviet mission to come as one means of relieving pressures between Pakistan and the Soviets. Not long after that, the same minister was instrumental in bringing about a change in Pakistan's China policy. Ayub recognized Red China and expelled the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador and Embassy. So there began at the time of the U2 incident a gradual change in Pakistani policies, which altered the nature of Pakistan's relations with the United States, although the basic friendship and cooperation with the United States remained.

I left Pakistan in 1962 and went as Ambassador to the Sudan. After I departed, Ayub's position became less firm. He made more and more concessions toward democratic processes under a system which he called "basic democracy". When he eventually lost power, the young minister I mentioned, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had a meteoric rise in influence and became a candidate for election to President, and eventually won that post.

Q: Had you gotten to know Bhutto when you were there?

ROUNTREE: I knew Bhutto quite well. When I was in Pakistan Bhutto was a very suave, sophisticated man with a beautiful wife, a very wealthy man of considerable property -- many hundreds of thousands of acres of land. He enjoyed western-type entertainment, parties and so forth. Shortly after we arrived, he invited my wife and me to his estate up near Moenjodaro, a place called Larkana. We spent a weekend there with a number of Pakistani leaders and I came to know him quite well, even at the outset of our tour. We continued to see a lot of him socially, as well as officially. When he decided to enter politics he gave up his western dress and lifestyle and became a more traditional Pakistani leader. When we were in Pakistan his daughter was a young child, perhaps eight or nine years old. As you know, now she is the head of state in Pakistan.

Q: Did the move of the capital to Rawalpindi and Islamabad take place during your tenure?

ROUNTREE: It did indeed. That's an interesting story in itself. Shortly after we arrived in Karachi, the new, beautiful chancery building was completed, and my wife and I gave a party to celebrate its opening. We had, perhaps, 2,000 guests, with bands and other entertainment. I made a speech and described the new chancery as indicative of the close relations which existed between the United States and Pakistan, as symbolic of this special association. I then introduced President Ayub who, during the course of his remarks, announced that the capital was being moved from Karachi to Rawalpindi, pending the construction of a new capital city at Islamabad.
All this to take effect immediately. This came as a great surprise to Pakistanis and Americans alike. We thus learned that one of the most beautiful embassy chanceries would soon become a consulate general. From that time, Ayub spent most of his time in Rawalpindi. When I had consultations or discussions with him, I would ordinarily have to fly to Rawalpindi. He did from time-to-time come to Karachi where we would always meet, but that was the exception, not the rule.

Q: Why did he do that? After all, Karachi was by far the largest city and Rawalpindi way up in the boondocks?

ROUNTREE: He wanted to move away from the sea, and wanted, in particular, to get it into an area which was more home to him. He never liked Karachi, and few Pathans did. His great ambition was to build a new capital city as a monument to himself. So he decided to take the bull by the horns and announce the move, and chose the occasion of our Embassy dedication to do so. We had the good fortune of having one house in Rawalpindi which had been used by our AID personnel as a guest quarters for their rather frequent visits to that part of the country. This was an advantage not shared by any other diplomatic mission. There were inadequate facilities in Rawalpindi for diplomatic missions to rent or otherwise acquire new residences. The President did make it possible for diplomats to rent facilities at a town called Murree, 39 miles from Rawalpindi in the foothills of the Himalayas, up winding mountain roads from Rawalpindi. We rented one building for a Political Officer who I assigned there full-time to be in close proximity to Rawalpindi, and rented a house for myself to be used during the period in which Ayub Khan was in residence in Murree, which generally was in June and July. I saw Ayub frequently during this period, but otherwise my meetings with him would normally require flights from Karachi to Rawalpindi.

Q: During this period too, the Pakistan-Afghan differences became quite serious. There was a severance of diplomatic relations in September 1961, a cessation of transit of goods to Afghanistan through Pakistan, which was their main route and, for some reason I can't figure out, our Ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, came out on a "good offices" mission to try to help resolve the Afghan-Pakistan differences. How did that come about, and how did he do?

ROUNTREE: This was a very difficult period and one that caused us a great deal of concern. There was, in fact, open warfare at times between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The implications of this, in terms of stability in the entire region, were disturbing. We made an all out effort to assist in resolving the problem, and urged both sides to settle this matter peacefully. We were finally instrumental in bringing an end to hostilities and in reopening the border. Livingston Merchant, who had been our Ambassador in Canada, and at one time was Under Secretary of State, was asked to come out to visit both sides and extend good offices in providing suggestions which might facilitate a settlement. Livy was a good friend of mine whose diplomatic talents I highly respected, and we welcomed his visit. Although he was not immediately successful, he certainly contributed to the final good result.

Q: Then in November 1962 Averell Harriman comes out, shows up again in your presence with Duncan Sandys. That was on the Pakistani-Indian differences, I guess, particularly over
Kashmir wasn't it?

ROUNTREE: I had left by then. Averell Harriman came out while I was there, shortly after the Kennedy Administration came into office. His concern at that time was primarily Indochina, not matters related directly to Kashmir or other Pakistan matters. His being in the area did give the new Administration an additional opportunity to have talks with Nehru in India, and with Ayub Khan in Pakistan.

Q: Before moving to South Africa and how that came about, I want to ask, too, how the appointment to the Sudan came about from Pakistan? After all, Sudan was an important African country, but after having been Assistant Secretary and then Ambassador to an important country like Pakistan, it was not exactly a promotion.

ROUNTREE: Not a promotion. I didn't look upon it at the time as a promotion. When I was completing my tour in Pakistan I had, in fact, expected to go to Australia. I was told by officials in Washington that it was the intention of the President to send me to Australia. That was changed and how the Sudan came to be substituted, I've never really known. In any event, it was a challenge and I was happy to accept the appointment. I found it one of my more interesting experiences.

WILLIAM E. HUTCHINSON
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Karachi (1959-1963)

Born in 1917 in Massachusetts, William E. Hutchinson started his career as a newspaperman in Honolulu from 1937 until well into the war, and was among other things a foreign correspondent -- a war correspondent for the Overseas News Agency. In 1944, he was recruited to work in OSS in Southeast Asia, where he worked as an "expert on Japanese affairs." He attended the National War College between 1958-59 prior to his post in Karachi. His other posts overseas included Tripoli and Lagos. The interview was done on August 10, 1989 by Jack O'Brien.

Q: All right. What was your assignment after the War College?

HUTCHINSON: I went to Pakistan as deputy PAO, deputy country PAO. It was a good assignment but not a brilliant one. I spent four years there.

Q: Who was PAO when you arrived?

HUTCHINSON: Clifford Manshardt, M-a-n-s-h-a-r-d-t. Cliff was an old missionary type from India. He spoke pretty good Hindi and was a great gentleman and a good man. He was not particularly experienced in the information side of things but he had all the background anybody could need on the cultural side of the shop. One of the things that were useful there was my War
College background, as a matter of fact, because Pakistan had a military regime. A number of the people in the military regime had attended the Imperial Defense College in London and they were all busy thinking about establishing their own war college in Pakistan and I had a kind of entree into these upper military circles from General Ayub down through his Cabinet.

Q: Ayub is spelled -- ?

HUTCHINSON: A-y-u-b. My job in Pakistan was pretty routine for the most part. A deputy PAO doesn't have quite the experiences of a country PAO, but there were exceptions. For instance, I was acting PAO for a while when Cliff Manshardt became ill toward the end of my tour there, so I was acting CPAO -- I took his place. And then we had some visitors.

We had several interesting visitors. First of all we had President Eisenhower and party. He was no trouble. I worked out a system that was applied to help the visiting press cover him. It worked very well. And after Eisenhower, after the Eisenhower regime, we had the Kennedy regime and in the course of the Kennedy regime we had one visit from Bobby and Ethel Kennedy and a number of hangers-on. They made a Ramadan visit early in the morning; they arrived about 4:00 in the morning. Everybody arrived in Karachi about 4:00 in the morning.

Q: Ramadan might need explanation.

HUTCHINSON: Ramadan is a period of fasting for the Muslim. It runs for a full month and people become very testy and upset and easily irritated after spending a long, hot day with no food or drink. Or cigarettes. Or sex.

Then toward the end of the time we had unparalleled extravaganza, a visit of Jackie Kennedy and her sister, Lee Radziwill, and they came to -- oh, I left out Vice President Johnson, didn't I? I'd better go back to Vice President Johnson because he had an historic visit to Pakistan. Vice President Johnson was the fellow who when he was in India hollered in the Taj Mahal to see how it echoed. He wounded some susceptibilities there a little. And then he came on to Pakistan. When he came to Pakistan I had gone over to Delhi and picked up Carl Rowan who was then the Director of USIA, and George Reedy, and we came back together. And we were back at Karachi waiting for the Johnson arrival. Johnson arrived and began his long, long ride in his motorcade into town. As we found out later, Johnson, who was due at Government House to shake hands with Ayub at about 1:30 didn't arrive until around 3:30 because he had been out pressing the flesh with camel cart drivers along the way. And Carl and I didn't know what was holding everything up, but we eventually got in and got the word on what had been going on.

That afternoon there was a public meeting close to the Embassy where speeches were made in Urdu, greetings to Johnson and flowery encomia of all kinds. We had pulled off Roy Bisbee who was then our branch PAO in Lahore and who, having been born in India, was perfectly fluent in Urdu. We'd asked Bisbee to act as Johnson's interpreter. Roy had a hard time of it, because at this public meeting the Pak government had been so incensed at Johnson's taking his arrival at Government House so lightly that their flowery encomia were just loaded with barbed references. It all sounded superficially pleasant but really was most unpleasant. And Johnson kept saying to Bisbee, "What's he saying? What's he saying?" And Bisbee had to cope with this.
Well, I didn't have that problem, fortunately. But my Urdu was not bad, too, and the next morning I was reading the papers. I read the Urdu papers at breakfast at home. Everything was uniformly disastrous from a public relations standpoint, except that there was one column in the newspaper Jang, that's J-a-n-g, means "Combat," written by a columnist, a very popular columnist, named Ibrahim Jaliis. Ibrahim I guess I don't have to spell. I-b-r-a-h-i-m. Jaliis, J-a-l-i-i-s. And Jaliis wrote a column that ran like this: "Man and boy," he says, "I've been in Pakistan now for 17 years and man and boy I've seen these big shots come and go. And they come and they talk to the Emirs and Viziers and the sons of Emirs and Viziers and then they go away. Yesterday things were different. Yesterday Lyndon Johnson came to town. And Lyndon Johnson talked to Bashir Ahmed, Uunt-Gharri-ban (camel cart driver)."

Q: Would you spell that?

HUTCHINSON: All right. Bashir, B-a-s-h-i-r. Ahmed, A-h-m-e-d. And 'Uunt Gharri-ban' would be spelled U-u-n-t G-h-a-r-r-i-b-a-n. "And he said to Bashir Ahmed, you must come on over and visit me. And he's promised Bashir he's going to stay in the Waldorf Astoria, the biggest hotel in the world, and he's going to come and visit Lyndon Johnson in Texas and he's going to do all sorts of things. So yesterday was a great day for the common man in Pakistan." And so on for a couple of thousand words.

Well, I got to the office and asked Frank Kuest, who was then the press officer, what are the press translations saying? He said, "It's all dismal, they're all opposed to Johnson's visit and saying bad things about it." I said, "Has anybody translated Jaliis' column?" He said, "No, Jaliis got something to say?" I said, "Yeah, I thought it was pretty good."

So, meanwhile I had smoothed out my own translation and was passing it around for the amusement of people in the office. After a couple of hours the translators brought forth a laborious translation of Jaliis' column and it wasn't as colorful as mine -- it said the same things, but not as colorfully. So we shot my translation off to Washington.

Two weeks later Johnson got up at a People to People meeting and he pulled out of his pocket this translation I had made. He said, "That's what I mean by a People to People sort of program. I want you people to invite Bashir Ahmed to come to the United States." And so next day I had to call up Jaliis and my conversation went like this. I said, "Mr. Jaliis."

"Yes?"

"This is Bill Hutchinson from the American Embassy. I wanted you to know that the column you wrote about Vice President Johnson is in the newspapers this morning in America."

"Vice President Johnson read my column?"

I said, "Yeah, I translated it for him."

He said, "You read my column?"
I said, "Yes." And I explained what had gone on.

So the next day there was another column by Jaliis which recounted this telephone conversation. The upshot was, of course, that I had to go find Bashir Ahmed and talk to him and get him prepared for his visit to the United States, which did come off and was a great success in most respects, although it probably ruined him eventually because he never could learn to drive that car that people gave him, the truck that they gave him.

Q: Well, Hutch, before we leave Pakistan let's go back to Jackie and her sister.

HUTCHINSON: Well, Jackie and her sister came to town. Of course one of the things they insisted upon doing was visiting Bashir Ahmed and his camel. And Jackie was really a tremendous problem because she was trailed by a world press of at least a hundred people and they went everywhere. Among these were media stars like Marvin Kalb and Sarah McClendon and Marie Ridder of the Knight Ridder newspapers, and teams of reporters, producers, and cameramen from all the TV networks. I lost my voice along the way but we managed to get all the things done.

Q: Was she married to Onassis at that time?

HUTCHINSON: No, no. She was still the First Lady. She wanted to meet Bashir Ahmed and he had to go rent a camel for the occasion. He had long since got rid of the original camel. But he came up with this handsome camel with its sides neatly marcelled in striking patterns and so on. And Jackie and her sister climbed up on top of the camel and had a little camel ride. And the photographers went crazy over it. We finally got her out of town.

But those are the highlights of my career in Pakistan I'm afraid. Not very significant, but fun.

L. BRUCE LAINGEN
Political Officer
Karachi (1960-1964)

Office Director, Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs
Washington, DC (1965-1967)

Country Director and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
Washington, DC (1971-1973)

Best known as the highest-ranking officer during the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1981), L. Bruce Laingen was born in 1922 in rural Minnesota. He served in the U.S. Navy during the World War II. During his career in the Foreign Service he had assignments in Hamburg, Tehran, Karachi. He also had a stint as the Pakistan-Afghanistan country director at the State Department in the early 70's.
He was interviewed on several occasions by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992 and 1993.

**Q:** Today is April 7, 1992. This is continuing set of interviews with Ambassador Bruce Laingen. Bruce, we are now at Karachi. You were assigned there from 1960-64. What was your assignment?

**LAINGEN:** I was a political officer. I guess I was the number two political officer, deputy to David Linebaugh.

**Q:** What was the situation? Obviously it was a changing one in Pakistan at the time, but when you arrived what was the situation?

**LAINGEN:** When I arrived there was no crisis. There was no Pakistani-Indian war as there was occasionally. That didn't happen until 1965, the year after I left. Karachi was still the capital although there was talk of beginning to move it north under Ayub Khan. Ayub was the President. He had his basic democracy movement underway, which was an attempt on the part of that Pakistani leader in the never ending effort on the part of Pakistanis to try to put some kind of democratic processes of government in place. So unsuccessful by contrast to India. In the aftermath of partition, India, I think all of us would agree, has set a rather enviable record in the developing world for reasonably effective processes of participatory government with elections that work. Pakistan, in 1960 when I arrived, had not achieved that objective or process, and frankly hasn't achieved it since. But we had a president in place, Ayub Khan, who had been a general, as so often is the case. He had put his approach to democracy in place which he called basic democracy. It didn't work very effectively.

I always remember the arrival in Karachi...the Pan American round the world flights landed in Karachi and Delhi in the middle of the night. We landed that night not at the civilian airport but the military airport for some reason. I will always remember the drive into that city having never observed that degree of mass humanity, miserable humanity, as I did then. Seeing sleeping bodies on every street corner and driving into town through slums, particularly around one section that we remember as "breathless corner" because the smell was so offensive. It was difficult arriving in the middle of a hot night and beginning a tour of four years in a city that I found then and still find today in the subcontinent singularly unattractive. It has no character. It was a city then teeming with refugees, and is still teeming, from partition and this was 13 years after partition. Masses of people living in squalor and poverty. But it was also a city and assignment that was interesting despite the singular unattractiveness of the city itself. There was nothing appealing about Karachi for an American family in terms of family relationships except the beach on the Arabian Sea. We would go there a lot. But professionally it was an interesting tour because Pakistan in those days was deep into its problems with India. My particular assignment was mainly to report on Pakistan-Indian relations.

**Q:** Did you ever bat around with your colleagues why India seemed, with this multicultural society, to be able to develop a type of democracy and Pakistan which was less multicultural didn't seem to be able to cut the mustard?
LAINGEN: I don't have a good answer to that. I am not sure there is a good answer to that. Part of it, I suppose, lies in the heavy military tradition of that section of the subcontinent. The Pushtuns and other ethnic tribal groups had under the British been very strong in military tradition, with and for the British. Perhaps it was less so in India. That was one contributing reason. I suppose another has to be the fact of leadership. The Nehrus had a different approach generally speaking to government and rule than these Pakistanis who tended to be, except for the first couple of years under inadequate civilian leadership, more inclined to the military approach...authoritarian, hard-handed, forceful leadership at the center.

Perhaps also the fact that Pakistan then, and still is, rather fractious in its composition. Tribal groups up against the Afghan border, Baluchis in Baluchistan, Pushtuns, and Sindhis down in the south. But then you can say the same thing about India.

Q: How did you go about your work? How does somebody in a fascinating and important situation go to work? We are talking about the 1960s.

LAINGEN: Well, this was my first assignment as a political reporting officer. I don't know if I was more effective than anybody else. I don't know if we were all that effective. We went about our business making contacts with as many people as we could. We had a problem in one sense of a divided country. Pakistan then was still made up of West Pakistan and East Pakistan. We had a Consulate General in Dacca, but you still needed, if you were going to have any kind of effective reporting to get over to East Pakistan once in a while. I had a very effective leadership in a couple of very good Ambassadors...Bill Rountree and later Walter McConaughy...who were experienced leaders and kept good tabs on the rest of us. I did not speak Urdu. In fact looking back on it we had very limited capacity in that language. Fortunately at that time, and still today, English is a very common language particularly in the upper levels of Pakistan.

We lived in a suburb of Karachi called the Public Employees Cooperative Housing Society...PECHS. We did a good deal of entertaining. Representation was still looked on then, down through the ranks, as something terribly important. We put a heavy burden on our wives and family in that process. Knowing where I have been and knowing where the Foreign Service has been and looking back on it, if I were to begin that tour over again today, I would do a lot less of routine representation and regret all that burden on my family because I think the product of that effort was rather limited.

We had good contacts in the Foreign Ministry. There was no problem of access. We had contacts with all levels of society despite some sensitivity on the part of the regime...Karachi was still the capital of the country and without a very actively functioning democracy, despite the claim to basic democracy on the part of Ayub Khan, and despite their sensitivity at times about contacts with the opposition.

We had at that time also an active diplomatic corps. There was a large Indian Embassy in Karachi. A good segment of our work was contacts with other representatives of the diplomatic corps, particularly with the Indians, to get their point of view there in Karachi of their problems with Pakistan.
Q: Could you discuss how we viewed from the Embassy at that time the ongoing Indo-Pak problem?

LAINGEN: You are right in calling it ongoing. It had been ongoing at that point ever since partition, 13 plus years earlier, and it was certainly in full speed at that point building the tensions that would eventually lead to war in 1965 between the Pakistanis and the Indians. As an embassy there and in Delhi, I think we were guilty of clientitis. I think both embassies too often got supportive of one's own embassy and critical of our opposite number. We didn't have enough interchange between the two embassies despite efforts on occasion to have exchange visits. Groups would come up from Delhi and we would go down to Delhi. We didn't have enough of that. Tensions weren't always at a high pitch. They didn't really develop into the kind of situation that contributed to war until the time I was leaving.

Those years were also marked by two major events involving the Kennedy administration. The first, the visit of Jackie Kennedy, and the second, of course, the assassination of President Kennedy. The first involving the visit of Jackie Kennedy saw her come in dimensions that made it essentially a state visit, both to India and to Pakistan. She came, of course, in good part because of the personal relationships between Ambassador Galbraith in Delhi and the Kennedy family. There was a sensitivity on the part of the Pakistanis at that point, again in the context of their larger problems with India, that she was going to go only to Delhi. The Pakistanis raised a good deal of concern about that and eventually a Pakistan segment was added to the visit. I think the Pakistanis always felt then and thereafter that they were just a tag on in the Kennedy administration. There was a good deal of concern among Pakistanis that would surface once in a while over the Galbraith relationship with the Kennedys. They felt Galbraith being in Delhi would work to their disadvantage.

Q: For the record, John Kenneth Galbraith was a Harvard professor, an economist of tremendous note, with an ego of tremendous note, too.

LAINGEN: And a personal friend of President Kennedy.

Q: Here you had Galbraith who had made a name for himself as seeing India as his particular playground. Were you almost geared up to rebut his telegrams, etc.?

LAINGEN: Yes, there was too much of that. Looking back on it I remember there was that sort of feeling in our minds, that he had this, they had this...a larger country, of course, and Pakistan has always had that problem in dealing with the impact of the subcontinent in Washington. Delhi was the big player, yet there was the other side of the coin that Washington also saw Pakistan more as a military ally, strategic ally, and that played in our favor. That was a concern that Galbraith and others had in Delhi. Some of this changed to some degree in 1962 with the Chinese invasion of segments of Kashmir and Ladakh. But that too raised more concern on the part of the Pakistanis, particularly the military types, when that for a time added a kind of military component to the relationship between Washington and Delhi.

Q: We sent in some fighters and gave them airlifts, etc.
LAINGEN: Yes. The Pakistanis were nervous about that. We watched Delhi's reporting very closely. There were times, frankly, when we wondered if we were seeing all of their reporting. But I think the people in Delhi also had the same sentiment. It was regrettable. It developed a kind of competition between the two embassies for impact and favor, if you will.

*Q:* I suspect that remains to some extent.

LAINGEN: It is probably inevitable. Particularly at a time of shifting strategic relationships, as we are experiencing now in the aftermath of the Cold War.

But to go back to the Jackie Kennedy visit, it did have the dimensions of a state visit with political implications. Galbraith, of course, did everything he could to make a success of that visit. Since the Pakistan segment of it followed the Indian one, the Pakistanis were determined to outdo the Indians, both in the enthusiasm they could arouse for her, and the splendor that accompanied the visit.

It was a splendid visit in Pakistan, as I am sure it was in Delhi. All kinds of trappings. I was the escort officer for Jackie Kennedy in her travel throughout the country. I was not the control officer, that was Linebaugh, the political counselor, but I was the designated escort officer, so I traveled with her and saw directly how much the Pakistanis worked that visit to build favor in Washington.

Ayub Khan was the President. He had the command of the military at his fingertips and he used it to great advantage. I forget now whether the Ayub visit to Washington followed or preceded that. There was during the time I was there the visit of President Ayub to Washington when there was the celebrated first time effort on the part of a President to use Mount Vernon as the locale for a very splendid state dinner...the lawns of Mount Vernon. Ayub Khan was transported up and down the Potomac by boat with Kennedy.

During the time I was there President Kennedy was assassinated. I, like everybody else at that time, will always remember where one was at that particular time. I will never forget the sentiments, the concerned feelings we had when that momentous news arrived, particularly the way that Ambassador McConaughy at the time immediately called the Embassy officers together in the conference room for a moment of silence. It was a very heavy burden that we all felt had happened.

Then we were strengthened by the tremendous outpouring of sympathy and empathy on the part of the Pakistanis from the ground up.

*Q:* I was in Yugoslavia, a communist country, and again it was overwhelming. It was a world event.

LAINGEN: Genuine sympathetic outpouring and regret and concern. I think it was special for the Pakistanis, and for the Indians too, I am sure because Jackie had been there just the year before.
Q: In your reporting were you able to get to military officers to talk to them?

LAINGEN: Oh, sure. We had good contact, especially with the military. We probably saw too much of them, because it was in a sense a military regime under Ayub despite his pretenses of democracy. There was plenty of contact with them. The military attachés had even deeper and stronger contacts. It was a very close military relationship at that time. CENTO was still in existence.

I don't recall a presidential visit but I certainly remember Vice President Johnson's visit.

Q: How did that go?

LAINGEN: Oh, it went over in the usual Johnson fashion, with a good deal of people-to-people contact on his part. Lady Bird was along. I was the escort to Lady Bird at that point. I seemed to be escort for the wives at that time. I came to appreciate what a magnificent lady Lady Bird Johnson is. I also came to appreciate watching Lyndon Johnson. What a towering ego that man had. How he expected all to pay due respect to that ego as he proceeded through that visit.

I will never forget the arrival of Lyndon Johnson at the Karachi airport. Any such official visitor of that stature always produces cars and confusion and a great deal of hustle and bustle, but this one was Lyndon Johnson at his best, or his worst, if you will. The trip from the airport into Karachi, which was a rather long one, must have been very similar to the retreat from Bull Run. The confusion and chaos of that motorcade...Lyndon Johnson stopping, ordering his motorcade to a halt and everyone then competing for place in that line...the diplomats, the chiefs of mission, ordered out to the airport to be a part of all this. So not having that much patience with all this stopping, some of them tried to get ahead of the motorcade by going around it.

But it was on one of his stops of that motorcade that Lyndon Johnson found the camel driver, whose name slips my mind at the moment.

Q: He became a very famous camel driver.

LAINGEN: He was a camel driver and Lyndon Johnson asked him the name of his camel. This guy said, "Camel, of course, Sahib." And that was the end of that effort to establish the name of the beast. But it was at that point that Lyndon Johnson said to this character, "Come and visit me in Washington." And, of course, he eventually did. The camel driver became celebrated in Washington because of the sort of grass roots eloquence of this fellow, apparently in his contacts with the Vice President and President here, and with the press. It came through as sensible eloquence. And a dispute continued for years thereafter as to whether these were actually his words or was it a very clever interpreter adding substance and color to words that were not all that eloquent.

Q: What about the opposition? Was Bhutto a figure at that point and part of the public opposition?

LAINGEN: Yes. Bhutto was a figure and beginning to give us trouble. He didn't really become
as large a player then as he would be in the years that followed. He was very young, energetic. I didn't see him. I never had any contact with him. The Ambassador did and I think the political counselor on occasion saw him. We had good contacts with the opposition despite some degree of sensitivity that seems always there in a quasi-military regime about such contacts. Part of that involved getting over to Dacca in East Pakistan and seeing people like Suhrawardy who was a major player in East Pakistan. I got over there on a couple of occasions.

In those days I recall you didn't fly direct from Karachi to Dacca, which would have been an overflight of India; you had to go all the way down around the tip of India, past Colombo and then up again, because of the sensitivity of the Indians involving Pakistani overflight of their country. So we traveled by Pakistani Airlines but by a circuitous route.

Once Secretary Rusk came on a trip and because of the nature of his visit and with the military aircraft we were able to fly directly.

The Embassy was then in Karachi, but the issue that affected us certainly in a logistic sense was the fact that it moved eventually to Rawalpindi as a temporary capital on its way to the capital being built in Islamabad. The American government and the Indian government and the Vatican did not have sufficient foresight to appreciate that was going to happen, so each of those three countries built a magnificent new embassy in Karachi while I was there. When I first got there we were in temporary quarters, which was very difficult. Eventually we built this new chancery, which President Ayub helped dedicate.

But by the time it was finished, President Ayub already had made the decision to move the capital to the north, so that chancery became one of the largest consulates general in the Foreign Service at that time.

Since the move to the north took place in 1963, we set up a branch embassy, if you will, in Rawalpindi, actually with the residence in the Hill Station in Murree as the process of building in Islamabad took place. That was part of the excitement of the personnel in the community at that time, watching that process take place. We had great pride in that new chancery, because it really is quite an attractive and handsome place.

Q: That was at the height of our building embassies abroad to display all the best of American architecture and building techniques.

LAINGEN: And the best encompassing openness, glass.

Q: This was before we turned into fortresses with reason.

LAINGEN: Exactly.

Q: How would you describe both William Rountree and Walter McConaughy as ambassadors...their style, outlook on the situation, etc.?

LAINGEN: Well, they were two different personalities, but I guess I would have to conclude
that they essentially ran the Embassy in an essentially similar pattern. They were firm, strong leaders. I think each of them probably looking back gave about the same degree of freedom of movement to their officers, staff in their contacts. I think McConaughy, because he came later in the time I was there and during the time that some of the political problems surrounding Ayub and his stature in the country were greater, so I think McConaughy was a little more nervous about contacts with the opposition than Rountree was. Rountree was a kind of family friend for me and my family because it was through Rountree that I had met my wife, having come back from an assignment in Tehran at about the same time that he did. He became Assistant Secretary and I became Desk Officer for Greece. He invited me over to meet the girl next door and she eventually became my wife. I don't say this to suggest that I had a special pull or influence with Rountree. Perhaps it was there. I think there was a little sensitivity on the part of my colleagues that I had some kind of special relationship, but I did not feel that and I don't think Rountree used it or allowed me to use it in any special way.

They were both essentially strong careerists who led their Embassies in similar fashion. I don't recall any special difference in the way they led that Embassy.

Q: Did you have the feeling as a political reporter that CIA or the military intelligence side was weighing in too heavily? This would seem like a place that they might.

LAINGEN: No. I don't recall looking back on it that I had any particular concern on that. Perhaps the political counselor, my chief, did in ways that I didn't sense or appreciate. But I recall having a very good relationship with the people down the end of the hall. The military attachés were very active, of course, because the regime was still essentially a military one, military traditions being as strong as they were and always have been in Pakistan. We had an alliance relationship with Pakistan with ups and downs, but on the whole the relationship was very close.

Just a word on reporting. In those days we still did airgrams. Some of our most eloquent reporting, possibly little read, was done by despatches. It was also the time that the WEEKA was developed. It was a weekly report to Washington done by airgram. For a good deal of that time I had responsibility for collecting and editing that weekly report to Washington.

Q: I might mention for the record that the airgram was designed to save on transmitting expenses and was designed to look like a telegram but was actually sent by pouch. The idea being that back in Washington nobody ever looked at anything that wasn't a telegram because it wasn't urgent, so this was an interim measure. Later on everything was sent by cable.

What about the Soviet threat there?

LAINGEN: Looking back on it, I don't have any particular feel for that. It was there. This was during Khrushchev's time. Our focus was so much on the India-Pakistan relationship. At the same time there was the alliance relationship we had with the Pakistanis essentially because of the Soviet threat. But, it was not my particular focus of reporting and I don't recall any particular incident or aspect at that time that looms all that large today in my memory. It was just a given.
Q: What about Afghanistan? Was there any concern of the great game being played by the Soviets in Afghanistan?

LAINGEN: It was being played up there, but I didn't get directly involved in it until a later assignment in Kabul. Again, looking back on it I recall Afghanistan figuring largely not in the context of the great game eventually between us and the Soviets, but rather in Afghanistan's difficulties with Pakistan over Pushtunistan. That is an essentially unresolved, still today, border issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan which we generally refer to as Pushtunistan because it is that area of the Pushtun tribes on both sides of the border.

The British in their time resolved this by something called the Durand Line, which became the international border but it was not always fully accepted by either side, certainly not by the Afghans, certainly not by the Pushtuns up in Kabul. That controversy, a very old and historic one, was very much alive at that time. Very much a subject of reporting from the Kabul Embassy.

Looking back on it, it occupied much too much of the time of those reporting on it from Kabul, but I guess it loomed very large up there.

There were border incidents all the time, small ones, but they did not involve any serious conflict.

Q: As a political officer and you were reporting on Indo-Pakistan conflict, how did you feel when you were doing this? Was there any role that the United States was going to play in any of this, or was this just keeping everybody informed?

LAINGEN: Well, we tried to play a large role, of course; the Kashmir issue was at the heart of India-Pakistan relationships, as it is so forcibly today. For the first time, I think, since partition, today in 1992, American tourists and other tourists are not going up into Kashmir because of armed conflict between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir. Then we were very much involved in that controversy; constantly looking for ways to try to contribute to a resolution of it. Both then and during my tour back in Washington during the three years that followed my assignment to Karachi the Kashmir issue was a front burner issue. Today, looking back on it and considering it, I have to conclude that it must be, probably will be, one of those forever unresolvable issues on the international scene. It has been active since the conflict there in 1948 that saw UN observers put in place who are still there today almost fifty years later. A plebiscite was directed by the United Nations at that time; the Indians refused to implement it and that still is a demand on the part of the Pakistanis.

I recall then and the three years that followed on the Desk in Washington, how much we involved ourselves in that issue, to the point of getting out and having maps all over the place; even drawing lines as to how to divide Kashmir. One of the big ideas at that time was that the only way to resolve it was to partition it with the line going right through the capital of Sirinagae. Looking back on it I am reminded how futile all of that was. How difficult it is sometimes for any outside power to go in and make any reasonable kind of contribution in situations that amount to civil war with all the emotions that go with such crises.
Q: Why were we doing this?

LAINGEN: Because Kashmir was the core of the problem between the Pakistanis and the Indians. That concern in our view was turning the Pakistanis, in particular, away from the larger issues we saw, and that was the Soviet threat up there to the north.

Q: Did you feel that the Pakistanis and the Indians were in a way toying with us or encouraging us to get involved, or were they accepting the fact that we would weigh in with something?

LAINGEN: Well, the Pakistanis expected us to be involved. As they saw it they were the weaker power and given our special relationship with the Pakistanis they felt that we should be in there putting pressure on the Indians to resolve it, of course to the favor of the Pakistanis. We were under constant reminders from the Pakistanis that we weren't doing enough to resolve that problem.

Q: You left there in 1964, is that right?

LAINGEN: I left in 1964 when things were beginning to hot up considerably between the two countries. It didn't break into war until some time in 1965. I went back to Washington to become Office Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs...called PAF.

Q: Was there a reason for this division? Was it that they couldn't have one person wearing the India and Pakistan hat because of the conflicts between the embassies? I would have thought there would have been an Indo-Pak Desk.

LAINGEN: So far as I know that never has been because of the sensitivity between the two countries. It was then and still is rather a big issue. Today, of course, it has evolved to the point where Mr. Solarz and others in Congress feel it should be a separate bureau and it is about to become one. I forget who was my counterpart on the India side at that point. We were separate and distinct. But there was an Office of South Asian Affairs that supervised both offices. It was headed during most of the time I was there by Turner Cameron and his deputy, Carol Laise. Their job in part was to try at times to mediate between the two desks.

Q: You did have this war in 1965, about a year after you got there, and you were representing Pakistan. Just to give a feel to somebody who is not aware of how the State Department works, what happens to a desk officer when their country is at war with somebody else?

LAINGEN: I suppose, it should, and I think it probably does bring out the best in us. Fighting brings out some appreciation between and among us that our real interest here is the American interest and not our particular clientitis toward one of the two countries. I think you come up against an appreciation that, damn it, both sides are wrong, carrying their dispute to actual conflict. Having said that, I think there still is a natural tendency on the part of a desk to be more understanding and more assertive in trying to convey to your superiors why the Pakistanis, in my case, behaved the way they did. Sometimes that is seen, I guess, as clientitis to an excessive degree. I don't know that I was guilty of it or my counterpart was guilty of it; I just think it was
there. It was a relatively short war. At this point I don't remember much of the details.

Q: What brought it about?

LAINGEN: Border clashes, aggravated, as always, by Kashmir. The clashes were along the main border, not primarily at that time up in Kashmir...mostly along the border in Sindh in Pakistan. I honestly don't remember who mediated, who brought that conflict to an end. I have a mental block right there. I will have to look at my record of the time.

Q: As this thing was moving up towards a war, were we trying to do anything? Did this happen suddenly or were you able to see it building up and try to do something?

LAINGEN: Yes, we tried to do something, but there is a limit to the capacity of any country, whatever the closeness of our relationship to prevent their doing what we saw was stupid to carry this thing to conflict. The armies were then in large numbers up against each other on the border, and they still are regrettably excessively so. They are their own worst enemies, the two of them, and they have carried it to war two or three times.

That period in Washington for me on the Desk, doesn't loom very large in my mind, despite that war. It ended but it wasn't resolved. There was a cease fire which eventually became permanent. But it was simply a prelude to a much large war that was to begin in 1971.

Q: That was the one over Bangladesh.

LAINGEN: The creation of East Pakistan.

Q: When Galbraith left he was replaced by Chester Bowles, who was another big gun in the Democratic establishment. Did you feel that he was sort of overpowering the issue from your vantage point?

LAINGEN: I don't know if I would use the word overpowering with respect to Chester Bowles. That term doesn't fit. He was not as big a man physically as Galbraith. He was a more sensitive man. In that respect I think there was the concern of those of us working on the Pakistan side that he was even closer to the Indians and closer to having some impact in Washington than even Galbraith had. Both of them were political appointees. Pakistan had career ambassadors. That was not lost on the Pakistani leadership, that the White House was sending political appointees to Delhi and career types to Pakistan. Nor was it lost on us and we worked on it. It was in our mind somewhere all of the time that the Indians had a somewhat stronger voice in Washington.

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Q: You left Afghanistan in 1971 after a three year tour and came back to Washington where you were Director of Pakistani Affairs from 1971-73. Was this per your choice of wanting to come back or it just sort of happened?
LAINGEN: My assignments have sort of worked out that I would rotate from the field and back to Washington in almost every case except the first one. I didn't actively seek it, it just worked out that way. It was suggested to me that from Kabul I go at that time to Madras and be Consul General and I turned it down. I said that I didn't want to go there, partly because of the problem with schools. Our sons could have gone to school at Nathizghali in south India, but I didn't want that. So I didn't go and I am glad I didn't go, even though I would have presided in an enormous consular district with hundreds of millions of people. I think the consul general in Madras feels very mighty because of all that.

I went back to Washington and was fortunate in that respect. I feel strongly that the more a Foreign Service officer has an opportunity to know his own country's problems, the better he is equipped to serve overseas again. And I have also been fortunate myself in these in and out assignments in having married someone from Washington. I jokingly advise young Foreign Service officers if they aren't married to marry somebody from Washington. It simplifies your logistics.

Q: It certainly does. You were the Country Director for Pakistani Affairs. What was the difference between this and...

LAINGEN: I had Afghanistan affairs as well. The Country Director program was then in place.

Q: This meant that it was no longer the Desk Officer, but it was the Country Director.

LAINGEN: You didn't have Office Director, you had a Country Directors and then you had Desk Officers underneath you. Later you had Deputy Assistant Secretaries that cluttered the landscape.

Q: Let's talk about this. This just seems a layering. I was talking not long ago to Richard D. Davies who was an old Eastern Bloc hand talking about when he came in in the late forties how the Desk Officer was a major figure. That was the person who did things. But since that time they have added on a couple of more layers.

LAINGEN: I agree, it is layering, and particularly because the layering of the Country Director was later made even more difficult by the layering of more Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and particularly political Deputy Assistant Secretaries. So the Desk Officer soon got lost way down in the bottom, where the expertise really is, of course. It is a regrettable trend. I don't know exactly what the situation is today, but there are too many Deputy Assistant Secretaries, that is clear, and many political appointees among them.

Q: Running close to a hundred of them, or something like that.

LAINGEN: The Country Director position is still there, but the potential that he was supposed to have in terms of access and influence with the 6th and 7th floors has been lessened by the proliferation of Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

Q: Did you find with this new title a difference in how you operated?
LAINGEN: Yes. At that time it was relatively new, a Country Director role. I certainly felt I had more direct access to the upper level than I did from 1964-67 as an Office Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs. In part I suppose that was a consequence of the Pak-Indian war of 1971, and crises always throw the issue higher up in the layers. So we saw a lot of the Secretary. Saw a lot of Kissinger in those days because of the large role that he played in the celebrated tilt towards Pakistan.

Q: For the record the "tilting towards" was a famous phrase. Tilting became both a buzz word and a war cry as far as the Indians were concerned.

LAINGEN: I was the Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, and David Sneider was the Country Director for Indian Affairs.

Q: Your arrival and the East Pakistan war, what was the timing?

LAINGEN: I arrived in August of that year and tension broke out sometime in September, very soon after I had gotten back in 1971. That had been building up while I was up in Kabul. This time not so much because of Kashmir, although Kashmir was still there as an issue, but because of the difficulty that the Pakistanis were having by that time in handling their internal division between East and West Pakistan. It had reached the point where the Indians saw an opportunity to be a force in the crisis. This saw eventually the split in the country and the establishment of Bangladesh after a relatively short period of actual warfare in December.

Q: How did you find this? Was this a war that was being waged in the corridors of the State Department too?

LAINGEN: I didn't sense that old kind of competition then between David Sneider and me. It seems to be that we were forcibly required, because of the fact that the Indians and the Pakistanis drove themselves to war, to think beyond that. I personally thought I was fortunate to have someone like David as a colleague on the other side of the wall to deal with at that time. We didn't sense any kind of direct competition. I don't recall at the moment who were the respective Ambassadors in Delhi and Islamabad. I will have to look that up.

Q: Kenneth Keating was in India and Joseph Farland was in Pakistan. Here you were getting along well with the Indian Country Director, but what about the two embassies? Were you sort of sitting there watching them each weighing in with...the subcontinent there has been a classic case of clientitis since the very beginning, I think.

LAINGEN: Yes, I agree with that and there was some of that then. This was a war of enormous consequence for Pakistan and the Embassy felt it because the country lost its other half. It was both an emotional and political and military issue for the Pakistanis to lose their other half, given the way the Pakistanis traditionally in the West looked down on these sort of small brown people in the East; the Punjabis in particular looked down their noses at them. Sindhis, too, for that matter. And I think the Embassy in Islamabad at that time probably reflected that to an excessive degree. But when you are thrown into a war the immediate objective is to try to find a way to
stop it. The risk was, as Kissinger saw it at the time, that the war could become a major conflict in the West as well as the East. It came close to being that at one point. It became a major issue confronting American foreign policy for a couple of months.

You referred to the tilt business. The feeling was that...well, there was a general sentiment, I think, on the part of a lot of Americans that the Indians were throwing their weight around excessively and were getting by with it and gaining territory in effect as a result. The concern was that rightly or wrongly the Indians were prepared to have their advantage territorial in the West as well. I personally didn't ever think that the Indians were prepared or intended to go so far as to occupy Pakistani held Kashmir or to attack Islamabad. It didn't work out that way. I think Kissinger's concerns were frankly excessive at the time about that threat.

Q: Kissinger was the National Security Advisor at that time. Did you have the feeling that he was taking the ball away from William Rogers who was Secretary of State in this?

LAINGEN: Maybe not taking the ball away, but certainly was dominating the strategic considerations.

Q: How did this play? As a Country Director in the State Department where you were on the side where the American weight was being put, how did you deal with him using you? It must have been a difficult situation?

LAINGEN: Yes, it was a difficult situation because decisions were being made up there at very high levels at that point. Nixon and Kissinger were making the decisions. It was a very difficult time, an uneasy time. Very sensitive time where for the first time in my experience, the only time I had that experience, we were second row participants in the situation room in the White House. David and I were over there essentially as notetakers. We were there watching and listening and recording as these decisions were being made in the heat of battle out there. As you know the US was close to actual involvement, moving an aircraft carrier contingent into the region.

Q: It was the Enterprise.

LAINGEN: We moved the Enterprise, a nuclear carrier, to the Indian Ocean at that point -- a very large signal, as far as Henry Kissinger was concerned, to the Indians that there was a limit to what they could do in terms of threatening the Pakistanis in the West.

Q: You were around when this decision was made which always struck me as being...here is this huge subcontinent and sending an aircraft carrier up there, if you weren't going to use nuclear weapons, what were you going to do with it?

LAINGEN: Symbols of that dimension matter in foreign policy as you know.

Q: Did anybody say, "Well, then what?" when this was decided?

LAINGEN: We may have said that, I don't recall that we came up with any sort of situation or strategic papers that would raise that question. Maybe we did, I don't know. It was such an active
and busy time just keeping up with what was going on over in the White House mainly. I thought it was excessive at the time because I simply did not believe the Indians were that kind of threat in the West. They wanted to achieve their purposes and they did with direct involvement in East Pakistan. They accomplished that and I think Pakistan is today better off for that having happened.

Q: *I think probably most of them would agree to that too.*

LAINGEN: Sure. But psychologically it was a very difficult time. On the US side there was great sensitivity, you may remember, about leaks -- Kissinger being that sensitive about leaks then. That was when the so-called plumbers were involved.

Q: *These were people who were tapping phones and later it became quite a cause célèbre. There were some people in the foreign affairs community who still will never speak to Kissinger because he tapped their phones.*

LAINGEN: In this atmosphere there was suspicion of a lot of people, including David and me that we had leaked because we were there taking notes in the situation room. We were interviewed by those who were then sent to investigate. Our notes were demanded. I don't know if we ever got them back, or made copies of them, or what. That was certainly a time when I felt the power of the White House focused directly on me.

Q: *You say that decisions were made at an upper level. But here you and David Sneider were both sort of the resident experts on India and Pakistan. Were you both united in feeling that the Indians were not going to take this over?*

LAINGEN: Yes, I think we were.

Q: *But here is Henry Kissinger, who God knows is no expert on India, certainly proved no expert in Iran, but he was making decisions without using resident knowledge?*

LAINGEN: Yes. In a crisis situation, I suppose it is inevitable in a system such as ours and with a bureaucracy as large as ours, that the "desk" for a country where decisions are made or where information is concentrated moves way up the bureaucracy. I sensed then that decisions were being made very rapidly at the top...they certainly didn't have time to discuss seriously about what others thought; they couldn't do that if they were going to also cope with the other problems that confront a Secretary of State or National Security Advisor at such times.

There were times that they were making decisions that reflected, in our view, a lack of understanding. But in saying what I say about the movement of that carrier, I have to ask myself whether I was in fact sufficiently knowledgeable myself to make that judgment. Maybe I wasn't. Maybe there were some things that I didn't know. But looking at it simply from my own perception of how Indians and Pakistanis are motivated to act in such situations, I thought it was unnecessary and that the threat from the Indians was not that great. The Secretary of State or a National Security Adviser with responsibilities of the kind that he has, perhaps that carrier was insurance that was essential, if for no other reason because of American PR and political needs.
Q: Did you sense at that time any tension, disagreement between our consulate general in Dacca at that time and our Embassy in Islamabad?

LAINGEN: That is another story that Archer Blood I trust has...

Q: We have an interview with Archer Blood on this, but I wonder if you could give the Desk view of this?

LAINGEN: I can't really add much depth to that, other than saying that for years that had been an evolving issue -- that our representation in Dacca being closer to the scene, for that reason alone, perhaps, had a much better understanding of what was developing in East Pakistan than the Embassy in the West did. I recall there were times when we would talk way back in the time of my assignment in Karachi, that the Embassy needed to get over to East Pakistan, Dacca, more than we did, because the Embassy was the place where by and large decisions were being made and not Dacca. And yet more than half the people of Pakistan as then constituted lived over there.

John Howison was Consul General there I believe. John, early on, certainly from his vantage point in Karachi later, was sensitive to the problems of East Pakistan more than any of us were. I just have to conclude that it was a classic example of where an embassy was not sufficiently mindful of what was happening in a distant part. The views of the Consul General were not being sufficiently taken under consideration. When those views were expressed in the way that Arch Blood eventually did, it cost him some trouble, unfortunately.

Q: What about the outcome of this war? It was over in less than a couple of months.

LAINGEN: I don't think it went on that long. The intensive fighting was only a couple of weeks I think. But it did run some serious risks of a much greater conflict. I still don't believe the Indians had any intention of taking territory in the West. It was very dangerous for a few days. The crisis in 1965 ended with the Russians, the Soviets, engaging themselves as players. The Soviets were decisive as mediators at that time bringing that conflict to resolution in sessions at Tashkent. This time it was resolved with what's called the Simla Agreement. The Pakistanis went up to the Hill Station at Simla with Indira Gandhi. This was reminiscent for me of the way in which the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey had gone off in 1960 and resolved the Cyprus issue at that time in the Zurich Agreement. Both were examples, I thought then and still think to this day, where issues are better resolved without an outside power being involved, if you can find a way to do it.

The Indians and the Pakistanis finally were mature enough in the aftermath of long years of British colonialism and foreign influence on our part and others, to go off to Simla and come up with a remarkable document, the Simla Agreement, which is still valid today and which is currently under some focus again because the Kashmir question is again hot. Anyway they went off then, Indira and Bhutto, and came up with this understanding. This had seen the downfall of the regime in Islamabad and Bhutto replacing it becoming the Prime Minister in the aftermath of
Yahya Khan, who fell from power in disgrace after this loss of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.

Bhutto, as part of the final settlement, came to the United Nations, the Security Council intervened...this is before the Simla process was begun, but motivated and perpetuated by UN pressure. I will always remember that Security Council discussion and debate because it saw Bhutto at his best in his capacity to play a very large public role. He came to the Security Council as the representative of Pakistan in that debate. He sat there and at one point dramatically tore up the UN Charter to convey the anger and frustration and emotions that he felt as a Pakistani in the way in which the Security Council, as they saw it, had stood by and allowed this theft of East Pakistan by the Indians.

That is an over simplification, but it was an effort on Bhutto's part to convey that public anger publicly in a dramatic way. But having accepted the Security Council decision, after the debate and after it was all over and the war had ended and it was clear that the Bangladeshis would have their country, he came to Washington and saw Secretary Rogers. He hadn't yet become the Prime Minister then; he was on his way back to assume the office when he got there. In Washington he had a meeting with Rogers, and I was the notetaker in his office that day. I remember how Bhutto said to Rogers, "I can assure you Mr. Secretary that from now on I will not be the Yankee-baiter. I intend to build a strong relationship between Pakistan and the United States."

Despite that show of emotion in New York, when he got to Washington he had put on a different hat and was attempting in that way to convey to the United States government that from now on Bhutto would be a different player.

Q: Bhutto was going to be Prime Minister. How was he regarded? He had been a minor figure when you were there before.

LAINGEN: He had always been regarded...going back to the time in the sixties when he was playing around with the Chinese as we saw it in ways that got Washington very nervous. We didn't like at all the way Pakistan with Bhutto as Foreign Minister was playing up to the Chinese. He was regarded as a young upstart who seemed determined to cause problems. That sentiment about him had continued throughout the time we had known Bhutto. That concern was evident when we saw he was going to become the Prime Minister after this mess in Bangladesh and the fall of Yahya Khan.

So there was a good deal of reassurance in having him come to Washington after that UN debate and in effect concede, sort of kowtow to the United States. He was going to put his past behind him and be a responsible, mature political figure, mindful of American interests. That was the image he conveyed in that meeting in the Secretary's office that day. That was reassuring to us as a government. It was reassuring to me. I had always liked Bhutto, myself. He is dead now...regrettably and unfortunately he was executed wrongly in my view. But I had been fascinated by him because of his youthfulness and courage; he was an articulate public figure in his use of English. He was exciting I thought, particularly in contrast to the traditional military authoritarianism of Pakistani leaders.
Despite that, leaders at the top in this country always remained very skeptical of Bhutto.

Q: What was the general thinking of why Bhutto was considered a Yankee-baiter before this?

LAINGEN: Well, that is the way he performed, in part for political purposes in Pakistan; it gained him a lot of public recognition and some public support. He was seen as a Yankee-baiter in large part, however, because of his playing around with the Chinese. It started with that.

Q: Were you Country Director during Kissinger's trip to China?

LAINGEN: Let's leave that until our next meeting.

Q: Today is August 25, 1992. Bruce we left the interview dangling with a question about the Kissinger China visit and whether or not you had been involved.

LAINGEN: I had absolutely no involvement in the Kissinger trip to China. Like everyone else I was uninformed until after it happened even though it was routed through Pakistan as a way station to China.

Q: After this visit did you feel any more warming towards Pakistan? That we had to be extra nice to Pakistan?

LAINGEN: No, I don't recall that that had any affect in broad terms on my view of Pakistan nor the administration's view of Pakistan. My problem is still that I don't remember exactly the date of that trip to China. I should look it up because I don't have it.

Q: Kissinger went to Peiping July, 1971.

LAINGEN: July, 1971. Well, that is one good reason why I don't remember it because I had not arrived on the scene yet. I had left Kabul that summer and I don't believe I had taken over responsibility as country director until September, 1971.

Q: I don't want to over push this point, but when you arrived you didn't feel any sort of warm glow of we really need to be nice to Pakistan because of this visit?

LAINGEN: No, I was part of the community in the Foreign Service and the Department of State in US policy making in Washington that saw Pakistan as still very important, and not least in my case because I had just come out of Kabul where Islamabad as the capital of the country to the south loomed rather large. And I was also conscious of the fact that things were heating up in terms of Pakistan-Indian relations.
Born in North Carolina in 1918, Ben Franklin Dixon attended University of Virginia's graduate school and received his law degree from George Washington University in 1956. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps during the World War II. While in the Foreign Service, he served in variety of positions in the State Department and had tours of duty in Tangier, Karachi, and Bangkok. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on October 31, December 4, 1990 and January 29, 1991.

Q: You left your job in this and all in 1962, and then you were moved somewhat over geographically. Could you explain what job you had and where you went. You went to Pakistan from '62 to '65.

DIXON: No, I think to '64. I was there for three years. Well, Bill Rountree, who was the ambassador, asked for me to come and be his political-military assistant. Which I did, and I was the sort of secretary of the country team and did odd jobs for the ambassador. He left and McConaughy came. He was essentially an EA man, and he was, I think, completely lost about anything about the subcontinent.

Q: He had been ambassador to Korea and then assistant secretary for EA and didn't get on too well with the Kennedy people and, I think, was sort of moved out of the area.

DIXON: Well, I don't know what it was, but he sure seemed ill at ease. When he first came there, I had a big negotiation going on with the Foreign Office about the terms... What the problem was, the...now I can't even think of the name of it... It started as MEDO, Middle East Defense Organization, and became the...well, the Baghdad Pact.

Q: Was this CENTO or SEATO?

DIXON: CENTO.

Q: I mean, there were two. CENTO was the Baghdad Pact.

DIXON: Right, CENTO. SEATO was for East Asia, the same thing as CENTO was for the western side. The major preoccupation of the Pakistanis at that time was India -- Kashmir, part of the Punjab. And, you know, the fact that Pakistan was divided and situated on both sides of India. There were problems in the east and in the west. But they were entirely preoccupied with India. They therefore felt that CENTO should concern itself with the threat to Pakistan from India. The Pakistanis insisted that the terms of the treaty call on the United States to give help to Pakistan. Actually, the treaty said that if they felt they were subject to a threat, they could consult all the other members of CENTO, and what would take place would be whatever they decided. But they felt their obligation to consult with this also implied an obligation to do something about it, and therefore they were trying to push this.

And I spent almost my whole time with CENTO affairs. Our political problem was this question of India and what we would do. We finally got to the point that they felt that the provocation was
so great that they called for a consultation.

Now McConaughy did not know really what the treaty provided. It was pretty finely defined. I reported this, and he and the rest of the country team wanted to say that we turned this down out of hand. I told them that that was not true, that we had to respond to this, and, if they insisted, respond affirmatively if we wanted the thing to go on. They sent a telegram, in which I did not agree, saying, in effect, that this was beyond the scope of the treaty and so forth and so on. We got a telegram the next day saying, in effect, what I had been telling them.

McConaughy never seemed to care much for me until this point. He suddenly began to realize that there'd been a lot of things I'd advised him on that he didn't particularly like. He didn't like what was said or he didn't remember what it was about. But I used to go to the Foreign Office with him. For example, when he first came there, we had seven points to make to them. I gave a very simplified thing to Mr. McConaughy. He obviously didn't have enough background to take them in. And he said what he said, but then he said, "Now, Ben, why don't you go on with this," and I said the rest of the points. It was pretty clear to me that he was not very much at home in this thing. So that I tried to advise him on a lot of these things when they began to come up. He didn't like it too much. But, after this incident, he listened to every word I said.

Another thing was that I used to talk a lot with, in effect, their chairman of the joint chiefs of staff who was there in Karachi. He was sort of a sarcastic fellow, but I began to realize that he was telling me, in effect, that they were getting more friendly with China. And I came back and I said to McConaughy, "You know, I don't know whether this is just him talking or what it is, but he clearly seems to be implying that they are getting closer to the Chinese." So I wrote a couple of telegrams on what this said. He toned it down considerably, but just had enough of a hint in the telegram. After this went on for a couple of months, Asghar Khan told Bill Hall, who was the DCM, that they were going do something with the Chinese. They had been wanting to do this because of their preoccupation with India.

I also worked on the military assistance program, which General Ruland didn't like very much. We had a hell of nice general there at first, and I worked very closely with him. I did all the write-ups asking for what we wanted to do with the Pakistani forces, the explanations and the justifications for these things. General Ruland was very particular. He said, "I guess you seem to be the chief of the MAAG, not me."

And I said, "Look, all I'm doing is writing up the political side. You tend to the military side, and I'll try to defend what you think militarily should be done."

Well, I got along fairly well, finally, with Ruland. Ruland came and complained to the ambassador about me, and the ambassador told him that I represented his point of view, you know, and just to be more amenable. So that came around. But Ruland felt I was running the military assistance program. Which I was not. I was simply trying to get him, as I did with the other general, to give me the military stuff so that I could write up the things to get...

Q: How were we seen? In the first place, I don't want to leave the Chinese thing yet. When you arrived there, Pakistan had not had relations with China, is that correct?
DIXON: Well, I think they had an ambassador there, but I can't remember. The relations were not very close. But you see, in the meantime, the Chinese invaded India.

Q: Did this take place when you were there?

DIXON: Yes.

Q: What was our reaction to this from that vantage point?

DIXON: I had to explain to them that we were helping the Indians because we did not want the Chinese in there, and that we were really trying to defend the subcontinent. If the Chinese came in there, they might do things also to the Pakistanis. You see, they have a slight border with China, in Sinchung I think it is. It's not very accessible, but they eventually got a road through there, you know.

Q: How did the Paks react to this?

DIXON: Pretty bad. I can't remember exactly, but they were not close with them. But when they invaded India, and when this thing drew back, the Pakistanis were very satisfied that they had bloodied the Indian nose. You know, they came way down, and then went back. But we made great efforts and I spent a lot of time at the Foreign Office explaining what we were doing in India.

Q: We became very close to India at that point.

DIXON: Yes. Well, we had always been fairly close to India. But we were trying to help them there, and the Pakistanis resented it. As I say, I spent a lot of time explaining what we were doing and that it was not stuff that could be used against the Pakistanis.

And, as a matter of fact, I got into discussions with a guy named Shah Yakhan. A Marine general that I had served with came in there, and I had long discussions with him about the possibility of how the Indians and the Pakistanis could fight each other.

Q: We're looking at a map right now.

DIXON: You see, all this is desert down in there. Amritsar to Lahore, there's a possibility of an invasion across that area. But there are lots of obstacles in there, and anybody with a good...

Q: This is between India and Pakistan.

DIXON: Yes. Anybody with enough of a force in that area could quickly come in. It was no easy job to send anybody through there. And, you know, later they did start across there. But, just as I had figured out with this general, the probability was that they would not be able to get through.

I explained this to Yahya Khan, the threat perhaps in Jammu and Kashmir, and sort of small
fighting elements, but that no major attack could come through there. The only place was down in the Amritsar, Lahore area, which with sufficient force they could stop, and therefore there was no real threat to West Pakistan. East Pakistan was different, but there was not much information on the East Pakistan front at that time. Those problems came up later on.

We had a lot of flare-ups in Pakistan, resentment against the United States, particularly when we'd help the Indians. There were several times that there were riots against us, particularly up in Rawalpindi and up in the north country.

I used to go up a lot to Peshawar to talk to Asghar Khan, who was head of the air force but who was a very important member of the government, so to speak. He was a very bright, a very able guy and was sort of a favorite of Ayub, who was the president. The guy who was head of the army, General Musa who was a sort of senior Pakistan military type, was a very nice dunderhead. I didn't take up much time with him because there was no return on it. But Aghar Khan and the head of the navy, I saw a great deal of and talked with about all these problems.

Q: Were we trying to fine-tune our support for Pakistan? I mean, did you and the embassy have the feeling of really working to fine-tune the support for Pakistan as opposed to India? What were our relations with our embassy in New Delhi? Did you have the feeling that they weren't understanding your problem?

DIXON: The department, NEA, was very pro-Indian. They had Ken Galbraith as ambassador. They had...oh, God, what was that guy's name who was very pro-Indian? And we were getting the short end of the stick.

Q: Ball or somebody like that?

DIXON: No, it wasn't Ball. Ball was very level headed. I talked at some length with Ball. Ball came out and somebody told him that I was the guy to talk to, and he got me off, up in Rawalpindi, and I spent a number of hours with Ball talking about things. I'm just trying to think of that guy who was the assistant secretary there. In any case, we tried to talk to him. And Bill...what's his name, Dean Acheson's son-in-law? His brother was Jack Kennedy's national security...

Q: Bundy.

DIXON: Bill Bundy was very pro-Indian.

Q: You're probably thinking of Phillips Talbot, who was the assistant secretary at the time.

DIXON: Phillips Talbot was very pro-Indian.

Q: And Bill Bundy was...

DIXON: Bill Bundy was the defense assistant secretary. What were we talking about?
Q: You were saying that Galbraith was very pro-Indian. He was ambassador to India. And Phillips Talbot was pro-Indian.

DIXON: And Carol Laise. Carol Laise had come back and was now head of the office.

Q: Of Subcontinent Affairs. Looking back on this, was this localitis on your part, too, and the people in Pakistan? Were we being objective about this?

DIXON: I thought we were not objective about it. I thought that they had localitis on India. The Kennedy administration, I think, in particular with Galbraith... Galbraith, I think, succeeded in having the U.S. government go all out for India, particularly when the incursion came. We felt we understood what they were doing.

Q: You're talking about the embassy in Karachi.

DIXON: Yes, or at least me, in the embassy. I felt that we understood everything they were doing in India, but that meant that we ought to do an equal amount or at least meet their requirements.

One of the things that the Pakistanis wanted was a submarine, because West Pakistan has no energy source and they get it all from the Persian Gulf. The best defense against submarines or, for that matter, surface ships, is a submarine. Therefore, the Pakistanis wanted a submarine to monitor the sea between their source of energy and Karachi, where they brought it in. They had been pushing this for a long time.

Bill Bundy had objected to it because he thought it would alarm the Indians. The Indians, in fact, knew that the Pakistanis wanted one, and were very much opposed to it.

We were having a big conference over Kashmir. Duncan Sandys and Averell Harriman were in Delhi, separately.

Q: Duncan Sandys was the British foreign minister.

DIXON: Or was he defense minister?

Q: He was in and out of the thing, but anyway he was the British representative.

DIXON: Yes. Harriman had been there and had tried to settle this Kashmir thing. But he came up for a long discussion with us, and we had lots of discussions with him. Bill Bundy was also there. And I had been down with General Ruland, who was the MAAG chief, and Bundy talking about this program, and I said, "I want to make the case for the Pakistani submarine.

Bundy said, "That's out. I don't want to hear a word about that."

And I tried to say...
And he said, "I don't want to hear anything about it. We're not going to talk about it."

Anyway, later on, Harriman was sitting up with McConaughy. I had something to take up to McConaughy, and Harriman said sit down, tell me about so and so and so and so and so. And I was talking to him when Bill Bundy came in. When I finished, Harriman said, "Is there any outstanding request the Pakistanis have that we haven't met?"

And I said, "Yes, there are a number of them, but I think the most important one is the submarine."

"Well, what about the submarine?"

So, with Bill Bundy there, I gave the whole case for the submarine, and he said he thought that it made sense. I don't think they ever gave one finally, but anyway we got even with that son of a bitch Bundy. I at least was able to get a hearing at court.

But we had great difficulty with Harriman. He embarrassed me to death. I belonged to the Singh club, which is sort of the Pakistan club there of the old English colony plus the Pakistanis who were sort of high and mighty. And they knew Harriman was there and they asked if Mr. Harriman would come. The met every Saturday morning and had a drink at the bar there, and sort of exchanged talk and one thing and another. And they had raw oysters, which is very unusual there, but somebody knew how to get them somewhere. Anyway, I spoke to the governor and he said why, yes, he'd be pleased to do it. When is it? I told him. He wrote down a note. Saturday morning came and I went by to pick him up, and he said, "I'm not going."

And I said, "Governor, I've told them that you are coming and they know that you've accepted this thing. It'll be terrible, because they've already got a big crowd there to see you. They want to see you, they're fans of yours, you should go and talk to them."

"No, I will not do it."

I said, "You gave your word you'd do it, and they expect you to come there."

I was very annoyed with him, and he began to get sort of edgy. I guess I shouldn't have insisted so, I think maybe he would have come around. But he refused to go.

He said, "Bring the book over, I'll sign the book."

I said, "They don't give a damn about whether you sign the book, they want you there."

He never would go. It was very embarrassing. I went back and said that something had come up and that he was terribly busy, he send his regards and so forth. But it was very difficult.

Also, one night at dinner (we kept having meals together at McConaughy's), we had General Adams from Panama, who was head of some great force that could fly around the world and do things, and several generals there.
Q: A quick-reaction force or something like that.

DIXON: Yes. And that son of a bitch who was ambassador to Turkey for a while, I've forgotten what his name is now, but he turned up somewhere.

Q: Komer? Let's look up Turkey.

DIXON: Yes, yes. Anyway, we went to dinner, and there was a very acrid discussion going on between the pro-Indians and the pro-Pakistanis. And Bob something this guy was named. I don't know what he was doing there, I think he was in defense.

Q: Robert W. Komer.

DIXON: Bob Komer, that's it. He was a nasty piece of work.

Q: Known as "The Blowtorch" by some people.

DIXON: We kept getting into these fights, and Komer told Harriman something, and Harriman said don't you tell me what to do, so and so and so and so. And they were about to jump at each other's throat. Somebody got Komer settled down. The telephone rang, and they came and said that they wanted Mr. Harriman on the telephone. I told Harriman, and he said, "Go and see what it is." So I went and it was Duncan Sandys. He said that they had had some more discussions with Nehru and that they were thinking of proposing so and so and so and so, and could I get the governor to the phone. I said, "He is involved in a very active discussion, but I think maybe I can get him here." So I went back. He said no, he wasn't leaving the table. "What did Duncan Sandys say?" So we stopped everything to tell what Duncan Sandys had said. Then I had to go back and tell him what Harriman said. And I kept going back and forth and back and forth, which I thought was very rude of Harriman to do that. I mean, after all, Sandys was the British foreign secretary.

Well, as you know, nobody ever got anything settled on that. No proposals really working or anything. It was just a mess.

The other gentleman that came was named Porter, who looked like a schoolmarm. Adams could do nothing but talk about shooting and hunting, and Porter always talked about protocol and administration. How the hell those two guys had these big commands I do not know. Porter was head of...I don't know, some big command.

Q: Well, now, did you feel that in our trying to give the British our good offices, that our good offices were pro-Indian regarding Kashmir at the time?

DIXON: Without any question. Without any question. And Bill Bundy was one of the main ones. And Phillips Talbot, the assistant secretary. Carol Laise was head of the office. Dick Sneider, who was our political counselor.
Q: Richard Sneider?

DIXON: Yes, who saw which side his bread was buttered on, was practically selling out to Pakistan just because he wanted to be in good with Talbot and Carol and so forth. He was very unadmirable afterward.

Q: Looking at it at that time, because we are going back to this period before '65, how did we in Pakistan, our embassy and you, view the "Soviet threat?” I mean, what did we feel about it?

DIXON: Well, that's what we were trying to tell the Pakistanis, that that was what the real threat was.

Q: Was there? I mean, did you really feel that there was a threat there?

DIXON: Well, sure. The Soviets always have been interested in Afghanistan. And, as you see, Afghanistan is only a thin line between Pakistan and U.S.S.R. Furthermore, traditionally the Soviets had tried to come down through these valleys that led into Peshawar, the Khyber Pass.

Q: Yes, but still, thinking about that, I mean, we talk about a thin line, but we're talking about the Himalayas and all that. It's not the greatest country to do anything in.

DIXON: No, they could come through there. Don't forget that the Vietnamese War was going on and we were having threats from China and Russia in this way, and a threat from Russia this way. That's why the Indians were kissing the Russians.

Q: Well, then we saw this as being a real possibility, as far as the Soviets moving into Pakistan.

DIXON: Our official policy was that, yes.

Q: But how did you think about it?

DIXON: I thought it was less pressing than our official policy. However, I didn't feel in any way that I should do anything other than stress the threat. And it was a realistic threat. The Soviets had all sorts of installations down in that area. We had installations in Peshawar which listened to what was going on in the Soviet Union. The Soviets up around Peshawar were always trying to claim they were Americans trying to find this place. And you know, the U-2 and all that. We had all these installations up around Peshawar.

But, you know, there's a valley down that little thin line of Afghani territory between Pakistan and Russia, and it is possible to come down through there and into Pakistan. It's difficult, but, you know, with aircraft and so forth you can come across. It's not logistically a difficult thing to do.

Q: Did you feel that the Pakistanis were in any position to do anything? I mean, was the military aid we gave usable and being positioned so it could probably be used against the Soviets?
DIXON: In West Pakistan, yes.

Q: So, when we gave them aid, we felt we were getting some value for it rather than everything going towards the Indian side. Or at least it could be transferred back and forth.

DIXON: Yes, we were getting a lot of inflation out of it. You see, the Indians wouldn't let us do any of that kind of thing. But, with all of our very secret listening devices, we could track everything the Soviets were doing electronically. Satellite monitoring and all that kind of thing was done primarily from Pakistan. And it was pretty important to us at that point because we didn't know exactly what the Soviets were doing.

Q: Well, shall we move on to your next post? Is there anything we haven't covered, do you think?

DIXON: I don't really know. Different things suggest other things.

Q: You were there when the Johnson administration came in. Did you see any change? President Johnson had made a rather famous trip, as vice president, to Pakistan and all. Did you have any feeling that there was some sort of a more equitable balance in that time?

DIXON: No, no. I don't think it changed any. I think we were too frightened about China and India to really make much of a change, although we continued to depend on Pakistan for very vital information. Because, you see, it's situated just under where the Soviets were doing a lot of this stuff.

The only other thing I think of in Pakistan was that I had a disease of too many red corpuscles, and I had to go to the hospital quite frequently for treatment. In the course, I found there was no blood bank in Pakistan, and also that they had a whole bunch of blue babies, about a hundred of them, in the...

Q: Blue babies being the designation for infants who are born not getting enough blood to them because of heart problems.

DIXON: Yes. So I talked to a doctor friend who told me about an outfit in California that did operations on blue babies. They were connected with a hospital that was there. They authorized him to see what he could do about it.

We tried to see if we could get AID to give us some money to do open-heart surgery on these babies. They said it was not worth the money, that by inoculations they could save more lives than a hundred blue babies for much less cost. They didn't want to get into it.

I suggested to the chief of the hospital that he write to President Johnson and tell him about the problem of the blue babies and ask if a team from his associated hospital in California could come out and do this. Which they did. Johnson answered affirmatively.

But we had no blood bank there. We had to have a blood bank, so my wife and I helped the hospital start a blood bank there. We worked on it some, and when we got the blood bank up, the
team came out and they operated on all of the blue babies. All of whom were successful except one grown man who had been a blue baby. The doctors were not anxious to operate on him because he did not respond to things they wanted him to do, and they thought after the operation he would not -- it was painful to cough -- he would not cough up the things that he had to cough up to pull through this, and they said they thought he had a poor chance anyway. But his family insisted. And he died, but he was the only one who did.

But that was sort of an interesting... that we got into.

**ARCHER K. BLOOD**

Political Officer and Deputy Principal Officer  
Dacca (1962-1964)

Consul General  
Dacca (1970-1971)


**Q: And what was your job in Dacca?**

**BLOOD:** In Dacca, I was political officer and also deputy principal officer. That second aspect became more important.

My consul general there was Nat B. King, who really didn't like the management functions of the job particularly. And particularly when he wrote efficiency reports, he said, "I've only known this officer for a year, and I'm really not in the position to make any judgment." I told him that he was crucifying officers by statements like this even though he didn't intend to do so.

So I volunteered to write all the efficiency reports for his review just to protect the officers. And I did so. He allowed me to do more and more of this so I became sort of a baby DCM in the consulate general which to me made the job more interesting than doing the straight political work.

**Q: What was the political work like at that time?**

**BLOOD:** Well, in large part, it was reporting the grievances of the Bengalis against the government of Pakistan and against West Pakistanis. This annoyed Washington because Washington liked to believe that Pakistan was a stable, united country. Ayub was then president of Pakistan. Popular in the United States, but not popular in East Pakistan. We were aware, as I was aware later on at my second tour in Dacca of course, that we were preaching a message that wasn't very popular. But everybody who served in Dacca has been so struck by the obvious fact of this unhappiness that we all reported.
Q: Now, in East Pakistan the government of the region was appointed by the West Pakistan authorities?

BLOOD: The governor was appointed. That was Ahsum Kandu, who actually was very popular.

Q: He was a Bengali?

BLOOD: No, he was not Bengali, he was a general. But he had a falling out with Ayub and was replaced. He was the key official. The next most important official would be the general office commanding; that is, commanding the Pakistan military. And we actually became very close friends with him.

At that time, we had very good cordial relations with the Pakistani military and with the West Pakistani authorities as well as with the Bengalis.

Q: And no one hesitated to talk to you, I suppose?

BLOOD: Nobody hesitated to talk. The Pakistanis were more circumspect than say Greeks would be about talking politics. But you had open access.

The problem there was we had a large AID mission. The AID mission director in Karachi, which was still then the embassy, had much more access to the leadership of Pakistan than did our ambassador. In East Pakistan, the director of the AID mission had more access to the governor than did the consul general. There was considerable friction between the two. AID was, in those days, a big dominant organization which threw its weight around a lot. That was one of the sort of irritating aspects of that job.

Q: Now, you say Washington wasn't happy with your reporting on grievances.

BLOOD: Well, they never objected openly, but . . . For instance, we had been reporting that Ayub was unpopular, that Ahsum, the governor, however, was popular and perhaps his popularity might lead to his removal because the president might consider him a rival. And in the summer of 1961, a young American came over to East Pakistan on a Farm Bureau exchange, and he worked in a Bengali farm for a while. When he came back to Washington, he was debriefed, and he said, "Ayub was wildly popular in East Pakistan, but they don't like Ahsum."

The desk sent me a cable saying, "Well, we've got this information. What do you think of that?"

And I was so teed off by it that I refused to answer it because, I mean, here is this one young man in the country in the wake of years of steady reporting to the country. But it just struck me that they were grasping at straws. Finally, somebody had told them what they wanted to hear, and they were trying to latch on to it.

Q: When you had contact with these unhappy Bengalis, did the West Pakistani authorities either in Dacca or back at Karachi complain about your activities in talking to their opposition?
BLOOD: As I recall, they did occasionally. I think we all were aware we had to be rather circumspect in our dealings. I was put in sometimes a difficult position by Mr. Suhrawardy, who had been prime minister of Pakistan and who been the leader of the Awami League but was sort of in retirement and no longer an important political figure. He would call me at home and say, "Let's go to the movies or let's do this or that."

And I would try to have to fend him off because I realized that if I were seen in public with him, it would be embarrassing. I mean, the Pakistan government wouldn't like it, and it could be embarrassing to the US And besides, at that time he was really not that significant enough a figure to warrant the risk.

Q: What were the consulate general's relationship with the embassy a thousand miles away?

BLOOD: Miserable.

Q: Well, that's true of every consul general with every embassy, isn't it?

BLOOD: Yes, but these were even worse.

Well, I really probably shouldn't say this but Nat King would -- his wife had never come out to Dacca. Oh, he kept saying she would join him; she was living in Switzerland. He was, I think, lonely. And he took to drinking. And he would call me on Sunday afternoon and show me a cable he was sending to the embassy chewing them out for this or that.

Q: What kind of this or that? Failure to provide administrative support?

BLOOD: Support, often that. Sometimes policy guidance but mostly on administrative and housing matters and things like that. I knew that it wouldn't do any good, and it would just get him into trouble. So my job was, I felt, to talk him out of sending this cable which I would nearly always succeed in doing, but it took about an hour and a half of a Sunday afternoon getting him out of this mood. He was very, very irritated with the embassy, and they knew it. I was sort of a buffer in a way. But I liked Nat, and he was good to me. I was really trying to protect him from actions I knew would just get the embassy angrier and angrier.

Q: What about the AID mission? You say they had more access. Did they respond to directions, suggestions on how to conduct themselves?

BLOOD: Not very well. The AID mission director was not a very impressive fellow. A fellow who had been, I think, a sergeant in the Army, in the military, and had come up through sort of their administrative ranks. He was not an economist. He was very concerned with his own position.

I mean, AID for instance lived so much better than the rest of us lived. They all had air-conditioners in every room of their house and air-conditioned automobiles. We didn't. It was sort of a two-class society in East Pakistan. The Foreign Service and the USIA and CIA were sort of
the lower class, and AID was the upper class.

Q: *How would you evaluate the work that they were doing there? Were they making a real contribution to* --

BLOOD: I think they were doing good work, yes. I think they were.

Q: *And they were well received by the Bengalis?*

BLOOD: Oh, they were well received, yes, because they were distributing large amounts of assistance.

Q: *What about the CIA? How did they fit into that picture? Did they cause you a problem or their operations?*

BLOOD: No. They were small. There were only two officers there and a secretary. We worked very closely with them. Never any friction there.

Q: *Was there an insurgency problem at that time? Was there any revolt under way against the Pakistani authorities?*

BLOOD: No, no.

Q: *And there was no difficulty with the Indians? The Indians were not stirring up trouble in any fashion at that stage?*

BLOOD: No, there could be communal disturbances, you know. If one occurred in India say with the Hindus taking out after the Muslims, it would almost automatically within a few days be some incident in East Pakistan with Muslims going after the minority Hindus or vice versa. That was the only -- of course, the Indians were very suspect by the Pak authorities, but we tried to maintain contact with the Indian high commissioner, close contact.

Q: *This is, what, a dozen years or so more during independence?*

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: *No one looking back saying, "We made a mistake," or that the union of these two very different parts of the subcontinent was a mistake. No one regretting at that period?*

BLOOD: No, no, not really. I think the Bengalis, of course, felt that they were not getting a fair shake. They thought they were being treated as a colony. They were contributing the bulk of the foreign exchange earned by Pakistan, but they were getting, what, maybe a third of the foreign exchange to spend. They were getting, well, less than half of the development funds. Key positions in the civil service and in the military were held by West Pakistanis. They thought that they were just being milked by Pakistan.
Q: *But no one was looking back to the past with nostalgia when* --

BLOOD: No.

Q: *Or to the future of independence with* --

BLOOD: At that time, no. They really weren't talking about independence. They were just voicing their grievances, primarily economic grievances. And they were justified, I think, when you consider that over half the population of Pakistan was in East Pakistan, but the West Pakistan was much more prosperous. The businesses in East Pakistan were controlled primarily by West Pakistanis.

Q: *An exploited colony.*

BLOOD: Yes. That's the way they felt, yes.

Q: *Before we leave Dacca, any reflections from that period you want to add?*

BLOOD: It was my first introduction to South Asia, and we were able to travel quite a bit in East Pakistan. We got up also to Kashmir and Nepal from there to Calcutta. In those days, we could go frequently to Calcutta. Calcutta was the big city, and you could fly over there in half an hour. I think it was that experience that sort of really piqued my interest in South Asia and made me keen on returning when I had an opportunity to do so.

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Q: *In March of 1970 you are assigned on direct transfer to Dacca in East Pakistan. Please go ahead.*

BLOOD: I went to Dacca by way of consultation in Washington. That was the first time and only time I was ever sworn in. Because in those days when Bill Macomber was Under Secretary for Management he had initiated a program of swearing in consul generals in order to give that position more prestige and authority. So there was a little ceremony which he conducted in which I took the oath of office as principal officer in Dacca.

Q: *It wasn't to signify that you had more independence than* --

BLOOD: No, not at all. I hope I didn't take it to mean that way.

Going back to Dacca after, let's see, eight years absence was an interesting experience. I knew many people there, of course. But the situation had changed rather markedly. The impetus for a break away of East Pakistan from West Pakistan was much stronger. President Yahya's plan to move Pakistan away from martial law and back to a parliamentary democracy involving elections in both wings was, of course, the major issue and the excitement of the time and made for a great deal of very interesting political work.
The first crisis that we confronted was the massive cyclone of November 3rd, 1970, which we estimated later resulted in the death of 300,000 people.

Q: Before we get to that, what would you say were the reasons for this shift in Bengali attitudes against the government in West Pakistan -- in East Pakistan?

BLOOD: Well, for one the --

Q: In West Pakistan.

BLOOD: The resentments of economic discrimination had more time to simmer, more time to surface. For another, the Bengalis were more politically organized. The Awami League had become clearer the dominant Bengali political organization, well led, very active. The 1965 war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir had further divided the two wings because East Pakistan . . . The people of East Pakistan weren't very appreciative of taking risk to secure gains in Kashmir. And, of course, everybody knew that the country was in for political transformation from military to civilian rule which made for a lot of opportunities.

The cyclone immediately, of course, brought many headaches to the consul general and the AID mission USIA there. I had remembered earlier a much smaller cyclone in 1962 where there had been some friction between the embassy and the consulate general in dealing with Washington. And I was determined to avoid that friction this time.

Q: What kind of friction occurred?

BLOOD: Well, requests for aid - how would they be funneled? Who would make the recommendations? And we worked out an arrangement with Ambassador Farland in Islamabad that we could initiate the recommendations for aid, but they would go through the embassy on the way to Washington. And Ambassador Farland sort of took himself charge of this operation and worked with us, with the provincial AID director in East Pakistan and with myself, very closely, more closely than with the members of his own staff in the embassy. I think thereby we were able to avoid some of the problems that do arise in situations like this.

We initially were under very great pressure from Washington to demand relief, which seems to be always the case. Then after a while, the impetus dries out and then you have to fight very hard to get anything at all in the way of relief supplies.

For example, we were asked whether we wanted a Army field hospital to be flown out. It would take many planes and much personnel. We had a doctor there, an American doctor, who was on temporary duty from the Army, and he made a quick helicopter survey, and we endorsed his report which was that a field hospital was not necessary. I think it was the right decision. The Belgians subsequently sent out a field hospital which found little cyclone-related injuries with which to deal. Of course, there is always plenty of work for a hospital in treating chronic dysentery and other diseases and things like that. But the cyclone either drowned people or scraped up their arms, but other than that, did not result in many injuries.
It was ironic to learn that Senator Ted Kennedy was berating the State Department and US Government for not doing enough to help the survivors when we were really doing much more than was the government of Pakistan. And this was very obvious to the Bengalis. In fact, the international response on the part of the Soviets, and the British, and the Germans, and the Saudis, and the Iranians was very great. The only response that was nil or minimal was the response of the government of Pakistan. And we reported to Washington that the more we did, the worse we made the government of Pakistan look and this would have political ramifications which I think it did at the time of the elections a month later.

Q: Why didn't the government move more effectively? Were they simply incapable of doing so?

BLOOD: I'm not sure. Because on the earlier occasion of 1961 - '62, the government of Pakistan, particularly the Pakistani military had been very effective in their relief efforts. But this time, they didn't do much. The Pakistan Army cooperated with our helicopter unit we sent from Fort Bragg. The Pakistan Navy sent out press release after press release we just got in the way of the British Navy which was working very hard to bring relief by sea to the isolated islands.

It was almost as if they just didn't care. Yahya, the president, flew over East Pakistan on his way back from China for about an hour while the Pope and many other non-Pakistani senior officials visited East Pakistan at that time which was occupying a great deal of media coverage in the world.

We had the problem, of course, of handling the media. We had only a few helicopters that were available and under our direction. The media naturally wanted to have almost exclusive use of the helicopters. We thought some of these helicopters should be engaged in dropping of relief supplies to isolated areas, but we managed to work out a fairly equitable deal, arrangement, with them. We knew we had to accommodate the media if we were to get continued support for relief activities.

Ambassador Farland came over to the east wing and was very helpful, particularly in dealing with the press. He got a very bum rap at that time because one American newsman -- AP I believe -- had reported erroneously that the helicopter in which the ambassador was riding, the blades had injured a Bengali who was trying to get a parcel of rice. This was not true. We found out later he based it completely on hearsay and had not bothered to try to corroborate it. The ambassador was very upset and went to some special lengths to try to correct this erroneous report. On our part, of course, we and the embassy just ostracized that reporter from then on, and he had no access to any American officials.

It was an exciting time, and I think the American role was a very helpful one in that operation. The Bengalis could see -- it was a very visible role because our helicopters were flying in and out of the airport. So were the British and the Soviet helicopters. There was much evidence of international interest and concern and very little evidence of interest on the part of the government of Pakistan.

Q: And you said shortly thereafter elections had been scheduled.
BLOOD: Elections had been scheduled earlier but had been postponed because -- well, actually elections were postponed because of some flooding earlier, and elections were held in December. Many people believed that the smashing victory scored by the Awami League was traceable in part to the resentment felt by Bengalis over the rather diffident attitude taken by the government of Pakistan for the disaster relief operations.

Q: The Awami League, would you say it is something like an American political party with a right, a left, a center, or factions within it, or how would you describe it?

BLOOD: What the Awami League?

Q: Yes.

BLOOD: The Awami League was the Bengali Nationalist Party that favored autonomy for East Pakistan, favored better relations with India. I think in terms of the left-right spectrum, I would say it was the center left.

Q: What is pretty well unified parties?

BLOOD: At that time, yes. It was well organized, and they ran candidates in every one of the constituencies.

I remember the Pakistan ambassador to the United States, Mr. Hellali, visited East Pakistan after the disaster relief operation had been concluded but before the elections. And I had a gathering of my principal staff members with him. He asked us how we thought the election would turn out. And we said we thought the Awami League would win big. He was very angry. I remember he said, "Are you a Muslim?"

I said, "No."

And he said, "Do you know what goes in the mind of the Bengali villagers?"

And I said, "No."

And he said, "Well, I can tell you that they are going to vote the way the mullahs tell them, and they are not going to vote for the Awami League. And you are dead wrong. You have been taken in by these Bengalis."

Well, I remember also that just before the elections when I called on Sheikh Mujib Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, he told me that they would win all but two of the 169 seats in the 300-man National Assembly allocated to East Pakistan. I reported this to Washington, but I didn't believe it. I thought that was an exaggeration. And it actually turned out to be right on the button. They lost only two out of the 169 seats which gave them a majority in the National Assembly.

Q: The population of East Pakistan is larger you said than of West Pakistan.
BLOOD: Yes. About fifty-five percent to forty-five percent.

Q: Well, didn't the government have any concern that that larger half might take control of the legislature and thereby the government? And didn't they have any knowledge of the Awami League's position?

BLOOD: I think that Ambassador Hellali was typical of their views. They expected that the more conservative parties like the Muslim League would do better than they did and that they did not foresee that the Awami League winning such a majority. Nor did they foresee Bhutto winning plurality in West Pakistan. The election was very honest, but I think the results surprised them a great deal.

Q: The authorities in the East made no effort to influence the outcome by throwing money in the right places?

BLOOD: Not that I know of. I wasn't aware of that. They may have to some extent, but . . . The feeling there was tangible; if you live there, you couldn't help but be aware of the strong sentiments in East Pakistan of --

Q: Did all of your staff think that CIA and USIA was --

BLOOD: Yes. We all gave the Awami League a large majority, but we varied, you know, whether it would be from seventy-five percent to ninety-five percent.

Q: If the Awami League was going to win big in East Pakistan and therefore take control of the government in the West as well, what kind of government did you think that would be in terms of its relationship with the United States?

BLOOD: The problem was that the program, the platform, of the Awami League were the famous six points which called for such a degree of autonomy for East Pakistan that it would not be -- if applied, it's hard to see how you could very long maintain even a fiction of a unified country. My thinking was that the Awami League platform was a recipe for the dissolution of Pakistan, but it could be a recipe for the peaceful dissolution of Pakistan.

Q: How did you think American interests in the subcontinent would be affected by a Pakistan that had split into two pieces?

BLOOD: Well, that's a good question. We really debated that. We had, as I recall, perhaps in January of 1971, a meeting in the embassy in which all the constituent posts, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca, and the embassy, made contributions, and we were wrestling with this question of suppose Pakistan does come apart.

Q: This is after the --

BLOOD: After the elections but before the government military crackdown when there was still
the possibility of a peaceful evolution.

Q: Well, how did this embassy debate go?

BLOOD: Well, as I remember, we sort of came to a conclusion that it would be in US interests preferable if Pakistan stayed together primarily for the reason that if East Pakistan became independent, it would be another country very much in demand and requiring economic aid. Calls on us for economic assistance would be greater in the case of two Pakistanans than one. But I don't recall any very strong reasons other than that for -- or reasons why the United States' interests would be severely or even significantly damaged if the two countries should split apart. Well, we were then talking in terms of a peaceful split not a --

Q: Right.

BLOOD: Not one brought about by war or Indian intervention.

Q: But a weakened Pakistan would pose less of a balance to India in the subcontinent. Does that bother you at all? The security considerations of a split-up.

BLOOD: Well, I don't think that bothered us too much because I think you could also make the argument that East Pakistan was sort of a liability to West Pakistan. They could never defend it against India because it is surrounded virtually by India and separated by over a thousand miles. As events turned out, it was almost impossible to defend against India. It had come to be something of an economic drain on Pakistan. A truncated Pakistan might be, economically, more viable than a united Pakistan.

Q: What was the attitude towards India in this -- I don't know that it is probably called a crisis at this stage -- but was it felt that India was going to intervene in some fashion, or how were Indians' interests going to be protected did you Americans think at that time?

BLOOD: I don't think we worried about that. I mean, in Pakistan we weren't worrying about that too much. We thought that India would welcome and perhaps try to encourage the breakup figuring that they would be on good terms with East Pakistan. India and the Awami League were on very good terms.

Q: What about the Soviet Union and China, the great powers? Did they figure into your calculations as you looked at the situation developing for Pakistan?

BLOOD: Well, I remember the ambassador had advanced the idea, which none of us believed, that China had a great interest in East Pakistan as a way of getting access to the Bay of Bengal and therefore would . . . But China really was very supportive of Pakistan, the government of Pakistan, and was staunchly opposed to any movement toward autonomy on the part of the East Pakistanis. Soviet, no -- this, of course, all happened before the Indo-Soviet Peace Treaty which took place in August of 1971.

We were looking at it in terms of US interests, in terms of a peaceful political evolution
assuming that Bhutto in West Pakistan and Mujib in East Pakistan wouldn't be able to work closely together in a framework of the united Pakistan, and they would choose to go their separate ways.

Q: So after these elections and the Awami League victory . . .

BLOOD: Of course there were negotiations between Mujib and Bhutto and Yahya which weren't getting anywhere. The National Assembly elected in December was scheduled to be convened March 3rd. On March 1st, President Yahya, yielding to pressure from Bhutto, announced the indefinite postponement of the convening of the National Assembly. I think this was the key event that started the chain of events that led to the NATO pack war.

Q: What did Bhutto hope to achieve through that postponement? What could be gained by more time? What could be accomplished in that time?

BLOOD: Well, I think he tried to get Mujib to back away from insistence on the six points. Perhaps block Mujib from becoming the prime minister which, of course, he was entitled to do because he had clear majority in the National Assembly. Or just stalling for time because he knew that if the National Assembly were convened, Mujib would be elected prime minister, and the most he could hope for would be leader of the opposition or perhaps foreign minister in a coalition government.

When we heard over the radio the announcement of the postponement, we went up on the roof of Adamji Court, which was the building that houses the consulate general, and we could see Bengalis pouring out of office buildings all around that neighborhood. Angry as hornets. They were just like a spontaneous demonstration of wrath because they had believed Yahya. He would hold elections, they would run the elections, and now they were being denied the fruits of victory.

The embassy, that same day, sent off a message to Washington with a copy to us saying they thought this was a very shrewd decision on Yahya's part to defuse the situation. I commented rather bluntly that we saw it completely different. That just seeing this spontaneous reaction made me feel, I said that I've seen the beginning of the breakup of Pakistan. I was chastised by Washington that said, "Please no more hyperbole."

But it was the beginning. And the embassy being so far away from it could not really, I think, accurately evaluate the anger in East Pakistan. And then that's when sort of the, you might say, revolt began in which the Awami League in effect took over the government of East Pakistan and began to act as if they were government. The army sort of stuck to its barracks clearly building towards a crisis.

I had the problem then of deciding whether or not to evacuate the American community.

Q: This is March of --

BLOOD: March. The crackdown was on the evening of March 25th. I still remember that night
vividly. We had invited some Bengalis and some members of the consular corps to dinner and to see a film called "Stella Dallas" -- no, "Cass Kimberling" with Lana Turner and Spencer -- what's his name?

Q: *Spencer Tracy?*

BLOOD: Spencer Tracy, yes. And just toward the end of the movie, I had a call from my CIA colleague who had gotten down to the office. Obstructions were in the road. Some Bengalis had cut down trees, and the army was beginning to move.

Q: *Was there violence that provoked this? What provoked this crackdown?*

BLOOD: Well, what had happened was that Yahya, who was joined by Bhutto, came over to Dacca for talks with Mujib to see if they could straighten this out. We had no contact with the Pak officials at that time.

Q: *Why not?*

BLOOD: Well, most of them were -- the people that we had known, the governor and the general officer commanding, had been withdrawn. We found out later because they had objected to the idea of a military crackdown.

Q: *Oh.*

BLOOD: And so they had been withdrawn. And, of course, the president's entourage had come over. They were secluded with Bhutto and Mujib. We still had contacts with the Awami League. From them, we had the impression that it was just like a roller coaster. I mean, for a moment, they looked optimistic, then be pessimistic, then look optimistic again. But then suddenly on the afternoon of the 25th, Yahya broke off the talks, and he and Bhutto flew back to the West wing. And then that night, the military moved in their brutal crackdown.

Q: *There was substantial violence beforehand?*

BLOOD: No, it was later claimed there had been . . . The Bengalis had torn down Pakistani flags that they had seen. Some of the bazaars had refused to sell supplies to the Pakistan Army. But there had been very little violence. One case, an American secretary had been accosted by some Bengalis. She reported it to me. I called the Awami League, and they said, "We will take care of it. You will have no more problems on this score." And we didn't. They were the de facto government. So we were dealing with them in that period from about March 5 to March 25; a very short period before the crackdown.

Q: *Now, the embassy was, I assume, in touch with the authorities in the West. Were they trying to persuade them in any direction or the other? I mean, what was the American position on how this crisis should be handled?*

BLOOD: I'm not aware that we had any position or were trying to exert any --
Q: *It was an internal matter, and we were not --*

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: *What about yourself in the East?*

BLOOD: No, I wasn't trying. I was just trying to find out what was going on.

Q: *Were you talking to Mujib?*

BLOOD: No, not Mujib himself but with the people close to him. And --

Q: *But you were --*

BLOOD: And I think it was made clear our hope was for some sort of a peaceful political solution to the problem. And we were --

Q: *But you had no desire to recommend.*

BLOOD: No, no.

Q: *Well, what was your feeling then from your conversations? Did you think things were headed for --*

BLOOD: I didn't think the Pak military would crackdown. We were aware, of course, they were reinforcing their garrisons in East Pakistan because we went to the airport and we would see these PIA planes arrive full of young men in khaki slacks and white shirts, all about the same age, who would be marched off the plane into trucks. We knew that they were soldiers. But it just seemed to us that a military crackdown would end up by precipitating the separation of the wings, as it did. I mean, it was a desperate action.

I think a lot of Pak military though genuinely believed they could cow the Bengalis. Very many of them had a very arrogant attitude toward the Bengalis whom they thought as artistic and non-martial and cowardly and people who could never stand up to tough measures.

Q: *What was the crackdown, precisely? Barricades in the streets; what else?*

BLOOD: Oh, no, no. The crackdown was . . . They deliberately set out first to destroy any Bengali units in Dacca which might have a military capability. These included what was called the East Pakistan Rifles who were officered by West Pakistanis but had Bengali troops. They were sort of a paramilitary organization that was charged with border security and the police. And so they just attacked their barracks and killed all of them that they could.

Q: *When you say destroy, you literally mean destroy.*
BLOOD: Oh, yes, yes.

Q: *Not order them to other units.*

BLOOD: Oh, no. They just tried to destroy them and kill them all they could. And the police headquarters.

Q: *And these were unprovoked attacks?*

BLOOD: Oh, yes, they were unprovoked attacks. They also attacked the university, Dacca University, because the students had been active in this period, you know, with demonstrations. They machine-gunned, I guess used mortars too, against the dormitories and killed a large number of students. They brought up tanks before the building that housed the major Awami League newspaper and blew it up.

Q: *What about the Awami League --*

BLOOD: They attacked the bazaars that had denied food to the troops and destroyed them. They went to the university and murdered Hindu professors. One of them I knew particularly was an elderly man, philosopher, who didn't have a political bone in his body. I think he was killed solely because he was a Hindu.

Q: *What about the leadership of the Awami League?*

BLOOD: They were arrested, if they could find them, like Mujib. The others went into hiding. A lot of them did escape.

Q: *What about the activities at the embassy? Were you circumscribed by the military authorities? Did they tell you to stay at home?*

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Well, there was a curfew. We were not allowed to move about for, I think, about thirty-six hours. We went up on the roof, though, that night, and we could watch, we could see, the battles raging. You could see the tracers and hear the tanks firing, machine guns. You could see those things.

Then the telephone lines were all cut. I found out later that the Pakistanis had cut those to prevent communications with resistance although they blamed the Awami League for cutting phone lines. We were out of telephone communications. Luckily, we had radio communications with the office and with our homes.

We were pretty much out of touch with our own embassy for about at least three weeks. They wouldn't allow anybody from the embassy over. And see there were no telephones. We had cables. That was it. And then toward the end of the three weeks, they allowed me to call the ambassador on a military phone on which I could speak to him. We were in cablecom communications, but they weren't allowed to get over there.
Luckily, we had the air attaché from the embassy who had been there before the crackdown. I had asked for him to come over. And he was very, very helpful because we were, in effect, reporting war from March 25th on, a civil war. He was the only American military person there. The British also had the foresight to get one of theirs over in time, too, so we could have some competent military advice in reporting the struggle.

Q: *Was he able to fly his plane around the country?*

BLOOD: Oh, no, no. He came over on a commercial flight.

Q: *Were the Indians active at this point in helping guerrilla movements?*

BLOOD: No, no. I don't think they had been active before.

Q: *Now how did the embassy react? I assume you reported all this pretty much as you described it here. But how did the embassy react to this?*

BLOOD: With disbelief. They, of course, were being told by the government of Pakistan that nothing much had happened. And this attitude of disbelief began to show up in their comments and their messages which was very depressing. I mean, people like the DCM, Sid Sober, who had entered the Service with me were close friends and still are. I remember when he came over. I guess he was the first one over before the ambassador in late April when the government of Pakistan lifted the ban and after we had -- I'll get to the evacuation in a minute -- evacuated women, children, and nonessential dependents. And you could see that he just didn't believe it because a couple of Bengalis told him really nothing had happened.

Q: *The big crisis was over.*

BLOOD: Yes. The initial fighting . . . It took about two weeks before the Pak Army managed to defeat and drive out -- at least across the border into India -- most of the organized resistance to them. But what had happened then was, of course, a guerrilla type resistance grew up and spread.

Of course, now came the question of the evacuation. Even before the March 25th crackdown, a number of the foreign communities had been evacuated. The U.N., French, Germans, Japanese evacuated their communities.

Q: *Had there been some attacks on foreigners?*

BLOOD: No, there had been no attacks, but there was anticipation that we were headed toward a civil war. I had decided against evacuation for two reasons primarily. One was I knew with the Awami League in control that Americans were not in danger. Americans were very highly thought of. Nobody felt any sense of personal danger. Also, I felt that if we pull out, it would signal we sort of accepted the inevitability of a civil war and a conflict. If we stayed, then it was sort of evidence that we thought there was still some chance for a settlement.

Q: *Did that make you nervous about putting your fellow Americans at risk?*
BLOOD: Yes, oh, yes. It's a very awesome responsibility because you have to make judgments - - I was under no pressure from the American community to pull out.

Q: What about Washington? Did they want you to do one thing or the other?

BLOOD: No. Well, the ambassador, who was undergoing some medical treatment in Thailand, sent me a message saying, "My only advice to you is err on the side of caution." I wasn't quite sure what that meant.

But then after the military crackdown, the situation changed drastically. Now Washington found it hard to believe that Americans could be in danger once the Pak military was in control. But we were.

Q: In danger from what? From whom?

BLOOD: From the Pak military.

Q: Oh.

BLOOD: There were several instances of Americans being . . . Well, I should explain first that among the troops sent to East Pakistan, there were troops that were not regular army. There were frontier levies from the northwest frontier province who were not front line troops. There were several instances where Americans had been threatened at gunpoint by soldiers and told that they were going to be killed immediately. There were other instances where soldiers would leave their barracks in the evening and rob American houses. In one case, they took the watch off an American wife at gunpoint. In another case, an American confessed to me that he had actually killed a Pakistani soldier who had tried to kill him and had buried the body.

We were also harboring, all of us were harboring, Bengalis, mostly Hindu Bengalis, who were trying to flee mostly by taking refuge with our own servants. Our servants would give them refuge. All of us were doing this. I had a message from Washington saying that they had heard we were doing this and to knock it off. I told them we were doing it and would continue to do it. We could not turn these people away. They were not political refugees. They were just poor, very low-class people, mostly Hindus, who were very much afraid that they would be killed solely because they were Hindu.

Q: Did you have Hindu servants?

BLOOD: We had some. We all had a mixture of Muslim and Hindu servants. They worked very closely together, well together. So this was another danger. I don't think if I had ordered the community to stop that they would have stopped. It was just a humanitarian gesture that really was essential. It was really a humanitarian gesture that was being undertaken by our own servants out of humanity to fellow Bengalis.

I had had a squad of Bengali police who had been camped in a tent on my front yard because
earlier there had been some left-wing death threats against me. The East Pakistan police had sent this unit to guard my residence. When the fighting began, of course, they were fearful of their lives so they took off their uniforms and buried their rifles in my back yard. Then later, the NCO in charge approached me and said that he had done nothing during the fighting. He wanted to return the rifles to the Pak Army, but would I go and vouch for him.

So I took him and the rifles to the nearest Pak military quarters and swore that what this gentleman had been doing and why he had the rifles in my yard and what he had done with them and that I could see him not taken apart. I hope he escaped safely.

Anyhow, so I decided to recommend to Washington that we evacuate.

Q: This was --

BLOOD: This would have been about mid-April. Washington's tone, which heretofore had been, "Anything you say, just give the word," suddenly changed. "Now wait a minute. Let's think this out. Are you sure you want to do this?"

I had, of course, pointed out that we knew full well that an evacuation by us now would be taken amiss by the government of Pakistan because they were claiming that everything was peaceful. So if the Americans evacuate, obviously we didn't think they were peaceful. But I said I think that the safety of the American community overrides that consideration.

They finally agreed to the evacuation, but the government of Pakistan insisted that we fly from Dacca to Karachi and use PIA planes. The same planes that were bringing over military reinforcements then could be used to evacuate our people on the round trip. This was upsetting because the evacuation plan, which had been worked out before, was for US Air Force planes from Thailand to take us to Bangkok which is only two hours away and a similar climate and a place to which we could get to visit our families more readily.

Washington agreed to the Pakistan demand. So our wives, children, and nonessential employees had to fly from Dacca to Sri Lanka to Karachi, which is the same length of time as going from New York to London. They were being flown by crews which were absolutely exhausted because they were ferrying troops back and forth. The government of Pakistan was, I guess, apprehensive that some of our people would leave the plane in Sri Lanka so they insisted on picking up their passports from them as they boarded the plane to be returned only in Karachi.

Q: Why were they so desirous of having your people arrive in West Pakistan?

BLOOD: Well, they were going from there to Tehran.

Q: Why did they care whether they went --

BLOOD: Well, first of all, Washington agreed to say we should describe it as a thinning out, not as an evacuation. Of course, it was an evacuation. And if they went out in so-called commercial PIA flights, it wouldn't look as strong an action as if the US Air Force came and picked them up
and took them out.

Q: Right.

BLOOD: I'm not sure why they wanted . . . And, of course, PIA was going back to Karachi anyhow. So they spent a night in Karachi and then flew on to Tehran. But this disgruntled a large number of the American community there. Many of them --

Q: These were all dependents plus all private Americans, or who was being evacuated?

BLOOD: Dependents, nonessential employees, private Americans. We also smuggled out several Bengali spouses of American citizens.

Q: That may have been one of the reasons Pakistanis wanted control of the exit. They didn't want people to leave who they --

BLOOD: But they didn't block them anyhow. You could just walk through with your spouse with your passport and get out.

But I could sense, you know, from Washington's reaction that they weren't too happy with this decision to evacuate. I also knew -- as the person on the spot who says evacuate, and if they overrule me and something should ever happen, they (inaudible). I really thought it was.

Our people wanted to go. They were desperate to go mostly because they were very angry. They were angry against our government for having . . . See, the Washington attitude had been there was nothing going on there. These people had seen all this happening. They were angry at the US government's failure to denounce the atrocities. I mention that too frankly. I know that some of these people when they get back, they are going to go to congressmen and the press, and they are going to (inaudible). But you can't muzzle that. You can't keep them here. I mean, they can go out commercially if they want to. And it's bound to come out sooner or later.

Q: What about the American press? Weren't they covering the events?

BLOOD: Well, the American press had been all -- on the day after the evacuation, all the foreign press had been trundled up and expelled.

Q: Ah. On the day of evacuation?

BLOOD: Oh, no, no, no. They were just sent out on planes before the evacuation.

Q: The crackdown. When were they sent out?

BLOOD: I think the 26th of March.

Q: Oh, I see. There were no American press.
BLOOD: No, there were a couple, one of whom came in surreptitiously over the border, one who escaped hiding. We hid him. We hid him in our house so they could keep reporting.

Q: *Could they get their reports out?*

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: *Did you send their reports out, too?*

BLOOD: Yes. Also, we were -- in fact, I never read so many other people's mail as at that time because in this period of evacuation, the commercial wireless was also cut. So we had our own communications, of course, the consul general. We weren't relying on Pakistan facilities.

But other smaller officers didn't. So the Japanese and Nepalese and others, when they organized their own evacuation, they did it through us. We would send, say, a message to Kathmandu at our embassy which then relayed it to the Nepalese government who would then come back through us. I would give the message to the Nepalese consul general. Same with the Japanese. Later on when the Canadian high commissioner came over, of course they had no facilities, so we transmitted their -- Washington okayed this -- transmitted their reports and so forth.

Q: *As we know, you and your colleagues at the post became seriously at odds with people in Washington. What would you say marked the division between good relations and the sour relationships that seemed to --*

BLOOD: Well, you have to remember that it was really Nixon and Kissinger and their people against the bureaucracy, as we found out later. I was a real part of the bureaucracy. We discovered when we went back to Washington virtually everybody in the State Department felt the same way we did.

Q: *But when in the field, you didn't have that --*

BLOOD: We didn't know that in the field. You know, you know how instructions come out of the Department, you don't know usually who is writing them. I really was not aware until I came back that our position had had such strong support at least among the working levels in NEA and elsewhere in the government.

Q: *But you did have a feeling that you and Washington were --*

BLOOD: Yes.

Q: *Had different views on how this crisis would be managed in terms of US interests.*

BLOOD: Well --

Q: *Or the perception of the way things were developing. What I was getting at was is there a particular point, was it the evacuation, was it earlier reports, where is it that you think you took*
a step down or up, as you prefer to call it?

BLOOD: A little hard to pinpoint, but it would be right after March 25th when we began to report the crackdown. I will admit we did it very bluntly. We didn't disguise it in diplomatic niceties. We talked about, you know, 5,000 people probably being slaughtered that night. Things like that. We also had evidence. Of course, I mean, I never saw anybody murdered myself, but we had Catholic priests out in the countryside who . . . When Hindu villages were machine-gunned by the Pakistan Army, these people would flee to the Catholic mission for sanctuary. We sent American doctors up there to treat their wounds. Actually, we didn't send them; they went up there on their own. So these were American eyewitness reports of atrocities which we were reporting.

Q: And the embassy --

BLOOD: But, of course, the dissent message was what --

Q: Before we get to that, the embassy's view. How did they mesh with you all? Were they supportive, critical, were they just hands off? How did they handle your reporting? They must have had some idea.

BLOOD: Yes. As I recall it, they sort of disbelieved that we were reporting accurately.

Q: You weren't saying (inaudible).

BLOOD: Yes, right.

Q: When did you file this dissent message?

BLOOD: I forget the exact date.

Q: Yes.

BLOOD: It would have been --

Q: After the evacuation?

BLOOD: No, before the evacuation.

Q: In April.

BLOOD: Before the evacuation. Early to mid-April. Actually, the dissent message was drafted by twelve or thirteen people on my staff. I did not draft it. They came to me and said we want to send this statement, we are so upset with the US failure to denounce the atrocities. They were all key people in AID, USIA. My own deputy didn't, but he was a weak officer. I think he decided he was too scared or something. But everybody whose opinion I respected had participated.
So I decided to send it, and I transmitted it. But I transmitted it along with a strong supportive statement. I said, "I had not personally drafted this. It was presented to me. But these are my best officers. I believe in what they are saying. I accord with their sentiments completely," and sent it off.

Now, I think we sent it secret [limited distribution].

Q: *Henry Kissinger said you sent it at such a low classification, it was sure to leak.*

BLOOD: Yes, that's not true. I should have sent it up. Secret [limited distribution] was the highest thing we were used to using. Now there is exdis that at the time was higher. Exdis, eyes only, I should have done that. Now I recognize that. But at the time, I used the highest classification that we were accustomed to using. There certainly was no intention, that's not true. That's just his supposition, but I can assure you that's not true. Any of it.

We sent it to the embassy and to Washington and the other posts in Pakistan. Of course, the embassy immediately grabbed it away from the other posts.

Q: *What was the embassy's reaction? Did it comment on the message?*

BLOOD: Well, their action, of course, was to take it away from the other posts. I don't recall. The ambassador and I never had any harsh words during this time, ever.

Q: *But the ambassador was not someone to have harsh words. Farland, right? I mean, he was --*

BLOOD: Oh, yes.

Q: *He was a mild-mannered gentleman.*

BLOOD: Oh, he could be pretty tough when he wanted to be.

Q: *I mean, Sid Sober --*

BLOOD: He and I always got along well.

Q: *Sid Sober was a much more definite personality in my opinion.*

BLOOD: Yes, but Sid and I, of course, were friends of long standing, close friends.

No, I mean, I knew when we sent it, they wouldn't like it. I mean, we are not that dumb.

Q: *After all, you wouldn't have sent a dissent message if you thought --*

BLOOD: No. Remember, this is just about the time that the idea of dissent messages was being heard about.
Q: Right.

BLOOD: We had been reading about the possibility of dissent messages.

Q: So you got no particular reaction to you from the embassy. What about from Washington? Did someone reply and say you are right or you are wrong? Did you get any indication that it had been read back there?

BLOOD: Oh, we began to get newspaper, but when --

Q: It leaked.

BLOOD: When it leaked. Then we knew it had leaked. And then I -- I don't know, maybe about a couple weeks later -- I'm trying to think how I got the word I ought to ask for a transfer.

Q: Who did you get that word from?

BLOOD: I'm trying to think. It may have been Sid. That didn't bother me after then so understand.

Q: But you didn't ask for a transfer, did you?

BLOOD: No, then I did.

Q: Oh, you did?

BLOOD: Oh, they said to do it.

Q: They said, "Ask for a transfer."

BLOOD: Yes. And I was due for home leave. I had gone on a direct transfer from Athens. I hadn't had home leave for a long time. So I asked for home leave and transfer and then the word came back to the apartment. Things were sort of interesting there. I wasn't in any hurry to leave so I stayed until about mid June. I did get one, I guess, indication from Sid who said, "When are you leaving?" Oh, politely done. But they were obviously hoping I would get out of there. But I wasn't in any great hurry to go. I mean, I knew I had to go, but I was sort of enjoying . . .

The situation was so interesting. We were down to about thirteen officers. The other countries' offices were also down to a few staff. Incidentally, the British deputy high commissioner left the same day I did for the same reason. And the Iranian was stopped by the Paks because he had visited the Indian deputy high commissioner who was under house arrest there. The Paks didn't like that. They brought the attention of the Shah's government, and they pulled him out.

I visited the Indian deputy high commissioner twice but on instructions. The Pakistani deputy high commissioner in Calcutta had been put under similar house arrest in Calcutta. Our consul general there or somebody in his staff had visited him and taken something to drink or reading...
materials and kept up contact and sent messages on his behalf back to New Delhi. This was quid pro quo. So on two occasions, I called on the Indian, who was a good friend, and I was allowed to by the Pak Army. They had him under house arrest. And I visited with him. But this was done with Pak knowledge and only because in Calcutta, we were performing similar service for Pakistani officials in the same situation.

Q: How did the leak of your dissent message affect your ability to do business in Dacca? Could you talk to Bengali political intellectuals?

BLOOD: No, they were either dead or in hiding. Of course, the Pak military officials were very anxious to talk to us because there was evidence that we accepted them.

General Kikakan, who is now, I think, governor of Punjab, was sent over as governor. He is a lieutenant general in the army and had a reputation of being a very tough guy in Luchistan earlier. When he was sworn in -- this was right after the crackdown -- I declined to go. I sent a junior officer instead. And I knew he wanted me to call on him. I stalled. One afternoon as I was leaving work, a Pak Army captain with a revolver in a jeep came by and said, "The governor has instructed me to escort you to his office." So I went out there. We had a pleasant chat. Then the next day in the paper, "American Consul General Calls on the Governor." But I did it at gunpoint. [Laughter]

Q: So you left.

BLOOD: I left in June, yes.

Q: In June. And when you came back to Washington, what kind of reception did you find?

BLOOD: Sisco was unhappy. He blamed me for leaking the message or at least giving it too low a classification. Nick Veliotes arranged for me to see Irwin, who was then deputy secretary. He was much friendlier. He wanted to know what I thought about the prospects of Indian intervention and asked my views. He was very nice. I think he genuinely -- I think Nick had put him up to it. Nick said, "You ought to talk to this guy." Those were the two major impressions.

Then I went on leave to Colorado. I joined my wife. And then I guess Howie Schaffer called me up to tell me that I had won the Herter award and please come back to Washington to receive it. I guess it was only then that I really feel, you know, that my peers at least applauded the action.

Later on, I talked to Chris Van Hollen. Chris was very helpful because by then I got a copy of my efficiency report which Sid Sober had written in which he had said a couple things which I took strong issue with it. One was that I had in fact encouraged the American community to be critical of the US government's handling of the situation. Of course, that is not true. I said that it was a genuine feeling that everybody felt, and I didn't have to encourage it. I didn't do anything to encourage it. I shared it, but I didn't encourage it. And a couple other things like that. Chris -- Joe Sisco refused to make a comment, but Chris, I think, put his neck on the limb, and he wrote a supplementary review statement. And then also that I hadn't behaved properly in Washington. And I objected to that, too.
Q: *In Washington?*

BLOOD: I was called up to testify before the Senate judicial subcommittee which also handled refugees. Ted Kennedy subcommittee. I think it was very certain (inaudible) when they started asking sensitive questions, I said we would have to go to an executive session, they stopped it then. There wasn't anything the Department could have objected to at all in that testimony. Chris said, you know, we have cooperated completely with the Department, and we have no objection to anything that he has done. Of course, Sid wasn't even in Washington then. He was home in Islamabad. I was still a loyal Foreign Service officer.

Q: *But you didn't see Kissinger, I'm sure.*

BLOOD: What?

Q: *You didn't see Kissinger at that time.*

BLOOD: Oh, no. He was, of course, over --

Q: *In the White House. (Inaudible) none of those people.*

BLOOD: Sisco . . . Rogers, of course, he had to give me the award at the meeting. I think he was a little embarrassed about that. I think this whole thing put him in -- I'm sure Kissinger probably said, "Look at your State Department people. They can't even follow instructions."

Q: *Now who took your place in Dacca at that time?*

BLOOD: Well, my deputy was Bob Carl. He acted briefly and then -- oh, gee, who is the guy who took my place?

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R. GRANT SMITH  
**Rotation Officer**  
Karachi (1963-1964)  

**India Desk Officer**  
Washington, DC (1970-1972)

*Grant Smith was born on Long Island and raised in Washington DC. He attended both Princeton and Cornell Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1963 and was assigned to Karachi Pakistan by 1964. Mr. Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

Q: *What was your impression of the Pakistanis with whom you were dealing?*
SMITH: I think that we had always been impressed by the professionalism of the Pakistani bureaucrat, and we knew some of the military officers, since my wife is a rider, and that's the way you get to know the military. Very professionals, very good with Americans, and comparatively open. I don't remember having the feeling that they were very closed. They certainly gave the impression of being open. You could travel around, and they would say, "Well, you shouldn't go up there because there are tribesmen up there," but you could travel other places.

Q: I've never served in either of the two countries, but the Pakistanis, certainly in the earlier times, seem to have impressed the Americans more than the Indians. The Indians always seem disputatious and argue, and usually come at the United States lecturing us on where we've gone wrong, and of course Americans prefer to lecture other people on the morality of something. And it doesn't seem to work very well. Did you have the feeling that the Pakistanis seem kind of like us, or something like that? Was that at all noticeable?

SMITH: Well, this was a period, remember, of basically military rule.

Q: Ayub Khan at that time?

SMITH: Yes. And it was also a period, I think, if you'll go back in the intellectual history, you'll see that we were thinking of the military in some developing countries serving as a modernizing influence, and Pakistan was often cited as an example of a place where the military would be nationalizing and modernizing influence - which was something that one could relate to in Pakistan at that time.

Q: What about the Soviet menace? Was that something that was in the air, or was Pakistan far enough removed to not make it a problem?

SMITH: Well, of course it was a factor in our relations with Pakistan. The Pakistanis have always been much more focused on India than they have been on Kashmir. On some occasions they're focused a little bit on Afghanistan, but not so much on the Soviets.

Q: This was an interesting time, wasn't it, for being on India? Kissinger was in the White House and was interested in the China via Pakistan connection, and India seemed to be getting sort of short shrift. Did you feel that, or was this a fair way of saying it, or how would you describe it?

SMITH: Well, the key event of the two years I was there was the December 1971 India-Pakistan War, and the key action that we took during that war that affected our relations with India for many years thereafter - if not still - was the dispatch of the carrier task force headed by the Enterprise to the Indian Ocean during the war. And it was something that, when it happened, we on the Desk didn't know about. We found out about it later. It was done by Kissinger, and he always made clear in the little book he wrote when he commented on this, that this had been done "in the context of the relationship with China." In other words, Pakistan was an ally of China, and because of our new opening to China and the relationship that Pakistan had in establishing that opening, he didn't think that we could stand by in the situation which could have occurred towards the end of that conflict, which was that India succeeded in liberating
Bangladesh and would then turn to Pakistan.

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Q: Well, how did you and your colleagues see the situation before the Bangladesh thing, which at that time was East Pakistan? How did you see that situation developing?

SMITH: Well, of course it began, as I recall, in March of 1971 with the crackdown by the Pakistan military in East Pakistan, as it was then, which came after the election in Pakistan, which had actually resulted in a majority for the main politician from East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The crackdown by the Pakistan military immediately resulted in this massive flood of refugees, and we're talking about a magnitude that, looking at present-day situations, makes present day numbers, as bad as they are, seem small, because there were 10 million altogether that came into India from Bangladesh, including the poor peasants but also the Bengali leadership. And one of the things that I was very involved with was organizing the money to transfer, as I recall, to UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] to help these, although the Indians, I believe, did not want to call them refugees. They were "temporarily displaced persons," because the Indians did not want these people to stay; they wanted them to go home, and they did not want to give them full refugee status. The whole purpose of Indian policy was to create a situation in which they could go home. Pakistan has always accused India of masterminding this whole thing so that it would divide Pakistan, split off East Pakistan and become independent. My view was much more that the Pakistan army, the West Pakistanis, were responsible for the events that precipitated everything, but once those happened and the refugees began to flow, then India, yes, Indira Gandhi, made a very hard-nosed decision that India would do what was necessary to stop this problem, and what was necessary to stop this problem involved training, equipping the Bengalis to be fighters in East Pakistan, supporting them with the Indian Army, which before the war actually started was, as I recall, operating across the border into East Pakistan. So India, pressured by this massive flow of refugees, did everything to force that conflict in East Pakistan, and its whole objective then was to hold to the west and to liberate East Pakistan - which it did quite quickly.

Maurice Williams was born in Canada in 1920. At the age of five, Williams and his family moved to Kansas City, Missouri. After graduating high school in 1939, Williams attended Northwestern University. He was drafted into the army before being able to finish at Northwestern, but only to receive his Master’s Degree in 1949. Upon graduation, Williams had accepted a position with the State Department in Washington. He has served in Iran and Pakistan. The interview was conducted by W. Haven North on May 15, 1996.

WILLIAMS: After Iran, I was assigned as deputy and later director of the AID Mission in
Pakistan, which was a very different proposition from Iran. The Government of Pakistan had a strong administrative structure which before partition from India had been part of the British-India Civil Service. While employing few in numbers, the British-India service was regarded as the steel frame which held together a diverse and complex subcontinent. Similarly, the Pakistan Civil Service was the steel frame which administered Pakistan. It's officers were few but they manned the senior posts and were highly competent, although below that top level there was limited professionalism.

Pakistan was governed by an authoritarian regime headed by General Ayub Khan. As president of the country he placed a high priority on economic development, having frozen the military budget and directed increased revenues for development. Pakistan was not only a member of the U.S. sponsored CENTO alliance - having received substantial U.S. armaments - but it clearly met the new aid criteria of the Kennedy Administration: a priority for development, clear goals and domestic mobilization of resources for economic development.

Again I found myself working in a major aid mission with large technical staffs, both American and local. The reorganized AID integrated a capital loan fund and an enlarged PL 480 Food for Peace program, along with technical assistance, and had authority to commit these resources on a multi-year basis in support of sound development plans and assurance of reforms for effective performance. The Mission was staffed not only with technical advisors, but also with economists, loan officers and legal talent, providing a complete capability to approve and process loans within the AID Mission to Pakistan. There was a large measure of operational autonomy delegated to the field. It was an exciting time for development.

Q: I remember, it was the real key to AID activity and mission.

WILLIAMS: President Ayub Khan's finance minister was Mohammed Shoaib who was dedicated to development. He would later become Senior Vice President of the World Bank. Shoaib, a close confidante of President Ayub Khan, was the guiding spirit at the center of the Pakistan Government's economic programs. A Five Year Plan had been formulated with the assistance of the Harvard Advisory Group, headed by Dave Bell who had become Administrator of AID. The Pakistan Plan was considered a textbook model of development planning.

We were a favored AID Mission administering a high level of assistance and staffed with some of the best talent AID could muster. U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan in 1964-65 totaled some $400 million annually, including technical assistance, development loans and food aid.

Q: Was there any commodity aid in dollars in addition to the PL 480?

WILLIAMS: A substantial part of the program was for commodity program assistance. And it was program assistance which provided an important bargaining tool for encouraging and supporting reforms, a process we called "performance bargaining." The integrated development loan fund provided for both commodity and project assistance. The substantial PL 480 commodity assistance was repayable in local currency which provided flexible budget support for aid financed projects.
Q: Did you have other instruments?

WILLIAMS: You used every instrument that could be brought to bear.

A consortium of aid donors provided total resources approaching $600,000,000 a year. The World Bank was heavily engaged both in pre-investment studies and project financing. A Harvard Advisory Team was integrated into the planning units of the central ministries. The United Nations had a number of sectoral advisors. And the large AID Mission in Karachi, with provincial offices in Lahore and Dacca, encompassed most of the skills necessary to carry out a combined development assistance effort. It was a major responsibility.

Pakistan was a country in two parts separated by a thousand miles across India -- West and East Pakistan. They shared a common religion but were otherwise totally different in culture, ethnic character, climate and geography; in a sense they were two countries and have since become two countries. The varied conditions, East and West, posed quite different development potentials and a unique range of issues and problems. Within a central political and financial frame, there was a good deal of administrative autonomy in each of the provinces and their respective governors were authentic political leaders.

A principal thrust of the aid program was the building and staffing of institutions of higher learning. The PL 480 counterpart in rupees was jointly programmed for buildings and equipment. The new institutions included teacher training colleges in Karachi and Dacca, agricultural universities in Lyallpur and Mymensingh, an administrative staff college in Lahore and a rural development training center in Peshawar. Each of these were staffed by American university contract teams while the newly recruited Pakistani faculty were being educated in the partner U.S. universities. Additionally, a large participant training program provided courses for hundreds of Pakistanis in the United States.

Education assistance was among our most important contributions to Pakistan's future. The programs were well conceived and administered. The only real problem was to assure that the selection process for participant training was based on merit rather than favoritism.

As in Iran, USAID mounted a substantial public administration program. In retrospect, I believe the American aid approach to public administration was overly rigid in assuming that American administrative doctrine and practices were the gospel. The British administrative tradition was more flexible and in some respects may have been better adapted to conditions in Pakistan. American technicians were often less flexible and sensitive than they might have been in adapting American methods to local circumstances. This was true for other technical fields as well. We believed the "know-how" derived from American experience had universal validity, and we were there to instruct these poor countries. That was a weakness of our technical assistance program. At the time I too was imbued with the belief that we knew the answers; our adaptation to cultural differences was not what it should have been.

Water management and its application to agriculture were major concerns for Pakistan's development. In the political separation between India and Pakistan there was a division of waters of the tributary rivers of the Indus plain. British-India had developed a large integrated
system of gravitational irrigation extending for hundreds of miles. Its division meant extensive engineering and investment in several large dams and water channels. This investment was led by the World Bank with the support of a donor consortium, which included U.S. Aid.

There were a number of issues concerning further aid for extension of the irrigation system by an additional major dam at Tarbela, and upgrading of the existing irrigation system which was plagued by water leakage and loss of productive land from water logging and salinity. AID funded a major study in regional water development and management, along with related agricultural land use. This led to a sequence of technical and capital investment projects. Additional to up-grading water channels, we financed large area projects for deep tube wells for control of water availability and for selective reclamation drainage. Tube well development supplemented the gravitational irrigation system and greatly increased the productive land area.

Water management and investment was also critical to development in East Pakistan. Its low-lying delta was subject to alternate severe flooding and dry seasons, as well as salt water incursions from the Sea of Bengal. Here the USAID program involved measures to alleviate flooding, extensive use of low-lift river pumps to expand agricultural output in the dry season, and the building of "polders" to enclose areas against sea water incursion - much as the Dutch had done in Holland.

The USAID program also emphasized participation by village farmers to improve agricultural practices, and support village level schools and clinics. The effort was to stimulate local self-help and demand for supporting services, while pressing various public extension services to be more responsive to local needs. The progress in participatory community development - supported by both the Ford Foundation and AID - was notable in East Pakistan and was widely publicized in the international development community.

The Green Revolution made possible a quantum jump in food grain production, providing farmers could combine the higher yielding seeds (initially wheat and later rice) with appropriate application of water and chemical fertilizer. With the progress in water management, fertilizer supply was the critical constraint for Pakistan in taking advantage of the Green Revolution. Addressing this problem would involve reform of Pakistan's fertilizer distribution policies.

The Government was not accustomed to investing in fertilizer for production of food grains, and when I proposed to including fertilizer in the U.S. financed commodity loan Finance Minister Shoaib initially refused, saying "Why should we when we can get the grain we need from PL 480 imports?".

I replied, "Yes but that's won't last forever, Mr. Minister, and you've got to build your own capability for producing the food you need". Finally he agreed, "All right, Maury, I know you have a reputation to make in Washington. As a favor to you, we'll include fertilizer imports."

Minister Shoaib was not entirely convinced that it was sound economics to substitute dollar repayable fertilizer imports - even on concessionary terms - for local currency repayable wheat. However, the issue was one of applying foreign aid to build self-reliance rather than encouraging over-dependence. Consequently I continued to urge the importance of fertilizer in speeches.
throughout the country with the slogan that "fertilizer is development."

That put the Mission in the fertilizer business, in the sense that we would seek to reform Pakistan's distribution system for agricultural farm supplies. We began financing fertilizer under our commodity import program, but it had to be readily available and reach farmers on time for effective application. Pakistan's distribution system was shot through with inefficiency and favoritism.

Q: This was a government distribution system?

WILLIAMS: Yes, there was strong opposition to placing the distribution of fertilizer in the private sector, so we worked at improving the government's procurement and distribution practices.

Reform to improve efficiency in the use of aid and in Pakistan's overall development was an integral part of the AID program. In annual reviews with Pakistan officials we would identify a reform agenda, focusing on issues where improved performance was important to aid effectiveness. We called this process "performance bargaining." Change was possible but you could not overload the circuit; I had learned early at the Civil Service Commission in Chicago, that "you could make a certain amount of progress but not too much initially."

One area of concern was reform of the procedures by which water was administered in Pakistan. Our point of entry was the substantial aid we were providing for water management projects, particularly in tube well development in West Pakistan and river pumps and water control embankments in East Pakistan. This meant negotiating with the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) in each of the provinces. While Pakistan's senior civil servants were competent, and some quite talented, the middle levels of their administration were often overly rigid and slow to change what were cumbersome bureaucratic systems. The need was for much more effective implementation of development projects, particularly where major capital investments were involved.

Often broad economic policy issues were involved. For example, AID financing of a thermo-electric power plant in Karachi and a project for exploitation of natural gas raised the question of energy pricing and the extent of public subsidy.

We were bargaining for improved performance at every step of the way. However, reform of major economic policies involves negotiation on the level and composition of program commodity assistance which provided the best opening. AID's experience with performance bargaining for policy reform in the 1960s, particularly in Pakistan and India, would later become the model for World Bank "policy based lending" in the 1980s.

Q: Could you elaborate a little bit on performance bargaining and what it consisted of?

WILLIAMS: The AID doctrine of the 1960s was that large-scale aid would relieve the constraint of capital investment -- with food aid as an essential wage good -- and yield accelerated economic growth. If the "take off" for growth and investment was to be sustained, however, it
was essential that there be an accompanying internal mobilization effort and, most important, that the large aid not substitute for or be a disincentive to a recipient country's internal efforts. This was the rationale for performance bargaining.

Relating economic assistance levels to performance involved important questions of timing in relation to the balance between incentives and disincentives. Logically, the time to reach understanding over reform policies was before major commitments of economic assistance. There was an alternate view, favored by the AID Mission in India, that high levels of aid provided an essential early incentive to change traditional attitudes, which in turn would lead to policy reforms for accelerated economic growth.

My view was that performance bargaining had to be on the agenda of the country aid mission before and during provision of high aid levels. And there was a critical future timing issue when it would be important to begin cutting back the aid level relative to internal resource efforts and incentives. Understandably, there was a great deal of imprecision in the application of performance bargaining, depending on country circumstances and the context of U.S. foreign policy.

Q: Did this involve a lot of conditionality and covenants and all of those types of things that we talked about as it related to aid?

WILLIAMS: For capital loan projects it was usual to apply conditions precedent. However, we did not think in terms of conditionality as proposals to be imposed. Rather, we sought to build specific understanding for reforms by back-up studies and intensive discussions with Pakistan officials and the Harvard Advisory team. It was an in-country review process by people who knew Pakistan on the ground and who sought workable solutions; that was the comparative advantage of AID in the 1960s over later conditionality applied by Washington-based donor agencies.

Q: Was there a lot of resistance on the government's part or were they more or less party to it?

WILLIAMS: There was often resistance to change in the middle level of the bureaucracy. They were used to doing things in a very administratively controlled way, and change could be threatening to the sense of bureaucratic stability. It could also threaten patronage and the corruption involved in administrative controls. Implementation was often tough going. Progress was possible with the support of senior leadership; and we had the resources to help reduce the risks of reforms.

One of the most notable reforms we achieved in cooperation with the government was to liberalize the import regime. It was government controlled through import licenses and there was a lot of inefficiency and corruption in it. Import licenses were worth money and they were often traded as political favors.

In negotiations AID agreed to provide substantial additional program commodity import assistance as imports were shifted to an import license auction system and domestic agricultural price controls were lifted. PL 480 food imports would stabilize prices for consumers even as
farmers gained incentives for increased production. And Pakistan was able to expand imports of essential raw materials in a market allocation system through auction of available foreign exchange. This not only reduced corruption but provided essential raw materials to the private sector. We provided several hundred million dollars of program loan support for that purpose.

It was a fairly significant reform, and we got a lot of credit in Washington from the development and academic communities. I mention the academic community because AID at that time drew heavily on the professional advice of academicians. I was called to Washington periodically for a review of the aid program to Pakistan, and Dave Bell as AID Administrator would be flanked by professors like Ed Mason, Gus Ranis and Hollis Chenery as principal advisors. Chenery at the time was at Harvard University, and would later become an AID Assistant Administrator for Policy and Program.

Q: Some of the greats of the development era.

WILLIAMS: Some of the greats who had made real contribution to development. And they were impressed with our progress in liberalizing the import regime as a support for private sector development. A freer import system favored industrial entrepreneurs who were emerging from the merchant class. We even did some initial planning for a stock market to help mobilize private capital.

Q: Was there much of a private sector then?

WILLIAMS: There were a number of wealthy families in Pakistan and a manufacturing sector developed initially in the processing of agricultural products, including cotton and jute textiles, as well as import substitution of consumer goods. An entrepreneurial class of talented merchants had migrated from Bombay and there was investment in many small machine and metal working shops as well as commercial ventures in banking and construction in the major cities. Manufacturing from an initial low level base was increasing at the rate of 15-20 per cent annually. A major constraint was raw material imports. So there was the potential for a vigorous private sector which needed encouragement and support. And commercial interests in private sector development had a major advocate in Minister of Finance Shoaib.

Another interesting development was a dam at Tarbela which would provide additional control and capacity for the water of Indus River. It was important for the agricultural development of West Pakistan, a big project requiring at least a billion dollars for its construction. The Pakistan Government had lined up World Bank support and the interest of a number of other donors, but needed to secure commitment of an additional $40 million. Completing the funding for Tarbela was a priority to which President Ayub Khan frequently referred. AID did not have that amount available. We had made major commitments for tube wells and low lift pumps, several capital projects for energy development, as well as large program assistance for the market-oriented import program.

While on consultation in Washington, I accompanied Assistant Administrator Bill Gaud to see if we could persuade Harold Linder, President of the EX-IM Bank, to provide the capping funds for the Tarbela Dam. With American assistance assured, all the other donor funding would come
forward and the billion dollar Tarbela project could go forward. I had known Linder from my early assignment in the Economic Bureau at State when I attended his staff meetings. Linder agreed to bend the EX-IM Bank's funding criteria in favor of moving the large Tarbela project. That was an achievement.

In 1963 the Pakistan Mission in Pakistan received an outstanding performance award from AID. It was an award to the entire Mission from Dave Bell as Administrator, and one that pleased us immensely.

In the ensuing period, there were increasing tensions between Pakistan and India, tensions which greatly complicated U.S. policy in the region. Pakistan as a member of CENTO had received substantial military assistance from the United States. India as a non-aligned country had received arms from the Soviet Union. President Kennedy's Administration had shifted aid policy from military security to large-scale economic development assistance for both India and Pakistan. Now, however, the Soviet Union was stepping-up the level of its aid to India in both armaments and industrial plants, and the U.S. was increasingly sympathetic to shaping the aid program to India as a counter to Soviet influence, both in terms of industrial plants and even selective military assistance.

In the view of the Pakistan Government these developments threatened to upset the military balance in the subcontinent. Pakistan sought U.S. aid for advanced armaments and a steel plant to match what the Soviet were providing India; however the Kennedy Administration was not prepared to meet these requests. Underlying the increasing tensions in the subcontinent was the unresolved Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India.

After my first year with the Mission in Pakistan, I took "rest and recuperation leave" (R&R) in Kashmir, rather than in Hong Kong or Beirut which was normal Mission practice. However, I insisted on combining a splendid family holiday with familiarization of Kashmir and Nepal. We traveled in Kashmir, rented a house boat in Srinagar, did some pony trekking, and gained some impressions of the country.

Q: What was your impression of the issues at that time? What was your sense of the difficulty?

WILLIAMS: Kashmir is a beautiful area with rich potential, in terms of tourism and the craft skills of its people. It has the reputation of the fairest women of the subcontinent. One farmer said to me, "Our land is fertile, we have water, and our women are fair; yet we are poor." Their potential in land and water was underdeveloped. My political assessment of the Kashmiris was that while Moslem, they were not as militant about being part of Pakistan as were Pakistan's ruling groups - for whom the issue was emotionally non-negotiable.

During 1964 tensions increased in West Pakistan over the perceived shifting military balance in favor of India, with spill-over effects on U.S.-Pakistan relations. Under the lead of the new Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan Government pursued close relations with Communist China in a non-aggression pact which, in the view of President Lyndon Johnson, undermined Pakistan's obligations to the U.S. under CENTO and SEATO.
In this period Minister Bhutto gained influence over President Ayub Khan, and Bhutto promoted a pro-China policy. Bhutto was like a son to Ayub Khan, the son Ayub Khan wished he had fathered, it was said.

While the U.S. Government accepted India's non-alignment in the Cold War, it found the new posture of non-alignment by Pakistan totally unacceptable. President Johnson found particularly irritating Pakistan's criticism of U.S. military engagement in Vietnam.

In early 1965 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Walter McConaughy, was instructed to convey this message to President Ayub Khan. In order to underline the seriousness with which the U.S. viewed the matter, our Ambassador was further instructed to inform President Ayub that pending satisfactory assurances, the U.S. was suspending its economic assistance to Pakistan and postponing that year's scheduled meeting of the World Bank led-donor consortium for Pakistan.

Ambassador McConaughy conveyed the content of this instruction from Washington at a hastily called meeting of his country team. As director of the USAID Mission, at that time, it was a shocking proposal and I argued strongly against delivery of the message without first appealing to Washington for reconsideration. Far from achieving the objective of influencing the Government of Pakistan to our way of thinking about China, I argued that such an ultimatum risked having the opposite effect. The successful American aid program constituted important leverage in support of our foreign policy objectives but the best way to use it, I maintained, was by nuance conditionality and further joint discussion with President Ayub to reach a mutual understanding. I proposed that the Ambassador request reconsideration of the instruction and offer to go to Washington to review how best to proceed.

Deliberation by the Ambassador with his country team advisors was lengthy. In the end he decided to deliver the message as instructed forthwith.

I was deeply disappointed not to make the case for reconsideration; in my view it was politically the wrong thing to do. We were dealing with people of great national pride, and I was sure that applying a blunt instrument which said: "Either you do it our way or we'll suspend aid" was going to adversely affect our ability to influence them. In my view, we in the field had a responsibility to at least point that out.

Walter McConaughy was an experienced diplomat. As a young foreign service officer, he had served in China with distinction. He had escaped the earlier McCarthy "witch hunt," and there weren't many old "China hands" in the State Department that had done so. Also, the ambassador may have known things that I didn't know. So my advice was overridden.

Q: This was essentially because of Pakistan's alignment with China.

WILLIAMS: Yes, Pakistan's military leaders believed that their security was gravely imperiled by the military build-up in India and viewed closer relation with China as an imperative. American policy at that time was to isolate China. Later, we would find it useful that Pakistan had normalized relations with China. The opening to China by the Nixon administration was with Pakistan's good offices. This was not that time and the China lobby in Washington was
deeply offended by Pakistan's closer alignment with China. From the Pakistan perspective it was an attempt to maintain a regional balance with India.

After the Ambassador delivered the message, U.S. relations with the Pakistanis deteriorated sharply, to say the least. And our program of aid cooperation was at a standstill, although we sought to maintain our Pakistani contacts.

Q: You were not able to continue anything. Everything came to a halt?

WILLIAMS: Technically, it was only new U.S. aid commitments that were suspended. We did postpone the donor consortium meeting so most other new aid sources were held in abeyance. But, we didn't pull out and we didn't stop assistance activities already underway. However, the USAID Mission found it difficult to continue implementing the aid program in an atmosphere that was increasingly adverse, even hostile.

The Pakistan Government mounted a political campaign against the United States for using economic assistance as a political weapon, and Pakistan increasingly took the posture of a non-aligned country internationally. The press played on sensitive national feelings of offense that we would suspend economic assistance when Pakistan met all of the development criteria in terms of effective use of aid.

There was a real deterioration in the environment in which we were trying to work. Minister Bhutto's influence in the government was increasingly strong; he was a talented politician and apparent leader of an anti-American faction. Our friends in the government were progressively isolated and all their meetings with Americans, on AID business or otherwise, were monitored by specially designated note takers who reported to a security service.

Finance Minister Shoaib was trying to keep things on a moderate keel, but he also lost influence. When I called on Shoaib, which I did regularly, we would have to walk in the garden away from his office to have a private conversation free from wire taps and note takers. His reports to me on the high anti-American orientation of government policy were progressively disturbing.

Illustrative of the surveillance, I recall a phone conversation from my residence in Karachi which was badly interrupted by static. While on the line I said, "I wish you people would be more efficient in tapping this phone. You're doing a bad job and messing up the line." A week later, there was a Pakistani at my gate outside the house who wished to speak to me. He said," Please, Mr. Williams, don't complain about the way we wiretap your phones. I have a wife and children, and I don't want to lose my job."

Trying to discuss questions of development policy and aid performance under these circumstances was impossible and effectively the mission program came to a halt. Even keeping contact with our opposite numbers in the government was difficult, anti-American feeling was running high. Finally, I concluded that I needed a break to get away from the continuous frustration in official relations. I decided to take my family for another holiday in Kashmir.

Tensions were high between Pakistan and India, and we had to walk carrying our luggage across
a closed border between Lahore and Amritsar. There I found that Air India had canceled flights to Kashmir so we proceeded to Kashmir in a hired taxi. En route northward we moved through convoys of a motorized Indian army division. The Indian troops were helpful, waving us through and even bodily carrying the small Indian taxi over an near impassable rock slide. Later in mountainous Gulmarg, a former British resort, I saw Indian troops take up defensive positions. Srinagar was strangely devoid of tourists and alive with rumors of impending hostilities, and while we were there, Pakistan troops disguised as Kashmiri guerrillas infiltrated to foment an uprising. But the Kashmiris did not respond, there was no uprising.

Q: But the Pakistani Government assumed that they would?

WILLIAMS: They assumed they would, but as I had observed in an earlier trip to Kashmir, the Kashmiris were not a militant or warrior people. After my return to Pakistan, the 1965 Indo-Pak war broke out and it was clear that Pakistan had miscalculated. Not only had the infiltration of Kashmir failed, but Indian armed forces were in a full-scale attack on Lahore. The Pakistan miscalculation was due to an earlier border clash in the south when an Indian army division broke in disorderly retreat, leading the Pakistan military to assume a seven to one dominance in fighting valor over Indian troops which was wrong.

Meanwhile, Ambassador McConaughy asked me to join him in Rawalpindi for calls on senior government officials. President Ayub Khan and much of his government were in Rawalpindi, although the new capital of Islamabad had not yet been built. The U.S. Embassy, AID Mission and our families were still in Karachi.

During the night the Indian air force attacked Rawalpindi and I woke up thinking "The Germans are at it again." In my subconscious I was back in one of the bombing raids on London during the Second World War. But I soon realized that this was an Indian attack on the near-by radio station in Rawalpindi. Outside my window was a 500 lb. bomb dropped by the Indian air force which had not exploded. With the air war activity, the Ambassador and I were isolated from our respective staffs 700 miles to the south in Karachi. All non-military flights were suspended.

But there was a U.S. communication unit in Rawalpindi and I became the ambassador's chief assistant in efforts to gain a negotiated cease fire. For several days we worked around the clock with "flash" communications to Washington, London, New York, New Delhi. Flash designations meant of high national security concern. Accompanying the Ambassador in the several calls on President Ayub Khan, I observed that the black circles around Ayub's eyes were larger and larger. He wasn't getting much sleep in that tense situation.

Q: He was in Rawalpindi at the time?

WILLIAMS: Yes, Rawalpindi was Pakistan's military headquarters.

A cease fire was in Pakistan's interest for although General Yahya Khan had won a major tank battle on the road to Kashmir, Pakistan's defense of Lahore was failing. The difficulty that Ayub Khan perceived in accepting a cease fire was that it would appear traitorous since the Pakistan people had been assured they were winning Kashmir. He expressed fear of a civil uprising.
The military situation forced Ayub Khan finally to accept a cease fire brokered at the U.N. Security Council in New York. An insight into the degree of isolation of President Ayub Khan was the incident of the barber shop. Not having slept for two nights I went to a barber shop for a shave, and there heard President Ayub Khan's radio announcement of the cease fire. There was a group of almost 50 Pakistan civilians gathered around that radio; they heard the announcement quietly and without comment. Fear of an internal uprising didn't seem realistic from the way this group took the news.

Ambassador McConaughy found my report interesting enough to suggest, "I want you to tell the President what you heard in the barber shop." Getting the Ayub Khan on the phone, Walter McConaughy said "Mr. President, I want you to speak to Maury Williams. He heard your announcement in the barbershop with an assembled group of Pakistani people. You will find his report quite interesting." I related my report to Ayub Khan who seemed pleased. While we were talking, an operator broke in to say that President Johnson wished to speak to President Ayub Khan. President Johnson's call was to commend Ayub on the cease-fire and to assure him of American friendship and support.

I don't think the AID Mission ever fully gained the momentum that it had before the suspension of aid and the 1965 war. We gradually began to piece the program back together, but it wasn't the same.

Q: Was the program restarted at some point? Was it while you were there?

WILLIAMS: For both Pakistan and India a year of new development assistance commitments were lost after the war. Support for high levels of aid for Pakistan and India were considerably more difficult to sustain with the U.S. Congress. Also dedication to development had eroded with the top political leadership in Pakistan. President Ayub was retired in favor of General Yahya Khan, and no longer were we assured that the military budget would be restrained in favor of development. It was tougher going all around.

Q: So both the move towards China and the infiltration of Kashmir sort of overrode the development priority, upset it, and the support for it.

WILLIAMS: That is true. I wish Ambassador McConaughy had appealed the aid suspension and encouraged a reassessment in Washington. Because the suspension played into the hands of the national extremists in Pakistan who convinced themselves and the leadership that they had nothing to lose from the U.S. in a military gamble with India over Kashmir. And Pakistan's opening of relations with China was mostly symbolic in power terms. It was a time for restraint in U.S. relations with Pakistan, as the U.S. found itself competing with Soviet influence in India. Balancing our relations with these two countries was always sensitive.

Q: How would you characterize what was accomplished in that period in a sense of what was left or sustained after the '65 war?

WILLIAMS: The accomplishments were very real. Agricultural production had increased
substantially in response to investment in water development - the aid financed tube wells in West Pakistan and low lift pumps in East Pakistan - along with improved fertilizer availability and high yield seed varieties, along with better prices for farm crops. The green revolution was real in Pakistan.

In cooperation with the Pakistanis, we continued to do a tremendous job in training people, in building educational institutions and helping to staff these institutions with Pakistanis trained in American universities.

As the government moved to Islamabad, I decided to move the central AID Mission office from Karachi to Lahore. In Islamabad, facilities were very limited. Also, I believed Islamabad was too isolated, entirely government officials, whereas in Lahore you could keep in touch with a broader range of public opinion, business interests, provincial leaders and there was less political tension. Normal relations could be pursued more readily at the provincial level.

In the period after the 1965 war, I focused more attention on development in East Pakistan. They had been largely unaffected by the political rivalries and fighting over Kashmir and their interest in working with us was undiminished. We had a large provincial office in Dacca and I spent more time there attempting to make up, in part, for the relative neglect of East Pakistan in the internal budgetary allocations of the central government.

East Pakistan is a very difficult development proposition, a greatly overpopulated rural economy with extreme poverty. The AID program focused on agriculture and community rural development, encouraging a generally participatory approach. The Mission made a film of the participatory approach, called "A Simple Cup of Tea." The film demonstrated villagers discussing their needs and how they planned to meet them over a cup of tea.

At the same time, we encouraged the extension agents of the various provincial offices to engage more actively in support of village level projects. This was an early application of participatory development, which would later become doctrine in the development assistance community.

Although East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings were fairly high from export of jute, most of it was allocated to West Pakistan. I attempted to reform that. However, the AID Mission's influence proved to be limited, particularly on that issue. Also, as I mentioned, the constraints on the military budget no longer applied after the 1965 war. Since that constraint had been at least a partial basis of our earlier large aid program, the level of AID assistance declined. And other donors were not quite as enthusiastic in their support of Pakistan's development.

Q: Did you sense, at that time, the beginnings of East Pakistan separating from the West?

WILLIAMS: No I did not. In Dacca I was dealing with senior officials, development planners trying to induce a greater priority for development. It was a weaker administration than in West Pakistan, and part of the problem for East Pakistan was that their programs weren't as well developed. But it seemed to be part of the excuse of the central Pakistan administration for their relative neglect in meeting development needs in the East. Our AID efforts were to develop the programs that would allow them to have a better claim on development resources.
I completed the move of the AID Mission to Lahore. Since the AID Mission had access to large counterpart funds in rupees, it was well able to command the facilities needed. Lahore is a beautiful city with an active community life and commercial economy. My family was pleased with Lahore, although I spent a lot of time traveling to Islamabad to maintain contact with the central government ministries.

RAYMOND C. EWING
Executive Assistant, USIS
Lahore (1964-1966)

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1936 and attended the Occidental College in Los Angeles when his family moved to California. His career in the Foreign Service included overseas posts in Tokyo, Vienna, Lahore and several African countries. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him in November and December of 1993.

Q: Two of the countries which became real problems later on were India and Israel. Did problems with them begin to loom at this particular time or not?

EWING: I don't remember very much about Israel. India and Pakistan were both extremely active in the IAEA. I don't recall any particular apprehension or fear that India -- or, for that matter, Pakistan -- were going to involve themselves in an atomic bomb program. The head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission always came for the key meetings of the IAEA. There was also a Pakistani, who was also internationally renowned as a theoretical physicist and who was extremely active in the agency. Of the countries that were the most active I remember particularly India and Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and the United States -- and that was about it. A number of other countries were members, but they tended to be much more "low key" and didn't take initiatives.

Q: You left Vienna in 1964, is that right? You moved away from the fleshpots of Europe and went off to Lahore, Pakistan, from 1964 to 1966. How did that assignment come about?

EWING: As I recall, the Herter Commission on Foreign Service personnel made a report shortly before I was due for transfer from Vienna. One of its recommendations was that there should be more interchange of personnel between the foreign affairs agencies. I was somehow picked out to go on detail to the U. S. Information Agency [USIA] and assigned, initially, to Dacca in what was then East Pakistan. I came back from Vienna, spent several weeks in Washington, mainly at USIA, getting briefings on Dacca. I was going to be the executive assistant or administrative officer, in Dacca.

Then I went on home leave in California. While I was there, I got a call from USIA in Washington, saying that, instead of going to Dacca, they wanted me to go to the same job as executive officer in Lahore. The reasons for this change were not terribly clear. They said that
they thought it would be an easier assignment. I had a wife and child, the person going to Lahore was single, and Dacca was more isolated...

Q: And considered more unhealthy, too.

EWING: I think that it was also partly because at that time the Country Public Affairs Officer was in Karachi. Lahore was a little closer, and perhaps they felt more confident that, since I didn't have any background with the agency or much experience with administrative work, I could be under closer supervision in Lahore than way off in Dacca. I have never been to Dacca. We never made it there. It wasn't all of that difficult for us to make that switch. We wound up going on the same ship to Hong Kong. The timing was pretty much the same. Our car and some of our household effects took a little longer to reach us because they had to go to Dacca first.

Q: What was the situation in Lahore or in Pakistan itself during the period from 1964 to 1966?

EWING: During the early part of that period the United States was very important in Pakistan. We had provided assistance and had a military relationship through CENTO [Central Treaty Organization]. Pakistan didn't have all of that many friends in the world. The United States was one of its main supporters, and USIS [United States Information Service] in Lahore was a large operation. We had, I think, eight or nine American officers and a large Pakistani staff. We had bookmobiles and we had vans that would go out to villages and show films. We had an active lecture series, with visiting speakers and others. All of this changed rather dramatically in 1965 when tensions began to rise between India and Pakistan, eventually resulting in war in September, 1965. Thereafter, I think that the Pakistanis felt that the United States was not sufficiently supportive or forthcoming. The Indians felt pretty much the same. [Laughter]. So we didn't win any friends, but then it was much quieter during the period after the war.

Q: Lahore at that time served as what? The Embassy was in Karachi?

EWING: It was a period of transition. The Embassy already had an office in Rawalpindi with a small staff. There had also been an Embassy office in Murree, a hill station up above Rawalpindi in the mountains. That office had already been closed, and they moved a minimal staff to a house in Rawalpindi. But before we left in 1966, the Embassy had completely relocated to Rawalpindi and had acquired a site for a chancery and some houses in what became Islamabad, which is just outside of Rawalpindi. But for USIS the branch post in Lahore was responsible for the whole northern part of West Pakistan. So one of my jobs, as well as that of others in our office, was to travel to Rawalpindi, where we had a library run by a Pakistani in the market area of the old town of Rawalpindi. In Peshawar we had a USIS office for which we in Lahore provided administrative support and monitor operations. I would visit Rawalpindi and Peshawar every one to two months. We also ran a summer library in Murree up in the hills. It was only open during the summer and closed on Labor Day.

Q: What was the target audience you were aiming at?

EWING: Our target audience was essentially the educated group -- the journalists, university people, and students in the major urban centers. But to some extent we were interested in
anybody who would walk in through the door. That's partly why we sent bookmobiles to smaller cities, and vans [mobile units] which would show films outdoors to anybody.

Q: Was there a problem at that time with what we now term, "The Religious Right" with books and showing films and so forth?

EWING: I certainly don't remember any such problems. I think that in many ways Pakistan at that time was as open and non-fundamentalist as any country. Christian schools were open, respected, and renowned. Christian missionaries were active. Pakistani Christians held positions of responsibility in the government, business, and so on -- and certainly in the field of education. I don't remember many women, for example, dressed in heavy veils such as one would see in other places.

Q: As seen from your level, were we making any effort to make sure that we had a balance with India, so that we weren't being sucked into the conflict between the two countries?

EWING: I think that, as I saw it at my level, we were conducting these operations in Pakistan, primarily because Pakistan was a good friend and ally. In India we had had a more "checkered," if you will, or "unbalanced" relationship in the sense that there was some concern about Nehru and his espousal of the Bandung or "non-aligned" philosophy. This contrasted rather sharply with Pakistan. On the other hand, India had been invaded, as they saw it, by China in early 1962. The Indians realized that their security was at issue -- not just from Pakistan, but from China as well. The Indians began to establish a more "balanced" relationship, if you will, with the United States. The Pakistanis began to resent that, feeling that they had been loyal, steadfast allies. I saw cables from our Embassies in Karachi or New Delhi. I knew that there was a lot of competition, but at USIS we really worked hard on our programs.

Q: Our Ambassador was Walter McConaughy. Did you get any feel about how he operated or what his interests were?

EWING: I know that the Pakistanis and, to a certain extent, the Embassy, were jealous about the fact that Ambassador Chester Bowles [Ambassador to India] had access to President Kennedy...

Q: It would have been President Lyndon Johnson by this time.

EWING: In 1964, of course, it was President Lyndon Johnson. I don't think that Chester Bowles was still Ambassador to India. Ambassadors Bowles, Moynihan, Galbraith, and other figures as ambassadors to India over the years had a relationship with the White House which our ambassadors in Pakistan didn't have.

Obviously, I didn't see very much of Ambassador Walter McConaughy. I'm not sure that he came to Lahore very often during that period. Bill Cargo, who had been my boss in Vienna, was then the DCM in the Embassy in Karachi. I saw more of him. In many ways it was a very professional group in the Embassy. They were very balanced, serious, and thoughtful. I really didn't know very much about their contacts: whom they were dealing with, how often they would see Ayub Khan, and so on.
Q: How did you and USIA deal with the Pakistani authorities? How did that work?

EWING: Again, I don't remember that that was particularly an issue of concern at the time. Our libraries were open and accessible, without any difficulties for students and others who wanted to come. The same thing was true of other programs. After the India-Pakistan War [of 1965] and the change of relationship, to some extent, with the United States, we were a little bit more cautious about arranging for "high profile" events. As I recall it, we sensed that there were limits on what the traffic would bear. No edicts or pressures were applied by the Pakistani Government.

Q: Were you there during the India-Pakistan War of 1965?

EWING: Yes.

Q: What were your experiences at that time?

EWING: We very much sensed that trouble was brewing and tensions were rising, beginning in the late spring or early summer of 1965. There was a dispute over the Rann of Kutch, a very arid region in the southern part of West Pakistan, a kind of desert area that was contested by the two countries. Both the Indians and Pakistanis, at one point during the spring of 1965, deployed forces opposing each other in that area. Eventually, the tension was eased, but the atmosphere at that time was difficult.

About that time my wife and I and our two-year-old son made an "R & R" trip to Tanzania in East Africa. I was glad to be away but also glad to come back, because Lahore seemed to be home to us at that time. I was asked to run the summer library in Murree for the last two weeks of the season and then close the facility and come back to Lahore on Labor Day. We listened to the BBC and Voice of America and knew that things were getting more tense and that something was perhaps going to happen. On the morning of Labor Day we drove down the mountain from Murree, not realizing that anything was going on. We went to the Embassy, which was then in Rawalpindi. I remember meeting a friend of mine who had been secretary to Bill Cargo in Vienna and was working for him again in Pakistan. She was running across the courtyard and called to me, "The war has started. Can't stop to talk," or something like that, and went rushing into the Embassy. That was about all that I heard from her. Then I found out a little bit more.

We had had our two year old son in the car. My wife was pregnant. Our home was in Lahore. Nobody paid much attention to us. They had all of these important issues involving the war to handle. So we got into our car and drove back to Lahore. On the "Grand Trunk Road" between Rawalpindi and Lahore we felt that the whole Pakistani Army was on the highway with us. There were armored personnel carriers and tanks on trailers. We also had a feeling that they had put everybody into the service to drive to the front, including people who had never driven before. We saw two or three accidents along the way. We saw one enormous military vehicle that was sitting in the middle of a railroad track, with soldiers scratching their heads and trying to figure out what to do next. The vehicle was obviously blocking the railroad. Eventually, we got back to Lahore. As we were going across the river bridge, entering the city, a couple of planes went over us very low. We weren't sure what side they were on. We stopped at the Consulate
before going home and reported in, to say that we were back.

Then I was asked to work with the Consulate staff in planning to evacuate the post. As it turned out, we had about 10 days to prepare before an arrangement could be agreed on between India and Pakistan to allow U.S. Air Force planes to land at the airport in Lahore, because a lot of the fighting was taking place in the Lahore/Amritsar area. We could hear artillery shelling and, of course, see aircraft in Lahore. We were under a blackout and obviously couldn't do any of our normal, USIS work during that time. So I was involved in planning for the evacuation. And then, eventually, the U.S. planes were able to come in. It was a difficult time for my family and me, partly because I was not giving as much attention to them as I should have. My wife was in an advanced stage of pregnancy and was due in September, 1965. Eventually, my wife and child -- and about 600 people altogether, consisting primarily of American women and children -- left on the aircraft and went to the safety of Tehran [Iran]. And my second son was born in Tehran about 10 days after the evacuation, on 24 September. It was a very difficult time. We had decided that air evacuation was the best way. The British Consulate people went out by road, overland to Peshawar and then into Afghanistan. While they were overnighting on the way, there was an air attack by the Indians. They were in much more danger than we were, sitting in Lahore, because Lahore, as I recall, was never bombed. While the fighting was very close, we were really quite safe there, as it turned out. Actually, we probably could have sat out the war, because it only lasted 17 days. My family left after about 10 days. At that point ammunition stocks were beginning to run low, and the fighting had already begun to ebb. Anyway, my family stayed in Tehran until after Thanksgiving, when it was safe for them to come back. I was able to make a brief visit to Tehran to see my wife, our new son, and our other son.

Q: How long were you there [in Lahore] after the end of the India-Pakistan War, which took place in September.


Raymond Malley
Assistant Director, USAID
Karachi (1964-1969)

Mr. Malley was born and raised in Massachusetts and was educated at Boston University, the University of Geneva, Switzerland and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. After serving in the US Air Force and engaging in private business, Mr. Malley joined the Treasury Department. He later joined AID, where he worked in senior level positions at home and abroad until he retired. During his career Mr. Malley was posted to Karachi, Rawalpindi, Kinshasa and Paris as well as in Washington, where he worked on economic development projects of AID and with international organizations concerned with foreign assistance and development. Mr. Malley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.
Q: Today is March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, and I resume the discussion with retired FSO Raymond Malley. In 1964 you are off to Pakistan. What did you do there and how long did you stay?

MALLEY: Recall that the DLF and ICA were merged to create USAID. But as in most mergers, it took time for the two to be fully integrated. DLF staff continued to work relatively independently for quite a while after the merger; we were handling big sums of taxpayer money, and the new authorities did not want to hinder us in doing this. But real integration had to come. Take the case of India. I was in Washington with a small staff responsible for all capital projects, while Carter Ide sat in Delhi managing hundreds of technical advisors working around the country. We seemed like two separate organizations. To rectify such incongruities, top management decided to transfer substantial capital projects capability from Washington to the field, pulling all assistance together in USAID missions under mission directors with significant operating freedom and authority. It was in this context that I was asked if I would like to be assigned to Pakistan to manage assistance operations. I agreed.

I believe that the U.S. foreign aid program in Pakistan at that time was the most complex in the world. Financially it was large and getting larger, I think second to India in quantity, but much larger on a per capita basis. It had many hundreds of employees – direct hire, contract, and local national. And management was most difficult because the country was divided into two separate parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, with a hostile India in between. Programs in three other countries also were prominent – Korea, Turkey, and Brazil. All together they were sometimes referred to as the Big Five. I worked on three of them.

The Pakistan mission had a director, deputy director, and four assistant directors. The director when I went there was Don MacDonald, but he soon left for Vietnam to take charge of non-military assistance and reconstruction, working alongside the military commander General Westmoreland. MacDonald later managed the successful resettlement in the U.S. of tens of thousands of refugees from the Vietnam war. Maurice Williams succeeded him as director. Williams somehow was close to President Ayub Khan, and was an intermediary between President Johnson and Khan, with the ambassador’s knowledge of course. Later he became Administrator of USAID. Bill Kontos followed him as director. The four assistant directors were responsible for program, operations, finance (controller), and administration. During much of my time, Jack Robinson handled program, Tom Blacka was controller, and Harry Carr was assistant director for administration. I was assistant director for operations. I was not so when I went out, but assumed the position when the individual in it was reassigned.

We were all located in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan we had a staff organized in somewhat similar manner, headed by an officer equivalent to another assistant director, dealing with the provincial government. Because of difficulty of communication, we delegated considerable authority to that staff.

Ironically Stu, I lived in three different cities within Pakistan – Karachi for about two years, Lahore for one, and Islamabad for two. This happened because the government was transferring the capital from Karachi way north to the new city of Islamabad. The embassy and USAID mission were in Karachi when I arrived because the government was still there. When the ministries of government with which we dealt, such as foreign affairs and treasury, moved north,
many of our people followed. But not all, because there was not enough office space or housing in Islamabad or the adjoining city of Rawalpindi to accommodate everyone. So most of the USAID mission, including my office, plus some other U.S. elements, moved to Lahore, almost 200 miles south of Islamabad. About one year later we transferred to Islamabad. The rest of the diplomatic community accredited to Pakistan had similar problems and found varying solutions.

**Q**: How did you get along with the directors?

**MALLEY**: Fine, although I was much younger and less experienced in the aid business than the rest of them. The mission directors let me run my show. I understand that some people had problems working with Williams, who was a no-nonsense guy, but I never did.

**Q**: You had dealt with India. Now you were in Pakistan. How was the situation between them at the time?

**MALLEY**: There was a lot of tension in Pakistan from various sources. Politically within the country because of the continued oscillation between military and elected civilian governments. And also the continuous tension between west and east because the peoples were so different. Religion was their only unifying force, and ultimately that proved not enough and Bangladesh was born.

Then there was the continuing tension with India, involving Kashmir, other boundaries, and various other matters. There was one war between the two while I was there – tank battles in the Punjab, dogfights over Karachi, and so forth. We suspended our aid program at that time. And a few other times too, when we felt that the Pakistanis had veered too close to communist China. But we always started up again after reaching some kind of political agreement.

Finally, Pakistan was and remains a poor country, so there were the continued worries and tension that come with poverty. That is what we and other donors were addressing with our aid programs.

**Q**: Describe your assistant director office.

**MALLEY**: Well, USAID had a very large program and a very large mission. When I arrived, there was a portfolio of perhaps 50 to 60 individual loans and grants totaling two to three billion dollars. During my stint we probably made more than that number of new commitments, at a rate of about $600 to $700 million annually, or over three billion dollars total. These were in the form of commodity import programs, projects, technical assistance agreements, and PL 480 agreements. The commodity import and PL 480 commitments normally were made in big annual chunks – up to $100 million at a time. Project loans and technical assistance took longer to complete – two to five years on average. Of course there were always some programs and projects terminating even while new ones were being made.

The total staff of the mission fluctuated between 300 and 400 people. This included Foreign Service officers and staff, other U.S. government personnel on detail, contract personnel, local staff, and support personnel such as clerks, drivers, security guards, etc. In Karachi we occupied
a building complex some miles from the embassy; in Islamabad we were closer to the embassy but still separate. Some of our personnel, especially those providing technical assistance, were located in other parts of the country.

There were between 60 and 80 people involved in my assistant directorship for operations. Project officers, financial experts, engineers, public health experts, educators, and other professionals, plus support staff. I remember some of the Americans. Ken Greiner, Fritz Moenninghof, Mike Speers, and Scott Rutherford were project officers; the latter was my top man in East Pakistan. Paul Dent, Don Schlick, and Jim Cassanos were some of the engineers. Leon Hesser and Irv Headrick were agriculture officers. Les Burgess promoted private enterprise development. Gilbert Lane was a financial markets expert, Bill Boynton a public health doctor, Tony Lanza a professional educator, and Paul Franklin a senior police official. Some were career people, others on contract. Some were veterans, others relative newcomers. Of course they were not all at the mission at the same time. There was periodic turnover, coming and going. But there was little turnover among the local staff – for their country, they had good jobs. We also worked closely with mission attorneys (Nick Angell and Rod Heller), economists, programmers, auditors, translators, and others in other parts of the mission. And with embassy economic officers (Bill Krason for example) and commercial and public affairs specialists. The latter frequently publicized our projects and activities in the local media.

I was a manager now, no longer much engaged in the details of individual commitments unless there were major problems. I divided our existing portfolio and proposed new undertakings among the officers, then oversaw their work. I reviewed and sometimes reworked their documents. I went on inspection trips. I wrote periodic reports on overall progress and problems for the mission director, the embassy, and Washington. I was a member of the mission director’s top team, and sometimes attended country team meetings with him. I spent much time keeping the director’s office, the ambassador’s office, and Washington happy. And I had frequent meetings with officials of the Pakistani ministries and operating agencies with which we dealt, and with representatives of the other aid donors.

One might ask how senior USAID officers such as myself could be effective going from one complex assignment to another in such short periods of time -- in my case from Korea to the ICN countries to Pakistan in only three years. Wasn’t that inefficient? Were the tenures long enough to digest and manage portfolios effectively? Were we handling the taxpayers money well?

I believe that during my career we were very effective, handling the portfolios and money well and responsibly. USAID’s senior officer corps in those days was enthusiastic and experienced, worked long and hard, and was periodically replenished. And we had great support. Especially important were the permanent staffs that worked under us – the local nationals abroad and the GS types in Washington, both professional and support people. They usually stayed in their jobs for 10 years, 15 years, whole careers – providing great continuity. Also of importance were the portfolio files maintained by support staff. For project loans, for example, there was a unified worldwide file system. Each file contained background information on the pertinent economic sector; feasibility or other studies of the project; the project paper; the loan agreement; letters that implemented the agreement; invitations to bid, bids received, assessments, and contract awards; periodic progress reports; site visit reports; letter exchanges and notes; audits; and yet
other pertinent material. An experienced officer could arrive at a new post, study the files, talk with American and local people implementing the projects, visit the sites, and be marginally up to snuff relatively quickly. We also profited from the knowledge and talents of other U.S. personnel in country, especially embassy economic and commercial officers, and of course from professionals in Washington.

It is not the same now. The whole civilian side of the U.S. foreign policy establishment has been downgraded and short changed in the last 30 or more years. Less prestige, low budgets, cuts in personnel. Graduates of our top schools of international affairs gravitate more to investment houses and consulting firms rather than the Foreign Service. And regarding foreign aid, administrations have created other spigots of delivery, thus diluting USAID’s primacy. In some countries the U.S. military is engaged in reconstruction and development work that used to be the province of USAID.

Q: Let me ask you the following before we get to the actual projects. I was never in a country where the USAID program was going full blast. But I heard from Foreign Service colleagues that USAID people got better allowances, better housing, better cars, etc. Was there this sort of discrepancy between the two groups at that time in Pakistan?

MALLEY: Oh, I don’t know. There was always some griping from somewhere. I didn’t pay much attention to such things. It is true that in Pakistan our mission had one of the top administrative managers anywhere in Harry Carr. He seemed to provide very well for us. On the other hand Stu, we had a gripe too – embassy officers were invited to more diplomatic receptions and parties than we were! Maybe it all balanced out. [Laughter]

Q: Let’s talk about East Pakistan first. What sort of things were we doing there, and was there a problem working out of West Pakistan?

MALLEY: We had widespread operations in East Pakistan. Some of them were unique to that part of the country, others were the east’s share of Pakistan-wide operations. Very important were projects to plan and build small dams, diversion channels, and embankments to control water flows and flooding. Bengal is basically the delta of the vast Ganges and Brahmaputra river systems, and there are strong annual monsoons, so water is everywhere and often wreaks havoc. Interestingly though, irrigation is needed for agriculture during parts of the non-monsoon season – we assisted in that. We also had projects to improve roads and provide equipment to the railways, and to modernize and expand ports such as Chittagong and Chalna. And we provided experts and training to some of the East Pakistan government ministries. I am sure there were others.

East Pakistan also received shares of the large commodity import and PL 480 food commitments that we made to the central government. And from our loans to development banks such as the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) for relending to businesses.

Traveling to Dacca was a lengthy affair during most of the time I was there because India would not allow flights over its territory. We had to go via Ceylon. But as compensation, if the trip was arranged right, one could spend some weekend hours on a wonderful Ceylonese beach.
Q: How did you find the Bengalis response to programs? Was there a difference between their approach and effectiveness as opposed to, say, the Punjabis in the west?

MALLEY: You touch upon the reason that the original Pakistan is no longer one country. The Bengalis are different from the peoples of West Pakistan – in history, language, and culture. Despite their poverty, they seem a happy people. They smile a lot and like animated conversation, music, and jokes. The Punjabis are more serious, restrained, even dour. That is more or less true for the other peoples of the west also. The Muslim religion was the only major similarity between the two wings of the country. To respond to your question, it is my impression that the Bengalis reacted to our aid with more enthusiasm and thankfulness than did the peoples in the west.

Q: There obviously had to be considerable consultation with the local authorities regarding what should be done.

MALLEY: Oh yes, that is essential. We couldn’t do those things on our own. They were their programs and projects that we were assisting, not ours. It is always important to remember that in any aid program.

Now Pakistan in those days had its centralized economic and development plans just as did India. These plans reviewed the state of the economy and what needed to be done in a macro sense, and then listed and described a lot of specific needs, such as expansion of electric power facilities, communications systems, agriculture, irrigation channels, industrial promotion, education improvements, and others. The Pakistanis could finance some programs and projects by themselves from their own earnings. For others they would turn to foreign aid donors for help. In the meantime, donors including USAID would be indicating to their contacts what they would like to consider. We would consider assistance in a broad range of areas. So wouldn’t the British. Other donors had more narrow preferences. For example, the Danes were known all around the world for financing dairy projects. The Japanese liked infrastructure projects which resulted in contracts for their large industrial exporters. The Canadians liked forestry projects. There was give and take between the country and the donors. Finally decisions were made and the activities moved ahead.

Q: Was there somebody who represented all the aid givers? How was overlap avoided?

MALLEY: You once again bring up a key point. There is continual danger of overlap when you have quite a few aid donors to any country. There can be dozens of such donors. Bilateral donors like the U.S. and Britain, multilateral ones like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and non-governmental organizations such as the Ford Foundation and OXFAM. But coordination mechanisms do spring up, informal ones and formal ones.

Let’s take Pakistan. It had then, and does today, some fine economists and administrators. When I was there, they would occasionally arrange quite informal meetings with a few or many aid donors to discuss their needs. Also, some donors themselves would meet informally from time to
time to review what they were doing or thinking of doing, and try to resolve problems. USAID, as the biggest donor, often took the lead. Our economists and program people were most interested in the country’s macroeconomic situation and overall foreign aid requirements, my office in specific programs and projects.

At some point – I don’t recall exactly when -- a so-called consultative group of the donors to Pakistan was organized, chaired by the World Bank. This was and is a very formal process; they exist for many countries now. This group would, and still does I believe, meet with a high-level Pakistan government delegation normally once a year at Bank headquarters in Washington or Paris. Senior people from USAID and State, and sometimes Treasury, participated. The Pakistanis described their country’s economic and financial situation, their economic and social development needs, and the level, types and terms of assistance they hoped to get from the donors during the coming period. After a dialogue with the delegation, the assembled aid donors would indicate what overall levels of aid they were prepared to consider, and for what economic sectors and even major individual programs and projects. Potential overlaps in activities among the donors would be discussed and hopefully resolved. All this was on a macroeconomic level. No final commitments to finance individual programs or projects would be taken at these meetings. That would be done later by the operating entities of the donors – like my unit at USAID Pakistan. It was our job to translate the U.S. indicated overall level of assistance into sound individual programs and projects, using the assessment methods I have described earlier.

I should mention Stu, that quite a few programs and projects in developing countries are supported by more than one donor. For example, in West Pakistan we were providing assistance for improvements to the transportation system along with the British, an advisory team from Harvard University, and others. The people doing our work would meet with their counterparts frequently as a matter of course to coordinate and resolve problems. This was natural. It was and is done in all jointly financed undertakings.

And finally, as diplomats are supposed to do, myself and my colleagues met with our equivalents in other embassies and international organizations, and with non-profit groups. We were all in the development business. We discussed that business, and we socialized also.

Q: In East Pakistan, who was calling the shots from the Pakistan side? Was it somebody from the East Pakistan government, or somebody from Karachi or Islamabad?

MALLEY: There was a provincial government in East Pakistan consisting almost completely of Bengalis, and it managed most local affairs. But overall national and international matters were controlled from the capital city in West Pakistan, and the key players in that were the Punjabis. Punjabis also were the dominant people in the army, which was and is so important in Pakistan. Sindhis also played a role in running the country. The Bengalis and other groups did not have much say in national and international affairs, although invariably there were some individual exceptions.

Q: Were you doing different things in West Pakistan? It is much more arid there, so I think there would be different work?
MALLEY: Some was the same, and some was different. Our large commodity loans and PL 480 agreements to Pakistan financed equipment, materials, and food imports for both parts of the country. They were a virtual annual affair, started before I arrived and continuing after I left. Loans to PICIC also financed businesses on both sides.

In West Pakistan, we had a series of commitments to the large and important Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), which ran agricultural irrigation networks and electric power generation and transmission facilities. We provided continual assistance to the Pakistan Western Railroad (PWR) for rehabilitation and expansion of facilities and rolling stock. I think we also provided smaller amounts to the equivalents of WAPDA and PWR in East Pakistan. There were also USAID loans to the publicly controlled Sui Gas Company exploiting gas fields in the Sind.

Those I have just mentioned were large capital project loans, accompanied in some cases by technical assistance. We also supported undertakings that were primarily technical assistance. One was to train Pakistani police officers and criminal justice officials. USAID had such police training projects in other countries also, I believe especially in Latin America. In the 1970s they were all terminated and no more permitted, on grounds that we were assisting authoritarian governments to oppress their own people. But our Department of Defense (DOD) conducts police training in some countries today under its military assistance program. We also financed a team from the U.S. Bureau of Mines advising the Pakistanis in mine safety. It was based in Quetta, around which many mines were located. It is an example of how USAID did, and still does, draw on other U.S. government agencies for expertise.

We also had programs with the West Pakistan health authorities. I remember a malaria eradication program. Our technical team was headed by Bill Boynton, a medical doctor and public health official. Supplies such as chemicals and spraying and monitoring equipment were imported under our commodity import loans, and the Pakistanis provided the people who did the actual spraying. And we provided some technical assistance to the education ministry, and financed some Pakistanis studying at American universities.

We also financed American advisors to the board and administration of the Karachi stock exchange and government authorities responsible for the capital markets, for the purpose of modernizing and expanding the exchange and markets to attract investment capital. Our consultant initially responsible for this project, Gib Lane, remained in Karachi when we moved north. Several advisors from the New York stock exchange visited to provide advice. Today the Karachi exchange is quite active – Stu, you can buy shares of Pakistani companies on it! I wonder how much our assistance of long ago, started when I was there, contributed to its growth.

I was able to get use of a limited amount of U.S.-owned Pakistani rupees to assist some of our activities. I remember that we loaned a large amount to the American company Intercontinental Hotels for construction of their hotel in Karachi.

We were also involved in Afghanistan. USAID-funded technical assistance teams were assisting the Afghans in agricultural development in the Helmand River valley, and also I believe with some road projects. Our people working on similar projects in West Pakistan exchanged visits with them to compare experiences and ideas. I also believe that USAID staff in Kabul was
limited for a while, so we provided some administrative support. This ended when Vince Brown, who served briefly with us in Pakistan, went to Kabul and opened a full mission.

This is a long list of activities. You see why we needed a large and experienced staff. As I said, I believe that the USAID operation in Pakistan at that time was the most complex foreign aid program that a donor has ever conducted in one country. I base my belief on the size, scope, and number of undertakings, and the difficulty of managing due to the two wings of the country. Pakistan broke apart a few years after I left, resulting in two separate, more easily managed programs.

Q: Were we able to deal with the tribal areas? It seems like they are almost ungoverned today by the Pakistanis.

MALLEY: I believe you are talking about Waziristan, which is so much in the news these days, and perhaps Baluchistan. In the normal course, some of the commodity imports and food that we financed ended up in those areas. It was normal and natural. But I don’t recall that we had any projects uniquely devoted to them. I took trips there and to Afghanistan with a driver and sometimes an aide. There was no particular danger then. I did see many poppies – they are quite beautiful when growing.

Q: Pakistan is known for a lot of corruption, by politicians and even when the military is in control. It is sort of endemic to the area. How did you find working in that environment?

MALLEY: Well, we did our best to avoid corruption in our programs. And I think we were pretty successful. As I said when we discussed Korea, if leaders want to steal, they generally do it from funds they directly control rather than from foreign aid monies. It is easier. And another consideration for a major country like Pakistan is that they are trying to attract foreign private investments into their country. They compete with other countries for such investments. So they want to be known as reliable in international financial circles. Investors shy away from countries whose leaders are known to be diverting funds, and even when interested they insist on much more stringent terms.

We talked about exceptions to this earlier. Under our large commodity import loans, licenses were granted by the Pakistanis to numerous public and private businesses to use our dollars for imports. There was always danger that authorities might provide some of these licenses to favored groups in exchange for kickbacks. We had controls to try to prevent this. And we assigned seasoned officers – called supply officers – to work directly and full time with the Pakistanis in implementing these loans. I suppose we had some failures, but I don’t believe many. The second exception I mentioned, which I did not experience during my Pakistan assignment, involves humanitarian assistance. In the haste and turmoil of providing help in emergencies, some supplies can fall into the wrong hands. We know that this is happening right now in Iraq and Afghanistan. And probably in Darfur.

Q: Of the programs you were running, which ones had real problems?

MALLEY: In an operation of this size and scope there were always problems. I spent much of
my time on them. One of major importance involved agriculture in West Pakistan. We were helping WAPDA dig wells and expand irrigation systems to increase the production of grains and cotton. Other donors were involved also. A salinity problem arose – in some areas much of the water from wells and channels became so salted that yields were substantially reduced or crops could not be grown at all. We hired all kinds of advisors to help. Research and actions were undertaken for many years to alleviate the problem, extending far beyond my stay in the country. Apparently solutions were found, because Pakistani agricultural production rose dramatically. It was their Green Revolution.

We also had occasional problems concerning the award of contracts after bidding. This is a continuing feature of aid programs everywhere – losing bidders complaining that they are being “robbed.” One particularly nasty dispute during my tenure concerned the award of a contract for the purchase of locomotives by the Pakistan Western Railway with our financing. I don’t remember the exact number of locomotives – 20 or 25 I think, costing perhaps a quarter of a million dollars apiece. The invitation to bid with exact requirements was prepared by PWR experts and approved by our project team, in the normal manner. The three big American manufacturers at the time – General Motors (GM), General Electric (GE), and American Locomotive Company (ALCO) – submitted bids. PWR with our approval decided that GM’s bid was best – it was considered responsive and the lowest priced. It proposed to award the contract to GM. But GE complained bitterly – on grounds that GM’s bid was not responsive in a number of ways, especially regarding turbochargers on the locomotives, whereas their bid was fully responsive. When GE could not persuade us in Pakistan to either overturn the decision or rebid, they took their case to Washington, first to USAID, State, and Commerce officials, then to Capitol Hill. I recall that Senator Scoop Jackson of Washington was one who vigorously supported GE. Naturally GM counter attacked with its supporters and lobbyists. Even the White House became involved. I was summoned back to Washington urgently to help respond to queries and criticisms and participate in re-review of the whole matter. I also participated in meetings on the Hill. After a week or so of great anguish, USAID decided that GM indeed was not responsive, and the award should go to GE. I was not invited to the high level meeting in State when this decision was made. How GM was placated by the authorities I do not know. I was glad to get back to Pakistan.

Q: Is Kashmir a no-go area for aid?

MALLEY: As in the case of Waziristan, some general imports and food that USAID financed would in the normal course have gone to Kashmir. And I suppose that some Pakistanis that we trained worked in Kashmir sometime during their careers. We did not restrict this. I don’t recall any aid projects specifically for Kashmir.

Q: We also had a big aid program in India. Was there much consultation and looking at the two programs, to see how they impacted on each other and ideas might be shared?

MALLEY: In this particular case, no. We did have exchanges with USAID advisors in Afghanistan – notably our people working on irrigation systems and salinity problems in the Punjab exchanging experiences and ideas with teams working on similar matters in the Helmand area. But regarding India, it was difficult or impossible for us to go to Delhi or for their people to
come to Pakistan, because of the animosities between the two countries and the controls. So there wasn’t much exchange, except when one would meet colleagues occasionally at regional conferences or in Washington.

There is one interesting case of contact however. Ernie Stern, a classmate of mine at Fletcher, was deputy director in Pakistan for a brief period before being reassigned to India. We all enjoyed diversions and sports from time to time. One day there arrived in the diplomatic pouch a specially made leather gauntlet, like the glove used in the Middle Ages, with a message from the USAID mission in India challenging our mission to two American touch football games, one to be played in Lahore (where we were at the time) and one in Delhi. Stern had thrown down the gauntlet! Naturally we accepted. Dates were arranged. Both missions got permission from the Indian and Pakistani authorities to drive busses with players across the border – there was a thaw in relations at the time. Their team came to Lahore, and we beat them. I played quarterback for our side. The return match in Delhi never took place – relations had unthawed. [Laughter] And by the way, Stern later became number two man at the World Bank, in charge of operations, perhaps the most powerful position in the whole worldwide economic development business.

Q: Did any “localitis” occur, meaning you identify with Pakistan and your counterparts in India identify with India? I remember that sometimes there would be blasts from our embassy in Pakistan and a counterblast from our embassy in New Delhi, each taking the side of the country in which they were.

MALLEY: I don’t recall such in my aid experience. There was another kind of “localitis” though. Occasionally some of our American staff grew so in love with Pakistan and their jobs that they resisted reassignments, wanting to stay in the country. We had one irrigation engineer that served something like 12 or 15 consecutive years in East Pakistan. Such people often supported the Pakistani view when we had disagreements.

Q: Earlier we discussed the problem of accumulation of rupees in India. Did the equivalent situation develop in Pakistan?

MALLEY: Yes, but less because the PL 480 program was smaller. As in the case of India, we used some rupees to finance U.S. government local currency expenses. I assume that the rest was eventually written off. I was not involved in this – it was a macroeconomic matter handled by our program people.

Q: Was AID involved in sending many Pakistanis to the United States for technical training?

MALLEY: Some yes. But I don’t remember that it was a major activity of ours. In country we were assisting the ministry of education with policies and curriculum development, and we did finance some local training and the import of books from the U.S. A local training segment often was part of our project loans. I believe that the British had quite a large training program. There was a tradition of studying in England among higher class Pakistanis.

Q: How was your life in Pakistan?
MALLEY: Personally we had a wonderful, fulfilling time. It was especially interesting to live in three quite different cities. I played a lot of tennis, usually on grass, and often in the miserable humid heat. I also learned golf and squash. Rita was active in diplomatic and Pakistani circles, and she managed or started nursery schools for the children of expatriates. She did this at other posts and in Washington also. We traveled. We took part in music and plays. I even arranged and directed a full-scale production of Neil Simon's comedy The Odd Couple in Islamabad. After months of rehearsals, it played six times on two consecutive weekends, and was a huge success. But I never saw it! On dress rehearsal night I had to leave for Washington to participate in the PWR locomotives dispute that I mentioned earlier. My deputy play director, Manny Silberstein, took over, and was widely praised. Oh woe! [Laughter]

JORDAN THOMAS ROGERS
Economic Counselor
Karachi (1965-1968)

Deputy Chief of Mission
Rawalpindi (1968-1969)

Mr. Rogers was born in South Carolina and raised in North Carolina. After graduating from the University of North Carolina, he served with the United States Air Force in WWII. Entering the Foreign Service in 1946, he served at a variety of foreign posts in Europe, Latin America and Asia, primarily as Economic and Political Officer. His final overseas post was Rawalpindi, Pakistan, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. In Washington, Mr. Rogers was assigned to the Department’s Staff Secretariat, to the Department of Defense as Foreign Affairs Officer and finally as Economic Officer in the Department’s Latin America Bureau.

Q: Well, after two years in the Defense Department, you moved across the world to Pakistan and at first to Karachi and then to Rawalpindi, I take it.

ROGERS: Well, it was a little more complicated than that. We were scheduled to sail sometime in September of ’65 and we were in New York ready to get on the boat and late on the afternoon before we were to sail the Department calls up and says, “We’ve just cancelled your boat trip because war has broken out between India and Pakistan and so we’re not sending anybody there right now, families at least.” And I said, “You’ve cancelled this boat trip? What the hell are we going to do? I’ve got four children here. We’re sitting here in New York, ready to get on the boat. What are we going to do? We can’t go back home. Our goods have been shipped. Our house has been rented” So they said, “Well, okay, go to Rome and then we’ll see what we’ll do.” That was fair enough. So we went to Rome, got a hotel, saw Rome, had a delightful time, ten days. And then they said, “All right, take your family to Beirut. Leave ‘em there and you go on.” At that time, Beirut was a charming place. Did you ever know Jean Farr?

Q: Very well, in Berlin, yes.
ROGERS: Well, put a halo around her head. No, make it a double! Jean Farr was in Beirut. So we went there. I was going as economic counselor to Karachi and I stayed in Beirut a day or two, helped Sarah find an apartment and then left. It was the worst thirty days Sarah ever had in her life. She had four children there (we had left our eldest daughter in her first year in college) One was a would-be senior in high school. Which high school? Should she enter school in Beirut? Do the others go to school (we were supposed to sign a contract for the entire school year). We lost contact. Sarah gave out of money. It was awful. But Jean Farr was a tremendous help.

So I went on. My predecessor had not been assigned yet. He was still there. This seems to be my fate. So I come in, there I am. What am I supposed to do? Well, he’s still there. He’s functioning. What is he supposed to do? Well, at that point the embassy is about to move to Islamabad. This was, at that time, late October or November. Pakistan is not very cold but it’s not tropical, either. So it’s decided that I would be almost the first one to go to Rawalpindi.

Well, my family finally arrived after a month, bad enough for me but horrible for them. The major problem was lack of communications and lack of knowledge as to what happened and to what would happen? But finally they got to Karachi, just in time to move on to Rawalpindi. Winter clothes of course were with our household effects, which had been shipped to Karachi. We put the two older girls in school in Karachi, parking them with the head of the U.S. military mission there. We went off to Rawalpindi with two other children, no winter clothes and with my predecessor still functioning in Karachi. Finally he leaves and the embassy is gradually transferred up. Actually, the first winter in Rawalpindi was very pleasant. Little of the embassy was there and things were quiet. I can’t remember what the two children with us did about school, they probably taught each other. Sarah had taught the older children for a year in Budapest, perhaps we put them in the same correspondence system. (Note: my daughter who was there has reminded me that she and her brother, who was about five, stayed home and read books! “The best year of my life,” she says!

Q: How about the war? Had that ended by this time?

ROGERS: Well, the war ended slowly. It began in early September. I think it was largely over by mid-October or so and families were allowed to come back. So it must have lasted close to two months. We took a week to get to Italy and then ten days there and then Beirut. So by the time Sarah and the kids were allowed to come to Karachi, which I believe was close to the end of October, the war was either over or in a truce.

We had a huge AID mission in Pakistan, a very active mission. So I was coming in as economic counselor in an embassy with an on-going, effective, very large mission. This was contrary to the situation in Quito, where there was a very small mission and I had a specific, respected role. I had no such role in Pakistan. If anything I was supposed to critique what they were doing. So I found it much more difficult to find myself a position and role in Pakistan. Of course, we had some dealings with the Pakistani government, but there was always this elephant in the room.

Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?
ROGERS: The ambassador when I got there was Walter McConaughy, a long-time career diplomat. He was followed shortly by two political appointees. I forget the name of the first, but he was intelligent and hard-working. I must confess I forget his name. [editor’s note: Eugene Murphy Locke] An amusing story about him. When he first arrived he gave a reception for all the US staff, including the Consul General from Dacca (now Dhaka). When he came through the receiving line the Ambassador asked the CG where he was from. “Tulsa, Oklahoma, Sir.” The Ambassador to his wife, “Don’t we own a bank in Tulsa?” “No, we sold that bank five years ago!!” But this Ambassador wasn’t there long; he was picked up by Lyndon Johnson and sent to Vietnam, to be one of several ambassadors, which I suspect didn’t make him very happy. He died not too long after that. In Dallas several years later with the Senior Seminar, I paid a quick visit to his wife. They were both very nice people.

The second Ambassador was Benjamin Oehlert, who had been CEO or close to that of Minute Maid Orange Juice. We got along quite well, but I would not rate him as highly I would his predecessor.

But nevertheless, the experience of working under three ambassadors, the moving of the Embassy to Rawalpindi and then Islamabad, and dealing with a government which was also split between two “wings” was not only a challenge but fascinating. And also of course conditions in Pakistan were far different from what they must be today, with much more internal tension, the threats from al-Qaeda, and so on. For example, we drove once with our children to Kabul for a few days, with no problems. Also our daughters, plus a niece who spent almost a year with us enrolled in a Pakistani college, moved freely around town in Pakistani clothing, and I’m not sure they could do either today.

Q: What can you say about the ties between the Chinese Communists and Pakistan?

ROGERS: Well, I can say more about the problem of ties with India. We didn’t hear much at that time about the Chinese, who had a big embassy there. I think much more significant were their problems with India. We tried very hard for a while to get both India and Pakistan to cap or reduce their military budgets and we thought for a time they might do it, but it didn’t fly.

Q: I asked that question I think because of the concern that Pakistan might be furnishing things to China that we wouldn’t like them to do and so forth.

ROGERS: Well this was in ’65 to ’69. I don’t recall that China, at that point, was a very big issue. I think, as I said, India was a constant irritant and problem to the Paks. For example, if we flew to what was then called the East Wing, now Bangladesh, air traffic couldn’t fly over India. It had to go around, which meant an eight-hour flight rather than three or four.

Q: I was going to ask you, did you ever get to East Pakistan?

ROGERS: Yes, I got to East Pakistan, one of those endless flights around, over Sri Lanka, I guess, and traveled around the country, down to Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar, up into the area which was largely Buddhist, and north of Dacca into the area of large tea plantations. At that point Pakistan only had about I guess fifty or sixty million people. Now its twice or three times
that. One of the things that we tried hard to push there was family planning, in both wings, but obviously it hasn’t been very successful. Who knows what the population might have been had there been no such effort.

Q: Or in India.

ROGERS: Well, anyway, during my time there as economic counselor, I had some excellent, excellent people on my staff. Tony Quainton, Sharon Erdkamp, she later married a Pakistani but he died. I think she resigned and after he died she came back in. She was then known as Sharon Ahmad and I believe she was appointed ambassador to some African country but the appointment stymied for some reason and never made it.

Q: The reporting, the economic reporting from East Pakistan, did that have to go through you at the embassy or did that go directly to Washington?

ROGERS: I think both. But mostly, they reported directly. But then if you put together an overall economic report for the country they would send it through us. By and large they were independent.

Q: Did you foresee a split coming between the two?

ROGERS: Did we? No, I can’t say that we did. One reason for that is that lots of the government employees were Bengalis.

Q: Even in West Pakistan?

ROGERS: In Islamabad. This was the national government. Yeah, I had several very good friends. Most of them seemed to be Bengalis. When I was going to Bangladesh, I was talking to one of them and he said, “Well, are you going down to Chittagong?” I said, “Yes, I’m planning to.” He said, “Well, what you should do is go into the Chittagong Club because it has a very strange odor. You’ll notice this strange odor.” I said, “Really? What do you mean, a strange odor? What kind of odor is it?” He says, “It smells like money.” And it did. I don’t remember the political section at that point forecasting any split.

Q: Was there tension between the two sections or

ROGERS: There was, but there was also tension within the western half between one section and another, so I wouldn’t say that it was

Q: Enough to cause a split. Any other thoughts about your tour in Pakistan?

ROGERS: Yes. Maybe the record doesn’t show it, I’m not sure, but about halfway or maybe a little bit more than halfway I was made DCM from economic counselor and that was not a very pleasant business.

Q: How did that come about?
ROGERS: Well, I was moved up because Ambassador Oehlert wanted to make some personnel changes and persuaded the Department to go along with it. I thought it was altogether unwarranted but I was moved up to DCM for about my last, I guess about a year and a half. I was there about four years. We dealt with all levels in the Foreign Office.

One story of my time there warrants telling. I was playing golf one Saturday morning and somebody comes tearing out from the pro shop and says, “The Foreign Office wants you on the phone, now!” I guess I was temporary chargé or something. So I called ‘em up and they said, “We have a question. We have a message from our embassy about the visit of President Nixon. Is the figure for the number of journalists 30 or 300?” I said, “What visit from President Nixon?” They said, “Don’t you know about this? Well, if we can suggest it, maybe you better give up your golf game and drop over here.” We didn’t know anything about this. This was during Kissinger’s hey-day. So we didn’t know anything about it. So I go over to the Foreign Office and they tell me what’s happening, when the president is coming. And so I said, “Well it can’t possibly be 300 journalists. They placed the dot in the wrong place.” Was I ever wrong!

Well, that was the beginning of a long and arduous hassle. One of the most interesting questions that consumed endless time was how do you get the president off the plane? The White House preparation team that came out was discussing all the momentous aspects of the visit with the Pakistani Chief of Protocol. I was there and the question was how do you get Nixon off the plane. And the Paks said, “Well, what we do normally is this: the plane stops, the chief of protocol goes up the steps and welcomes the visitor and escorts him down to the bottom of the steps, where the president of Pakistan is waiting to shake his hand and the chief of protocol introduces the two.” And the White House team says, “No, no, we don’t do it that way. We can’t have anybody on the steps with the president.” And the Paks say, “Well, we’ve received the Queen of England. We’ve received the Shah of Iran. We know how to do this. This is the way we do it.” The White House says, “Well, we don’t do it that way. This is the way we’ll do it. The chief of protocol can go up the steps if he wants to but the president comes down the steps by himself and first. He’s not going to be preceded by anybody, even your chief of protocol,” meaning you. Well, they gave in on that.

Then the White House says, “Now, the route that we’re taking in from the airport,” to the guest house where he would be staying, “we need to line that with people.” And the Paks said, “Well, he’s coming in on Friday afternoon, which is our Sabbath and it’s going to be 105 degrees or higher.” The White House asked how many people are there likely to be along this route and the Paks said, “Well, not many, given it’s Friday and the heat. Not very many.” And the White House said, “That’s not gonna fly. You’ve gotta have people out there.” Well, they went back and forth, back and forth. Finally, finally, they lined it up with soldiers, some in civilian clothes. I don’t know whether they issued civilian trousers and shirts for the occasion or not.

So this went on and on. What is it, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely? But I think there ought to be another line, but I can’t make it rime: proximity to power corrupts, proximity to power is worst of all.

Q: Did the president stay with Ayub Khan, then, while he was in Pakistan?
ROGERS: They had a guesthouse. He stayed there. He didn’t come to Islamabad. He came to Lahore and so almost the whole Embassy came down there. He stayed in a guesthouse in Lahore.

Q: Now, this was the famous trip to China?

ROGERS: No. The trip to China, I believe I’m right, Nixon didn’t come to Pakistan. Kissinger came through Pakistan en route to China, but we knew nothing of it. Maybe the Ambassador did, but I doubt it.

Q: He didn’t go through Pakistan. He went directly to China.

Q: Didn’t know anything about the Kissinger visit? What was President Nixon doing in Pakistan? Was this a good will visit or was he visiting India, too?

ROGERS: Yes, he had just visited India. This was some time after his visit to China, I believe. Now, he’d been to Pakistan earlier while he was out of office. At that time he did come to Islamabad and we were called in to brief him. And although I’m not an admirer of Nixon’s, I will stay that on that visit he asked good questions, was interested, he listened and what more can you ask? This was a different experience from my earlier report on briefing him in Austria on the Hungarian revolution, when he was interested in refugees only.

Q: He was good on the foreign policy side.

ROGERS: Well, I certainly must give him kudos for his trip to China and what followed.

C. WILLIAM KONTOS
Mission Director, USAID
Lahore (1967-1968)

Ambassador C. William Kontos was born in Illinois in 1922 and attended the University of Chicago and where he received his graduate degree in 1948. He served in the U.S. Army during the War World War II. He joined the Foreign Service in 1949 subsequently had tours of duty in Colombo, Lagos, Lahore, Rawalpindi. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern in February and March of 1992.

Q: In 1967, you were assigned to Pakistan as Mission Director. That was a large mission. What did you find?

KONTOS: I found a mission that was regrouping after the second Indo-Pakistani war. Three years earlier, the Pakistanis had their noses bloodied by the Indians. The war period obviously affected the work of the Mission, but by the time I arrived, its effects had pretty will dissipated and the Mission was functioning normally again. The majority of the Mission itself was in
Karachi, although the government under the leadership of Ayub Khan had decided to move the capital of Pakistan north to Islamabad. AID had a small office in Lahore in the Punjab, which is closer to Islamabad. Before my arrival, the decision had been made to move the Karachi staff to Lahore as a half-way house to Islamabad. So we established temporary quarters in Lahore pending the renovation of an appropriate building in Islamabad. So for a year, we worked out of Lahore, with a small liaison office in Islamabad where the Embassy had moved. During this first year, I spent a lot of time on an airplane shuttling back and forth between Lahore and Islamabad. In those days, East Pakistan was still a part of greater Pakistan, separated by India, requiring considerable plane travel to that area. I did a lot of traveling that first year and a lot even in the second.

The year we spent in Lahore was very advantageous. Lahore had been the traditional capital of Islamic India, when it was still part of the British empire. The Pakistan establishment lived in Lahore. So while we were there, we had excellent entre into the elite of Pakistan society. When we left Karachi, we left a small office there, giving us a continuing access to the financial and commercial sector of Pakistan society. Our new offices in Islamabad were very close to the Chancery; that helped us to become more closely associated with the Embassy and being in the capital, with the Pakistan government. So we developed and maintained relationships with all the important segments of Pakistan society.

The Ambassador was Benjamin Oehlert, Jr. who had been the CEO of Minute Maid, a subsidiary of the Coca-Cola company and a friend of President Johnson's. He had also been a lawyer. He had no understanding of foreign affairs, but had the wit to recognize his deficiency and basically allowed his staff fairly free reign. He was very good at ceremonial occasions; he traveled around the country. He saw his role primarily as chairman of the board with the operations being conducted by his staff. His DCM was Dave Schneider, a career officer, who was very good with considerable experience and knowledge of the area.

This was however a situation in which the Ambassador's wife played a disproportionate role in the way the embassy was organized. The wife of the economic counselor -- a very ambitious woman -- became very close to Mrs. Oehlert. To put it bluntly, that woman wanted her husband to have a higher status in the embassy. She told many stories to Mrs. Oehlert, which contributed to an unusual and unprecedented change in staffing. The DCM was reassigned to Washington with the economic counselor being appointed as DCM. These shifts had no effect on the AID Mission, but I know the story well because I was consulted by all parties. I told the Ambassador that he was making a serious mistake, to no avail. The Consul General in Dacca was also removed on some frivolous decision by the Ambassador. These actions created some havoc among the career people and were the only legacy left by the Oehlerts.

In fact, since none of this foolishness affected our operations, I was pleased to have an Ambassador who gave us a free hand. In light of the size of our assistance programs, my access to the President and his senior Cabinet officers was excellent. Most of the Pakistanis who worked on the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and some of the other ministries were very good and our relationships were first class. Many of them are still playing important roles in the Pakistani government today. Needless to say, all of them spoke excellent English. Many had been trained in Pakistan in English schools; some were trained in England and some in the
United States (a number had graduated from Yale, Princeton, Harvard and Berkeley). The older officials had been members of the Indian Civil Service, which was a very distinguished group indeed. Pakistani officials were a very capable group -- articulate, knowledgeable, and well versed in the bureaucratic quarters which required us to be on our toes at all times.

Q: What were the principal objectives of the assistance program in Pakistan in this period?

KONTOS: One of the principal ones was to increase the food supply. During this period, the so-called "green revolution" became the major innovation in South Asia. The dwarf varieties of wheat and rice were being introduced on a considerable scale into Pakistani agriculture. They had a great success. These new varieties of wheat and rice seeds were a major breakthrough in agriculture production. The two centers where the experimental work was done were Mexico City and Los Banos in the Philippines. To foster the spread of these new grain crops throughout Pakistan, we needed appropriate transport, fertilizer and other necessary inputs. The AID Mission played an important role in minimizing the government's control over fertilizer trade. We fought valiantly, and with some success, with the government to free fertilizer from import duties, to develop a loan program for Pakistani fertilizer plants, and to improve the distribution flow by eliminating governmental controls and middle-men. The farmers accepted the new seeds but with the usual concern about how they would grow in a Pakistani environment. In general, the demonstration projects which clearly indicated the strength and virility of the new seeds in Pakistan's climatic conditions were sufficient to convince the farmers to use them. We brought these new seeds at very reasonable costs, so that in fact the farmers obtained them at subsidized costs. The government and the Mission worked very closely to support the "green revolution", including procurement of the seeds, water allocations (the Punjab was heavily irrigated), and distribution of fertilizer. In promoting what was an agricultural development project, we were very active at the same time in fostering a freer market and an open economy. That was another major objective of our program.

We of course had other projects as well to achieve that goal. For example, we helped set up a stock exchange in Karachi. We tried to sponsor some new banking regulations which were more sensible than the existing ones. We were also interested in the growth of Pakistani industry, which began to flourish while I was there.

Our public health program was largely focused on family planning. It was a major aspect of our mission. In education, we had some modest projects, but it was not as important as it was in Nigeria, where it was a central theme of our program. We had a modest project in public administration. But our emphasis was really in the creation of a free market. We had advisors to various financial institutions, such as the stock exchange. In addition to our own economists, there was a group of economists from Harvard, which at one time had been headed by Dave Bell. They were working with the Pakistani Planning Commission and were influential on such matters as a new investment code and the optimum use of outside assistance. The AID Mission, along with its Pakistani counterparts and other groups like Harvard, was deeply involved in the planning and execution of an economic development program for the whole country. It was a heady experience.

Pakistan had a history of central control of its economy. The hand of the government was found
in many areas; the private sector flourished in certain niche areas, light manufacturing and pharmaceuticals, equipment for hospitals, and sports equipment. Wherever the heavy hand of government could be loosened, there was a private sector response that was really heartening.

We also had a major import program. For example, the government of Pakistan was modernizing its rail system and we provided loans which permitted the procurement of GM locomotives. We played an important role in the design, construction and equipping of a large hydro-electric power system. So there were a lot of activities in which we were involved. The aid level ranged between $250 to $275 million and the staff consisted of 162 U.S. direct hire and a sizeable number of contract personnel.

Q: Were there any efforts made to have our assistance meet certain political goals?

KONTOS: The U.S. of course wanted to achieve amicable relations between India and Pakistan and we tried to maintain a reasonably balanced military assistance program to both countries. But, as I recall, our relationships with India became much more strained and as we continued our considerably military assistance program to Pakistan, the Indians shifted to procurement of Soviet military hardware. Then the Pakistanis tended to look to us to maintain a balance of forces.

Q: Can an assistance program influence such political matters as an India-Pakistan relationship?

KONTOS: Yes, in a variety of ways. We kept in close touch with our colleagues in New Delhi. There were frequent visits back and forth. We encouraged discussions between Indian and Pakistani officials that were of mutual interest to both sides. The kind of military assistance that the U.S. provided was instrumental in maintaining a military balance and stability between the two countries. It was a delicate problem and we had to move with great caution. We never, unfortunately, reached the stage when we could have joint U.S.-India-Pakistan projects.

Q: Tell us a little about the internal politics of Pakistan at this time and the impact they may have had on the nature of our assistance programs or what impact our programs may have had on Pakistani politics.

KONTOS: One of the major issues of the day was the maintenance of the unity of the country. There were signs even then of growing disenchantment in that part of Pakistan now known as Bangladesh. We therefore took great care to make sure that assistance efforts were proportionately distributed between East and West Pakistan. I made frequent visits to East Pakistan -- Dacca and other parts. There were other tribal areas which were restive and we tried to make sure that our assistance reinforced those elements that were in favor of a unified Pakistan. We tried to make sure that the new country of Pakistan, formed out of a partition of India, would succeed as one country.

Pakistan was an important country to our global policies. The British had fought for Afghanistan's independence to prevent further encroachment of the Russian bear into Southeast Asia and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. We were not about to let that change. It
is not difficult to judge that the size of our assistance program was in large measure dictated by
our political objectives. The Pakistani needs were obvious. The size of the previous year's
program played an important role; it would have been difficult to deviate one way or another
from that. Indeed, when aid levels were below the previous year's levels, many a government
saw that as a sign of American displeasure or lack of concern or interest for its well being. A
number of factors went into setting levels of assistance for Pakistan: the previous years' levels,
the fact that it was a country of 75-80 million people, located in a strategic place, and a country
that had used its assistance very usefully. In addition, I think we had very persuasive arguments
to support the levels of assistance that we requested. I must admit that looking back on it, I can
not say that the country allocation was made in any coherent or rational or logical fashion. It was
more a hit or miss happenstance. I refer to the whole assistance levels determination process. The
setting of levels is a very arcane and esoteric business.

Q: Did you have a Peace Corps program in Pakistan?

KONTOS: We did not, although we tried to start one from time to time. But the Peace Corps was
viewed in some quarters as the advance guard of American intelligence and was suspect. So the
Pakistanis were really never interested. We did have a number of private volunteer agencies --
e.g the Asia Foundation -- represented in Pakistan which, although small, were very effective.

That tour was one of my great experiences overseas. I look back on it with great affection and
even some nostalgia. I left before I think I should have. I was there only two years; I think I
should have been allowed another two years. There were a variety reasons for my reassignment.
For one, the deputy administrator of the NESA Bureau wanted my job. Secondly, I had not
established the best of relationships with the head of the Bureau who had been my predecessor in
Pakistan. Everything that I did which deviated from what he had done previously was seen as
"not well thought through" or ill-advised. So I had the classic problem of my predecessor being
my boss which created a certain amount of tension. The ostensible reason for my return was to
establish a new program evaluation system for AID. This was a management innovation strongly
backed by John Hannah, then the AID Administrator, and he was very interested in getting it
started. Until then AID did not have a formal evaluation process. Hannah and others felt that this
was a great deficiency and wanted it put in place in a hurry.

Q: How did Hannah perceive the evaluation process?

KONTOS: I was the first director of this new evaluation office. But Joel Bernstein, my ex-boss
from Nigeria, had already made an effort to get such a system underway. In a reorganization
of the Agency, Joel had been made the chief of a new Technical Assistance Bureau and had
recommended me to Dr. Hannah as his successor in his old job. By the time I arrived in
Washington, the new Office and the process were just in their infancy. The objective of the
process was to learn from our extensive assistance experience around the world (we had
programs in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa. We had had experiences in Europe).
But nowhere was there a clearinghouse which could be the Agency's memory from which
lessons could be learned and mistakes avoided. Another objective was to find projects that were
not meeting their objectives so that they could be terminated before more resources were wasted.
When you begin with an organization that has no capacity to review its on-going activities or to
learn from its past experiences, there was a formidable argument for an evaluation process.

Q: Was there an assumption that lessons learned in one country might be applicable to projects in another?

KONTOS: Absolutely. That view was prevalent. For example, we frequently had people in an agriculture project run into problems that were quite similar to those encountered by our technical people in another country. The remedies that might have been developed in the second country certainly could have been applicable to the first. This was true certainly at the micro-level, i.e. the project level, when problems might have arisen with the indigenous bureaucracy or the local farmer, but I think it may well be true for larger issues. While in the evaluation job, we undertook surveys of key issues such as land reform -- its successes and failures. We explored the circumstances where it worked well and where it had failed; we looked at the long term economic advantages of land reform. So we garnered experiences that were relevant from one country to another and which, if heeded, could have obviated a lot of differences.

Q: Does your view suggest that the cultural barriers to economic development that many people perceive may not be as insurmountable as they believe?

KONTOS: The cultural barriers do exist, but when you undertake activities that require innovations, new ideas, new approaches in an environment of traditionalism, our experiences have shown that, given palpable and clear incentives, people do respond despite their cultural inheritances. It is usually the same incentive: cash. It is remarkable the way farmers in a variety of cultures respond to prices. Given a fair price for their products, they will increase their production many fold. If, as many governments have done, they are paid low and inadequate prices, production falls. There is a clear record of that phenomenon in all kinds of farming situations.

It is true that any economic development program runs into cultural barriers of one sort or another. In Pakistan, for example, we encountered the firm popular belief that government had all the answers. Tight government control was therefore viewed as beneficial in the long run, which I consider a false premise. Also, since we operated in an Islamic society, the role of women had to be considered carefully. In many ways Islamic tendencies created inhibitions for the use of women in a variety of fields. Pakistan had a high degree of illiteracy; even today it approximates 75 or 80%. That makes economic development difficult; people cannot read simple instructions and follow them. We also had regional tensions -- Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis -- creating internal problems. We faced difficult relationships between the Muslims who had come from India and those who had lived in the area that became Pakistan for many generations.

I never encountered in any of my assignments cultural barriers that could not be overcome. Of course, I worked, with the exception of Greece and Lebanon, essentially in countries that had been former British colonies: Ceylon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Sudan. In each case, English was the second language so that discourse with the government and the local elites was easy. These countries had a legacy of relatively decent civil services, of reasonably good road systems, of law and order that was more or less effective; these countries were born with some fairly
positive influences even though they all possessed different cultures and histories.

To go back to the evaluation process, I should describe how we established the procedure. We first set some benchmarks for evaluation purposes. We had to begin the process of being able, in a fairly direct and fairly workable way, to assess the successes and failures of ongoing projects. Once that was done, then conclusions could be reached on the reasons for success. We had to establish a formula and that took most of a year to devise. We developed a matrix which enabled us to evaluate various assumptions that spawned and maintained the project. Sometimes we found them wanting; the project may have been floundering because the original assumptions has been faulty. We had the assistance of a very talented contractor called "Practical Concept Inc"; we used them as our stalking horse. The matrix for program evaluation that we developed is still AID's basic tool today for project evaluation. We tested the matrix in a number of field trips and conferences attended by the contractor and myself and some of my staff. We met each week with representatives of the regional bureaus and other interested parties. Out of the year's effort, we were able to develop a working tool which was ultimately accepted and became a permanent part of the AID program evaluation process.

ANDREW I. KILLGORE
Political Officer
Dacca (1967-1970)

Andrew I. Killgore was born on a farm in Alabama, and graduated from a small teacher's training college in Livingston, Alabama. He entered the Foreign Service as a Wristonee, initially working as a service staff officer. He has served in Jordan, Baghdad, Iran, and Qatar. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 15, 1988.

Q: What was your job there?

KILLGORE: I was number two. I was there three years. Essentially, I was doing the political reporting, which I mostly did everywhere, but I also took a hand in running the post under most of the consul generals. During the time I was there, Stuart, for about one year, at various times all added up together, I was the acting consul general. Incidentally, a very big post, hundreds of people, counting the AID mission and everything.

Q: Would you describe the political situation as you saw it in 1967, when you went to Dacca?

KILLGORE: It didn't take me very long, a few weeks, to figure out that East Pakistan and West Pakistan would not stay together, that Bengal would break away and establish a separate state.

Q: It became Bangladesh.

KILLGORE: Yes, the present Bangladesh. They had too much against them, the difference of language, of course, Bengali on one side and Punjabi and Urdu on the west side. From the
beginning, the central government, at first in Karachi, later, of course, in Islamabad, gave no official standing at all to the Bengali language from 1947, when the country was established, when the Moslem parts broke away from India, until '52. Bengali, although it was spoken by probably 60% of the people of the combined country, had no standing. Every year, language riots on a certain day, mostly at the University of Dacca. Of course, the Bengalis resented this. Also, as you know, the two parts of Pakistan were separated at least by 1,200 or 1,300 miles of India. The Pakistan Army, gradually, during the period I was there, it had come to be regarded as an occupation Army.

Q: During the time you were there?

KILLGORE: During the time, certainly, when I was there, because Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who became the first president, was in jail already when I got there. He was, of course, a Bengali nationalist. He had come into prominence earlier, when he was a student at the University of Dacca. Political ferment was always at the University of Dacca in the capital city. He had taken the side, as a student, of the people who did the cooking and cleaning and sweeping and grass cutting and so forth, who made practically nothing. He stood up for the really down and out in Bengal, and became a hero to the Bengalis. Of course, the central government was afraid of him and threw him in jail. Eventually, in June 1969, the central government cooked up a conspiracy in which they accused Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and about ten other Bengalis of plotting to separate East Bengal, as it was called, from the rest of Pakistan. They had a trial, which became a sensation, called the Agartala conspiracy trial. It's a little village just across the line from what was then East Pakistan over on the edge of India. They claimed that the plotters met there. But mostly I think it was cooked up. There was no such plan, really, to separate Bengal from the rest of Pakistan. What they wanted was a chair. They wanted to be part of the show.

In the early days of Pakistan, of course, there had been Bengali prime ministers of Pakistan, but those days were gone. In the 1970 general elections after I left, the party headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won something like over 60% of the seats in the Parliament, and thus he should have been the next prime minister. But instead, the Army refused to go along, and in effect, the civil war started.

Q: You're really talking about Army rule, aren't you?

KILLGORE: Army rule.

Q: It was the Army that was being this. I assume from what you say that the Army was not Bengali.

KILLGORE: You had a few Bengali officers, but just sort of a token. There was also a racial or color thing pulling the two parts of Pakistan apart. If you think we have a color bias in the States, you should go to South Asia, where color means almost everything. During the Agartala conspiracy trial, it came out that one of the top ranking Punjabi Army officers in then East Pakistan had referred to Bengalis generally as "little black bastards." That was played, and it was reported in the Baltimore Sun by Adam Klymer, who now works for The New York Times, who attended the conspiracy trial. I said in my first reporting, the day the trial opened, that the
Agartala conspiracy trial was a portentous political development, inasmuch as all the defendants were Bengali, if they had been found guilty, they would all have been heroes to all of East Pakistan, who felt they had been mistreated by the central government.

There's another factor here separating them. The Bengali jute captured quite a bit of hard currency foreign exchange. Jute is a crop, which is used for rugs, wall coverings, and all sorts of things, rug backing. Of course, it earned the hard currency which the central government took and kept. Then they gave rupees, which are little pieces of paper, to the Bengalis. For example, "Okay, this year you've got 3 billion rupees (I'm just pulling a figure out of the air) for development. We're going to do this, that, and the other with this money." But the red tape was such that maybe only 1 billion got spent, and the other 2 billion reverted at the end of the fiscal year back to the central government.

So Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, once he was released from prison -- and we became good friends -- said to me, "They are stealing my jute. They are stealing me blind," was the accusation. He said, "My fellow Moslems in West Pakistan are treating me like a tenant." He personalized everything. He became Bengal, and the jute money was his, and jute was "my jute," "my people." He was a charismatic Messiah type. He said, "When the British were here, all they wanted to do was trade. The British were far better to us than our fellow Moslems in West Pakistan."

Q: Islam being the one thing that was the determining cause for the union of East Bengal and Pakistan.

KILLGORE: That was pushed by Ali Jinnah, who became the first president of the United Pakistan, he said he had been a Hindu, the upper crust, probably even a Brahman. From the look of him, I'd say he was a Brahman. His family probably came from Kashmir, from the looks of him.

The problem, however, was that Islam had an appearance of being a unifying factor; but, in fact, it wasn't because the Moslem armies, Arab armies in the seventh and eighth centuries came out and got along the same line as Alexander the Great, which was along the Indus River. Alexander said he stopped there because there were no more worlds to conquer. What he really ran into was the massed millions of India.

Q: His army just said, "This is it."

KILLGORE: "This is too far. We've been gone too long."

Q: They just turned back.

KILLGORE: That's right. In any case, the Bengalis were a totally different type. They love dance, they love poetry, they love music. In other words, Bengalis, the feeling of being Bengali, was much stronger than feeling Moslem. Whereas in the West, you had had a collision between Islam and the Hindu millions of India going on for centuries and centuries. There had been a lot of bad blood. A lot of blood had been spilled. Right now to this day, Pakistanis look
with red eyes at the Indians. So they had one view, it was the fire and the sword, and we have to fight. This was quite foreign to the Bengalis. They should never have been separated from the rest of Bengal. Frankly, Stuart, I don't blame just Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was the first president of Pakistan; I also blame the British. The old imperial "divide and rule" was still very much in their minds, in my opinion.

Q: Talking about policy now, let's go back. You went there in 1967. Who was the consul general?

KILLGORE: Lee Metcalf was the consul general when I arrived for the first few months. Then Leslie Squires became the consul general. Actually, he was a USIS man, had been the public affairs officer in Pakistan, as a whole. Then the last few months I was there, it was Archer Blood.

Q: What was our -- I almost hesitate to use the word -- policy toward East Pakistan? Did you call it East Pakistan or did you call it East Bengal?

KILLGORE: We called it East Pakistan, sometimes referred to as the East wing and the West wing.

Q: This was before the war and the break and the creation of Bangladesh. What was American interests when you were there, if any?

KILLGORE: Our military officers and CIA and conservative diplomats found the West Pakistanis, the Punjabis, and the Pathans terribly attractive guys. They were big guys like you. They could drink Scotch whiskey with the best, they spoke impeccable English, and they could handle a riding crop without looking ridiculous. But they had some most unrealistic ideas. They had a notion of fighting the Indians and taking all of Kashmir, which they said was rightly theirs. They didn't realize that they were probably outnumbered nine or ten to one, both in numbers and in resources and everything else, and there was never any chance of jousting with India. This was the days of pactomania, as it's been called.

Q: Not Pakistanomania, but pactomania. We wanted to have alliances, CENTO, SEATO, NATO.

KILLGORE: Close to the Soviet Union, we'd have allies. In that sense, Pakistan was seen as important. I think, essentially, our policy push for West Pakistan, we mostly liked the West Paks. We found the poverty and the misery and the degradation of life in East Pakistan turned us off very much. There were people who sympathized with the Bengalis, of course, but any attempt to tell Washington or the embassy in Islamabad that things were ripe for falling apart, of course, was quite impossible to do.

You know, this amounts to a digression, but our problem is we can't handle problems until they overwhelm us. Someone explained America this way: we're half Celtic and half Germanic. But essentially we are Celtic. Just as the great English common law, on which our whole legal system is based, came with tiny gradual accretions through the centuries, as facing actual problems, and where the whole idea of the reasonable man deciding what is the proper thing to do in these circumstances, that's the way our foreign policy is done. You can't warn beforehand. You have a grand thing over there at the State Department called the Policy Planning Council,
where you have some really brainy people, pretty good intellectuals, and they write very fine papers that make pretty good sense. But what they're doing has little relevance to what actually goes on in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It's a desk officer doing little bits and pieces of paper every day, handling things just as they come up.

Q: What I'm hearing here is as far as our feeling towards Pakistan at the time was being created by the personal relationships of officers mainly in West Pakistan with people they related to, charming macho-type people and all they could get along with well, the type of people you could "do business with," is the term. So in lieu of sitting down and saying, "Where are we going with this subcontinent," you're talking about people sending reports back to Washington about how fine these people are, and sort of a disparagement of another area, mainly because of personal feelings, rather than somebody saying, "We want to be with this emerging group," or thinking about what we wanted to do. Is this what I'm hearing?

KILLGORE: Yes, I think what you say is correct. Of course, there are complexities here. Don't forget the Indians had a foreign minister named Krishna Menon.

Q: Oh, my God, yes. And defense minister, too.

KILLGORE: He may have been the deputy prime minister.

Q: I think he was often the defense minister.

KILLGORE: In any case, Krishna Menon was a fiery intellectual type of fellow who was quick to denounce the West. I suppose looking back on British imperialism was part of what formed him. In any case, he was very unpopular in Washington, and when the Paks portrayed themselves as jousting with Krishna Menon, of course Krishna Menon was going to come out second best. In fact, of course, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs or State Department is generally quite incompetent. This is one of the periods when Dean Rusk, as I suggested, who was a brilliant fellow, but who was a supplicant type and never took any interest in anything other than Southeast Asia, you couldn't get anyone at the topside to listen at all. It may have been that no matter what we did, Pakistan was going to break up. There was no virtue in staying together, just as a man and wife who really can't get along and probably should never have married, there's no need to try to hold together artificially something that is rejecting each other. But in any case, it was a fascinating political thing to write about from Bengal.

Q: Without any firm line of policy but more a mind set, showing some disfavor towards East Pakistan, mainly because of the type people, I have to say that this reminds me a little, on reflection, of when I was consul general in Naples, Italy, of our people in Rome towards the southern Neapolitans, who were very lively and energetic, not as energetic, efficient, but they weren't the type of people you could do business with, as opposed to those who were running FIAT and all up in the north. This often happens. We find ourselves more attracted to the ones who come closer to, you might say, the Teutonic or more business like. Anyway, this is a digression.

In your reporting, were you under any constraints on what to report, either from your consuls
general or from our embassy in Rawalpindi or in Karachi? It had moved at that time.

KILLGORE: Rawalpindi. You were under some constraints. The embassy, for example, in Islamabad, was not persuaded that the central government was treating the Bengalis unfairly by hogging the hard currency from the jute sales. You couldn't persuade the embassy that the political situation in East Pakistan was really quite volatile and ready to start burning. We weren't under much pressure. We were under some pressure. This was an interesting thing. How did you handle it in Naples? Did you report directly to the State Department?

Q: Yes.

KILLGORE: We did, too, in Dacca.

Q: For the record, there's a difference between reporting from your consulate general directly to Rome or to your capital, where they can maybe put their own spin on it, as opposed to reporting directly to Washington with a copy to the capital. Often this is done mainly because it's easier to do it that way.

KILLGORE: Basically, the embassy is Islamabad believed that we were taking localitis pills, we were too hung up on Pakistan as seen from Bengal. I think the State Department felt somewhat the same way. I learned several years after this happened that Ambassador Joseph Farland, who was, during most of my time in Dacca, the United States ambassador in Islamabad, when the last consul general, Archer Blood, left, he recommended my name to be the new consul general, which I didn't learn anything about until much later. He apparently sent it back to the State Department. Subsequently, when I found out about this, I was talking to Ray Hunt, who was the executive director of NEA. The poor guy was killed.

Q: He was assassinated in Rome.

KILLGORE: That's right.

Q: Ray Leaman Hunt.

KILLGORE: When I mentioned it to Ray, he said to me, "Yes, but you wouldn't have got it because you were too identified with the Bengalis." I had been reporting. What am I supposed to report about? Burma or Pakistan? Or am I supposed to talk about Bengal and how the Bengalis feel about things?

Q: I think we are pointing up something here, that there is a problem. If you report on local events which may sort of upset the establishment, again not because of a policy matter, but just because how the mind set -- we're really talking about a mind set.

KILLGORE: That's it. Idee fixe, as the French say. That's right. Fixed views of what things are.

Q: Fixed views. And if somebody comes in, mainly because they're reporting from a different area where they see it differently, not because they are trying to particularly push a cause, but if
you are in a post or a country where there are events happening, they tend to be dismissed by the establishment. This is not a matter of the President in a new administration coming in and saying, "We don't want to hear this." This is a matter within the State Department.

KILLGORE: Stuart, you have put that as well as it can be put in just a few words. That is a permanent ongoing problem, and I don't really see that there is any answer to it, given the fact that our society is so totally ignorant about the outside world. After all, we are picked to be Foreign Service officers because we have the capacity, the wit to learn, and being in a country or part of a country, you have the opportunity and the occasion to learn what the situation is. And perforce you come to certain conclusions that, in your opinion, are of some moment, some consequence to your own government back home, being honest, you have to report it. You have to report it as you see it.

Now, it was Talleyrand or some French foreign minister, once said, "Let's, for God's sake, don't have too much zeal." Well, to my mind, there isn't quite enough zeal in our system. The Foreign Service officers have learned, as a survival mechanism, that you don't joust intellectually against these fixed ideas and views and outlooks that prevail in Washington. If you do it too much, you're reckoned to pick up something called localitis.

Q: The outstanding example, of course, is the fate of the old China hands, which, as we've seen in other circumstances, was not just a matter of outside political forces taking it, but within. These were people going against the conventional wisdom within the professional service, that China was falling apart.

KILLGORE: What they saw very clearly, with great clarity, was that the Chiang Kai-shek regime had become corrupt and discredited, and that Mao Zedong and his forces were going to rule China, and they said so. They were another classic example of the messenger being blamed for the message.

Q: In a place that, at that point, was not critical, but later did become critical, because our tilt to Pakistan and the bad odor that lingers from this, we're talking about the '71-'72 split, still taints our relation with India.

KILLGORE: It rankles in my heart.

Q: This is already in the system. This was not just necessarily Henry Kissinger coming up with an idea. It was in the system already.

KILLGORE: It was in the system, but it was personified in Henry, of course, who was tilting, as he called it, towards Pakistan and was continuing to overly tilt towards Pakistan when anyone who had a lick of sense, which Henry did not have, incidentally, he was too ignorant, when there was no chance. The time had passed when it might have been possible for East and West Pakistan to get back together. It was irretrievably lost.

Q: ~"You don't back losers" is number one in policy.
KILLGORE: And not only that, there was a very serious moral problem involved here, because a decent person, if he looks at evil and killing and slaughter, you have to stand up and speak out against that. You are obliged to as a decent person. At the time that the Pakistan Army was slaughtering Bengalis by the tens of thousands and throwing them in the rivers, letting them float down to the Bay of Bengal, Henry was still making these strong statements on behalf of Pakistan. In fact, it got so bad that the staff at Dacca sent a blast cable which actually, in effect, wrecked Arch Blood's career, because Arch might have been the ambassador to India except for that.

Q: We are talking about Archer Blood, who never did become an ambassador.

KILLGORE: No, he never did.

Q: But highly thought of within the State Department. Everybody knew he was a prime candidate, even I, who didn't deal in the area, thought of him as being one of our very top diplomats.

KILLGORE: He was a very top diplomat. He was a very decent chap, very highly regarded professionally, and greatly admired. People felt great affection for Archer Blood because of his character and his personality, a terribly decent chap.

R. BARRY FULTON
Rotation Officer, USIS
Islamabad (1968-1970)

Director, American Cultural Center, USIS
Karachi (1970-1971)

R. Barry Fulton was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He earned his B.A. and M.A. from Penn State and after graduating in 1962 served in the U.S. Air Force. In 1968 he entered the Foreign Service and during his career served in Pakistan, Japan, Italy and Belgium. Mr. Fulton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: How did you feel about India?

FULTON: Well I said I was assigned to go there, I didn’t say I went there.

Q: Okay. Should have known better.

FULTON: Because when I finally struggled through the completion of Hindi and reached the required minimum score I got a call from USIA personnel and they said, “Well, we have a change and we’re going to send you to Pakistan instead. Hindi and Urdu are essentially the same aren’t they?” I said, “Well, spoken language is essentially the same and the written language is
totally different. It turns out that everybody else in my class has been studying Urdu except me, and I have been taken out of class to study Hindi script, so I don’t know a word of Urdu script.” So I got extended for two more months to study Urdu and then went off to Islamabad.

Q: So you were in Islamabad from when to when?

FULTON: I got there in November of 1968.

Q: And you were there until when?

FULTON: I was there until February of 1970, and then I went to Karachi where I spent a year additional.

Q: When you arrived in Pakistan 1968, what was the political situation there, social situation as you saw it?

FULTON: Well, Pakistan’s one of those countries where history keeps repeating itself, and there was then an exiled former leader by the name of Bhutto who was about to come back to the country. There was a military takeover of the country. The Americans were off base to official Pakistanis in the capital of Islamabad. At the time the capital was brand new, very small. The diplomatic community was just then moving into the capital from Karachi. The official Pakistani community was not allowed to spend any time socially with Americans unless they had permission.

Q: Why was this?

FULTON: It was one of those down periods of our continued ups and downs with the Pakistanis. But we disapproved of the military government that had taken over officially in the same sense that we do today, not loudly and belligerently but we did and the government decided that they should have hands off. There were no newspapers in Islamabad per se, although there were in nearby Rawalpindi. There were no Universities in Islamabad with the exception of the then fledgling University of Islamabad that had all of six students. The Headquarters of the Pakistani television service was just recently moved to Islamabad so there were people in USIS had contact with them, but in short I guess what I’m leading up to is there was very little professional contact within Islamabad itself. It was a sterile new city and the life that I had imagined in the Foreign Service was not one that any of us in that city found.

Q: Who was the ruler at that time?

FULTON: Ayub Khan.

Q: What were you doing? It sounds like USIS wants to get out and meet the folk and get to work on the students, all six of them, and do the newspapers. It sounds like your work was cut out for you. Like being protocol officer.

FULTON: Yes, something like that, it really was. I eventually ended up in Karachi where
everything I just said was totally the opposite. We had a large, thriving intellectual community. What we had in Islamabad, just to retrace my steps for a second and describe the geography in the way we operate, the population center was the city of Rawalpindi, and Islamabad was built in the foothills of the Margalla Hills about fifteen miles from Rawalpindi. This was a little longer commute than that sounds because traffic doesn’t move too fast there. On the outskirts of Rawalpindi itself, closer to Rawalpindi was the American Embassy in a place called Satellite Town. Through the whole time that I served there the Embassy was still in Satellite Town because although they had broken ground in Islamabad they hadn’t finished construction of the buildings, so people worked out of these temporary quarters in Satellite Town, and USIS had its main offices split between Satellite Town and the city of Rawalpindi. In Rawalpindi we had decent, good sized, attractive library. As a new junior officer in training, I rotated from section to section, and so I spent as officers did in those days several weeks in the cultural section, several weeks in the information sections and several weeks in the political section, and several weeks in the economic section, so I moved all around the Embassy and ended up spending most of my time as a trainee in the American center, Library and Program center. At the end of the training I became director of that center. Now the center, being located in Rawalpindi, not in Islamabad, in fact was packed with students. In the city of Rawalpindi there were several good colleges. So we had a very large student clientele in that city. With very few exceptions, we did not have a professional clientele, because during that period of time the people really came there at their own risk, it was not encouraged.

Q: You say you were packed, who?

FULTON: Students.

Q: I mean, these were students in a way, somewhat out of the line of fire.

FULTON: The students didn’t have any prohibition on their coming there. It was people in positions of authority who were advised that they should not accept invitations to the Center. It was one of these xenophobic times, and in Pakistan where the U.S. was seen by some as the enemy, but foreigners in general were enemies in Pakistan during that time. In the new capital and around the new capital it was not easy to have a social meeting at any level. This wasn’t just with those contacts that USIS would normally make, but the same extended to the ambassador. Soon after I arrived, a new ambassador was assigned there, Joseph Farland, who had been written up by the Reader’s Digest from an earlier assignment as the ‘People’s Ambassador’. He had an interview in the Washington Post before he came out and he said he was going to take the Embassy to the people. We shuddered when we read that he was going to take out the good silver and the candelabra and go out to the villages and set this up in the village square and invite people in. I tried to imagine how that would work. He didn’t actually do that, but he did insist when he came in that, contrary to his predecessor who didn’t seem to have entertained many Pakistanis, he was going to fill the official residence with Pakistanis. We were his agents to make sure that all of our contacts would come to all of the official functions. We couldn’t, people did not come. They were polite. They either said, “No thank you, I can’t,” or they said, “Yes, I’ll be pleased to accept,” and did not show up. We had great spreads, buffets laid out at the ambassador’s residence with Americans and other third country diplomats and third country journalists and academics and others present, and almost no Pakistanis.
Q: It must have been a very sterile time.

FULTON: It was.

Q: Who was in charge of USIS there?

FULTON: Gib Austin, Gilbert Austin was the PAO (Public Affairs Officer) in Islamabad, and he oversaw that headquarters operation as well as branch post operations of considerable size, in Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca, and lesser operations staffed by national employees in Rajanpur, Chittagong, Miram Shah, and Hyderabad.

Q: Well it sounds like it was a pretty extensive operation.

FULTON: It was a large operation.

Q: Was there any thought, when you got there were people saying, “Well we’re going through a rough patch but we’re keeping the apparatus going and eventually things will work out.”

FULTON: I was the third of three JOTs to arrive in Pakistan within a six-month period, and the other two had each left a few months after they arrived. This did not reflect well on the post. That is, they resigned, left. That did not reflect well on the post. So by the time I arrived, I didn’t realize that immediately, but I was given kid glove treatment. Because they didn’t want a third person to leave. The other two left for different reasons, personal reasons that were not relevant to me. In fact I nearly left as well, basically because I didn’t see any chance to do there what I thought I had joined the Foreign Service to do. We were a headquarters operation and we were top-heavy and we were, like the classic top-heavy headquarters operation basically giving support to people in the branch posts. We thought they were meeting with real people doing real things. This was not the time to bring to bear my baggage of conceptual knowledge, because we weren’t top-heavy with conceptual guidance, we were top-heavy with bureaucracy. That’s quite a different thing.

Q: Were you picking up any of the tensions between where you were in West Pakistan and East Pakistan? Because it wasn’t too much later that all hell broke loose.

FULTON: It had to break, even while I was there, and fulminated sometime after I’d left. As part of my rotation, I spent nearly a month in then East Pakistan, traveling around. It wasn’t evident in travel that there were tensions, it was evident in reading the press that there were political tensions. In travel what was evident was, it was a totally different culture. I remember telling the story when I got to Dacca, to the PAO who was, Brian Bell. I remember telling him about a recent event that had been held at the Ambassador’s residence and how a handful of Pakistanis had shown up. Brian said, “Well, you know what happens here? We look at capacity, and we figure for this event we can accommodate a hundred Pakistanis, and we send out fifty invitations to Mr. and Mrs., and we get fifty acceptances. When they actually come, we have a hundred and fifty people show up. We always get more people than we invite. Because they tell their friends, and they bring them along, because they love it here.” The Bengali culture I am sure has been
significantly different than the culture in Punjab.

**Q:** Well I would have thought, you were there ’68 to ’70 in Islamabad. I would have thought that with the Nixon Administration and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, I mean later there was a tilt towards Pakistan. Even so I would have thought that things would have been sort of opening up a bit. I would have expected that our relations with Pakistan would have gotten somewhat warmer and less confrontational.

**FULTON:** Well, during that period there was a Nixon visit to Lahore with Henry Kissinger, and the tilt was already obvious in our terms. The receptivity was fairly cold on the Pakistani side at that moment. Before I left Pakistan there was a general election and Bhutto did come back into power during that time. Bhutto had a mixed relationship with the United States. On the one hand I think he admired parts of the American culture. He did after all send his daughter to school here. On the other hand, he was playing the Soviets against the Americans, and he was not trusted by the Americans, in the period that I was there, at least at the level I was operating, and junior officers aren’t privy to everything by any means. There were probably things going on that I don’t know even today, but certainly from where I sat at the time there was no warming of official relations. Now, when I moved to Karachi where I was center director, Karachi was far enough away from this very sterile center of Pakistani government, and relations were quite warm at that level.

**Q:** Was anybody a little more senior sort of sensitive enough to, you know, this is a pretty bad time and say, “Other places are much more exciting, we’re just going through a bad patch.”

**FULTON:** Well, I had a particular respect and regard for the PAO, Gib Austin. He was a person who was a good mentor and was encouraging in that regard. I was fresh out of graduate school and probably a little bit full of myself, and I suspect I was regarded by some people in the staff as a bit of a smart ass, and probably with some good reason. Where I was sort of wanting to get engaged in some way, I was restless. It was in part because of that restlessness that I got transferred to Karachi. I think if I had sat back, I would have spent my whole tour there. The PAO had to pull some strings when a job opened in Karachi that looked like it would be an active job, and I did get transferred there and that worked out well. On their part I think they were very understanding of where I was and what I needed, because I had not joined the Foreign Service to sit at my desk in a sterile city. At that moment I still thought that I would spend several years in this profession, and then go back to teaching. That’s what I thought I would do. The reason I decided to do that was to get some real life experience, and I was getting nothing except experience in a sterile bureaucratic headquarters operation.

**Q:** Okay let’s talk about Karachi, you were there ’70 – ’71. What were you doing there?

**FULTON:** Karachi was then not nearly as large as now, but still a bustling, large commercial capital of Pakistan. What became the American consulate had been the American Embassy before the capital moved to Islamabad. As part of this, there were very large conflicts. There was a very handsome American center, the American Cultural Center. I was director of that center and that center had a collection of about ten-thousand books. It was the most widely used library in the city, even though there were larger libraries, there were no libraries that were so easily
accessible, or friendly as ours. We had a hall that seated a hundred plus people, so we could have lectures and performances and we kept that busy several nights a week. It gave one a chance to interact with all levels of the community, it gave one a chance to run an operation that was very professional when I arrived, I just took over this operation that had been well-run by others. It was my first exposure to doing what I thought the Foreign Service, this USIS part of the Foreign Service, was about.

Q: How was it to explain Vietnam.

FULTON: It wasn’t the task that I had feared it might be. I made peace with myself when I joined the Foreign Service in the early part of 1968 when after our training by the Foreign Service institute and when the eleven USIS people went back for some further USIA training, we were all specifically asked about that at some length together: can you support American policy in Vietnam? My answer was a simple answer for myself, and satisfied those people at the time. My answer was simply I can represent American policy in Vietnam, I can represent with clarity, I can represent American policy without exception, without any ifs, ands or buts, whether I personally support it I think is not important. I thought, by that time I had come to the conclusion that we were wrong, as many people had. I argued that it wasn’t wrong as long as I officially would represent it with clarity, and that seemed to satisfy people, and I was prepared to do that. In fact, in Pakistan there wasn’t much of an issue. Middle Eastern policy was a big issue in Pakistan, and anything, any tilt in any way by the United States that was perceived to be taken toward Israel was a major, major issue. Our relations with India were a major issue, our relations with China were a major issue. Vietnam was hardly on the screen.

Q: How about dealing with the Israeli issue?

FULTON: The press in Pakistan is not free, but it has various degrees of freedom. There are both governmental influences on the press and religious influences on the press. American policy toward Israel was consistently misrepresented. I don’t think that any of us, to my knowledge, ever had any influence in correcting that. It is not as though the reporters were ignorant of our policy, or not as though they didn’t hear us out. They did hear us out, but there was an official line in that. And, at the time, part of maintaining the power in Pakistan is defining the enemy. Israel was easy to define as an enemy, and to the extent that the U.S. propped up Israel it was easy to define the U.S. as a bigger enemy. And that was one of those immovable forces. The Israeli-U.S. perception. I remember one of the people, one of the national employees on my staff, once we were talking about that, said to me, he said, “I’m open-minded and all, you know.” But he said, “This, this is a different thing.” Then he went on to say, “What does a Jew look like anyway?” I said, “Well, have you ever talked to Dr. Wolman?” who was one of my colleagues on the staff. He said, “Yes.” And I said, “He’s Jewish.” He said, “No no, I mean what does a Jew look like?” And I said, “Joe is Jewish.” And he said, “Well he seems like such a nice guy, he seems like a regular person, I wouldn’t have imagined.” That in a way was the kind of mindset that was there, and it was one that we, I don’t think, at least as represented in the public press that we affected at all, as represented in friendships that we made with people. People were very sophisticated, and they knew this was a misrepresentation.

Q: What about, both in Islamabad and Karachi, our relations with India? How was the Indian
relationship dealt with?

FULTON: Our relationship with India at the time was one of considerable ambivalence, and if anything with Nixon as President and Kissinger as National Security Advisor our tilt was clearly toward Pakistan. That was not necessarily perceived by the public in Pakistan because it again served the interests of many people to allow it to be thought that America was tilting toward India, and that was a terribly emotional issue of course, as it has remained since then.

Q: Well did you get any feeling while you were in Islamabad about Ambassador Farland? Were we trading barbs back and forth between our embassy and New Delhi and Islamabad or not?

FULTON: No, no. He came there with the idea of lifting U.S.-Pakistani relations from the depths they were in when he arrived. He had the idea that through force of his personality, he had a forceful personality and was a very gregarious, outgoing person, that he could repair that. I left the country before he did but he left the country with great disappointment, because the first thing that happened on his watch was one of those recurring terrible storms in East Pakistan where thousands, tens of thousands of people’s lives were lost. One hears every several years ago, the worst storm ever and what is now Bangladesh, each storm seems to be worse than the one before, but this was a killer and many lives were lost, and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) was there under Farland’s personal supervision very early, very fast. Without adequate means of distribution on the ground, it didn’t do what we intended. We didn’t control the provincial distribution and there were scandals about the grain that was brought in being sold on the market for exorbitant prices. All those things that happen when you have a disaster. Farland was very disappointed by that. Then of course while he was there, there was the breakup of East and West Pakistan. So when he left Pakistan he was Ambassador to a smaller country than he had arrived. It was a great disappointment.

Q: In Karachi when you were able to talk to people, what were you hearing, and also from your colleagues who had dealt with him before about Bhutto, what were you getting?

FULTON: Well everyone recognized him then as a very shrewd politician. Bhutto was a rich landowner, had his own resources to bring to bear, and at the time (we’re really talking 1970 when the cold war is about as hot as it gets, our involvement in Vietnam, Kissinger planning a secret trip to China) Bhutto was perceived as a very crafty player in power politics between all the major powers, between China and the Soviet Union, the United States, and certainly the United States admired his shrewdness and did not trust him.

Q: Were you picking up stories from your colleagues who were old Pakistani hands about Bhutto?

FULTON: Well, I have summarized the general perception. The stories that built that perception have faded somehow into the distance after thirty years, but yes there were a number of people on the staff who had been in Pakistan before and knew the Bhutto family and recorded some perception on that issue. It was thought to be a mixed blessing for the United States, because here was the United States, as is often the case, caught between the outcome of a democratic election which it didn’t much like and an efficient military government, which it didn’t much
like. And there we are in 1999.

**Q: How about Pakistanis who went to the United States? Was there a significant number of them?**

FULTON: There’s never been the number there has been from India or other places that have a particular attraction for the United States. I knew some Indians and Pakistanis when I was in graduate school, so I had a sense of their culture before I ever got there. There are more similarities than differences, but there are some profound differences as well between the two cultures. Particularly, religious differences, as everyone knows. Several Pakistanis that I came to know while there subsequently traveled to the United States and contacted me after I was in the United States. I stayed in contact with one Pakistani family who, since that time, has spent some time living and working in Texas, and is now back in Pakistan. Both their children were educated in the United States and both are working in the United States. They keep up some ties, but there has not been the large flight out of Pakistan as there has been, for example, from India.

VINCENT W. BROWN  
Deputy Director, USAID  
Lahore (1968-1972)  

Vincent W. Brown was born and raised in the San Francisco area of California. Brown attended UCLA where he received his Bachelor of Science in business administration. Brown was hired by the Marshall Plan in Paris in 1950. In June of 1968, Brown became a fellow at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. He has served in Tunisia, Libya, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan. The interview was conducted by W. Haven North in May of 1997.

**Q: Who was the Director in Pakistan, and whom did you replace as Deputy Director?**

BROWN: Bill Kontos was the Director when I arrived, and I replaced Dr. Ernst Stern as Deputy Director. Bill Kontos only stayed about one year after my arrival and was replaced by Joe Wheeler. Bill Kontos went on to head up the UN mission on the Gaza strip and became an Ambassador in the State Department. I had known Bill Kontos when he was deputy USAID director in Nigeria under Joel Bernstein and I was the Nigeria Desk Officer in Washington. However, we had never worked closely together.

Dr. Ernst Stern, the departing Deputy Director, and I debriefed in the Bois de Boulogne one sunny afternoon in Paris. Ernie was on his way back to Washington, DC and I was en route to Pakistan. Ernie had a brilliant career in AID, and several years later he resigned from USAID and joined the World Bank where he eventually rose to second in command.

Bill Kontos’ replacement as Director in September 1969 was Joe Wheeler. Joe remained at post in Pakistan for over four years. He then went on to become Deputy Administrator of AID, and eventually was elected to the prestigious post of Chairman of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris where he served for several terms.

Q: You were only back in the United States for nine months. What did you and the family think about another overseas assignment?

BROWN: We had always enjoyed our overseas assignments, even tough ones like Zaire. The children were used to the small international schools. I was delighted to be assigned as Deputy Director to a post with a sizable aid program. Also, the Economic Development Institute at Harvard had a long association with the aid program in Pakistan, and some of the Professors who had worked in Pakistan, such as Wally Falcon and Carle Gotch, had very helpful background information to share.

Q: Why were you posted to Lahore, I thought the capital of Pakistan was Islamabad?

BROWN: When I arrived in the summer of 1968, the USAID was in transition. Several years earlier the capital of Pakistan had been transferred from Karachi to the newly created town Islamabad in the Northwestern part of the country -- near Rawalpindi. Initially there was insufficient housing for the diplomatic community and aid missions to transfer to the newly created capital, so USAID headquarters were transferred to Lahore, provincial capital of the Punjab, with part of the staff left in Karachi. By 1968 the situation had changed. Most of the government ministries had been transferred to Islamabad, and the government was pressuring the US government to transfer the USAID headquarters there as well, even though housing was extremely limited.

Q: Did you stay in Lahore for long? Apart from orientation, what were your first tasks as deputy director?

BROWN: We only stayed in Lahore for the summer. After a few weeks orientation, I was assigned the task of preparing the move to Islamabad. This included working with the Pakistan government in Islamabad to find suitable office space, housing for staff, directing the administrative arrangements of the move in stages so that our very busy aid program would not be disrupted. In early Fall, as soon as the executive officer and I could find adequate housing, we moved our families to Islamabad. While the building we contracted for was being built to house the USAID, we rented temporary quarters for the USAID office.

I remember that Françoise and the children were looking forward eagerly to the move. The weather in Lahore had been, humid, dusty and 120 degrees almost every day since our arrival, and Islamabad was 15 to 20 degrees cooler. None of our personal effects, except for the air freight had been unpacked, since we knew we were to move. Even though there was not much in this administrative capital in the early days (Islamabad was declared Pakistan’s official capital in 1967, although they had been working on the infrastructure since 1961), our family took to Islamabad immediately. It was well laid out with wide streets and residential neighborhoods that were well-defined as were the commercial and industrial areas.

Q: What was the size and scope of USAID Pakistan? And in this context what were your duties
as Deputy Director?

BROWN: Pakistan was one of the four or five largest aid missions at the time. We administered a sizable non-project commodity import program, a PL 480 program, a large technical cooperation program, and were responsible for one of the largest portfolios of capital projects in the world. The USAID staff (“Mission personnel” as they were called in those days -- approximately 190 Americans and 490 locals) were distributed between West and East Pakistan (now the independent country of Bangladesh). Provincial offices existed in Lahore, West Pakistan and in Dacca, East Pakistan (3500 miles from headquarters in Islamabad) A small contingent was continued in Karachi which remained the financial and commercial center of Pakistan. I used to go over to Dacca about once a month. Too bad they didn’t have Frequent Flyer miles on Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) in those days.

My duties were simply stated in my job description. The Deputy Director:
1) served as the Director’s alter ego -- spoke and acted on his behalf in all aspects of management of the Mission and its program. Participated fully in all program and policy matters and assumed primary responsibility for day-to-day operating matters.
2) Provided operational supervision and guidance, on behalf of the Director, to the Assistant Directors in Lahore and Dacca as well as the Division Chiefs.
3) Served as Acting Director of Mission during absence of the Director.

Mastering the program was a real challenge. It took a full six months to become familiar with all the aspects -- especially given the concentration during the early months on arranging for the move of the USAID from Lahore to Islamabad, and almost immediately filling in for Director Kontos during his home leave shortly after my arrival. In addition to the headquarters duties we were always traveling to visit our provincial offices. The trip to Dacca (East Pakistan) required a whole day flying across India at its widest part. Later in my stay when East Pakistan was fighting for independence India closed its borders, and we went to Dacca via Sri Lanka. The span of management control was broad. The Deputy Director supervised six Assistant Directors, one Special Assistant, one Regional Legal Advisor, five Division Chiefs and one American Secretary. We tried to keep in close communication with our staff. As a result both the Director and the Deputy Director were almost always traveling. When one was in Islamabad the other was invariably visiting East or West Pakistan. All of the staff under my supervision turned out to be highly experienced and very competent which greatly facilitated my work.

All of the technical cooperation projects, commodity assistance, capital projects, PL 480 food were carried out in close consultation with the Pakistan government. This, of course, was a very important dimension to the work, and helped assure the efficacy of the programs and projects.

Although the work had been started long before my arrival in Pakistan, I should mentioned the success that resulted from the introduction of “Mexi-Pak wheat” in West Pakistan and “IRRI rice” This demanded a tremendous effort, not only in the development of the high yield seeds, but also in teaching indigenous farmers how and when to plant these seeds During my time in Pakistan the results of the introduction of Mexi-Pak wheat (developed in Mexico), and the IRRI rice (developed in the Philippines) were spectacular. Increases in yield of 25 to 30% for the special rice and wheat were commonplace. (The new seeds were also introduced into India with
a huge success, especially in the Punjab.)

Q: You mentioned earlier that Bill Kontos was replaced by Joe Wheeler after the first year. Did this change your working relationship?

BROWN: Joe Wheeler arrived in September 1969. By that time I was very comfortable in my position as Deputy Director. Bill Kontos and I had settled down to a good working relationship and I was sorry to see him leave.

Having said that, Joe Wheeler was in a class by himself -- a marvelous Director. The USAID program prospered during the time he was there. He and I got along exceptionally well. For the remaining three years that I worked for Joe, I sincerely felt that I acted as his alter ego. We understood each other very well, and I had no difficulty grasping his program goals and participating in their successful implementation. Along with my tour of duty in South Korea, these three years constituted one of the high spots of my career in AID.

Q: What was the political situation like at the end of the ‘60s and early ‘70s? I understand their was considerable turmoil.

BROWN: In November 1970 there had been a tremendous flood wiping out much of East Pakistan’s rice crop. General Ayub Khan had resigned and turned over leadership to another military leader, General Yahya. Although AID and other donors made significant food donations under their disaster, the situation remained desperate in the East. The USAID through its PL 480 food program was the largest single donor.

In 1971, East Pakistan was in ferment. The local political party led by a Bengali leader named Mujibur Rahman, began calling for independence. His call had a tremendous response from the impoverished population. Over one million people showed up in downtown Dacca to hear Mujib advocate independence. The West Pakistan government responded by severe military interventions, which further inflamed the population. By September, not only was tension at boiling point between East and West Pakistan, but India leaning heavily in favor of the Bengali’s drive for independence.

By the Fall of 1970, we had upped the amounts of PL 480 food going into East Pakistan and were going all over the country setting up supply depots to facilitate distribution. All economic assistance to Pakistan had been cut off except for humanitarian aid, as the repressive measures from the Central government (i.e. the West) escalated.

I still remember one of my East Pakistan field trips near Chittagong. I had spent a sleepless night on the floor of a guest house in a small town in the interior as the Pakistan army lobbed grenades over the roof into a local market. As we left the next morning for Chittagong, there were rumors of the Bengali rebels placing mines in the road. Our carryall came rapidly around a turn in the road only to see that there were a number round spots in the road about a foot or two in diameter where the asphalt had been dug up. All conversation stopped as we roared over these spots, expecting to hear an explosion as we ran over a mine at any second. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief at the next corner when we spotted the provincial road repair crew. In Dacca, there was a
curfew, but we could hear shooting in the streets every night.

I was fortunate to catch one of the last commercial PIA flights out of Dacca for Islamabad before the militarily closed the airport. I slept on the airport floor the night before departure to be sure I would be there on time for the early morning flight.

In December 1971, East Pakistan succeeded and called itself Bangladesh. As the violence grew, 10 million East Pakistani’s fled to India. India intervened in early December with its army. There were major battles in the Punjab near Lahore. While West Pakistan’s air force held its own against the Indian air force, the Pak army was no match for the superior Indian forces. In 13 days the West Pakistan army was defeated. While most of the USAID and Embassy staff had been evacuated to Afghanistan, our family remained in Islamabad. We watched the bombing of Islamabad’s airport by two jets fighters from India from the terrace of our home.

After the surrender, on December 20, 1971, General Yahya turned the government over to Zulfikar Bhutto, who had been the leader of the opposition party. Since Bhutto was a leader elected by the people, the government was under civilian leadership, and the obvious domination by the military had receded, our development program for Pakistan was soon reinstated and back on track.

Q: Do any other events stand out in your mind?

BROWN: Yes, one involving Henry Kissinger. I believe he had just taken over as Secretary of State a few months prior to his visit. His stopover in Islamabad was the last stop on a trip to the Far East in which he visited Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, India and Pakistan. Joe Wheeler was in the US on consultation, so as Acting Director I was elected to give Kissinger the economic/aid briefing prior to his seeing the Ministers of Plan and Finance the next day.

When he arrived at the USAID directly from the airport, he complained of stomach trouble, and after 15 or 20 minutes of briefing excused himself to go to the Embassy nurse for some medication. Winston Lord was with him. Later that evening I received a call at home advising me that Henry Kissinger had decided to spend a few days at the Government’s Presidential home in the Hindu Kush mountains near the Kashmir frontier to rest up and recuperate. Winston Lord represented him on our visits to the Finance and Planning Ministers. Four days later we were asked to be at the airport to say good-by to Kissinger who had fully recovered. When I shook his hand, I asked how his health was and he replied “splendid” as he bounded up the ramp into the air force plane.

The next morning our Ambassador, Joseph Farland, called a special country team meeting at which he announced that Henry Kissinger had been to China, and had made arrangements for President Nixon to visit. The whole visit had been carried out in great secrecy so that if it had failed no one would have known. Several month earlier Ambassador Farland had gone to Palm Springs, California to see about “selling one of his coal mines”. (He was a political appointee who owned a number of coal mines in West Virginia.) At the country team meeting, he explained that his personal visit to the US was a cover story. He left Pakistan, not knowing why he had been asked to set up this subterfuge. When he arrived at Los Angeles airport he was taken
to Frank Sinatra’s private plane and flown to Palm Springs and taken to Sinatra’s estate. When he arrived, there was Henry Kissinger waiting for him, alone. Ambassador Farland was asked to set up Kissinger’s secret visit to China via President Yahya. (Pakistan had had excellent relations with China since independence.)

So it was prearranged that when Kissinger arrived in Islamabad, he would pretend to be sick, and would be taken up the Pakistan president’s mountain retreat to rest up and recover. Actually, early the next morning under cover of darkness he was taken in a government car to Islamabad airport. The car drove into one of the hangars where he got into a PIA 707 jet and flew to Beijing. When they came back, they landed at the US air force base in Peshawar (about 90 miles from Islamabad), and he was helicoptered back to the mountain retreat from which he publicly exited the next day. Counting the arrival and departure days, four days had elapsed. We all know, of course, that shortly after President Nixon carried out his historic visit to China.

Q: How did the aid program survive with all of this political upheaval, and the suspension of economic aid for a time?

BROWN: We were very fortunate in that the permanent civil service, both at federal and provincial level, was very understanding, and did its best to keep the various projects moving during the suspension of aid. So although there was considerable upheaval at the political level, the permanent civil service, who were quite competent, remained at their posts. The dialogue never stopped, and the aid funding that was in the pipeline was permitted to continue. Our technical cooperation consultants, teachers, extension agents, and investment advisors continued to be welcome, although most of the programs were either slowed down significantly or put on hold. As mentioned above the humanitarian assistance (e.g. PL 480 food) was never stopped.

Our aid office in Dacca converted from the East Pakistan Provincial office to USAID Dacca in Bangladesh. While the staff on the USAID side stayed about the same, there was much more of a shakeup in the civil service since many of the senior personnel serving in Dacca were from West Pakistan and had to be repatriated. Many of the replacements in Dacca were Bengali’s who had been working as part of the Pakistan Federal Civil service in Islamabad. They resigned in order to return home, and serve their country.

Q: While Pakistan was one of our priority countries for many years and many positive things have happened from a development standpoint, its political record has not been outstanding. What are some of the lessons to be learned?

BROWN: Although Pakistan received only limited physical structures at independence (the colonial capital being New Delhi, which went to India), one of the most important legacies from the British was a trained civil service, and an educated elite capable of running the country. Also the basic infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems in the Punjab, railroads and ports were already in place. English was widely spoken, and widely used, along with Urdu, in the running of the government. This heritage was an enormous help in running the newly independent country.

USAID Pakistan was blessed by a succession of talented Directors, such as Maury Williams, and Joe Wheeler who both went on to become deputy Administrators of AID, and successive
Chairmen of the multi-national development assistance committee (DAC) at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris.

Probably, our greatest contribution was in the field of agriculture. Tremendous efforts were made to help modernize (electrify) the irrigation system in the Punjab -- Pakistan’s breadbasket. Major training programs were launched and successfully carried out to train Pakistan’s agricultural extension services. They would play a major role in the introduction of the Mexi-Pak wheat and the IRRI rice along with the use of fertilizer. Both of the new varieties produced spectacular increases in production -- around 30 to 40% increase in yield. Major programs were introduced to help the Pakistan provincial and federal governments cope with the growing problem of salinization by convincing the farmers to dig and/or pay for the supporting drainage ditches on their land.

Pakistan had one of the largest loan portfolio’s in AID. These low interest long term loans helped jump-start the chemical industries to produce fertilizers and pesticides, and many other basic factories. Commodity import programs helped provide the raw materials needed for these activities. On the technical assistance side, substantial help was provided to the Pakistani business community. Business loan programs were set up in the provinces to expand the industrial/business base beyond the port city of Karachi.

During my years in Pakistan, we were careful to jointly finance our development programs Not only was there substantial Pakistani technical/management input in each project design, we insisted that they also share in the financing of the activity -- largely with their payment of most of the local currency expenditures. I believe this helped assure the continued success and financing by the Pakistanis when the levels of US assistance began to decline; essentially, because they considered the projects their own.

Another breakthrough was in the area of Family Planning. Even though there was significant initial and continuing reluctance because of the Muslim orientation. a major program was started which made a good start in reaching the feminine population. While the overall progress has not been spectacular, it did demonstrate that it was possible to make some inroads in family planning in a Muslim country. For example, family planning and training for female family planning field workers was introduced -- a significant breakthrough.

Rural Development represented another area of concentration. In the Northwest Frontier province (in Peshawar) a Rural Development Institute was founded. Cooperatives were encouraged for farm workers and for starting small businesses. Much progress was made in encouraging the start of small businesses in the rural areas and providing low-interest, long term loans. Prior to the small loan program, the farmer or prospective entrepreneur had to go to the “village money lender” for his loan (10 to 20% per month). When I left 1972, both the programs in West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) were well launched and doing well.

Q: Before we leave Pakistan, how did your wife and family like it there?

BROWN: All of us really enjoyed Pakistan, and living in Islamabad in particular. There was an excellent international school with an US curriculum. Our two sons enjoyed it. Our eldest Chris
was student body president and Greg played center on the touch football team. Valerie was in primary school and we felt that her teachers were excellent. The two boys took to the culture and had a number of Pakistani friends who went to the international school. Zulfikar Bhutto’s children went to the International School and our two boys were often invited over to the Bhutto’s for a swim. They told us that Bhutto always found time during the day to talk to his children and bring them up to date on his political activities. Chris and Greg learned to speak Urdu.

Françoise was very busy. As the wife of the Deputy Director, she had considerable social entertainment responsibilities -- i.e. preparing official lunches, dinners, and receptions. We had many official visitors to USAID/Islamabad, and when Joe Wheeler was away we would do the necessary entertaining. In addition since we were both fluent in French we were often invited to dinners at the Ambassadors. We had a beautiful new home with a rose garden that Françoise planted as well as gardeners, guards, servants. Françoise also worked with a group that helped handicapped Pakistani children. She was active in the international woman’s club and participated in many joint activities with the Pakistani woman’s club.

In April 1972, I was transferred next door to USAID Kabul as Deputy Director to replace Victor Skiles (who had already left). It was understood that I would replace Bart Harvey as Director in Afghanistan after his departure in late Fall.

PETER D. CONSTABLE
Political Officer and Deputy Principal Officer
Lahore (1968-1970)

India-Pakistan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1971-1972)

Office Director for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan
Washington, DC (1973-1976)

Deputy Chief of Mission
Islamabad (1976-1979)

Ambassador Peter D. Constable was born in New York State in 1932 and received his bachelor's degree from Hamilton college. He earned his graduate degree from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in 1957. After joining the foreign service, he served in Vigo, Tegucigalpa, and Lahore. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 17, 1990.

Q: What attracted you? You obviously applied and took Hindi, Urdu training from 1967 to '68. Why there? What were you getting about the subcontinent? Because NEA seemed so concentrated on the Arab-Israeli problem that one always suspects that the subcontinent doesn't quite get the attention maybe.
CONSTABLE: It often seems like that, because there is so much focus on the Arab-Israeli dispute, but there are a lot of people in the bureau who are dedicated full-time to the South Asian problems.

I'd only been in the bureau about two days when war broke out between India and Pakistan, the '65 War. And so, inevitably, I got involved in (just in reading as papers crossed my desk) a lot about the subcontinent and got interested in it. I had done reading on my own about India and Pakistan, which I found interesting before.

One of the things I had had in mind when I came over to NEA as Staff Assistant was that I might go on to some posting in South Asia. As I looked around, I realized there were a lot of people interested in it at that time, probably more so then than is the case now, and that the sure route to getting an assignment as a Political Officer in South Asia was to take the language training.

Q: Speaking of the '65 War, did you have any feel at that time within the bureau... How did the people within the bureau feel about the war? Were they siding with India or Pakistan or saying, "Oh, my God, a plague on both your houses?" What did you feel that the attitude was?

CONSTABLE: Some of this may be retrospective reflection, really, rather than feelings I had at the time, because I was so green and probably wasn't sensitive to all the nuances at the time.

Q: I also think that there was almost a visceral feeling that the Indians got on our nerves.

CONSTABLE: Well, you had Krishna Menon running around, and he certainly did get on everybody's nerves.

Q: Krishna Menon was the Minister of Defense at the time and a very outspoken anti-American.

CONSTABLE: He enjoyed nothing more than twisting our tail in as nasty a way as he could think to do.

Q: Until he got his comeuppance.
CONSTABLE: That's right. But it was deeper than that. It involved our view of the Soviet Union, our view of China, India's view of those countries, views of the Third World. There were a whole series of issues in which we and India simply did not view things through the same prism.

Q: I have you going to Lahore from 1968 to '71. What were you doing there?

CONSTABLE: We had a consulate general there, and I was the Political Officer on the consulate staff and also the Deputy Principal Officer. The fun part of what I did was the political side. Lahore is located in the Punjab, and the Punjab is really the major province in Pakistan.

Q: Lahore is very close to the Khyber Pass and that area.

CONSTABLE: No, it's really quite south of that. It's right next to the Indian border, about 20 miles from the Indian border in the heart of the Punjab. The Punjab is the most populous province in what is now Pakistan, so it was a key political center. Islamabad was a brand new, artificial capitol, so the embassy was really rather isolated. They didn't have many people up there to talk to.

Q: They'd just moved up from Karachi.

CONSTABLE: They'd just moved up from Karachi, so they were way off in an isolated hinterland. In that particular period, I think the political work done by the consulates was especially important because it was very hard for Islamabad to stay in touch.

Q: What was the situation in Pakistan in this period?

CONSTABLE: Field Marshal Ayub had been President for ten years in a rather authoritarian government, which he characterized as democratic. But the election process was a contentious one in the indirect election process, in which there were real constraints on the opposition. His leading opponent at the time that I arrived in Pakistan was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and then Mujib in East Pakistan.

Everybody thought that Ayub's government was quite stable, but there were some things going on underneath the surface that erupted shortly after I reached Lahore. Some of these were fallouts from the '65 War, which was something of a psychological disaster, a political disaster for Pakistan and for the leadership in Pakistan.

It was after that war that Bhutto broke with Ayub. Bhutto himself may have been as responsible as anybody for the major error that Pakistan made in starting that war, goading Ayub into doing it. But he managed to walk away from it, dropping all of the blame on Ayub, and he himself came out rather clean in a bit of an heroic posture, which he then used to exploit against Ayub.

The process of street demonstrations started in Pakistan. The most important ones were in Lahore and in Dacca in East Pakistan. Eventually, after three or four months of this, they brought
Ayub down in a military coup and led to another whole new process, which ended with the separation of East Pakistan and the war with India in ’71.

Q: How did we see the situation, as you saw our operations there, the political thing?

CONSTABLE: We had a political Ambassador at the time, a very fine man.

Q: Joseph S. Farland?

CONSTABLE: No, at first in ’68 it was Benjamin Oehlert. He felt very strongly that his mission there was to support Ayub. Now I think others would have defined our relationship with Pakistan as the thing that we wanted to preserve and promote in some way. But he interpreted this as a commitment to an individual, to the then-President Ayub. So he was increasingly distressed as Ayub was weakened and eventually brought down. I think others of us tended to see that not so much as tragedy, the end of Ayub. But other problems that came in the wake of that were serious problems: the divisions between East and West Pakistan, which eventually led to the secession and the war with India, but that our policy should not have been hinged on one man. Not that there were serious consequences of that, because, as in so many situations where a leader is brought down by the will of his own people, the revolt of his own people, there was very little we could do about it.

Q: You were now in the Nixon Administration.

CONSTABLE: ’68 was the end of the Johnson Administration. Oehlert had been sent there by Johnson. He used to say that Johnson had told him when he went out there to take care of Ayub.

Q: I think Ayub had given him quite a welcome as Vice President at one time.

CONSTABLE: Yes, Americans were...

Q: Camel driver [?]

CONSTABLE: Yes, exactly. Americans were very fond of Ayub. Ayub was quite a distinguished-looking person, spoke forcefully, stood ramrod straight, and spoke a language that was music to the ears of American political leaders. He was anti-Soviet and a good military type.

Q: I’m a little confused. Ayub came down when?

CONSTABLE: Early ’69.

Q: When did the war come about that separated Bangladesh?

CONSTABLE: Not until ’71. But it all flowed from this event as the political life opened up with the collapse of Ayub, even though there was a martial law administration.

The martial law administration was regarded as a rather weak one. General Yaya promised
political reforms and democratic elections, which indeed were held in '70. And they were free and fair, as nearly as anybody could tell.

But the results were a political disaster, because Mujib, the Awami League, won a massive victory in East Pakistan. I think they won all the seats but one.

And Bhutto emerged as the largest vote-getter in West Pakistan, although he probably would not have had a majority. I can't recall the figures now, but anyway he was clearly the leading political figure in West Pakistan.

A struggle for dominance of the center in Islamabad by the Awami League began. The West Pakistanis had always dominated the central government. The East Pakistanis had regarded this as disadvantageous to them. By winning a majority, Mujib had had a majority for the center. But there was great consternation in West Pakistan, because, for the first time in the brief history of that country, the West Pakistanis were going to have to subsidize the East. In the past, it had worked the other way.

Q: Here you are in Lahore, you're in West Pakistan. In the first place, how did you view Bhutto, you, personally, but also the consulate general? You were reporting on this man.

CONSTABLE: I think, with some suspicion. I will say that we did not realize how popular Bhutto had become out in the boondocks, how forcefully his message had been received by peasants who were going to vote for the first time. To some extent we accepted the view that old feudal patterns would still prevail when the votes were finally counted, that even though elections were ostensibly fair, the influence of landlords over their tenants would still be very strong in the polling place.

As it turned out, that wasn't true at all. They completely ignored the views of the landlords and voted for Bhutto as a political revolutionary who was going to change land tenure systems, abolish feudalism, abolish the great industrialists who controlled so much of the wealth of the country. He campaigned with a revolutionary message, and it took. He won a stunning victory in the Punjab.

Q: We had looked upon Pakistan as being a rather firm ally to us and our anti-Soviet stance. Was there the feeling that here was somebody who would not be as strong? Were we doing anything maybe not to change the thing at the time?

CONSTABLE: No. There was a lot of concern about Bhutto being too opportunistic, too antagonistic to India, perhaps a little bit too slippery. But I don't think there was fundamental concern that he would lead Pakistan away from a relationship with the United States that we valued. The concern about him was not so much in foreign policy terms but in the quality of the man.

Q: Was there any feeling of almost localitis -- there you were sitting in a major post in West Pakistan, and things were happening in Dacca, in Bangladesh, which was Bengali, which was almost a thousand miles on the other side of..., separated -- that there were completely different
dynamics over there? Was there much interaction between our two posts or not?

CONSTABLE: There was a lot, and I credit the embassy for being very open this way. Even though initially when I was first there and there was agitation against Ayub, Ambassador Oehlert was less than pleased about the kind of reporting that was coming from the consulates, because we were predicting that Ayub would go under.

Oehlert didn't see it that way and really didn't like that going to Washington. But he didn't do anything to stop it, to his credit. He came down and talked to us and tried to argue his case with us, but he didn't interfere with the reporting. Subsequently, when we changed Ambassadors and the martial law regime...

Q: The new Ambassador was Joseph S. Farland.

CONSTABLE: There was a tremendous amount of interaction between the consulates and the embassy. There was a regular process of having Political Officers and principal officers from the constituent posts go up to Islamabad, meet with the country team and thrash through the issues. All the reporting from the consulates was shared with each other, so that we had full access to what they were saying from Dacca, what that point of view was. I thought that part of the operation was very good, it was really excellent.

It wasn't until '71, when Yahya ordered a military crackdown in East Pakistan, that the harmony within the country team began to fly apart, because the perspective from Dacca became dramatically different from the view of the embassy.

Q: Were you there at the time?

CONSTABLE: Yes. The crackdown started in March of '71. I left the post in May of '71 and then came back to Washington on the Pakistan desk, so I was still working on it.

Q: Who was our Consul General?

CONSTABLE: At the time of the crackdown it was Arch Blood. And he stayed sometime into the summer, I think.

Q: Was there the feeling that gee, he's coming from where you were or something, he's gone too local or not, or is it...?

CONSTABLE: I think they felt that in the embassy. And I think they felt that back in Washington, that he had taken, that the consulate and the reporting had taken too pro-Bengali a view, which I don't quite agree with. They felt very strongly that what the Pakistanis were doing, one, would be unsuccessful, would ruin the country and therefore was not in the U.S. interest and, two, that it was barbaric, and they were really shocked by what was happening there.

Q: It was very brutal putdown.
CONSTABLE: It was terrible.

Q: I've seen pictures of people being killed and being beheaded in the streets. Now, this was a peculiar country anyway, two parts divided by a thousand miles by essentially a hostile country.

CONSTABLE: Held together by an airline.

Q: Which flew over hostile territory. Was there the feeling that the United States should do everything they can (I'm talking about the people you were dealing with), that we really have to hold this thing together, or saying, you know, this is going to go, this is never going to hold?

CONSTABLE: Views were really quite different, and they operated on a number of levels. I'm not sure the different levels entirely understood the views of the other levels and why they were held the way they were.

But the time was 1971, and we were in a period of domestic uproar over Vietnam and Cambodia, a feeling that the United States was somehow over-committed around the world, and that we were sticking our nose into things and we shouldn't be, and that we should be in a period of retraction, get out of Vietnam and bury our heads in the sand. Some of this affected our people around the world.

Prior to the actual crackdown, when there was a period of negotiation going on between politicians in East and West Pakistan, the embassy's view generally was that we should stay out of this, let them settle their own hash, and that no vital American interests were involved in this. We argued from Lahore that it wouldn't cost much for us to involve ourselves in a low-level way.

Q: Doing what?

CONSTABLE: Talking to leaders on both sides to see if there was any kind of a mediation that might help them to get to a political settlement and reach agreement on a continuation of a united Pakistan, but with some modifications for greater autonomy for the provinces, some formula like that. Formulas which were being discussed and which came close to success, but didn't quite make it.

But the embassy and indeed the department didn't accept that view. And even in East Pakistan, our people felt that we should just keep our nose out of this.

I think, in retrospect, we should have had our nose in it, because once the separation became a serious problem and there was a military crackdown, there was a furor in the Congress.

Henry Kissinger's view of this was not so much that a united Pakistan was important to us, but that we had very important incipient relations with China that were involved in what happened to Pakistan.

Pakistan was China's oldest and closet friend. They were one of the first to recognize the
Communist regime and had developed a very close relationship with China. That was important to China.

Henry Kissinger saw what was important to China as being important to us if we were going to develop any kind of relationship with China. We had to persuade the Chinese that we understood their interests and could support some of their interests elsewhere in the world, and that there would be a value in having a relationship with us.

But this was not understood in the department, because it was not articulated at all. Henry was running his own Pakistan policy over in the White House.

Q: He was at that time our National Security Advisor.

CONSTABLE: He was the NSC Advisor and Bill Rogers was Secretary of State. He was feeling this constant heat from the Hill and from the press: Why are we supporting Pakistan? Why haven't we cut off all arms shipments to them? Why haven't we cut off all assistance to them? Here they are butchering Bengalis in Dacca, and you're carrying on. India, in any event, is the important country in South Asia. They're opposed to what's happening in Pakistan and yet we're kicking them in the groin. Why are we doing these things?

Henry was not in a position at that point, because up until August he hadn't even visited China, they were just trying to get something...

Q: So behind the scenes there was this using Pakistan in order to get us into China, and actually it did work that way.

CONSTABLE: It did work that way, yes. None of us could understand what the hell was going on really. Why was Henry so determined to tilt towards Pakistan?

Q: This was a very famous phrase, wasn't it?

CONSTABLE: Yes, a phrase he used in an NSC meeting that was then leaked to the press.

Q: That we were going to tilt towards Pakistan and yet we had, you might say, bigger fish to fry. But it still poisons the well as far as India's concerned today.

CONSTABLE: To some extent I suppose it does.

Q: At least it's always there.

CONSTABLE: On that level you had a strategic concern about the breakup of Pakistan. Not so much for what the breakup per se was going to do to Pakistan or to our interests, it was the way it happened, and how it happened, and how could this be managed so that what Nixon and Kissinger were trying to do with China would not be damaged.

And I must say they handled it brilliantly. They tilted a bit towards Pakistan. We weren't
shipping them any arms of any consequence, and before the war broke out we really had closed the pipeline down entirely.

We made an attempt to see if there was any way to mediate between Yahya and Mujib, who was in jail in Calcutta. That collapsed in the course of the months that we were trying to do it, to see if there could be a peaceful resolution.

When that was impossible, we tried to get the Indians to hold back and not invade East Pakistan. That was not successful. As anyone could have foreseen, the Indians cleaned up East Pakistan fairly quickly and liberated Bangladesh. The issue then was would they invade West Pakistan.

I don't know to this day what the Indian intentions were. There was an intelligence report floating around that there had been a Cabinet discussion of launching an attack on Pakistan and ending the threat from the Pakistanis once and for all.

Henry Kissinger seized on this and later claimed that he was convinced that that was the intention of the Indian government. I think it wasn't so clear. But he then went into a kind of diplomatic tour de force of warning the Indians off from this, sending the Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal...

Q: *The Enterprise being our nuclear carrier.*

CONSTABLE: And also (although I'm not sure of this) warning the Soviets against any further Indian attacks against Pakistan. The upshot was a cease fire and the end of the war.

Now, all of this, I'm convinced, was done for the purpose of assuring the Chinese that we took their interests in South Asia seriously.

After the war, Shulzberger went to China. (He was a pundit for *The New York Times.*) He went to China, and he also visited in Pakistan.

In the meantime, the Yahya government, defeated by India, collapsed and Bhutto came into power in Pakistan.

But Shulzberger did a column in *The New York Times,* which I thought was quite fascinating. Bhutto told Shulzberger that the United States saved Pakistan by warning the Indians off from an attack against the West. And how did he know this? The Chinese told him. The article doesn't say how the Chinese knew, but one suspects that Henry told them.

So it was a very brilliantly constructed policy. But it was a hidden-hand kind of policy, and it was very difficult for the people who were working in the vineyards to understand what was going on and why, and why the moves were constructed the way they were. And not just difficult for us, it was difficult for the Congress and for the press because none of this was articulated, or could be articulated. It would have been blown out of the water.

Q: *You were back in Washington on the desk by this time. You were...*
CONSTABLE: Just in the dark. We went on doing our business. We ran from our office the effort to do a mediation between Yahya and Mujib. We wrote the telegrams on that, the instructions and so on. But we didn't understand how they fit into a larger view. And we really didn't understand very well why there was such a pronounced tilt towards Pakistan.

Q: That's fascinating. Well, you came back in spring of '71, and you were then, I suppose, probably immediately co-opted onto the desk, weren't you?

CONSTABLE: Right, I'd come back to go on the desk.

Q: The desk was India-Pakistan desk?

CONSTABLE: There were two different offices: an India-Nepal-Sri Lanka office and a Pakistan-Afghanistan office. Subsequently, that became Pakistan-Afghanistan-Bangladesh office.

Q: From that vantage point, you were there from '71 to '72, how did you see the threat of the Soviet Union in that area, including Afghanistan?

CONSTABLE: In that period we saw it as not terribly great. The one element in the Soviet threat that was important to us was the Soviet relationship with India. That was formalized in the summer of '71 in a friendship treaty. Not that anybody thought that India was going to go Communist or become a handmaiden for the Soviets, but we didn't like the relationship with the Soviets. And we didn't like it when they formalized that in a treaty relationship. And, in general, we didn't like lots of elements of Indian foreign policy that seemed to us to be too close to the Soviets.

Q: If I recall, at the time India was not... Part of this time I was in Saigon and the Indians were part of the ICC, International...

CONSTABLE: We didn't like the role they played there I don't believe.

Q: We always felt that at least there were the Poles, the Indians, and the Canadians, and we felt at least we knew where the Poles were. But the Indians pretended to be neutral and yet they were very pro-Soviet. Did you feel any conflict, internally in the Near East, in dealing with South Asia on the thing? I mean did you have Indianists and Pakistaniists?

CONSTABLE: To some extent we did, yes. Although in '71, people were so appalled by what the Pakistanis were doing in East Pakistan that we all became a little bit anti-Pakistan in that period and a little more pro-India. India got the ten million refugees, and we were sympathetic to that dilemma. But our biggest problem was this different views at different levels, and our inability to comprehend what the rationale was that was driving the Kissinger part of the government, which was in control of policy.

Q: You were at a juncture where one could feel the tremors, the difference between Rogers and
Kissinger, too, weren't you?

CONSTABLE: This became a junior feud in terms of military supply policy. After the '65 War when we embargoed arms sales to both India and Pakistan (it was more important in the Pakistan case, because we had been a principal supplier to Pakistan up to that point), we had restored some military sales to Pakistan.

It was a very modest program, and we weren't all that important to them. Certain kinds of spare parts were key, because we had supplied airplanes to them and so on. They had long since turned to China and to international markets as their major suppliers.

But when the trouble started and the crackdown occurred in East Pakistan, there was a huge hue and cry from the Congress and from the press: Why are we supplying any arms to these butchers? And it was a good question.

Rogers wanted to shut down any arms sales to Pakistan. And Kissinger was opposed. This went on for months and months. Rogers ostensibly prevailed and turned off any new sales.

Then there was the issue of the pipeline. He would say nothing was leaving, then The New York Times would discover some ship had sailed out of Baltimore Harbor loaded with arms for Pakistan. This was a lesson to me on how hard it is to control something within our government.

Nevertheless, the policy still allowed for certain limited sales. Rogers kept driving at this, and driving at this, and driving at this, trying to get this shut down. And Henry kept resisting, and resisting, and resisting. We were caught in the middle and not comprehending why the resistance was so great from the White House.

So I think the most important service that I did to Rogers and to Joe Sisco, who was then Assistant Secretary, was to figure out some tricky little way that we could close down the remaining things that we were shipping to Pakistan without getting the Pakistanis too mad at us.

Q: How did you do this?

CONSTABLE: Oh, I can't remember. It was a letter that I think Rogers sent to Yahya explaining why we had to do this and trying to put the best light on it. It was a drafting exercise, essentially, but the Pakistanis took it in good grace. What we were cutting off at that point was very marginal. So we were able to finally say, and it satisfied Rogers, that we were not shipping any more military equipment to Pakistan.

Q: You'll have to remind me on the dates. When did Nixon make the announcement that he'd gone over to China?

CONSTABLE: That Kissinger had gone. You see, Kissinger went in August of '71. He flew secretly from Pakistan to Beijing. Nobody knew he'd done it until he got back and announced it a few days later, and at that time announced that Nixon would be going in January. Now if we hadn't been so dense, it was at that point that we should have understood a little bit better exactly
Q: I was going to ask, the light bulb did not really go on?

CONSTABLE: The light bulb went on in a sense, but I don't think any of us really quite got our arms around the whole rationale that Kissinger felt, and Nixon felt, it was important to somehow satisfy Pakistan's Chinese interest in Pakistan through this period. I don't think we saw all of that -- the little maneuvers that were never explained, the tilt towards Pakistan. Some elements of it still were hard to rationalize during this period.

Q: Also, isn't there a certain amount of style, at least from what I've heard, that Henry Kissinger enjoyed doing this thing? I mean it was a constant thing.

CONSTABLE: Yes, I suppose. Although I think he really did feel that he had to play a hidden hand here, while temperamentally that was his inclination anyway. But I think in this instance he was right, that to have stated the rationale, revealed the rationale, he'd have been blown right out of the water. And Nixon maybe would never have gotten to China. It would have been seen in the Congress and in the press as a very high price to pay for a toast in the Great Hall of the People. It was a very difficult policy to get through.

Q: Well then, to move on. We're obviously going to come back to this area. You went to the War College from 1972 to '73. In this time, without going into all the particulars, did you notice a difference in attitude between the military men above the Colonel level, who were on their way up? Did they understand the State Department and how we operated, diplomatic things? I'm saying this in context of the misunderstanding we've had in recent weeks about the diplomatic role in our little invasion into Panama, which was militarily fairly well done, diplomatically an absolute disaster. I'm just thinking about your view of the military mind and the State Department mind.

CONSTABLE: There were very pronounced and sharp differences. The military population in the War College, by and large, were people who had no experience of any kind in the international arena. They might have served in Germany as part of forces committed under NATO, but unless they had done staff work in some international organization or the JCS, I think they had a very limited world view.

They tended to be rather hawkish, quite defensive about Vietnam at that time, disturbed by the way Vietnam was ending, understandably. State Department people were quite dovish in that period. Therefore, their views and the views of the military at the War College were quite divergent on a lot of foreign policy issues.

The dialogue was not always (sometimes it was) a terribly sophisticated one, because the background that the military people brought to the discussion was too limited.

This was a real difference that I noticed later in my career, particularly when I started doing the peacekeeping thing in the Middle East, that American officers who reached the Colonel level very often are there with no experience at all in any kind of international environment or affairs.
Whereas those in the British Army, Norwegians, Europeans, generally, had had quite a different experience and arrive at the Colonel level with a much greater degree of sophistication about foreign affairs than Americans do.

Q: I think this is true. Also, most Foreign Service officers, certainly of our generation, have had a good, solid injection of military, albeit maybe at the enlisted ranks, but they have served in the military and have some idea of the military. Whereas the American military just does not have, generally, any feel, and it causes real problems in having dialogues I think.

CONSTABLE: That is true, that is true. I don't know quite how this played out in the example you just cited of Panama and the diplomatic snafus in Panama, but the one thing that always struck me about the military is they accept, in principle and fervently, the notion of civilian command, that their orders come from a civilian chain: the President, Secretary of Defense, and so on.

For Foreign Service officers, Ambassadors dealing with military on the country team, or Deputy Assistant Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries dealing with people in the Pentagon, it's a tremendous advantage that they understand civilian authority and accept it. Civilians don't always know how to use that and how to convey that to the military.

I had a friend who always said that if you want to really convey something to the military, put it in writing, because they not only respect civilian authority, but they respect the written word. Q: We have a tendency to give our instructions almost by indirection.

CONSTABLE: Yes, indeed, we're always clear.

Q: This is the diplomatic style. Well now, you came right back. You certainly had your concentration in the area we're talking about, the subcontinent. After the War College, I have you from '73 to '76 as the office Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. What was the situation there at that time, the '73 to '76 period? The Nixon Administration, Vietnam, fell in that period, and the United States was reeling a bit from world commitments.

CONSTABLE: Yes, indeed, indeed. Things were settling down in South Asia after the '71 War. West Pakistan seemed to be pulling itself together under Bhutto's leadership, and with a good deal of support from us. In Bangladesh, the worst disasters were being avoided, again with massive assistance from the U.S., primarily in food.

An interesting political change in East Pakistan, in Bangladesh, was occurring, which in some ways made things easier. After the flush of liberation, the more natural concerns began to play themselves out, and the Bengalis began to resist Indian influence. One way for them to do this was to reconcile themselves with Pakistan and, through Pakistan, the rest of the Islamic world. And that was very good for Pakistani morale.

In, I think it was '74, Mujib flew from Dacca to Lahore to an Islamic conference meeting with Bhutto. It was a reconciliation, which one could not have expected in such a short time. It was an amazing turnaround. But it was good both for the Bengalis and for the Pakistanis. The Indians
were licking their wounds after we had kicked them around in '71, but things were gradually getting better, and some of those wounds were healing.

It was not a period of great activism for U.S. policy in South Asia. Things began to unravel a little bit in Afghanistan in ways that we did not fully understand. The monarchy was abolished, and a member of the King's family declared a republic, and so President Daoub [STATIC]. And this was to come back and haunt us later when the King himself was thrown out in the Communist coup. What we understood, but didn't necessarily fully appreciate what the ramifications would be, was that with the abolition of the monarchy went probably the only Afghan institution that was capable of reaching or covering such disparate ethnic and tribal elements in Afghanistan.

Kissinger, by then Secretary of State, continued to have a very warm place in his heart for Pakistan. And we had to deal with, again, one of the aftermath issues from the '71 War.

Secretary Rogers had succeeded, finally, in closing down the military supply relationship. I think all of us who worked on Pakistan issues felt that that was not a suitable policy for us to be pursuing. Not that we wanted to stimulate an arms race in South Asia, but Pakistan was a friend, and that we should open it up a bit, which we succeeded in doing, I think it was in '75.

But at about the same time a new issue loomed on the horizon, which came to dominate our relationships with Pakistan over the next three years -- that was Pakistan's nuclear program.

The Indians had in '74 exploded a nuclear devise. This was a terrifying thing to the Pakistanis, whose security concerns revolved mostly on what they perceived as a threat from India. For the Indians not only to have an overwhelming advantage in conventional weapons, but to supplement that with a nuclear capability was, indeed, genuinely terrifying to Pakistan.

So Bhutto vowed that they would do whatever they could to duplicate India's capability. I think nobody took that too seriously initially, because Pakistan was not believed to have the resources or scientific capability or financial resources to pull off a program like this. Again, we underestimated them very seriously, because they went at it hammer and tong.

By various feats of chicanery and some smart diplomacy, they set into train a two-pronged program: one, to reach a nuclear explosive capability by way of reprocessing plutonium and, two, by uranium enrichment.

The plutonium reprocessing plan was well known, because that was dependent on assistance from the French. The French had agreed to build a plutonium reprocessing plant in Pakistan.

We became concerned about that capability. There was no real reason to reprocess plutonium in Pakistan except for weapons capability. Pakistan had a reactor in Karachi, a Canadian-built reactor, which would produce plutonium to [?], then had to be reprocessed in order to be useful in building the bomb.

So we started working on the Pakistanis, in various diplomatic representations, to cancel that
reprocessing program. And we started working on the French.

The Congress got very interested in this issue and passed legislation that would require the U.S. government to cut off assistance to Pakistan, economic and military assistance to any country that developed a reprocessing capability. So we were in that kind of a bind with the Pakistanis.

The dialogue went on for a couple of years with the Pakistanis and with the French. Ultimately, the French were persuaded that the only rationale for this was for a bomb, a nuclear bomb in Pakistan, and they canceled the contract with the Pakistanis.

In the meantime, under the pressure of the Symington amendment, we were obliged to cut off economic and military assistance to Pakistan. This came later. I'm really getting ahead of myself to when I was in Pakistan, back in Pakistan in '77.

Q: Was there anybody in the State Department saying: After all, if the Indians have got the capability, the Pakistanis certainly need this for stability?

CONSTABLE: I don't think anybody said that they need it or that it was desirable. There were lots of people who said initially: Well, this can't be serious. They may be trying it; they'll never make it. They don't have the capability to do it.

That was certainly, I think, Kissinger's view at the beginning, that this can't be serious. I don't know his innermost thoughts on this, but he didn't like the issue and wished it had never come up, I do know that. There were many arguments about how we should deal with it, but I don't recall anyone ever suggesting that: Oh well, it's ok.

Q: Was there any way of trying to work on the Indians to do anything, or was the cat out of the bag?

CONSTABLE: Yes, yes, we did. We did. We did, but it was not easy. And, in fact, I felt that the Indian position was just awful on this. They saw us working over the Pakistanis and trying to beat them, the Pakistani program. And their attitude was: Well, we don't concern ourselves with that.

And it was the most cynical sort of policy -- of course they were concerned. But they were just happy to have us do all the beating.

We tried it from different directions: Well, we aren't going to get anywhere bilaterally with Pakistan, we need to do this in a South Asian context. We need to get India and Pakistan to have some kind of a mutual stand down. The Pakistanis were willing to entertain that kind of a policy (or so they said). It never got very far, so they were never completely tested on this.

But the Indian view was, and not surprisingly: Well, we're not concerned about Pakistan, we're concerned about China. China's got a nuclear capability and missiles that will reach us, but, by the way, our program is entirely peaceful. But we're not going to make a bilateral stand down
deal with Pakistan. If you can get China in it, we might be interested.

Q: Well, in this period, I take it, outside of this issue, relations with India were not particularly warm, close, or proper.

CONSTABLE: No, but they weren't bad. They were a little better than proper. I think, a couple of hard knocks with the Indians... The Indians got a little more realistic about us and wanted to improve relationships. And so, on certain specific issues, we probably made more progress with the Indians at a time when relations on a political level weren't very close or very warm. We did more real business with them than we had previously.

Q: With Bangladesh, was it the view that this was a basket case, or that we do what we can, but this is going to be a minus in whoever tangles with this problem, because of its economic problems?

CONSTABLE: Well, yes, I mean that it was going to cost money. In that sense it was a minus, because there was nothing much to be gained. We had no great strategic interest in Bangladesh, political axes to grind or objectives to promote there. It was a humanitarian issue, essentially, but on a scale that was important to us. We could not stand back and watch 75 million Bengalis starve, go though that kind of a wretched process.

So we did crank up a very substantial relief and assistance effort there, which continues to this day. Although I must say they've made remarkable progress towards self-sufficiency and food. They're not there, probably not close to it, but they have increased their rice and wheat production enormously over this period. So it's been money well spent.

Henry said, "Bangladesh will be a basket case, but it won't be our basket case." Of course he was wrong. It has inevitably become ours.

Q: Well then, in 1976 you went to Islamabad in Pakistan as Deputy Chief of Mission. Your Ambassador was...

CONSTABLE: Henry Byroade for the first year and then Arthur Hummel.

Q: So you had two real professionals.

CONSTABLE: Two real professionals. Couldn't have been more different styles, but they were marvelous people.

Q: How did they use you, and how did you see these two men, because these were important people?

CONSTABLE: Well, Byroade was the kind of person who had his own very special way of operating. As far as he was concerned, the DCM ran the embassy and all the housekeeping stuff, took care of morale problems and coordination problems, and all the things that DCMs do.
Byroade had been an Ambassador many times and was not interested in doing any of that stuff any more (if he ever had been, I don't know). His principal concern was his relationship with the leader of the country. He had done this in Egypt with Nasser, he had done this in Afghanistan with the King, he had done this in the Philippines with Marcos.

He came to Pakistan and the relationship that he concentrated on was his relationship with Bhutto, who was then Prime Minister. And he had a very good relationship with Bhutto. Bhutto liked him a lot. It was sort of an avuncular relationship, because Bhutto respected him, maybe even was a little intimidated by him in a sense.

Byroade was intimidating in the sense one felt, always, that Byroade was a presence, and he was somebody who really had been around, knew a lot, had a very shrewd appreciation of people and their motives, and the way things worked. So he was very successful in Pakistan because of this relationship with Bhutto.

Now shortly after he left, Bhutto went under. The same kind of street demonstrations and agitation that had brought Ayub down came back again to Pakistan's political life and brought Bhutto down.

So when Hummel came, Bhutto was gone. There was again a martial law administration with General Zia. Hummel's style was totally different from Byroade's. It was not as personalized. He did not play it that the key was a one-on-one relationship with the chief of state. He tended to work in what I suppose one would call a more traditional way, working with foreign office people, occasionally seeing the chief of state on a business matter, and so on. I don't know how Hummel might have played it in a different situation. If he'd been there when Bhutto was there, I don't know, he might have done some personal things.

Q: Were we trying also to keep a little bit removed, do you think? I mean, here was a military dictatorship...

CONSTABLE: Yes, our policy at the beginning was that there ought to be a democratic government in Pakistan, there should be elections.

Q: We are talking about the Carter Administration?

CONSTABLE: We are talking about the Carter Administration at that point, so there was that element in it, too, probably. But I also sense (I could be wrong) that this was the way Hummel would do it anyway.

Q: Well now, let's go back to when you first got there and Bhutto was in. How did the embassy view Bhutto? You were getting from Byroade and from others...

CONSTABLE: Very positively. We were disturbed by the nuclear issue. By the time I got to Pakistan, summer of '76, this had moved up to the front rank of our concerns with Pakistan. It was beginning to get publicity.
I had only been there about a month when Kissinger made his farewell visit to Pakistan at the end of the Ford Administration. He had to raise the nuclear issue with Bhutto as the central issue. He didn't want to, but he had to, because the Symington amendment was on the books, and our hand was being forced by the Congress, if for no other reason. Also, in the election campaign, Carter was making an issue of nuclear proliferation. So the heat was on.

But we thought well of Bhutto. Bhutto had done well. He had picked Pakistan up off the floor. In a political sense he had given it back some self-respect. We had our own questions about the way he ran his government. He tended to be a little bit more authoritarian than perhaps he needed to be, or we would have liked, but it was not something that we ever raised as an issue with him. We didn't consider it essentially our business.

And we didn't think his economic policies were very effective. In fact, to the contrary, we thought he'd kind of made a hash on the economic side. But we thought he had been good for Pakistan. And in a foreign policy sense we were very close. So we were happy with him. He came to believe we weren't. We were disturbed by the nuclear issue, but we didn't really pin that tail on Bhutto, although we might have, because it really was his program.

Q: When did we feel that he felt that we were trying to destabilize him?

CONSTABLE: That came later. He got into trouble. They had elections early the following year, early '77. We were surprised, as was the opposition itself, by the strength of their support that became evident in the early months of the campaign -- a great outpouring of dissatisfaction with Bhutto and his government, and support for this rather motley opposition.

They had not expected this themselves. They thought that they could get a few seats and they could do their best with that. But for awhile during the campaign they thought they might even win it.

By the end of the campaign, Bhutto and his people had rallied. And it was our assessment that he would win the elections, but probably with reduced majorities in the Parliament. Apparently what Bhutto was after was a two-thirds majority so he could amend the constitution at will. Exactly what he had in mind we're not quite sure, but we think he probably wanted to strengthen the position of the Prime Minister, or become President again instead of Prime Minister, and maybe set himself up for a more autocratic government.

But to get that two-thirds, either he ordered, or some of his minions did it on their own initiative, rigged the elections in the Punjab. And he won more seats than he probably was entitled to. At least that was our judgement. And certainly that's what the opposition thought, that they had been really cheated. So, this was January of '77, the elections were held.

By February, the opposition was organizing street demonstrations against Bhutto, and they began to grow in size and effectiveness.

One element in this was the Islamic orthodox groups, who were part of the opposition but became very effective in the streets and in organizing street demonstrations against Bhutto, and
putting Bhutto, who was himself quite secular, very much on the defensive.

There were silly things that became issues in the election campaign. Later when Bhutto came to Washington on an official visit and was entertained at the White House, Mrs. Bhutto danced with President Ford, and there were pictures in the Pakistani papers. Well, a Muslim woman is not supposed to dance with anybody who isn't her husband, probably not supposed to dance at all, certainly not with a man who's not her husband. And this was that kind of low-blow, but effective, anti-Bhutto, Islamic stuff.

Q: Sounds like one of our campaign people in...

We were talking about the relations with Bhutto. I wonder if you could go back over what was happening during the election period, what was our attitude towards the election, and then how did this develop?

CONSTABLE: We liked Bhutto. We had a good relationship with him. We didn't like his economic policies, but he was saying the right thing, that he was going to change these in his second administration. So we were happy about that, that they might get themselves together economically.

We had this developing nuclear issue, but that was no reason for us to favor any change in leadership in Pakistan, because we were convinced that any government was going to be difficult to deal with on the nuclear issue.

Q: And we were talking about your contacts with the opposition.

CONSTABLE: We were in close contact with a broad spectrum of political leadership in Pakistan. One point I was making was that this always caused misunderstandings in a society like Pakistan's, where their experience with democratic institutions was not very deep.

The opposition itself tended to exaggerate the importance of their contacts with us, and tried to interpret them as meaning that we favored the opposition somehow or that we were unhappy with the government.

The government viewed them with similar alarm, that we were somehow encouraging the opposition, and that by just the very nature of seeing their opponents we were giving them encouragement and undermining the government. And this came back later, after the elections, to haunt us in a sense. Not that I would have changed our way of doing this at all, but it has its risks and costs.

We thought, at the start of the campaign, that Bhutto was an absolute shoe-in during the elections. And we were surprised, as was the opposition, when the campaign was started, how much support the opposition seemed to have. People came out in huge numbers for the opposition rallies at the beginning of the campaign.
This panicked the government, panicked Bhutto initially. They seemed quite demoralized in the early stages of the campaign, but they pulled themselves together.

By the end of the campaign, our assessment was that Bhutto would win, he would have a majority of seats in the Parliament, but perhaps not as great as his present government. Bhutto himself seems to have wanted to get a two-thirds majority, so that he could amend the constitution at will. What he had in mind specifically we were never quite sure, but he may have wanted to strengthen his position over the long-term and maybe even set up a succession for his daughter, who is now the Prime Minister.

Q: Benazir Bhutto.

CONSTABLE: Well, when the votes were counted, he had indeed won. But there was a general feeling that he had won the size of majority that he did by some political skulduggery. And whether this was on his own orders or some overzealous work by some of his minions in the provinces, we don't know.

The consequence was that the opposition had an issue: that there had been cheating in the elections. And they went to the streets to overturn the results of the elections. They, in effect, used the same tactics that Bhutto and other opposition people had used against Ayub -- mass street demonstrations, huge outpourings of people that paralyzed the country. This went on, as it had under Ayub, for a period of three or four months.

Bhutto began to look around for a scapegoat, somebody to blame for his troubles, and blame somebody in a way that would enhance his own position. We became that target.

A few months earlier, when Carter was running for President, he published a campaign book in which his only commentary on South Asia was high praise for India (and maybe some criticism of Pakistan, I can't remember), but this was avidly read in Pakistan and interpreted as meaning that the new Administration was anti-Pakistan.

Q: You mention Carter's mother had served, at a very elderly age, as a Peace Corps volunteer in India.

CONSTABLE: That's right, and Pakistanis saw this as a reason why Carter was going to tilt towards India and away from Pakistan. As Bhutto got into trouble and there were street demonstrations, the U.S. government, in a highly visible way as part of its human rights policy and concerns, prohibited the sale of tear gas to Pakistan. This, also, was interpreted as a deliberate attempt to bring Bhutto down, to undercut Bhutto in Pakistan. I don't think that was the intention at all, but that's the way it was seen.

Then Bhutto's supporters began to put together stories, bring stories to him, about American Embassy officers going around talking to opposition leaders and encouraging them in their demonstrations against Bhutto and bad-mouthing Bhutto.

As nearly as we could figure out in the aftermath of all of this, these stories were twisted.
Certainly some of the meetings had occurred, but not the content that was ascribed to them by various people. Some of these stories may have been invented by the opposition leaders themselves just to persuade Bhutto that we were against him.

Anyway, that's the kind of intrigue and crosscurrent that goes on in a country like Pakistan and sometimes catches the U.S. government in its net. Well, the upshot was that after Ambassador Byroade had left, Bhutto, in a speech nationally televised...

**Q:** You were there as Chief of Mission.

**CONSTABLE:** Yes, and then at that point I was the Chargé. Bhutto went on national television and, speaking before the Parliament, denounced the United States for attempting to overthrow him. He didn't mention us by name, but it was very clear who he meant. And he cited a number of these stories of contacts between U.S. Embassy officials and opposition people. He cited, and completely distorted, a couple of phone-tapped conversations between embassy officers. It was quite a performance.

So we were Enemy Number One. Bhutto may have believed part of it, but he did this in order to rally his own troops and see if he could discredit the opposition. Well, in those terms, it was a complete failure, complete failure. Of course, we were very upset by this. We didn't like it at all.

**Q:** How did we respond?

**CONSTABLE:** We responded in public statements. He made this speech about eight o'clock in the evening, and we all rushed down to the embassy and started firing off telegrams. Because of the 11-hour time difference, we were able to get stuff into Washington as they were coming into the office in the morning. And they were able to get responses back to us when we returned to the office. So we had a very quick turnaround.

Washington made a public statement denying that we were involved in any way in trying to overthrow Bhutto. We got Secretary Vance to send a message to Bhutto. It was a fairly stern, but conciliatory, message.

The next day when we delivered the message, Bhutto, being a real political rogue and rascal, went out in an open Jeep and drove around through Rawalpindi, and had all his supporters out in the street, and he was waving this letter from Secretary Vance, saying that the Americans had apologized to him. Of course, it wasn't an apology at all, and we then got the department to release the text.

But that's the kind of thing we were going through. We, in the embassy, were feeling rather put upon by all of this and thought that the U.S. ought to take quite a hard line with Bhutto.

I think Vance thought that we should not. He was hearing from the Shah, who was still in power in Iran at that time and was a close friend of Bhutto's and a supporter. The Shah did not want to see Bhutto go under in Pakistan, did not want to see a fundamentalist government come into power in Pakistan, so he was counseling Vance to see what we could do to help Bhutto out. So
we did not take a really hard line against him publicly. We just let the thing sit.

Bhutto came to realize that this was having no positive impact in Pakistan for him at all, wasn't getting him anywhere, so he put out a little feeler that he might want to find a way to compose our differences.

He called me over one night, and just he and I and his Foreign Minister sat out on his lawn (and were bitten by mosquitos) while we made the first tentative steps towards getting our relationship back on some normal keel.

Q: How did he put it?

CONSTABLE: Well, he didn't apologize (naturally). He defended his charges and said that he had this dossier of incidents and charges. And I said, "I would welcome the opportunity to see that." I wanted to see that list so that we could talk about it. Well, it was never quite forthcoming, but he said he would give it to the Secretary at some point.

What we arranged in that meeting was for his Foreign Minister to meet with Secretary Vance in Paris. I think it was a couple of weeks hence, the Secretary had to be there for some purpose, some other meeting, and met with Aziz.

But, anyway, there was a desire on both sides to bury the hatchet and not go on in this way publicly. He stopped, and his press stopped, making these charges that we were trying to overthrow him, but none of it was ever retracted.

Q: Let me ask you just a little operational thing. All of a sudden you get these charges. You're sure they're false, but did you have any feeling of: My God, is anybody (I'm particularly thinking of the CIA) doing something that I don't know about?

CONSTABLE: Yes, of course, of course.

Q: And did you sit down and say: Come on, fellows, let's talk about this?

CONSTABLE: Yes, we did that. We did that. I called people in and said, "Does anybody know of anything that..." And I said, "This is a very delicate moment, and Bhutto is going to be out looking for opportunities to prove his charges, so I want everybody to be super-cautious and lay back and not see opposition people at this particular point, while they've got Bhutto by the throat. Let's just knock it off. We can cool it for awhile. We can pick up those contacts again. We don't need to exploit these at the moment. Let's just sit still."

So the orders were out to all the Political Officers not to go see their political guys and that sort of thing. One officer disobeyed the instructions, came and told us about it a few days later, and I sent him home, because I had assured the Secretary that we were not doing anything that Bhutto could take exception to.

Q: Was this officer, obviously we don't want names, but was this just because he or she couldn't
sit still?

CONSTABLE: Partly that. It was poor judgment on his part. A couple of guys showed up at his door, young guys who were political contacts of his. What particularly disturbed me about that particular contact was that they were fresh from a demonstration where they were being chased by the police and had come into an American officer's house. So I just thought he showed remarkably poor judgment.

Q: What about the CIA? There is sometimes the feeling that the CIA can be a rogue elephant, but I take it the atmosphere was not such that you might think they were playing a different policy.

CONSTABLE: No. No. Not at all. I had no reason to think that at all. No. No. They were very cooperative and, in a sense, were very helpful.

Q: This was just using America as "the Great Satan."

CONSTABLE: Yes, yes. And twisting and distorting little things that came to his attention. An interesting example was what he did with these taped telephone conversations that his intelligence people had intercepted.

A couple of weeks before this speech, maybe three weeks before, Bhutto had gone down to Lahore and had gone into a hotel and not emerged for 72 hours, while there were huge demonstrations going on in the streets every day. Rumors began to fly that he was about to quit.

A journalist called our Consul General in Karachi (this was a source that our Consul General trusted and had known for a long time) and told him that Bhutto, indeed, was going to resign, and that his people wanted to know if he would be welcome in the United States; would he get a visa?

Well, this was at night, and it struck our Consul General in Karachi as something that we needed to know about right away, and that it was a question that might be posed to us in real terms very suddenly, and that we needed to get our act together: What would we do if Bhutto wanted to leave Pakistan and go to the United States? Would he be welcome there?

So he called our Political Counselor in Islamabad and, using euphemistic language, tried to describe the question that was posed. And the way he put it was, "My source tells me the party is over...." So the Political Counselor then called me and used much the same language to describe the issue.

I think at that point I went over and saw Byroade, and we talked about it. I can't remember if we sought guidance from Washington at that point or not.

But, the way Bhutto used this, I think he genuinely misunderstood. The phones were tapped, and he got this tape and he listened to this, and he said, "Oh, they're saying I'm finished. The Americans are saying I'm finished."
So he quotes this conversation and says, "Let me tell you, gentlemen, the party is not over!"

There was nothing malicious in what we were doing at all -- totally insincere.

And I had another example, later, of Bhutto misunderstanding. I had a very good friend whom I'd known in Lahore who was in politics, and Bhutto had just named him as his Minister of Food, I think. I did a little amateur theatrical stuff while I was in Islamabad, and I was going to be in a play. He called me one time and we started talking about the play -- it was a conversation almost entirely about the play.

He was then called in by Bhutto who said, "What do you mean talking to Constable on the telephone about my sexual exploits?"

Well, it was never in the conversation at all!

Pakistani English and American English aren't exactly the same, so these bizarre misinterpretations and misunderstandings come very easily.

Q: Particularly in a situation which could be true in the United States. When political paranoia sets in, anything can happen.

CONSTABLE: Yes. Well, any Pakistani politician suffers from paranoia, and with reason, because people are out to get him -- at least his own opponents are -- by every device available. But they tend to think that American policy operates that way, too. Most of the time I think it doesn't. Sometimes it probably does, but in this instance, it certainly didn't.

Q: Today is March 7, 1990. This is interview Number Two with Ambassador Peter Constable. We finished the last interview talking about Bhutto trying to blame the United States for his difficulties. Let's now talk about what happened after that period. Would you give the time frame?

CONSTABLE: Yes, we're in the spring of 1977. Bhutto fairly quickly found that trying to shove his difficulties off on the United States, in an effort to create some sort of groundswell of support based on nationalism and anti-Americanism, really wasn't taking him anywhere. The opposition was not cowed by this effort. In fact, there was no great anti-American rallying in the country.

So Bhutto began to back off from this and look for ways to reach some kind of an accommodation with us. But his difficulties in the streets continued and even got worse.

The Saudis became very active in trying to mediate some sort of a compromise between Bhutto and his political opponents. For awhile it looked as if they might be successful. It was very clear that Bhutto was going to have to give something very substantial, like new elections monitored in some way.

The surprising development, I guess, was the fact that in the middle of this mediation effort by the Saudis, Zia made his move and overthrew Bhutto.
Q: Zia was who?

CONSTABLE: Zia was the Chief of Staff of the Army, who had been hand-picked by Bhutto presumably because he would be dependent on Bhutto, was not senior enough in the military, did not have that prestige to run the military as an independent entity. And Bhutto thought that he would be dependent on him, that indeed Zia did seem to be for some period.

But pressures within the military were growing to do something. The thing that the military has always hated in Pakistan is to be used as a force for the maintenance of civil order and turn their guns on the population. And it was that feeling that impelled Zia to strike.

It would have been more understandable if he had made his move after a collapse of the Saudi mediation effort, but he moved in the middle of it, for reasons which are not entirely clear.

In one of those things that happens, a series of coincidences, Ambassador Hummel had just arrived in Pakistan and had presented his credentials to President Chowdri.

As part of his desire to cool things down with the United States, Bhutto had indicated that he wanted to come to our Fourth of July party. So an effort had to be made to arrange an opportunity for Hummel to call on Bhutto. Because Bhutto was caught up in this very elaborate and intense political negotiation, it was hard to schedule an appointment.

Q: I might point out, for those not aware of diplomatic niceties, the Ambassador has to call on the Prime Minister pretty much before the Prime Minister can come calling the other way around.

CONSTABLE: Exactly. It's a protocolary point, but an important one in relations between states.

In any event, Bhutto's aide kept assuring Hummel that, yes, Bhutto wanted to see him, and to stand by. Well, we were into July 3rd, and then into the night of July 3rd, and the reception was at midday on the 4th.

Finally, in the wee hours of the Fourth of July, about 12:30 in the morning, or one o'clock, Hummel got his call to come and see Bhutto. So he duly trotted over there.

And the next day, Bhutto showed up at the midday Fourth of July party. And, in fact, everybody was there who counted in Pakistan. The opposition political leaders were there. General Zia was there. The President of the country was there.

I only mention this because it was that very night, about eleven o'clock or midnight, that Zia made his move and overthrew Bhutto.

I'm sure that there are many people in Pakistan who believe to this day that somehow that peculiar chain of events, of Hummel going to see Bhutto at one o'clock in the morning, Bhutto showing up at the embassy at noon and being overthrown that night, was something engineered
by the United States.

Q: Let me ask (this is obviously an unclassified interview) what was our attitude towards Bhutto at that time, and were you concerned (we mentioned this before in our earlier interview) about anybody within our embassy community meddling around encouraging the military?

CONSTABLE: No, not at all, not at all. We wanted to see some kind of peaceful solution of this. The mediation effort that the Saudis were undertaking looked promising at that moment, and we thought it stood a reasonable chance of success.

We were standing our distance from this. We were not seeking to involve ourselves as a mediator. We were concerned by what was going on in Pakistan, because there was a tremendous stand-off and disruption in Pakistan as the result of the aftermath of the elections and this opposition in the streets to Bhutto. But, I think as I said in the last interview, our relations with Bhutto had been very good up to the point of the elections.

We had one major disagreement with him, and it was an important one, over Pakistan's nuclear policy. It's an issue which remains to this day.

But, otherwise, we thought Bhutto had been a force for stability and had done well. We didn't think his record was terribly spectacular on the economic side. But we also understood that in his second administration he intended to change his policies in a more market-oriented way, which we thought would be good for the country.

So we had no policy differences with Bhutto, with Pakistan, except over the nuclear issue. And we did not think that anybody else was going to be any easier to deal with. I think events have proved us right. Zia was not easier to deal with on the nuclear issue.

Q: Again, let's look at it from how the embassy reacted, heard, and what you did, because I want to have somebody who's not familiar with what we do... how do we operate? Here's a coup in what we consider a critical country, what did you do?

CONSTABLE: One always stands back and tries to assess whether a coup is going to be effective, and whether the people who have made the coup can establish order and establish themselves in power. So one tends to avoid taking any steps which sanction the coup.

We have gotten away, as a policy matter, from using formal recognition as a step following a coup. We now take the posture that relations are between states, and they're a continuing matter, no matter what government is in office.

But at the same time, after a coup, we tend to go rather slowly in developing our relationships with the new government until we come to understand that they're there to stay, that the coup has in some way been accepted and is not a resisted coup or the country is suddenly in a civil war situation.

As it turned out in Pakistan, the coup seemed to be welcomed. The opposition that had been
badgering Bhutto in the streets certainly welcomed it, and Bhutto's own party seemed quite passive. They did not take to the streets and resist the effects of this.

Q: Could you describe how you saw the actual coup?

CONSTABLE: The actual coup was bloodless and in the middle of the night. Some soldiers marched into Bhutto's quarters, woke him up and informed him that he was under arrest. There was apparently no resistance from presidential guards or anything of the sort.

So we did not learn of the coup until the following morning when we woke up and people turned on their radios and martial music was playing. There was suspension of the normal programming.

I drove in to the embassy at about eight o'clock, the usual hour, and the Political Officer, Arnie Raphel, who was subsequently Ambassador in Pakistan and was killed there in the plane crash with Zia a year and a half ago, was waiting for me in front of the embassy.

He said, "There was a coup last night." I was astonished. The timing of it, as I said earlier, was totally unexpected.

So the first thing that an embassy does in a situation like that is try to gather as much information, report back to Washington, so that Washington is not any more surprised, anyway, than the embassy was. And then try to assess what we think the prospects are for such a government, what they might do and what the impact of this would be on U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Q: Did somebody from those running the coup get in touch with you or did you get in touch with them? How does one establish relations with this new group?

CONSTABLE: I don't recall the specific steps that we took. I don't recall that they immediately contacted us, although that may have happened. We may have been called into the foreign ministry and been given some sort of an explanation, that all embassies would have been called in. I think that's probably likely, but I don't really remember that. I know for the first few days most of our contacts with the government were through the foreign ministry. I mean, nobody ran over to see Zia and say, "Congratulations." But, bit by bit, of course, we did hear from them, all parts of the government.

Q: I assume that Ambassador Hummel probably gathered everybody together, and of course he's brand new anyway, and said, "Who is this guy Zia, and who knows him?" How did you see it at the time?

CONSTABLE: As it turned out, Arnie Raphel was the one who really knew Zia and established a relationship with him when he was perhaps not even yet Chief of Staff of the Army. Arnie had gotten to know him through our military assistance programs and had become really quite friendly with him.
Obviously, the things that Washington wanted to know were: What kind of a government is this likely to be? What kind of a person is Zia? Is he likely to be an effective leader?

And, frankly, our assessment at the time was that Zia was a soldier and not likely to be very swift as a politician, and that he'd better figure out some way to turn power over to a civilian government, because he was unlikely to be able to handle the thing.

Of course, we couldn't have been more wrong. I think we were right initially. The moves that he made politically were very clumsy, but he learned fast. Within six months he had demonstrated that he really was in charge and knew what he was doing.

He lasted for ten years, until his death in the airplane accident. He proved to be a very shrewd and astute politician, and very adept about maneuvering his opponents.

But, at the time, we thought that he had better get his act together and find some way to elections and get back out of there within two or three months. And, in fact, that's what he wanted to do initially. But it proved, from his perspective, not possible. He arrested Bhutto; within a month he let Bhutto out. And he talked about having elections in September or October.

Q: Of '77.

CONSTABLE: Yes. This was early July when he was overthrown, and he talked about being back out of office in three months. His calculation was that Bhutto would be so discredited by revelations the government then started putting out about Bhutto's misdeeds that the country could have elections and Bhutto would lose.

Well, that was a miscalculation, because the Bhutto phenomenon was not over at all. He remained an extremely popular political figure. When he was released from prison he immediately started organizing massive political demonstrations. And they were huge. There were just enormous turnouts as he went to Lahore and to Karachi. These terrified the government, so they had to figure out something else.

It became apparent if there were early elections that Bhutto would win. And that would be intolerable for the Army that had just thrown him out. They had made a serious miscalculation on what the effect of Bhutto's arrest would be on the people's party, on his support.

The kind of thing that we were saying to the government was, yes, you need to go to elections, because we didn't think that Zia could handle this politically. And we also felt that Pakistan needed to have democratic institutions, that the only way ultimately that Pakistan could develop political stability was through the exercise of a more democratic system.

But Zia backed off and postponed elections. He continuously promised elections, but they began to recede into a more distant future until he figured out another plan. He then did, subsequently, have elections. He had some non-party elections. All of this was after I had left Pakistan.

After this scare for Zia, when he let Bhutto out and it became apparent that Bhutto was still a
highly popular figure, it was then that Zia and his advisors developed the strategy of trying Bhutto for his misdeeds, and then ultimately having him sentenced to death and hanging him.

Q: He was hanged on April 4, 1979. What role were we playing, as you saw it at the time, on these developments? This is the Carter Administration; human rights was very big on our agenda; we no longer had Henry Kissinger, who saw Pakistan as being vital for the China card; Carter, who was probably less interested in Pakistan, perhaps more in India; it was the usual Democrat-Republican thing; plus Carter's mother had served in the Peace Corps in India; etc., etc.

CONSTABLE: All of that is true. Those impacts of attention to human rights, greater interest in India, were truer of the period up to Bhutto's overthrow, or maybe a few months before that. I think some of that began to give way to a slightly more real politque view as the Carter Administration found the world more complicated perhaps than it had initially thought.

The Administration was hearing from the Shah that he was interested in stability in Pakistan.

And, as every Administration finds, you can't quite play the game with India that people like to think you can. Here's the world's largest democracy. We ought to have so much in common, why can't we make common cause and be really close friends?

Well, the Indians had their special relationship with the Soviets, their own hostilities to the Chinese, their difficulties with Pakistan, and considerable animosity against the United States. So they were never a player that we could quite bring into play the way some people tended to think. It just never worked out.

So one's attention was turned back, sometimes, to Pakistan, even though one didn't quite start out there.

Then, I believe it was in '78, there was the coup in Afghanistan by Communists. That caused great concern in Pakistan, and in Iran, and in Washington.

So there was a change. Now we didn't give up on certain basic premises. We continued to believe that ultimately Pakistan had to get back to democratic processes. But the way in which we dealt with that in Pakistan may have undergone some subtle shift.

Q: We have to remember, because right now things are changing so much in the other way, we're talking about March 1990. This period will probably be one of the great historic periods of, certainly, the post-World War II period, but at that time we were really concerned about Brezhnev and an expanding Soviet.

CONSTABLE: Indeed we were.

Q: Would you talk a little bit about how you saw the Afghanistan business at that time.

CONSTABLE: If you can think of it in a larger context: The Carter Administration was faced
with difficulties in the Horn, in Somalia, Ethiopia, the Ethiopians developing a much closer relationship with the Soviets, the Somalis being beaten down in the Ogaden War, which...

Q: *This is in the Horn of Africa.*

CONSTABLE: And there were those who were arguing, in a very public way, that the Carter Administration was presiding over a disintegration of American influence around the world, and that we were letting the Soviets take advantage of our weakness. It was alleged that this is what was happening in the Horn, it was happening in Angola.

In that context, then, there was a Communist coup in Afghanistan, and this was viewed as one more example of the Soviets on the march and U.S. influence receding.

That was certainly very much the way events were seen in Pakistan by Pakistanis. They were extremely concerned about this. They had counted, for decades, on, if not an alliance with the U.S., U.S. benevolence and influence to hold back Soviet influence in South Asia and a Soviet thrust toward the Indian Ocean. So they were deeply concerned about the direction of American foreign policy, and then really quite panicked when the coup occurred in Afghanistan. Just by chance when that happened, Art Hummel was away in Washington and I was again Chargé. I was called in by either the Foreign Minister or the Foreign Secretary (I can't remember what he was then) Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, I think, and asked what this coup meant to the United States, and what it meant in terms of U.S.-Pakistan relations. What he was looking for was our interpretation of this coup in light of the 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan, the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral agreement.

I was able to get back to him after consulting with Washington and tell him, the very next day, that we viewed events in Afghanistan with great concern. And that any threat to Pakistan by a Communist-dominated or a Communist-controlled power would trigger a response from the U.S. under the 1959 bilateral agreement, which did not specify what kind of action we would take.

It didn't say that we would send in troops or anything of that sort, but the implication was that we would, in some way, assist Pakistan militarily, either with military equipment... And we would certainly use our influence to protect Pakistan against a Communist threat. They found that vastly reassuring.

But this was the kind of thing that the Carter Administration was being pushed into by developments around the world. It was something of a reversal of the kind of policies that the Carter Administration wanted to pursue at the beginning of the administration, but events pushed them in a different direction.

It affected, obviously, the way we dealt with the Zia regime, too. Certainly, from the moment of a Communist coup in Afghanistan, we were not going to beat Zia around the ears to the point that his government collapsed. We were, from that point on at least, really interested in stability in Pakistan.

Now we continued to believe that the long-range stability in that country depended on the
development of democratic institutions. But we were not prepared to say to Zia, "You've got to step aside tomorrow and get on with elections," because we appreciated the political dilemma that existed in Pakistan, the deep divisions between the PPP and the rest of the body politic.

Q: Looking ahead after your time that you dealt with it in another context. Pakistan, as far as American relations -- they burned down our embassy. And, in a couple of days, the Soviets were bouncing into Afghanistan, in December of '79. Instead of our remaining mad, we had to get down to the immediate thing.

CONSTABLE: Yes, that was a logical consequence of what I've been talking about. But, in the meantime, other things had intervened: the collapse of the Shah in Iran, and then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q: So we didn't have time for taking care of; you could almost say, the minor matter of now protecting the embassy. How did we deal with the problem of Bhutto? How did you see this? Here he is stirring up crowds; Zia's got to respond. What were we doing on the ground and also from Washington?

CONSTABLE: We were observing and reporting. We were not taking any kind of a policy position on this, other than letting the Pakistan government know, letting Zia know, that we thought he needed to find a way to get on to an election process and get the Army back in the barracks and out of power. As I say, the urgency with which that message was delivered shifted over time as other things happened in the region.

More difficult for us, or more painful I think for everyone, was what was going to happen to Bhutto once Zia embarked on this process of a trial, a public trial, and then condemned him to death.

Q: Did you and the embassy see, once he started on the trial business, that this was the ultimate conclusion?

CONSTABLE: The logic of it always seemed to me that, yes, he had to put him to death, that the way Zia had constructed his own position, there was no way out. There was a Punjabi saying: "Two men and one grave." One or the other had to go in it.

Even as we urged him, after Bhutto was sentenced to death, to pardon him, or to put him in exile, or in some way to spare him, I personally felt that the logic of it was that Zia could not do that.

Bhutto, out of the country, would have been forever a threat to Zia's regime. Bhutto, in jail in the country, would have been a similar threat. Zia built a political construct in which Bhutto had to be eliminated, which was unfortunate.

Q: Could you follow through on the Bhutto business. What role we were playing as this moved on its way? Were we passive the whole time, or were we getting...?

CONSTABLE: No, we made several representations to Zia and the Pakistani government urging
that Bhutto's life be spared. We did not have a formula to sort out the political problems in Pakistan. But we made it very clear to Zia that we thought it was a mistake, that also on human rights grounds, we thought he ought to be spared, although we had to be very careful about this, since we have capital punishment in our own country. So the element of opposing this as a human rights issue was rather muted. We put it in humanitarian terms rather than human rights, and in political terms, that we thought it was a mistake for this to happen. This kind of thing had never been done in Pakistan.

Q: There was the example of Menderes in Turkey, of the same thing.

CONSTABLE: Which it seemed to me was an object lesson, in the other direction, for Pakistan. But it was a dilemma, because, analytically, it was difficult to see how Pakistan would return to any kind of political stability while Bhutto was a factor. If he returned to power, either he would have to eliminate all his enemies or his enemies would be back in the street as they were just before his overthrow. So it was difficult to see just how the country got itself out of this dilemma.

In a way, Zia did. He took a long time, and he moved very, very slowly through a series of steps towards limited democracy, non-party elections, and constituting an assembly that allowed for political expression and political debate. But still there was in effect a kind of martial law on top of it with Zia running things. Step by step, he moved towards a multi-party democracy. After he was killed, then they moved very rapidly and held elections.

The Bhutto phenomenon, obviously, still exists in that his daughter is now the Prime Minister. But I think it has a different context to it now than it had ten years ago. People have changed and their views have changed. Benazir, while she has many of her father's qualities and political abilities, is not her father. The country is not the same as it was ten years ago. It has moved on in important ways. So this kind of process may work now in that Pakistan may be able to go through a series of elections and develop some institutional stability that it has always lacked.

Q: Was it apparent that the opposition group, which would be at that point the Bhutto supporters, was looking to the American Embassy to pull some sort of trick? Were we blamed for what was happening to Bhutto?

CONSTABLE: Oh, I think to some extent we were blamed, yes. There were those in Bhutto's party who found it convenient to blame us. At the same time, I think they could hear what we were saying, which was that we wanted to see Pakistan return to elections. And I think they recognized that it was, to some extent, pressure from the outside that kept Zia moving towards elected politics and forced him to take some of these steps. Of course, there were internal pressures that forced him to do so, also. But he kept hearing from outside.

And after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when we...

Q: This would be December of '79.

CONSTABLE: That was December of '79. And it was not until sometime in '81 that we came to
agreement with Pakistan on a very large aid program, a five-year program, and agreed on the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. From that point on, Pakistan obviously had to be very concerned about what opinion was in the U.S. and in the U.S. Congress. And so Zia understood that he had to hear these expressions of support for a more democratic system. And he took those steps. I think, had he lived, one probably would have seen something similar to the kinds of elections which were held right after his death that led to Benazir coming into power -- although he wouldn't have liked that. He wouldn't have liked that result, but I think he would have been in a position where he had to accept it.

Q: When did you leave, and what did you do?

CONSTABLE: I left Pakistan in June of ’79. At that point I came back to Washington as the Senior Deputy in the Near East-South Asia Bureau. That gave me responsibilities across-the-board in NEA, but I also paid a lot of special attention to the South Asia side, to what I knew best.

JOSEPH S. FARLAND
Ambassador
Pakistan (1969-1972)

Joseph S. Farland was born in West Virginia and raised in both West Virginia and Pennsylvania. He attended West Virginia University. He entered the State Department in 1955 and was appointed as ambassador to Pakistan in 1969.

Q: When you arrived, for the general reader, what was the state of affairs as it was explained to you in Pakistan, what Pakistan consisted of at that time, who was the ruler, and how our relations were?

FARLAND: I found nothing but good relations. I must tell you this story. We arrived in Karachi in the middle of the night. I was still half asleep, groggy. I was thinking about what the Pakistanis did. I walked down the steps. The plane lights were on. My wife was walking behind me. When I hit the tarmac, my sense of humor went into high gear. I turned around to my wife and said, "I divorce you! I divorce you! I divorce you!" She said, "The hell you say!" [That was] cut out. That is the way we arrived. It is cold there in Karachi at night in the desert. There was a group down from Islamabad. The consulate was out in force. We were terribly tired. We stayed a day or so. I read the lesson at the cathedral and promptly was called to read the lesson and said to never, never again ask the man to read the lesson from the little prayer book, but for Heaven's sake, send to England and get a real book for that lecture, which he did. Then I went on to Islamabad.

Q: One of the classic things within our foreign affairs establishment has been the India-Pakistan War as done by our embassy in New Delhi and our embassy in wherever it was in Pakistan at the time. Did you find yourself rather close on, reading the telegrams that were coming out of New Delhi, responding, and that sort of thing?
FARLAND: We, of course, got information out of New Delhi and cables out of the Department. I in turn infoed Delhi on my cables to the Department. One fine morning, my USIA man comes in. He says, "Mr. Ambassador, this is going to shock you. This is in 'The New York Times.'" I read it. I said, "These are my words. That was in my cable. Those are the exact words." So, I forthwith sent a [cable] over to the Department demanding an investigation. I knew that somebody had leaked. In about two hours (and of course an info of that went to Delhi), I got an info from Delhi of a telegram to the Department from Keating saying, "Mea culpa." I found out that he had taken the files home, which you don't do. He had a "New York Times" reporter staying with him, which is unusual. Three, he gave the files to the reporter to copy. What did the Department do about it? Nada (nothing).

Q: Did you find that you and your embassy were spending a certain amount of time responding to these info cables from Delhi which could talk about India-Pakistan relations and that you felt you had to say, "Wait a minute. There is another side to this?" Was this an ongoing thing?

FARLAND: I don't remember anything specific. I presume we did or we just sent our own cables. The night it started, I was in the residence. We were having a blackout all over Islamabad. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs appeared and said that the President wanted to see me at the guest house down in Rawalpindi. So, in the dark of the night with all those bullocks moving along in the dark silently, traffic going every which way, without lights, I thought I was going to get killed on the way to see the President. We arrived. Here was the entire military's top with the President in a state of jubilation on the theory that they had made an instant victory. Needless to say, most of them were pretty well soused by that time. I stayed for a little while and finally got back.

Q: That now is Bangladesh.

FARLAND: Yes. The truth of the matter is, the Bengalis had nothing in common with West Pakistan except the religion. They were neither similar in shape, size, or anything. Religion was the only thing they had in common. It wasn't enough to hold them together.

Q: What was happening militarily? How were we responding in the West?

FARLAND: Other nations were pulling their embassies out. I was told to stay. We were down to practically the United States being the only one there. I was hanging on there in case there was a breakthrough and Islamabad was overrun basically by thugs from Rawalpindi looking for TV sets, etc. I was the one that was going to get the blame. I was trying to establish without making any fear in the embassy an escape route. That had to be through Murree and into Afghanistan and hopefully out of there. This was pretty hairy for good old Joe, I'll tell you.

Q: What were you getting from the military attachés at this time?

FARLAND: There wasn't too much activity from the military attaches except for Chuck Yeager, who was on fire. I have accused him of this jokingly (maybe not too jokingly) that perhaps he took an F-4 up there and did a little practicing himself. He had close contact with the Air Force
and kept me thoroughly advised as to what was going on. Pakistan was rapidly losing that war. I sent out five FLASHs one day, which is unheard of. Nixon chose his hand by tilting towards Pakistan. But then I got a direct order to go see Yaya and tell him to call off the war. One bright day, I had to get in the car without the flags flying and go down to his bungalow [and] the foreign ministry and tell him he had to call off the war, that he was the loser. That was quite an activity for an ambassador of a foreign country to tell the president of another country, but I did. On the way back, we were being bombed. I finally got under a tree so that they wouldn’t see the car. Bombs were falling around the area. One thing nice about the bombing was that they didn’t bring in telegrams to me in the middle of the night. I got to sleep. As long as they were bombing, I got to sleep. But this was no fun really. This was scary.

Q: Had you been apprised of the fact that a war was going to start? Were we getting information that India and Pakistan were on the verge of war? Were we following it?

FARLAND: I was pretty sure that something was going to happen, yes. Yes, I knew it was close. I was even shown their nuclear plant. I even got into that. I must have a sympathetic face or something. I've done things that are almost impossible.

Q: What was the cause of this war as we saw it?

FARLAND: Kashmir was always the cause of it. It always will be. 80% are Muslim in Kashmir. The Indus River in the Hindu religion is a goddess. Here you have a country in which your goddess is your main source of water. You can't have it. Kashmir has been the flashpoint.

Q: When you got there and subsequently, did you go often over to East Pakistan?

FARLAND: I tried to make a point of being there more than any other ambassador ever had been. I did that purposely because they felt that they were not part of Pakistan. I wanted them to feel that I had a definite interest. I flew back and forth over India every whipstitch. Archer Blood was my consul general over there. When the Bengalis revolted, he revolted also. The embassy wasn’t taking care of him properly. Had I been in his place, I would have felt that way, too, 1,000 miles away. They were far, far away from us. I can understand his feeling. I am sure he felt that I was not sympathetic. I say this now and I felt then that basically I was sympathetic to him. I more than likely would have done the same thing if I had been in his place.

Q: Were you getting reports and also were you seeing on the ground as you went there the fact that the West Pakistani army was being particularly brutal towards the Bengalis?

FARLAND: I had some reports. I complained to Yaya. I told him. He said, "No." I went over. They showed me their intake stations where they were taking care of their people. It was a sham. They had all the signs in English for people who didn’t speak English. That was for my benefit. That was a complete bungle. There was no love between the two of them. I know that and it's regrettable. Bangladesh is a basket case.

Q: You mentioned a hurricane. Did that happen during this time?
FARLAND: I had a hurricane and I also had my friend Kissinger. One fine night in the mouth of the Ganges, a tidal wave came rolling in out of the Indian Ocean and inundated that whole area down there and killed that night by drowning anywhere from 350-500,000 people. It was unbelievable! When I got that word, my first thought was "What can we do to help on this?" I was in Islamabad. I had ordered the plane service to prepare to fly. I called a top meeting of AID and alerted them, asked what they could do, and told them whatever facilities they had, to get them ready for action. We had a huge emergency on our hands and we had to be there firstest with the mostest. That resulted in the acquisition of a number of C-130s, a lot of emergency biscuits, tents, all that sort of thing. That had to be collected.

I flew immediately over to Dacca and stayed with Arch. He and his wife couldn’t have been greater help to me. I was in touch with our Air Force base and asked for five helicopters. They sent them over in a C-141 from the States with crew forthwith. They arrived. They were put together. I was the first one down there. We had emergency blankets. It was token, but I wanted the people there in the drama that were still alive to see that there was action coming to help them. We flew down there these helicopters, circled around all over the place, stopped at one point, and people came up out of the ground. That is the way they do. I don’t know where they come from, but they're there. They were frightened of us. They were scared to death. [They had been] through Hell. So, we put the blankets down and went back and took off. They got into one hellacious fight over those blankets. It looked like they were killing each other. Then the newspeople started to arrive. We tried to organize the distribution of emergency biscuits that the Army has and rice. Russia started coming in with rice in their type of crafts that were somewhat like a C-130. I was going back and forth. There was no incident of outbreak of flu, diphtheria, plague, or anything like that. They were either dead or alive. Those that were alive were more careful to boil the water than they had been before. They knew that the water had been contaminated. I hate to even think about the pictures in my mind of the dead that were heaped all over that place.

Anyway, the press got down there. We tried to [feed] as many as we could. We had rice made up into what amounted to 10 pound bags. The women in the embassy made a bag and we filled up a C-130 with that. I took a lot in a helicopter. We landed and tried to distribute it. They had started crowding the helicopter. We knew that somebody was going to get killed, so we took off and just dropped it. There was no control of the crowd. There was one stringer who proceeded to say I, being a politician, made him shake hands before I would give them rice, which was absurd! In the first place, he didn’t speak Bengali. How did he know I was saying that. I was trying to pass out rice. Anyway, that was the headlines all over the world and that has hurt me ever since. It hurts me now. I got affidavits from the helicopter crew and I called in the AP man. I said, "You know me. You know I wouldn’t do that. Why did you take that stringer's advice?" He said, "Well, it looked like a good story." I said, "Well, send a contradiction out." He said, "What good will that do? It's already in print." That cut.

Q: In Pakistan at that time, was the Soviet Union much of a factor?

FARLAND: In the beginning, when I first got there, they were very much a factor. After I had been there about six months, I was moving closer and the engine was moving back. The Soviets were seeking forever and always will an outlet on the Gulf or the Indian Ocean.
Q: This has always been part of the great game. When one looks at the fleet and all, it seems to be a real stretch to think that you could do much with lines of communication being such that...

FARLAND: The head of the KGB in Afghanistan was then moved over to Islamabad as the ambassador. He was the head of the KGB in both instances. Even the one that dug the tunnel through the mountains that [got] him to the capital. We built a highway down towards the Gulf. That was very convenient from their standpoint.

Q: When you arrived there and during the three years you were there, what was your impression of the operation of AID?

FARLAND: They were a big outfit and they had all the troubles that a gigantic outfit would. They considered themselves to a large extent removed from the embassy. They didn’t like the ambassador giving orders to the [AID Director]. For instance, in Pakistan, it was expected when you went into an office that you had your coat on. They were very formal. I told the officers, "When you are expecting a Pakistani official to call at your office, put on your coat, for Heaven's sakes." That went down like a lead balloon, but they put their coats on.

Q: One of the criticisms of AID has always been that when it comes in, the infrastructure often gets huge. These are Americans. They set up offices. A lot of our money that we supposedly give to the country ends up by the salaries, the housing, and the maintenance of Americans, as opposed to translating it into actual elements that are of benefit to the country. You came in with an experienced eye. Did you look at this?

FARLAND: I saw. It was one of the largest embassies and it was primarily AID. They were trying to make rivers run uphill. This is a little difficult, even in the best of circumstances. There were a lot of things they could do on a lesser scale which would be quite productive.

AUGUST VELLETRI
Consul General
Peshawar (1969-1973)

August Velletri was born in New York state in 1916. He received both his undergraduate and graduate degrees from the Ohio State University. He started his career as newspaper reporter during the war and joined the Foreign Service in 1949. He served in Rome, Athens and a number of positions in the State Department. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 1993.

Q: You left in 1969. Where did you go?

VELLETRI: In 1969 the Department asked me to go to Peshawar to close the Consulate. So I came back to Washington for two weeks of consultations. I was told, "Take a year and close the place." I went to Peshawar in the summer of 1969 and in early 1970 the air station (Badaber) was
closed.

Q: This was the air station. Peshawar was in Pakistan.

VELLETRI: Yes. Twenty-five miles from the border of Afghanistan. I did not know anything about that area. Everything was new. But I was curious and interested. After about six months I didn't think the Consulate should be closed. I reminded the Department that if the Consulate should be closed, it probably could never be opened again, especially since the Pakistani government did not like the idea of having an American presence in that area. Peshawar was very near to a sensitive area. Finally, with the help of Ambassador Neumann in Afghanistan and Ambassador Farland in Islamabad, I was able to dissuade the Department from closing the Consulate.

Q: Well, you were there how long?


Q: You say it was near a sensitive area. What were you doing there?

VELLETRI: The Consulate was open in order to service the personnel of the American Air Force "listening post". After the closing of the station, however, the Department decided the Consulate was no longer needed. I felt, that from a political point of view it was useful. The operation was costing the U.S. about $75,000 a year. We were very near the tribal area; we were near Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had an interest in the area, an interest which became quite evident later, when they invaded Afghanistan.

Q: How did you deal with the local Pakistani authorities?

VELLETRI: Our relations were very good indeed. Also you must remember that Peshawar was the location where the air force of Pakistan was based. It was the Headquarters of the Air Force. Peshawar was also the headquarters of one of the reserve military divisions. Whenever we saw the movement of that division, then you knew something was going on. It was a very interesting place. You wanted to know what the heck the tribes were doing. What was their relationship with the Pakistani or Afghan government? Was anybody fomenting any trouble?

Q: How could you tell?

VELLETRI: Well, we had some sources of information. Our number one local employee was a Pakistani, an ex-colonel in the Pakistani army, who knew the area very well. He came from Chitral. Of course, I was not allowed to go into the tribal area...the government didn't allow us to do that. But from time to time we sneaked in. We did talk to tribal chiefs, etc.

Q: Were you there during one of the India-Pak wars?

VELLETRI: Yes, the 1971 war.
Q: How did that impact on you?

VELLETRI: The only aspect of the war that touched us was the air war. Two or three Indian planes flew into Peshawar, but caused no damage. They were shot down immediately and they never tried it again. They tried, I remember, to destroy the bridge over the Indus as you go from the Frontier into the Islamabad area. They missed it all the time. It was a war period and we had to maintain a certain discretion, not too many lights, etc. Our servants had dug a little ditch for us just in case we were bombed. But nothing happened.

Q: Who was your Ambassador?

VELLETRI: Farland.

Q: How did you find him?

VELLETRI: He was very, very interesting. He was, of course, a Republican, a political appointee. He relied a great deal on his DCM, who was a professional.

Q: Who was that?

VELLETRI: Oh, it was Sid Sober.

Q: We also have an oral interview with him.

VELLETRI: He was the officer who ran the Embassy.

Q: But you felt that you were getting pretty good support from the Embassy?

VELLETRI: The Embassy left me alone. They couldn't do anything. In fact they were worried about my security. One day the Embassy security officer came to inspect the premises and to warn me that there was nothing that could be done to improve the situation. The Security Officer reminded me that the jeep was wired to make a lot of noise...in the event of trouble, I was to instruct my driver to activate the siren and speed as fast as he could. That was the amount of security that I had apart from a 45 which was left at the Consulate by one of my predecessors.

Q: I suppose in the practical sense that was about all they could do anyway. Did you have any problems during the war with a Pakistani mob or anything like that?

VELLETRI: No. There were a couple of instances of mob demonstrations against the USIA under General Yahya.

Q: Yahya Khan?

VELLETRI: Yes, Yahya Khan. We had some students who demonstrated in front of the USIS library which was a distance from us. But apart from that, the Consulate did not experience any hostile demonstrations. In fact, the Consulate was situated near the Pakistani army barracks and
army intelligence which was always watching us very carefully, would also see to it that we were protected.

Q: Was there much political activity in your area at that time?

VELLETRI: Yes, the Moslem League was active and so was the Awami Party which struggled for political autonomy. The North West Frontier Province, like Baluchistan and Sindh, was always pushing for some kind of autonomy, but the central government refused to surrender any centralized power. This was unfortunate, because if the provinces could have been granted some local autonomy and been able to raise some taxes, administer their own educational and judicial system, like the states in our country, Pakistan would have avoided a great many internal problems.

SIDNEY SOBER
Deputy Chief of Mission
Islamabad (1969-1973)

Sidney Sober was born in 1919 in New York state and attended the City College of New York. During the World War II he served as a naval officer in the Pacific. He earned his graduate degree from the George Washington University in 1964. He started his Foreign Service career in 1947 and had posts in Tananarive, Praha, Reykjavik, Ankara, Bombay, and Islamabad. He also served at chief of South Asia Division in the Office of Intelligence and Research and director of Regional Office for Near East and South Asia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 1990.

Q: How did we view Pakistan as being a member of CENTO. There's talk that the British brought them in in order to get us involved.

SOBER: I don't think that's true. It's true that our outlook, the northern tier concept, we did develop in collaboration with the British. Of course Pakistan was part of the old British empire of India. India was known to the British far better than it was to us. But by the time this was taking place, we're talking 1954, 55, 56, the British influence was not nearly what it had been. We were playing an increasing and what became the major role in that area, too.

Pakistan. We didn't have to bring Pakistan in. Pakistan was very glad to come in. They had a bit of concern, but they were glad to come in. Basically Pakistan wanted to have some very powerful friends and the American superpower would be number one to help Pakistan build itself against what it saw as its primary foreign threat. And that was India. It was not the Soviet Union or Communist China, which were the great threats which the northern tier concept and the Baghdad Pact and the collective security across Asia were concerned about.

So we and Pakistan had different views about the primary threat. However it served the purposes of both countries to have an alliance. (Actually our only formal alliance was through the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of which we were both members; we never officially joined the Baghdad Pact). But we looked on Pakistan as an important element in this collective security system, in that it was a fairly large country, believed to have a good military tradition, and willing to sign up, if you will, on the western, free world, side. That was good enough for us.

At the same time, for Pakistan, I'm not suggesting that they liked the Communists, but that was not their major concern. Their major concern was India. And it served their purpose, very clearly, to receive American military equipment and political support.

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Q: I've heard it said by somebody else whom I interviewed that there has been this perception in the area that when a republican administration is in the tilt goes to Pakistan, and when a democratic administration is in, to India. And looking at it I can see a certain amount of validity about it. Is this valid?

SOBER: This is a fact that is deeply believed in by the people of Pakistan. In fact, also by people in India. And I think, historically, if you check it out, you can support this. I'm not sure this is a result of a deliberate interest or effort by democratic or republican administrations. But that's the way it has worked out. It's a fact of life, in the political map of the subcontinent, certainly as to what they believe and expect.

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Q: Then you moved to Rawalpindi, as deputy chief of mission in 1969.

SOBER: Islamabad was the new capital which had been built beginning in the early sixties. We moved our embassy up in Karachi, I guess, by late '65. We had kept a branch office up in Rawalpindi.

Rawalpindi and Islamabad are a dozen miles apart. Rawalpindi was used first as our embassy site, and as Islamabad was developed, we moved our operations there.

Q: This was the beginning of the Nixon Administration and there was a new ambassador. His name was Joseph Farland?

SOBER: Yes. He was asked to be ambassador and he asked me to be his DCM. My wife and I got to Islamabad a week or two before he got there with his wife.

Q: You'd been following this area for some time. Did you notice a change, having a new administration coming in, like the wind had changed?

SOBER: You'd have to think hard to identify actual changes of policy and action. It was generally known that Nixon was favorable to Pakistan. He had been vice-president when our strong connection with Pakistan had been built up, during the Eisenhower years. When he was out of office he had visited there and kept up his contacts. Again there is this syndrome that a
republican administration is going to be good to Pakistan. As a matter of fact things began to happen that were not known to the general public. Nixon did stop in Pakistan in spring of 1969, just a few months after he had taken office. He had a meeting with the man who replaced Ayub just briefly before, President General Yahya Khan. Nixon raised the question as to whether Pakistan might be willing to be helpful, as conditions permitted, in establishing some sort of link between the United States and China. That was very secret.

When we arrived in Pakistan in late ’69, we still had certain problems. In 1965 there was a September war between India and Pakistan. I alluded to this before. Much to Pakistan's annoyance, although CENTO was still going, SEATO was still going, we still had a military defense assistance program that had started in 1954, and we had this 1959 bilateral agreement which I mentioned before, not only did we not come to Pakistan's help in this war in 1965, but we said, in effect, a plague on both your houses. We suspended military supplies to both India and Pakistan. Now that sounds quite even-handed but, in effect, it hurt Pakistan and didn't bother India at all, because India had not had anything substantial in the way of US military aid, but Pakistan had become quite heavily dependent. Not only for equipment, but for things like parts and ammunition. So Pakistan felt betrayed by the United States. And the embargo on military shipments was still largely in effect when Nixon came in. We had lifted it slightly by saying that we'd sell spare parts. We said we'd supply non-lethal weapons - some things that don't go bang, like radio or transport equipment. But it was a pretty low-key level of military supply. So Pakistan was looking elsewhere and China was the obvious place that they were looking to, mainly. Thus that although Pakistanis perceived a benefit to them in Nixon's coming in, the immediate effects were not much evident when we arrived in 1969.

Q: Your ambassador was Joseph Farland.

SOBER: Joseph Farland had been a political ambassador before and had served in the Dominican Republic and Panama, under Republican administrations. He'd been an FBI agent during World War II and he was married to a lady whose father had been a coal operator in West Virginia. There was a lot of money there, and I guess where most of the money for political contributions came from. But obviously Farland, when he was named to his third ambassadorial post after a certain number of years, had some background. He knew something about the system. He went out with obvious feeling that it was his job to improve the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. And he set about to do that. He liked to travel and liked to be seen. He was quite good at that. As for running the embassy, my relationship with him was excellent. Without sounding self-serving, let me say that I think in retrospect, he was wise in letting experienced career people look after the operation of the mission. Which he pretty much did. He saw himself as chairman of the board and myself as chief executive officer.

Q: How long were you there?

SOBER: We stayed a little more than four years. We came in October of 1969 and we left in November of 1973.

Q: What was the political situation in Pakistan while you were there?
SOBER: President Yahya had come in in the spring of '69, having replaced Ayub, another general whose time had run out after ten years. Ayub was forced out. Yahya had a martial law system, and the military really ran the show at the top. It was referred to sometimes as the Junta. But Yahya, to his great credit, really wanted to move back toward a more normal political system. He instituted, not too many months after he took over, a number of reforms, under what he called a legal framework order and some other steps, which moved forward toward the restoration of political party rights and eventually towards a national political election which took place toward the end of 1970. What is noteworthy about this, is that not only did the election take place—a national popular election for the National Assembly -- but it was the first-ever democratic national popular election in Pakistan's history, since the country was formed in 1947. There had been so much political maneuvering and shenanigans that they had never been able to come to a really free and honest election. Now that took place and I think it was very much to Yahya's credit. He was very much maligned later on. Some of the complaints were justified but many were not. He isn't given credit enough for what he did. He had the elections on the basis of one man, one vote, which sounds normal and easy but was a very controversial issue in Pakistan, as it now may be in South Africa. Because in Pakistan, one man, one vote, meant that the majority of the electorate was located in East Pakistan, a thousand miles away from, if you will, the core of the central government.

Q: East Pakistan is what is now known as Bangladesh.

SOBER: Now known as Bangladesh. It had been part of Indian, Bengal - which was partitioned in 1947 and the Eastern portion became East Pakistan. Since there were and still are more people in that area than in what was West Pakistan and is now just Pakistan, it meant that they would have, and were scheduled to have, more parliamentarians in the National Assembly than West Pakistan. A result of that election was the almost unanimous victory for one party in East Pakistan, which led, after several months, to the civil war which occupied almost all of 1971.

Q: This was Mujib.

SOBER: Yes.

Q: This is very interesting because we have had several interviews which have really been quite interesting, because more than anywhere else, the relations between the various elements of the embassy which reflect the situation there. We've had interviews that have not been completely checked over with Archer Blood and with, at somewhat a different time, with Dick Post. Still there was this consulate general/embassy tension. Let's focus first on the Bangladesh/Islamabad relationship. How did the reporting go. Did the consulate report directly to Washington with a copy to the embassy?

SOBER: Throughout the time that I was there until after Arch blood left, I was the DCM, although I was in charge during a variety of periods. The reporting from Dacca was always direct with a copy to the embassy. We never exercised a privilege that we might have had to say no, we will clear and forward only what we want. There was nothing like that.
Q: Because later when Arthur Hummel was ambassador in the late seventies and Dick Post in Karachi, it was different.

SOBER: I'm interested to hear this. I was not aware of it. It was not true when I was in Bombay in the consulate there. And it was certainly not true for the consulates in Peshawar, in Karachi and Lahore as well as Dacca, in Pakistan, when I was at our embassy in Pakistan. The reporting was always direct with a copy to the embassy.

Q: How did you view, and the embassy view, the situation in East Pakistan. And how did you see the situation and how did it develop. Let's start from the election.

SOBER: Well, it was an honest election. It was remarkable in that it was the first time such an election had been held since 1947. Mujib won 167 out of 169 contested seats in East Pakistan, which was to give him an absolute majority in the National Assembly. That was December of 1970. Then the question was when would the National Assembly be convened by Yahya. And what's going to happen. Well, what would have happened, what everybody saw was inevitable, was that with an absolute majority of parliament, Mujib, the leader of the Awami League, would become the Prime Minister. Now that caused a great deal of concern among a variety of people in West Pakistan, because Mujib had been campaigning on what you might say was really a nationalist platform of so-called Six Points, which would have given a very high degree of autonomy or self-rule, short of actual independence, to East Pakistan. There were some people in East Pakistan who were calling for UDI, Unilateral Declaration for Independence. There was a long history, which we won't go into, of troubles between East and West Pakistan because they are of quite different ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, although the mass on both sides are Moslems -- which is the reason why the one state of Pakistan had been created. But there was a feeling, pretty wide-spread in East Pakistan, that they hadn't been dealt a fair deal. That they had been exploited by the more powerful political, military, commercial, financial elements of West Pakistan; and they wanted a better deal.

The prospect of being ruled by East Pakistanis was, quite frankly, not one that many West Pakistanis could take easily to. Then there was, beyond that, a concern, and this was surely a concern of the top military, whether these Six Points would lead to the inevitable break-up of Pakistan. As a first step on the way to a break-up. Six Points would have allowed foreign affairs and defense to the central government, but very little else. There was a concern that Mujib and his followers would then take the next, what appeared to some to be the next logical, step towards breaking with Pakistan.

There was a lot of dispute as to whether East Pakistan was a politico-economic plus for Pakistan as a whole or not. But East Pakistanis felt, to a large extent, that they had been milked and they would be a lot better off as independent. To be free.

Among the military, I'm sure, there was a deep concern. I think they thought that if push came to shove, their major responsibility to the nation as patriots, as servants of the state, was to maintain the integrity of Pakistan. Integrity is a word we use all the time. We favor the integrity of Lebanon, whatever that is. We favor the integrity of this country and that country. So saying that
they wanted to preserve the integrity of Pakistan is something one could understand. But in a very troubled history, where east and west had not gotten along so well...

Q: Was there much of an East Pakistani element in the army?

SOBER: Virtually none. This goes back to the British days under the Raj. Certain ethnic groups had been identified as what they called, martial races. That did not include the Bengalis. They were seen as poets and dreamers. The bulk of the Pakistani army, as is true now, was made up of Punjabis and Pashtuns. There was a very small percentage of East Pakistanis. So that was a serious problem.

Another problem related to the civilian political element in West Pakistan, and how it would react to a circumstance where not only would it have a Bengali, East Pakistani, Prime Minister, but a man who really was in charge. Now there had been, in previous years in Pakistan, Bengali, East Pakistani, Prime Ministers. There were three. They were always brought in by, and in fact were under the thumb of, West Pakistani Presidents, Generals or Governors General. So Mujib would not have been the first East Pakistani Prime Minister, but he would have been in an assembly which really had the power, to which he was responsible. Not responsible to a President or a Governor General. Much has been made of this, going over the history. The question is how the man who was the most popular political elected leader in West Pakistan, the winner of the December '70 elections there, one Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would deal with being number two. Well, he would be the deputy Prime Minister. He had won an absolute majority of the assembly seats in the December '70 elections in West Pakistan. So he was clearly the number two man, but he didn't begin to have the number of backers that Mujib would have in the Assembly. A lot has been made as to whether Bhutto, presumably not willing to be number two, not willing to be anything but number one, didn't have a hand in making sure that the Assembly didn't get convened. There was a lot of politicking involving visits by Yahya as well as Bhutto to Dacca to meet with Mujib. They were not able to come to an agreement.

And ultimately on March 25, 1971, three months after the election, the Pakistani military which had been ferried over by air, over Sri Lanka (that's another story, why not over India) from West Pakistan had been reinforced in East Pakistan in anticipation of a possible crunch. And in fact on March 25, they were let loose. I would call it a military riot. We use the term police riot. That was the beginning of the civil war, with some very gross abuses of force by the Pakistan military. It was the beginning of a war that only came to an end in December when the Indians mopped up the Pakistani forces.

Q: How was rapport between the embassy and the consulate general in Dacca. I can't recall the Archer Blood interview but there was some indication that the consulate general saw things in Dacca a certain way in Dacca than the embassy saw in Islamabad.

SOBER: There was a certain division. People in Dacca were horrified by the gross abuse of force by the Pakistani military. No question that there was a gross abuse of force. Their reaction was unanimously in favor of the Bengalis, the East Pakistanis, and against whatever action the central government was taking.
In the embassy in Islamabad, no one that I know of was pleased with what was happening in East Pakistan. We were aware that there was a gross abuse of force. On the other hand, unlike Dacca, we were looking upon the situation in terms of a national viewpoint of Pakistan and in terms of a US/Pakistan relationship. When I say looking at it from a national Pakistani viewpoint, I come back to what I said before. My feeling was that the Pakistani military, rightly or wrongly, were informed by one imperative, which was to preserve the integrity of Pakistan. Whether it was a mistake to have an East Pakistan to begin with is, going back to 1947, another question. Historically it was not destined always to be a part of Pakistan. It was always destined, maybe, to be a separate state. Nevertheless, it was part of Pakistan and these military thought it was their duty to their country, to keep the country together.

We had our Civil War. I don't say that I want to compare our Civil War and Lincoln's effort to maintain the union as similar to the Pakistan situation. But at the edges you can see similarities.

In addition to that we had the view of whether the United States should be seen as taking a position to favor the break-up of any country. There had been the Biafra problem before that. There is no modern counterpart in any other part of the world that I can think of to what happened to Pakistan - the break-up of a country, because of its own action. No other revolution has been as successful in breaking up a country. So this is a highly unusual thing.

The question I think we need to deal with in Pakistan is, whatever you thought about the wisdom of what they were doing, was it absolutely wrong for Pakistan to take the view that if they did not do this, the country would be broken up. The wisdom of how they were doing it is another thing. There was on this issue a very sharp division of view with Dacca. To say it again, we never in any way had any censorship about what they were reporting. We were very much aware of their position. I remember as DCM, I went over to Dacca in the spring of 1971 while Arch was still there - it was before he left in June. I didn't have oranges thrown at me but I would say that there were people who were very unfriendly towards me.

Q: You mean in the consulate general.

SOBER: Yes. We were not, in the embassy, about to take a position to break relations with Pakistan, or make a statement to that end. At that time, Bengali leaders, wherever they were, had already issued a unilateral declaration of independence after the break-out of the Pakistani military. We were not about to say yes, let's recognize the new regime. People had fled to Calcutta. We were not about to do that. So that was the basic difference.

There was another issue that didn't come to public view until after this. Arch left in June of '71. And that was three or four months after the trouble began in earnest with the fighting. I'm going to talk about one other thing that was unhelpful in a general way. Not as a value judgment as to the idea's being unhelpful, but the way it was done was unhelpful. There was a virtual unanimity in our Dacca consulate staff that we should denounce the West Pakistani effort in East Pakistan in every way we could. I was somewhat sympathetic with the thought that we hadn't done enough to distance ourselves, and as I recall, I think it was time when I happened to be in charge, we did send a telegram in which I recommended that we take certain steps, in addition to those we had taken to distance ourselves politically from the methods that the Pakistanis were using in
East Pakistan. We had come out publicly in saying we didn't condone, we didn't endorse what they're doing. But we didn't say, gee we think it's awful the way they're handling this. I recommended that we do something more to distance ourselves.

Never got a response.

The consulate in Dacca sent a dissent message to Washington about the American position, arguing that we should disassociate from what the Pakistanis were doing. In oversimplification, that was what it was. And that was certainly their right to do. It was an expression of what they felt, and so I had no question or problem with their doing that. Again that message went directly. I think it was unfortunate, in retrospect, that they sent it as an unclassified message with a copy to New Delhi and maybe some other places. Now such a message was destined to become public, which it did immediately. And of course that was very much in line with the Indian government's view which was very much against anything Pakistan would do, and so much against this particular effort in East and West Pakistan.

I think that was a mistake. That it had become a public disclosure of a dissent message enraged Washington, enraged Richard Nixon. As I recall (perhaps incorrectly) the immediate result of that was that he said that he wanted those people fired. Well that didn't happen but it enraged some people.

I think that this method was probably an overreaction. You do have certain constraints, as government people. You may feel very strongly. If you are serving you have ways to voice your protest. It's not supposed to be a public protest. So that was a mistake.

Well, Arch left in June. Let me say that Arch and I came into the Foreign Service together. I had known him all those years. He had been in Dacca during part of the time my wife and I were serving in Bombay. We knew he had been there. I guess I was personally responsible for Arch's being brought as consul general to Dacca, because Ambassador Farland had wanted to have a very strong officer. We recognized the importance of getting good reporting and strong control through the actions of the consul general in Dacca. It was my recommendation to Farland which Arch accepted. He had been political counselor in Athens, and he was detached in mid-tour and brought to Dacca. When we had these events in the spring of 1971, Farland felt, and I agreed with him, given the way events had progressed, that when Arch was ready for home leave in June of 1971, it was probably better for him not to return.

Q: Wasn't there also a question of evacuation of the families because of the attitude of the Pakistani troops, feeling as if they felt we thought they couldn't defend them.

SOBER: There was some soreness with regard to the evacuation. We did decide, when the fighting was growing, to evacuate our people. They went to Tehran, most of them, to begin with. We did have a little trouble at first getting an agreement from the Pakistani military about bringing in a plane. They were dragging their feet. People in Dacca were justifiably outraged at that.

I remember myself getting on the phone, again when I was in charge, because Farland was doing
a lot traveling outside. I had a telephone conversation with the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Mr. Sultan Khan, and I said that I thought the delaying actions of the Pakistan authorities in East Pakistan over the preparations for the evacuation were "intolerable." That was the word I used. When the ambassador returned a couple days later, he was called in by the Foreign Secretary who protested that I had used that word "intolerable." As I remember, Farland did not discipline me. On the contrary he reported on it positively by telegram. The word I got back was (and it made me feel good, because there was a lot of hard feeling) that when the consulate general in Dacca saw a copy of the message, they cheered because I had said that. But there were hard feelings. There is no question about that.

Then another little incident occurred. These are footnotes. No great consequence. I flew down from Karachi where the Pan American plane had stopped with the load of evacuees from Dacca on the way to Tehran. I guess I did say something to this effect: Remember, we still have people in Dacca; and this is a very touchy situation there, and so I hope we'll all be somewhat careful about remarks to the public about what's happening. We knew about our people's feelings. They were outraged, thoroughly outraged. I had no problem with that. But we were in a somewhat sensitive position. After all, we were dealing with the Pakistani government. My remarks were taken rather offensively by some of our people -- as if they were meant as a gag.

Q: *This is a case of overly identifying with the people.*

SOBER: I don't want to be the one to say that. I think there was a danger of that. It was a highly emotional situation. I say there was gross abuse of force by the Pakistan military. You can read whatever you want into that. I think the outrage was justified, but after all we were diplomats representing our government and the situation was fairly complex.

Q: *How much did you feel that the hand of Henry Kissinger was involved in this whole thing?*

SOBER: What I said before was that there was some other element at the time this was going on that hadn't come yet to public notice. That became public in July 1971. In June Arch left. As you may remember July 1971 was the time of the rather momentous, historic visit by Henry Kissinger to Beijing. It was the culmination of what I referred to briefly before. The first approach about China was made by Nixon to Yahya in the spring of '69. In a later trip, by Yahya to the United States, in '70, he was asked if Pakistan would in fact serve as a channel of communication. Not as an intermediary but as a channel. And in fact Pakistan did and it did it very successfully, very ably and secretly. Those messages between the United States and China, via Pakistan, culminated in the secret flight of Henry Kissinger from Rawalpindi to Beijing about the 5th or 6th of July 1971. What was not known at the time, except to one or perhaps two people in our Embassy, not including me, was that these negotiations had been going on. In retrospect it is very clear that Washington, with its knowledge of these things, was not about to endanger the successful culmination of our talks, via Pakistan, by unduly and seriously endangering our relations with Pakistan. So with that retrospect, one can see why we perhaps did not take as forthright an action as we might have in expressing our opposition about the way the Pakistanis were going about trying to keep the country together.

Q: *There was something about an aircraft carrier.*
SOBER: Oh yes, that's still a buzzword in current India/US relations. You're talking about the Enterprise, and that was much later -- in December 1971. Here we've gotten up to June and July of 1971.

Q: Were you aware of any of this US/China stuff.

SOBER: I personally was not until the announcement which was made about the 15th of July at the White House.

Q: Was Ambassador Farland aware of it?

SOBER: Yes, he was the only one at the embassy who was substantially aware of it. Yes he was in on it.

Q: What happened after, with the break up of East Pakistan? How did you see it? What was our role?

SOBER: The Indians, as I mentioned before, had taken a very open and forthright position, denouncing the government of Pakistan, and established a relationship with the leaders of the Bengalis of East Pakistan who had got through the net and had fled to Calcutta.

Q: Where was Mujib?

SOBER: He had been picked up on the night of March 25 by the Pakistan military, and brought to Pakistan, where he spent the rest of that year in jail. India was just 100% in favor of East Pakistan's independence. They cited the fact that a huge mass (they used the figure ten million) of refugees had come over. And a large number had come over. But clearly it appeared to me then and it appears to me now that India had another iron in the fire and that was something against Pakistan in general. I remember we sent a telegram, in the early summer, when Indian participation was already evident. They were providing safe refuge for the rebels, called the Mukti Bahini, who had crossed the border and they were safe. The Pakistani military were not about to cross the Indian border in hot pursuit. And the Indians were providing arms and some training, and some military leadership. Things began to come out. I remember we sent a telegram fairly early in the summer from Islamabad saying, in our opinion, that India was heading toward an irresistible temptation to cut Pakistan down to size. This in effect is what happened. I think that the Indians saw a ready-made opportunity. Not that they devised it, but which they would exploit it.

I remember that the United States tried to prevent the war. I was in charge and I had a telegram, go to see Yahya. The same telegram went to Ambassador Keating in New Delhi, go to see Indira Gandhi. Make a strong play that they should agree to have military forces withdraw a certain distance, about ten miles, from the border in East Pakistan, and let UN people come in and separate them to try and avert a war. I went to see Yahya who happened to be in Karachi and he said, sure. It was in Pakistan's interest to agree to anything like that because everybody knew that if it came to a war with India, Pakistan couldn't possibly succeed in East Pakistan. Ambassador
Keating saw the Foreign Minister, because Indira was away, and couldn't get anywhere with him. India was already committed.

A little later, Indira visited Washington, in November of '71 and Nixon tried to talk her out of any engagement with Pakistan. Didn't succeed. He's written about this in his memoirs.

In early December, the war started. The way wars go in the subcontinent, they take two to three weeks. That's the standard period for war. And that's what happened. At the end of it Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were mopped up. There was some fighting on the western front but it was inconclusive. Some 90-odd thousand Pakistanis were captured and that was the end of Pakistan as it was. There was no more East Pakistan. And that was the birth of Bangladesh.

Q: How did the Pakistanis regard America during this time? Were they pleading for help?

SOBER: No. Fairly early after the March 25 beginning of fighting, we suspended any new shipments of military equipment. Now that wasn't very important because the embargo that we put on in the '65 war had never really been lifted to any substantial degree. So there wasn't much coming. But there were a few things in the pipeline. In fact we had a glitch. The Foreign Minister of India, Swaran Singh, had visited Washington in the summer. He was told no, everything was stopped. It turned out that there was a shipment of about five million dollars of stuff in the pipeline, which went through. The Indians cried foul, we've been misled. Well even then, five million dollars didn't make for much, and the type of things we were sending to Pakistan had no important -- if any -- military impact in East Pakistan. It's not a place where tanks could be used, where combat aircraft were used. It's very watery. But the Indians took it as another sign of American hostility.

Pakistanis were not unfriendly to us, although we did not help them. We stopped all military shipments. All economic aid was also put on hold because you couldn't operate in East Pakistan. Everything was in suspension. We didn't really help them but on the other hand, we certainly didn't abuse them publicly.

In Islamabad, we maintained a friendly and open discussion under Yahya with Pakistan. We went to see him. We appealed to him on several occasions. I think we can take some credit in that he decided to not have Mujib executed, which some people in West Pakistan were demanding. We made appeals to him, some of which were accepted, to ease up in East Pakistan. Replace the military governor with a civilian governor, who happened to be of Bengali origin; offer amnesty. Some things were done to soften things, but the total effect was not very much. The die had been cast and the fighting had already gone too far. It could not be stopped or pulled back.

And we kept saying, as we had been saying in the Sinai Desert one or two years before, stop shooting and start talking. We weren't ever able to get to that point. Fighting had gone too far. Nor were we able to avert a war in December of 1971. But during that period, I would say we maintained a good, decent relationship with the government of Pakistan. Not to say we liked what they were doing but in terms of a dialogue with them.
Q: Did you feel at all threatened during the war between India and Pakistan?

SOBER: I happened to be returning from home leave when the war broke out. My wife and I had just arrived in Tokyo on the way back. I got a call from the desk officer, Peter Constable, about two in the morning at the hotel, and he said the war had started. I was on a plane the next morning at eight o'clock out of Tokyo Airport. We couldn't fly over India because the air space was closed. I finally got a plane to Tehran and flew from Tehran to Kabul and drove from Kabul back to Islamabad. I got back to Pakistan about two days after the war began.

There was one minor air raid. One airplane came over and shot up the terminal in Rawalpindi. No bombs. The Indians clearly were superior overall, although the Pak air force was giving quite a good account of itself. No, I don't remember that we were worried.

We did evacuate people, dependents and non-essentials -- people from various posts in Pakistan, especially from Lahore and Islamabad.

Q: For the rest of the time you were there, how did things play out?

SOBER: My wife and I stayed on almost two more years. Ambassador Farland went on home leave in January and while he was home on leave, he was designated to be Ambassador to Tehran. That was an important job. I think his work was appreciated, particularly the Pakistan link with the opening of China. He came back for a week to say goodbye. But basically throughout all of 1972 and until we left in early November of '73, I was in charge of the mission.

It was a very interesting time. Pakistan had suffered a very serious defeat - 90,000-plus people had been captured. They had lost half their country, more than half their country in terms of population. It was a tremendous humiliation. And the question was, what's going to happen. Yahya gave up immediately with the surrender of the West Pakistani forces. He turned power over to Bhutto who had been the big winner in the elections of West Pakistan the year before and was the obvious civilian to take over, which he did. He became President, and was in charge of the country until he was ousted by Zia in 1977.

It was an interesting period, while Pakistan tried to set itself right, and in retrospect, they did a remarkable job. The United States was reasonably sympathetic. We provided a great deal of economic aid. Bhutto had a past in which he had at times criticized the United States. He had been very critical of our failure to help in the '65 war, for example. He had been the architect, to a large extent, of the close relationship between China and Pakistan, at a time before we opened up with China. That had caused some troubles between the United States and Pakistan. But I would say that certainly for the two years I was there, and I know for some years thereafter, the United States and Pakistan under Bhutto maintained a very good dialogue and relationship.

Q: How about your personal impression in your dealings with Bhutto?

SOBER: My dealings with him were always very friendly. I had reopened an embassy relationship with Bhutto in 1970 during the first year I was there, with Farland's approval. That relationship had been closed down by the previous ambassador who had been turned off by
Bhutto because of some of these anti-American things he said. But I didn't think that was the way to operate because he clearly was a man with a future. My relations with him were always very, very good. It wasn't a deeply social relationship but it had some social overtones. And a very open political relationship. My impression of him at the time was, here is a man with great ability. He was a standout. I saw him operate with a crowd of more than 110,000 people in Lahore Stadium, where he was speaking in Urdu, which was not a great language of his. He had people eating out of the palm of his hand. On the other hand I saw him dealing on sophisticated global issues, on a one-to-one level with a man like Henry Kissinger. He had that vast reach to deal with the populace. He was a populist leader. But with a very sophisticated and sound view of world events.

Q: Do you think he understood the United States? What made it tick. I always had the impression that the Indians tended to respect but really look down upon the United States, being a lot older civilization.

SOBER: I think that's true of Nehru. I think Nehru tended to look upon the United States as rather an upstart and with not too deep culture. This is perhaps what Nehru imbibed while he was at Cambridge.

Bhutto was different. After all he had gone to the University of California at Berkeley. I wouldn't say which one of us does fully understand the United States. But I think that his understanding was more than adequate. He did understand pretty well. Whether he looked down upon us I can't really say. My own relationship was very open and on a very level basis. During the period I was there, I must say, we had no disputes of any important nature. On the contrary, it was very close and very good.

Q: Anything else to cover during that time?

SOBER: There were no major disputes or events. We were sympathetic in helping Pakistan get back on its feet. We did have a series of very important economic aid agreements. Military aid was not opened. It was not an issue. I think he wanted very much to have good relationships with the United States. With Iran also, which was a factor in this. He stayed in CENTO. You might have thought from his statements in earlier years that he would have wanted to get out of CENTO. He did get out of SEATO but that was understandable because East Pakistan was the link towards the east and towards southeast Asia. With East Pakistan gone, Pakistan had no basis in SEATO and he did get out of it.

I think the reason he stayed in CENTO, was not only that he wanted to maintain a close relationship with the Shah of Iran but also because of the United States.

We discussed questions of all types. There were no major regional issues that needed to be dealt with in that particular time.

Q: You've been here for three hours. What gave you the greatest satisfaction, if anything.

SOBER: This is bound to be a self-serving opportunity, isn't it?
Q: Yes, absolutely.

SOBER: The thing that gave us the most pleasure, and that's different than satisfaction, was our duty in Bombay. For my wife and myself that was the time when we enjoyed ourselves thoroughly. Even when the Indians didn't like us. More so when they did like us. There was enough of the good.

As for a single moment of satisfaction -- I guess your question comes down to something that probably was related to something that was important in which we had some role.

Q: It doesn't have to be. It could be with relationships, or how one viewed one's career.

SOBER: Okay, this is a little self-serving but you asked for it. It was at the time when I was Chargé d’Affaires in Pakistan.

Bhutto wanted to have a constitution, a good constitution. It was hammered out over a period of months. It's the 1973 Constitution which is still in force although it has been diluted, amended, transgressed upon in fact, by Zia, the last previous boss. And that's a problem in current Pakistani politics. But it was a good Constitution, which was adopted unanimously by the Parliament -- quite an event, because you had some very stalwart opposition leaders of different stripes. But every single one of them stood up to vote "yes" in the Parliament. I was with other heads of mission in the Parliament gallery, watching. It was a good Constitution, recognized at such, with a recognition of provincial rights, and reasonable protections for democratic processes. Why I had the most satisfaction was that I was there as the acting American head of mission, and as always we were a rather prominent mission. It is certainly true today and it was true then. I had fairly wide contacts, including not only with Bhutto but also with senior opposition people. I remember I had discussions, just one-on-one, at the house with two of the major opposition leaders, one from Baluchistan and one from the Frontier, in which I encouraged them to take an open attitude toward the effort to come up with a good constitution, one that was good for Pakistan; give the country for the first time in its history, a really good constitution that the people would like. The satisfaction I had was reflected from the day that the constitution was adopted. There was a reception in Rawalpindi, by the government, for the members of Parliament, to which diplomats were invited. I remember (my wife remembers this more accurately) that numbers of the political leaders, including the opposition, came up to thank me for my role.

What was more interesting to me was that I had a call about that time, from Mr. Bhutto, just after the reception. He'd gone to spend the evening in Murree, which is a hill station some thirty miles north of Islamabad. He asked me to come see him, which I did. Drove up. And what he wanted to see me about was to express his thanks to me for helping get the constitution through. Now that's an unusual thing, but not such a wonderful position for any diplomat to be in. I took it in all good grace. I didn't think that I was interfering. But, in retrospect, since that constitution is still looked upon as what Pakistan should go back to, by the present government led by the daughter of the man who asked me to come up and see him at that time, it gives me some satisfaction.
Q: This is what diplomacy is all about. We are called upon from time to time, not only because we are a powerful country, but we have had a constitution that has gone through all sorts of strains, but it still has held up. Naturally, if you are talking about a written constitution, an American is not a bad person to ask about it.

JOSEPH J. SISCO
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco was born in Illinois in 1919. He received both his graduate degree and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. In 1951, he joined the State Department and served in variety of positions including Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern affairs. Michael Sterner conducted the interview on March 19, 1990.

SISCO: It also happened on India, and Pakistan where Kissinger and I disagreed on an intelligence report. There was an intelligence report that came in which said that there was a cabinet meeting in which the Indians intended to go beyond separating Bangladesh from Pakistan, but also to pursue military operations in order to destroy effectively the overall military capacity of Pakistan for an indefinite period. I cast doubt on the memorandum, which came from dubious sources. I argued strongly against it saying that's not the assumption on which we should be operating. This was in a NSC staff meeting, and Kissinger carted me to the President's office and, of course, what he did not tell me, and what the President didn't tell me was, that they were then using the Pakistanis as a conduit in opening the door to China. That was the main reason for a distorted tilt towards Pakistan.

LEONARDO M. WILLIAMS
Director, American Center, USIS
Karachi (1970-1971)

Mr. Williams was born in Alabama. He was raised in Alabama, Washington, D.C and Minnesota and was educated at St. John’s College (MN), University of Wisconsin and Georgetown University. After joining the Foreign Service in 1968, he served as USIA Public Affairs and Information Officer in India, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. His Washington assignments dealt primarily with operations of USIA. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: When did you go to Karachi?

WILLIAMS: Summer of 1970.
Q: And you were there until when?

WILLIAMS: Until summer of ‘71.

Q: Again a year.

WILLIAMS: Yes. But that was at my own request.

Q: What was Karachi like?

WILLIAMS: Before I got there, someone described it as the largest village in the world. At the time, it was about three million people. It just seemed very quiet. Being an Islamic country, it seemed much more drab. The city had been relatively small until partition and then suddenly all these refugees came in. And they still had people living in refugee communities 20 years after partition. It didn’t have a lot in the way of amenities outside your home. There was the SIMD, which was an old British style club that had Pakistani members as well. Vietnam was still going hot, so that was always a big issue. I started out as the assistant press officer and then became the director of the American center after three months. It was a time when USIA had a lot of money and you were encouraged to do whatever you could dream up. We did some interesting things. There used to be ship visits, U.S. Navy ships. They would bring in films and then we would organize film showings for the community using those films. Finding speakers. We did exhibits. We did a book fair every year. It was an environment where you could do a lot of different things. The security issue wasn’t there yet.

Q: Today, there is strong hardline Muslim fundamentalism, which is essentially anti-American.

WILLIAMS: Yes. In those days, the Muslim fundamentalism was there but it was considered more on the fringes. You would hear of an incident maybe involving a foreign tourist every now and then, maybe twice in the year that I was there, but it was usually something involving modesty. The American women when they went out dressed modestly. They wouldn’t wear the burqa covering everything. But it was definitely a more conservative society than New Delhi. But they had places that were supposedly westernized, a couple of clubs that would bring in Filipino performers, bands, that type of thing.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

WILLIAMS: I don’t remember. Being in Karachi, I was in the consulate. Our consul general was Hobart Luppi.

Q: Did you find that as you were working for USIA, was there an effort to key programs to a Muslim society?

WILLIAMS: No. There wasn’t that dimension. The focus was on the issue. I don’t know if they were so carefully thought out in Washington, but I don’t recall any bad experiences with any of the materials that we got or the way the speakers presented themselves. It may have been just that we instinctively or unconsciously didn’t do certain things without discussing them. I don’t
recall ever having a discussion saying, “Well, how are we going to pitch this particular issue?” In retrospect, I remember what we were doing. We were pitching American culture; there was no Islamic dimension to that. We never talked about a community of Islam in the United States, at least that year that I was there. We were dealing with international issues which... I don’t recall the Middle East being discussed.

Q: *This was not long after the Six Day War.*

WILLIAMS: I don’t recall that there was an outcry there.

Q: *I don’t think it had become that much of an issue as it became later.*

WILLIAMS: What was going on when I was there that took up a lot of the Pakistani’s attention was the problems they were having in maintaining east Pakistan as a part of the Pakistani state. The war broke out in December of ‘71.

Q: *Just after you had left.*

WILLIAMS: Right. But the effort to suppress the independence movement in east Pakistan had started before then. So, in that spring and summer of ‘71, the Americans from the consulate in east Pakistan were evacuated to Tehran. For them, that was the big focus. But I just don’t recall the Mid East being part of our dialogue with the Pakistani people.

Q: *Did you get any feel for the tensions between our people in India and our people in Pakistan, localitis?*

WILLIAMS: No, not really. at least in USIA, the people tended to rotate between posts. The senior guys were pretty much of the background where they had a number of posts in both countries. Languages, except for reading them, the spoken languages in Lahore and Delhi are very similar. Urdu is kind of the lingua franca all over Pakistan and it was very similar to Hindi. So, I didn’t sense any... Maybe at the policy level in the embassy, but I don’t recall that being an issue.

Q: *You left there only after a year. Why was that?*

WILLIAMS: Because I didn’t like it. I asked to transfer. I felt disappointed in having been sent to Karachi. I had been told I was getting another assignment and then I didn’t get it, so I kind of got there with a bad taste in my mouth. It was very different. One of the directors of USIA, the regional director, came through and in talking, I let him know I was very unhappy and wanted out. He was kind enough to say, “Well, if you’ll stay a year, I’ll see what I can do.” It was a very different personnel system in those days. After a year, I left.

EDWARD C. INGRAHAM
Counselor for Political Affairs
Islamabad (1971-1974)

Edward C. Ingraham was born in New York state in 1922. He received his undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College in 1942 and subsequently joined the war effort and served in the U.S. Army overseas between 1943-45. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. In addition to Islamabad, his posts included Cochabamba, La Paz, Hong Kong, Perth, Madras, Djakarta, and Rangoon. He was interviewed on April 8, 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: There were no crises. What did you do between 1971 and 1974, before you went to Islamabad?

INGRAHAM: I went to Islamabad in 1971. I was a year and a half in INR and, frankly, it was an interesting job in its way but wasn't anywhere near the center of things. Then I heard they were looking for a political counselor for Islamabad so I made a few phone calls saying, "I would love it." Next thing I knew, off I went to Islamabad.

Q: So you were in Islamabad from 1971 to when?


Q: What was the situation in Pakistan during that time?

INGRAHAM: Now this was a crucial, key period in Pakistan's history. It was exciting to be there. When I arrived in the summer of '71, there had been quite a cataclysm in Pakistan. After years of a rather benign dictatorship under Ayub Khan, for some weird reason the government decided to hold free elections. So they held free elections. Now the majority of Pakistanis were Bengalis from East Pakistan -- 55 million to 45 million, something like that -- but the country from the beginning had been run totally from the West. There was something called rather condescendingly "second capital" in Dhaka. The Punjabis ran the country. The Bengalis were second-class citizens, even though most of the foreign exchange came from East Bengal -- jute primarily. So you had a country of two separate people who spoke different languages, with totally different cultures. The only thing they had in common was Islam. And because of the strange doings of the Indian partition of 1947, the two parts of the country were separated by a thousand miles of India. By the time I got there it seemed utterly doomed. They had held those free elections. All the Bengalis had united behind Sheikh Mujib and his party. In the West meanwhile there were three or four parties. The Bengalis had won an absolute majority in the parliament in Islamabad. The East Pakistanis had taken over the government lock, stock and barrel. Well, the West Pakistani politicians and the army simply couldn't stand this. So they promptly annulled the election, threw everybody in jail, declared martial law, sent the Punjabi army to East Pakistan and the debacle started.

The East Pakistanis were supported diplomatically and materially by India. The Pakistan army in East Pakistan behaved very badly, not quite as badly as the Iraqis, but on that level. They didn't really consider the Bengalis to be fellow citizens. They considered them groveling, inferior beings. They shot them up, raped, murdered, burned down villages, etc. India began supporting
Bengali guerrillas coming in from India. Hundreds of thousands, and eventually millions, of refugees moved into adjoining India, putting a terrific strain on the Indians. The Indians stepped up their aid to the guerrillas to get rid of Pakistani control and permit the refugees to go home.

So we had the crisis. We were sitting in Islamabad, we had a consulate in Dhaka. I remember spending three weeks in Dhaka in October 1971.

Q: Arch Blood was the Consul General at that time wasn't he?

INGRAHAM: Yes, he was.

Q: Did you see a problem between your being in Islamabad and having your contacts seeing it one way and then the Consul General in East Pakistan seeing it another way? Did this cause problems?

INGRAHAM: Not really. Some problems but not as many as you might think. We in Islamabad, particularly after my trip to Dhaka, realized that...from the time I arrived we believed Pakistan was doomed. A split was inevitable. In fact it had already occurred. But Washington wouldn't believe this. And so our quarrel was with Washington, yet at the same time we didn't want to tell Washington to switch policy. At that time we had a more or less neutral policy. Unfortunately it got hung up with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and their globaloney. They saw Pakistan as a firm base for CENTO -- Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, the eternal Iran standing as the center piece. Washington was pro-Pakistan. We had built, supported and maintained the Pakistanis. Years earlier Ayub Khan had come to Washington and said, "I have one of the finest armies in Asia and it will be at your disposal. All I need are the weapons." And he got them. But by 1971 we had a not-very-bright general in charge in Islamabad, General Yahya Khan.

We in Islamabad found ourselves at odds more with Washington than we did with Dhaka in this period leading up to the December 1971 war. Washington -- Henry Kissinger -- had looked at a map and said, "We need this piece of real estate. Forget what is happening inside the country. It is a part of my overall strategy to surround the Soviet Union." Pakistan was also a member of SEATO -- the bridge country between SEATO and CENTO. To the highest levels in Washington, Pakistan wasn't a country approaching chaos but a piece of the global jigsaw puzzle. So we found ourselves constantly bickering with Washington.

Now the internal structure of the Embassy was rather strange at that time because we had an ambassador who was, to put it mildly, a lightweight.

Q: This was...?

INGRAHAM: Joe Farland. He had been head of a large coal company in West Virginia. He had become head by hard work, perspicacity and marrying the boss' daughter. It was the Christopher Coal Company and her maiden name was Christopher. Farland was a heavy contributor to the Republican Party and had bought ambassadorships before -- in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo. To show the depths of his political perception, he once said, "Ed, you don't understand; Trujillo was a fine man, he was just misled by evil companions." I said, "Oh, is that so Mr.
Ambassador." Fortunately he had a deputy, Sid Sober. The Ambassador generally realized that he didn't really know what was going on so he let Sid Sober run the Embassy. He made lots of trips back to the States -- business trips where he would be gone for a month or so with his family. He also had a lovely place up in the hill station, Murree, about 50 miles out of Islamabad, and every Friday, or Thursday if he could, he would go up and spend the weekend. He would be closeted there, drinking and playing games and that sort of things. He loved to fish too. Then he would come back to Islamabad Sunday or Monday.

Sid Sober, meanwhile, ran the show. Fortunately, as I say, Farland realized that foreign policy was not his bag and that he had a good deputy. He didn't put his finger in the machinery very often.

In late 1971, of course, things went from bad to worse. We had a teenage daughter who was going to boarding school in India. My wife and I drove across the border in November 1971, and on up to Mussoorie in India; picked up our daughter from the school; spent a little time traveling around India; and then drove back across the border on December 3. Rather than spending the night at Lahore, we decided to drive straight on to Islamabad. The roads were clogged with army trucks. As we pulled into our driveway in Islamabad the air raid sirens went off and the war started. Had I been one day later, the Political Counselor at the Embassy in Islamabad would have been on the Indian side of the border for the duration.

We were in Islamabad throughout the war, but it only lasted two weeks. Our DCM, who had been running the Embassy, was on home leave in the States.

Q: Sid Sober.

INGRAHAM: Sid Sober. Joe Farland was trying to run the Embassy. He had no idea what to do, so he did nothing. By coincidence, that was exactly what we should have done. Sheer accident but it worked. We didn't evacuate, although most of the other embassies did. We kept our people there. We did evacuate the staff from the Lahore consulate general.

It was a strange war. Blackout curtains. The Indians never touched Islamabad, but the airport was just a few miles away. I can remember in the evenings, in this lovely city with mountain ranges surrounding us and jackals howling, we would go out on our upstairs terrace just after sunset and sit, surrounded by flowers and potted palms, with the servants padding in and out keeping our glasses filled, while we watched the Indian air force bomb the airport. One of the airplanes they hit belonged to the head of our military mission in Islamabad, a fellow named Chuck Yeager.

Q: Oh yes. One of the first astronauts.

INGRAHAM: He was the first man to break the sound barrier and he was quite a hero. Chuck Yeager had a small plane assigned to him, that he used to use primarily to fly the ambassador around the country on fishing trips. Well, an Indian fighter plane came racing down the runway and saw only two planes there so he took them both out. I remember Yeager coming in, shouting, "This is an atrocity. They knew it was my plane. This is an insult to the President of the United States. They are going to pay for this." I said, "Chuck, the Indian pilot is coming in over an
enemy airport at 500 miles an hour and is under fire. He sees an airplane, what does he do, check
the registration?" Chuck looked at me and said, "You are disloyal."

Q: You say that you were probably doing the right thing by doing nothing, but were you getting
the feeling that our Embassy in New Delhi was weighing in India-wise, or did you find...

INGRAHAM: Yes, the Embassy in Delhi was weighing in very definitely. I forget who our
Ambassador was at that time, but yes, they were definitely at odds with Washington. We were
half on their side, because we felt the war ought to stop and India should end it once Bangladesh
had broken off. Washington was charging that Indira Gandhi intended to send her army into what
was left of Pakistan...the Pakistanis were absolutely convinced that the Indians were going to
reverse the 1947 partition and reabsorb them. The Pakistanis started the war, incidentally. Their
armies were being decimated in East Pakistan. Indian intervention was becoming ever more
open, so the Pakistanis took a deep breath and said, "Lets attack in the West."

The war only lasted two weeks. Wisely, Indira Gandhi blew the whistle and stopped the war
without taking any Pakistani territory as soon as the Pakistani general in the East surrendered.
The defeat caused a turnover in Pakistan. Yahya Khan...a decent man I guess, not very bright,
drank a lot -- he was the only man Joe Farland knew in the government because he would call
Farland over to drink with him. He didn't want to talk about politics, he just wanted a drinking
partner. Farland was dense enough so that the two of them got along quite well.

Anyway, Yahya Khan resigned. It was a sad resignation, because the war had been lost, and he
had had a great deal to drink and his voice came over the radio -- they didn't show him on
television, they simply showed the radio. His last act was to order the execution of Sheikh Mujib.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto suddenly emerged as the new leader. The first thing he did was to cancel the
execution. He then put Mujib on a plane and had him flown to England, saving his life. Bhutto
then became first Prime Minister and then President.

Bhutto was one of the most fascinating characters ever. He had great flaws. He was egotistical,
somewhat dishonest, but he also was a man of considerable brilliance and he wanted the best for
Pakistan. I did see a fair amount of him. He was a person you could hardly trust but very often
admire. He saved Pakistan, which was utterly demoralized by that defeat.

In the Embassy, Farland stayed on during the war. Late in the war -- it may have been over -- Sid
Sober had managed to fly back as far as Kabul, get a car down to the border and slip into
Islamabad just in time for the war's end. As soon as the war was over, Farland felt he had to go
back to the States on business, so he disappeared. He was back in the States for quite an extended
period. Suddenly we heard that he had been named Ambassador to Iran. So he moved his
personal entourage to Iran. He was there only a few months when Washington had to do
something about Dick Helms, so they bumped Farland and sent him as Ambassador to Iran in
Farland's place.

Q: How long were you in Pakistan when Bhutto was there?

INGRAHAM: Bhutto took over in January 1971. I left in the summer of 1974, so it was a couple
of years. Most of this time, for two years -- for reasons that to this day I am not quite sure of-- Sid Sober was Chargé. No ambassador was appointed. During the first few months, of course, Farland was the ostensible ambassador, but when he was appointed to Tehran in the late spring, nobody replaced Sid Sober. Sid remained chief of mission. Sid was the one who, with me at his shoulder, would frequently see Bhutto. Sid knew him better than anyone.

It was a fascinating time, because Pakistan was reforming itself as a totally different nation. All its perceptions had to be completely changed. It was no longer vital to India. It had one-eighth the population of India. Its army had been humiliated. Bangladesh was no longer part of Pakistan. The country began to look inward. Now, without Bangladesh, Pakistan actually became a sort of nation. They had four different ethnic groups, all of them bloodthirsty. But each could see that they had more in common with each other, with one exception, than any of them had with the outside.

I remember when I first arrived in Pakistan, back in the summer of 1971. I had never been there before. I knew India reasonably well, but I had no idea of what Pakistan was like. I remember the first weekend, my wife and I got into our car and drove down to Rawalpindi. We walked into our first Pakistani store and five minutes later I turned to Susan and said, "This is India." It was the last time we ever said that, but we had discovered what Pakistan was -- Pakistan is India. The culture is, shall we say, South Asian subcontinent. The Pakistani generals would have had nothing in common with, lets say, the generals of Iran. But those same Pakistani generals could talk for hours with their old classmates from military school who ran the Indian army. So Pakistan, in those days, anyway, was really India.

Q: How did we view Bhutto as far as his policy towards us?

INGRAHAM: During this period, quite favorably. When war broke out, Nixon said, "We don't want to be neutral, we want to tilt toward Pakistan."

Q: It was Kissinger, I think.

INGRAHAM: We sent one of our aircraft carriers...

Q: Enterprise or one of those.

INGRAHAM: Yes. ...to the Indian Gulf. It had absolutely no effect on India because by that time the Indians had ended the fighting. We tried to claim that if it hadn't been for us the Indians would have kept right on going, but no such thing.

So with a favorable initial outlook from Washington, we considered Bhutto pretty good. He didn't do anything wrong during the period I was there. Later on he stole an election that he would have won honestly, anyway. That was one of his flaws: he couldn't be satisfied with 60 percent, had to have 90 percent. So his lieutenants went out and stole the election for him. That was the last straw for the army and he was overthrown.

Q: That was when?
INGRAHAM: That was about '75, '76. And then, of course, he was charged with murder. It was a trumped-up case. I suspect he ordered murders in his day, but then so had General Zia, who had him hanged. Bhutto was hanged as a common criminal. And then there was that extraordinary period a decade later when his daughter became Prime Minister.

Q: *You left Islamabad in...?*


Q: *You came back for a period to Washington.*

INGRAHAM: Three years. I was country director for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It was a good job, but I was sorry to leave Pakistan because it had been so damn fascinating and you always had the feeling of being in on something.

Oh yes, just before I left, Byroade came in as Ambassador. So I didn't serve much under Byroade in Pakistan although I had served under him in Burma for two years. It took only a short time to realize he was going to get along fine with Bhutto. Byroade was determined to do the right thing by Pakistan. When he first came...that was when Moynihan was in Delhi and Byroade was in Islamabad...Delhi was sending in some brilliant cables, drafted by the political section, no doubt, but it was obvious that Moynihan was editing a bit, spicing them up. As political counselor I had the job of trying to match Moynihan's prose. I would write what I thought was a sparkling rejoinder, saying, in effect, "Whatever Delhi may say, what really is happening is this." I would send them in to Byroade. He would whittle them down, deleting all of my brilliant, sparkling phrases. I was furious at first but then I realized what he was doing. He would calculate, "We can't beat Moynihan in sparkling phrases, so we are going to go to the other extreme. We are going to tell Washington, `Aw shucks we can't write like that book-learnin’ fellow over there in Delhi, but we have the honest, unvarnished truth to tell you from over here.'" So my cables would be butchered. But he knew what he was doing. We held our own, thanks to Byroade.

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
South Asia Specialist, National Security Council
Washington, DC (1971)

Near East Affairs
Washington, DC
(1974-1976)

Near East Affairs
Washington, DC
(1978-1981)

*Harold H. Saunders was born and educated in Philadelphia and received his*
undergraduate degree in American Civilization from Princeton. In 1956, he earned his Ph.D. in American studies from Yale. After a stint with the Air Force, Harold Saunders began his government career with Central Intelligence Agency and then moved on in 1961 the National Security Council and then to the State Department. While at State, he became intimately involved in some major foreign policy events as such as the Middle East peace process and the Iran hostage crisis, about which he wrote extensively. He was interviewed in 1993 and 1994 by Thomas Stern.

Q: Hal, let me ask you now about the India-Pakistan war. You were in the NSC covering that area when that war broke out. What did we know before the war broke out and what, if anything, did we do to prevent the outbreak of hostilities?

SAUNDERS: I assume you are referring to the Bangladesh secession crisis of early 1971, which was the spark that touched off the war. My response will enable me to add to what I noted earlier about the differences in perspectives between the White House and the Department of State. The secession crisis and the ensuing war took place at a time when Nixon's "opening to China" policy was in germination. It was therefore not possible under these circumstances for the Department's officials to understand the White House's position on the India-Pakistan dispute. The White House may have been wrong in its views, but its perspectives were bound to be different from the Department because it was working on a different agenda. Kissinger was in the process of working on a strategy that would culminate in his secret trip to Beijing. I only became aware of Kissinger's plans when I accompanied him on his trip to Pakistan in July 1971. He went through Saigon and Bangkok, were I joined the party and accompanied him to New Delhi and Pakistan. On the plane ride from Bangkok to New Delhi, he told me that he was going to Beijing from Pakistan. That was the first time I had ever heard of the plan. The only reason Kissinger told me was because he asked me to write talking points about the Middle East for his upcoming discussions with Zhou En-lai. So up to that point, we could not have taken Kissinger's larger perspective into account. Kissinger understood that the Chinese leadership was asking itself whether the United States would be a steadfast ally. They wanted some assurance that if a relationship between the United States and China were to develop, both countries understood that their linkage was the direct result of their concern about Soviet expansionism. Implicit in that framework, from the Chinese perspective, was the question of whether the United States could be used to offset Soviet pressure if it should ever arise. That was their American "card" question. So Kissinger thought that as the South Asia developing conflict, the Chinese would measure our steadfastness by our willingness to support our Pakistani allies. That would be the standard by which they would judge whether establishing relationships with the US would be worthwhile in the context of Soviet expansionism.

Furthermore, Kissinger recognized that he would have to use Pakistan as his jumping off point if he were to go to Beijing. That point of view naturally resulted in a White House perspective on South Asia considerably different from that of the Department of State, which of course knew nothing about Nixon/Kissinger China initiatives. Daily I used to be on the phone with Chris Von Hollen, who was then the Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA responsible for South Asia. Once he told me that he had been asked to testify before a refugee subcommittee chaired by Ted Kennedy. The Congress was interested in what the United States might do about the millions of
Bengali refugees that had looked for refuge in India. Chris wanted to know what he could say about what the United States might do to alleviate the suffering. I couldn't give him much guidance because, although this occurred probably after Kissinger's trip to Beijing, the White House policy had a China aspect to it that made our position on refugees not particularly palatable. So here we had a classic example of a State Department official focusing on a specific problem in his region -- a refugee tragedy that had gripped the world -- which was not linked -- and could not be meshed -- to the global perspective that the President and his National Security Advisor were worrying about.

Kissinger, in fact, saw the Indians as Soviet surrogates trying to dismember an American ally. As I have suggested, in light of his efforts to establish relationships with the Chinese, he could not let such an event go unnoticed and thought that some efforts on behalf of Pakistan were in order. If the Chinese were permitted to doubt America's reliance, then they might have questioned the utility of closer relationships.

When the war broke out, our main objective was to make sure that the Pakistanis would not be seriously damaged. We wanted to stop the hostilities before that could happen, in part, at least, so that the Chinese would perceive us as having come to the assistance of our allies. We set up a Special Action Group, under the chairmanship of the NSC. It met almost daily in the morning. I provided the staff support for that group. That inter-agency working group worked quite well because everyone could support bringing the war to an end, so that further damage could be prevented.

In answer to your question, I don't know that we could have prevented the outbreak of hostilities. All things being equal, we might have been more involved with Pakistan in the pre-war days. The critics said that we didn't adequately urge the Pakistanis to ameliorate their policies so that the crisis might have been prevented. I don't know that we fully recognized the impact of Pakistani policies which then resulted in a flood of refugees.

GEORGE G. B. GRIFFIN
Political Officer
Islamabad (1972-1973)

Deputy Principal Officer
Lahore (1973-1975)

*George G. B. Griffin was born in Istanbul Turkey and raised in both Georgia and South Carolina. He served in the US Navy and entered the Foreign Service in 1959. In 1972 he was appointed as a Political Officer to the Pakistan embassy.*

Q: So what was going on in East Pakistan?

GRIFFIN: Archer Blood, the Consul General in Dhaka, got in trouble for honest reporting. We heard that he ran afoul of Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad, a political appointee and
former Coca Cola Company executive. Arch was accused of going native and siding too much with the Bengalis. But then things began to snowball. Refugees started coming across into India, fleeing from the fighting. In the monsoon season, which would have been in June, July, and maybe August of 1971, hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into West Bengal and Assam, as well as further north and east into Tripura and Burma. I went out to the West Bengal border one day, and found the land flooded as far as the eye could see. On the water were hundreds of rowboats loaded with people and their belongings, piled as high as they could without sinking, all looking for dry ground. At about the same time, resident Americans began to leave East Pakistan. The families of Consulate General personnel in Dacca were evacuated. Political Officer Scott Butcher pouched me all his biographic files for safekeeping.

At some point, it was evident that the Indians were planning a military move into East Pakistan. They closed air corridors between East and West Pakistan, so the Pakistanis had to fly around the southern tip of India to get from one side to the other. Tensions kept building up. A large group of American missionaries was evacuated by ship from Cox’s Bazaar and Chittagong to Calcutta, where we helped them find temporary lodging and onward transportation. Then the American press began to appear. The first one was a journalist with whom I’m still in touch – Barrie Dunsmore. He was an ABC TV News correspondent stationed in Rome, and came out to see how big a story was developing. His trip led to others and, eventually, at the height of the war, there were something like 800 American correspondents in Calcutta. So as these events mounted, I dropped my scheduled tasks and focused entirely on the East Pakistan crisis.

The outflow of refugees increased steadily in the Fall of 1971, climbing to an estimated total of ten million people at one point. Several Senators and Congressmen came out to check on the situation. One was Republican Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, who was Chairman of the Near East/South Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Another was Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts. I took them out to refugee camps, as far as we were allowed to go. We weren’t allowed into Assam or Tripura, so they only saw what was in West Bengal. More journalists came, and started getting in trouble. And then things got even more interesting for me.

Among the refugees was a group of politicians...

Q: Who would be Bengali politicians?

GRIFFIN: That’s right. East Bengali politicians. They got together in Calcutta and formed a Bangladesh government in exile. In the midst of this, in early July 1971, Henry Kissinger made his secret trip to China to prepare the way for President Nixon. He came first to India and then to West Pakistan, where he disappeared for several days. We heard that he had fallen ill, but thought he was trying to talk sense to General Yahya and address other urgent problems of South Asia. Later we learned that he had other things on his mind.

In any case, it was decided in Washington (after a proposal by the Indian Ambassador there, and with the concurrence of Ambassador Farland in Islamabad) to respond positively to a feeler from the East Pakistanis in Calcutta. The Department instructed the post to give them a message, and I was selected to do it in secret meetings with a representative of the Bangladesh government in
exile. The Department said it would be too official if the Consul General did so. This caused me instant problems with the Indian police tasked with keeping an eye on us. They may not have been fully briefed by New Delhi, and began to track my every movement. I almost couldn’t go to the bathroom without being followed, which got to be very irritating. I found a way to evade them and meet the Bangladeshi the first time, which they didn’t like. At the same time, I was building better access to senior Indian officials. That included all the military commanders – from Indian Army chief General Sam Manikshaw, to Eastern Commander General Arora, to his deputy Lieutenant General Jackie Jacob – and the governors and chief ministers of West Bengal and the other states, plus Calcutta Police Chief Ranjit Gupta, whose men were assigned to follow me.

*Q: Was there concern on our part about the brutality of the West Pakistani troops in the East?*

**GRIFFIN:** Quite a bit, and every time Embassy Islamabad said it was an internal Pakistani affair we sent in a report showing how those “internal” problems had spilled over into India. People were fleeing in all directions from the nastiness, including several million refugees who came in India and into our consular district. We couldn’t count them, but we certainly saw refugees as far as the eye could see on the many occasions we went to the border in West Bengal. There were many Americans and other foreigners who came out of East Pakistan to Calcutta and spoke to us. There were lots of photographs and enough other evidence to document the brutality of the West Pakistanis. Later, when I was transferred to Islamabad, I met some East Bengalis who had been in the government in West Pakistan. They were locked up during the war and eventually repatriated, but they had some horror tales of their own to tell.

*Q: Did that tilt towards Pakistan that came out later, did that hit you while you were there?*

**GRIFFIN:** Yes, and Kissinger argues that that was the only thing that saved all of Pakistan from being invaded by India. There certainly was talk at that time that the Indians would go all the way, just as there is right this minute, with the Indians growling again at the Pakistanis for the latest shoot-'em-up in Kashmir. It always comes up. They have fought two and a half wars, so it’s not unusual for the idea to come up. But most of my Indian contacts would argue what I said earlier – that Pakistan is indigestible. India is already the world’s second largest Muslim country and has a big enough problem with it. Do they want to absorb more? No

*Q: Who was that?*

**GRIFFIN:** Jim Hataway. He had medical problems, and family problems, and left suddenly. Two other things happened about that time. Gordon King, the Consul General in Lahore, met a Department officer on an orientation trip, and within a very short time married her. This was Marguerite Cooper, whom you may have heard of. Just before the wedding, his daughter, a 20-year-old, wrecked her car, killing herself. Gordon was miserable of course, and wanted Marguerite to be his deputy in Lahore. The Department, after much debate, said no, creating the principle that a spouse cannot work directly for another spouse, setting up the system of tandem appointments that are so well known today. That was basically Howie Schaffer’s work. He was in Personnel at the time.
Anyway, it was then agreed that Marguerite would come to Islamabad in my job, and I would go to Lahore as Deputy Principal Officer. King wanted me there ASAP, but there was a gap between Hataway’s departure and my arrival because I had to finish up some work in Islamabad. The Embassy was in the throes of moving from the USAID building, a big, barn-like structure that had been a bank, to its new compound. I think I spent all of a month in the new digs before heading for Lahore. It was monsoon season, and I sent my wife and daughter on a train. Our household goods went by truck. I went first in our car, packed to the gills – and I mean that. There was barely room for our house boy to squeeze into the shotgun seat. It rained the whole way. He and I got about 40 miles out of Lahore, and came upon a sheet of water. Several cars were stuck, but a truck roared through spraying water in all directions. So I decided, well, if he could make it, I could make it, and took off. When the water started coming in the doors, the servant got very nervous, saying, “We’re not going to make it.” But I gunned it, and we did make it. That was the beginning of a major flood season. The road was washed out an hour after we left, and my wife and daughter were turned back because the train track washed away.

It was a flood of historic proportions, which of course gave me plenty to do immediately. I began filing reports before going to our new home to unpack the car. We got the embassy’s attention, which got Washington’s attention, which officially declared it a disaster, which triggered funding. We mounted a disaster relief effort that was huge by any standards. U.S. Army teams came from as far away as South Korea, with boats, tents, and helicopters. The Air Force flew in fuel on C-141s. They stationed huge rubber bladders at the airport into which the C-141s would unload fuel and drinking water. The Air Force also brought in some helicopters and some smaller aircraft, including some old DC-3s that were used to spray pesticides on rice crops. Hundreds of thousands of people were washed out of their homes, and fled to high ground. It was perhaps Pakistan’s biggest flood on record. Lahore is the capital of Punjab, which in Hindi/Urdu means “five waters” or “five rivers,” which include the four big ones that are tributaries to the Indus. They tore up central Pakistan for several weeks.

I was the Consulate liaison in this effort. One day I was out flying with one of the Army helicopter crews to check on a claim from the Punjab government that there were serious problems other than roads, railroads, electric, and water systems. The flood came at harvest time for the rice crop, which was a major source of food for the country. Unless the rice could be saved, there was a real prospect of mass starvation. It wasn’t a question of the rice being flooded or washed away; it was a question of insects that focused on the rice as the things they regularly ate vanished under the flood waters. The regular insects were being pushed aside by a swarm of locusts which had flown up from the inundated desert country in the south. I went out and took a look with, I seem to recall, the provincial Minister of Agriculture. We stopped on a road near a rice field and got out. It was plain even to me – I’m not a farm expert – that the crop was crawling with bugs. The Air Force flew in some malathion and mounted a spraying operation using the C-141s and the Army helicopters. Only one of the pilots had done crop dusting before, but the rest learned quickly. They dusted for several weeks and saved the crops. After that operation, the Army left six helicopters – they were Hueys – in Lahore as a gift to the Pakistan Government. The Air Force left a DC-3 and another aircraft; I don’t remember the type. These were old aircraft, refitted with new tubes and spray tanks. That was the beginning of a rather fascinating tour.
The flood relief effort took about three months from start to finish. At the end, there was a small Army helicopter team left. I wanted to invite them all to a farewell party, along with the Pakistani military with whom they had been working. I checked with the Consul General, who checked with the Pakistani military commander. Everybody thought it was a fine idea, so we had a party at our house, in the garden. (I don’t remember why, but the CG said he couldn’t do it at the residence, and didn’t come.) We invited several other people, Pakistanis and Americans, mostly from the business community. Only two or three Pakistani civilians showed up. At first there was no military representation, but finally a Pakistan Army captain who was the protocol officer at the military headquarters roared up in his Jeep. He said he was sent to represent the entire command, as everybody else was “busy.” When I offered him a drink, he declined, saying he couldn’t drink anything cold because he had a sore throat. So I made the mistake of offering him a hot toddy. He asked what that was, so I made him one. He thought it was swell – the best thing he ever had. He promptly downed it and asked for another.

Q: You might explain what a hot toddy is.

GRIFFIN: A hot toddy is whiskey and water with lots of sugar in it. It’s the basis of what my grandmother called a sugar tit – she said that sugar in a sock dipped in whiskey would cure babies of anything. It was an epiphany for the captain, who soon became the life of the party. We had set up tables on the patio for a buffet. My wife was about to announce that the food was ready when, all of a sudden, somebody said, “Look at that guy!” I turned around and there was the good captain standing in the middle of the lawn, urinating. As I was trying to digest that, an American woman asked me to light her cigarette, saying she couldn’t find her own lighter. Another woman overheard us, and said the same thing had happened to her. They both began digging in their purses, and then one said, “Hey! My wallet’s gone too!” Pretty soon all the ladies were checking their purses, and found that lots of things were gone. Then my wife came up and asked if I had taken some silver salt and pepper shakers off the table. It was dawning on us that we had a kleptomaniac among us. They both began digging in their purses, and then one said, “Hey! My wallet’s gone too!” Pretty soon all the ladies were checking their purses, and found that lots of things were gone. Then my wife came up and asked if I had taken some silver salt and pepper shakers off the table. It was dawning on us that we had a kleptomaniac among us. Trying to figure out what to do, I grabbed the major in charge of the US Army contingent and said, “Look, who do you trust the most? Somebody’s robbing people here, and I want someone you trust to block all the gates and doors while I try to shake somebody down.” He agreed and spoke to a couple of his men. I made a big scene, collaring my chief bearer and loudly accusing him of doing it all. He, of course, was terrified and protested that he had nothing to do with it. I pushed him into the kitchen and told him to stay there. By that time I had pretty well concluded that it was the Pakistani Army captain. One of our Army non-coms went out to his jeep in the driveway, and ran back to report that he found a driver, some stuff we knew was missing, half our booze supply, and several other things, including a transistor radio.

At that point the captain started for the gate to the driveway. I stopped him, saying I needed to talk to him. He said he had to go, as he was not feeling well. I shook his hand and jostled him. He clanked because our silverware was in his jacket. Well, the troops held him while we cleaned out the Jeep. I called the duty officer at Army headquarters. He sent over some MPs, who took the captain away. The next morning, the CG and I were invited to Army headquarters by four-star general. He offered a mild apology, but basically defended the captain saying that he hadn’t done anything wrong. I objected, saying I had many witnesses. Finally, the general let us know that the captain was married to a woman who was well connected to the government in
Islamabad. He indicated that, if I made trouble, he would have trouble. He didn’t want trouble, so would we please shut up and go away, accepting his apologies for anything that happened, and let it drop. After some reconsideration, we did just that. I found out later that the captain specialized in going to cocktail parties where he could indulge his habit. That was when I saw him steal some silver in the house of another diplomat. I got word to the host, who quietly got it all back.

Lahore was the headquarters of WAPDA – the water and power authority for Pakistan. They do everything in the way of dams, power plants and electric transmission. It was also the headquarters of the railways and the military pension authority. Checking out possibilities with those entities was my first success as a commercial officer. I discovered many sales possibilities, sometimes financed by PL-480 money, and sometimes straight commercial deals. In the end I calculated that I had facilitated some 3 billion dollars worth of sales, which in those days was a huge amount of money. It got the attention of the Commerce Department and the Commercial Attaché, who was stationed in Karachi, not Islamabad. He and I worked together well, so he came to Lahore quite a bit.

At the same time, there was a lot going on politically. Prime Minister Bhutto was a Parsee and a Sindhi, without much of a base in Punjab. From Islamabad he was trying to put his allies in top positions in Lahore, the capital of the most populous province in Pakistan and the base of most power brokers. Punjab is also the economic heart of the country, though people in Karachi dispute that because of the banks there. But what Bhutto used to call the “20 families” – those he claimed had raped the country and stolen all the money – mostly came from Lahore. I got to know most of them, in all sorts of business, from textiles to you-name-it, with a fair amount of success in promoting American business.

In dealing with the local politicians, it became clear that there was a disconnect between “democracy” and the way that Bhutto and company were running the country. This has been a Pakistani disease since the country was founded. Lahore was also where I first met George H. W. Bush. At that time he was our representative (I think that was his title) in Beijing. For whatever reason, he wanted to meet Bhutto, who agreed to receive him. But he and Barbara were first shunted off to Lahore by State House, apparently because Bhutto had a sudden, more senior visitor. So they were asked to enjoy the lovely scenery in downtown Lahore for a while. They were hosted by Punjab Governor Mustafa Khar for a couple days. Because I was at that point Acting CG, my wife and I went to lunches and dinners with them, and found the Bushes charming. Mrs. Bush and my wife are both alumnae of Smith College. We have met them several times since.

During my time as Acting CG, we got funds to paint and refurbish the Consulate, which had become a bit dreary. This was probably between the departure of Gordon King and the arrival of his successor, Bill Spengler. I decided to be a little imaginative, and ordered a “modern” décor for our consular waiting room. It was a sort of 1960s style, shall we say – Peter Max style. Fanciful. I found an artist at USIS who liked that sort of thing, and we had a good time. It was the kind of decor that USIS was doing around the world at the time, and the local people seemed to enjoy it. But then we were inspected. The senior inspector hauled me on the carpet and told me it was outrageous. Not appropriate for a diplomatic mission. It had to be replaced before the
next CG showed up, because he wouldn’t like it. He certainly didn’t. I waited till Bill Spengler arrived, so he would at least have a glimpse of it. When I asked if I should paint it over, he said, “Please do.”

That time was the beginning of the downfall of Bhutto. You could sense it in the Punjab. I made several tours around the province; first to see the aftermath of the floods, which was terrible. The roads and railways remained washed out everywhere. The roads were in pretty bad shape before, but the flood made things seriously worse, with long – I’m talking 50-and 100-mile – detours. One of the causes given by some Pakistanis for the magnitude of those floods was an enormous USAID project in the ‘50s in which huge canals were built. Or that canals already there were lined by USAID with concrete. I remember talking to the central Minister of Irrigation. His comment was, “Well, it was a good idea at the time, but, when you start fiddling with Mother Nature, she will bite you back, so it’s rarely a good idea.” Later I wrote a formal recommendation that USAID critique what had been done in the past.

Q: Going back to when you were in Islamabad the first year, this was really just after Pakistan had lost East Pakistan, wasn’t it? What were you getting? Was it sort of in a way a relief - ‘We got rid of those Bengalis; now we can get down to business’ - or was it a sense of loss?

GRIFFIN: It was both. Many West Pakistanis looked down on the East Bengalis as inferior beings. There was a “good riddance” attitude on the part of some people, who saw them as troublemakers – always causing problems. Bengal was too far away; to get there, one had to go around India. But there was also enormous resentment among West Pakistanis, who argued that they were being blamed unfairly for all the problems. They said it wasn’t their fault, and that they were done in by India. If you read today’s news, you see that they remain prickly neighbors.

Yet, at that time – the period from 1972 to ‘75, one to four years after the Bangladesh War – many of the top generals in both the Indian and the Pakistani armies knew each other, and some still do. Many had gone to school together at Dehra Doon or at Sandhurst in the UK. The old-line hands – pre-Independence or pre-Partition hands – are gone now. Pervez Musharraf went to military school in Pakistan, and had little contact with his Indian counterparts, so they don’t understand each other as well. At the time of the 1971 war, most of the soldiers on both sides tended to be Punjabis; Muslims on the Pakistani side, Sikhs on the Indian side. They sometimes had civilized meetings in the middle of battle, inviting their counterparts over for tea, and then going back and shooting at each other again. That’s probably died out by now.

While we were in Lahore, the border between India and Pakistan was opened to diplomats. We decided, what the heck, we’re diplomats, let’s visit some friends in India. We had a dinner party the night before we were scheduled to go, and slept late. We suddenly woke up and realized that, oops, the border was going to close in half an hour. It was 18 miles to the border from my house. We jumped in the car, threw the kid in the back, roared off down the road, and managed to get to the Pakistani side just as they were shutting down. They said, “We’ll let you through, but we’re not sure the Indians will.” Somehow, the word got across. We got through, and with a big sigh of relief started driving on the Grand Trunk Road. Then suddenly I had a flat tire. It was pouring down rain, and I got soaked as I fixed the flat. As I was getting back into the car, I looked up and saw a sign that said “Jammu, X kilometers ahead.” Not Amritsar, where I thought I was headed.
We were in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, halfway to Kashmir. Then I reached for my wallet. No wallet. I started the car and the yellow light came on: no gas. What else can go wrong? Our daughter was screaming in the back seat.

I turned the car around and coasted as much as possible, looking for an Indian Army base I knew was in the vicinity. I figured that somebody there might speak something besides Punjabi and help me out, despite our Pakistani diplomatic tags and American passports. I would have to risk that they had gotten over our position toward India during the war, and wouldn’t know me by name. Finally, I saw the gate to a base and, at the same time, a gas station. I decided to try to gas station first, and went inside. In halting Hindi, I tried to get across my problem to the attendant, who was not interested in the least. Then, a gentleman who was paying his bill turned around and said in English, “You seem to have a problem.” I said, “Yes,” and explained our problems. He said, “Not to worry.” He said his name was Singh, and that he was the President of the Jullundur Rotary Club. He was going to a meeting where he had to introduce the speaker, and he was late. He told the attendant to give me a couple of liters of petrol and told me to follow him to a hotel. He told me to go in, and that after his speech her would come back to check on us. He repeated, “Not to worry. Everything will be fine.” I didn’t really know what to say, but agreed. The attendant put some petrol in the car, which Mr. Singh paid for, and I followed him to a hotel. Singh drove away immediately, leaving us there.

I walked up to a desk clerk and started explaining what was the matter. He stopped me in mid-sentence and said, “Mr. Griffin, where are your wife and daughter?” I said, “In the car.” He said, “This is nonsense. Get them in here immediately. They can’t stay out there in the rain.” I went out and brought them in. The clerk, who turned out to be an assistant manager, took us to the presidential suite, and sent up a very fine dinner. The next morning he had my flat tire fixed, filled the tank with gas, and declined to present me with a bill. The Rotary President never returned. When I asked how could pay, the clerk said, “Well, you said you are going to Delhi, and coming back this way to Lahore.” I nodded, and he said, “When you come back, stop by here and pay me. That’s easy.” So off we went. On our way back, having borrowed money from a colleague in New Delhi, I repaid the hotel. I didn’t see the President of the Rotary Club, but did have his name. After returning to Lahore, I wrote to several Indian newspapers, describing all this. I wanted others to know that, even at a time of high tension after a bitter war in which the Indian government viewed the United States as siding with Pakistan, a U.S. Government official was treated with kindness and respect by ordinary people, far from the capital. The letter was printed in several newspapers, omitting all the names except mine. It said something about the way things are done in South Asia.

Soon thereafter, I got a call from Dean Howells, who was the Division Chief for South Asia in INR, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He had been selected for senior training at Harvard, and wondered if would I agree to take his job. I hadn’t thought that far ahead, but readily agreed, so I transferred to INR as South Asia Division Chief from Lahore in 1975.

Q: Okay, I’d like to go back now. How did you operate as a political officer in Islamabad and Lahore?

GRiffin: In Islamabad, I was the basic Parliament watcher. Ed Ingram was the Political
Counselor. Sid Sober was the Chargé. Sid had all the top contacts to himself, including Bhutto, when Bhutto would see him. Sid had known Ayub Khan when he was in power. Ayub was under house arrest when I first arrived, but the government didn’t object when Sid wanted to go see him. He made a point of doing so. Ingram did the ministers. I’m trying to remember who else was there, covering external relations. Our organization mirrored that of the Embassy New Delhi. I met as many lower-level politicians as I could, as well as journalists, academics, and other intellectuals and leaders. There weren’t thousands of those in Islamabad.

Q: Bhutto was getting increasingly autocratic. What sort of political life was going on? Was the parliament...?

GRiffin: Yes, in the beginning. Oh, I remember who else was there – Bill Simmons. Bill was the deputy to Ed Ingram, but he didn’t write my efficiency report. Ed did that, and it was reviewed by the acting DCM, Sandy Sanderson. Bill had been there for several years. He took me in hand and introduced me to many politicians from around the country. Most of the ministries at that time were headquartered in Rawalpindi, 12 miles away from Islamabad, though they were starting to build offices in Islamabad. We too were building an embassy compound, to include the ambassador’s residence.

There was an interesting event, pertinent to today’s news, on which I did some reporting, although I wasn’t covering external affairs. At first we lived a block away from the Iraqi Embassy. One Sunday as I was out for a stroll with our daughter, all hell broke loose. The Iraqi Embassy was suddenly surrounded by police and soldiers, with helicopters roaring overhead. As we watched, the Pakistanis charged into the Embassy over the strident objections of the Iraqi Ambassador. After about an hour, troops started hauling out case after case after case of small arms, submachine guns, rifles, and ammunition. I’m talking about truckloads of such stuff. That evening Bhutto declared the Ambassador persona non grata and accused him of smuggling arms to “enemies of Pakistan” in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier regions. Clearly, the Iraqis have been doing such things for a long time.

Q: Was the parliament an active parliament, or did it mean much?

GRiffin: Certainly it met, and Bhutto, who fancied himself as the first real democrat in Pakistan’s history, didn’t quite treat it as a rubber stamp body. Parliament didn’t meet regularly, but when it did, we would hear from the members. Oh sure, Bhutto and his lieutenants sometimes had fun and games with people who disagreed with the ruling party. At times some members didn’t appear at the sessions, and others had bad things happen to them. Some of the most colorful politicians would tell us the details. Nonetheless, most of the members insisted that they were really doing the people’s work in Parliament. Even when outnumbered or placed in difficult situations, they would brag about it.

Q: Was there a feeling that your phone was tapped and you were being watched and all that sort of thing?

GRiffin: Like many of my colleagues, I always assumed that my phone was tapped in every post. I was sure of it in India; it was a given. And I presumed it in Pakistan. Since I had
transferred directly from India to Pakistan, I probably was under more suspicion than some of our other people. It was proved later on when Howie Schaffer and Dennis Kux were tapped.

Bhutto played a tape recording of one of their conversations on the air, claiming that American diplomats were making fun of Pakistan and were not real friends. That was long after I left, but it created quite a stir. So, yes, one presumed.

Watched? Of course. They tracked me around. They always knew where I was. The Northwest Frontier was a bit like the northeast in India; you had to have a special permit to go there. There was a DEA agent in Islamabad who got in trouble because of that. He came to Pakistan directly from being a deputy sheriff in West Texas, and hadn’t been overseas before. I’ll never forget his name – Harold Leap. He sported a 10-gallon hat and cowboy boots, and liked to strap on a six-shooter and have a good time. Once he chased some drug runners into the Northwest Frontier. The Pakistan police would never do that, but Leap did. He was lucky to be alive. He got shot at and then rescued, I think, by Pakistan Army troops. The Ambassador sent him away before he could be PNGed by the Pakistan Government. Yes, they knew where you were.

Q: How were we seeing Bhutto when you were there? How was Bhutto seen?

GRIFFIN: Bhutto was a charismatic charlatan, I guess a lot of people would say. He certainly was perceived as having stolen the 1970 election, and a lot of Pakistanis blamed him for the breakup of the country. So did a lot of other people. But most Pakistanis probably were not too upset about it. Some shrugged and said, “What else did you expect? We couldn’t have East Pakistanis running this country.” That seemed to be Bhutto’s attitude. No way was Sheikh Mujib going to be the leader of West Pakistan. He had the wrong agenda. He didn’t understand. Bhutto convinced President Yahya to block the results of the elections, and eventually took over himself. He was seen as an opportunist, and his wife was considered something of a foreigner. She was not, she was born in Karachi, but since she was a Parsee, or, let’s say, of Iranian background, she wasn’t considered entirely “one of us.” She had too many Iranian connections, but that didn’t seem to affect the later success of their daughter.

Q: That was Benazir.

GRIFFIN: In Islamabad I was urged to get to know the Bhutto kids – Benazir, and her brothers; Murtaza and Shahnawaz. I was one of the younger political officers and, while my wife and I were a bit older, they were expected to become important politically, so it was deemed worthwhile. The Embassy gave us tickets to a spectacular Chinese gymnastics show. We were seated behind the Bhuttos, and we chatted a bit, but the kids were not the least bit interested in us, so we never really connected.

Q: Was Kashmir a focal point at that particular time?

GRIFFIN: Yes, it always is. Some people hoped that, after the war, since neither side had managed to take all of Kashmir, and the Chinese kept rattling on about their claim to part of it, that maybe it would die down for a while. But, no, it was still very sensitive territory. For example, if I had kept going up the road that time I told you about when I had the flat tire in India, I could have been into trouble with the Indians, who would have assumed that I was on
some spy mission, no matter how absurd. I went to Kashmir when I was stationed in India, but if I were coming from Pakistan, that’s different. Unless I had told Embassy New Delhi that we were going, and gotten their ok, but I would still assume that they would look at me with great suspicion. We did that at another time, with some Lahore friends, but it was set up properly after things calmed down. We also got close to that border on the Pakistan side. Some friends had a weekend place in Muzafarabad practically on the border, south of Srinagar. It was a lovely spot amongst orchards, where we went for brunches. But if you went beyond the village, you ran into border guards and checkpoints, and were quite firmly told to go away and not come back. But Kashmir was not part of my portfolio. That was done by others in the political section. I just did local politicians.

Q: How about the Islamic fundamentalist movement?

GRIFFIN: There were a couple of Islamic parties, whose leaders are still heard from; still pushing for an Islamic state. There were also several pirs who were important politically. Pirs are religious and tribal leaders, but seem to be less religious than some of the preachers. They are often large traditional landowners, in a rather feudal sense, who have inherited religious titles. They are looked up to as community/religious leaders and landlords, but some were mostly playboys or even crooks, in a word. Without naming names, we met several of them and, over time visited some of their farms and country houses. The scene when they arrived in one of their villages was quite feudal. The whole community would start bowing and kissing feet, asking to be blessed – amazing. More broadly, there were rabble rousers among the Islamic types who preached that Bhutto was not a religious man – “a socialist” – who should be ousted.

Q: Was there any problem with Afghanistan? There was that loose area between the two places, sort of tribal areas.

GRIFFIN: There are always problems between Pakistan and Afghanistan, one of which is the so-called Durand Line. It was proposed by Sir Mortimer Durand, then Foreign Secretary of the Indian Government, as the boundary between Afghanistan and what was then British India. It is laid out along mountain peaks, is not a straight line, and has several peculiarities. It was intentionally drawn to cut through the Pakhtun or Pashtun tribes. So, yes, there was a constant undercurrent of “Let’s see if we can’t settle this thing, but what were your people doing on my side last week?” When I got my orders to INR in Washington, I realized that there were two places where I hadn’t been that were going to be in my territory – Afghanistan and Iran. So I cadged a ride with the Defense Attaché in Islamabad, who regularly drove up to Kabul. My wife had already gone with several ladies on a bus tour to Kabul. But my trip was curtailed. I didn’t want to fly because I wanted to see the lay of the land, and anyway neither INR nor the Embassy wanted to pay my way at the end of the fiscal year. So we drove up through the Khyber Pass and the Kabul Gorge and spent a couple of days in Kabul. Ted Elliot was the Ambassador, and he and his staff took very good care of me. I didn’t have time to go to Mazar-e-Sharif or Herat, but planned to drive down to Kandahar and return to Pakistan through Quetta, in a big circle. But then the DoD vehicle broke down and the only other ride I could find was on a USAID truck that went, unfortunately, straight back to Islamabad. So I didn’t go to Kandahar. On my way home, I stopped in Tehran and had a couple of day’s consultations there. Just my first taste, but that changed when I got back to Washington.
Q: Before you went to INR, just at that time when you were leaving Pakistan, you’d been in India and you’d been in Pakistan. Can you sort of compare and contrast the two states?

GRIFFIN: Sure. Before I do that, though, I forgot to add that my son and a friend of his – both teenagers – came to Pakistan just before I left, and went on a round-robin with me. After Kabul I flew with them to Karachi, Bombay, Colombo, Calcutta, Kathmandu, New Delhi, and back to Lahore before leaving for Tehran. That was my quick consultation tour to get up to speed before reporting to the Department.

The difference between India and Pakistan is quite stark in some ways. India is much larger in terms of population and land area. South Asia as a whole is roughly the equivalent size of Western Europe, and has even greater geographic contrasts. That is, it has everything from deserts and the tropics along the equator, to the highest mountains in the world, not to mention everything in between. It has as many languages as Western Europe. In fact, it has 13 major languages – major languages being one spoken by more than 50 million people. They are mutually unintelligible, by and large, which is why English works among educated people in both India and Pakistan. India has several major religions, with a majority of Hindus, but it also takes pride in calling itself the world’s second largest Islamic country, after Indonesia. If Pakistan and Bangladesh had stayed together as Pakistan, it would rival India for the number-two slot, but Indonesia would still come out ahead.

India is a more relaxed place, in part because it is bigger and doesn’t have to worry as much, I suppose. It is also a more colorful place. These are the first things that impress you. Indians dress far more colorfully than Pakistanis do. There is more apparent art and culture in India than in Pakistan, though the Pakistanis would fight you over that. They would argue that their art and culture is just as good as India’s and, “by the way, please look at the best monuments in India, which are very Muslim, such as the Taj Mahal.” The two cultures have lived together for a very long time and have strong emotions about each other.

My wife thought Calcutta was neat in the late 1960s and early ‘70s. As I said before, it was the time of miniskirts, and she could walk to the main market and back without attracting stares. In Pakistan she very quickly learned to cover up everything. The first time she went to a market she was stared at, pinched, and touched. She has never wanted to go back to live in Pakistan. She has gone back to India. Women are treated somewhat differently in each country, but often in pretty much the same way. South Asia has a history of matriarchal societies. There have been female leaders in virtually every country. The world’s first female prime minister was in Ceylon, don’t forget.

Q: Bandaranaike.

GRIFFIN: Yes. Then there was Indira Gandhi, and then Benazir Bhutto, Khalida Zia, Shiekh Hasina, and so on. So you can’t say that women are excluded, but they are mostly widows of major politicians or other elites.

I’m not sure that Pakistan should ever have happened. You can say that in India, but not in
Pakistan. Once I was told by a Pakistani politician – Shaukat Hayat: he was present at the creation of his country, but is no longer with us; an interesting and elegant man – that he, Jinnah, and the other founders did not want to create Pakistan as an Islamic state. He said the prime motivation was to escape the Hindu caste system. If you study history, the Muslims of South Asia, by and large, came largely from the so-called untouchable caste in the Hindu system. (I’m leaving Buddhism out of this because Buddhism, except long ago, doesn’t figure anywhere but in Sri Lanka.) So Pakistan and Bangladesh ended up with the poorest and least educated elements of Hindu society. Less economically advanced and, I would venture, more prone to making mistakes than the more highly sophisticated and much larger Indian elite system. That is not to say that Pakistan is rife with stupid people. It certainly is not. Some of them are brilliant. But, by and large, they came from the underclass and started with a handicap, and haven’t really overcome it. This may be why commentators today often talk about the dangers of mistakes being made in another, perhaps nuclear war between the two. This has been on the news the last couple of days. They talk in a bit of code, generally saying that the Pakistanis are liable to bumble things. Not that the Indians aren’t capable of making the same kind of mistake. Either side could begin a violent conflict, without considering all the consequences. It may be insulting to Pakistanis to say that, but history does bear out the argument that they miscalculate more often than the Indians. Given the makeup of the present government of India, that may have changed. Vajpayee’s government is growing in popularity among rabble rousers, but it got there democratically, so you can’t argue about it.

Q: At this time, but in Pakistan you didn’t get - I’ve never served there - quite the same feeling.

GRiffin: Well, you did and you didn’t. Historically, the top officers in the military and in the civil services, some businesspeople, academics, jurists, and other elites in both countries, by and large were educated either in British-founded local schools and universities, or in the UK itself. That has changed dramatically in both countries, and what you have now is a different system of education in both countries. Indians, for example, have come up with a system of technical institutes, which has driven what is today their computer industry to world class status, along with the scientific industry, which includes missiles and nuclear weapons. Indian minds are good at mathematics. Higher education has slowed in Pakistan over the last few years, in part because our relations haven’t been that friendly. But if anybody is going abroad for education, the destination of choice is the United States of America right now. More and more South Asians are coming here, especially for professional training, medicine, and the sciences.

There was another point I wanted to make. Other differences remain. Pakistan has become more inward looking and more susceptible to the rise of Islamic extremism over time, and there is a certain amount of that in India as well. It’s kept relatively quiet. Indian Muslims tend to be poorer, and some are kept that way by their Hindu neighbors, who still view them as untouchables.

Q: In a way, this was the origin of how you get out of this untouchability; you convert to Islam.

GRiffin: That’s right, convert to Islam. That’s what they did. Some of them have stayed in the same place for centuries, living side by side with Brahmans, at the top of the Hindu caste system. Often they are treated like dirt, as ex-untouchables, even though they are Muslims now. It
sometimes breaks out into the open, as it did recently over Ayodhya, the site of the demolished Babri Mosque. About 30 years ago a professor in Lahore named Qadir wrote a fascinating article headlined “The Mind of the Pakistani.” I didn’t believe what I was reading until something happened to me one night in Lahore. He basically said that Pakistanis assume that the end justifies the means. He added that Pakistanis are not as slimy as the Persians, who have no principles whatsoever.

Q: You’re paraphrasing.

GRiffin: Yes. He didn’t talk about the Indians, but in fact Indians are a bit more open than Pakistanis. More comfortable in their skins. Why? Because they’re bigger and stronger. They’re like Americans in that sense. We can all be obnoxious, especially as perceived abroad, and many Americans certainly consider Indians to be obnoxious. We got to know many people in India, and some of our best friends – that’s not a cliche – today are among them. We stay in touch with a few Pakistanis, but for us the Indians are easier to deal with. The incident that I was about to mention was at a dinner party. I had been talking to a senior civil servant, who confirmed something I had been trying to check. I thanked him and walked away. A little later, I was standing around a corner from him and overheard him talking to one of his Pakistani friends. He recounted what he had told me, and said, “He actually believed me. Ha, ha, ha!” I put that lesson to good use later on.

Q: Was there the feeling that Pakistan - I’m going back to the ’70s when you were there - that Pakistan was not a state that could survive?

GRiffin: People said that from day one. Some argued that Pakistan never should have been allowed to happen. They said it was a mistake by Lord Mountbatten and the British Government, who just wanted out of a deteriorating situation, so they cut and ran. Before things settled down in 1947, an estimated 10 million people died. It was a bloodbath which many still remember vividly. Leaving that aside, since you can’t change history, Pakistan does exist and there will continue to be trouble. It is a situation as intractable as the Middle East problem between the Israelis and Palestinians. There are ways to make peace for awhile, but not short of sorting out Kashmir – and it’s difficult to see how that could happen. Asking the Indians to give up Kashmir is like asking the Israelis to give up Jerusalem. It isn’t going to happen, so they have to find other ways to keep things quiet.

Q: When you were sitting around with whiskeys and sodas or so with Pakistanis, were any of them putting up what they felt might be a solution to Kashmir?

GRiffin: Yes, everybody has a solution all the time. There have been many attempts made. Much later, when I was briefly in charge of the South Asia Bureau, and Tom Pickering was Ambassador to India, I convinced him that I had a proposal that might work, but only if the U.S. became involved, addressed it seriously, and put its influence on the line. He took me to Secretary Jim Baker, who agreed that it might work, and said he would get involved personally and get the President on board. Then he was snatched away to run Bush’s election campaign and I never saw him again, so it didn’t happen. Yes, many of us made efforts. I think there is an analogy in Jerusalem. One solution is to create an international zone: internationalize the place.
Many Kashmiris will tell you, including Abdul Ghani Lone, who was killed last week, “Just make us independent and we will survive.” I had long conversations with Mr. Lone about that subject. He was considered a moderate among Kashmiris, and yet the Indian central government, and its agent, the Kashmir Government, for that matter, treated him like dirt. As Stalin was supposed to have asked about the Pope, they would ask, “Where are your divisions, Mr. Lone?” I tried to point out to him that, Kashmir, like Afghanistan, would be a landlocked country and have a tough time, especially if its neighbors suspected it of making trouble. Kashmir’s main access routes are through India. The roads and other links through Pakistan are less well developed. It’s much easier to get there through India. From China, you have to cross the Himalayas, which isn’t very feasible. It can be done, but it’s very difficult.

Is there a solution? There is, and I have preached it, gone out and tried to do something about it, made innumerable speeches, talked to innumerable people, basically telling the Indians something they don’t particularly want to hear. That is, “You need to be more magnanimous.” I tried sometimes, for example, to draw an analogy between our relations with Canada and Mexico, and India’s with Pakistan and Bangladesh. I argued that it’s like what Pierre Trudeau said. Living next to an elephant isn’t easy. I suggested that if they could see their way to being a little kinder, and not insist on having their way every time, they might have better results.

The Pakistanis have consistently, since the first war they got into, and certainly in the second one in 1965, sought American intervention, just as the Palestinians have. They want us to help them deal with the big guys. The Indians have consistently taken the opposite approach, saying it is a bilateral matter. They argue that no one else has the right to get involved. Since 1947, the Indians have also ignored United Nations’ resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir. They don’t want to hear about it. In other words, it would take the direct, focused, difficult, intense involvement of not only our government – meaning the Secretary of State and the President of the United States – but also a major effort by other interested parties, such as Russia and China, to move the process.

Q: In a way it sounds almost more intractable than the Palestinian thing. I think most people who’ve been involved with this know where it’s going to come out. It’s just how do you get there, and that is getting the Israelis out of the West Bank and that the Palestinians aren’t going to go back to Israel and work out some sort of maybe internationalization of Jerusalem. The lines are pretty well apparent there.

GRIFFIN: There would have to be an interim hand-off of Kashmir, and it would have to include all of Kashmir. We’ve approached this from time to time. It has been talked about a lot, and both the Indian and Pakistan governments have come close to at least a partial solution a couple of times. They have sat down at a table and come close to talking seriously about it, in other words. It would take the collaboration and agreement of India, Pakistan and China, not to mention the Kashmiris. The Kashmiris themselves are not agreed on the issues, to put it mildly. Then you have everybody else and their brother messing around. In other words, those who can’t successfully do much in Afghanistan right now are probably having a good time in Kashmir.

Q: You’re talking about what we would call terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists.
GRiffin: Musharraf says he stopped them; the Indians say, “No, you haven’t. We see them.” This is going to go on. There are more ways than one to skin this cat – spending money, for example. But the history of Kashmir is not a simple one. You can’t roll back the history; you’re stuck with it, so how do you get there is the problem. It would take a combined, intense effort on the part of all those interested parties, and it won’t happen, short of sorting out the Middle East first, because it is a serious flash point. Then, they might decide to start slinging nuclear weapons at each other, which is possible within weeks. If they do, then others might try to step in, but my guess is it would go back to the status quo ante – nothing particularly new, unless the Indians were really damaged somehow, and I can’t see that happening. I don’t see the Indians taking over all of Kashmir. It’s too difficult even for them, with a much larger army. I certainly don’t see them trying to swallow Pakistan. They can’t swallow that pill. Bangladesh is not a part of the equation this time. China hasn’t opened its mouth, but...

Q: Well, there isn’t much it...

GRiffin: Oh, they can make trouble for India, and have done so in the past. In the ‘71 war, they growled, but didn’t do anything. I doubt that the Chinese want to get themselves mixed up in another war at this time, so I think they would probably sit back, as would the Russians. So the Indians, thinking that we usually end up on the side of the Pakistanis, made it their business to strike a deal with the Soviet Union before the ‘71 war, and then the Pakistanis felt betrayed by us because we didn’t send in troops. We would not send in troops now. I don’t think our present Administration is so concerned about an imminent war between India and Pakistan. But they are concerned about losing Pakistan as a platform to do what we need to do in Afghanistan, in part because we no longer have access through Iran.

DOUGLAS R. KEENE
Consul
Karachi (1973-1975)

Mr. Keene was born and raised in Massachusetts and graduated from Colby College. He joined the Foreign Service in 1967, serving first in Viet Nam and subsequently at Middle East posts including Jerusalem, Karachi, Cairo, as well as Amman and Muscat, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. His Washington assignments also concerned primarily Middle Eastern matters, including the Arab-Israel problem. Mr. Keene was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: ’73. Where did you go?

KEENE: Karachi, Pakistan.

Q: You’re moving around! You were in Karachi from when to when?

KEENE: ’73 to ’75.
Q: What was Karachi like at the time?

KEENE: Really a horrible place. It was overcrowded, filthy, dirty, chaotic—traffic was unbelievable. And there was very little of historic interest, because before the partition it was just a backwards fishing village and never had any real history to it. It just grew up really, really fast after partition. So, the interesting parts in Pakistan were elsewhere, like Lahore, Peshawar, and the hill stations. I was a consul, and we had huge numbers of visa applicants there, most of whom if you gave them a visa, they would never be seen again—the same situation. Not fun.

Q: Who was the consul general there?

KEENE: Gordon Tiger.

Q: How would you describe American-Pakistani relations at that particular time—’73 to ’75?

KEENE: They were pretty good then. That was the Bhutto era (I issued Benazir’s visa to study at Radcliffe), so he was elected; it wasn’t the military government that you saw so much of, and things were pretty close.

Q: Had the China connection already opened at that point?

KEENE: Yes, it had. They were up there building roads and providing military equipment.

Q: Also, Karachi today, of course, is a very dangerous place. But wasn’t a fundamentalist problem at the time?

KEENE: No. I mean, you could see the pretty good educational system they inherited from the British was starting to crumble, and the birth rate was extremely high. You could see that they didn’t have a great future. But no, we didn’t have too much of that.

Q: Was there much concern about war with India when you were there?

KEENE: Not high. I’m trying to remember now, my dates. One had occurred not too far in the past.

Q: I guess that the one that occurred then was the one between—over the independence of Bangladesh.

KEENE: Yes.

Q: That was around ’72 or something like that.

KEENE: That was actually just as I was leaving Warsaw, so that would have been maybe ’71. Again, there was a lot of fall out from that, a lot of talk about that…but
Q: On the visa side, was it mainly sitting there and saying “no, no, no”?

KEENE: Pretty much. And that’s not popular. My consul general didn’t like it too much; he was getting phone calls all the time about interceding in visa cases.

Q: How did you find the Pakistani staff there?

KEENE: The consular section staff had been there a long time, and they were pretty professional—certainly experienced. The culture of corruption was very pervasive, though, in Pakistan, so you never were quite sure and you had to keep very alert to what they were up to. They could be really good, but some of the other consulate staff that had been there awhile were good, too. Pakistanis can be arrogant, but some of them can be quite competent.

Q: As you were doing this, were there any spots in the United States that had particular Pakistani immigrant communities?

KEENE: Yes. Let’s see if I can remember: they were California, and maybe around this area. But I don’t know—there was a colony in the DC (District of Columbia) area.

Q: Did you have much contact with Pakistanis socially?

KEENE: Quite a bit, quite a bit. We had some friends and then there was a fairly active official representational routine there. We had some nice housing because the embassy had been there, moved up to Islamabad, but had kept the houses, so we had places that were big enough to entertain in. The consul general had a mansion!

Q: Did you get up to Islamabad much, or not?

KEENE: Yes, a fair amount. We’d hold our own little in-country consular conferences every six months or so at the posts. We had four posts there. Besides Karachi and Islamabad, we had Lahore and Peshawar. Peshawar then was a one-man post, but they did do visas. And we went up a couple of times as tourists; we flew up to Islamabad. A friend of mine in the embassy there loaned me his car, and we drove up to Afghanistan—up into the mountains, you know—Swat, and…I don’t even remember all the—the Murray Hills, old British hill station. And we tried to get around Lahore, which was a particular interesting place—a lot of historical buildings there.

Q: Did you pick up sort of the attitude of your Pakistani contacts vis-à-vis their neighbors or the Indians?

KEENE: No. And they weren’t all hostile, either. I mean, they’re the same people, just Hindus versus Muslims. So actually a lot of people still had relatives in India, and this, that and the other thing, and they weren’t averse to visiting when they could. There were periods when you could and periods when you couldn’t. And we took a trip to Delhi, too.

Q: I’m trying to think. Was much happening up in Afghanistan at that point?
KEENE: No. That was pre-Soviet invasion.

Q: That was '78... '79.

KEENE: No, we were able to go up, cross the border, drive around, go up to Bamiyan and see those statues that the Taliban later destroyed. Our kids had blond hair, though, and when they’d see that, the villagers would throw rocks at them.

Q: Really?

KEENE: Yes. So we bought them turbans. Put the turbans on them and the problem went away. It was pretty primitive; you can see why they have the problems that they have. It was like going back a couple of centuries. Beautiful—it’s a beautiful country.

HENRY BYROADE
Ambassador
Pakistan (1973-1977)

Ambassador Henry Byroade was born in Maumee Township, Indiana in 1913. Upon graduation from high school, he received an appointment to West Point. He graduated from West Point in 1937 with a Second Lieutenant appointment and Bachelor of Science. Byroade then received his Master’s in civil engineering from Cornell in 1940. Byroade has served in India, China, Cairo, Pretoria, Kabul, Rangoon and Manila. The interview was conducted by Niel M. Johnson on September 19, 1988.

Q: So you left there in '73 and went to Pakistan.

BYROADE: That's right. I planned to retire, and Henry Kissinger talked me into going to Pakistan. I went there for one specific purpose, and I planned to stay about 18 months.

We'd had an arms embargo on Pakistan for about ten years, growing out of the India-Pakistan war. This had worked out in the long term to be, I thought, very unfair to Pakistan, because India turned to the Soviet Union for their armament needs, primarily, but also to a lot of other countries. Pakistan was left with sort of Korean-vintage US equipment which was worn out. They needed help, but under the embargo we couldn't do it. Kissinger said, "This is unfair, and we've got to lift that embargo, but it's not easy with the India lobby and all of that." So he said, "You go out there and stay long enough to be credible, and come back and talk to people on the Hill about it, and see if we can lift that thing."

Well, I did. I stayed over a year and I came back before a visit by Bhutto here. I spent about three weeks on the Hill talking to everybody that I thought was interested, and then gave Kissinger a report of who I thought would raise hell and who I thought wouldn't cause any trouble over lifting the embargo. It looked to me like we could safely go ahead and get away with lifting the
embargo. You know, it's very easy to impose these things; India and Pakistan get into a war, our weapons are involved, so "bingo, embargo!" It was very proper, but when it came around to lifting it, it's something else. But we did during Bhutto's visit, and we did get a little flak from the Hill but not very much. So we lifted that, and were able for the first time to start replenishing some of their equipment. I was then ready to come home, but Pakistan got involved in the nuclear business, which upset me no end. I stayed and struggled, trying to keep that from being a problem between us for two more years. I was there about four years.

Q: Four years, and Bhutto was still in power?

BYROADE: Bhutto was in trouble, deep trouble when I left, but he was still in power.

Q: General Zia, was he the one that was...

BYROADE: When I left, he was chief of staff, with, I think, no idea of taking over at that point.

Q: You say Bhutto was in trouble?

BYROADE: Well, yes, there were lots of riots in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, etc. But still the whole thing started, as it did later on in the Philippines, with the question of cheating on elections. I told Marcos the whole story on a trip to Manila a few weeks before he was deposed. I said, "You know, you've got somehow or other, to control your supporters. The world's watching you, and you've got to have a fairly clean election, as clean as it can be by Philippine standards." I said to Marcos, "Look, I may not have been, but I should have been Washington's expert on strongman rule. I've been accredited to Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, to Daud of Afghanistan, to Ne Win of Burma, Marcos of the Philippines, and Bhutto of Pakistan, and all these governments have got something in common; they go into power with a group of supporters that grow and grow and become a force unto themselves. They begin to do things to please the boss or to protect their own position, things that they think will please the boss, but he doesn't know about, but he's got to take the blame because he's the boss." I said, "In Bhutto's case, the election returns came in very fast; he had lost in Karachi; he had lost in Peshawar, but on the whole in the three provinces, he was in by about 70 percent, which was a fair, honest, correct vote. Then the returns of the Punjab, which was politically the most important province, started to come in, and Bhutto was winning by 98-99 percent, and everyone knew that this was phoney." I said, "I saw him the next morning and he wasn't himself; he had been on the telephone all night calling Lahore. He was asking his lieutenants there, 'What the hell have you done?'" I said [to Marcos], "Bhutto wasn't above cheating on elections, if he had to to stay in power, but if he had done this himself, it wouldn't have been so ham-handed. You know, he not only lost power, but he lost his life." And I said, "The problem in the Philippines is gaining control of your supporters." He said, "You've put your finger right on the problem" and he hit the desk and he said, "I will!" I said, "Well, if Bhutto had admitted the vote in the Punjab was phoney and had scheduled reelections in three weeks, he'd have won by 70 percent and he would be alive today." He said, "Oh, I would even do that if I have to."
SCHAFFER: In those days, Islamabad was still a totally artificial city; it had no other function except to be the capital. That has changed over a period of years. The population during my tour was about 88,000 -- it is now more than twice that size. Most if not all of the population were either bureaucrats or diplomats or politicians. In all of my time in Islamabad, only one person told me that she had come from Islamabad. In fact, she had come from Karachi, but she liked Islamabad so much that she used to go around telling people that she was from Islamabad originally to see what their reactions might be. Now, it is an entirely different city; there are actually some retirees there.

The politicians did not set up a second home in Islamabad. Even when Parliament was in session, one would find more politicians in Lahore than in Islamabad. They would attend Parliament for a few days and then retreat as quickly as they could to Lahore or their home territories.

I must say that we in the mid-1970s had a far more optimistic view of Pakistan’s economic situation than we have today. I am now referring to a period following the break up of the country. The part formerly known as West Pakistan, was functioning on its own and by most accounts the Pakistanis probably doing better than they had been while East and West Pakistan were one country. Certainly, politically they were doing better even though the mid-1970s was a complicated period. Bhutto was the Prime Minister thanks to his party having won the 1970 election in West Pakistan. That election, which occurred before the break-up of the country, was ultimately responsible for his accession to power. His Pakistan People’s Party had nationalized the banks and some other businesses when it first assumed power. The Party had run on the slogan: “Bread, clothing and housing.”

Bhutto’s style of government was very much in the Napoleonic tradition. He liked to appeal directly to the people. He traveled frequently around Pakistan, holding rallies and making speeches. He had no patience for institutions such as Parliament. He was very hard on anyone in his party who was suspected of disloyalty -- which was anything less than 100% committed to him.

It was a time of relatively optimistic assessment of Pakistan’s economic future, particularly since it wasn’t doing so badly in the mid-1970s. They had had a couple of years of decent GDP growth, although they were followed by a couple of years of unimpressive growth. But this pattern gave some hopes for the future. Investments were coming in at a measured pace, but they were being made. They were staying ahead of population growth, which was over 3%, so that it absorbed almost all of the GDP growth. It was clear that population control programs were a
failure giving rise to considerable concern -- more than now.

We encouraged American investors to look at opportunities in Pakistan. We thought that if the right investment were made, then it had a pretty good chance of succeeding. I mentioned earlier the fertilizer program; Americans had two plants working in Pakistan. There were also some American investments in other industries and in consumer goods production, although they didn’t prove to be too profitable. There was a tobacco project. There was some agricultural processing: e.g. a corn oil plant which was funded by a program of loans from the PL480 local currency fund to American investors.

Time did not hang heavy on my hands. In addition to my job in the Embassy, I had two children and a household to manage. In fact, it was relatively easy because the household staff did all the laundry, cooking and cleaning. I made up the menu, but the staff did everything else. We lived about seven minutes from the Embassy, giving me an opportunity to eat lunch at home most of the days. That gave me an opportunity to talk to the children, who also had lunch at home. We avoided receptions like the plague. We tried very hard to be at home between the end of work and about 7:30 p.m. when the kids went to bed. That was their family time. We also avoided social engagements on Sundays. I soon discovered avoiding receptions was not much of a loss. Most of them were very large gatherings which inhibited any kind of meaningful conversation.

I should note that our tour -- especially Howie’s -- did not end well. Bhutto decided to proceed with an election which had already been scheduled for several months hence. I remember vividly the early-1977 meeting with our British counterparts during which we compared notes. Everyone agreed that the election would be a “non-event” because Bhutto would be the overwhelming winner. But Bhutto decided to hold a very open election, which meant that the government would not harass the opposition, who also would have access to the media. This new freedom resulted in a surprisingly strong showing for the opposition during the campaign. Bhutto was criticized severely for not having delivered on his economic promises -- which had been wildly optimistic -- and for treating his opponents -- alleged and real -- in a manner that repulsed many voters. This treatment included the murder of the father of one of Bhutto’s estranged political associates, who was shot while driving in Lahore. At the time, the story was that the bullet was intended for the son, but that in any case, Bhutto had hired the assassin. There was no follow-up and the assassin went free.

Parliamentary elections took place in spring, 1977. Not surprisingly, the Embassy’s reporting officers came to be viewed by the Pakistan government with some suspicion. Howie and Jon Gibney, our political officer in Lahore, were subjects of complaints to Ambassador Byroade from Bhutto himself. The Ambassador said that he had defended his staff vigorously. Bhutto apparently had concluded that the U.S. was trying to destabilize his government. If he only had been properly briefed, he would have known that Byroade would have been tempted to hold a rally in his support, if he could have.

There were considerable tensions and nervousness before the election. The polls were showing a very close race with the opposition spurting slightly ahead once the votes were beginning to come in. Then the counting stopped unexpectedly, and by the end of the evening, lo and behold, the government was winning by incredible margins, including in neighborhoods where the
government’s candidate had hardly ever appeared. Opinions were -- and to some extent -- still are on whether Bhutto stole the election; there was no question that there were many “unusual” activities.

I remember visiting a Pakistani friend who had a child in nursery school with my oldest son. I think this visit occurred on a holiday right after the election. When I went to her house, she was in the garden among many relatives; everyone was dressed casually -- an unusual situation in those days. Every time a new Pakistani guest would arrive, many of the family members would go off in a corner with the newcomer. It was quite clear that they were talking about the election and that they were seriously troubled by the turn of events.

The local and provincial elections, which took place three days later, had the same results as the national one. This further increased tensions which became wide-spread political protests. Partial martial law was declared in many cities -- not including Islamabad which was an island of unreality, nor Rawalpindi. Byroade’s tour was coming to an end; he was due to leave in the middle of April, but his departure was delayed because the roads to the Karachi airport were unusable as result of the protests. Finally, the Ambassador was airborne; a week later Bhutto gave a speech in Parliament lambasting Americans. Up to the penultimate paragraph, the speech was filled with thinly veiled references, but in the final paragraph, Bhutto said that he could now tell the American Embassy that the “party was not over.”

I was watching television and when Bhutto made that comment, I quickly ran for a notebook because I recognized that Bhutto’s words would have to be reported to Washington that night. Toward the end of the speech, Howie came in, dripping wet from his squash game.

The Bhutto reference was to a telephone conversation that had taken place a couple of weeks earlier between the Consul General in Karachi and us. He had called our house at about midnight and said: “The party is over.” He was referring to a social occasion that had just ended; it included all the leading journalists of Karachi. The Consul General had waited for the party to break up so that he could talk to the journalists about what was going on. When he called us, he was reporting elliptically on his findings. He said something along the line that “the goods may be exported in our direction.” Howie interpreted that as an indication that Bhutto might be trying to leave the country. So, after thanking the GC for his information, Howie called the DCM to tell him that Karachi had just reported that “the party is over.” That was a literal statement but misunderstood by the Pakistani secret service which was monitoring our phones. It has become a footnote in Pakistani history.

This episode changed my view on wiretapping because had the CG been more plainly spoken, none of the consequences of his phone call would have ensued. If he had just said that there was a rumor that Bhutto was leaving Pakistan, it would have been far less quotable. Once the story became known to the Pakistani intelligence community, it was almost certain to follow that US representation generally and Howie specifically would be in some kind of trouble. Two days after that conversation, we received a cable from Washington informing us that the Political Counselor position in New Delhi had been vacant for a month, and that the Department was proceeding to assign Howie to it unless he had some very serious and compelling reasons to the contrary. I had always thought that the two episodes were a happy coincidence, until one day I
found out that Denis Kux, then the India country director had come to the conclusion that Howie had to be reassigned -- the sooner the better.

That Bhutto speech was a watershed for my relations with the Pakistanis. The Department’s cable transferring Howie arrived in the early part of May; Howie was on the plane to Delhi five days later. He had come to the same conclusion as Kux; the quicker departure the better -- before the Pakistanis had word of his reassignment, allowing them to kick Howie out, putting his career potentially in some jeopardy. So Howie and I flew to Delhi, but I came back three days later. During that week, people whom we had known well for three years, avoided us. The DCM had a “farewell” party for Howie; the only Pakistani who showed up was a junior official from the American desk of the Foreign Ministry. It was very clear that all Pakistanis had been instructed to boycott the party.

We had to pass through Lahore to catch the Delhi flight. A friend of twenty years standing refused to see us. When I returned to Islamabad, the “deep freeze” was still on for all Americans. Bhutto was blaming the U.S. for his troubles. One day, when I came home for lunch, I noticed an old car, which I did not recognize, parked outside the house. When that car was there an hour later, I called our security officer to report this event. The car did belong to the Pakistani security services and I was told that I should stay in the house. In addition, the press became rather nasty. I remember that on one Saturday a column written by H.K. Burki appeared in the Pakistan Times. It included several snide remarks about Howie’s departure; he also went on to mention that there was a rumor that Howie was actually the head CIA man in Pakistan. He went on to notice that my previous overseas posting had been to Israel; that I “claimed” to be working for the American Department of State. This was the first time that someone had taken notice of one of my previous assignments; I had never tried to hide the fact, but didn’t make it a major subject for discussion either. So my tour in Israel was known to a number of Pakistanis who never seemed to let that interfere with our relationships.

On the day that the article appeared, I went to the Embassy to check the cable traffic. The DCM asked me whether I wanted to join Howie right away. There was nothing I would have liked better, but I was the only officer in the Economic Section at the time and furthermore, I was not going to be driven out of town by H.K. Burki. After that article, I changed my practices and appeared at every national day party to which I had been invited. Many people approached me to ask whether I was still “in circulation.” I assured them that I was.

I was uneasy when I noticed the Pakistani security services sitting outside our house -- mentioned earlier. But it only happened once; I think they had some inhibitions about harassing American officials. I remained in Islamabad for two more months -- until mid-July. Howie visited us twice during this period. The second time was on the Fourth of July week-end. Art Hummel had arrived as the new Ambassador in late June. He was very eager to have Prime Minister Bhutto attend our national day reception and put the recent unpleasantries behind us. Hummel made his wishes known. Bhutto at this time was in the midst of intense negotiations which, if they failed, would mean the end of his stewardship. But on July 3, Hummel got a call from the Foreign Ministry telling him that the PM most likely would show up the following day for our national day. The Ambassador waited and waited for the confirmation call; finally at 11:30 p.m. he did get a call and drove down to Rawalpindi to the PM’s office. He had a meeting
which Art thought had gone quite well -- the PM confirmed that he would attend the Fourth of July party. So Hummel came back and drafted a reporting cable to Washington.

On the Fourth, I took Howie to the Embassy to meet Hummel, who was most courteous. He showed us his reporting cable written earlier that morning, which in addition to summarizing his conversation with the PM noted that things had gotten off to a pretty good start, which would be useful for future developments. Hummel decided that he didn’t want to call a communicator to the Embassy; the cable could wait for the following day.

We had already been invited to the Fourth of July party, which was to take place around noon. Howie was asked to take his old job as “VIP spotter.” In Pakistan, there was a custom that VIPs -- particularly the PM -- who came to a reception would sit in an anteroom and the more important guests would be brought to him or her. Howie and Arnie Raphel had undertaken to be the VIP spotters for this Fourth of July reception. The PM came; General Zia, the Army Chief of Staff, and the President came -- he was a non-entity because that was his job. The toasts which were exchanged could have been given at any national day -- full of banalities. During the reception, Raphel approached General Zia to ask him whether he wanted to visit the PM. Zia said that he did not think that was necessary. Then Arnie asked whether he could call on Zia later in the day; the General said that he would be sort of busy that day. [Arnold Raphel had already become quite close to General Zia during this tour as a political officer in Pakistan. He returned to Pakistan as Ambassador during the last part of Zia’s long presidency. It is no small irony that both men were killed together in a still unexplained plane crash in July, 1988.]

After the end of the reception, Howie packed up and was heading back to Delhi. At Lahore, during a long layover, he met an opposition leader, Jennifer Musa, an Irish woman who had married some one from Baluchistan and had been very much involved in opposition politics. She just happened to be at the airport and they met. After their conversation, Howie boarded his plane to Delhi. The next morning, when we woke up, we were told that General Zia had moved against Bhutto during the night -- that must have been the reason he would not see Raphel. Bhutto was taken into “protective custody.” This event tells you something about Islamabad because no one knew anything until the actual deed took place.

As long as we are discussing the Bhutto family, let me mention Benazir. In the mid-1970s she was a student at Oxford. She had just graduated from Harvard where she was a year behind my brother, Frank Currie; they lived in the same house. They were good friends and kept in touch for a long time after graduation. When Benazir visited Washington after becoming Prime Minister, she invited Frank to a reception that she hosted. I saw her only once or twice in Pakistan -- she was there very little -- mostly for summer vacations. When I did see her, she was very friendly. We talked a little bit about Frank and about Harvard. She was very careful about following Pakistani Muslim practices while in country -- she was dressed properly, although in those days she did not cover her head. She was certainly lively.

No one at the time expected that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would be executed; therefore Benazir was not seen as a future PM. Both of her brothers were still alive. The youngest was a senior in the American School in Islamabad when we first arrived. To his family’s consternation, Harvard would not accept him -- his grades were not good enough; besides that, he had earned the
reputation at school as a slacker. His two sisters and the other brother had gone to Harvard, making the plight of the youngest child that much more difficult.

Benazir was always considered to be the apple of her father’s eye. She was probably the brightest of all of the children; she got by on her brilliance, rather than her student diligence.

Once Bhutto was executed, his older son had to leave Pakistan during the Zia tenure. He became involved with a radical political group. In the early 1980s, it became apparent that Benazir was the likely heir to the Bhutto mantle. She was in and out of exile or house arrest. If one has read her book and/or talked to her -- whether she was in or out of power -- one can see how strongly she felt about continuing her father’s mission. She said that she had learned politics at her father’s knee. In reality, however, she had learned politics from her father’s legend. Most of the time he was in office, she was not in the country. She did work with him at the UN -- Harvard gave her time off to do that. So she saw how her father operated internationally, but she could not have observed his domestic politics very much -- at least at close range. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto practiced a unique style of politics in Pakistan; it had to be seen at close hand to be understood. He did not use a gentle approach. I think because of her absences from Pakistan, Benazir developed an idealistic view of her father which was not necessarily based on hard facts.

STEVEN W. SINDING
Population Officer, USAID
Karachi (1975-1778)

*Steven Sinding was born in Massachusetts and raised in both Massachusetts and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and entered the USAID in 1971. Mr. Sinding was interviewed by W. Haven North in 2001.*

SINDING: Let me tell how I got to Pakistan. Because Ravenholt had veto power over the assignment of population officers, his considerable skepticism about whether I would be a useful addition to the Pakistan mission had to be overcome. He was very resistant to letting me go to Pakistan, despite Wheeler’s and McIntyre’s appeals. Finally, I remember a conversation in his office in which - I guess, Carl Hemmer was present; I don’t recall who else was there - Ray made me promise that I would conduct what he called a thousand household study, if he let me go to Pakistan. What Ravenholt meant by thousand household studies was demonstration projects which created the ideal service delivery environment of household distribution of pills and condoms. He was convinced that, if you could put that in place, it was possible to demonstrate in almost any setting that there would be a significant level of demand for those commodities. He, in fact, had established in Bangladesh what he called a thousand household study. It became the famous Matlab contraceptive introduction project, which had demonstrated in Bangladesh (which had been East Pakistan) that even in the most backward setting through good delivery of services at the household level you could increase contraceptive prevalence. So he made me promise that I would do a thousand household study.
We arrived in Pakistan on the 13th of September 1975; I remember because it was my wife’s birthday. When we arrived at the Karachi airport, and she saw what she had gotten herself into, she was just beside herself. She thought she knew the developing world from our living in Chile and travels through the Andean region, but she was not prepared for the subcontinent. So we got off the plane in Karachi; McIntire had flown down from Islamabad to meet us. I remember at the Midway Hotel, McIntire took me off by the pool and wanted to start talking business; it was Monica’s birthday, and she cried her eyes out. It was one of those moments with these two little kids ages three and five. So that was the beginning of our foreign service career.

The first thing I did when we got to Islamabad was to go and see the director, actually he was the codirector of the family planning program, he was joint secretary one of the two joint secretaries in charge of the program. A man named Maqbul Sheikh. And I said to Maqbul Sheikh, “Dr. Ravenholt (who he knew) asked us to do what was necessary to carry out a thousand household study, and I would like to talk with you about how to make that happen.” And Maqbul looked at me like I was crazy and he said, “Thousand household study! We are doing a contraceptive inundation program in the whole country.” He said, “We are testing the supplyside Ravenholt hypothesis on a national basis; why do you want to do a thousand household study?” He said, “two years ago, we did the Sialkot experiment in which we inundated the district with contraceptives, and it was on the basis of that experience that we decided to go ahead with the national inundation program, which USAID is lavishly funding.” These are not his exact words, but this was the spirit of the conversation. “So what are you doing coming here; who are you coming in here talking about a thousand household study; it doesn’t make any sense.” Well, I made the mistake of not reporting that back to Ravenholt; I kind of let it sit there.

I meanwhile got busy with all kinds of things in the mission. McIntyre decided that it would be a good idea alongside the mainstream inundation program - and it really was a contraceptive inundation program - that it would be a good idea to have an R&D program that was kind of experimenting at the edges of what, in addition to contraceptive inundation, might be needed to bring down birth rates in Pakistan. And this included consideration of a lot of things that were in the literature and the wind at the time, like no birth bonus schemes, and other kinds of incentives. Ron Ridker and Bob Muscat both had written papers - both economists in PPC - and essays, and there was in the literature the suggestion that there were measures “beyond family planning,” as it was called, that could bring down birth rates to the level that they needed to get to in order for population growth not to be a development problem. So I was designing what was called the “Population Research and Development Project” to create a mechanism for experimenting with some of these things. In retrospect it was a ridiculous undertaking; I mean there was very little capacity in Pakistan to do any research at all, much less highly sophisticated interventionist research of this kind. But I worked away at designing this thing and, meanwhile, became more and more convinced that the contraception inundation approach was not going to work in Pakistan.

Contraceptive inundation meant importing enormous quantities of pills and condoms, training a cadre of young field officers - young men and young women - who would work as teams going villagebyvillage to introduce contraception. A vertical program completely unconnected to the health system and managed out of Islamabad in a country that was federal in nature, where the provinces were supposed to have the responsibility for the implementation. So it was deeply
resented by the health establishment at the provincial level, in fact, undermined. The central government had no capacity to manage anything like this logistically or otherwise. It was a colossal failure. The pills and condoms piled up in the warehouses; many of them found their way into the black market and actually over the border, especially condoms. There wasn’t much demand for pills, but condoms disappeared in massive quantities to show up later in Afghanistan and Soviet Union and, in some degree, India. But most of them went over the Khyber Pass and up into Central Asia. I got there in mid ‘75, by the end of ‘77, it was clearly understood that contraceptive inundation was a massive failure.

Joe Wheeler had left in the meantime; he left in the summer of ‘76 and came back to become the Assistant Administrator for the Near East and South Asia. McIntyre left a year after that. I was in the mission when two things happened simultaneously. First, Dick Cashin came as the Mission Director from Indonesia where he had been highly regarded and a very successful Mission Director and presided over probably USAID’s most successful population project up to that point. Second, the nuclear reprocessing issue arose, and all USAID disbursements were frozen. Something else had happened at that time. Monica had worked as a rupee contractor in the USAID mission. Joe Wheeler had put her in for a lateral entry as a direct hire Capital Development Officer. And she was all set to come in as a direct hire, and she had made that a condition of her willingness to return for a second tour. Well, Jimmy Carter imposed a hiring freeze in 1977 as soon as he came into office. The nuclear issue made it impossible to make a credible case for a waiver for Monica, and Cashin didn’t like me and didn’t like what I stood for. He was a Ravenholt man down the line, and he felt that I was not on board. Ravenholt had written me a letter - Christmas of 1976, in which he accused me of - I’ll never forget the phrase - “failing to get my utilitarian wheels on the ground.” That was his terminology. Ray was famous for coming up with these original turns of phrase. I wrote him a letter back angrily defending myself. That letter eventually found its way to Sander Levin and became part of the dossier when he went after Ravenholt - but we are getting ahead of the story.

So I went back to Islamabad from home leave in summer of ‘77 with Monica - not having a job and refusing to return to Pakistan, although she would follow a few weeks later. There was a guy on the desk, David Levintow, who basically persuaded Monica that, if she came back and hung in there, they would eventually get her exempted from the freeze. So she agreed to do that. So I was back there; Cashin had said to me he did not want me to work on population; he’d like me to consider becoming the Mission Evaluation Officer. I didn’t want to do that. And besides the Pakistan Mission wasn’t going anywhere; we couldn’t obligate any new money. And there was no job for Monica. But the only way I could get out of there was by exercising my reemployment rights to the civil service. The foreign service was not going to transfer me. I got in touch with friends in Washington and told them I wanted to come back. Ravenholt wouldn’t have me. But Joe Wheeler offered me the job of pop officer in the Near East Bureau; Jack Sullivan offered me the pop officer position in the Asia Bureau, and I had three offers from PPC. One to go work with Barbara Herz in her social sector division; one to join the new studies division in the Office of Evaluation, and I can’t remember what the third was, but I remember there were five. But under the rules, if I was exercising my reemployment rights, I had to pay my own way home. So we flew back the four of us - Monica had come back and both kids were there at the end of February ‘78. And I joined the new Studies Division. I can remember people in the Mission and people in Washington asking why in the world would you go to work for PPC
when you had the opportunity to go work for a regional bureau. Why would you turn down Joe Wheeler. But I had it in mind to work in a place where I could do something analytic. In retrospect, but maybe I knew it at the time, I needed to get out of my system all of the things I disagreed with Ravenholt about.

Q: Before we turn to that, let’s finish up on Pakistan. What was your view of what we were able to accomplish in Pakistan? Talk about the Pakistani government and the people you worked with and their attitudes. What was your sense of the environment for carrying out programs?

SINDING: Both at the level of the society and at the level of the bureaucracy, I thought the situation was pretty hopeless. I can remember going out at one point into the Punjab on a field trip and having a conversation with a farmer. I spoke a little Urdu at the time. I said to him, “How many children did his parents have?” and he said, “six.” And I said, “how many children do you have?” and he said, “six.” And I said “if you could do it over again, would you still have six children.” He said, “Oh, absolutely.” He said, “I need six children.” He said, “I need one son to work with me on my land; I need one son to go to Lahore (by which he meant to get a job and to earn income for the family); and I need a third son in case something happens to one of the other two.” And he said: “Allah blessed me with three daughters.” I said there is the explanation of the six child family in Pakistan; unless there happens to be a change in that basic equation, family planning is never going to be of interest to a guy like this. That was my mindset.

Q: Did you talk with his wife?

SINDING: I did not talk to his wife. Ravenholt had talked with the “wife” and heard a different story. You know, I did believe that there was some demand for family planning, particularly in the urban centers. I didn’t think that Pakistan was an utterly hopeless case. But on the other side of it was the complete incompetence of the bureaucracy. They had pursued it down a road which had placed the central government and the provincial government at such loggerheads, so that the system was not capable of producing the kind of delivery system that even would have gotten them to the point where they could have gotten contraceptives out, given the social circumstances. It was a completely inept delivery system.

I can remember the Prime Minister’s wife Megum Nusrat Bhutto at one point went out on a field trip; I think Fred Pinkham had become the AA at this point in the PHA Bureau which was eventually to come the S&T Bureau. Fred came on a VIP visit to Pakistan, and he went off on a field trip, and, I think, Begum Bhutto went with him. It was then or when Robin Duke came one of the periodic VIP visits that we had. And I remember her commenting with shock when she met with the field workers and she said, “These are kids. What does a child have to tell a Pakistani mother about family planning?” And basically her politician’s instinct was right on the mark. That they had the wrong people employed by the wrong agency doing a job that was essentially impossible under the circumstances. So the combination of the resistance to family planning and fertility control, the increasingly conservative religious environment, and a bureaucratic structure that was just inept led me to conclude that the prospects for fertility decline in Pakistan were negligible. When I left, I was very negative.

Q: But the population program was very substantial?
SINDING: It was huge. In the years that I was there Pakistan may have been the single largest USAID population program in the world. Indonesia may have been larger. India had, at that point, closed down because of the IndoPak war of ’71’72 so we really didn't have a presence in India. I don’t think we had a project anything like the size of the one in Pakistan; except the one in Indonesia.

Q: The mission had bought into it?

SINDING: Joe Wheeler had a gambling streak in him; he was willing to try things. He thought let's test the Ravenholt hypothesis. He had an open mind; he was prepared to believe that maybe it wouldn’t work. I should add that I was not in charge of the population project. I was responsible for designing this Population R&D project. But there was a population officer by the name Andy Haynal, who was a physician, had been with the Ford Foundation, and was a Seventh Day Adventist; a fervent believer in family planning, who subsequently left the agency. But Andy was the architect and the manager of the population program.

Q: What was his attitude?

SINDING: He was a true believer. He believed that if we had been able to effectively implement inundation, that is, to actually get the commodities to the households at the village level that the scheme would work.

Q: That wasn’t happening? So the concept was never tested?

SINDING: That was Ravenholt’s argument always; he said you can’t conclude from the Pakistan experience that availability is not the key to use, because they never really implemented inundation.

Q: No where?

SINDING: That’s one of those imponderables. There were thousand and thousands of villages, and there were tens of thousands of field workers; surely the supplies and the workers were present in some places. But the Pakistan fertility survey was carried out in 1978 - field work in 1977 - and published in 1978, and it showed absolutely no increase in contraceptive prevalence over the period of the inundation project.

In fact, there is a little bit of a story in the Pakistan Fertility Survey, itself. There was an officer of the Population Planning Division named Nizamuddin He was based in Lahore and became a friend of mine. Nizam had received a Ford Foundation Fellowship to go to get a Ph.D. in population studies at the University of Michigan at the conclusion of the Pakistan Fertility Survey. But he was responsible in the meantime for conducting it. The people in Islamabad, the powers that be in Islamabad, were well aware that the results of the Pakistan fertility survey would essentially represent the verdict on their effectiveness. So the stakes were very high. There was a new Secretary of Population by the name of Zahidi. He was a little guy, less than five feet tall, and a Bhutto henchman and a real thug. Anyway Zahidi understood that the fertility survey
was going to be the report card on inundation, and so he was paying close attention to what was going on. Nizamuddin called me up in July of ‘77 when the temperature in Lahore was $120^\circ F$ and said, “I’ve got the results, could you come down and help me work on them?” So I flew down to Lahore, took a room at the Intercontinental Hotel. Nizam and I sat there for three days in my room poring over the printout of the tables, the raw cross tabs. And it was absolutely clear that inundation was a failure. The desired family size was essentially unchanged; the completed family size was unchanged; the contraceptive prevalence was essentially unchanged. Basically nothing had happened despite this massive expenditure of funds and mobilization of ....

**Q: The thousand village test was never done?**

SINDING: The thousand household study was never done either, right. In fact, Nizamuddin told me that the decision to proceed with the inundation program, which had been ostensibly based on this experiment in the Sialkot district a few years earlier, was taken before the results of the Siakot Study came in. And, in fact, the results from Siakot did not support the decision to go with inundation. The decision was not really based on anything except some hunches about what might work. And it was totally unrealistic in terms of what the public bureaucracy in Pakistan was capable of doing. That was the worst mistake. I think even worse than the mistake of believing that, if you got the pills and condoms into the villages, people would use them was the mistake of believing that you could get the pills and condoms into the villages in an acceptable way to begin with. The Pakistan system was simply not capable; a country that can’t deliver the mail is not going to be able to deliver pills and condoms to households under conservative religious and cultural traditions. It was a mind bogglingly inappropriate set of decisions in my view.

**Q: What do you conclude as the lesson from that experience?**

SINDING: Well, I am going to come to that, because what I went back to PPC to do was directly related to that. But let me anticipate the answer by saying that I think that what Bangladesh did right, and Pakistan did wrong, was to seriously test out ideas before going to the large scale. Indonesia did the same thing. What Indonesia discovered was that what worked in Bali didn’t necessarily work in West Java. And what worked in West Java, didn’t necessarily work in East Java. What Bangladesh discovered was that just getting the pills and condoms into the villages was not enough, that you had to have trained experienced and trusted field workers at the community level, you had to have a referral system, and you had to have a capacity to deal with sideeffects of contraceptives. If Pakistan had observed those basic rules of testing honestly on a small level and learned from that before going largescale, a lot of pain and suffering and money could have been saved. The big mistake in Pakistan was not actually letting the Sialkot Study be completed and going ahead with a massive inundation program that was highly risky. Taking the risk is one thing, but doing it without any pilot testing I think was irresponsible. Subsequently, Jack Sullivan, when he became the Assistant Administrator for Asia, had the courage to say that - to say that the Office of Population was pushing supplies out in an irresponsible manner - with this full supply mentality. There was enormous pressure on the Mission from Ravenholt in the Office of Population to accept very large shipments of pills and condoms. You were working in Africa at that time, so you may not have been subject to such pressure.
RICHARD M. CASHIN  
Director, USAID  
Islamabad (1977-1978)


Q: You did that for a couple of years and then went off to Pakistan in 1977. Was there any war going on there at that time?

CASHIN: Not at the moment. But I preceded my wife to post and recall sitting in the house when the lights went out. The steward said, "It's an air raid." I said, "How do you know?" He said, "Well, the lights went out and I hear a siren in the distance and it is always like this when we have an air raid." Shortly thereafter the lights came back on again. It had been raining and this was the reason. The siren had something to do with the end of the Ramadan fast notifying everybody in Islamabad that it was time to eat. But that always stuck in my mind because the first thing he thought of was an air raid.

Q: How did you feel your mission in Pakistan went? Did you have the same sort of tensions?

CASHIN: Less so, I would say. The government was reasonably serious. The Pakistani staff was the best I have ever had in terms of local staff. It was a pleasure to work in the country because they were so very well educated and well prepared.

Q: This was already your third Muslim country. You must have felt as though you were becoming a specialist in Islamic affairs.

CASHIN: But they were so very different. Indonesians are Muslims in a very different way than Pakistanis. It is a much more gentle, humanistic reading of the Koran.

Q: In 1978 you moved from being the AID mission director in Pakistan to the delightful city we both love, Rome.

CASHIN: While I was in Washington doing this legislative job and not knowing exactly what the future held, I went and put my name on a list in the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs because I had heard that they were some times looking for candidates for positions in the UN. When I went in they were not particularly encouraging. They said somebody with my background really belonged in UNDP, but UNDP was going through a difficult period and they didn't have a lot of money and there were too many Americans anyway, but they said it doesn't cost anything to leave my name so to go ahead. I did and forgot, really, that I had ever done so.
I went off to Pakistan and would have been quite content to stay there when suddenly a telegram arrived from the Department asking whether I would be interested in a position as the head of the Project Management Division in the World Food Programme in Rome. I went home that night and told my wife and she said that she would be delighted to move to Rome. It came at a good time because the US assistance program to Pakistan had been put on hold by the Carter administration over the nuclear issue. The Pakistan government, even then, was understood to be pursuing a program to develop nuclear capability.

Q: Had Pakistan signed the NPT...Non-proliferation Treaty?

CASHIN: I frankly don't know. My knowledge of these things comes from such encounters...there was a French fellow that one of my colleagues met at the Intercon Hotel in Rawalpindi and he said, "Are you the new chef here?" He said, "No, no, I have come on the nuclear program."

Q: The French were actively selling the nuclear knowhow around the world.

CASHIN: It is not unlikely that the Pakistanis were interested in this. The Indians were known to have exploded a device and as we discussed earlier, the Pakistanis were absolutely paranoid about the possibility of being attacked...at least they were then.

MARC GROSSMAN
Junior Rotational Officer
Islamabad (1977-1979)

Ambassador Marc Grossman was born in Los Angeles, California in 1951. He received his BA from the University of California, Santa Barbara and his MSc from the London School of Economics. He entered the Foreign Service in 1976. His overseas posts include Islamabad, Pakistan, Amman, Jordan, Brussels, Belgium, and Ankara, Turkey. He was Executive Secretary of the State Department (1993-1994), Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (1997-2000), Director General (2000-2001) Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2001-2005) and U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2011-2012). Ambassador Grossman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy beginning in 2006 and finishing in 2014.

GROSSMAN: I went to Pakistan in early ’77.

Q: How’d you find it?

GROSSMAN: I discovered I have no aptitude for language.

Q: Welcome to the club.
GROSSMAN: I took the MLAT, and it was pretty low, 59 or something. I was paired in Urdu class with an Army Major named David Lemon. He was a FAO (Foreign Area Officer) on his way to India. I liked him very much. I’d never really met anybody from the military before, so that was also good.

Q: What, how long was the course?

GROSSMAN: Twenty-four weeks.

Q: And then?

GROSSMAN: I went to Pakistan.

Q: Where in Pakistan?

GROSSMAN: To Islamabad. I was the junior rotational officer in Islamabad.

Q: And you were there from?

GROSSMAN: I got there in March or April of 1977 and I stayed there until, June 1979. There had just been a failed election in Pakistan, there was rioting and a lot of unrest. It was a pretty interesting time to be a junior officer. Like in NEA/ARN, I got to see some great FSOs in action. I was there for the last five or six weeks of the tenure of Ambassador (Henry A.) Byroade, a historic character. The DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) was Peter Constable, the Political Consular was Howie Schaffer, the Deputy Political Consular was Arnie (Arnold) Raphel. I went there as a rotational officer. I started my rotation in the economic section, working for Tezi (Teresita C.) Schaffer.

After a few months, the junior officer in the political section got removed by embassy management for violating the DCM’s instructions not to meet with the opposition. They decided I might be able to do the political job, so I was reassigned to the slot. It was a real education to work for Arnie Raphel and Howie Schaffer and Peter Constable and Ambassador Arthur Hummel when he arrived later in the year.

Q: When you arrived there who was the president or prime minister?

GROSSMAN: The prime minister was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I can’t remember what all of the issues were, but it was a very divided country; lots of demonstrations in the streets after what everyone called a failed election, which had taken place just before I got there.

Q: In what manner?

GROSSMAN: There was a lot of cheating and it hadn’t really come to any conclusion and so there was some feeling that Bhutto was not fully legitimate. Bhutto was also pursuing a nuclear program, which put the US and Pakistan at odds.
At some point later that summer, Howie Schaffer got PNG’d (persona non grata) or left Pakistan before he got PNG’d. Howie was talking on the phone to our Consul General in Karachi, Bob Moore, and he said something like, “the elephant never forgets.” They were talking about the election, talking about Bhutto. But the Pakistani security services had tapped the phone and so, the next day or two days later in parliament, Bhutto says, “I have a transcript of a conversation between the Political Counselor at the American Embassy and American Consul General, ‘the elephant never forgets.’ Well, I say to the elephant that we will never forget.” Bhutto made it into a huge thing because he had interpreted it that we would always oppose Bhutto. So Howie, I can’t now remember whether they PNG’d him or whether everybody on the US side thought, “This is probably best if he just sort of moves on.” For months Arnie Raphel was the Acting Political Counselor and there was plenty of work to go around. I became a great admirer of Arnie Raphel and it was a privilege to work for him and with him. I learned how to be an FSO abroad from that group of people. Herb Haggerty then arrived to become the Political Counselor. He was a true South Asia expert and was great to me. Arnie went back to DC to work for Secretary (Cyrus Roberts) Vance.

Another great story from that time was that when Arthur Hummel arrived to succeed Byroade, let’s say in June, Bhutto was up to his eyeballs in his domestic politics and all this fighting and rioting. Ambassador Hummel wanted our July 4th party to be a vin d’honneur. I had to ask, what does that mean? I had never heard of such an event. The plan was to invite everybody to the Ambassador’s residence at noon on July 4. So it gets to be the end of June and Hummel still hasn’t presented his credentials because Bhutto never has time to receive Hummel. Then it gets to be the 1st of July, the 2nd of July, and everyone’s saying to Bhutto, “You can’t go to the American Ambassador’s Fourth of July party until the American Ambassador has presented his credentials.” So July 2nd goes by. July 3rd goes by, and Hummel says to us at CoB (close of business) on the 3rd of July, “I guess you better go home, they’re supposed to call us at some point to go down and present credentials; I’ll let you know.” About 3:00 in the morning he gets a call from the prime minister’s office, “Come right now and present your credentials.” I’m sorry about it, but no one thought the most junior person should come along. Anyway, they went to Rawalpindi at 3:00 in the morning on the 4th of July, Hummel presents his credentials. They have about an hour meeting. Hummel comes home.

I go to work and find out all this has happened. We all then go over to the Ambassador’s residence before noon on the Fourth of July and my job is to greet people at their cars and then walk them up to the Ambassador and try to introduce them. After a while the Ambassador sits in some alcove and it was up to more senior people to bring distinguished guests to him. The house is full of senior Pakistani government, military and opposition people. Arnie at one point goes up to General Zia and says to the then Chief of the Army Staff, “Would you like to meet Ambassador Hummel?” And Zia says, “No, I don’t think so.” Then Arnie says, “Well, okay.” Then he says to Zia, “I know you’re looking to buy a C-12 Beechcraft for the Army, we’ve got one in the country over the next few weeks. Would you like to take a ride?” Zia looks at Arnie and says, “I’m going to be sort of busy over the next few weeks.” So at 2:00, this vin d’honneur is over; everybody goes home.
Next morning we wake up, it is now the 5<sup>th</sup> of July. There’s martial music playing on the radio; there’s been a coup overnight. So I call the political FSNs (Foreign Service National), two wonderful people, Imtiaz and Amman. And I ask, “What the heck is going on?” “Well, there’s been a coup, General Zia’s now in charge of the country, Bhutto’s in jail.” And I said, “Well, when did you know about this?” “Oh, we knew about it in the middle of the night.” I said, “Well, why didn’t you call us?” And they said, “Well, why would we have called you since you all did this?” I said, “What are you talking about?” And they replied, “Well, Hummel went to see Bhutto at 3:00 on the morning of the 4<sup>th</sup> of July and gave him some demands, all of the conspirators were together from 12:00 to 2:00 on the 4<sup>th</sup> of July at the Ambassador’s residence, where they clearly made some plan and then there was a coup. So why would we have called you?” None of that was true, of course. It was a great lesson in the power of conspiratorial thinking.

Q: What was the feeling among you all when the coup came? Was this any good thing, a bad thing or what?

GROSSMAN: Fair question. I think in some senses Pakistanis were relieved that there was going to be order. But many Pakistanis and Americans recognized that it was a blow to democracy. And of course Zia took Pakistan in directions no one predicted at the time.

Q: Were you getting, I mean, this was before it happened or maybe discussions afterwards; was Bhutto’s anti-Americanism a sort of handy political ploy to have somebody to be against or was it ingrained or what?

GROSSMAN: I think a little bit of both. If you go back to the LSE problem. He was a British-educated socialist-view person who was very suspicious of the United States. We were also opposed to his nuclear ambitions. But I think he also found the United States was a very easy whipping boy for him and his political party.

Q: Did much change when Zia came in?

GROSSMAN: Yes. Lots and lots of politicians were in jail. I think the parliament was suspended, I can’t remember. The military really ran the country. And so, yes, there was a big change. Then, of course, over time the most important issue of all became Bhutto’s execution. He was tried and then Zia ordered his execution.

Q: That seemed so out of line with the way things happened in there. I mean, the execution. Of course, this happened in Turkey too but those are about the only two examples I can think of coups where they—in sort of major countries.

GROSSMAN: Well it was disastrous and I can remember Ambassador Hummel going, with instructions and without instructions, to Zia saying, “You can’t do this, this is the wrong answer to the question,” and using (Turkish Prime Minister Adnan) Menderes as the example; the execution of Menderes has haunted Turkish society ever since.

Q: Yes.
GROSSMAN: I can remember him going over there time and time again trying to convince Zia that an execution wasn’t the answer, but they did it. I was sent out that day to try as best I could to judge public reaction. My reporting then was that 50 percent of the people were in tears and 50 of the people were giving each other candy. I was amazed, especially as an American, to see people celebrating the execution of a leader.

Q: Yes. Was Benazir Bhutto at all a factor in those days?

GROSSMAN: No, she was, a student in London and in the US I think, at that time. So we were conscious of her but I don’t remember her being a political factor. Her mother, Bhutto’s wife, was a political factor.

Q: How did you find Pakistan? You’d been studying political processes and you had a Pakistani friend and all. Did you find it more a what? A tribal situation or a ...?

GROSSMAN: It was feudal and tribal.

Q: Feudal.

GROSSMAN: Pakistan was a feudal society. It was also tribal. Baluchistan was certainly a tribal society and the North-West Frontier was as well. There were also great landlords, like the Bhuttos, who were a great landlord family from the Sindh.

Q: Well, one of the things that is so apparent as time has gone on over a period is that Pakistan just doesn’t seem to have been able to really settle things.

India has made the breakthrough apparently.

GROSSMAN: Part of Pakistan’s problem is that Pakistan is still unsure why Pakistan is Pakistan. For a while Pakistan was the homeland for Muslims in South Asia. But then Bangladesh breaks away and so, why Pakistan? What do you believe in? India now has a very large Muslim population, so Pakistan is not the “homeland for Muslims” in South Asia. When I lived there 1977-79, I thought often about how lucky we are to have had more than one Founding Father, in the sense that if you don’t like Jefferson you can like Franklin or Madison or Hamilton. If you don’t like Franklin you can like Washington. Pakistan had one person, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and that was it. He was a great man, but if you didn’t like Jinnah or he didn’t grab you, there wasn’t anything else to believe in. So part of their problem is that they just never were able to unify around some concept of who they were and what they’re all about.

Q: Well Jinnah was rather an austere figure and not very lovable.

GROSSMAN: But he had an idea; he was an intellectual and he helped create the state, and then he died before he could inculcate his vision.

Q: As a junior officer and all, how did you find the corruption factor?
GROSSMAN: In Pakistan?

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: As a junior officer it wasn’t the corruption so much; it was that for the very first time in my life I was confronted with millions and millions of poor people. All of us kept asking ourselves: how are they ever going to get out of this cycle of misery? I know there are poor people in America, but for me the numbers in Pakistan were overwhelming. It was a big splash of reality to wander around there as a junior officer and say, “What’s going to happen here? What do you do? What’s the responsibility of the United States?”

Q: During the time you were there was there a stance—standoffish, hostile or what—towards mainly a Zia government in that early period?

GROSSMAN: It was, no, it wasn’t standoffish except for the fact that the nuclear issue covered over everything. It was Bhutto who said that Pakistanis would “eat grass,” if that’s what it took to invest in the nuclear program. Zia was more cagier. Zia always wanted us to prove there really was a nuclear program. I can remember the first time I ever met Bob Gallucci. Gallucci was flown out as a young INR nuclear specialist accompanied by a photo interpreter, and they went to see Zia. And they said look, here it is.

Q: They showed the pictures.

GROSSMAN: They showed the evidence. They said, “This is what’s happening in your country.” Zia said, “Oh no, can’t possibly be.” And that was the time when the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, was on the cocktail circuit in Islamabad and presumably giving details of the Pakistani nuclear program to countries like North Korea. Zia was much cagier about it and I’m sure wanted the program to continue and was just harder to deal with. But you know at that time we had cut off all assistance to Pakistan; the nuclear issue dominated everything.

Q: Was there, did you get any feel for the Islamic movement in Pakistan at that time?

GROSSMAN: A little bit. As the junior political officer I had a chance to meet people from the Jamaat-e-Islamia party. They were headquartered in Lahore and I can remember going there to call on them and listen to them about how an Islamic State was the answer to Pakistan’s questions. You’ll also recall at that time that Zia himself turned out to be a much more religious figure than anyone had expected and banned alcohol in Pakistan after he became what was called the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Islam and its role in society and government began to be a front-and-center issue there in the year after the coup.

Q: Well as a Political Officer what were you doing when, I take it political movement was pretty well stifled, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: We were able to get out and about. The embassy leadership encouraged it. I can even remember calling on people on house arrest.
Q: Knocking on ...

GROSSMAN: I can remember one time going up to meet a very interesting retired air force officer named Askar Khan, who taught me a big lesson about America. He was under house arrest. I don’t know why, but I got permission to go see him. He was up in the North-West Frontier somewhere; we talked and we talked. He finally said to me, “You know what I love most about America, what I admire most about America?” I said, “No, what’s that?” He said the peaceful transition of power. He said, “On the 20th of January, someone leaves and someone comes and nobody goes to jail, and here I am in house arrest.” And I never forgot that.

Q: Do you have any feel about the military, where they were coming from?

GROSSMAN: Well, again, I think it was surprising that Zia turned out to be so Islamic. People would have guessed that the military was not so Islamic, or not so religious. They were very restricted in terms of contacts.

Q: Did you get any feel, at least from accounts of other people you talk about, the power of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) or whatever it is, the intelligence service?

GROSSMAN: No, at that time I did not. I either wasn’t part of it or it wasn’t a focus for me. It is possible that the Ambassador and other people did.

Q: And it may have developed more later, too.

GROSSMAN: That could be. Because don’t forget it was in February, 1979 that (Ambassador Adolph) Spike Dubs was murdered in Afghanistan and that many things in the region started to shift. It was not until Christmas of ’79, after I’d left Pakistan, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The 14th of February of ’79 was the first takeover of the Embassy in Tehran and also when Ambassador Dubs was murdered.

Q: Yes. Well, before we move to that, were the Saudis at that point doing their support of the madrassas and all that sort of stuff or not?

GROSSMAN: I confess I don’t know. Our big external focus was the Iranian revolution. We watched, we were next door and we listened to what was going on in Iran.

Q: Well was there concern for the Khomeini revolution and all that, in Iran that it might spill over and were you thinking that ...

GROSSMAN: In Pakistan, I don’t remember thinking so at the time.

Q: How about Afghanistan?

GROSSMAN: Before the February 1979 events, I’d been to Afghanistan two or three times. We used to swap houses with junior officers in in Afghanistan. I used to drive up there in a little Datsun station wagon. You’d fill the gas tank in Islamabad; drive to Peshawar, and in Peshawar
there was a guy who’d sell you aviation fuel. You’d fill half your tank with 110-octane aviation fuel, and get up the hill to Afghanistan through the North-West Frontier and Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. When you got to Afghanistan, all they had was Soviet gas and it was 70 octane. So you’d hope that some of the 110 was still in there and you’d get half or three-quarters of a tank of 70, hoping that the combination would make 80. But I loved being in Kabul and making that drive. You were surrounded by history and mystery.

Q: You didn’t feel under any particular concerns about the threat of terrorism or that sort of thing?

GROSSMAN: No. It is amazing to think of today. Within the bounds of reason, we were pretty much free to go and do what we wanted. I went with my DEA colleagues to the Swat Valley, for example. And many other places in Pakistan as well.

Q: How about social life? Was there sort of the ruling feudal class; were they still going under military dictatorship?

GROSSMAN: I think so; I would imagine. I don’t know enough; a number of people who opposed Bhutto were probably quite happy with military rule, at least in the beginning. You could see that in the way some Pakistanis celebrated Bhutto’s execution.

Q: I’ve talked to people who served there at that time going out to the country with one of their contacts and they talk about how many villages they own and all that.

GROSSMAN: I can remember being in the Swat District one time; we went for tea with the Wāli of Swat, how could you resist such a thing? While we were there, a man knocked on the gate and they conversed and the Wāli reported that the person had just come by to see if the Wāli wanted anybody killed. I don’t know whether that’s true or not or whether that was done for the visit, for the visiting impressionable American, but that was sort of an amazing comment to hear.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador Hank Byroade?

GROSSMAN: Unfortunately I was only there sort of five or six weeks with him, but he was an historic character. I’d read Stillwell and the American Experience in China and knew a little bit him. I am sorry I did not have a chance to really work with him

Q: How about Art Hummel?

GROSSMAN: Art Hummel was a marvelous man. When he got to Islamabad he was a great teacher. When I became an Ambassador, I tried to remember how he acted and how he led his team. Ambassador Hummel would come down the hall, stick his head in and say, “Marc, are you doing anything?” I’d say, “No, sir.” He’d say, “I’m going to see the foreign minister, come along and take notes.” We’d get in the car and go over to see the foreign minister and then, on the way back, he’d say, “Why don’t you write the cable up about my meeting with the foreign minister?” I did my best and I’d get it back corrected. He’d call you in and explain, teach. He’d say, “Better this way than that.” He had an ear for the Washington audience that I tried to emulate.
I remember the first week he was there, I didn’t know what he was doing, I didn’t know it was a technique; he came by—we worked Sunday to Thursday so let’s say it was Thursday—and he said, “Marc, on Saturday I’d like you to make an arrangement with the motor pool to get a car and a driver and I want you to take me to three interesting places in Rawalpindi, and then I’ll buy you lunch.” That sounded great. So I made arrangements with the motor pool, I took him to three interesting places in Rawalpindi because a friend of mine and I had often visited Urdu Bazaar, which was where all the books were sold and there were amazing paper things that they made. We went to the Fine Picture Framer, a lovely man who framed pictures, and then we went to the fort. Ambassador Hummel said, “Those are three interesting places, I’ll take you to lunch.” So we went to the Intercontinental Hotel. Hummel told me the story about how (former Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger said that he, Art Hummel, was the “meanest man in the Foreign Service.” He said, “I don’t seem so mean, do I?” I said, “I don’t think so.” Anyway, I dropped him back home and I took the car back and, a couple of weeks later, he said, “Do you know what I did?” I said, “No, I don’t know.” He said, “I wanted to see whether you, as the most junior officer in the place, had enough contacts to get a car and whether you’d ever been to Rawalpindi before and whether you knew anything about this country.” He was a great teacher and a great person.

And Mrs. Hummel, Betty Lou Hummel, was just also a great person and leader. They really led a community.

Q: Well then you left there in?

GROSSMAN: The summer of ’79.

Q: And things, I thought we’d stop at this point.

GROSSMAN: That would be great.

Q: And we’ll pick it up. But just to set things, when you left all hell was going to break loose, including literally at the Embassy.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: Within a relatively short time.

GROSSMAN: November. It happened in November.

Q: But were you feeling under any concern that you were on the lip of a volcano or anything like that?

GROSSMAN: No sir. I can’t say that we did.

Q: Well then, summer of ’79, where did you go?

GROSSMAN: I became one of two staff assistants in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. I became a staff assistant to (Harold H.) Hal Saunders.
Q: Okay, we’ll pick it up then.

GROSSMAN: That would be great.

Q: Before we go, did you get any feel for that time, the sort of New Delhi-Islamabad, the two embassies were not always on the best of terms or, I mean, I think of (John Kenneth) Galbraith.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: How were things then? How were Indian-Pakistani relations viewed?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is that while I was in Pakistan there was one of those little tiny warming trends; where there was actually Pakistani diplomatic representation in India and vice-versa. I can remember meeting the Indian representative to Pakistan and I knew the Pakistani representative over there through Arnie. I think Ambassador Hummel and whomever was the Ambassador to India—sorry, I don’t remember—had committed themselves not to get into squabbling between the two embassies. I can remember being sent over to India to meet with the political section there and to spend a few days, and I can remember them coming to Islamabad so that they knew people. The two Ambassadors worked quite hard not to get into these games.

Q: Every once in a while it flares up; it is silly. But it is localitis.

Did you see the Taj Mahal?

GROSSMAN: I got there two or three times and it was like the Grand Canyon, one of those few things that’s even better in person than the most beautiful picture.

Q: One other one, I’ve got this then we’ll stop.

GROSSMAN: Okay.

Q: Arnie Raphel, he’s quite a figure in the Foreign Service. Unfortunately he died in an airplane crash with Zia when he was Ambassador there. But what was your impression; how did he work with you?

GROSSMAN: He worked with me by trusting me; he worked with me by teaching me. He was great to work with and for because he was smart, committed and wanted every day to be fun. He had time for junior people. There is a reason the Department has a leadership and mentoring award named for Arnie. Arnie Raphel was a bottle of champagne. Arnie had a gift for bureaucracy; he had the gift to be able to write quickly and clearly; he could talk your ear off, and he oozed charm. He was a wonderful human being and I miss him.

ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.
Ambassador
Pakistan (1977-1981)

Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. was born in China in 1920, the child of missionaries. In 1928, his family moved back to the United States. He attended a local primary school and a Quaker boarding school, but dropped out of Antioch just after one year. After wondering the Midwest for a while, he returned to China to teach in a Catholic missionary school there. Not listening to his parents to leave China before Pearl Harbor, he was interned by the Japanese. When he finally returned to the States, he enrolled at the University of Chicago, where he received his master’s degree. In addition, he has served in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Burma, and Ethiopia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 13, 1994.

Q: Let's move to your time in Pakistan. You mentioned that your assignment as Ambassador to the Philippines fell through, because of your friend, Carlos Romulo. You agreed to go to Pakistan in 1977. Was there any problem in your going to Pakistan, either in getting agrément or obtaining approval from the Senate?

HUMMEL: No. This was handled on a pro forma basis.

Q: You went at a very interesting time. Did you know that you were going for what would be, in Joseph Grew's term, "a turbulent era" in Pakistan, or not?

HUMMEL: No. The first 10 days that I was in Pakistan were absolutely sensational for me. I arrived at a time when Mohammed Ali Bhutto was under very heavy fire from virtually the whole country for having rigged recently-held elections.

Q: We're talking about June, 1977.

HUMMEL: Late June and July, yes. The election, as I recall, had been held in March, 1977. Henry Byroade was Ambassador at that time. Bhutto had no reason to rig the election, but he did, and he more or less was caught at it. A large number of people -- virtually the whole country -- rose up, objected, and demonstrated. Bhutto gave ground slowly, over a period of weeks, before I arrived. He had already agreed to hold new elections, which was an admission of some sort. He was negotiating with a group of powerful moguls and political leaders about the terms of the new elections, who would be in charge, and so on. During this period, by the way, he used a sort of Senator Joseph McCarthy tactic of waving a letter from Ambassador Byroade which, he claimed, demonstrated American interference and pressure on Pakistan.

Q: He'd done this before, hadn't he?

HUMMEL: Byroade was sickened by this because he had very successfully made a practice of developing a close relationship with various heads of state. He had done this with Marcos in the Philippines, for example, and in Afghanistan as well. Anyway, Bhutto had his hands full, saving his own career. He was negotiating, as I said, with people who opposed him about the terms of new elections. I arrived during this time, and Bhutto was exceedingly busy. I presented my
credentials to the President of Pakistan, who was a nonentity. Bhutto was Prime Minister and really ran the country. Presenting credentials in Pakistan, by the way, was quite a colorful experience because it was done in the British style, with a carriage and a mounted guard...

Q: Lancers and pennants and all that...

HUMMEL: In Ethiopia it was quite colorful, also. Even though the Emperor was gone, they maintained a lot of the pomp from a former time and of the same sort.

Anyway, I presented my credentials in Pakistan. I had no particular problems. I was beginning to call on the various cabinet ministers who were able to see me. Within a week of my presentation of credentials our Fourth of July reception came up. The normal drill in Pakistan was to have a "vin d'honneur" at noontime, with just the diplomatic chiefs of mission and government officials invited. You played the two national anthems and stood there with the President of the country and gave toasts. I was told that Bhutto might not be able to come to my National Day "vin d'honneur." He was a crucial figure there and confrontational toward the United States, but couldn't come unless I had called on him beforehand.

So we were all on tenterhooks, including a lot of Pakistanis who really wanted US relations to be repaired. Bhutto was terribly -- and genuinely -- busy. At 2:30 AM on July 4 I finally saw Bhutto by driving down from Islamabad to Rawalpindi. They are about 15 miles apart. I was invited to call on him at his residence. In our conversation I told him that I didn't want to discuss past frictions between Pakistan and the United States. I just wanted him to know that I hoped that we could begin again from my arrival in the country. I said that the American Government had nothing to do with internal Pakistani political affairs. I hoped that we could put all of that behind us and start on a new relationship. He seemed to want to do that. He was cordial and spent a half hour with me. That was it. I said goodbye at 3:00 AM on July 4. At noontime the same day Bhutto came to the "vin d'honneur" and very ostentatiously spent all of his time talking with the Soviet Ambassador! General Zia, the chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, was there, as well as other, senior Army officers. At 10:00 PM, still July 4 Gen Zia launched a military coup d'etat, arrested Bhutto, and took over the country, promising immediate elections which, of course, were not held for years. So all of these things happened at one time or another on July 4, 1977! It was an epitome of the chaos which Pakistan was going through.

Q: Just to back up a bit. Before you went out to Pakistan, you were now in a different bureau in the State Department -- the NEA [Near Eastern Affairs] Bureau, rather than EA. You must have been briefed prior to your departure. What were the views at that time of the Country Director and desk officers for Pakistan on Bhutto, where Pakistan was going, and the situation in general?

HUMMEL: I don't think that any of them had any particularly unusual views on those subjects. I think that we all figured that Bhutto was likely to find a way to survive, that new elections would probably bring him a plurality, and that he would remain in office, although I don't think that anybody was sure of this. The tension that caused the coup was the real possibility of a split and the prospect of a kind of civil war of some sort. The four provinces of Pakistan, Baluchistan, Northwest Frontier, Punjab, and Sindh: are quite different. Bhutto came from Sindh Province.
The military, by and large, came from the Punjab, which is in the northeastern part of the country.

I had an absolutely first rate DCM, Peter Constable. I was always extremely lucky in that respect. He knew the area and Pakistan extremely well. By the time I arrived and had presented my credentials, we knew that the situation was extremely dicey. Nobody was willing to say exactly what they thought would happen. When I was in Washington, before going out to Pakistan, I think that the NEA Bureau did not have quite this sense of crisis.

Q: What about Bhutto? Was he considered some sort of Krishna Menon type of person? Did he detest the United States, was he accustomed to using this country as something of a whipping boy, or was he an opportunist? Did you get any feeling of where Bhutto stood, ideologically?

HUMMEL: He was certainly not a Leftist. He did not really have any interest in cozying- up to the Soviet Union. He was basically an opportunist and was a very strong Pakistani nationalist. He was very smart but completely ruthless. After he was arrested, he was tried for murder and convicted. He appealed his sentence, and the appeal was considered in an orderly way, according to the British style judicial system in effect in Pakistan. He was eventually executed. Even his devoted followers in the Progressive People's Party (PPP) would say to me and to other diplomats privately, "Of course he ordered these executions. We know that. Everybody knows that. But that's the way we expect our leaders to behave here." He had been doing this for years. He was found out to have kidnapped and to have sent off secretly to concentration camps other political leaders whom he didn't like. He had other people murdered as well. There is no question that he was guilty of murder and of ordering people to be murdered. This is what he was tried for.

However, at the time when he was about to be executed, the United States Government and others made genuine efforts to...

Q: He was executed on April 4, 1979.

HUMMEL: Yes. A little less than two years after he was tried and convicted of murder. Legal procedures were followed. We strongly urged General Zia not to execute him but to commute his sentence to life imprisonment. Zia didn't want to do that, and I can understand this. He didn't want to have this potentially explosive person in a jail anyplace where his followers might succeed in getting him out. He might die in jail, and Zia would be accused of killing him in secret. Anyway, our pleas didn't do any good.

Q: Where did the pleas come from? Why were we pleading with Zia to spare Bhutto's life?

HUMMEL: They were on behalf of his friends. By the way, you asked if he was anti-American. This anti-American slant only showed up when he was in such dire trouble after he'd rigged the elections in the spring of 1977. Before that he'd been a relatively close friend of the United States. He would show his independence from time to time, but there was no anti-American tinge to him before that.
Q: When you went out to Pakistan in June, 1977, what did you consider your major goals? What did America want from Pakistan at that time?

HUMMEL: Basically, we wanted to help make sure that Pakistan survived and that there was peace in South Asia. There had already been three wars between Pakistan and India. In each case, I think it's fair to say, Pakistan started them. After Bangladesh, which previously had been part of Pakistan, split off and became independent, Pakistan was far weaker than India, militarily, politically, and otherwise, because of the fragile nature of the state, the weakness of the relations between the different provinces, and the fact that nobody was trying seriously to split the country by supporting Provincial independence. The strongest thing that held Pakistan together was Islam.

However, Bhutto was really an expert at manipulating the political situation. He'd been around for a long time. He'd survived in the opposition during the time of Ayub Khan, the military dictator who was in charge in Pakistan for a long time. I thoroughly agreed with the Pakistanis who said, "Yes, of course he was guilty of murder. This is what we expect of our leaders."

Q: When you were going out to Pakistan, did you sense any bias within the NEA Bureau, either toward India or toward Pakistan?

HUMMEL: There was perhaps some pro-India bias, I think, because India did have a true, democratic system, and Pakistan had been in and out of having a democratic system. General Zia took over in a coup and was no longer democratic. Of course, in NEA they didn't know that that was going to happen. Also, we had lost any direct treaty relationship with Pakistan through CENTO, Central Treaty Organization, formerly the Baghdad Pact, which had included Pakistan. CENTO collapsed of its own weight when the Shah of Iran died. We were supplying Pakistan with arms. I should add that we were not the principal supplier of arms to Pakistan.

After the war that broke East Pakistan loose and created Bangladesh, the Pakistanis were terrified that India's military forces suddenly became a far greater threat because half of Pakistan's territory and armed services had been taken away. They also lost an enormous amount of equipment. The Chinese Communists jumped in at that point and supplied a lot of fighter aircraft, tanks, and other types of equipment. This helped to create a deterrent to whatever adventurism may have existed in India. And there were signs that some people in India -- not so much in the Indian military services themselves, but elsewhere -- would like to bring an end to Pakistan. There was even some such feeling in the military and among some militant Hindus who wanted to solve the Pakistan problem once and for all by invading the country and breaking it up.

That could have happened. During the war which led to Bangladeshi independence, Kissinger and others had moved an American aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean as a signal to deter India from undertaking the final dissolution of Pakistan. India had the military power to do this.

Our national sympathies, intellectually and generally, were with India. However, our purely strategic view was that Pakistan needed our support to maintain a balance and so that there would not be a disastrous war between India and Pakistan.
Q: The Carter administration had just entered office. This was an administration controlled by the Democratic Party, which in very rough terms seems to lean toward India. The Carter administration sort of embraced India. President Carter's mother had been a Peace Corps volunteer at an advanced age in India. The Republicans seemed to like Pakistan a little more as a military led and more anti-communist country. Did you feel any of that?

HUMMEL: The Pakistanis used to say exactly that. You have that just right. They would say that Democratic administrations in Washington would prefer India, and Republicans would prefer Pakistan. They felt this -- and there was quite a bit of truth in it.

Q: Let's follow through a bit on this. Who was the Ambassador in India, in New Delhi, when you were Ambassador in Pakistan?

HUMMEL: Bob Goheen. He had been born in India, had been President of Princeton, was a very capable and nice guy, and did a good job in Delhi. I remember that on at least two occasions he made speeches which infuriated the Pakistanis. In these speeches he asserted that fundamental American interests dictated that the United States must have a better relation with India than with Pakistan. He didn't quite say it this way, but he seemed to say that everybody knows that we prefer India. This, of course, didn't help me any. I managed -- correctly, with Washington's help -- to make some public statements which balanced off what Ambassador Goheen had said.

This is an illustration that there was some truth in what Goheen said. Many Americans prefer India over turbulent, Islamic Pakistan.

Q: Well, India is perhaps more fun. At the same time I would have thought that many of the attitudes of the Indian Government would have just outraged Americans. They were playing this game of cozying-up to the Soviets and getting Soviet equipment. One always had the feeling that this was not a real alliance but one more or less intended to make them look better on the world stage. Maybe this was done for domestic, political reasons. From your position were you hearing concern about India and the Soviets?

HUMMEL: Yes. But the Indians were extremely clever at playing these games, particularly Indira Gandhi, for the purpose of having a few external enemies to point at. She particularly wanted to have China as an external enemy, as well as us. We were absolutely certain that she was being fed plain disinformation by pro-Soviet Indian advisers about alleged, tinkering by CIA in Indian internal affairs and so forth. There were an awful lot of convinced, pro-Soviet people in India. She loved to publicize these accusations. Our relationship with India was stormy. At the same time the relations between the American Ambassador and the Indians, as well as between the American Consulates General in Calcutta and Bombay and local Indian people were very smooth and very friendly. Indians do have a liking for Americans.

Q: Was there a pretty good exchange of views between our two Embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad?

HUMMEL: Yes, there was. Both Embassies made special efforts to make sure that our political
officers, in particular, went back and forth on TDY (Temporary Duty) trips. I think that I said earlier that I reinvented the idea that I had in East Africa to have a regional Chief of Mission conference, set up in the same way, conspiring among ourselves. We included Iran, where Bill Sullivan was the Ambassador, and all of the South Asian countries.

Q: That would be Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

HUMMEL: Plus Nepal and Ceylon, Sri Lanka. Those meetings were a lot of fun. We had one meeting in Kathmandu, another one in Colombo Sri Lanka, and one in Delhi. We had at least three, as I recall. Anyway, this was a way of maintaining contact and personal relationships among the Ambassadors and Embassies. We all deliberately fostered this.

Q: Basically, when General Zia took over after the coup d'etat, what was our immediate reaction? This always comes up after a coup: do you recognize it and how do you deal with the new government?

HUMMEL: We solved that problem years before. There is a Latin American doctrine which covers this. I think it is the "Estrada Doctrine." Under this doctrine you don't have to decide whether to recognize the new government. You deal with the entity in power and don't have to make an agonizing decision of approval or disapproval. This doctrine originated in Latin America, where it comes up often. We didn't have to say that we recognized and approved of Zia's coup.

Q: How did the Embassy respond to the coup? You were newly arrived in the Embassy and you had a knowledgeable DCM...

HUMMEL: Don't forget the Political Section, too, which was very knowledgeable.

Q: When you have a coup, all hell is breaking loose.

HUMMEL: Not really, because this coup was bloodless. If there had been actual fighting, that would have been something else. Things were surprisingly smooth and calm. Once again, as was the case when President Marcos took over in the Philippines, much of the population heaved a sigh of relief. Things had calmed down, and there was not going to be a civil war. The confrontation was over. Many people believed General Zia's promise that they would have elections. He said, at first, "By September," 1977, which, of course, was totally unrealistic. Then he reneged on all of those promises for a very long time, although he did hold elections toward the end of his tenure, before he was killed in an airplane accident, along with our Ambassador. That was in 1990, or something like that.

Q: Was there any interruption in normal relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

HUMMEL: None at all. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs was staffed by professionals who had been around for a long time, with foreign assignments and then periods of duty back in Pakistan. They had the remnants of the really first class Indian Civil Service, a class of people with very good educations who staffed a lot of the ministerial and lower ranking positions.
Q: How about the nuclear issue while you were there?

HUMMEL: That came up a year later.

Q: There had been something about the French being involved just before you arrived in Pakistan.

HUMMEL: Our relevant legislation changed over a period of time, but we cut off aid to Pakistan in 1978, because, as you say, of their intention to purchase a French nuclear reprocessing plant. They said they didn't have a reprocessing plant and needed one. We said that they didn't need it, and we were right. We cut off both military and AID assistance, except for some humanitarian aid. That didn't destroy the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Zia and the Pakistanis hoped that we would change our legislation and come back. They had a point when they said, "Look at India. The US hasn't done anything about India's nuclear explosion," which is true. The Pakistanis at that time didn't have the means to make any kind of nuclear device. India had exploded a nuclear device already, claiming that it was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The United States had done nothing whatever about that, because our legislation was crafted in a way that talked about the introduction of suspect nuclear equipment. Well, India didn't introduce anything. India did it all by itself, by diverting nuclear material and violating some of their agreements, particularly with Canada. However, the Pakistanis would say, "Look, we didn't do anything like the Indian bomb. Why are you terminating aid to us, even if what you say is true about our secret nuclear plans? We're still far from having a weapon." That was very hard to answer.

Q: What was the impact of cutting off our aid -- particularly military aid? Did this turn the Pakistanis more toward Communist China?

HUMMEL: Strangely enough, no. They've had ambivalent ideas about Communist China, even though China's been very steadfast in maintaining their support for Pakistan. Chinese material has continued to come into Pakistan. The Pakistani military gradually took a few steps backward from the American military, with which they always used to have extremely close relations. But when we terminated [military] aid, it was harder for us to learn about mundane things like force readiness, what kinds of small arms they were using, and the state of their supplies. This was because the Pakistanis didn't want to tell us. We knew from our own sources that there was a lively trade in military equipment going on, and the Chinese Communists were supplying it, at low prices. They provided a lot of things that we had supplied previously. One thing the Chinese Communists could not do was provide good fighter aircraft. However, the Pakistanis were not too badly off.

Q: Looking at your period of assignment in Pakistan, I note that there were a couple of major events. You might divide your tour of duty into the time when you had the coup, which happened just after you arrived. Then you had the upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism, which came about because of events which had also occurred in Iran.

HUMMEL: That came very gradually. I always felt that his handling of Islamic fundamentalism was a basic mistake on the part of General Zia. He didn't have to do that, and I don't think that he
really believed that a Muslim-controlled Sharia court system should govern the whole economic and political life of the country.

Q: *The Sharia means Islamic law.*

HUMMEL: In fact, it was Bhutto who did two things to bow to his Islamic critics, during his last weeks in power. He abolished all gambling, which meant the abolition of horse racing. Horses are a big thing in Pakistan and India. That put a lot of people out of jobs, and nobody wanted that. He also abolished alcohol. It was Bhutto that did that -- not General Zia -- as a sop to his Islamic critics. That was well known to be highly hypocritical, since Bhutto was known as a heavy drinker and didn't stop drinking even after he had prohibited the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. There was a creeping emphasis on Islamic law, but this tendency moved very slowly. General Zia was basically using this emphasis on Islamic law to retain his power and keep up a good relationship with the Islamic leaders, the Muslim clerics of the country. He did that rather well. His actions had the desired effect, because he was taking slow steps toward Islamization. They did put heavy emphasis on tithing by everybody. That's what good Muslims are supposed to do.

The problem of how to deal with the collection of interest in banking has always bothered the Islamic clergy. However, they used euphemisms for interest. When you loan somebody some money, you, in effect, went into partnership with the borrower. The borrower would give you part of the profits of the partnership. You didn't call it interest. However, it amounted to the same thing, and the banks generally operated in a normal way.

Q: *What about reporting by the Embassy? It seems that one of the hardest places to "crack" in countries with a rather strong, fundamentalist Islamic element is to be able to talk to religious leaders. Was this a problem in Pakistan?*

HUMMEL: Yes, it was. It's very difficult for Western Christians to have a good dialogue with them. In one sense, according to traditionalist, Islamic thinking, Jews and Christians are also "people of the Book." That is, we share a common heritage in the Old Testament. We split over the issue of whether Jesus Christ was the final prophet or not. But Muslims agree that he was a real prophet. However, of course they believe that Mohammed was the greatest prophet of all. The Muslims also adhere to the ban on eating pork and shellfish, among other things. So there was kind of an affinity. There wasn't always an antipathy. But it was very difficult to get close to the Muslim clergy. Honestly, we just didn't have the background to be able to discuss Islamic law with these people. We just didn't have the people with the right training for it. Also, this was viewed as a sideline in a geopolitical sense.

After General Zia took over, Zia was the person who was concerned. I developed a relatively close personal relationship with him. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place in about the middle period of my tenure in Pakistan.

Q: *That was in December, 1979. Christmas Day, I think.*

HUMMEL: Yes. Before that the leader in Afghanistan, Daud, had had a too close relationship
with the Soviets. The Pakistanis very cleverly drew him closer and closer to themselves. He became much more cooperative with Pakistan and with the United States toward the end of his time in power. Then came a Leftist coup d'état in which Daud was killed. My good friend, the Afghani Ambassador to Pakistan, happened to be in Kabul at the time. He was put in prison and killed, along with a lot of others. The reaction in Pakistan to these events in Afghanistan was very sharp. A lot of Pakistanis had little regard for the Leftist group which had seized power in Afghanistan -- particularly the Muslim clergy, who didn't like them at all. There was considerable tension there.

Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to prevent the overthrow and dissolution of the Leftist, pro-Soviet government in Kabul. The Soviets said that they had been invited in. No doubt they were, by their own supporters. That happened in December, 1979.

Just before that, however -- to skip back a little, and I should have said this earlier -- came the storming of our Embassy in Tehran in the fall of 1979.

Q: This was in November, 1979.

HUMMEL: A couple of weeks after that a mob burned our American Embassy in Pakistan.

Q: Can you give us, in narrative form, how the Embassy was operating and how you saw the country operating? First of all, let's talk about the reaction in Pakistan to events in Iran, prior to the takeover of our Embassy.

HUMMEL: With the departure of the Shah, the Pakistanis were quite worried about the situation, as were we. I was not close enough to events in Iran really to appreciate the kind of thing that happened when Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile. In Iran the whole country turned sharply against the Shah. The Shah was seriously ill and left the country. We didn't have an Ambassador there. Bill Sullivan had left some time previously. The rise of Shi'a Islam -- in its fundamentalist form -- scared the Pakistanis quite a bit.

Q: The Pakistanis are mostly Sunni, I believe.

HUMMEL: Mostly Sunni, but there is a substantial Shia minority in Pakistan. That's always been a problem in Pakistan, as it has in many Muslim countries -- the clash of doctrines between Sunni and Shia. Pakistan was mainstream Islam, and the Sunnis didn't like to watch the fundamentalist Shia taking over in Iran. Combined with the turmoil in Afghanistan, the Pakistanis saw that their regional situation was deteriorating. They had always thought that India was hostile -- and to some extent that was correct. Then to have Afghanistan and Iran, both of whom have borders with Pakistan, turning away from them...

Q: This is before the storming of the Embassy in Tehran. Were we beginning to look harder at Pakistan, seeing it as more of a bastion of our interests?

HUMMEL: Yes, that's right. Let me discuss first the storming of the Embassy in Tehran. Then we'll come back to our own situation. The Carter administration gave a kind of non-response to
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This disturbed me. I think that it was about two weeks after our Embassy staff in Tehran were blindfolded, locked up, and mistreated so publicly that, all of a sudden, and without warning, as I was driving home from the Embassy to my residence for lunch -- a distance of about a mile and a half...

Q: You mean on November 11, 1979, wasn't it?

HUMMEL: I saw busloads of men shaking their fists, leaning out the windows, and going toward the Embassy as I was leaving. As soon as I got home, I got on the phone and said to my Administrative Counselor, "something is happening. You'd better button up the Embassy." They did this, extremely well. They locked the gates. We had a first rate Administrative Officer who turned out to be a real hero.

Q: Who was that?

HUMMEL: Dave Fields. He later became head of security in the Department and then went off as an Ambassador.

Q: We can fill this in later.

HUMMEL: Anyway, everything went like clockwork, as far as the internal arrangements inside the Embassy Chancery were concerned. The Embassy compound was a large, walled area, comprising the Chancery, a half-finished and unoccupied Ambassadorial Residence -- the walls had still not been completed -- an American Club, including a swimming pool, and apartments for single officers, as well as outbuildings. It was quite an establishment.

The reason for the demonstration, it turned out, was that word was broadcast over the local radio that Americans and Israelis had occupied the Holy Places in Mecca. It turned out later that the Holy Places had been occupied by a bunch of Saudi religious fanatics. They had to be driven out and were virtually all killed -- about 200 of them. However, we never could figure out and could not find, in all of the reporting, intercepts, and everything else, the source of the rumor that swept through Pakistan -- that it was the Americans and the Israelis who had occupied the Holy Places in Mecca.

That, of course, set everybody off. Immediately and spontaneously, people commandeered buses and trucks. In addition to that, there was a small group of Palestinians who had probably been planning some kind of action against our Embassy, anyway, because they arrived at the Embassy compound with hoses for siphoning gasoline out of tanks, pails to put the gasoline in, and grappling hooks with ropes already attached to them. They knew what they were doing and they did it pretty well. With a lot of manpower you can pull almost any fence or wall down, which they did.

At the same time I was on the telephone, calling everybody frantically, including General Zia, asking for help. About 50 police arrived very quickly in two buses. They were promptly overwhelmed by the mob, and their weapons were taken away from them. One of the weapons, a rifle, was used to shoot one of our Marine Guards, who had been on the roof, according to people
who were watching. The Marine Guard was shot in the head and eventually died, hours later.

It turned out that General Zia, whom I couldn't talk to for some time, was touring Rawalpindi which, as I said, is 15 miles away. Most of the available troops were in plain clothes and standing around the streets, making sure that General Zia didn't get hurt. So there were no armed forces available nearby ready to saddle up and come the 15 miles to Islamabad. Furthermore, I realized that there was a strong disinclination to use Pakistani troops to kill Pakistani civilians in the streets, on behalf of the United States. It should have been clear to everybody that the United States was not guilty of this alleged violation of the Holy Places in Mecca. Anyhow, to cut a long story short...

Q: Don't cut it short.

HUMMEL: I was in my residence. I had three different telephone lines. One of them was taken up, talking to people in Washington who, in turn, were calling the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington. The Pakistani Embassy in Washington was calling Pakistani Government officials, as I was calling the Foreign Ministry. I was also trying to reach General Zia. I was on the phone to other officers in the Embassy who were not in the Embassy. And I was also in direct touch with the Embassy, until the phone line finally broke down. Then a very courageous Pakistani phone operator stayed on duty while the Embassy was being burned.

The Embassy compound was stormed by between 2,500 to 3,000 people -- young, active men. They overwhelmed the police. In the compound the apartment buildings and the American Club were never stormed -- which I'll come to in a minute. They overwhelmed the Chancery, going right up to the gates. All safes inside the Chancery were locked by that time. This had been done very quickly and very efficiently. This was one of the first things they were deviling me about from Washington because they recalled how the classified documents had been compromised in Tehran. Initially, I didn't know but was told on the phone that the staff had locked up all the safes. Actually, it was Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher who said, "We have to know" that the safes were locked. I didn't think that that was the first priority.

Anyway, it turned out that everything had been done according to the rules. Some arms were issued to CIA people who had had weapons training. And, as I said, there was the hero Administrative Officer, who had had military training. They retreated slowly up the four stories in the Chancery as the mob was coming in, until they reached what turned out to be a "safe haven" in the Communications Vault. The Communications Vault had a trap door up onto the roof, through which they eventually managed to escape. However, there were attackers on the roof as well, who were firing down air vents with their weapons.

Then the rioters began to burn the building. The whole building burned. It is incredible how a building made of brick and cement can actually go up in flames that way. I suppose that with enough gasoline you can do anything. The Marine Guards fired tear gas to slow down the attackers, but it didn't deter them. There didn't seem to be any way to stop them.

All of this began, I suppose, around 1:00 PM. It ended at about 6:30 PM. By that time there were about 50 members of our Embassy staff crammed into the Communications Vault. The floor was
getting so hot that it was very uncomfortable to sit on, since the building was burning. Dusk was coming on, and the attackers just sort of faded away. We were never quite sure why. There wasn't any substantial military or police rescue effort until just later. The group in the Communications Vault opened up the trap door to the roof. There was a makeshift ladder leading to a lower roof and then another makeshift ladder leading down to the ground. The American staff rallied about a half mile away in the British Embassy compound. That's where I went to see them.

I had left my residence I was afraid that my wife and I would be a target. It was only a couple of blocks away from the Foreign Ministry. I stayed at my residence, on the phone all the time, until about 4:30 PM and then went directly to the Foreign Ministry, where I dumped myself on them, pounding the table and demanding protection for the Chancery. I had with me one of the Military Attachés. Another key person was the CIA Chief of Station who managed to get to the British Embassy where he could observe our compound with his binoculars. He was the one who reported that the attackers seemed to have left the roof of our Chancery, which enabled our staff to escape from the Communications Vault.

Meanwhile, down below, inside the Embassy compound, there was in addition to the burning Chancery, the American Club and the American staff apartments. People in the club and the apartments -- about 15 of them -- who went out into the open, because things were burning, were surrounded by this irate mob, were spat on and shouted at but not struck. They were surrounded by a small group of Pakistani police, who did their job very courageously. They fended off the mob of people who appeared to be about to attack the women and children. I should have said that first. That was terribly harrowing for them all. As I said, nobody was harmed there, and eventually the mob melted away.

Another incident happened at the International School -- known locally as the American School. It was three miles away in a deserted part of town. Some young toughs went out there, apparently to harass the kids. One very good friend of mine, a retired Pakistani colonel, had gone from his house to the school, fearing something like this. He just harangued these people, telling them, "Get the hell out of here, you stupid fools" and so on, in Urdu. He persuaded them, or just chased them out of the school compound, so that nothing happened to the school.

Nothing happened at the other American residences, either, which were scattered around town. This could easily have been different.

I should say that two Americans died: the Marine who was shot in the head on the roof of the Chancery and died three or four hours later in the Communications Vault. An American military attaché died in his apartment inside the compound, which had burned. His burned corpse was found -- nobody knows quite what happened and whether they had planned to kill him and burned or shot him. Two Pakistani employees of the Embassy died, fleeing from the Chancery building. They were killed by the mob.

Q: It sounds as if the best response to an attacking mob is not to fire on them but retreat and avoid further inciting the mob. It sounds as if there was good discipline in the Embassy.
HUMMEL: It was really good.

Q: The tendency [by most people] would be to open fire on the mob.

HUMMEL: Well, the Marine Guards operated under the instructions of the Security Officer and this very capable, Administrative Officer. They followed their instructions. You fire only to protect life.

Q: But I would have thought that it is really dicey where...

HUMMEL: But if you have a mob of 2,000 people out there, which one do you fire at? And what are you going to do when the rest of them get angry and swarm over you? So there was really a good deal of discipline.

Q: What was the aftermath to this?

HUMMEL: One of the first things that happened was that we were ordered to downsize the Embassy and evacuate all dependents. This process went off remarkably smoothly. We had a security network operating, and that worked very well to notify outlying American citizens living in outlying areas. My wife and I had American citizens sleeping all over the floor in our residence. Other people also had people staying with them -- taking care of them and feeding them.

Pan American Airways, acted with its usual alacrity. Pan Am has always been excellent at helping Embassies. Somewhere they found a Boeing 747 aircraft and sent it to the airport in Islamabad. On the morning after these events, we were all so shocked that we didn't know quite how to behave. Everybody was disoriented. However, not long afterwards, early on the second or third morning after these events we mounted a convoy and went out to the airport with a Pakistani military escort. The whole group being evacuated went aboard the Boeing 747 and flew off to Washington, where they, with much help from my wife, formed an evacuees support group which, I think, worked very well, indeed. I credit my wife with a lot of leadership in that respect.

Now, the Pakistani reaction was to be terribly shamefaced about the whole thing, because there was a complete misunderstanding. There was no reason for attacking the American Embassy. As I said, we never found out who started the rumor that the Americans were responsible for the desecration of the Muslim Holy Places in Mecca. However, within about two weeks I had in my hand, delivered by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, two checks amounting to US$21 million -- part in U. S. and part in local currency. That was our estimate of the cost of rehabilitating the Embassy. They acted about as quickly as they could.

I must say that I was very annoyed that I could never get any ranking Pakistani official -- civilian or military -- to come and inspect the Embassy compound. I wanted to rub their noses in it. They didn't want to come. They didn't want to have their picture taken. They just didn't want to have anything to do with it.

Q: Were any people put on trial for involvement in this?
HUMMEL: No, they never got around to it. They said that they couldn't identify [who was involved]. There was no way to identify them. We had no photos [of what had happened]. I know that they could have identified some of them. The police who were protecting our dependents, out in the open, must have known and could have fingered some of those responsible.

Q: How about the Palestinian students? Were they involved?

HUMMEL: No. The whole thing was swept under the rug as fast as they could do it. They didn't want a public affirmation of guilt or an apology.

Q: What about the reaction of the people you normally dealt with in Pakistani society?

HUMMEL: There was instant regret. Everybody knew that what had been done was wrong and that four people had been killed. However, the official and public response was highly unsatisfactory, except for the quick payment of funds for reconstruction. It took about two years to rehabilitate the Embassy.

We quickly organized a downsized Embassy in what had been the AID offices, a quarter of a mile away in a suitable place outside of town. That took up a lot of energy. I had had a guest house across the driveway from my official residence. The official residence was quite modest -- not much larger than this house is. I turned the guest house over to a committee of Embassy officers and told them to start a club. So we had a club where people could come. The British and all kinds of friends came. There was a lot of drinking don, unwinding, and dancing. The new club was a smash hit, and helped us all to get over the disappearance of our spouses, and the trauma of the whole thing.

They asked me what I wanted to call the club, and I said, "Well, I don't know. But off the top of my head, why don't you look at all of the words beginning with 'AMB,' standing for 'Ambassador.'" The only one they could think of was "Ambush." That seemed a little strong, considering what everyone had been through. Anyway, they finally called it "The Ambush Club."

Q: In a way, what happened to you involved the usual, very cull period of readjustment which was almost overtaken by events. There was the continuing, "hostage crisis" in Iran, which affected everyone. Then there was the December, 1979, coup d'etat in Afghanistan...

HUMMEL: Which brought Soviet troops to the border of Pakistan for the first time.

Q: This must have scared the hell out of everyone.

HUMMEL: It did.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about that. What was our reaction and, as you saw it, the Pakistani reaction to the continuing crisis in Iran? We had centered our attention on the hostages, who
were held for 444 days. However, there were obviously other things to be concerned about. There was a militant, expansive Shy force in Iran which wanted a worldwide, Islamic revolution on their own terms. How did that sit with you?

HUMMEL: As far as the Pakistani Government was concerned, they desperately wanted to maintain good relations with Iran. They were not going to destroy their relationship with Iran to benefit the Americans, even though it might be reasonable from our point of view to do so. We kept asking them to put pressure on the Iranians to release the hostages, to give them improved treatment, or whatever -- all of those things. The Pakistanis may have tried to do something privately, but, quite frankly, they would just waffle in formal communications. Privately, they would tell us that they didn't have any leverage and, because of their relationship with Iran, they were simply not in a position to be stern with the Iranians.

Q: Let's move on to the other, major development. You were blessed or cursed with "interesting times." Is that supposedly the Chinese curse?

HUMMEL: In fact there is no way to say that in Chinese. The ambiguity in the word "interesting" just doesn't come through.

Q: Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or whatever you want to call it, in December, 1979, how did you see Soviet-Pakistan relations?

HUMMEL: As I said, Bhutto was making a play at countering the United States by appearing to be nice to the Soviets. Zia adopted the traditional, Pakistani view. They didn't want to have hostile relations with the USSR, and never did. However, they viewed the USSR as in league with India. There already was a mutual defense treaty between the Soviet Union and India. Pakistani strategic thinking -- and there was good reason for this attitude -- was that India and the USSR might combine to try to eliminate Pakistan, thereby giving the Soviets a route to the Indian Ocean, which they always wanted to have. These fears in the Pakistani mind, which were not totally unfounded, prevented them from having any really close relationship with the Soviets. However, the Soviets were present in Pakistan, which didn't want to have bad relations with them, either.

Q: How did the Soviet "coup" of December, 1979, affect Pakistan? Was this a surprise to the Pakistanis?

HUMMEL: As I said, it was preceded by a good many months of Leftist rule in Afghanistan after the initial coup d'etat. In fact, there were two coups. There was an internal coup that brought Leftists to power. Then, when there was a backlash against that, and the Leftists seemed to be in danger of losing power, the Soviets moved in.

Q: Did the Pakistanis give any direct or indirect support to the anti-Leftist groups prior to the [Soviet invasion]?

HUMMEL: Yes. The Pakistani "Northwest Frontier Province," or NWFP, adjoins Afghanistan and is populated to a very large extent by Pushtuns, who are identical with the same ethnic group
in Afghanistan. That border has always been exceedingly porous.

Q: *That includes the Khyber Pass and all that sort of thing.*

HUMMEL: All up and down that border there is quite a long stretch of permeable territory. There are traditional passes over and through the mountains. The border includes a plains area down towards Kandahar, in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military had no problem with getting volunteers and arming them to go into Afghanistan and conduct pinprick raids, first against the pro-communist, pro-Russian group that took power in the first coup d'etat. Later on, in a highly systematic way, they assisted us in arming the volunteers with U. S. and Chinese equipment and providing them with Saudi money. There was also Middle Eastern equipment provided to the Afghans.

It was a very highly organized operation which eventually supported the "Mujahideen" and ultimately forced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan -- something that I didn't think would ever happen. I always assumed that the draconian controls within the Soviet Union would prevent any outcry of the sort that we had with regard to our involvement in Vietnam. I thought that negative public opinion within the USSR would not and could not lead the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. In fact, it appeared that this pressure combined with a desire on the part of Gorbachev to do good things caused a reversal.

Q: *In December, 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Obviously, Pakistan was quite concerned about this -- and with reason. What did you think of the Washington response?*

HUMMEL: We immediately began to think of various things we might do. I began to make suggestions in telegrams to the Department. I don't recall going back to Washington for consultations, but there were a lot of communications back and forth. We had several visits from Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to the President, Warren Christopher then Deputy Secretary of State, and others, who came to Pakistan.

After consultations with Congress, the Department concocted a meager little American aid package. Congress agreed that our nuclear legislation had to be changed -- not to abolish it but to allow some American assistance to Pakistan in the new situation. The legislation was not changed, however, until later on. I had a direct part to play in that, just before I left Pakistan, after Ronald Reagan and the Republicans took over the administration. After President Reagan had assumed office, I drew the attention of Gen. Al Haig, President Reagan's National Security Adviser to this whole failure.

We got together a package to change the existing nuclear legislation. We'll come to that later, because it presents a very interesting foreign affairs problem. By that time the Pakistanis had a very active nuclear program of their own. At the same time we had other interests at play in Pakistan. Incidentally -- or, perhaps, not so incidentally -- narcotics had become an interest of ours in Pakistan. Anyway, we had conflicting interests involved -- an exercise in foreign policy making.

Initially, the package of assistance to Pakistan was so meager that General Zia very impolitely
called it "peanuts."

Q: *That term actually appeared in the newspapers [at the time].*

HUMMEL: I don't think that he quite realized that it would attract so much attention.

Q: *For those who may do research on this interview, President Carter had been known as a peanut grower and wholesale dealer in peanuts in Georgia.*

HUMMEL: Zia himself was a very interesting person. Bhutto completely miscalculated when he put General Zia in as chief of the Pakistani Army staff. Bhutto thought that Zia was a complete non-entity and would never be a major factor. Of course, that was totally incorrect. Zia turned out to be a very astute politician. He was learning on the job, as all of the military, and all of us, do, to be a political practitioner. He was not dumb by any means, although he was not brilliant in the same way that Bhutto was. However, he managed to hold his fundamentally military government together for I don't know how many years until he died in 1990.

I always enjoyed talking to him. He lived very simply and throughout the time that I was in Pakistan he continued to live in the same house where the chief of the Army staff normally lived. I would go over there for dinner, sometimes with his wife at the table. He had a very pleasant wife and children around the place. One of them was handicapped, it was touching to see how the whole family treated that child. Zia had some pretty astute aides, including General Arif, who handled intelligence and other things. Our CIA operation was in very close contact with them. We were concerned that, after Iran fell [into the hands of religious extremists], there were very few listening posts where we could monitor the telemetry signals of the Soviet space launches.

Q: *We had been using our monitoring stations along the Caspian Sea in Iran very successfully. Then, of course, when Iran fell into the hands of the religious extremists, those stations were closed down.*

HUMMEL: We had very good cooperation from the Pakistanis. Almost anything that we wanted to do, we could do, as long as we could figure out how we could keep it hidden. That was a problem, of course, but that kind of cooperation was very close, even at this time when we had no military assistance program for Pakistan -- until we changed the whole situation.

As I say, I enjoyed Zia. He was personally very mild-mannered with me. Before I left Pakistan, he arranged for me to receive a Pakistani decoration and presented it to me -- with a sash. Of course, I obtained permission from the Department to receive it. I was rather surprised that the Department allowed me to take it. However, I obtained approval from the Department, partly because I was instrumental in getting military assistance resumed. This happened early in the Reagan administration.

I liked Zia. He was not, as I say, terribly astute. When I came to him first with a really tough demarche about the Pakistani nuclear program, which had been carefully drafted in Washington, because we had to protect our sources in Pakistan, he was a pretty good actor. He expressed indignation and alarm and swore that none of that could possibly be true. Then he was incautious
enough to invite me to send experts anywhere in the country. I said, Yes, that's exactly what we want to do. I'll be back to you in a day or two with a concrete plan. There are some things that we would like to look at. I said that we would bring officers from the United States. You know, he never should have offered that. Of course, he didn't repeat that. He rescinded that offer, and we never got that chance again. Sometimes he didn't think quickly enough.

Q: Did you get a feeling that he understood the American system, including the role of Congress, public opinion, and all of that?

HUMMEL: I think so. We had been lecturing to the Pakistanis for so long on the termination of all aid because of the French nuclear reactor provided in 1978. They understood that quite well, as well as the reason why we did nothing about India's nuclear program while we zapped the Pakistanis. First of all, the Pakistanis have a pretty good idea of how our system works.

Q: How well were you served by your military attachés?

HUMMEL: By and large, very well. I had to ask for one of the senior defense attachés to be relieved.

Q: Without naming names, how did that come about? What was the problem?

HUMMEL: He simply wasn't doing his job. He was drinking a little too much, although that was not the problem. The problem was that he was just not competent enough. He let a lot of things pile up which he never answered. I had word from his own subordinates that they would be happy to see him go. As a matter of fact, DIA in Washington made no problem whatever about...

Q: They were kind of waiting for you to make the move?

HUMMEL: I think so.

Q: You took care of their problem.

HUMMEL: We also had a MAAG, a Military Assistance and Advisory Group, of course. Even though the military aid program had stopped, we still had a MAAG staff there. Of course, you couldn't expect the MAAG chief and the Defense Attaché to share an airplane, so they had two airplanes, which I was able to use for my own travel upcountry. It was a marvelous way to go to Quetta and Chitral and the far Himalayas. My wife and I just loved traveling land we did a lot, also by road. We went all over the place. With prior permission these planes were allowed to go to Pakistani military bases.

Q: Did our military attachés have good contacts within the Pakistani military establishment? I've always thought that we would have particular entree because, in a way, the Pakistanis were brought up in the British and "Anglo" tradition, in somewhat the same way ours were. It would be easier to deal with them than with somebody who came out of a different system.

HUMMEL: That's right. The Pakistani military were quite a professional outfit. They had some
very interesting traditions, including the bagpipes, the uniforms, the parades, the officers' mess, the Khyber Pass, and so forth.

Q: A little bit of going back to Rudyard Kipling. You were there in 1980. When did you leave in 1981?

HUMMEL: I left in summertime.

Q: So you left Pakistan approximately a year and a half after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and prior to the election and assumption of power by the Reagan administration. With further reference to the Carter administration, how did you deal with assistance to the rebels in Afghanistan?

HUMMEL: This was handled entirely through the CIA station in the Embassy. The CIA Chief of Station was an excellent person. As I say, we had Pakistani military cooperation. There were elaborate maneuvers to get new listening posts to follow Soviet missile launches and intercept the telemetry. That took a lot of logistical support, with people coming in and going out of the country all the time.

The supply operation for the "mujahideen" in Afghanistan was run entirely through the Pakistanis. In the initial stages and, I think, for quite a long time afterwards -- this happened during all of the time that I was in Pakistan -- American officers never met face to face with Afghan "mujahideen." In the case of training on new weapons, we trained the Pakistanis, and then the Pakistanis trained the Afghans. This was particularly true of things like the Redeye Missile, a shoulder-launched anti-helicopter missile. It is quite often written that we escalated the war in Afghanistan dramatically when we gave the mujahideen Stinger missiles. In fact, we had supplied them "Redeyes" for quite some time before that. The Redeye didn't happen to be nearly as efficient as the Stinger, and it often misses its target. However, Soviet helicopters were facing Redeye missiles long before Stinger missiles were introduced. The Stinger, of course, is much more effective. Anyway, this kind of training was done, step by step, without Americans facing Afghans.

The Chinese were making substantial contributions of their own, but later on we were using about half American and half Saudi money to purchase the weapons turned over to the Pakistani military. Subsequently, after my time in Pakistan as Ambassador, a problem developed because the Pakistanis were playing favorites among the mujahideen groups. There was a lot of dissatisfaction in the US government over that. Probably at General Zia's instigation, too much was going to the more militant Islamic leader and not enough to the other people who were not quite so fundamentalist in their views. Some of them were doing better and more effective fighting than...

Q: I would think that Zia, being a professional military man, would be a bit dubious over strengthening the fundamentalists.

HUMMEL: Well, I think that we all realized -- and the Pakistani better than anybody else -- that the Afghans just don't work together very well. We're seeing that, of course, right now.

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Q: They're still...

HUMMEL: Even since the Soviets have left.

Q: It's already 10 years, and they're still fighting.

HUMMEL: Zia was anxious to keep the goodwill of the clerics in Pakistan, on whom he depended for support. So, as far as he was concerned and because he was a pretty sharp observer, the long term problems of fomenting this armed activity in Afghanistan revolved around...

Q: As the Ambassador to Pakistan, how did you find your CIA operation? Did they keep you well informed? Sometimes this relationship is not very good, and at other times it is.

HUMMEL: It was excellent. One of the Pakistanis who had been recruited by CIA and was giving us very good information about the Pakistani nuclear program was caught by the Pakistani Government. He was a dumb guy. He was supposed to destroy all of his old papers, but he kept everything. So for some reason -- we never knew how -- he was arrested and disappeared. The CIA Chief of Station came to me immediately and told me what had happened. We immediately got his case officer out of Pakistan. This operation was not handled out of Islamabad but from another place in Pakistan. I immediately sent a telegram, outlining my scenario for handling this when and if it was brought to me by the Pakistani Government.

This is one of the things that I was proud of. I didn't just send in a report on this, asking for instructions, but I drafted a solution. I received approval for the solution, which was that I could use my suggested form of words, which I immediately committed to memory. Sure enough, it took about a week after that before I was called in by my good friend, Shahnawaz, the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry who was the number three man in rank in the ministry. Above him were the minister and the senior civil servant in the ministry. He made his point, and I said what I was prepared to say, which was that I wanted his government to know that I am in charge of all American activities in Pakistan, as an Ambassador should be. I said that I take this responsibility seriously. I knew and know about these activities. I didn't admit anything. Regarding this incident in that particular city, "You must realize that you have failed to give us information that we feel that we need about your nuclear program. It cannot be a surprise to you that we were trying to obtain this information. I don't think that I want to say anything more." Shahnawaz just smiled and nodded. I never heard anything more about it.

Q: I saw something in the press that the CIA Chief of Station was "uncovered" or something like that. Did that happen when you were in Pakistan?

HUMMEL: The Chief of Station is usually declared publicly, or at least privately to the local government. So that wasn't too bad. It is rare to have a Chief of Station who is under cover as far as the local government is concerned.

Q: Before we move to the end of this section, dealing with the arms prohibition and your role in that connection, may we return to the earlier matter of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bhutto?
Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, [his daughter], is now Prime Minister again. She was previously arrested. Did we get involved in this matter at all?

HUMMEL: No. I met Benazir Bhutto a couple of times at receptions. I never attempted to have any substantive contact with her. It would have been taken quite amiss by General Zia. At the time I was Ambassador in Pakistan she was by no means the heir to control of the PPP, Pakistan People's Party, either before or after her father died. She messed up, as, I'm afraid, she is doing again. Even in those early days, before there was a political context for her to come from, before the elections when she was elected the first time, she acted, I thought, in a foolish way. She alienated many of her father's closest associates by bringing in her young Fabian Socialist friends from England, elbowing aside the oldsters who had been Bhutto's main support in the PPP and the organizers of the party. She lost a lot of political strength by the way she handled the internal affairs of her party.

I did not have the feeling that she was going to rise to power. If I had had a map of the political future, we would have made more of an effort to be in touch with her. She was angry with the United States because she blamed us, in part, for not preventing the execution of her father. She said this in a book, not too long ago. She apparently felt that we should have made more of an effort. She maintained that her father was innocent. So perhaps you can say that she lost some ground there because, as I said, most people believe -- and some of them knew -- that Bhutto was guilty as charged.

Q: Junior officers in an Embassy can often go out and make contacts which senior officers cannot do. This is one reason why, in this Oral History Program, it is interesting for those whom we interview to talk about their earlier years in the Foreign Service, because they had a different experience as junior officers than they had as senior officers. There is a structural reason for this. Were you able to use the junior officers to get out and about different places?

HUMMEL: We had some junior officers who were very fluent in Urdu. The language training program was continuing. They were put in the appropriate places -- usually in the Political Section. We had two outstanding people. One of them eventually rose to be Ambassador in Pakistan and was killed in the same plane with General Zia. That was Arnold Raphel. Another junior officer has now gone off to be Ambassador to Turkey. I draw a blank on his name.

Q: He was the head of the Executive Secretariat in the Department.

HUMMEL: It was Marc Grossman.

Q: Did these officers have contact with the opposition?

HUMMEL: Yes, indeed. A third officer, Herb Haggerty, also had very good contacts with officials of the PPP -- not directly with Benazir Bhutto in particular, but with other officials of the party. I think that we were reporting quite accurately on what was happening inside that opposition party.

Q: You mentioned that Brzezinski and Warren Christopher came out to Pakistan. Did you have
the feeling that you were or weren't getting much support for the way in which things should be going between the United States and Pakistan? Were you getting much support from the powers that be in the State Department?

HUMMEL: There was a great deal of interest, but there was more talk than action. As I said, the aid package that we put together as an inducement for the promise of a cessation of their nuclear program never worked out. It continued to chug along for a few years. The package really was terribly small. As I said, General Zia called it "peanuts." I thought that it was insufficient to attract their interest. Also, I knew, after being told so by Pakistanis, that any Pakistani leader who actually terminated their nuclear program would be thrown out of office by the Pakistanis themselves. They could not, actually, terminate the program. So our only option was to try to string the issue out over a longer period of time. I think that we did that.

Q: Was this a deliberate feeling on your part? Or did you feel, "Well, it's a nice policy and nice to stand by. However, with India already having nuclear facilities, the Pakistanis just have to have this program. It's a 'no win' thing to be completely idealistic on this."

HUMMEL: Since this whole aid package would have required Congressional approval, this was one main reason why I recall not voicing a reservation about the actual termination of the aid program, except in the course of a few conversations with people like Brzezinski. I really surmised that it was unlikely that the Pakistanis would actually terminate their nuclear program. Of course, if this had happened, it would have been the answer for us. If I had been on record and the Intelligence Committee of Congress had received a copy of my telegram, they would have said, "Why should we change this legislation when the nuclear program isn't going to go ahead anyway?"

Q: So you always had to be aware of what the impact would be in Washington of what you said in your telegrams?

HUMMEL: Exactly. Not so incidentally, this is a major defect in the way we conduct business. So many foreign leaders now will not tell us what they think because they know that there may be a leak in Washington -- a leak coming straight out of Congress. This has happened so often. We can't get the Chinese Communists to tell us frankly what they know about the North Koreans, for example.

Q: The Reagan administration came into office on January 20, 1981. You were reaching the end of a normal tour of duty as Ambassador to Pakistan. Were you planning to leave Pakistan about that time, anyway?

HUMMEL: Yes.

Q: How did you deal with the new, Reagan, administration and how did you find it, in terms of the situation in Pakistan?

HUMMEL: Well, of course, Al Haig came in as Secretary of State on January 20. I'm sure that he saw my telegram on January 21. It was like opening the door for a serious discussion of what
we ought to do. The main point was that we and the Carter administration had failed to do anything significant about the Russian occupation of Afghanistan and the immediate threat which that posed to Pakistan and to our interests in the region. We terminated our wheat exports to Russia and backed out of participating in the Olympic Games in Moscow. This amounted to shooting ourselves in the foot in both cases. It was pretty tragic. It wasn't for any lack of trying on the part of the Carter administration. However, as I say, they just couldn't put together an aid package substantial enough to protect what we wanted. What we wanted was to have the Pakistanis sign up for limitations on their nuclear program.

Meanwhile, it is true that we were providing more and more substantial support through Pakistan to the Afghan mujahideen, who were fighting the Soviets -- eventually, very successfully.

Anyway, Secretary of State Al Haig immediately fired back a telegram to us. We had a couple of more exchanges of telegrams, and then he asked me to come back to Washington for consultations. This was in late January, 1981.

Q: So we were moving very rapidly on this...

HUMMEL: Very rapidly. It was high on the agenda. After all, President Reagan was a hawk, and so was Al Haig. So I had a willing audience. I came back to Washington and spent about six weeks here. This was a solid six weeks of work. First off, I did a lot of Congressional liaison, getting Senator John Glenn...

Q: Of Ohio.

HUMMEL: He was the author of most of the nuclear legislation that would have to be changed. I am very annoyed with John Glenn now because he has written articles strenuously objecting to the policy of assisting Pakistan, since Pakistan has kept on with its nuclear program. He is totally disingenuous because he was on board and he understood and agreed with our changes in the law in early 1981. He pretends now that he did not, and that is bad. Anyway, this was a multi-pronged effort, because I was sort of on the periphery. There were many more people working on it than myself. We had to get together an agreed aid program, with various components in it. We did this with help from the Pentagon and AID. We delivered to the meetings what we wanted to do. Then it was a matter of selling it to the Congress. I was only one of many people involved including the top level of the State Department, who did very good work in presenting this dilemma, first to the White House, and then to Congress. Secretary of State Al Haig was behind this effort all the way.

I went back to Pakistan and was able to assure the Pakistani Government that we were going to resume assistance shortly. We had to give them some idea of what the aid program would consist of. This shortly did happen.

Q: For somebody who is looking at this issue in the way a professional diplomat operates. You were not in your job as American Ambassador to Pakistan because you were a Republican or a Democrat. The presidential election had been held in November, 1980. President Carter lost, Reagan won. Reagan would not become President until January, 1981. Did you sit down and
make the calculation, "All right, we have a more 'hawkish' type administration. Now is the time to do this." In other words, you held off your telegram until the water was the right temperature to pop it in.

HUMMEL: That's right. Besides, I had a personal relationship with Al Haig, so I could address him personally and be sure that he would see the telegram.

Q: How did this relationship develop?

HUMMEL: He was on the High Commissioner's staff when I was handling the negotiation on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Also, he was around in the White House -- I can't recall the exact time -- when I was Assistant Secretary and Acting Assistant Secretary of State in the EA Bureau. I didn't know him well, but he knew me, and I could get his attention.

Q: So how did you feel about the direction of Pakistan and Afghanistan when you left Pakistan in the summer of 1981?

HUMMEL: I was glad that we had unfrozen our relationship with Pakistan. I seriously doubted -- in fact, I was pretty sure -- that they would not terminate their nuclear program. We had been following this matter for a very long time -- both the CIA apparatus in Europe and elsewhere. They were importing materials and indeed the design, which was stolen from the Dutch by a well-known Pakistani nuclear physicist. They were putting together a "cascade" of very high speed centrifuges into which you put very rarified, low pressure uranium in gaseous form. You ran it down this cascade long enough -- for months and years, and you eventually got very highly enriched uranium, with the enriched part separated out. That takes an awful lot of expert engineering and a lot of special materials, which are not easily available. We had monitored their acquisition of these materials from around the world and did quite a bit to stop their obtaining some of them. Yet they were chugging ahead at a site that we knew about -- which they flatly denied that they were doing. They had no choice but to deny it. We had no choice but to disbelieve them.

Q: Did you consider that Zia was firmly in place, or was there any particular way that...

HUMMEL: Yes. We concluded that he was firmly in place. Most Pakistanis agreed that there comes a time when a military government in Pakistan has to step down, because the military get so entangled in government affairs, as they did under Zia, and therefore in corruption, and are blamed by the public. Their reputation deteriorates in the country. Eventually, the military say, "To hell with it", and they allow a civilian government to come to power. That's what happened in the case previously of Ayub Khan and eventually happened under Zia. Even under Zia there were elections to Parliament of a sort. He took several steps back from the political process, although he was the final arbiter and most of the time made the decisions. So this was the way I felt then and I feel now. The time would come, some day, when the Pakistani military would say, "We're not going to play this game any more."

Q: Why don't we stop at this point? You were leaving Pakistan in the summer of 1981. We'll pick up from there next time.
HUMMEL: I would like to mention one issue of morale in the Embassy in Islamabad. In some respects a tour of duty in Pakistan was tough on women. I didn't really realize it until my wife, Betty Lou, brought it to my attention. Women were uncomfortable because there were no women on the streets or visible in ordinary life. Pakistan is a Muslim country. It's not nearly as Muslim as Saudi Arabia, but very few women were functioning outside of their homes except in the bazaar areas, where they had to go to do their shopping.

Q: I know. We lived in Saudi Arabia for two years. My wife found it quite difficult.

HUMMEL: Yes. Also, the attitude of the Pakistani men was somewhat threatening to many American women. We had one case of attempted rape, for instance. One of our male, household servants attempted to rape the daughter of our medical doctor, as a matter of fact. It wasn't too traumatic, because the daughter was a registered nurse, didn't lose her head, and nothing actually happened, you might say. She never should have allowed the man to stand in the doorway while she was in bed. That was just dumb on her part. However, of course, you can't blame her. The man was instantly fired. We tried to take some legal action taken against him, but I could never get the Pakistani authorities to do that.

Reports of incidents like this got around. There were cases of pinching and men putting their hands on women in public and so on...

Q: And plain cases of just staring [at American women]. This was a problem in Saudi Arabia.

HUMMEL: This was one aspect of life in Pakistan. It turned out that women who had problems with their husbands were the most militant in demanding changes in things. Six women formed a little cabal in Islamabad and eventually insisted on seeing me, because they insisted that, when they went to the very nice swimming pool located within the Embassy compound, before it was burned down, they had to park their cars in places where there was no shade. Cars could get terribly hot when left out in the sun. There were shaded spaces where the Pakistani employees of the Embassy were parking their cars. These women demanded that we kick the Pakistani employees out of their shaded parking spaces, so that the Embassy wives could park in shaded areas. The very idea of working themselves up into a real fury, to the point of coming to the Ambassador with this matter, shows you how demented some people would get. I flatly refused. I said that these Pakistanis were members of the American civil service and were U. S. Government employees. I was not going to have to tell them that they have to park elsewhere so that your part-time parking would be more comfortable for you. I said that I just couldn't and wouldn't do that. They went away, very unhappy and disgruntled.

This incident was coincidental with the time when the State Department promoted or authorized the formation of Community Liaison Offices. My very good DCM, Peter Constable, had this brilliant idea of making the ringleader of this little group the Community Liaison Officer. From that time on, we didn't have a morale problem. She became involved in both sides of the problem, so to speak. She could explain the Embassy point of view to the other wives in a way that we couldn't do.
Q: *In a way this is a case of "co-option," but at the same time it's a practical solution.*

HUMMEL: I think that most of us in the Foreign Service were opposed to the idea of having to appoint a Community Liaison Officer, because we felt that we could handle things alone. It turned out that the new system worked out very well.

Q: *Today is St. Patrick's Day, March 17, 1995. Erin Go Bragh [Ireland Forever], I suppose, is the right term to use. We have you leaving Pakistan in 1981. As you left Pakistan, how did you evaluate U. S. relations with that country? Where were Pakistan and the United States going?*

HUMMEL: I was quite happy and satisfied with my tour in Pakistan, which I enjoyed personally in many ways, as I've said. Professionally, I was able to help materially in getting the aid program restarted, particularly with Pakistan clearly facing up to the Soviet threat, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter administration's inability to do anything significant about that had bothered me, as I said before.

By the time I left Pakistan, we had an aid program in place, under new legislation which permitted it, although I didn't think that the Pakistani nuclear program was going to stop. I felt that we may have slowed it down a bit. Relations between Pakistan and the United States were back on a reasonable basis. We had leverage through the assistance programs. We were also actively supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan, through Pakistan. Eventually, they managed to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan or persuaded the Soviets to leave. I had some considerable satisfaction as I left there, after four full years.

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JAMES P. THURBER, JR.
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Islamabad (1978-1981)

James P. Thurber Jr. was born raised in Milton, Massachusetts, with his early education coming from the Milton academy. From there he went to the Thatcher school in California, eventually graduating from Stanford University. Thurber got into foreign service through a friend convincing him to join the USIA. He has served in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Malawi, Nigeria, Lagos and Canada. He was interviewed by Emily Thurber.

THURBER: The tour in the Policy Guidance Office came to an end in mid-1978 when I received harbinger of what was to come in this assignment, probably one of the most challenging and interesting assignments of my life, but certainly not what I joined the agency for and certainly not one I would recommend to other officers.

As I say, it started off badly. I was told by Personnel in the spring of 1978 that I would not be going overseas that year, that I would have another year in Washington, which was unusual, I'd been there five years already, and to settle down and not plan on moving.
At that point, my daughter, with glee, went out and made the final arrangements to purchase a horse that she had wanted to buy for some time. The family in general, including me, expressed delight that they would be able to make plans for the coming year, knowing that they wouldn't be subject to moving.

That all came to a roaring halt about two weeks later when, believe it or not, I was in the men's room and a member of the Personnel Office turned to me and said, "Congratulations on your assignment," to which I expressed a bit of surprise. He said, "Didn't you know you were going to Pakistan as PAO?"

To the best of my ability, I tried to find out what had happened. This was part of the John Reinhardt personnel policy. You go where you're told to go and you don't question it. No wimps in USIA. You join the agency to serve anywhere in the world and don't give me any back talk or get out.

In fact, two officers were assigned to Pakistan before me. Both, for one reason or another, and I know the reasons were very legitimate, said they couldn't go, wouldn't go, or similar words, and the director got their resignations.

We didn't want to resign and we felt it was a good assignment. It certainly was a compliment to be asked to go out there. It was a big post, 16 Americans, 155 local employees, and a challenge, so we picked it up and, in early September, were on our way.

Actually, the director wanted me to go out ahead of the family, in two weeks, in fact, because my predecessor had serious hearing problems and was being medically removed from the country. I did manage to get that two weeks extended until the end of the summer, so that I could go out in some semblance of order.

The situation in Pakistan when I got there, and I think a great deal of this was due to the illness of my predecessor, as his hearing got worse -- this is all hearsay from other members of the staff -- he withdrew more and more into himself, and did not get out into the field and see what was going on.

The basic problem I came up against was the lack of central authority out of USIS, particularly our branch in Rawalpindi out 12 miles away from the embassy. It was somewhat of a weird situation. In the embassy, you had the PAO and his immediate staff, including all the administration.

In Rawalpindi, only 12 miles away, you had a branch PAO who was really an assistant CAO and a fairly good sized staff, occupying a very large center which once had been the main USIS office.

The officer in Rawalpindi was, to put it mildly, out of control. He was running his office as he felt the USIS shop should be run, and he was not a young man to take advice from headquarters. That was my first problem.
Luckily, in two of the other branches, I had superb officers, in Lahore and Karachi. They were running by themselves very well, in the tradition of USIA, traditional programs, working very closely with the CAO and IO in Islamabad.

Peshawar, the fourth branch post, had no American officer and none had been assigned at the point when I got out there. It was a quiet little town on the Afghan border, not to last that way for long, but at that point, it wasn't really much of a problem and I was able to ignore it while I tried to settle Rawalpindi and some of the conditions there.

There were two things going on, or three, actually, that I didn't particularly like and wanted to change. One of them was the lack of travel by the main USIS officers, the PAO, the IO and the CAO and Admin Officer to the branches. Apparently, there had been little or no travel over the past couple of the years and the branches were run as mini-USIS country centers by themselves.

Secondly, while we were in the embassy, with all of the main embassy officers, there was very little contact between USIS and the embassy and I was determined to change that, which I think I did over the next year, year and a half, while we were in that building.

In fact, we were greatly aided by the Ambassador, Arthur Hummel, who was a USIA officer himself at one point, and prided himself on knowing the value USIS could be to any embassy operation.

At the same time, he exhibited complete faith in me and my operation and never, ever looked over my shoulder unless I went to him for advice. He let me run my own program, but he cooperated every time.

Thirdly was the situation within USIS regarding the families. USIS, for some reason, probably the Islamic influence on our main participants, was a stag operation. All entertaining was stag. Visits were stag. The women and the wives and the families just didn't play any role whatsoever.

After about three days at post, I found out what was going on and outlawed stag parties. Working luncheons, working dinners, were permitted, which generally then ended up pretty much all male, but any social event to be paid for out of representation could not be stag.

Needless to say, I ran into quite a bit of flack on this one, as much from the Pakistanis as from the Americans or vice-versa, but it did sit and eventually, it got to where the wives, the families, were playing a major role in USIS operations and, I hope, feeling they had some responsibility in the country and they were there to do more than just wash dishes and serve hors d'oeuvres.

The problems of finding a new branch PAO in Peshawar were so typical of the USIS personnel program, which leaves personnel decisions completely centralized in Washington with no input from the post.

Peshawar was a one-American, five-Pakistanis post, located in a very rugged, very "he-man" operation, very Islamic, and very much a post for a creative self-starter, go-getter type of officer.
I sent numerous cables, memoranda to Washington, saying this is the type of officer we must have in that post. There's just no room for somebody on a retirement program, somebody who is not a self-starter, somebody who might have medical problems, something like that.

Believe it or not, that's exactly what I got, a man with an alcohol problem, a non self-starter, a man on his retirement posting, and it was a disaster. Luckily, we were able to transfer him back to the United States, but not without tremendous difficulty, a very unfortunate situation as far as the officer himself was concerned, who was fully aware of what was going on and had no capacity to defeat it or change it, and considerable loss of face among the Pakistanis who, within minutes, knew what was going on.

In a country that prohibits liquor, in a country that looks on the male as being the strong individual, et cetera, to have this situation was not good. It didn't make any difference. The next time, I got a woman for the position. While she was very good and worked out very well and worked extremely hard, she was at a tremendous disadvantage.

She realized it as much as I did. I think she worked even harder because of it, but the Pakistanis weren't about to accept her as a full-fledged member of the business and international community the way she needed to be accepted.

Unfortunately, the USIA personnel section hadn't changed when I left in the summer of 1990. It was still making the decisions by itself. It was still causing me the same type of problems and ignoring the recommendations from the PAO.

The biggest problem I had, however, was not the personnel there in Islamabad. At this point, it was the new building. I arrived in Pakistan just as construction began on a new USIS center for Islamabad which was to replace the center in Rawalpindi and become a showcase for USIS operations in the country.

I left three years later. The building was not complete. It would have been about a five or six-month construction job if done in the United States. In fact, I went back two years after that -- six years after the start of construction, I went back to the dedication.

Construction of the new USIS center in Islamabad was chaos. It was awarded to the lowest bidder who was, in pure, simple English, a crook, and a very poor contractor who did not understand construction methods unless they were done according to Pakistani style. Of course, we weren't doing that. We were building quite a nice elaborate building with some fairly tricky construction methods in it. That was just the first of the problems.

The second of the problems was that I immediately found out when I got there that I was supposed to supervise construction of the building. I mean completely supervise it. I notified Washington immediately that I couldn't do this.

I wasn't a construction supervisor. I could build a bookcase and maybe hang a door, but that was the extent of my knowledge and, if they wanted a building properly built out here, they would have to send a construction supervisor out to do it.
I then went back later and reinforced this after my first few meetings with the contractor and then going out and seeing the work on the site. Washington eventually responded, but not with what we wanted.

Instead of sending out a construction supervisor, they sent out the architect to supervise the construction, a man who was very good at designing redecoration jobs for large and wealthy homes in the Washington area, but who had very little experience and the lack of personality to handle a Pakistani contractor who himself didn't know what he was doing.

The net result was we spent I don't know how many thousands of dollars more than we had to spend on that building. The whole thing, just in one word, was stupid. Materials were brought in from the United States. They weren't complete.

We were held up for four or five weeks at one point because the description on the incoming windows said, "Use such and such screws," and these were unavailable in Pakistan. They had to come out from Washington and it took four or five weeks to go through the ordering process to buy several boxes of screws which here, could have been purchased from the local hardware store and sent out by air pouch in a matter of days.

All sorts of things went wrong with that building. We'd go over and check it, as I did, every single day, especially during the first year and a half and almost as frequently during the second half of my tour there. You'd go over one day and find that they'd put in a reinforcing bar right through where a window or a doorway was going to be.

You would find that no window had been put in where one was supposed to be or that the contractor had used up all of his advance money and didn't have any money to pay his workers, so had let them go and it was sitting there in a very unfinished state and nobody on the job. It went from bad to worse.

There were bankruptcies involving the contractor. There was an attempt to bring in another contractor who discovered serious problems with the first contractor. It was just absolute chaos. It taught us that we should never, never build a building overseas without a U.S. supervisor or I should say a building using U.S. standards overseas without a U.S. supervisor; that it was stupid to build a building overseas using such things as American windows and window glass.

We got window glass shipped out of the United States in crates and we'd open them up and there wasn't a single piece of glass in one piece, just little powdered dust at the bottom of the crate. We'd reorder. Half of them would arrive unbroken and on and on like that. Eventually, we did start to use local glass, just to seal up the building, because we couldn't seem to get some decent glass out in one piece from the United States.

I was involved in this up to my neck, far more than I wanted to be. It took far more time away from programming than I wanted to spend. It developed a great deal of animosity on the part of Washington staff. Part of this was due, I'm sure, to the numbers of frantic cables I kept sending back, saying, "We need this and this, and why don't we get proper help, and who is doing this in
When I finally did get back to Washington, I found out the Area Director was getting blamed for the slow progress and many problems with the Center. He was obviously trying to shift the blame to me. He mentioned it negatively in my OER and later said, "If I were you, I'd get myself a lawyer."

I didn't get a lawyer. The problems at that time, cracks in the roof, proved to be inconsequential, and the building eventually was sealed.

It was not a happy story. It could have been easily solved by the appointment of a proper building contractor at the beginning, but the building is finished. I went to the dedication, as I said. I've been back several times. It is a glorious building and, unless you'd been deeply involved in the construction and know where to look to see where the problems were, the casual observer would never notice them.

Also during my tour in Islamabad, I continued my interest in overseas schools and I served on the school board of the American International School in Islamabad and in the fall of 1979, became president of the school board.

Leading up to other problems was the incident on November 4th. Our superintendent, Bill Keogh, had formerly served in Tehran and, on the weekend of November 4th, went up to Tehran to see about closing out the school there because of the problems with the Iranian government and the fact there were no more American dependents there.

That was the time of the take over of the embassy and Bill was inside when it happened, and was one of the hostages who then were kept 444 days in captivity in Iran. It left us without a superintendent, a series of unfortunate debates or discussions with Bill Keogh's wife, who claimed her husband had notified her that she should take over the running of the school. The board did not wish that to happen, eventually, or at the same time, requiring a tremendous amount of time on my part, in the evenings and on weekends, to try and fill in the tremendous gap left by Bill's being incarcerated.

Following the takeover of the embassy in Tehran, things began to fall apart in Pakistan. We'd gone through a long, lengthy and very disagreeable session over the past seven, eight, nine months, with the Pakistanis over their development of a nuclear weapon.

We were pretty sure we had excellent evidence that they were doing so and, because of that, the automatic AID law, so to speak, kicked in, which meant we had to discontinue our AID programs. This caused a great deal of resentment on the part of the Pakistanis and we began to see and hear of small groups of Pakistanis demonstrating against the United States.

As the middle of November came, these demonstrations took on an uglier turn. There were marches on the consulates in both Karachi and Lahore stopped by the police, and we began to hear on the radio and on television that the United States was not welcomed in Pakistan.
This all reached a head on November 21, 1979, when a mob of students and people from Rawalpindi and Islamabad stormed the American embassy, burned everything burnable within the compound which, in effect, burned out the entire place, killed two Americans, two Pakistanis on our staff, and I don't know how many Pakistanis among the demonstrators, and caused not only a complete change for a lot of people but, certainly, my role as Public Affairs Officer.

This took place on Wednesday afternoon, the day before Thanksgiving. Early on Friday morning, about 3:00 a.m., we evacuated almost the entire embassy staff except for 20 or so -- I stayed -- and all of the dependents, the wives and children, from not only Islamabad, but Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar.

It should be noted, also, that the demonstrators also burned down the USIA centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore. They tried to in Peshawar and Karachi and were turned back by police.

Following the evacuation on Friday morning and a day trying to get some semblance of order into my life after my family was on its way to the States, I sat down at a dictating machine and dictated a report of the raid on the embassy and my emotions and feelings.

I'm enclosing that with this tape. I see no point in recounting all of that, because what I remember now could be quite different than what actually happened. Times change; feelings change; remembrances change. So, the one thing I can say about the attached, it's not very perfect grammar or it does not flow very well, but it is accurate.

The raid on the embassy occurred in the middle of my tour in Pakistan. The first 18 months were devoted to programming the normal USIA operations, trying to get the staff built up, and building the new building.

The second half, the next 18 months, were entirely devoted to rebuilding. There was very little programming. Speakers didn't particularly want to come to Pakistan at that point. We did not rebuild our center in Rawalpindi, by the way. We just continued with the center in Islamabad with the plans to move there completely, but rebuilt our center in Lahore and rebuilt our staff.

We did not bring back many of the original officers who were there at the time of the fire. They went on to other assignments, and we had to get new people in, train them, and get the programs going again. It took about 18 months to do this job.

In Islamabad, we moved our operations into the house of one of our evacuated officers -- remember, we had nothing out of our offices, both in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, everything was completely destroyed, including the library in Rawalpindi, a 10,000 volume library.

My office, as a description, which I went into the next day, had about four inches of ash on the floor, a metal wastebasket in one corner, a glob of glass in the middle of the floor where the desk had been. It was the glass cover of the desk, the runners of the desk drawers, another glob of metal which was the telephone, and that was about it.

I had a whole row of books. There wasn't a single one left. Even the structure of the brick and so
forth was destroyed, which gives you an idea of the heat of the fire.

So, we started from scratch. We had nothing to begin with. We went out, literally, to a stationery store and bought pencils, pens, and pads of paper. The embassy was in the same state. They moved into the AID building, so they were able to draw on AID supplies and we did, to a certain extent, but basically it was a start from scratch.

Washington started and built up our supply of books, our manuals, everything you need to operate in today's bureaucracy and, within a couple of weeks, we had packed up the furniture and personal belongings of the officer who had lived in the house. We had begged, borrowed and purchased furniture. We had telephones installed. We even had a copying machine and we were pretty much back to business on a very reduced scale.

We had nowhere near the space for the staff of 155, well, actually, in Islamabad, it was about 59 or 60 Pakistanis, so we put them on a rotating administrative leave basis that went on for six or seven months, until we were able to get jobs and space back to bring them all back to work.

The officer's house we were living in was much too small to do what we wanted to do. It was located in a residential district. There was no parking, et cetera, so after a few months, we found a much larger house closer to the embassy, in fact, right next door to the Ambassador’s residence and we took that over and set that up as a USIS center.

We had a small library, or eventually did, as we received new books to replace the old ones, and a large front hall where we could show films or television and VCRs. It was a small, but adequate, center, and enabled us eventually to get all our staff back to work again and working productively for the Information Agency.

In Lahore, much the same thing; after a week or two of looking, the Branch PAO found a reasonably-sized house which he moved into and set up operations. He was better off, as far as the fire was concerned. The students in Lahore did not do as good a job destroying that center as they did in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, and much of the library was salvaged.

Many of the books were repaired by sanding, literally sand papering off the ash that had accumulated on the outside, washing down the covers and putting them back on the shelves. The staff spent the next two or three months recovering the library and setting it up, and by the summer, six months later, they were back pretty much in operation.

It should be mentioned, however, that while it sounds like we went back to work pretty quickly, the situation in the country was not that good for a few weeks or months. We were not out advertising our presence. We did such things as removing the diplomatic plates from our cars that identified us as Americans. The Canadians came forth, in great esprit de corps and gave us plates identifying us as Canadian diplomats, which we were delighted to have. We took name plates off our houses.

We increased our guards around the houses. The first few nights, there were isolated groups, small groups, of Pakistanis who came around and wanted to know where the American was
living in this house or that house and yelling and threatening. My guard was very good. I was
one of the few Americans still in town, and he gave them to believe that I had left and the house
was deserted. They went their way, I think luckily for me.

But, gradually, the atmosphere improved. The Pakistanis realized that they had made quite a
mistake and that we had not been involved, as my statement said, in the attack at the mosque at
Mecca and that we weren’t really that bad, and we could be accepted back without having to pay
any great penalty, although the students still showed no remorse, months after the incident, and I
think would have done it again if there had been the leadership to do it.

Certainly, we went through some tense times as other world incidents boiled up and we felt there
might be a repercussion in Pakistan. I would say by May or June, things were completely back to
normal. By August, our families were allowed to return and, by September, the situation in the
country was pretty much the same as it was before.

There were far fewer Americans in the embassy group, far fewer American children at the
International School, and my work was basically still on rebuilding and getting an operation back
in usable shape. It continued that way for the final year.

After some of the comments I’ve made about our relations with Washington, I should note,
however, that most of the elements of the USIA in Washington were terribly helpful those first
few days and weeks after the raid on the embassy. Obviously, we were in need of a tremendous
amount of assistance, and we got it.

This helpfulness and assistance tapered off as time went by and people forgot what had
happened. This was particularly true of the Area Director who couldn’t figure out why we were
having so much trouble doing certain things six or eight months later. Since he hadn’t been there
and seen what had gone on, he really didn’t understand the situation we were facing. In fact, no
high officers from the Agency came to visit; it was as if we didn't exist.

While all of this was going on, we have to go back to December 27, 1979, a little over a month
after the raid on the embassy, when we woke up in the morning and found that the Russians were
invading Afghanistan, our next-door neighbor.

As the result of this, our center in Peshawar assumed a vastly different proportion. It started
slowly. There wasn't much role for USIS in Peshawar or Afghanistan at the beginning of the
invasion. The military was the important thing in getting arms to the Mujahideen but, over the
year and until I left, this center gradually grew in importance.

We finally got the officer that we needed there, the one I wanted three years earlier, and the role
of the USIA there in training Afghans to tell their story to the world, how to do it, how to write a
news story, how to write a television program, all was done in cooperation with USIA at
Peshawar. It grew to two American officers and a much larger local staff than we had at that
time.

This problem in Afghanistan was what eventually changed much of the attitude of the Pakistanis
towards the Americans. We were, so to speak, in bed together against the Russians, and the Pakistanis looked to us for supplies and monies in their support of their brethren in Afghanistan against the Soviet army.

The net result of that immediately, however, was the large number of Codels and high level American bureaucrats coming out to see the situation at first hand, and our role in exposing them to Pakistan, to the Khyber Pass, to the various points of interest and making sure they were thoroughly briefed on the dangers that were building up across the border.

We got to meet many dignitaries from Washington including people like Walter Cronkite, who turned out to be a great trouper. He was sick as a dog with some stomach ailment when he was out there and he never let it slow him down or never admitted that he wasn't feeling well.

I left Islamabad for reassignment to Washington in early October 1981 and, by that time, our program in Pakistan was pretty much back to normal, a standard USIS program in the Subcontinent being conducted under the new rules and programs of the Reagan Administration.

Our staff was back to work, although in reduced numbers, due to the budget cuts that had started throughout USIA, although I still feel that India and Pakistan took a disproportionately large share of these cuts, and all of the American positions had been filled. Basically, we were treated from Washington like any other USIS post, with no particular difficulties.

STEPHEN EISENbraun
Consular Officer
Lahore (1978-1981)

Stephen Eisenbraun was born and raised in Iowa. He attended both the University of Northern Iowa and Delhi University. He entered the foreign service in 1975 and was assigned to the Lahore embassy in 1978. Mr. Eisenbraun was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Then '78, whither? Where did you go?

EISENbraun: I went to Lahore, Pakistan. Jane Coon happened to come out to Bangladesh in about March or April of '78 and we hit it off nicely. She was the deputy assistant secretary responsible for South Asia in the Department. I was her control officer and took her around Dhaka on her calls, and that’s how we got to know each other. When we were at the airport waiting for her flight, she pulled out a piece of paper that had the positions coming open that she was recruiting people for. She was just sharing this information with me because she didn’t have anything in mind for me.

She said that one of the hardest positions to fill was the number two spot at the America consulate in Lahore, the political officer and deputy principal officer job. She said I just don’t know who can fill that job. I said, I can do it. But she replied, no, you’re too junior. It’s a rank
above you. But I repeated that I could do the job. She thought for a minute and replied, yes, maybe you could. I said, unfortunately, however, this new bidding process has just started and they told me I had to go out of region and pick up consular work. I added that I had just gotten a cable that morning assigning me to Oslo as consular officer, and I was supposed to confirm my willingness to go there. Coon said, ignore the cable. Don’t answer it till you hear from me.

I left the cable assigning me to Oslo in my in-box, and about 10 days later, another cable came out assigning me to Lahore, without any reference to the previous unanswered message.

Q: All right. Well, we’ll pick this up, 1978 out in Lahore. Great.

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Today is the 25th of March, 2005.

Well, Steve, we’re 1978 and you’re in Lahore. You were there from when to when?

EISENBRAUN: I arrived in the latter part of September of ’78 and I was there until the summer of 1981, so it was a three-year assignment. My wife and I arrived in Lahore with a two-month-old son, John, who had been born during our home leave. We had stayed with my father and his wife, Jeanie, in Florida for the birth. (My father remarried after my mother died in 1968.) Jane had gone back to the States a few weeks earlier than I from Bangladesh to have the baby, but luckily, the little one waited for me. Jeanie nicely took a Lamaze course with Jane so that she could be in the delivery room if I couldn’t make it back from Dhaka on time, but I did, and I had the benefit of the final Lamaze class before John was born. Then, after a few weeks of camping out with my dad and then a quick visit to Iowa to visit Jane’s parents, we were off to Pakistan. Neither of us worried much about John’s health, going out to such a difficult health environment. We in the Foreign Service take our chances, don’t we?

Q: Yes, it’s a bit much sometimes. So you arrived there. What was the situation in that part of Pakistan when you got there?

EISENBRAUN: In 1978, General Zia ul-Haq was into his first year as chief martial law administrator. Maybe he had named himself president by then. At any rate, he had seized power the previous July by overthrowing Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the army had then taken over the country. There was no active politicking going on, much like Bangladesh, as I had told you earlier. The Punjab is the political heart and soul of the country, so there were a lot of unemployed politicians around to talk to. One had to be a little careful because they didn’t want to get themselves into trouble with the military authorities and there was a military governor in Lahore for the province of the Punjab. My job in Lahore was the number two in the consulate; there probably all told were about 10 of us including the three people at USIS (United States Information Service.). I was the deputy to a very fine gentleman who had 37 years’ experience in the Foreign Service, David Gamon was his name. He was a really fine officer. He was at the end of his career and retired six months after I arrived. My responsibilities were to look into political, economic, and commercial matters, a very broad mandate. There were virtually no taskings from Washington, and few from the Embassy in Islamabad, so I had a lot of flexibility.
One of the first things I did was to move around and meet some of the provincial authorities as well as some of the well known political figures across the spectrum, from the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), to the Islamic parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami. The latter weren’t so enthusiastic about meeting Americans, but with the consul general I was able to meet the senior Jamaat leaders occasionally. There were a lot of retired politicians and former CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) leaders, people who had been very important in Pakistan in an earlier era, and I looked up many of those people as well.

I hit upon this idea, looking at what I would do differently in Lahore from, let’s say, what I had done previously in Bangladesh, and came up with idea of traveling in the countryside. The consul general encouraged this, and Pakistan is a pretty exotic place, romantic in the old-fashioned sense of the term. Rugged hills and barren deserts and hospitable, colorful people in the far west, blending into Afghanistan tribal chiefdoms, and in the more settled areas of the Punjab, there were big landlords friendly to Americans. I began a series of trips. I had a wonderful Foreign Service National, Mahmoud Ali, as a guide. Generations at the Lahore Consulate had benefited from his enthusiasm and knowledge Pakistan’s political environment. He knew everybody and everything; so he and I went out on the trail, along with a driver, usually Mr. Khan or Mr. Beg. The three of us, much like boys out looking for adventure, drove all over the countryside on week-long trips. Over time, we explored every district in Punjab, and then we started over.

On one trip, we went to the southern part of the Punjab to Bahalwalpur, smack in the Thar Desert. Bahalwalpur had been a princely state, run by a nawab, one of the largest in the unified subcontinent under the British colonial rule. So, we went down to the nawab’s palace, which could rival in its heyday anything in the Loire Valley in France, but the heyday had been 60-70 years earlier. It was a little decrepit but dramatic nonetheless. A twenty-something son of the old nawab lived there alone with about a hundred servants. The palace had maybe 50 acres perhaps, and inside the high walls it was green and beautiful with peacocks strolling around. Outside the wall, it was desert.

The old fort of Bahalwalpur was about 20 miles out in the virtually trackless desert. Not quite trackless, I guess, because in the 19th century a telegraph line had been strung out to the fort. The road had long since been covered by sand, but you could still tell the direction to the fort by the telegraph poles. The local official of the Pakistan government, that’s the Deputy Commissioner (DC), loaned us a jeep with four-wheel drive, and we drove out to the fort. It had been abandoned for generations but was still in the nawab’s family. So you’re driving in the desert, and there’s camels occasionally wandering along, and it’s 110 degrees. Then this imposing fort, right out of Rudyard Kipling, comes up over the horizon and we drive up to the vast entrance, honked, and a lone watchman opened the gate so we could explore inside. I asked to see the dungeon, and there were cells with doors swinging with the wind, with sand in the cells. There were even a few cannonballs lying around on the parapets. I think the cannons were there, too, and the cannonballs were just scattered on the ground. The place was still furnished, but the doors to the nawab’s private chambers were locked.

I don’t want to go on too much about all these travels but every one of them was exotic in some
fashion. In the north, for example, in the salt range of mountains, there was an old salt mine. We
got down into the mine, which was as close to hell as you can get, I think, because it’s deep,
straight down, a deep hole that almost immediately became pitch black and there was at most 18
inches of a ledge carved out of the side of the wall that you had to inch along down into
blackness. I think that one of the guides had a flashlight, and halfway down in this almost pitch
black came some little donkeys with saddlebags of salt. They were not being led by anyone; they
knew exactly what they had to do and they were hugging the wall too. They just sort of pushed
us out of the way. We were right on the edge of falling into the abyss, but somehow we got to the
bottom. Once there, we found men hacking at the walls, with flaming torches lighting the area. If
it was 110 on the surface, it must have been 125 down at the base of this pit. These men were
laboring in utter blackness except for burning torches stuck in the walls, and with pickaxes they
were pounding away at the salt rock and loading up the saddlebags on the donkeys. I thought the
lifespan of these men working down there must not be very great. That was a gruesome thing to
see.

Q: At that particular point, what was the attitude of the Pakistanis towards the United States?

EISENBAUN: The Pakistan government was rather disillusioned with the United States
because there had been twenty years or more of hot and cold relationships from Washington. We
had been quite supportive during the Cold War and we had supported them in ’71 when they had
their war with India, but then we had backed off a number of times and this period of ’78-’79,
my first year there, we were, because of the military overthrow of the elected government, we
were pretty cool to the Pakistanis. I think that we had curtailed a good part, maybe all, military
aid. It manifested itself on the provincial level in that it was sometimes difficult to get prior
permission to go out on these travels. But in the end, I don’t think I was ever denied. When I got
out into the districts and met the local officials, the Deputy Commissioners and the
Superintendents of police and others, they were always pleasant enough. Proper; I wouldn’t say--
they were not effusive, but they were accessible. The Pakistani people were very friendly, and
even farmers knew a lot about the American-Pakistani relationship. They knew that America had
been a close friend at one time and wasn’t so friendly anymore, so there was always this
question, why can’t America be steadfast in its friendship? But they were predisposed to be
friendly.

Q: Well, how was the disposition of Bhutto seen at that time?

EISENBAUN: Bhutto was in jail and he was being tried for murder. There had been a local
politician in Lahore who had been ambushed, and by mistake, the father traveling with him was
the one who got killed. I met the politician on many occasions, that is, the one who escaped, and
he was convinced that it was a trap set by the government on Bhutto’s orders. I don’t know that
anyone will ever know precisely, and I don’t quite remember why the trap was allegedly set
except that the fellow had been too critical of Bhutto. There was also a feeling amongst many
people that this was a contrived affair and that General Zia was going to make sure that Bhutto
was out of the picture, locked up or whatever forever, whether the charges were true or not. And
so there was a lot of discussion from PPP leaders about what the United States could do to bring
pressure to insure that a fair trial was held. If my memory is correct, I think most people from
other political parties, across the political spectrum, also assumed the charges against Bhutto

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were trumped up.

Q: Did you, I mean, was Bhutto a loved leader? I mean, was this a particular section of Pakistan where his base was, or something?

EISENBRAUN: His base was not in the Punjab as much as it was in the Sindhi province to the south, where the Bhutto family was from. He also had plenty of support in the Punjab too, however.

Q: Did we have a position in this? I mean, were you fed your instructions? Did you play it neutral or be concerned or what else?

EISENBRAUN: It’s my memory that we played this pretty neutral. I have to be careful because I don’t know what was going on in the embassy, but I don’t believe that we were fighting the military authorities on behalf of Bhutto. We were essentially observers.

But to finish the story of Bhutto, it was February of 1979 and it was probably a Friday, which was not a day of work in Pakistan, and a friend of mine, Nur Hyatt Noon, came over to my home mid-morning to report that time was getting really short for Bhutto, that he was in danger of being executed at any moment. Nur said the Americans have got to do something. And so David Gamon and I drafted a message to Islamabad, which explained this because we did not know if Islamabad had this information or not, and we argued in the message that we ought to put pressure on the government to make sure that due process was followed and so forth.

Well, Nur was right. Bhutto was hanged the next day at dawn, and it took the country by complete surprise. Everyone thought that this would probably be the ultimate conclusion but it happened so quickly that suddenly the country was told he was hanged and buried and gone. There were riots and demonstrations around the country. In Lahore, there were thousands of people who came out on the street, but the police were able to maintain basic order. I don’t think the army had to get involved. It was quite a shock, I think, to the Pakistani people that such a charismatic man who had been so popular, especially in the days after he’d assumed power in ’72, that he could be gone.

Now, it happened about the same time, I want to mention the abduction and death of our Ambassador in Kabul, Spike Dubbs. A few months earlier, at Christmas (1978), he and his wife, Mary Ann, had come down to Lahore for four or five days of relaxation. I was asked to go out and play golf with them. I’m not much of a golfer, but it didn’t matter because Mary Ann wasn’t very good either, though the Ambassador was. So, it was just the three of us, and it was very pleasant. They were such gracious, nice people. Several of us in the consulate took them into the old city because it was also the time of Muharram, a holy time for the Shias, and someone knew a balcony we could all watch from as the processions went past. Many of the men were flailing themselves with whips and chains, because the occasion was one to mourn the death of Ali, the brother-in-law of Mohammad. My point in saying this is that all of us in the consulate were involved in the Dubbs visit.

Well, it was Valentine’s Day, February 14, 1979, when I got the call mid-morning from the
political consular in Islamabad, Herb Hagerty, saying that Spike Dubbs had been kidnapped in Kabul and was being held at the main hotel in Kabul. There wasn’t any action for us to take in Lahore, but we were all traumatized to hear this and an hour later, just after noontime, Herb called me back and said the Ambassador had been killed in a hail of bullets as the government stormed the room where he was being held, even though we had told them not to. What a shock. My reaction, I got the call, I walked into the consul general’s office and said, let’s lower the flag. But he was old school, so he said we have to wait for Washington’s instructions on that. And Debbie, the secretary, was crying at her desk. It was a terrible circumstance even for us in Lahore.

Q: In the first place, you say you traveled around. Did this include the so-called tribal areas? I don’t know Pakistan but these, I gather, are sort of a wild west areas of Pakistan.

EISENbraun: I couldn’t go into those areas. That was somewhat farther west. The Punjab boundary bordered on the northwest frontier province and Baluchistan in its far western areas, and then farther west from there along the Afghan border, that’s where the tribal areas were. So I was not allowed by the Pakistan government to go anywhere in the rural areas outside the Punjab. So no, I was not literally in the tribal areas. That’s not to say that in the western part of the Punjab it wasn’t pretty wild also, but at least the Pakistan government had a presence, which was not the case in the tribal areas. But there were still some pretty fierce people in western Punjab, and remember thinking that the Russians would have their hands full if they ever thought to invade Pakistan.

I remember it was somewhere in western Punjab, probably in Mianwalli district along the border with the frontier province, I had a meeting at about five in the afternoon with whoever was the local power out there and he had already arrived at the meeting place. I walked into this room and there were probably 30 men there with rifles and shotguns and bandoliers across their chests. They all stood up simultaneously, and I did a bit of a double take, thinking, great Scott, what have I gotten into? Then the man in charge introduced himself, and we had a good talk. It was clear that these people could be a challenge to the government if it got tense because they had plenty of weapons and they were pretty independent minded.

Q: Were you getting any feel for Islamic fundamentalism and what it was doing to the attitude of people?

EISENbraun: Yes. That was a period when Islamic fundamentalism was relatively new or it manifested itself in politics pretty much for the first time in Pakistan and its first expression really had been in the open demonstrations that tried to bring Bhutto down in 1977. Then Zia, when he took over in mid-1977, began to promote an Islamization of the society. He himself was a devout Muslim and perhaps he also saw it as politically useful to, rather than to oppose this element in politics, to try to meet some of its concerns, maybe co-opt it. I don’t know exactly what his master plan was, but it fit in with what the Islamic element in Pakistan, or at least the militant wing of Islam, wanted. The urban middle class, well educated, maybe western oriented people, they didn’t know what the rules were, but suddenly there was prohibition and everyone was being encouraged to go to the mosques on Friday. Not everyone had done that previously, but I know a number of people started going to the mosques, and I think they began to take
fasting more seriously during the holy month of Ramadan.

There was such a huge unemployment problem in Pakistan and so- anywhere in the urban areas there would be literally thousands and thousands of young men unemployed, idle, hanging around on the streets all the time. And in the early evening when it was teatime, they would be in the tea stalls. You thought, my goodness, this is a volatile group of people, because they were the very types that the Islamic element could bring out on the streets and they could do it in an hour’s time. And you could see anyone would have to take this element seriously in politics. So that sums up the first year, essentially, that I was in Pakistan.

Q: In your area, your consular district, what were the economic factors?

EISENbraun: Well, that’s an interesting question because I did follow commercial matters and economic matters as well as political events. The backbone of the Punjab economy was the spinning of cotton into textiles, which were then exported. A lot of cotton was grown and there were a lot of cotton gins. I visited practically every textile mill in the Punjab and some of the owners were fabulously wealthy. Some of them were new wealth; that is, they had created their wealth through the textile industry and then branched off into other things, whether it was banking or processed ghee, that’s a form of butter. They had branched out and they had become enormously wealthy and they lived in fabulous homes and so forth. Spinning mills were a mainstay of the economy, but another money-maker for the large landowners was the growing of mangos. Almost all the great landlord families, and this is a feudal society with great estates, they all grew mangos. Now, you wouldn’t think that great fortunes could be made in this trade, but you would be mistaken. I don’t know if it would show up on the trade statistics about the export of mangos or whatever but that was important. There also was a growing assembly sector to the economy and I noticed that the Japanese were coming into Lahore and they were setting up television assembly plants and transistor radio assembly and so forth. They were really small operations with 50 people or so and I was able to go around and I toured some of these. Generally, the local Pakistani manager would acknowledge that, well, they weren’t making much money but they were putting together pretty cheap television sets and they were available on the local market. And they said, you wait, we’re going to expand. And even in the three years I was there, from ’78 to ’81, I saw that these assembly plants were expanding.

Now, from time to time American businessmen would come through Lahore too, and they were looking at investment prospects and bidding on contracts from the government. The contracts at that time were mostly to do with telecommunications, setting up line-of-sight telecommunications around the country and so forth. They were multimillion dollar contracts, which the Americans weren’t always successful in getting. The American businessmen complained that others, the Japanese particularly, were using other means to get contracts; it wasn’t a level playing field. I’m referring to cutbacks. I don’t want to single out the Japanese but whatever the competition, the Americans always said, we can’t compete because it isn’t a level playing field. I think the Americans also couldn’t give the best financing, because many other governments worked closely with the private sector to extend terms that the Americans couldn’t match. I would say to American representatives, I remember Motorola came through, and I told them about the Japanese assembly shops, look at what the Japanese are doing, and the Americas scoffed and said, we don’t deal with setting up little factories of 50 people to assemble cheap
televisions; that isn’t what we do. Even at the time, I thought, well, this seems pretty short­sighted. I can tell you that even by the time I left in ’81, with a three-year perspective, the Japanese assembly factories weren’t so small anymore and I don’t know what their balance sheets were, but I’ll bet they were all right, and I can guess they were doing this not only in Pakistan but in many other parts of Asia. There was no America capacity for that kind of investment anyway because it seemed the Japanese had sewn it up entirely in Pakistan.

Let me turn to the dramatic events of November 1979. That was the attack on the America embassy in Islamabad and the consulate in Lahore and other America interests throughout Pakistan.

Q: First, had the unrest in Tehran prior to the takeover of the embassy, had that had any effect, I mean, was that just something you were watching or what? Because the embassy had been overrun once, I think on Valentine’s Day of ’79 and then-

EISENBR AUN: Yes, that’s right. That was happening the very same day as the Spike Dubbs murder.

Q: Yes. And then, you know, the Shah had fled, and I was wondering whether that was going to mean any repercussions or not.

EISENBR AUN: Well, it certainly created a lot of tension within Pakistan and with the Americans. But it did not directly affect our day-to-day activities, although we buttoned up security a bit. It was certainly a tense situation and it was about to get a lot tenser.

The day before Thanksgiving 1979, the consul general, Clive Fuller, and I went out to the Jamaat-e-Islami headquarters to pay a courtesy call on the head mufti, and that was always kind of a tense situation. We wanted to keep as cordial relations as possible, and they were willing to meet us. It was not friendly meeting, but they listened to us. Fuller was under instruction to try to get the Jamaat leaders to intervene with Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran to release the American hostages. The Jamaat leader said he would pass our message along, and we drafted one on the spot. Who knows whether the Jamaat leader, a Sunni, had any influence at all with Khomeini, a Shia? He did not promise to lend a helping hand, just pass along the message.

Well, we got back into Lahore about noon­time, and we noticed a tremendous amount of activity on the streets and that there were flyers being handed out all over. We had no idea what was up, but we got a flyer, in Urdu, which we couldn’t read. Fuller and I lived a block away and behind the consulate, so we both went home for lunch, separately, and then we reconvened about an hour later at the office. It was probably about one o’clock in the afternoon and a whole bunch of police, like about 200 of them, had shown up and formed a ring around the consulate building. There were groups of young men all around reading this handout. We had someone on the staff, a Pakistani national, quickly translate it, and it said something about Islamic militants had taken over the grand mosque in Mecca. I don’t remember if that publication said the Israelis were behind it; yes, it might have, and by implication the Americans because of our close relationship with Israel.
Actually, police had shown up before at the American consulate in large numbers and so it wasn’t completely unusual. We were still open and functioning. Then I got a call from the German who ran the American Express office down in the central part of the city, about two miles away, and he reported that thousands of angry people were on the streets and they’ve come by and broken our windows and trashed the front of our office and then moved on because the American Cultural Center, USIS (United States Information Service), was nearby. It was a very nice building, right around the corner from the American Express Bank, and there were three Americans working there. The German said they’re attacking the USIS center. But the USIS center hadn’t called us; no authorities had called us. It was just his phone call.

It was quiet around our office. I walked next door to Fuller’s office and told him what was happening. And he said, you better call the embassy in Islamabad. He picked up the phone to try to call the governor, whose office wasn’t that far away from the American Cultural Center. I went back to my desk and put a call into the political counselor’s office in the embassy in Islamabad, about 300 miles north. I got a busy signal. I then tried the DCM; busy signal. I thought, this is really peculiar. I’m sitting on important news, and I need to get this out immediately so I called our American Consulate in Karachi, about a thousand miles to the south. I got Dick Post, the Consul General, on the line. He yelled into the phone that the embassy was in flames because thousands of people had attacked it. He said I’m under attack too. I’m in the safe haven (vault) in the consulate. Then the line went dead. I put the phone down; it’s still perfectly quiet around us. I went back into Fuller’s office and reported what I’d just learned.

Then more calls starting coming in from Pakistanis telling us what was going on. They said the American Center had been overrun and the place was in flames. All this news landed on us in just a few minutes. We didn’t have any idea what might have happened to all of our colleagues, Pakistani and American. In the meantime, Fuller was frantically trying to call for the police, the DC, the governor, anybody, but nobody was available. We couldn’t send a cable to Washington because our communications went through the Embassy in Islamabad, which was off the air. There was no official in Lahore in his office, or nobody was taking our calls. Later, we learned that all the senior government leaders were in a meeting, and they weren’t to be disturbed. In fact, they were taken as much by surprise at the public uprising as we were, although someone had had the presence of mind to send police to our office.

Jeff Lundstead, the consular officer, then ran upstairs from the consular section, where he had been hearing the same stories. The American staff gathered in the area around the consul general’s office. Essentially the question was, what do we do now? If there was need of a flash cable, it was then, but we couldn’t send one. Our only precedent had been Teheran, and the staff had not been able to leave the embassy then. In fact, they’d all gone into the embassy vault and then eventually had to surrender. Do you know, we never considered abandoning the consulate? We had classified material, and in that era we thought our job was to stay put. Fuller was constantly on the phone, trying to raise somebody and get some action going for more protection but without success. Then I got a call that the crowd was moving up the street from the American Center to the consulate with the intent of burning us down too. I told this to Fuller and added that we’d better start destroying classified material. He said, no, no, wait. We’ve got a lot of police around here. I said, but they’re coming, and he said, we’ll be okay.
Lundstead said, I’m leaving. This is crazy. And he went down and opened the back door to the consulate, but then slammed it shut. He shouted, it’s too late; they’re coming over the walls! And they did, thousands of them. We were stuck inside with our indecision.

We sound now so incompetent, frankly. We must have called the American School, which was about a-half mile away and told them, but I can’t guarantee that that call was made. Yes, there was an emergency contact network, but this all happened probably in twenty minutes, and yes, I believe we tried to alert the rest of the America community. There was a malaria research laboratory with a handful of American scientists working there. Our incapacity to alert others became an issue in the community in the months to follow because it looked like the consulate could care less about the American School or others.

Then we were engulfed. The rocks came flying, and bricks, and the windows were breaking, and we realized what it’s like to be under siege. We hadn’t a clue what was going on outside, since we could hardly be near the windows with all the shattering class, despite their protective grating. All we could hear was this hurricane of noise and then explosions. We learned later that explosions were cars burning around the consulate and their tires blowing out. I happened to look out one of the top windows that didn’t have a curtain on it and I could see this great big cloud of black smoke coming from the direction of where my home was only a block away. I had called my wife to alert her, and Fuller did the same but then the lines went dead. All we had was this terrific noise, with bricks flying, glass breaking, and explosions hurting our ears.

There was a DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) agent with us, and according to our previous plan, he stationed himself at the fortified door at the bottom of the steps to the first floor and had tear gas in one hand and a revolver in the other. He was ready to lay out that tear gas if they broke through the windows and doors and got into the lower level. Our plan was to go into the vault on the second floor. The vault had no escape. It turned out we didn’t have to go in because the hundreds of police ringing the office were actually beating off the demonstrators and kept them from getting inside. The demonstrators threw into the broken windows burning rags, but they didn’t have gasoline, so the damage was not great. They had used up all the gasoline at the cultural center. The carpets and the curtains charred a bit but they did not catch on fire. The police kept them from breaking through the windows, which were all, of course, reinforced with heavy wrought iron, but that can’t withstand the fury of a crowd. The police save us. The attack went on for a couple of hours, this horrific noise and the bricks pounding against the walls; in fact, it went on so long that it began to get dark outside. We couldn’t get out, we couldn’t call, and we were trapped. I said, we better be destroying the classified material. But Fuller said no, I don’t think we need to. Let’s just wait. Absolutely not one document was destroyed.

There must have been a radio because the Pakistani army made communication with us eventually and said, it is quieter now and getting dark; open your doors and we’ll evacuate you. We did, the back door, and they came in nervously. They were taking this situation very seriously. They said, you’re going to be evacuated with army trucks. They had put down a lot of tear gas around, which was now coming in the door, enough to make us uncomfortable. The soldier in charge ordered, get out quickly. The trucks pulled right up to the door, and we were pushed inside and made to lie down and were driven away. They asked where we wanted to go. We had a small apartment building farther out in the suburbs that had three units for American
staff, so we said, go there. It was quiet out there. The demonstrators did not know that that was American property. The army dropped us and left with no further offer of assistance, to my memory.

So here it was, full night and there were about seven or eight of us and, now what? Somehow, yes, there were phones working out there and we got a few calls. I found out where my wife was and where the consul general’s wife was; they were together. You don’t mind all this detail?

Q: No.

EISEN BRAUN: The story of how the two wives got out of their homes near the consulate is a good one. In the midst of the initial attacks, when the demonstrators were charging all around the neighborhood, the demonstrators did not know that the American consul general and the number two’s house was there in the otherwise Pakistani suburban area right behind the office. My cook, Omar, was smart and brave enough to go and take the flag down at the consul general’s house and take our names off the gate. Those servants stayed in the houses throughout the day.

In the meantime, the wife of a doctor, Dr. Anwar, a pediatrician we used for little son John, (my wife was also seven months pregnant) came roaring up in her car and said, this is too dangerous, you’ve got to get out of here fast. She pushed them on the floor of the back seat and covered them with shawls and whisked them away. She went to the home of Nasim Saigol, about a half mile away. The Saigol family was a very powerful and influential family, and their home seemed like a safe haven, and that’s where they spent the afternoon.

I should add that Dr. Anwar ten months later saved my wife’s life one hot afternoon by inserting a critical intravenous drip when she was going into a coma at home because of a severe attack of hepatitis.

All right. So, Fuller and I and the others, we found ourselves at six in the evening, it’s completely dark, the rioting, we learned, was all over the city and all over the country. We learned it occurred throughout the Islamic world because the rumor spread from Morocco to Indonesia that the Americans were behind the Israelis who had taken over the grand mosque in Mecca. As it turned out, these were Islamic radicals with no connection to any outside force, to my knowledge. But they were holed up in the grand mosque in Mecca and the Saudi authorities, I think it took them the better part of a day to clear them out, but there are other people who are more expert on what was going on in Saudi Arabia.

But for us, we were still cut off, we had no idea what was going on in Islamabad. We were totally on our own. People dispersed to their homes and the consul general and I got somehow a ride, I don’t remember who gave it to us, to Nasim Saigol’s place. His beautiful home in its compound was perfectly quiet. He was there too, and he said, supremely confidently, don’t worry, you’re safe here. He meant it. As a matter of fact, to show how safe it was, the DC was there, as was the superintendent of police, using his house like a command post. Not in their offices because Pakistan was teetering at that moment, and the officials did not know if the crowds would turn and attack Pakistan government symbols of authority. They could have marched on the governor’s mansion which was only a half mile from the USIS center, but they
didn’t. As it turned out, the Pakistan authorities were about as frightened as we were. If the
crowd had turned, I suspect the government would have fallen, because it would not have been
likely that the army would have fired on its own citizens. Literally, the Government of Pakistan
was just about as threatened as the American interests in the country were that day.

Well, it’s not my personal experience, but you probably should know what happened in
Islamabad just very briefly. Others in the oral history program have probably told that story in
great detail. But just to give a picture. Huge crowds of people came pouring in, thousands upon
thousands of people came pouring into the vicinity of the American embassy and the embassy
was caught just at lunchtime. There were lots of other Americans in the cafeteria who weren’t
associated with the embassy, and the Marine guards could not possible lay down enough tear gas
to hold off the demonstrators. They just came over the walls and broke through the gates, so
quickly everybody inside the embassy rushed into the vault. There was an escape hatch from that
vault, but the demonstrators quickly wired it shut. It all happened almost instantaneously. One
Marine was killed and two Pakistani employees were also killed, caught up in the fire which
burned the entire compound. There were apartments there and the whole mission was in flames.

There were probably well over one hundred people in the vault and they had a phone line out; the
Ambassador happened to be at his home, he’d been caught at lunch. I think the DCM was out at
lunch as well, at home, so the ranking people were Herb Hagerty, the political consular, and
Dave Fields, the admin counselor. They could talk to the Ambassador and the Ambassador had
an open line back to Washington. I’m told that President Carter got on the phone to General Zia
and said, save our people in the embassy. The embassy is burning around them. I understand
General Zia said, don’t worry, I will. But he didn’t. The Pakistan army took all afternoon to get
to the embassy, even though the Army cantonment was only a maximum 10-15 miles away. It
wasn’t until about six in the evening when observers outside watching all this told those inside
that the demonstrators had left. It was getting unbearable in the vault because it was so hot, and
the air was getting bad. The escape hatch had been wired shut. The marines opened the vault
door into the smoldering corridor and a couple of them ran down the corridor, got up onto the
roof and opened the escape hatch, allowing all inside to climb out. One dead marine who had
died in the vault during the afternoon from a gunshot wound also had to be gotten out.

They saved themselves. That was the cover of- one of the international news magazines, either
Newsweek or Time. The correspondent for the magazine had been caught in the embassy and
had been in the vault, and he told the story. This is what I was told: The correspondent wrote a
draft story of the way it happened. The point was that we saved ourselves; the Pakistan army did
not. The Pakistan army was right there, was arriving about the time we were climbing out, but
they didn’t have to do anything. The Americans came out themselves. The head office of the
newsmagazine balked at the story that the embassy employees had saved themselves because it
was at odds with what the American government was saying in Washington, which was that the
Pakistan Government should be praised for saving our people in the embassy. The correspondent
said, no, that isn’t right, and you print the real story or I’m resigning and will tell my story
anyway. So it got printed the way it actually happened.

Q: In Lahore, was there any suspicion that everybody, all the government officials, were staying
away or was it a matter that they were actually out of touch?
EISENBRAUN: Apparently they had been in a meeting. The meeting was not because of the demonstrations. That meant that all the authority was tied up in one room and no underling in any other office would take any responsibility. I must reiterate, however, that someone had the good sense to send those extra police to the consulate, and the police did not back down from the demonstrators.

Q: What about, though, with General Zia, the fact that he didn’t respond and the Pakistan army didn’t respond, that must have lingered for a long time.

EISENBRAUN: It did. It did.

Q: I mean, was there-

EISENBRAUN: What, repercussions? What was the explanation? I don’t know specifically what the Pakistan senior authorities told the Americans in Islamabad or Washington. Basically, their story was that it took time to get from the cantonment in Rawalpindi to embassy in Islamabad, a distance of a dozen miles or so. I think they always denied that they had anything except the best of intentions. It’s undoubtedly true that it caught them as much by surprise as it did us. But it did take them an awfully long time; I think they were afraid the fury of the mob would turn on them, so they lingered until the situation resolved itself.

However, to repeat, the police saved us in Lahore. As it turned out, down at the USIS center, the American and local employees got up to the roof, and that included all the patrons who were in the library too. No one died or was seriously injured. They all got up to the roof and eventually off the building. The center was reduced to a smoldering hulk, though.

The story was not quite over, however. We all dispersed to our homes for the night. A phone line was established with Islamabad from people’s homes. We got the word that night that Washington had ordered the evacuation of all non-essential Americans from the country for the following evening. We were told that a Pan Am 747 had been leased to come to Islamabad to pick up all dependents. That plane had a maximum capacity of around 300, maybe 350 seats. But there were more than 350 Americans in Pakistan, so it had to be decided on the spot, who went and who stayed. Who were official Americans? We were told, figure it out. As far as Lahore was concerned, they said that PIA had agreed to bring a special flight into the airport. The plane had 40 seats, so identify 40 people to be evacuated on that flight that would go up to Islamabad to meet the Pan Am flight. That was it. This was less than a two-minute order, and then the line was dead.

So, Fuller and I convened at the office early the next morning. The interior was okay, but the exterior was a shambles, a mess. The parking lot was filled with burned cars. The Pakistan Government sent around a cleaning force, even though we had not asked for it, and they cleaned up the exterior in a few hours, towing the cars out of public sight, and by noon, the consulate looked pretty good. Glass was reinstalled in the windows. I don’t believe we ever asked for this, it was just provided, and we were back in operation. I guess the Pakistani authorities didn’t want any evidence of this trouble to be tinder, you might say, for further demonstrations. Of course,
they couldn’t help the smoking building down at USIS. As for our work, the challenge was to figure out how to communicate with all the Americans and let them know that some of them, but not all, were going to be evacuated that night.

It didn’t sit well with us, but we decided somehow that the American teachers didn’t qualify as official Americans, that is, as U.S. government employees. We thought that’s what it was defined as. We had to define it ourselves. The school was operating independently in that crisis; this is not a nice chapter in the relationships there among the Americans. They just made their own decisions. In fact, what they did is, the American teachers got in cars and headed for the Indian border 15 miles away. From there, they went to Amritsar and New Delhi. They were out of the country fast as far as I understand. I was pretty ashamed, you know, that the consulate didn’t think of them first.

But still the question was, who are official U.S. government-funded people? Well, they were the U.S.-funded scientists at the malaria research lab and their families and there were some other U.S.-funded contractors around, plus the consulate staff and families; it wasn’t hard to find 35 or 40 people. So we were calling and saying you’re all being evacuated tonight. There’s no choice, you have to leave with one suitcase. You’ve got to go. Everyone’s in shock. That was Thanksgiving day, yes, and there had been plans for a huge American community picnic. I know that in our house, our cook was planning to cook about seven or eight turkeys that somehow they had found around the community and so the decision was okay, cook the turkeys. In the meantime, my wife was frantically packing, getting ready to fly off to the States. But who knew what would happen in Washington? There was no communication with the States. We were unable to call anybody in the States; that was impossible in those days.

We established a rallying point, the same apartment complex where we’d been evacuated to the night before. We had a departure of something like 7:30 in the evening and the army said, you gather your people and we will transport everybody in army trucks to the airport. And we’re leaving right on time. They did. Everyone gathered in a chaotic and tearful scramble.

The army trucks arrived, and the soldiers said, get in right now. No one argued. There was a convoy of about five or six trucks, big ones. Totally anonymous. I mean, they’re army, of course, but otherwise the canvas was down and they didn’t want anyone to know that there were Americans inside. They drove through the dark and foggy night to the airport. We expected that we would go through the usual check-in procedure. What’s this? No. The trucks went around to a far entrance off on the field. They had no more pulled onto the end of a runway than a small propeller plane landed and pulled up to us, keeping its engines running. All this was in minutes. We got off the trucks and the army said, get on this plane as fast as possible. People exchanged a few hugs and kisses, and it was all over in minutes. The engines never stopped. The plane turned around and roared back down the runway, leaving just four of us standing in the dark on the field.

The four were the Fuller, the consul general, Lundstead, the consular officer, Jim Larkin, the admin officer, and me. We sent away our communicator and the secretary. It was crazy for us to make that decision, but in our haste we thought, well, all of our communications went through Islamabad and that’s destroyed, so what do we need a communicator for? Well, we didn’t realize
how valuable a communicator was, because they do more than communicate electronically. We didn’t have a clue how to make up a diplomatic bag, for example.

And so we just waved good-bye to the plane. It was about 8:00 at night. What do we do? We’re in shock. I said, you know, I’ve got all these turkeys back at the house. So we came back to my place and ad a big Thanksgiving dinner. Afterward, Lundstead said, I don’t want to go back to the empty apartment at the compound where all the families had just left, can I stay with you?

So he stayed in the guest bedroom and he said he slept in his clothes. I did not, at first, but I had this vivid dream in the middle of the night; I dreamed that the phone rang and that somebody on the other end said, they’re coming for you to finish you off. That was it, and I put the phone down. Then I awakened. The dream was so vivid that I believed it. I jumped up and got dressed and ran to tell Jeff, and there he was with his clothes on too. It’s three in the morning. But then we began to realize this was a dream, so I got back in bed. I think I kept my clothes on, though, just in case I had to flee. I had that same dream the second night and the third night. Well, the third time around I recognized I’m having a dream, so I didn’t jump up and get dressed.

Q: What happened afterwards? Or, how do you feel about it?

EISEN BRAUN: Well, this is ironic because life returned to normal in Lahore, although not so in Islamabad. The skeleton crew left behind there had to find new office quarters. They camped out in a USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) building, I believe, but they were traumatized in Islamabad. We were not traumatized in Lahore. We were just left empty. But it’s remarkable. The demonstrators evaporated and life returned to normal. We had told the FSNs, that is, the Pakistani employees, to leave the building while there was still time, and they did, but they anonymously mixed with the demonstrators. The consul general had an officially assigned bodyguard, and he stayed inside. In the moments while there was still time for him to get out the door, we said go, but he replied that it is my duty to be here. So he was prepared to burn down with us if necessary. I have to note that, I don’t even remember his name, but he was loyal, and he didn’t even work for us, he worked for the Punjab police.

All the FSNs were outside milling in the crowd and they reported that the leaders weren’t Pakistani. They were Iranians and Palestinians. There was a large element of both Iranian and Palestinian students in Lahore. Of course, the Pakistani youth made up the bulk of the thousands of people in the crowd, but the leaders, they said, weren’t even speaking Punjabi or Urdu, they were speaking Arabic or Farsi. So I think we should put that in the record. That actually made quite a difference to our personal reactions with the Pakistani public because the consulate was flooded with letters and telegrams and calls from Pakistanis expressing their condolences and outrage at this event.

I recall that a night or two after the attack and evacuation, I went to Nur Noon’s for dinner. He let me use his phone to try to find my wife in the States. Nur had the only phone with international service available because he routinely kept an employee of the telephone company on his payroll so he could make any calls he wanted. Otherwise, one had to book an international call several days in advance, and it hardly ever went through anyway. By the way, on the way back home around one in the morning, I had a flat tire, just as I was passing Punjab University, a
hotbed of radicalism. I didn’t stop to change that tire, I drove home on the flat.

Let me relate what I learned later about my wife’s experience on the chartered Pan Am flight back to the States. We learned subsequently that it was chaos up in Islamabad and that Pan Am flight came in and poof, they got all crammed in and just took off. Well, it so happened that my 15-month-old son, John, was developing an ear infection which we didn’t know about. On that flight home, he cried and screamed the entire way. He had been crying in the hours before when he left Lahore, too. I guess to say crying is to understate it; he screamed the whole flight back to Washington and traumatized everybody, as several people told me later. The crew finally put him and my wife up in first class, as far away as possible from others. So, they arrived at Dulles and no friends or relatives knew they were coming. Where should they go from Dulles? It was Thanksgiving weekend. She called her mother in Iowa, but no answer, and no answer from her sister, also living in Iowa. So, what do to?

The authorities from the State Department met the plane, and I understand they were basically handing out tickets to go on somewhere else. I guess they had rented some rooms for those not planning to leave Washington, but there are others who are more knowledgeable about what happened in Washington than I. I expect the Department did the best they could, but it was chaotic, said my wife. She decided on the spur of the moment to call some friends in Kansas City. She got them and said, can I come? They said yes. So she caught a flight out that night and stayed about three or four days in Kansas City before she was able to establish contact with her family and eventually fly up to Iowa. It was hard. In addition to his ear infection, it turned out son John had an intestinal infection which took weeks to clear up. They continued to be traumatized, the dependents. How to survive, financially, for example. The Department wasn’t handing out money at first, and weeks later only a pittance, and people didn’t necessarily have any spare cash. It was a great personal crisis for these evacuees, those who didn’t immediately have families to retreat to. I must add that my wife was seven months pregnant during that evacuation.

As for me, life returned almost to normal in Lahore. It was the start of the cold season, which meant the start of the social season for the Pakistanis. The consulate was all cleaned up. We didn’t have any official communications at the office, but I was still writing reports by hand and typing them myself with the intent that they would be sent off soon, telling the story of the attack, and other political reporting.

I should say that, actually, things got pretty quiet and pretty lonesome. I continued my rounds of meeting political leaders and typing reports that we couldn’t send. One of the political leaders I had been meeting with all year long was a gentleman named Malik Wazir Ali, a retired Civil Service of Pakistan official who had become the general secretary of a party called the Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, which stood for the return of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. It was headed by a retired air vice marshal, Asghar Khan. I never met him because he lived in the Islamabad area.

But anyway, I had been friendly with Malik Wazir Ali. On the day after Christmas, a lonely time, by the way, I paid a call on him in the morning at his home. It was a beautiful sunny day, cool, and we sat out in the garden and had tea. He said our discussion would have to be briefer
than he wanted, as he and his wife were planning a family trip that afternoon into the western part of Pakistan, to Mianwali district. About the time he told me this, his wife Nasra, whom I had never met, and his daughter Shahnaz, a teacher at the American School, came home from errands and joined us for tea. On the spur of the moment, they invited me to come along with them on their planned trip to this rugged area. I had already been to Mianwali on my office trips, and I knew it was a pretty wild and interesting area. I said it would be great to go along with them.

I went back to the office, and secured Fuller’s permission. He thought it would be worthwhile to travel with a Pakistani family into the countryside. He didn’t have any qualms about the fact that I was traveling with a Pakistani politician. He said, well, I don’t think it matters from a perception point of view because you’ll be with his family. So I got a consulate car and adjoined them in Faisalabad that night, a town about 75 miles south where they said they were going to spend the night. They’d given me the address where they were staying with some friends.

I mention this because, first of all, the Wazir Alis were very gracious and it was a lot of fun, and second, I learned more about Pakistani rural life than I could ever have learned on my own, despite the fact that I had been off and around the Punjab on my official travels. We made our way slowly out to a little town called Bhakkar in Mianwali district. We stayed in the town home of the local zamindar, that is, the local landowner and power broker of the area by the name of Captain Ahmed Nawaz. His town home was rather Spartan, as he used it only for meetings from time to time, living the rest of the time in the countryside.

It turned out to be fascinating to see how a local landlord conducted his business, which we watched for the better part of a week. I should note that Pakistan was then, and still is, one of the last remaining feudal societies in the world, where landlords controlled everything, the land, the economy, the politics, and the government bureaucrats who came on short postings and then went on.

Ahmed held court all day long outside in the cool sun. He sat in a chair with a couple of attendants nearby and a telephone that had a long, long cord that went back into the house. He didn’t dial on that phone, he just picked it up and got the operator in town. There were always 30 or 40 or 50 local people, mostly farmers, people of very modest circumstances, who were queued up or milling around the gate, respectfully, quietly, waiting to see him. Ahmed Nawaz’s guards would let them in a few at a time for an audience.

While he was being shaved, or having tea, he met people and heard their problems. He was generally very cordial, and always offered people tea. If he thought somebody was hungry, he offered them food. Many people were too proud, perhaps, to admit their hunger, but others accepted and were given rice and chapattis. They came because they needed him to solve their problems, which is what the local landlord was supposed to do. We just sat and watched, and Wazir Ali was able to hear enough to give me an update from time to time of what was going on. The men—never women—would present personal problems, such as a wife having run away, or a brother-in-law stealing from the family business, and so forth.

Having heard the story, Ahmed Nawaz would just declare, ah! and pick up the phone and bark out orders to the local official he got immediately connected with, whether police or whatever,
and I was told that they always carried out his decisions. He would decree that this is the way it’s going to be, he would make decisions on people’s lives, whether it was legal or social or political or land disputes, whatever it was, he would make decisions right there on the spot. Then he would put down the phone and he’d offer tea or food. The man with the problem would express their humble gratitude and would leave, sometimes after having some food. And this went on all day long. All day from eight in the morning until dark he sat and heard people’s problems. And I had no doubt that Ahmed Nawaz was probably a wise man, especially after Wazir Ali would summarize some of his decisions for me. I relate this story because I think it represented the way life was in the countryside, as this pattern was happening wherever there was a big landlord.

One other event I observed is worth relating about rural life. One afternoon, the four of us, Wazir Ali, his wife Nasra, and daughter Shahnaz, went out to a village. Virtually as soon as we arrived, Nasra and Shahnaz were surrounded by the village women who were asking questions and imploring them to do something, which I couldn’t understand. I wondered what on earth was going on. Here’s the story: These women, recognizing that educated Pakistani women were in the village, were asking for answers about birth control. I learned that they said they felt like prisoners to their husbands because of constant babies to tend to, and they wanted to know how to avoid getting pregnant so frequently. I have no idea what Nasra and Shahnaz told them, but they took the questions seriously and tried to give good advice. This was the major concern of the village women.

Q: Of course. Well now, did we have any AID program to do anything on this?

EISENBRAN: Yes, in general, I think there had been family planning programs, but at that time, there was virtually nothing going on because we had virtually stopped our AID programs in response to the overthrow of Bhutto. So I doubt there were many programs out there in the rural areas at that time.

Wazir Ali got up very early each day and listened to the BBC news on his small portable shortwave radio. One day in the latter part of that week, I joined him in the garden after the news, and he said, well Steve, what would you say if I told you that the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan and the Americans have re-established a close relationship with Pakistan and are sending military assistance to prepare against a possible Soviet invasion of Pakistan? I replied, well, that would be a good Hollywood story. He responded, well, actually it’s happening. The Soviets invaded during the night, and Jimmy Carter called General Zia and offered unlimited military assistance. And all this is happening not two hundred miles from where we were sitting. That’s how I learned about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q: Today is the sixth of April 2005. Steve, we’re now at the end of 1979, Soviets are coming into Afghanistan in force. What happened to you?

EISENBRAN: Well, after coming back from Bhakkar on the first of January, a lot of things began to happen. It was never the same in Lahore. The job wasn’t the same, life wasn’t the same. First to remind you, the families had all been evacuated about five weeks before.

Q: This is because of the-
EISENBRÄUN: Of the attack on the Embassy. For me, one of the first things to happen is that I became acting principal officer because the embassy wanted to send as many as possible of the skeleton crew back on R&R (rest and recreation) to the States. So, the consul general, Clive Fuller, went back to Washington and left me in charge of what had now become a very small post. A few American staff had come back, one USIS person, and the secretary, Fran Kendrick, and a new communicator, Dick Gary.

The Ambassador in Islamabad, Arthur Hummel, had gone to Washington at the end of the year, and he returned to relate that no one in Washington could understand why the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan.

Q: I’m still asking the question. Did you come up with any answer?

EISENBRÄUN: Well, I want to tell you the thoughts of the Pakistanis on this subject. Art Hummel invited anyone on his staff and at the consulates to send in an analysis. He said you can send it directly to Washington, bypassing the embassy, which had reestablished communications. So I took this on as a big challenge. I thought, this is my chance to be George Kennon, you know, and explain it. Not that I had any original ideas, particularly, but I had the privilege of talking to a lot of very sophisticated Pakistanis in Lahore, a lot of people who were very thoughtful and very articulate. So I explored their thoughts—this was, after all, the topic everyone wanted to discuss anyway. Everybody in Lahore I talked with, whatever his or her position on the political spectrum, thought the same thing, which was this.

The Soviets really had a strategic plan in mind and they ultimately wanted access to a warm water port and Karachi was that warm water port, the main commercial port of Pakistan. Working with the connivance of the Indian Government, the Soviets had in mind the dismemberment of Pakistan in the effort to get their port in Karachi. Mind you, the Pakistanis were still just recovering from the 1971 war, so complete dismemberment didn’t seem so radical a concept. They’d already been cut in half by India in 1971. The invasion of Afghanistan was only the first step in the master plan, they thought, and Pakistan was in mortal danger. My contacts pointed out that the Americans must agree because they were sending in considerable military and economic assistance.

I spent a lot of time drafting what I thought was a good cable and send it in. It went under my name because I was the head of the office, and I slugged it, at the Ambassador’s direction, for the NSC (National Security Council) at the White House and for the Secretary of State. The embassy put in its own analysis, as I’m sure Karachi and Peshawar did.

So, Fuller was gone for the month of January, and then I was slated to go to the States for the month of February because my wife was due to give birth.

In the first days of January, 1980, a cable came from the Secretary of State ordering every post in the Islamic world to destroy all of its classified material, or ship some of the vital material immediately back to Washington. The point was, within a couple of days, don’t have any classified at post beyond a working file that it could be burned—and this is really important—in
five minutes. Because Washington fully expected more attacks. Who knew what post would be overrun next?

It’s hard to imagine, but in the small consulate in Lahore, classified wasn’t really destroyed. Virtually nothing, only maybe ten percent of what we held, as it turned out. Fuller felt that our holdings were of historical significance. They went back 20-some years, and there was a lot of fascinating archival information, and he said it just wasn’t appropriate to destroy it. And second, it just wasn’t feasible to box it up and ship it back because we were barely functioning with diplomatic pouches. Also our classified and our unclassified were mixed together to a large extent. Imagine file after file after file, things all mixed together.

On the roof of the consulate there were five burn barrels. You may remember the era when there were burn barrels in of our consulates and embassies around the world. I’ll bet that few posts ever tried to use one of those barrels. We decided to try one out. The idea was that in an emergency you just dumped everything you had, even typewriters, in there, absolutely anything; and then light the fuse. Fuller said, let’s use one of them and see what happens.

We gathered some of the classified material and half-filled one burn barrel and lit it. Well, that was quite a show. It worked. It was like a Saturn rocket going the opposite way, with its tail of fire going up into the air and the rocket theoretically going down into the ground. The flare went up 20 feet or something. It was just unbelievable and created quite a spectacle. People going by on the street no doubt wondered what on earth was happening. You couldn’t get within 10 or 15 feet of the burn barrel, and there was no way of putting it out.

Well, we were mighty impressed. Fuller said, well, in five minutes time if we had to we could bring up all our files to the roof and use the other four burn barrels. We could dump everything in there indiscriminately and light the fuses and that’s five minutes. The cable from Washington asked for a written compliance cable from the ranking officer saying we were down to five minutes. Fuller drafted it under his name and sent it, certifying that we had complied. But we hadn’t complied. We may have been the only post that didn’t comply.

Fuller went back to Washington, leaving me in charge. The mood was tense. After all, on one side of us was Iran where the hostages were being held. The Soviets were invading to the northwest of us and the fighting was pretty fierce and refugees were coming into Pakistan. We had our own worries because we were convinced that the demonstrators would finish the job and burn us out. We knew that all the perpetrators of the attack were still out there in Lahore, probably passing by our consulate every day, rankled by the fact that the flag was still flying. So we felt deep in our bones it was a given that there was another attack coming. I know that Islamabad felt that way too, even more so. So, while life appeared to go back to normal, deep inside we felt that they were coming for us again, this time with a lot of gasoline.

I was in charge and I didn’t know the extent of our classified holdings. The communications officer, Dick Gary, came to me a couple days after Fuller departed and said, you know, back there in the vault is an incredible amount of classified stuff. As you know, in our missions abroad, nobody goes back into those deep areas of the communications center except for the communications people themselves. He invited me back and showed me file after file, whole
cabinets. And in the outer officer area by my desk and in Fuller’s office there were other files thick with historical material with the classified and unclassified put together that went back 10, 15 years. I hadn’t even realized what was back in the secure area. Dick asked, how could we have sent that cable saying we were down to five minutes destruction time? Clearly, this whole building is full of classified.

So, we had a meeting, the four of us. We agreed we couldn’t live with this subterfuge. We had to tell Islamabad, this is national security information here, we can’t keep it. So it was agreed that I would go up to the embassy and tell the DCM the situation. Mind you, I’m telling you stuff that was kept really quiet at the time, but I don’t know that it has to be so quiet 25 years later. This was awfully sensitive at the time. I flew up to Islamabad and met with the DCM.

Q: Who was the DCM?

EISENBRAN: Barry King.

Q: I know Barry.

EISENBRAN: Good man.

Q: Yes.

EISENBRAN: Barry was a rather crusty senior man who’d seen it all and done it all, but still, he practically fell out of his chair when I reported our situation. He couldn’t believe what I was telling him because there had been an order from the Secretary of State. It wasn’t a casual cable. This was one of the more dramatic things in front of Washington at that time, the security of our embassies in the Islamic world. So he said, all right, you’re ordered to go back to Lahore tonight. I will send you a cable to give you the additional authority to destroy. You go in there tomorrow morning, even though it’s a weekend, with the staff and destroy everything. Then you send me a cable of compliance. Real compliance.

I thought my career might be over because I was essentially turning in a senior officer for non-compliance on a really important issue. But I also thought I didn’t have any choice. I’m in charge of the consulate for an entire month, and at any moment we could be overrun again. That’s the way the other people felt in the consulate too, we were unanimous in this attitude, but we were also quite junior except for Dick Gary, the communications officer. We all felt that we’d really done something pretty bad and disloyal. Necessary, but we thought that there could be some serious repercussions for us. I certainly thought that I could kiss this career goodbye.

I went back to Lahore, and we all came in early the next morning. We opened up every file and worked virtually all day. We even opened the one in the consul general’s office, his so-called personal file. We found some really sensitive stuff, almost current nodis cables. The communications officer knew it was there, of course, because he had given it to the consul general, but I as deputy hadn’t known the material existed. Fuller’s secretary didn’t know it existed. We pulled all that stuff out and spent the day with the shredder. We estimated when it got done it was 22 cubic feet that we had destroyed. It took hours to go through the classified and
unclassified together. I think we’ve probably learned this all over the world, don’t mix the two because it’s impossible in a crisis to sort it. By the time we went home at four or five in the afternoon, we were confident that the consulate was clean. We kept literally three or four cables in a chron file that could be burned with a match. I sent the second compliance cable.

The other consulates didn’t know what had happened. All they saw was a second cable, this time from the embassy, reiterating the first instruction for complete destruction, and they innocently replied that they were down to nothing. Fuller came back from the States at the end of January, and I left the next morning. We hardly had an hour’s overlap. I remember he called me over for a drink in the evening, and I filled him in on all the details and said, well, you know, this cable came down from Islamabad defining what classified meant, so we had to throw everything away. He asked, everything was thrown away? Including the stuff in my safe, my personal stuff? I replied yes, everything that was classified had to go, there was no question. So he sighed and said, all right, I guess that’s the way it had to be.

I did not tell him that I had gone up there and initiated this. I had been told by Barry King not to discuss it. He said, you take care of the consulate and don’t worry about anything else. So I was, essentially, out of the loop and I guess, the DCM thought that was the best thing, that a junior officer didn’t need to be privy to all that was going on. I wasn’t proud of myself for not telling the consul general, however, about what I’d done.

Q: Well, I mean, I’m not quite sure- you’re caught in this thing, you know, I think King was protecting you but I mean, you’re supposed to do it. And one has to think about a worst case scenario and the worst case scenario wasn’t that far from being reality.

EISENBRAUN: No, that’s right. We all thought that the next attack was just around the corner, so there wasn’t any choice.

Q: But during this time you’re talking about, you had Iran doing its thing, the Soviets doing their thing in Afghanistan, was India pretty quiet? I mean, because they’re right, 17 miles away or something. Did you feel any threat from them?

EISENBRAUN: Yes, the people in Lahore felt a threat. They were sure that the Soviets were going to roll into the Punjab next. They were sending division after division of their best troops into Afghanistan. What, just to fight the Afghans and to subdue them? The Pakistanis couldn’t understand why the Soviets would expend all this effort on the Afghans. There had to be another purpose. The Pakistanis were sure that the Soviets would be striking next into the Punjab and that the Indians were going to cooperate in some fashion. So there was a lot of tension in Lahore. On the other hand, it seems reasonable from the Indian point of view that they were about as shocked as anyone else with the Soviet invasion. It’s one thing for the Indian government to have a close military supply relationship with the Soviets and to be allowed to produce some of the materials under license that the Soviets allowed them to do, some of the war materials, but it was quite another to have the Soviets really in their backyard. And after all, India has for decades seen itself as the major player on the South Asian subcontinent and Pakistan as a nuisance. From the Indian point of view, Pakistan was an important rival but still it was India’s sphere of influence. And the Soviets weren’t any more welcome than the Americans were within their

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EISENBRAUN: So, in fact, I think that the great tension felt in Lahore regarding India was perhaps unfounded. It turned out to be unfounded, in fact, because nothing ever happened, but I don’t think that India was doing anything belligerent to fan the flames. But nevertheless there was a palpable sense of tension.

Well then, at the end of January came and I went off to the States and attended the birth of my daughter, Annie, in Iowa.

I barely made it. She was born in the middle of a snowstorm a day or two after I arrived. I stayed several weeks in Iowa. In addition to new daughter Annie, I had to get reacquainted with my 18-month-old son John, who was OK, having recovered from his ear and intestinal infections. Then I had to return to Pakistan in three weeks, leaving my wife Jane to cope with a newborn and a toddler, all camping out with her mother.

So then it was the latter part of February when I returned to Pakistan. I stopped in Washington for some days and talked to people in the NEA (Near Eastern Affairs) bureau, and got caught up on what had happened in Pakistan in my absence. I asked the desk officer, the country director and then the principal DAS, Peter Constable, whether by chance they’d seen my cable from Lahore on the issue of Soviet intentions in Afghanistan. But they all said, no, they couldn’t remember having seen it. I went over to the NSC (National Security Council) where a friend, Tom Thornton, was handling South Asia, and over a lunch of sandwiches in his office I asked if he had seen the cable. No, he said he couldn’t recall any cable like that. So anyway, I left Washington with a little lesson in humility that not a soul could even recall my cable. In fact, I think probably what happened is that it went directly from my pen to the archives and was never read. Someday maybe I’ll do a Freedom of Information request and try to find it.

Well, I flew back out to Pakistan at the end of February. Fuller told me it had been pretty quiet in Lahore while I had been gone, and we settled down to business as usual for a few days. Then, the Ambassador called Fuller up to Islamabad.

Q: What was his name again?

EISENBRAUN: Clive Fuller. He came into the office that morning and said, I got a call from Islamabad last night and they want me to fly up to Islamabad this morning. He added that he didn’t know what they wanted. The next morning, he came to the office and related to me that he had been relieved of his duties, that the Ambassador said he no longer had confidence in him and that he was being sent back to Washington. He handed me his in-box and said, here are the things I’m working on, they’re now yours. If you have any questions, let me know. I’m going home and start packing, and I’m not coming back in the office. We didn’t talk further.

We just sort of sat there, that is the secretary, Fran, and I and Dick Gary, and I guess Jeff came up from the consular section and we were all stunned. First of all, Fuller didn’t tell us why he
was dismissed, and nobody had told us anything from Islamabad, so it was just as much a
surprise to us as it was to him. Of course, we could kind of figure that it might have been the
issue of the nondestruction of the classified material. To this day no one has ever said a word to
me about the incident; it was just complete silence from the embassy on this matter.

So, a few days later Fuller got on a plane and departed, and I was left in charge of the office
again. That was about the first of March, 1980, and I served in an acting capacity until the
middle of July.

Q: Were you there when Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Pat Derrian came through?

EISENBRAN: Yes.

Q: How did that go?

EISENBRAN: Well, that was quite an experience because she was a fiesty lady. She came
through about a month after I had assumed charge. Her visit didn’t get off to a very good start
because I set up meetings for her and reported back her proposed schedule that included what I
thought was a balanced introduction to a wide variety of the important people in Lahore. About
24 hours before she was to arrive, a cable came back from wherever she was on the road and it
said I don’t like any of the people you set me up with so cancel all those meetings. Here are the
people I really want to meet. They tended to be almost all people from the Pakistan Peoples Party
or even on the far left beyond that. One name on the list was a journalist whose name I don’t
remember, an older man, really charming and thoughtful. He and his wife were really pleasant to
talk with. They were considered, well, communist sympathisers, if not outright communists. I
don’t know where she got that list from, but it was all skewed to the left. There were no Islamic
leaders, there were no moderates; it was all of one persuasion only.

So, okay, it was kind of embarrassing, but I had to call up all the contacts and say there’s been a
change of plans. We scrambled and set up all the alternate meetings she had requested.
Personally, we got off to a good start, because at that time I was subscribing to The Village
Voice and I had a whole year’s worth of back issues in her guest room in my house. She dropped
her bags and came out of the room, saying I have never been in a Foreign Service house yet
where there was all this wealth of information, meaning The Village Voice.

I took her around to these meetings she had requested. One was with a young barrister, Ethizaz
Ahsan, who later became the Minister of Law when Benazir Butto became Prime Minister. He’s
a charming guy, very articulate, and I believe an Oxford or Cambridge graduate. He played her
like she was a violin. They got along famously. He told her stories that were not literally
inaccurate, but his point was a little off, reflecting his bias rather than the actual facts. She,
however, thought he was tremendous and encouraged him with the equivalent of right on several
times. Afterwards, we went out and got in the car, and she exclaimed, that was just a wonderful
meeting. And I said, well, you have to keep in mind his perspective and that not everything he
said was quite accurate, could not be taken to the bank. She angrily replied, I’m quite capable of
making my own analysis, I don’t need your thoughts. And I said, okay, but that’s what I thought
I was here for. And she said, no, you’re here just to facilitate my visit.
When I put her on the plane, I thought, well, I didn’t handle that visit that very well. That was my first major duty as the acting principal officer. Amazingly, she told people in Islamabad I had been the most helpful of any of her Foreign Service contacts along the way and that Lahore stood out as the best part of her visit to Pakistan. Go figure.

*Q:* It is a little unprofessional to come into a strange country and get what amounts to a snow job and not accept some of these people on the ground to say, you know, this is a snow job.

**EISENBRAUN:** Yeah, that’s what I thought.

*Q:* Well, was there a Benazir Bhutto coterie at that time in Pakistan?

**EISENBRAUN:** Oh yes, there certainly was. But of course, that was only just developing. She was not an active political player in my tenure, ’78 to ’81. Part of that time she might have been in the Sindh and mostly under house arrest, if I remember correctly. Other times, I believe she spent a lot of time in London, or at least out of the country. General Zia had her pretty much wrapped up. But everyone assumed that she was going to be important some day. I’ve not met her to this day. There were a lot of people in Lahore who would gladly have facilitated an introduction during the time she was not under house arrest, such as when she was in London. However, I figured it would have been considered bad judgment to even bring up such a prospect to the embassy in Islamabad.

*Q:* Then, the rest of the time you were in Lahore, what was developing particularly as the Afghan conflict was concerned, its impact on where you were?

**EISENBRAUN:** Well, it never affected our lives very much in Lahore. After the great scare in the winter and spring of 1980 that the Soviets would come marching in, things went pretty much back to normal. We were aware that there were literally, what? Millions of refugees in the northwest frontier province a couple of hundred miles away from Lahore, but no refugees had made their way down to Lahore. I did go out and do a little bit more traveling. Travelled up to the northwest area near the frontier and I did see some refugees on the road but they never made their way into the heart of the Punjab. We were aware that a resistance force had been developed, the mujahidin, Afghan freedom fighters, who were back in the country fighting, and everyone knew that the Americans were helping supply them, but the details I wasn’t aware of. There’s a book out now called *Charlie Wilson’s War*, which describes Charlie Wilson, the congressman on the appropriations committee who took it as his personal mission to fund the mujahidin. Wilson had to overcome a great deal of skepticism and inertia even in Washington before sufficient resources went out to turn the tide against the Soviets and that took years. But we weren’t aware of that in Lahore. All we knew was that American assistance was flowing.

I continued as acting principal officer until July, when a really find gentleman named John Brims, who had been the deputy in Karachi, was named the consul general. So he came up and we got along really well.

Months and months dragged on in the spring of ‘80, February, March, April and the dependents
were not being allowed to come back. After these shocks of the December-January period, Pakistan settled into pretty much into business as usual, and our fears began to recede that there would be another attack. There was a lot of pressure mounting to bring the families back. It became obvious eventually why the families weren’t being brought back because there was this hostage rescue attempt being planned in Washington. That happened, I think, in April of ‘80. I got no advance warning, of course, because it was, after all, a super secret event. Seems to me it was a Friday afternoon when I heard, and I was at the swimming pool. A call got to me that the DCM was anxious to talk to me. What’s going on? He said there’s been this rescue attempt in Iran to try to get all the hostages out, but it went wrong and so you should inform the Punjab government and ask for extra security for the consulate. So we got another big contingent of police around the office. The Pakistanis were really very receptive to any security requests we asked for. There was a worry that there would be some kind of retaliation against the United States for this rescue attempt. There was none, however. Afterwards, it was obvious why the families hadn’t been allowed to come back for so long.

During this same period, the Chinese premier made an official visit to Pakistan, and General Zia brought him down to Lahore, and the governor held a banquet. It was the only time I was at the governor’s mansion in Lahore, which is really quite a splendid place. I was invited to this official dinner, and I think the Pakistani protocol people kind of had fun with the seating assignments, because although there were hundreds of guests, they seated me next to the Iranian consul. This was while the hostage crisis was in full swing. Now, it just so happened I knew the Iranian pretty well from prior to the days when the Shah had fled and the Iranians were the only other consulate in Lahore. The diplomats at the Iranian Consulate had been very friendly with the Americans, and his wife used to bring their kids to play at our house. So, how could I give him the cold shoulder a few months later, even though officially I was not supposed to talk to him? He was pretty nervous and I was kind of nervous. Eventually, I asked how’s your family? He seemed relieved and replied, well they’re back in Teheran, and how’s yours? I told him of the birth of my daughter in the States. He seemed grateful that I had acknowledged his presence, and we chatted a little further about the weather and so forth. I didn’t report it to Washington.

In early part of June of 1980 the families were allowed to come back and they did. I should say it was kind of dramatic in my case. My wife flew first to Athens with my oldest son, who was 18 months old, and the newest baby, Annie, who was six months old. They intended to visit American friends there for a few days. But while there my son, John, got seriously ill and had to have an operation. So at the last second, I was allowed to fly to Athens to join them. The operation turned out all right, and I was able to accompany them back to Pakistan.

After my wife returned to Lahore, she saw all her old friends and we were back on the social circuit. I had kind of dropped off because I didn’t have the energy or the interest to run around to all the parties, and I don’t think I was quite as interesting as my wife was, anyway.

The third year, 1981 to ’82, was pretty uneventful. The dramatic events of the previous year tended to recede a bit. I was recruited to be the political officer on the India desk in the Department starting in the summer of ’81. That was still in the days when the American government was using its excess rupies from India and Pakistan, and the government allowed those posted in India and Pakistan to travel on the Cunard Lines across the Atlantic. There was
only a small contingent of us that knew about this travel prospect because the Foreign Service was not advertising it, but I know about a dozen officers and their families who were able to take advantage of that travel. Strangely, Cunard put a caveat on this travel which said one had to go first class, there wasn’t any tourist class that they would accept. So the four of us in my family went back across on the Queen Elizabeth II in July of ’81, first class. That was a nice way of going back to the States. And so we arrived back in the States in July of ’81 and I took up my duties on the India desk.

TERESITA C. SCHAFFER
Deputy Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan, & Bangladesh
Washington, DC (1979-1980)

Ambassador Schaffer was born in New York and later educated in France. She received her undergraduate degree from Bryn Mawr College and joined the Foreign Service. Her Foreign Service career took her to Israel, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Ambassador Schaffer was interviewed by Thomas Stern in September 1998.

SCHAFER: Our major issue with Pakistan concerned their nuclear program. That was followed by the spillover from the USSR invasion of Afghanistan. Those two problem areas had a major effect on our bilateral economic relationship. Just before I started to work in PAB, the U.S. had, for the second time, cut off assistance to Pakistan because of its efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. Pakistan has had a long history of economic challenges -- particularly the balance-of-payments problem. We kept pretty close track of that problem.

Over the course of the Fall of 1978, Afghanistan had been through a succession of crises. A Communist government had already taken over; it was not a very cohesive institution because of internal tensions. In December 1979, one Communist leader was assassinated and replaced by another. A few weeks later, on Christmas Day, came the Soviet invasion. For about two weeks prior, we were receiving lost of information about Soviet military build-up along the Afghan border. I think it was clear to all that something was about to happen. We held a series of discussions in rapid succession with the Pakistani Foreign Minister -- one before the invasion and two soon after. As it happened, Bob Peck was away for Christmas, leaving me in charge of PAB. At the highest level of our government, options for our response were being considered. One step that was taken was to dispatch Clark Clifford to New Delhi to brief the Indians on what was going on in Afghanistan and our thoughts about events there. Howie went along and I am sure you will find reference to that trip in his oral history. Clifford and he were the total delegation.

Before the Clifford party had a chance to take-off, Warren Christopher, then Deputy Secretary of State, made plans to go to Pakistan. But that soon became the “Brzezinski” delegation, with Christopher just a member of the delegation, and with enough members to fill a plane. So the Pakistan visit turned out to be highly visible -- lots of limelight and headlines. It was on trip that an initial assistance package was offered General Zia; he rejected it calling it “peanuts” -- a
somewhat infelicitous phrase particularly in light of President’s Carter affinity for peanuts. Despite this unauspicious beginning, in fact that trip became the starting point for U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on the Afghan issue.

Soon after the Brzezinski trip, we hosted a Pakistan delegation in Washington. That was headed by Agha Shahi, who had been the Foreign Secretary for many years. In light of his experience, he tended to operate as the Foreign Minister. He wanted to talk about US-Pakistan relations, the U.S. commitment to Pakistan and the effect that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan might have on our bilateral relations. We had an elaborate series of meetings -- Secretary Vance spent a lot of time with Shahi and his delegation. I was the note-taker for the U.S. side in all of these meetings. The consultation did not result in any concrete operational results; we just promised to keep in touch. The most uncomfortable part of the discussion, in light of recent history, was about the U.S.’s commitment to Pakistan. In my view, this issue had been central to a dialogue which seemed to be at cross purposes for almost thirty years. We have had a number of alliance relationships with Pakistan, starting with the regional alliances like CENTO and SEATO. By 1979, neither organization was exactly robust. But in both cases, the U.S. view -- as stated in words in a number of documents -- was that we were interested in Pakistan primarily, if not exclusively, as a front line state in our fight against Soviet Communism. The Pakistani view, which probably reflected a lot of atmospherics at the time, was that the U.S. would be its supporter -- no questions asked. Of course, Pakistan’s perceived enemy was India. The fact that there were Soviets in Afghanistan really raised this difference of national objectives. My guess is that the Pakistanis were looking for a much more positive statement about our commitment to it than anyone was willing to give in 1979.

The second set of meetings, a few weeks later, followed roughly the same format as the first one, except that the Pakistani delegation was headed by Ambassador Yakub Khan, who was one of the most remarkable officials in the government. He is still around, even though he is getting on in years. He had been a general, and had then served as ambassador to almost every major country, including the U.S. and the USSR -- which was the position he held when he was assigned to head this delegation. He is one of the most articulate, urbane and sophisticated people I have ever encountered. In 1979, the Ambassador was at the top of his game. Mike Hornblow was asked to meet Yakub Khan at the airport and then to drive him into the Department’s parking lot in the basement. That was an effort to avoid as much press attention as possible. Mike had a particularly disreputable looking yellow VW at the time; it served well as a cover for the Pakistani.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we made frantic efforts to restore aid to Pakistan, which had been suspended in the summer under the non-proliferation bans then in place. At one point, I remember my phone ringing at 5:25 p.m. from the Secretariat; I as being asked to submit a memo by the end of the day to the Seventh Floor outlining what an assistance program to Pakistan might consist of, assuming that a $200 million appropriation was forthcoming. I called the former deputy director of our AID mission in Pakistan -- he was working in Washington in AID. I suggested to him that the whole amount be spent on fertilizer. He suggested that half of the amount be devoted to roads; he told me that those funds too would be readily disbursed; that was good enough for me and I included a road construction program in my memorandum. It took us about fifteen minutes to spend $200 million -- which was about the length of time it took me
to type the memo. Of course, this was not real money; we had both the opposition Congress as well as Pakistani rejection of our offer.

The Pakistani visits were useful in achieving communications between the higher echelons of both countries. There was a frank exchange of views on the strategic situation, but few operational results. As I said, the Pakistanis were more concerned about India; we shared some worries about India in light of some very pro-Soviets statements about Afghanistan emanating from New Delhi. The Soviet statements on Afghanistan did nothing to allay our concerns; they certainly helped the Pakistani position.

We were not able to convince Congress to authorize the resumption of assistance. But we kept on working on different formulations on what an aid program might look like. The only possible way to get some supplement appropriations would have been for the President to make calls himself. The time was not opportune -- this was April, 1980 and because the government was in the middle of one of its budgetary crises he turned down the suggestion. The bureaucratic machinery creaked along as it often does and by the time the recommendation went to the White House, the Soviets had already been in Afghanistan four months. Furthermore, there were other crises to worry about, notably the Iran hostages and the failed rescue mission, the Vance resignation, the advent of a new Secretary -- Ed Muskie. The new Secretary had to face this Afghan can of worms, which would have been tough enough for a veteran, much less a newcomer.

I fully supported our attempts to restart an assistance program for Pakistan. I started with the assumption that our aid cut-off had been spectacularly ineffective in influencing the Pakistani nuclear development program. Furthermore, the internal situation had changed dramatically. For years successions of regimes had been voicing great concern about Communism -- essentially to ingratiate themselves with us -- by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, Pakistan had a very good reason to worry about its security. The Soviet invasion had an unsettling effect on Pakistan’s internal political problems.

I must mention another major event that had an effect on US-Pakistan relations. I refer to the attack on our Embassy in Islamabad. That certainly had an effect on our bilateral relations. It was a major catastrophe -- four people were killed and many more seriously wounded -- which had been totally unexpected. Islamabad was built to be riot proof. So no one expected what happened.

When the crowd began to assemble, it seemed to come primarily from the direction of the University, down the road from the embassy. There was some indication of Iranian supply of equipment to the rioters. The Ambassador and the DCM were not in the Chancery when the attack began; both were at lunches. The DCM went to the Foreign Ministry as soon as he was alerted, to demand that security protection be provided, as required by international law and practice. He was told that the whole police department was in Rawalpindi, about ten miles away, providing protection for President Zia’s talk about the importance of austerity while he rode around on a bicycle. A few policeman did arrive and may have provided some assistance to people who had been eating in the Embassy Club, but it was a haphazard operation. The fire department and the military didn’t show up until night-fall. The crowd finally dispersed, not under pressure from government forces, but because night was falling. By that time, it had set
fire to the whole building. So the fact that our Chancery was assaulted and that Pakistani security forces did not come to meet their legal obligations until six or seven hours after the start of the disturbance, came as great shocks to us. It raised questions about the viability and competence of the Pakistani government, not to mention its attitude towards the U.S. I think there may have been some people in our government who suspected Pakistani government participation in the riot -- or perhaps “benign neglect -- ; but that didn’t last very long. Our greater concern was not as much about involvement in the riot, but the degree of *Schadenfreude* that had taken place. It was at best evidence of major incompetence and at worst a sinister Pakistani plot.

Pakistani officials called and expressed their apologies. We told them in effect that we would send them the repair bill. The event certainly shook people up both here and in Pakistan; they were astonished. I think the government recognized that there were strains between our two countries; but a riot and mayhem -- unthinkable, particularly in Islamabad.

The winter of 1979-80 was also the winter of the great evacuation. Our Embassy in Teheran, including some staff, was taken over by the Iranian “students” in early November. Much of our staff from there was also in Washington awaiting developments. On November 22, our Chancery in Islamabad was torched. I was actually in the Operations Center when Peter Constable, the NEA senior deputy assistant secretary, spoke to Ambassador Hummel in Islamabad. The Ambassador resisted efforts to evacuate his staff; he thought Washington was over-reacting (and I don’t think Mrs. Hummel wanted to leave). Peter told him that the Secretary had issued instructions to evacuate most of the staff and the dependents and that was the way it was going to be. And that is what happened.

In the next two days, something happened in Libya putting our staff there at some risk. There were rumors that a demonstration against us might be mounted in Dhaka on the Friday after Thanksgiving. Ambassador David Schneider requested permission to keep the Embassy closed -- an interesting sign of the times because a few years later an ambassador would have made that decision on his own authority. We have become so much more accustomed to crises that we now give ambassadors much more leeway that we did in the late 1970s. At that time, what was happening in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Libya were still rare occasions when all local US reactions had to be approved with Washington. I remember Hal Saunders turning very pale when he read the Secretary’s instructions; he said if anyone wants to close down his or her embassy, they should go ahead. The U.S. could not stand any more assaults beyond the ones already suffered in Teheran and Islamabad.

As a result of all these incidents, sometime during the week after Thanksgiving, NEA was instructed to evacuate dependents from essentially all the post in the area, except India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka -- all the non-Muslim countries. By the time we had evacuated our staffs and dependents, we had about 1000 people evacuated to the U.S. The Family Liaison Office was a very new organization; that meant that most of the work-load of supporting this large group fell to the regional bureau. We tried hard to provide good services to the evacuees and I noted that different evacuees behaved differently. The desk was very much involved with the evacuees from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most of us had served in the area and had some feel for what it meant to have one’s life disrupted -- especially just before Christmas. We sent to the post a
weekly newsletter to which any of the evacuees could contribute. We also sent messages from the post to loved ones in Washington.

The Pakistan evacuees organized themselves. They had pretty well agreed on a *modus operandi* by the time they arrived in Washington. They had a couple of people who took upon themselves to know where all of the evacuees would be; they published a newsletter which would circulate to their fellow evacuees. They tried to keep the group in contact with each other as much as possible. Evacuation is always a terrible experience, but I think the Pakistan evacuees did a marvelous job of minimizing the hardships.

On the other hand, the evacuees from the Persian Gulf states got much less support, and were less self-reliant. They came from small posts; there had been no crisis in their country of assignment. That made many of those evacuees wonder why they had been pulled out. Furthermore, the Department gave to the posts’ leadership discretion to decide how many dependents must leave. In most cases, for example, the ambassador’s wife was not evacuated. So the selection from several of these posts was quite arbitrary and focused on the junior staff members. Many of the evacuated staff did not accept that they had any reason to be evacuated. They tended to assign blame somewhere in Washington. They did not organize; the desks did little to support them. These evacuees became as bitter and disgruntled a group as I have ever seen. It shows what difference embassy leadership and cohesion as well as the Washington support system can make. It was a lesson to me.

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**RICHARD ST. F. POST**  
Consul General  
Karachi (1979-1982)

*Consul General Richard Post was born in 1929 in Washington and received his undergraduate degree from Harvard University in 1951. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served in Addis Ababa, Hong Kong, Mogadishu, Lisbon as well as desk officer in charge of Libyan; Ethiopian-Somali affairs. Charles Stuart Kennedy conducted the interview in February 1990.*

Q: You then moved out of your normal area. You go to Europe for an R&R and you were there for a most auspicious time, the one time in thirty years that there was a change in the government in Portugal. Then you went to Karachi as Consul General, just at the time when things started to heat up in that part of the world, because of Afghanistan. When did you go to Karachi and what was the situation?

POST: I went there in July or August of 1979. General Zia was in charge having overthrown Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who eventually was executed. In fact the execution took place in March of the year I went there.

It was a military regime. We had problems with it for that reason. We had done our best, along with a number of other countries, to persuade Zia not to allow the execution. But he went ahead...
and did it anyhow. I wouldn't say that that was necessarily a principal note of contention between us but it was clear that his concept of human rights and our concept of human rights were a little different.

On the human rights side, more or less, and on the ideological side we were anxious to have Pakistan return to democracy. Zia, when he took over, promised elections in ninety days. Well, that never took place. In fact when I arrived, municipal elections were held, and that was supposed to lead to general elections. Well, they had the municipal elections, and Bhutto's party, the PPP, won a hell of a lot more seats than they had anticipated and so he canceled the next elections too. That was another bone of contention with him.

But the principal one was the nuclear issue. Despite our efforts to get them to stop going down that path they were continuing efforts to do so. We had in law, we were required by the law, well the law didn't actually say that if they were trying to get a nuclear bomb we had to cut off aid, but we interpreted it to mean that. In effect that was what Congress was trying to say. Use this leverage of withdrawal of aid to get people to shape up on the nuclear proliferation issue.

So we had decided to stop our aid, and therefore the situation when I arrived was at a pretty low ebb between Pakistan and the United States.

Q: I also had the feeling that Carter, partly because his mother had been a Peace Corps volunteer in India, was moving away from the Nixon-Kissinger tilt towards Pakistan into a more. If you weren't for Pakistan, you were on the side of India. Was there that feeling?

POST: There is a general feeling in South Asia that when the Democrats are in the White House, India benefits and when the Republicans are in the White House, Pakistan benefits. There is obviously some slippage there. When the Bangladesh war came, from our point of view, we thought we were tilting towards Pakistan, by getting our aircraft carrier out in the Bay of Bengal, and issuing warnings and so on. The Pakistanis don't see it that way.

Pakistanis, since there has been a Pakistan, have always looked upon the United States as their big brother. So that basically there is a very close relationship. But what happened is that it leads them towards expectations of behavior on our part that are totally exaggerated. Totally false. If they get into a war with India, even though it is their fault, they expect us to support them. We didn't do that in the case of the Bangladesh War or the earlier 1964 war over Kashmir. In fact in '64 we had been their only suppliers. We had supplied very little if at all to India. And we put an embargo of arms to both countries. Well that clearly was a detriment to the Pakistanis and they very clearly saw it that way. The point is that when we don't do things that they would like us to do, or expect us to do because of the closeness of the relationship, their reaction gets to be much more drastic and violent. It is sort of like an affair between people. If it is a love affair, when the other person doesn't do what you expect, your reaction is much more strong than if you didn't have much of a relationship.

Q: Then you had your Consulate in Karachi and the Embassy was at Islamabad. What was your relationship with the Embassy? Were there different points of view?
POST: There were certainly different points of view. The embassy, seen from Karachi, was up there in this artificial town. They had contacts with other diplomats and people in the government. They were a long way from any action. Karachi was certainly the economic and business center of the country. And one of the major political centers of the country. Lahore, a little less so. But still even Lahore much more than Islamabad. But particularly Karachi was where most of the action was. We felt that we were much more in touch with things than they were. So we'd read what they were reporting about what was happening in the country and we would find it quite ludicrous. Like looking through the telescope through the wrong end.

Q: How did you report?

POST: We had to report through Islamabad. We would send cables through Islamabad. They would look them over and either they would send them out directly, changing them as they saw fit, or they would ask us to send it directly to the department. It was not a particularly happy experience.

Q: In other places the Consulate Generals report directly with a copy. In other words there was some tension there.

POST: I tried my best to persuade the Embassy that they would lose nothing by allowing us to go ahead and report. If they disagreed with it they could send a cable and say so. But one thing that I felt was important was for others on my staff, writing reports, to be encouraged to do the very best job that they could. If they knew that it was going up and be cannibalized in Islamabad, why bother?

Q: There is a bad feeling. When I was Consulate General in Naples, not that there were any great tensions, but we never felt any compulsion and we sent an information copy up to Rome.

You had two ambassadors while you were there Art Hummel and Ron Spiers. Can you compare and contrast?

POST: Well, first of all we didn't see Hummel very often down in Karachi. I was there with him a lot longer than I was with Spiers, but I saw Spiers many more times in Karachi. Also I had a real battle with Hummel over contacts with the opposition. Specifically with Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto, the mother and daughter of Bhutto. The daughter is now the Prime Minister.

Q: Was this a legal party?

POST: Well, yes the party was a legal party. Now, most of the time I was there, Benazir was in or out of house arrest or jail. There were very few windows of opportunity for me to have any kind of contact with her, but I thought it was really my duty to do what I could with all of the various political groupings, and particularly the one that seemed to be the only one that was a country-wide party. That had been the party in power before the coup, and therefore the one most likely to come out on top if there were ever any free election. So I did my best to keep in contact but I got a direct order not to do so from Hummel.
Q: Why?

POST: Because he was afraid that it would hurt his relationship with Zia and his government. I argued this back and forth in cables to him. I had it in the back of my mind that if his relationship with Zia was so bad that it could be upset by what a Consul General in Karachi could do in the way of having contacts with others, he was in dire shape. What I suggested to him was that this was my view and that it could be said to the Pakistani government up there and that is that we have had all too recent of an experience of not having had sufficient contact with the opposition in a neighboring country.

Q: You are talking of course about the Iran hostage situation.

POST: The fact that the Shah had been overthrown and we had not had sufficient contacts with the others.

Q: There too was the underlying instructions from Washington, "Maintain good relations with the Shah."

POST: My contention was that we could say that the situation in Iran was a reminder of the necessity for us to keep in touch with all shades of opinion. It doesn't mean that we are endorsing them. It just means that we are finding out what they are talking about.

The way this developed was, I was invited to a party by a retired general. Who should be there but Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto. I didn't know that they would be there. It was the first time that I had met either one. I think Benazir had been in jail before that. We had a long conversation and I reported it. It was the first report of any kind that had come out by an American diplomat who had had direct contact with Benazir Bhutto. So the ambassador thanked me for it. He did send it into Washington. Then he said that "I want to make sure that you don't have any more contact with those two ladies. I don't even want you to have any chance contact." In other words he was virtually ordering me not to have contact with anybody. Because I couldn't be sure that she was not going to be at a party that I was going to. I went to an average of three parties every night I was in Pakistan. Karachi is a big city. There are an awful lot of people very anxious to have the American Consul General come.

So from that point on it was a little more difficult. She was in and out of prison. On the few occasions when she wasn't it would have been difficult in most circumstances to have contact even if you were planning.

What happened was very interesting. My wife got into a group of Pakistani women who stuffed dolls which were then sold for charity. And one of the women in that group was Nusrat Bhutto's niece, Fakhri Khan, an Iranian, married to a Pakistani, and therefore an "auntie" to Benazir. Through her we kept up on what was happening, with reports of Benazir being in this or that jail. Which enabled me to have another source of reporting. But also what I did was on the few occasions where she would be out of jail for a while, we would get an invitation to go to dinner, at Fakhri Khan's, and sure enough, the Bhutto ladies would be there. And we would have more contact. And I had several other friends in the community who could be counted upon to invite
us with Benazir, but not necessarily letting us know that she was going to be there. Or in fact, a few times they did and I went anyway, despite the ambassador's instructions, because I frankly felt that he was totally wrong.

Q: Did you have any encouragement from the desk or the department?

POST: Certainly not anybody in the embassy. Certainly not from the DCM. There was the office director who came out on the trip and seemed to be rather more sympathetic. At least to the extent of saying that the reports that I had sent in on Benazir Bhutto were fascinating and they were very happy to have had them. I don't know that I got in too deeply with him about the actual directive. Because I didn't want to be put in the position that I was violating the ambassador. But I expressed my view that it was unconscionable for us not having as much contact with the opposition.

Q: What did Benazir Bhutto feel about the role of the United States?

POST: Well she felt that we should be putting more pressure on Zia to restore democracy. This is something that virtually everybody in the opposition would be saying, to which my reply would always have to be, and it would be accurate, that we don't control him. Pakistanis don't believe that for a moment. They assume that anything that happens in Pakistan happens because we allow it to happen or we make it happen. She wasn't as naive on that subject as some but she still felt that there was a lot more that we could do to induce change.

Q: What happened when Hummel left and Spiers came?

POST: Things eased up considerably. At that time, Benazir was in jail but Nusrat was out, and I think the first test of Spiers' attitude came when I suggested to him that I would like to invite Nusrat Bhutto to the Fourth of July party. No way I could have gotten that through Hummel. Spiers said fine. So I did.

Q: How did the Iranian revolution and the takeover of our Embassy effect you?

POST: There came the time when the mosque in Mecca was taken over by the renegade Shiite group, in 1979. The first report of this event came over Voice of America. Mind you this was at a time when Carter had just dispatched a second carrier task force into the Arabian Sea. Things were looking a little tense between the United States and Iran. Here comes this report by Americans pointing the finger at a Shiite group who had taken over the holiest of holies. This was then reported by the BBC, and attributed to the Voice of America. So they immediately got the idea that the Americans are doing this and are taking over the Mecca mobs. Having already connived with the Israelis to take over the mosque in Jerusalem. Result: riot.

They burned down our Embassy in Islamabad and tried to do the same to us in Karachi. But the Karachi police force is much more accustomed to this sort of thing and controlled them, using probably a year's supply of tear gas, (which, ironically, we had embargoed for shipment to Pakistan). Meanwhile up in Islamabad, first of all, the security forces that were normally available are pretty thin up there. But they were all arrayed on the streets in nearby Rawalpindi,
because President Zia was out riding a bicycle to demonstrate the need to rely on other energy sources. So there was nobody there to defend the Embassy.

Of course Zia delayed sending any help until it was already completely burned down.

Q: So what did this do to relations? Both from the Embassy and the Consulate. Zia did not respond as he should have. This may be a lesson. Some Americans were killed. It was a very nasty, very nasty situation.

POST: As I said earlier, relations were already rather tense. This made them much more tense. At least in Karachi, well Karachi is basically an anti-Zia camp, so there were a lot of people who were very sympathetic to us more so than they might have been there. They became even more sympathetic when the department ordered all of our dependents and non-essential personnel to go back to the United States. I don't know if you have ever had to tell an officer that he was non-essential.

Clearly our lines were cut. We didn't have our dependents back for six months. I think the relationship itself would have deteriorated a lot more except for what happened on Christmas eve, with the Russians walking into Afghanistan. That changed the whole picture overnight.

Q: How did you see the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and how did Pakistan?

POST: I myself saw it as a limited thing, not a roll up of the area. A lot of people in Pakistan and in our own government viewed this as a latter-day expression of the Russian interest in having a warm water port. The Great Game. Everybody's favorite port for that would be Karachi, or Gwadar. Some said that Gwadar was the port they really wanted. I had been to Gwadar. You certainly don't invade Afghanistan to get to Gwadar.

I looked at it from the point of the Soviets that they were preventing the collapse of a Communist government right on their border. The Soviets don't like to see communist governments collapse anywhere. But when one does right on your border, and it is on the border with your Muslim population, and the reason they collapse is because of militant Islam, you don't want that message to get across to the Muslims of Central Asia. That was my view.

The public pronouncements by Brzezinski would suggest that a different view prevailed and that in fact they bought, or at least wanted people to think that they bought, the warm water port theory. Which of course did justify our going and offering military assistance to the Pakistanis.

Q: What was the Pakistani view?

POST: There may have been negative or hostile attitudes at times but they were still very interested in the United States. But now it was much warmer. We were now doing the right thing by them. While they were a little unhappy that it would take a thing like the Soviet invasion to get us to do the right thing, more the less here we were offering to help. Of course the initial offer by the Carter Administration was dismissed by Zia as peanuts. I don't think that he realized that he was talking to a peanut farmer. And he got the ante upped. Also an exemption to the
foreign aid act restriction of providing aid to a country who was going for the bomb.

Q: *Was your role changed at all because of this?*

POST: No, not really.

Q: *You were there from 1979 to ’82. The Carter Administration got this shock about Afghanistan which turned Carter around in his view of the Soviets. When the Reagan Administration came in did you have any feel for their views towards Pakistan?*

POST: Oh, immediately there was a much warmer view towards Pakistan. I think even though the Afghan thing had turned things around, there was still evidence of concern about human rights, concern of the absence of movement towards restoration of democracy. That kind of thing appeared.

Q: *What about the role of the CIA and the military? (This is an unclassified interview.)*

POST: Certainly the role of the military increased because we began to provide military assistance. What increase there may have in CIA activities was not evident in Karachi. Now up in Peshawar, it might have been something different. You had the odd CIA fellow passing through who gave hints about this or that, but aside from that we were not conscious of that going on.

Q: *What about Bhutto and the rest of her father’s party?*

POST: Their feeling was that, had we been in the government, we certainly would have wanted to be receiving this assistance from the United States. Perhaps the United States feels that it has to give this to Zia, but we would hope that the United States would exert as much influence on him as they could through the provision that it should help him move towards democratic change. And they didn’t see us doing that.

BARRINGTON KING
Deputy Chief of Mission
Islamabad (1979-1984)

Barrington King was born in Tennessee in 1930. He attended the University of Georgia and received his BFA in 1952. He joined the State Department in October 1956 and subsequently served in these postings: Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Nicosia, Athens, Tunis, and Islamabad. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: *Your time was up in Tunisia in 1979, and moved to what sounds like a difficult assignment as DCM in Islamabad, and you served there, my God, for five years.*
KING: Four and a half.

Q: *Four and a half years, during a very critical time. Can you explain what you were up to?*

KING: Yes. Of course, this was a big step up for me because Pakistan is a very large Embassy but more than that. At that time, I would say it maybe was one of the half dozen most important Embassies we had in the world from the point of view of everything that was going on there. I arrived as Charge, I had never seen the Ambassador.

Q: *Who was?*

KING: Arthur Hummel. He wanted to take home leave, and as it worked out I just arrived, and I was in charge of this huge Embassy, and never seen the Ambassador I worked for. But that worked out okay, and he came back in about...

Q: *You arrived when?*

KING: I'm not real sure about the date. It must have been about August. Anyway, he returned and then I went back to my usual job; very much of a management job in normal times because there are three subordinate posts: in Peshawar, in Lahore, and Karachi. And during my tour from a very small A.I.D. program, we grew to have one of the largest in the world. Also a big military assistance program. So there was a lot of coordination internally to do among a number of agencies. But then things kept happening all during my tour.

Q: *Could you take some of these, chronologically, that impacted on this?*

KING: The first one, of course, was the Embassy was burned. Now this is not the greatest disaster we've ever had now, but I think at the time it happened, it probably was in the whole history of U.S. diplomacy. As far as I'm aware, it's still the only incident of an entire Embassy being destroyed, I mean everything.

Q: *How did this come about?*

KING: The way it came about was that...of course relations with Iran were a problem because there is a large Shiite minority in Pakistan. They were very antagonistic towards us because of our relations with Iran. The day before Thanksgiving...

Q: *1979.*

KING: In '79, a group who later turned out to be Shiites, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca and were driven out after a great deal of bloodshed and trouble by the Saudis. That was broadcast early in the morning, and I've never quite got the story straight, and there are apparently some broadcasts that were never taped by anybody and it's a little murky. Somebody alleged, probably the Iranians, who may well have been involved themselves, probably were, that the Americans and Israelis were behind this sacrilege. Now you've got to understand how things are in Pakistan. It's an emotionally volatile place, and once when the Italians made a film about Muhammad, or
were going to make a film about Muhammad, an army of people marched on the Italian Embassy to burn it down, and it took the Army to turn them back. This is something we get from the newspaper. It's easy to stir up this kind of situation. You have a large, very poor, very ignorant population, very religious and emotional, and if they're Shiite, then it's in spades.

We were not too concerned about security because, like Canberra, Islamabad is an artificial city. It's built out in the middle of nowhere, it has no urban population, it all consists of diplomats and bureaucrats. There's no industry, there's nothing. So the government didn't take security there too seriously. There is, however, about 20 miles away a major population center in Rawalpindi. Well, I guess, the way they felt was, or they later claimed, that given the topography of things, a large crowd could hardly walk through this landscape 20 miles to do anybody any damage, except of course, there's this big six-lane highway that goes to the airport and then on to Rawalpindi. So all you really have to do is just close the road. The problem is they didn't close the road. The word got about, and somebody, and I think the Iranians and Palestinians were probably mixed up in this -- there are a lot of Iranians and Palestinians students there -- somebody said that they should go and avenge themselves on the Americans by attacking the American Embassy.

We didn't know any of this at the time, of course. Rawalpindi is one end of a truck route that goes to the Khyber Pass, and these big trucks, old fashioned vehicles, go in large numbers back and forth between the northwest frontier province and the Punjab. And in Rawalpindi there's a big market area, where on any given day you find hundreds of these big trucks which are offloading one thing, and are taking on something for the return journey. So what happened was, the mob got the truck drivers to take them to Islamabad, and they came in the thousands.

I was in my office, and I was having a talk with Father Lee, who is an Irish American priest who had been in Pakistan for many years, about a Thanksgiving service we were going to have the next day. And about 12:00 we finished what we had to discuss, and I said, "It's about lunch time, I'll walk down with you and go home for lunch," which I always did. So I went down and got in my car, and was driven home. I'd been there about 15 minutes when I got a call which said, "Don't come back, stay where you are. There's a crowd marching on the Embassy." I did that, and quickly discovered that the Ambassador was also at home for lunch. Just by some fluke out of 150 people who were in the Embassy that day, only maybe five people were outside the compound when this happened.

It was a big brand new Embassy. It cost 23 million dollars. I know because that's the claim we put in, and around it it had a big brick wall. It had bars on the windows, and it had big sliding metal doors, and a lot of things like that. It was reasonably good security, not the best, but given the situation we probably didn't concentrate on that as much as we would have if it had been in downtown Rawalpindi. In any case, the wall didn't stop anybody long. They just drove the trucks right through the wall.

There was good coordination inside the Embassy. The Administrative Counselor, and the Political Counselor, and a couple of other people led things. They locked all the safes, and retreated into the vault. The vault was on the top floor, it's a three-story building. The Marines were positioned outside, eventually they all retreated into the vault. There was one Marine up on
the roof keeping a lookout, and he was killed by someone who had a weapon. It may be that they had weapons, but they overpowered the police detachment, and took their weapons from them, and they may have used those. There was a Warrant Officer who went to his apartment, because we had 30-35 apartments in the compound. He went to his apartment and locked himself in. Two of our FSN employees locked themselves in their office rather than going to the vault. All three of these people were killed by smoke inhalation.

What the mob did, and you know, motivations were different as they are with mobs, after it was all over we noticed that not a single typewriter was any longer there, no liquor was left in the American Club, not one bottle. So some people just came to loot. In fact, they stripped the Embassy of everything. But in the process, there were about 80 cars in the parking lot, they drained the gas tanks, and took gas in buckets, put it all over the Embassy, and set it on fire. It's not that an Embassy is particularly easy to burn, its masonry and brick, and there's not a lot of inflammable stuff, but if you use enough gasoline you can make anything burn. So it wasn't long before the whole Embassy was aflame. I was on the telephone with the Ambassador, and we agreed that he would stay where he was. He had radio contact with the vault. I had a radio in my house, and my wife sat beside the radio for the rest of the day, and transcribed everything that was said. It's the only record of what happened. I got in my car with my driver and made a loop around to avoid the crowd to get to the Foreign Ministry, which is very close to the Embassy, and luckily didn't run into any of this mob. I went straight up to the office of the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, and that was about 12:45 or 1:00, where I stayed until the whole thing was over. He and I together called various people, including the President, the President's chief military aide...

Q: President Zia.

KING: President Zia. President Zia, however, was in Rawalpindi, and he had taken to riding bicycles, and he was having a bicycle ride, and he was greeting his constituents. I think the non-arrival of the Army for the next five hours is very suspicious. You could even say, I think legitimately, that they were taken by surprise by the suddenness of this rush down the highway that they could have stopped if they'd had an hour or two warning. In any case, I think most people involved found it very suspicious that they didn't do any...

Q: It wasn't just the attack, it was also the mob getting to Rawalpindi. I mean, at least maybe they couldn't have stopped it, but they could have been alerted to what was happening.

KING: Yes, but I would imagine that was a matter of minutes, once the idea struck the crowd. Because you had all of these truck drivers, all of these people who were not really fully employed, hanging around, it's a big city. I can see that happening. The response was unsatisfactory, to say the least. Some people explain that they wanted to teach us a lesson about a few things. Others that they didn't want to get involved until they absolutely had to because that meant shooting Pakistanis, because that's the only way you can control a mob in Pakistan. You just have to kill people. Or that they didn't realize it was as bad as it was.

Anyway, from the Secretary General's balcony of his office, you could see this huge column of black smoke going up into the sky. I mean, there was no question how bad it was. And you could
also see the road, and you could see truck after truck after truck of these yelling, chanting people. I guess we probably got about 10 or 15 thousand at the height of this thing. Finally, and this took some time, we got Army helicopters but by that time there was so much smoke -- the idea was to land on the roof, one at a time, and take off with a load of people. They couldn't see where to land, and also -- and this is legitimate -- they weren't sure what the roof would hold. It's nothing I was an expert on. I had no idea either. My guess was that it wouldn't be a problem. In any case, they never landed, and I think, also, there was some concern that they were going to be shot at too. This situation went on, and on, and on. I would talk to the Ambassador. He would talk to the people in the vault. We'd try to get somebody to do something. By that point the police were no use at all, you had to have regular Army to have any hope of saving people.

About 5:30 in the afternoon, still nothing had happened. The Army was on its way, we were being told then, for some time. There was a second group of people who were dependents, women and children, who got caught in the compound, and were surrounded by an angry mob, but about a dozen policemen with weapons surrounded them, and there was a stand-off that lasted all afternoon. The real danger, of course, was the people in the vault. We had all of our American, and FSN employees, in there, including the Time Magazine correspondent who'd been conducting an interview at that time. About 5:30 it got so bad in the vault from the heat -- this building was all in flames -- that the floor tiles started popping off. We knew we couldn't last much longer. So the Marines at that point were all inside the vault, and they had shotguns. This was discussed with the Ambassador, and they said, "We don't see any choice. We're going to have to come out. There's a ladder that goes to the roof. There's an escape hatch which is locked." The people had gotten up on the roof is the reason we had not tried to get out, and they were firing weapons down the ventilation shaft. What they didn't do, and they could have done, is just pour some gasoline down the shaft and drop a match after it, and everybody would have been dead.

In any case, it looked grim. It looked very grim for the 150 people inside. So they unlocked the hatch, a Marine went up, and another behind him with a shotgun, poked his head out just in time to see the mob climbing down off the roof. They had gotten to the roof by taking a bicycle rack, upending it, and getting onto the first floor balcony, and with that getting to the second, and then to the third, and there were quite a crowd of people up there. But they were starting to climb down. At just that moment, the Army arrived. And by that time it was beginning to be dusk, and I'm sure they felt there'd be a lot less problem with the Army shooting people in this situation, than in the full light of day. So they got out of there fast.

We were, of course, trying to watch other situations, and I was on the phone to Peshawar, Karachi, and to Lahore. We had a particular concern because we had hired a train. A whole crowd of people had gone down for Thanksgiving to Karachi, and as can be done there, they took a whole train. The train was somewhere between Islamabad and Karachi, and we figured if its ever stopped anywhere with this story about, they'd all be massacred. By that time the Secretary General had gone to see president Zia who had finally got back to Islamabad. I was with the Chief of Protocol, who is an Army General himself, trying to get hold of the railroad authorities to get that train to some place where it was safe. At this point, the Political Counselor came bursting into the room, and I had been so totally concentrated on what I was doing it didn't even occur to me where he'd come from until I smelled smoke. And then I realized that he'd been
in the vault along with everybody else because I had no idea who was in there. So we together worked on this problem.

This went on as we tried to get ourselves organized, find out where the people were, and all during the afternoon too I was on the telephone with my wife finding out what was happening, according to the radio, to everybody in town. The school, where my two children were, was attacked -- it was not a serious attack -- and a retired Pakistani colonel just pulled out a gun and got the people out of the school. So by the time everything sort of settled down, the Army by then was there in large numbers. They were all over the city. At every street corner there was an Army vehicle.

The Ambassador and I, I guess it must have been by that time about 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning, went to the Embassy to look at this situation. The Soviet Union had had a couple of cars around the Embassy, and people were trying to get into the compound, and see what they could find. And then we discovered that we didn't lose a single piece of paper, which was quite different from what happened in Iran. I remember we walked around the Embassy a couple of times with the GSO...

Q: The General Services Officer.

KING: The General Services Officer, and the building was still so hot you couldn't get close to it even though there were no more flames. The bricks were almost glowing. We had no communications, obviously. The next morning we moved into the A.I.D. building which was some blocks away. The Army was now in complete control of things. We made a telephone call to Washington, and left the receiver off the hook for the next three days, and ran up a $12,000 telephone bill, which we sent to the Pakistani government with our compliments. That was our only communications for three days. The decision was made in Washington, in which we could but concur, that dependents had to leave because we didn't know what this was going to lead to. The Department commandeered the PanAm around-the-world flight in New Delhi, threw off the passengers, and sent it to Islamabad. That happened the next morning. During the day we got ready for the plane's arrival. Thanksgiving dinner had been all prepared, so I said, "To hell with it. I don't care what has to be done, I'm going home and have Thanksgiving dinner." So we had turkey, all the things that go with it, then I went back to work. Because of the reports that there was going to be more trouble, and a need to move quickly, we moved all dependents into four different houses in the city, where they slept on the floor that night. The plane was coming early in the morning. Then they were taken with armored personnel carriers to the Rawalpindi airport, and everybody got off with no problems.

And after that there were several scary situations, but basically we were never faced with that again. I mean, this kind of internal threat from mobs did not reoccur, although there was one bad day in which a mob of Shiites got on the loose in Islamabad, but their object was the government and not us.

It took us eight months to get dependents back, which seems like an awfully long time, because as I said, after that there was nothing further. But having spent all the money to move, you know the State Department is reluctant to send everybody back and then have it happen again. It
doesn't look very good. We expected two or three months, but every time the bureau would propose that dependents be allowed to go back, Secretary Vance would say, no. Everybody else agreed, but invariably he would say, "No, they're not going back." And that's not the kind of thing you'd think the Secretary would have strong views on. He later resigned over the attempt to rescue the hostages, and that explains why. He knew this was coming. He didn't agree with it, and he was not going to have us in that situation again. He was absolutely correct.

Q: To put it in perspective, we were planning...our Embassy also in November of '79 in Tehran was seized by the Iranians, and we were planning to go in there on a rescue mission which would have probably turned into a military operation, and would have enrag...the Shiites again.

KING: We could very well have had a repetition in Pakistan, and I cannot speak very highly of the way that was handled. I was in charge at the time that that mission took place. We got a message at 8:00 in the morning, saying there was a disturbed situation in the Middle East and we should take all necessary security precautions. So I called together the Country Team, and said, "Based on my experience in this business, if there's a disturbed condition in the Middle East, we've got something to do with it, and I don't think this telegram is being frank. I think there's something up. I just don't like the sound of it." So I said, "I'll tell you what we're going to do. We're going to burn every piece of classified paper in this Embassy, right now. We're not going to run that risk again because I just don't trust this." So we did. We burned every single piece of classified paper there was in the whole Embassy.

About three hours later, we got a telegram saying that the mission had failed, and that there might be bad scenes all over the Middle East. Well, having failed, I wasn't particularly concerned. If it had succeeded, we certainly would have. And that I feel was not right. I think you were taking risks with people's lives that were unnecessary, and I don't find that excusable. I think in situations like this, it usually turns out that the Department is told by the White House what they're going to do; and I suspect that's what happened in this case. As I can figure out the chronology of this, I think the mission was over by that point anyway, when they'd sent the first telegram.

Q: The Iranian situation must have been on your plate the entire time you were there, wasn't it? I mean the rise in fundamentalism, and the concern about a spill-over. We already had one manifestation, but a complete spill-over into...

KING: It was, but from that point on, the Pakistani government was pretty concerned that they didn't have a Shiite problem of their own. So they were watching it pretty carefully. I can't say that internally I was concerned about what was going to happen, unless we did something. And that's precisely what happened. That was the dangerous thing, if we got ourselves involved in something. Well, we not only sent dependents home, we sent all non-essential personnel. But shortly after that, of course, the Soviet Union came into Afghanistan...

Q: This was in '79.

KING: That's right, and things turned around very fast. We needed the Pakistanis, the Pakistanis
certainly needed us. And that began a series of talks that led to a massive A.I.D. program, and to supplying Pakistan with a great deal of war materiel, including two squadrons of F-16s which we would not have done under other circumstances. Again, I had three Ambassadors there, so, in between, I was in charge a lot of the time. So I was involved in a lot of these negotiations. We also had a lot of concern about the Pakistani nuclear program which occupied a lot of peoples’ time. And then we had a major refugee problem as a result of the war in Afghanistan. And last, but not least, Pakistan then turned into the world's largest heroin producing country -- all taking place in the same geographical area. I spent a great deal of my time as DCM as head of the narcotics committee. And none of those things really quieted down during my time there. It was a very active, and very interesting tour. I can't think of a better job in the Foreign Service than that one was.

Q: There are a whole number of things, but let's talk about relations between the constituent posts. You mentioned that we had three. Was Richard Post there at the same time? He talks with a certain amount -- or maybe its just me -- sort of bitterness about the fact that...he was in Karachi, and that he felt he was being kept on a very tight string by Ambassador Hummel in making contacts with opposition, which included Benazir Bhutto and her mother; and that every report he had to do had to go through Islamabad, rather than go out as most constituent posts do. Was there a problem with keeping a lid, or controlling constituent posts?

KING: Only in the case of Karachi, because that's where the opposition that counted, including Benazir Bhutto and her family and friends, were. I happen to agree with Hummel's policy. I think that's the way we should have handled it, and I supported it, and the post was very aware of it.

Q: These interviews are designed for somebody who is interested in how things work. What was the issue there, how one controls the post, and how did you see the issue?

KING: In this particular case...it's a situation you don't often run into, where you have a very large Consulate General, because it's the regional center, and it's the airline connection for everywhere. So various U.S. agencies have offices there, it's big. It's also, of course, one of the largest cities in the world, but it's not the capitol. The Embassy has got to keep control of the basic political process of relations between the U.S. and the host country. It can't be done in some subordinate post. The Ambassador, if he's got anything to do that's important, is managing this process. It can't be managed from somewhere else. It doesn't occur normally. You can think of a few places in the world where you'd have a situation like this, but the Ambassador is normally where all the political action is.

Q: What was your impression of President Zia? How did he relate to the United States? And our policy towards him?

KING: I think our policy was the correct one for the time. We had very large stakes in that part of the world, and it's now possible to look back on Afghanistan as not being quite as important as it looked then, but it looked very important then. Zia's movement towards democracy was far too slow for our tastes. But aside from that we had common interests on almost everything, except for the Pakistani nuclear program in which we had a very sharp disagreement on.
Q: *What was the issue?*

KING: The issue is that we said that they were developing nuclear weapons. They publicly and privately, to this day as far as I know, have denied this. Well, it's not true. They are, or they were. I don't know what they're doing right now. And even if we had wanted to ignore this, which we most certainly did not, the U.S. Congress wasn't going to ignore it. So their aid was always in danger over this issue. But in other areas, the refugees, and certainly Afghanistan, we had a really solid cooperation. General Zia was an extremely clever politician, a very solid military man, and a tireless worker. I've been called to see him at 1:00 in the morning, and after that somebody else is seeing him, and he's up early in the morning, into everything, knows everything that is going on. He generally made very sound decisions given what he had to work with. Pakistan is a very difficult country to govern. I don't know what our relations would have been like without Afghanistan because of the Embassy being burned, and the drugs, and the nuclear problem. The cooperation was reasonably good on drugs, but like everywhere else in the world, we're just kidding ourselves when we think we're going to stop narcotics in the United States by wiping them out somewhere else. In the first place you aren't going to wipe them out, that's just a myth. Most of the people who are involved in doing it know it isn't going to work, but domestically this is what we continue to do.

Q: *I always feel that we're not in the best position when we're exporting...one of our major exports is tobacco, which unfortunately kills more people than this. But that's a different battle.*

KING: Oh, yes, indeed.

Q: *This was a sort of an odd time in relations with a sub continent in that it was not a time of balancing off India and Pakistan, and where do we go because we were so focused on the Afghanistan...we're now back to the normal problem. Did India play much of a role, or were we just too busy...I'm talking about you, to worry too much about India.*

KING: We worried very little about India. I think the only real concern is that India was going to start another war, or launch a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Either one of those things was quite possible. No, we had far too many concerns in Pakistan to think much about anything else.

Q: *Was there much exchange back and forth between Islamabad and New Delhi?*

KING: Not much.

Q: *We really are talking about a time when these two were normally...there was a great balancing act, this was a whole different game.*

KING: Yes. I think during this period India was not of terribly much concern to us. It goes up and down, of course, but Pakistan as you said, is now back to a sort of normal situation.

Q: *Well, trying to reconstruct, on Christmas eve of 1979 -- in the first place, were we getting reports that the Soviets might do something because of the situation in Afghanistan?*
KING: Oh, I can't comment on that because I was on home leave. It happened just as I was about to return -- not home leave, I was back seeing my wife, she was still evacuated. And Jimmy Carter's speech, I remember seeing when he cut off food aid to the Soviet Union -- food sales -- I saw in Dulles airport on my way back. So when I got there it had already happened, but there was no question at all in the Embassy about what it meant. That was very clear that U.S.-Pakistan relations were going to change immediately, and they did.

Q: The view from there, what did we see? Did we see this as a Soviet threat as a menace to everything? How did we see it from that vantage point?

KING: There are two aspects to this, of course. One is, what our policy was going to be toward the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. And the other was, is it going to have some effect beyond Afghanistan. There were some concerns about that, particularly as the refugee population built up in the northwest frontier; that this thing might spill over into that part of Pakistan; or might in some other way represent a threat to stability, because President Zia was obviously an impediment to what the Russians were doing, because it was very clear that he was the main support that the Afghanistan rebels had. I guess my feelings were that that was probably not too serious a threat, and that our concentration should be on just getting the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

Q: Was there sort of a feeling that this Afghanistan is going to be a lot harder for the Soviets than they think?

KING: I felt that way. Some people didn't. I thought they were going to get bogged down, and they did. But there was a difference of opinion on that.

Q: I don't want to overburden you but I wonder if you can talk a bit about...you were there during the change over from the Carter to the Reagan administration. How did this reflect itself in Pakistan on the work you were doing?

KING: Hardly at all. The Carter administration doesn't get as high marks as it deserves for some of the things it did. All the Reagan administration did, was just to continue the Carter policies. That's all, nothing more. You couldn't even have told that there was a change of administration for all the difference it made, because we had already decided on the policy which obviously was the correct one, and one which the Reagan administration would probably have adopted if the invasion had happened during their own time.

Q: Carter really took this Afghan business...I mean this was a song Road to Damascus practically, wasn't it?

KING: He reacted immediately, and I think in the right way, and he put a lot of effort into it in his administration. It got real high level attention all the time.
Ms. Taylor was born and raised in Illinois and educated at Wellesley College, George Washington University and Boston University. After joining the Foreign Service of USIA, Ms. Taylor served in Washington and abroad in the field of Cultural and Information. Her foreign posts include Moscow, Kabul, Tel Aviv and Rabat. She also served in Washington as USIA Desk Officer for Afghanistan/Pakistan and for South Asia and as Policy Officer for Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States. Ms. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Going to Pakistan…

TAYLOR: In our heroic way, no. I think the whole embassy set up shop elsewhere. The American Cultural Center in Rawalpindi had been sacked but it was salvageable. As I recall, we just reconstituted the embassy and made a band-aid, patched together, working set of offices around town in Islamabad. In my view, we did not make any useful entreaties to the Pakistani government as to how they failed us in an hour of need. I think that’s another story that has never really been told properly. They did nothing to deter the mobs from attacking the embassy and they did nothing to drive them away once they had.

Q: Was there the feeling that this was a policy or that this was just a failure?

TAYLOR: I don’t know. The Pakistanis were very important to us because of what was going on in Afghanistan. There was the opening to China, so maybe it was a policy. But I don’t think we would have upset the policy if we had made slightly more strenuous representations. But this was something that really went wrong. Where were the Pakistani authorities to keep this from happening or at least once it started happening? I mean, there were busloads of people. You don’t organize busloads of people in Pakistan without somebody knowing about it. And they all headed toward the U.S. embassy. They had enough gasoline with them to burn down a brick and cement, concrete, building. I don’t know how many police forces in the world can overlook something like that. And the only reason that everybody in that place did not die was because the Pakistani attackers thought everyone was dead. They couldn’t believe that anybody would still be alive after the building had been burning for as long as it had. Either Herb Hagerty or Jim Thurber or one of the several people who emerged as heroes in that whole thing said they probably had about 12 minutes of air left in that vault. The heat had become unbearable. So, it was not that the Pakistani authorities came and drove the crowds away. The crowds drifted away because they thought it was all over inside. Only then did somebody from the vault pop through the hatch and see that all was clear and then they began getting people out. The roof was ready to collapse, which it did. The smoke inhalation was getting so bad.

I was on the desk only six months after I came back before I went to replace Kenton. I think that, being the troopers that we are as Americans, I think we just set up shop in temporary quarters until we could rebuild the thing. We had a USIS section pretty much fully staffed out there.
within a year. We’ve always had a huge staff in Pakistan. We had six or seven people out there quickly.

TERESA CHIN JONES
Science Officer, Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Mrs. Jones was born in the Soviet Union of Chinese diplomatic parents. She was raised in the USSR and the United States. A specialist in Scientific Affairs, both civilian and military, Mrs. Jones’ Washington assignments were primarily in the fields of international nuclear and scientific matters and included non-proliferation, arms control, East-West Trade as well as general Political/Military subjects. Her foreign assignments were in the scientific and consular fields. She holds two degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. Mrs. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: I want to move back to the OES. What, you say you had the issues of export control.

JONES: Yes, and non proliferation also.

Q: What was going on in 1980 to ’82 or so in that field that you were particularly concerned with?

JONES: Basically the situation had become one of holding actions. In ’74 the Indians had already set off a “PNE” a peaceful nuclear explosion. So the cat was out of the bag. IAEA and its entire safeguard systems were beginning to look more like paper mache tigers than real tigers. There were no real consequences for a country in let’s say violating safeguards or setting off a nuclear explosion.

Nuclear programs take a long time, so we knew that a large number of countries had been maturing, had intentions in that direction. A large number of companies particularly in Europe, Italy and France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, were very eager to make sales, and they really didn’t care whether their special alloy steels were going into centrifuge systems. URENCO security had already been breached when Mr. Khan had stolen the centrifuge plans and taken them to Pakistan.

Q: He is sort of the genius...

JONES: He was the father of the Pakistani nuclear program. He stole plans for the small centrifuges used by URENCO which made catching them much harder. At the same time I think this was before the South Atlantic event where you had the VELA satellites pick up the signature double flash of a nuclear explosion. When an atomic bomb explodes it heats the air. You have the initial flash of the explosion. Then the air is heated to such high temperatures that it is opaque until it cools off enough and you can see the light again, so it is a very particular double flash.
And a VELA satellite, which was designed to give early warning for a ballistic missile launch, saw it. We did know that the South Africans were investing in the Becker Nozzle process which is a process that depends on the fact that at certain speeds and under a magnetic field the different uranium isotopes would end up with different arcs of curvature. So you can collect them with plates at different points. That one was extremely labor intensive, and extremely energy intensive., so it was more or less in the line of like Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plants, which can be easily seen as the plant is almost a mile long with the Tennessee Valley Authority Electrical Power Plants feeding its energy needs.

The work was very interesting. The politics were reasonably poisonous in the sense that when President Carter killed U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel to support his nonproliferation goals. This went a long way to killing the U.S. nuclear power program. This was the days before people were worried about global warming. And as allies he had all the groups that were basically very anti nuclear because they were very anti death, death being represented by radiation - even though light and heat area also “radiation.

I worked with Bob Gallucci in OES. I will only say that if there was a way to believe intelligence and interpret it to fit his preconceptions, he did it. It was very innocent in a way, and he truly believed it would be a better world, the world he envisioned, but alas my feelings at the time on all these programs was that they were doing exactly what the intelligence indicated they were doing. He and President Carter showed this kind of rosy vision of other intentions when first negotiating with the North Koreans. I understand that they completely ignored any intelligence contrary to their bias in favor of trusting the North Koreans.

Q: So in 1981 you went to Pakistan as Ambassador. Why were you so interested in the Asia subcontinent?

SPIERS: I had never been there, in the first place. India was a huge country and that made it appear interesting. I knew little about the area and I wanted to learn more about it. I had been in Europe; I had little interest in Latin America or Africa. I would not have minded going to the Far East, but no interesting assignment was available at the time. I would have regarded Korea as a great assignment because that was a significant country. Bob Peck, who was then the Office Director for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, suggested that we lunch together. He told me that he had heard that I was interested in India and that if I insisted, I would probably be assigned

RONALD I. SPIERS
Ambassador
Pakistan (1981-1983)

Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers was born in New Jersey in 1925. He received his bachelor's degree from Dartmouth College in 1948. He received a master's degree from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. After serving in the Navy and a five year tenure with the Atomic Energy Commission, he entered the State Department and served in many high-level positions.

Q: So in 1981 you went to Pakistan as Ambassador. Why were you so interested in the Asia subcontinent?

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there. But he told me that I should really consider Pakistan and then he made a very persuasive case. So I volunteered for Pakistan.

I really didn't know that much about Southeast Asia. I of course learned something about the subcontinent while in INR, but in INR you get a synoptic view; that is you view the world as a whole. You are not involved in day to day action, except for intelligence operations; as I said, INR's role is to provide information to the decision makers.

I knew something about Pakistan's efforts in the nuclear field although in the early 80s that was still a very nascent program. In general, having had some experience in the intelligence area was tremendously useful to me in Pakistan. I think every ambassador should have some experience in the intelligence field. It is so important, so protean, all encompassing that it is very useful to have been exposed to it. I am now speaking particularly of operational intelligence. What I learned about the U.S. government's intelligence capability was extraordinarily very useful. When in Pakistan, if I wanted to find out something, I would task a satellite. Ambassadors who had no knowledge of operational intelligence would not have thought of doing so.

Q: What was the status of U.S.-Pakistan relations when you went there?

SPIERS: They were improving. They had hit a low point following the 1971 war with India which led to the cancellation of U.S. assistance. Pakistan had a military dictator at its helm, General Zia. That did not make the country particularly popular in the U.S. The former Prime Minister Bhutto had just been executed. These factors were burdens on our relationships. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the atmosphere entirely. That actually took place during my last week in Turkey. As a matter of fact, the Soviet ambassador was a dinner guest at our house on the day of the invasion and the evening was a tense one.

That event changed the nature of our relationship with Pakistan. During my whole tour, our total attention was devoted to juggling the various facets of our relationship: the India issue, the Pakistan-China relationship, the Afghan problem, the nuclear issue, the military assistance problems. It was a fantastically complex web of issues that made up the relationship.

Although we had always tilted toward Pakistan in its tensions with India, we got little credit for that. The issue was always "What have you done for us lately?". It was the same way it was in Turkey. Gratitude has a very short life span in international relations. As I suggested earlier, the relationship with Zia was slowly but surely becoming a very positive one.

Q: What were our interests in Pakistan?

SPIERS: There were different theories about that. I used to have arguments with Zia about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We all agreed that we had to make it as difficult for the Soviets in Afghanistan as possible. Zia's view was that the invasion of his neighbor was the beginning of another traditional Soviet expansionary effort to gain access to the Arabian Sea. That view was shared by our military. Zia foresaw a Soviet effort to take over Baluchistan -- a province of Pakistan. He had countless meetings with Congressional visitors, Cabinet members and other U.S. dignitaries, most often in his modest little house, which had been the home of the Army
Chief of Staff (He never moved to the Presidential residence). He would display a map, on which he super-imposed a red area, which was the part of Asia occupied by the Soviets. He would then discuss how Pakistan was being squeezed between India and the Soviet Union. He really believed this strategic view of the world and was genuinely concerned with the "red horde" knocking on his door. He also believed that India would attack him one day; I never accepted that, just as I didn't believe that Pakistan was waiting to attack India.

I told Zia that I was convinced that it was important to stop the Soviets in Afghanistan, even though I did not necessarily accept his theory of the Soviet's larger intent. In my mind, the Soviets were essentially improvisors and didn't have any grandiose world plan. They were paranoid and that meant that they would never have enough security. That paranoia would always be a justification to broaden their security perimeter; they viewed such a policy as a defensive one. I thought that the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan because Hafizullah Amin was so contravening Afghan Islamic sensitivities that the Soviets were concerned about having another Iran on their border. That would have created major political pressures in the Central Asian Soviet Republics which might have threatened the whole union. I therefore viewed the invasion as quasi-defensive or preemptive. They wanted to overthrow Amin and replace him with Babrak Karmal, who they viewed as less of a problem. That is what I believed the Soviet rationale was; I did not believe that they were really interested in annexing Afghanistan. At the same time, I thought that there would be a good chance that if the Soviets were successful in Afghanistan, they would be tempted to look at Baluchistan as a necessary buffer and become a threat to Pakistan. That made me a strong proponent of assistance to the Mujahideen. That became one of my principal responsibilities in Pakistan. All of our efforts to help the Pakistani to help the Mujahideen was handled in Islamabad by the CIA Station Chief and myself. Casey visited Pakistan on several occasions clandestinely. He, the Station Chief and I would meet with Zia and his Inter-Services Intelligence group commander, unbeknownst to the Pakistani Foreign Office. Casey would usually be accompanied by one of his Washington staff, Chuck Cogan or Claire George. That small group would meet and dine at Zia's residence. The daily liaison was handled by the Station Chief. I urged maximum assistance to the Afghan "Freedom" fighters because I thought it was important that the Soviets be stopped before they got any other ideas.

Q: You are saying that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed our relationship with Pakistan.

SPIERS: Right. It was an interesting period because while we were on the same side of the Afghan issue, we did have major differences on the nuclear issue. So we were drawn together on one issue and apart on another. The Afghan issue took precedence. Our problem was to contain Pakistan's nuclear development efforts without losing Pakistani support for our efforts in Afghanistan. Now, that situation is changed because the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, eliminating that problem; that brings the focus of U.S.-Pakistani relationship more to the nuclear issue. That is the reason this relationship is going downhill again.

Q: What was your evaluation of our intelligence on the Pakistani nuclear developments?

SPIERS: It was rudimentary; most of the information came from clandestine sources developed by the Embassy. But I must add that I didn't know how much there was to know. It was very
clear that there was a group in Pakistan that was working towards the development of a nuclear capability. We didn't know how far it had advanced. We knew that they were not reprocessing plutonium at that point. We knew they were obtaining some technical assistance from the PRC -- that was common knowledge in Islamabad. There was an installation near Islamabad which was off limits to everybody. Once, the French Ambassador had a picnic near this area and was jumped upon and brutally beaten up. It was clear to me that the Foreign Office, including the Foreign Minister -- Jaquob Khan -- who by the way was one of the most competent people I had ever met, didn't know anything about what was going on the nuclear field. It was not clear to me that even Zia's principal nuclear advisor, Munir Khan, was fully cognizant of developments. The little group of nuclear experts was headed by A.Q. Khan, whom I never met because he lived in the south some place and was kept under-cover. Khan had worked once upon a time for EURENCO (European Uranium Enrichment Company) and had allegedly stolen or had copied enrichment machinery plans. That was some evidence here and there of small procurement efforts which by themselves appeared innocent enough, but that if taken as a whole appeared to be part of a larger pattern. Once plans for a nuclear device had been purloined, the evidence became very strongly suggestive that the Pakistanis were embarked on the development of a weapons program. I am sure that Zia was well aware of what was going on.

There was a cultural dimension to this whole effort, which very few Americans could be brought to understand. Zia valued the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. The culture of the subcontinent makes it impolite to tell someone the truth if it would offend them or make them uncomfortable. For example, if you send something to the launderer and he knows that you want it back the next day, he will tell you that it will be done although he knows full well that it is impossible. For Pakistani, that is not a lie; it is politeness. The launderer knows that you know that it will not be ready the next day, but the game must be played.

We didn't pay enough attention to these local cultural nuances. Dick Walters, who was every President's favorite special emissary, visited Pakistan once. He had with him what was allegedly a Pakistani blueprint for a atomic weapon which we had gotten through the efforts of a third country's intelligence service. It looked to me like any drawing from a scientific magazine which would be readily available to anybody. We, i.e. Walters, was going to confront Zia with these plans. I tried to tell him that this scheme wouldn't get very far because Zia didn't want to embarrass us; he wouldn't admit to anything that we might find offensive because that was contrary to the culture in which he was raised. Zia would not have viewed his negative response as lying; it would have been more of what we would call a "white lie", that is an answer which would have spared us embarrassment or hurt. In the Pakistani culture, that was perfectly innocent behavior; we just couldn't understand it.

I tried to make our policy clear to Zia. We had a good relationship and I liked him. I did the same with the Foreign Minister, whom I think was persuaded by the logic of our arguments. He understood that there would not be any winner in a nuclear war with India. But at some stage, irrationality becomes the controlling factor. I tried to point out that even if they had a nuclear device, they did not have a delivery system; it would be a very expensive enterprise which would soak up resources foolishly, even if they were available -- which they were not. Unfortunately, since both we and the Soviets were building weapons, our arguments against anyone else doing so were somewhat less than credible. The reality was that the Indians had exploded a device in
1974; it did not make much difference that it was labeled "peaceful" explosion. It was a nuclear explosion and it created concerns, fears and pressures among the Pakistanis. Pakistani public opinion favored and still favors the development of a nuclear weapon. Any government that disavowed it would lose the support of the people.

We persuaded the Pakistanis to publicize the best position they could under the circumstances and that was that they would sign the non-proliferation treaty and put all their nuclear programs under international inspections when and if the Indians would do the same. The Indians of course won't play because they equate themselves to China and won't accept any nuclear regime less stringent that the one under which the PRC operates.

Q: Did you ever try to use the press as leverage?

SPIERS: I gave some speeches in which I presented our point of view. Some of what I said was reported accurately; some was distorted. My statements were discreet; there was no use in being a blusterer. Interestingly enough, my comments received a more favorable reaction in India than they did in Pakistan. That of course was not helpful in Islamabad. But Zia knew that I was trying to be helpful; he was as honest with me as he could be.

I was also helped in Pakistan by a very sizeable military assistance package that Jim Buckley, then Under Secretary for Security Assistance, had put together. So I was able to arrive with something in hand. Then came the sale of the F-16s. That was a real coup. I thought it was silly for the Pakistanis to waste their money on equipment they didn't really need, but it certainly gave the country a shot in the arm. The acquisition of the aircraft became a symbol of national virility. The whole issue caught the imagination of the Pakistani public. It is hard to believe how emotionally important that wing of planes became. When the first deliveries were made I became a sort of national hero. I went to an Air Force base; there were hundreds of thousands of people watching. The Pakistanis flew these planes over the stands. They were good. They had as good, if not better, a reputation in U.S. training circles as the Israeli pilots. They took off, flew straight up until they disappeared from sight, did loops, flew in formation; it was a sight. The Pakistani's busses which were always carefully adorned, had pictures of these F-16 planes on them. The planes became a symbol of national pride and identity. It was almost incredible; just that euphoria made the sale worth while. I don't think Zia tried to marshal this enthusiasm, which developed spontaneously, but when he saw it happening, he certainly did nothing to discourage it. That whole era was a remarkable sequence of events. The arrival of the F-16s became a defining moment for the unity and patriotism of all of Pakistan. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to enjoy the total benefit of the occasion because I left Pakistan a few months after the arrival of the planes, but the benefits of that sale certainly lasted for the rest of my tour. It is true that we had some residual discussions about the ancillary weapons. The Pakistanis wanted AIM-9 missiles that we would not at that point sell them.

We also had some arguments about other weapons systems. I wanted to arm the Mujahideen with Stinger missiles -- the shoulder fired surface-to-air -- but I didn't win that one. The Red-Eye which was an earlier and cruder version was inadequate. The arguments for not providing those kinds of weapons are well known and it was not until long after my departure that we began to arm the Mujahideen with Stingers.
Q: What in your view are the limits that the U.S. government should impose on types of arms it will sell or allow to be sold?

SPIERS: Of course, anything nuclear; that is immediately ruled out. I would have ruled out sale of very sensitive technology except to some of our NATO allies because there was always the possibility that it might fall into the wrong hands. I would not have sold surface-to-surface missiles outside the NATO area. But in general, planes, tanks, artillery, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles gave me no great concern, although I don't recall the latter missiles ever being an issue. I don't think I have had to face that question.

Q: Let's return to the Pakistani situation. Tell us a little more about your tour.

SPIERS: One of my first tasks was to collect money from the Pakistanis to pay for the rebuilding of our Chancery which had been burned down in 1979. In fact, they used some of our military assistance money to repay us for our building. But I had made it clear that our relationships would not improve at all as long as we were not compensated for our losses. That was a very expensive rebuilding.

Q: What did we get for our military assistance package, besides compensation for loss of the Chancery? Did it motivate Pakistan to help with the Afghan program?

SPIERS: The Pakistanis were completely cooperative when it came to assistance to the Afghani resistance fighters. They would probably have been helpful on that matter in any case because getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan was in their interest as well.

The military assistance package was another illustration of a large aid program which had to cover requirements far in excess of anything we could afford or would give. The decision as to which requirements would be met was made essentially in Washington, much of it even before I became involved. As I said, I viewed the F-16s as an unnecessary luxury; the F-5s would have done just as well for military purposes. But Pakistan loved its new toys. You have to remember that I never thought that India and Pakistan would ever again go to war; if such an event had taken place, India would have clobbered Pakistan. So I didn't take the Indian threat very seriously and I felt that Pakistan had a adequate military force to deter Indian aggression, if that was India's intent, which I did not see.

Much of the military assistance was important to Zia to keep his own military commanders pacified. He needed their support. The military is the most coherently organized element of the Pakistan social structure. It is important to understand that in many respects, Pakistan is not one country; it is an amalgam of four distinct linguistic and ethnic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu and Baluchi. The military were primarily Punjabi. Bhutto was a Sindhi who eventually didn't enjoy anyone's support. Zia was a military officer who had been appointed Army Chief of Staff and then had to run the government after Bhutto's overthrow.

The common denominator of the four parts was Islam. Also Urdu, which is the second language for most Pakistanis. Interestingly enough, there are more Moslems in India than there are in
Pakistan. Also the paranoia about India helps cement the four parts together.

Q: *Let me move on to economic assistance. What was our aid intended to do?*

SPIERS: Our assistance was, as in the case of Turkey, an economic support program. We had a big AID mission, which managed a lot of projects. We were deeply involved in crop substitution. Pakistanis grew a lot of poppy which created a major drug problem for us. In almost every post I have served -- Bahamas, Turkey, Pakistan -- we have had a major drug problem. Pakistan was the largest problem of all. We tried to find other crops for farmers to grow. We also assisted with rural electrification by helping dam construction. We helped a lot on agricultural development in general. We were very much engaged in infrastructure development -- highways, etc. We helped with population control programs -- marketing of condoms, etc.

I must confess to some skepticism when it comes to economic assistance. We had a difficult, but good AID mission director. I had a very hard time keeping him in check. He and the economic section were always at each other's throats. He didn't care for my supervision or that of the Embassy; most of the arguments were about "turf" issues; very little dispute about substance. But our assistance was a drop in the bucket. The fundamental Pakistani problems were low literacy, poverty, slow economic growth and little free-market and our assistance could only be marginal.

Q: *How did economic assistance abet the achievement of our political objectives?*

SPIERS: We had three political objectives: a) maintain India-Pakistan relations on a non-violent basis; b) elicit Pakistani assistance for our efforts in Afghanistan; and c) discourage the development of a nuclear capability. Our economic assistance helped to enhance our political influence and leverage. It also helped, even if only marginally, to improve the living standards of ordinary Pakistanis.

As said earlier, although I had great reservations about the need for the Pakistanis to buy the very expensive F-16s, our government would not deny them that right. If the Pakistani wanted to spent U.S. funds in that way, so be it. The sale certainly increased our ability to meet the three objectives. That was the principal determinate and I suppose the same could be said for the economic assistance programs.

Q: *Let me turn now to the human rights issue. You got to Pakistan after the Carter administration, which had human rights high on its foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, I wonder how much interest Washington displayed on this issue?*

SPIERS: I don't remember the subject ever being raised. I don't believe that it was a very hot issue on our agenda with the Pakistanis. As I mentioned earlier, Pakistan lived in a different culture than the American one. That question was more relevant to in our relationships with Turkey than it was with Pakistan. We certainly intervened on behalf of Bhutto, but that was before I reached Pakistan.

Q: *While you were in Pakistan, Zia came to Washington on a State visit. How did that go?*
SPIERS: It went very well. Reagan was something else. I was part of the briefing team for him. His eyes glazed over during the meeting; I am not sure that he knew where Pakistan was. But Zia knew who he was dealing with. Zia was perfectly willing just to stay with generalities, so that there was very little of substance discussed. The visit became largely ceremonial; Reagan hosted a State dinner for him. We did take Zia around the country. We took him to Texas, California and New York; in all places he was treated royally. We traveled by SAM aircraft -- the VIP Air Force wing. Zia visited a number of Pakistani communities around the U.S. In Houston, he stayed at the Inn at the Park; he was the guest of honor at a large banquet attended by all the local luminaries. He visited a mosque. In San Francisco, we had a great boat trip around the Bay. He gave a speech to the World Affairs Council. He did the same thing in New York. It was all very nice, but little substance came of it.

State visits are useful to an Ambassador. I had attended one when Callaghan was Great Britain’s Prime Minister; that one covered many substantive issues. It enables the American Ambassador to become better acquainted with the Chief of State of the country to which he or she is assigned. He also gets to know the people around the Chief of State better.

Q: Pakistan was another example of a situation in which the U.S. often finds itself: a country which is at odds with another country with which the U.S. has or is trying to have friendly relations. How would you compare your relationships with your counterparts in New Delhi with those you had with your colleagues in Athens?

SPIERS: We had a good relationships with our Embassy in Delhi. There was no backbiting or arguments which unfortunately had too often been the precedent. Harry Barnes, then our Ambassador in new Delhi, agreed to exchange visits. I went to Delhi and he arranged for me to see Mrs. Gandhi. That turned out to be a very formal, twenty minute call during which she gave full vent to her unhappinesses about various matters. When I mentioned to Zia that Harry was coming to Islamabad, he immediately invited us to have dinner with him. So the three of us spent the evening chatting in a very relaxed fashion. It was quite a contrast. We exchanged visits on a number of occasions. Harry and I would of course have opportunity to exchange views during Chiefs of Mission meetings, one of which was held in New Delhi, one in Islamabad and one in another capital. It gave us a chance to talk about the area as a whole. One of these meetings was chaired by Secretary Shultz. That was the one that resulted in my return to Washington to become Under Secretary for Management.

Q: What is the role of the United States in situations such as Greek-Turkey, Pakistan- India, etc? Can the U.S. play a useful role?

SPIERS: The U.S. can play a pacifying role. It can avoid becoming a partisan for either side; it can be perceived by both sides as even-handed. In both situations of this kind that I was involved in, we tended to tilt more towards Pakistan and Turkey due to exogenous factors. With India, we have had a difficult relationship with that country for a long time, partly because we felt that they tilted toward the Soviet Unions and because India was not a free market economy. Pakistan was viewed as being more hard-headed, more reliable and friendly; it was part of the Baghdad Pact a long way back. So our relationships with Pakistan over the many years have been entirely different than those with India.
As far as Turkey was concerned, the Greeks certainly felt that we tilted towards Turkey. I don't think the Turks ever accused us of favoring the Greeks, although they certainly would have preferred a more pro-Turkey policy. In some respects, our relationships with Greece over the long haul have been more difficult than they have been with Turkey. There had been more anti-Americanism in Greece than in Turkey. Turks tend to like Americans in general.

Q: Were you satisfied with the assistance we were providing the Mujahideen?

SPIERS: I would have liked to see more done. The program did increase substantially after I left. I worked with Casey as much as possible because he was really the manager of the program in Washington. It was never clear to me how much State was involved. I know that Larry Eagleburger was when he was Under Secretary for Political Affairs because he was the person I would communicate with. But I don't think that the Bureau for Near East Affairs had much input or even knowledge. The Afghan support program was probably handled primarily in the breakfast meetings between the Secretary and Casey when covert operations were discussed. Casey would probably tell Shultz that he was going out to Pakistan again to see how things were going and that he would stop in Saudi Arabia on the way to get more contributions just to make sure the Secretary had no objections.

There was only one Afghan incursion into Pakistan while I was there; it was an overflight, probably made in error. There were already three million Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps when I was there. I visited those camps several times. It was an emotional experience for a lot of American visitors. The emigration had started before I had gotten to Pakistan, but it became a flood while I was there. Of course, there is really no border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is Patan territory, inhabited by various tribes. Islamabad's writ did not run very strongly in that area. One day, my wife and I were invited to visit his area as guests of one of the tribal chiefs. We were escorted by Pakistani government guards. When we approached the tribal territories, the guards were sent back because we were the guests of the tribe who felt we were their responsibility in their territory—not Islamabad's. The central government is very circumspect with these various tribes, which actually inhabit both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. They are all related. The border may sometime run through villages; that makes it a different proposition than what we in the West regard as an international line of demarcation. People cross those borders constantly without any objections.

Pakistan was a very interesting country. We saw a good deal of it. We went to the northern territories as close to the China border as they would let us. It was spectacular with all the mountains and glaciers; it dwarfed Switzerland. We saw K-Z which some say is higher than Everest. We went to the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas. We went to the Kingdom of Hunza, which is one of the oldest in South Asia. We spent some time with the Mir of Hunza. You have to recognize that many of these mountainous areas are almost autonomous. The Mir was not too bright -- the result of many years of in-breeding; he had been a member of the Pakistani Foreign Service. He really was just a figure-head, but Hunza was spectacular. It is the place that Shangri-la was allegedly based on. The atmosphere and life-style are so healthy that the inhabitants tend to live longer than they do in other parts of the country.
Q: What was China's role in the subcontinent while you were in Pakistan?

SPIERS: The Chinese had a very close relationship to the Pakistanis, partly because they were in a competitive situation with the Soviets. They also had an antagonistic relationship with the Indians so that a close relation with the Pakistanis was natural. The Chinese were very helpful in Afghanistan. They provided support for the Mujahideen which is not well known, but they were part of a cooperative effort. I had some conversations with the Chinese Ambassador, but they didn't amount to much because he was kind of old and not well versed in what was going on. Most of the Chinese contributions to the Mujahideen were handled in Beijing. I had good relationships with both the Chinese and Soviet Ambassadors in Islamabad.

The Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan was Smirnov, a career diplomat. He was a stamp collector, which provided some fodder for our conversations. We would give him American stamps. He was not really well plugged in and didn't have much of an idea of what was going on in Afghanistan. He used to tell me that he knew what we were doing there; that he knew we were running clandestine training camps. I would offer to take him by helicopter to any spot he designated; all he had to do is to tell me where these camps were supposed to be. Sometimes he would ask me what we were up to; I would always respond that I wouldn't tell him if we were or if we weren't doing something. I don't think that either he or the Soviets in general had much information about what we were doing. Smirnov was a nice guy and we had good personal relations. He would come to our Fourth of July party, although I was never allowed to go to his national day. In Turkey, the Soviet Ambassador, Rodianov, was less personable and friendly; he later became Soviet Ambassador to Canada. He was also a professional diplomat. Yuli Vorontsov, whom I mentioned earlier in connection with disarmament negotiations, was the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi. He had been the DCM in Washington while I was Director in PM, so I used to see him frequently. He is now the foreign affairs advisor to Yeltsin. I did not have the same relationship with the Soviet Ambassadors that I did with Soviet delegation members at disarmament conferences because that work required daily close collaboration. That is where I saw daily that the Soviets were human like all of us, with the same variety of vulnerabilities and strengths. I think all the Russian Ambassadors I met had been given a biographic resume on me from Moscow. They all seemed well briefed. I had their bio sheets from CIA. Because I had known so many of their colleagues, every once in a while one of the Ambassadors would pass greetings from an old Soviet acquaintance. Both Russian Ambassadors, the one in Turkey and the one in Pakistan, always said that they were strong defenders of Soviet foreign policy; now a number of my Russian acquaintances tell me that they really never were, although when I knew them in the old days they certainly seemed to be strong proponents. I was sometimes the same way; I strongly supported certain U.S. policies even when I didn't agree with them. But then I didn't have to face the extremes that Soviet diplomats did.
Erasmus Hall for secondary school. He received his undergraduate degree from Harvard University. He then earned a master’s degree in Buffalo before returning to Harvard to obtain his Ph.D.. All of his degrees were in the field of economics. His first overseas assignment was working with the Marshall Plan in Norway. He has also served abroad in Brazil, Jamaica, Guyana, Peru, and Thailand. He was interviewed by W. Haven North on June 25, 1997.

Q: Right. Let’s move on to Pakistan. Pakistan has been through many gyrations of programs. What was the state of affairs when you got there?

LION: In 1977 or 1978, there was Senator Symington, again, this time it was to cut-off aid if they were doing bad things on the nuclear front. So aid was cut off. It had been maybe the fourth or fifth largest bilateral program in our whole effort, after Korea and England during Marshall Plan days. But something happened in 1979, the Russians attacked Afghanistan. And suddenly, Pakistan became more important. And suddenly we were able to have a different perspective on their nuclear development work. President Carter sent someone over to negotiate some sort of assistance package. They came up with 300 million dollars. President Zia of Pakistan said, “That’s peanuts.”

Q: A famous speech.

LION: Very appropriate, considering who our president was.

Then there was an election in January of ‘80. By the middle of ‘80, the new administration, no, ‘81 it had to be, election was in ‘80. By the time they got installed, they sent somebody to renegotiate the deal. This time the Reagan administration came up with 3.25 billion dollars over five years. Half of that, 52% of that, was economic assistance. The other was military assistance. So our economic assistance program to Pakistan, over a five-year period, was 1.625 billion dollars.

Before I got there as mission director, I was sent there as a member of a team which Fred Scheck headed up. Three or four of us, plus Fred, were asked to come up with a package - more activities, program, project, food, whatever. So we came up with something like 23 projects. Actually, we did not come up with these projects on our own. This is another example of meeting with every Pakistani ministry that was relevant -- and the minister of finance, and the minister of planning, and the President of the country. We got their feedback and what they thought made sense. The only thing that we put in there that we were not too happy about, was something they requested very firmly. That was a program for Baluchistan. Baluchistan is a province to the west and is the most undeveloped province, in some respect the wildest province and the most difficult and the poorest and the most isolated. But they wanted to do something for Baluchistan. But, every other component of that program was something that we were interested in, perfectly happy to do, and perfectly happy to respond to their request.

Then I came back, about three weeks or so. After I completed my team work, I went back to Guyana. No, it wasn’t three weeks, I packed and two days later I went back to Pakistan. Poor Linda had a baby, a two-weeks old baby, had to finish the packing and get herself ready. We also
had a nanny.

When I got there, we had to, in a space of a few weeks, develop PIDS, remember those things?

Q: Yes. Project Identification Documents.

LION: Twenty of them. They were to be substitutes for project papers because it would take you a year or so to come up with a project paper. We ended up with twelve projects that first year -- designed, funded and beginning to be implemented. What we did was very smart because we learned from Egypt’s experience with their enormous pipeline. People were saying, “Why are you sending a billion and a half to Egypt when they’ve got three billion in the pipeline.” From their point of view, a reasonable question.

So we did not fully fund any projects. We funded them for a year or eighteen months and we never had that pipeline problem that they had in Egypt.

So, when we got there, there were 14 US direct-hire people who were being asked to design, manage, implement what was, in effect, a 300 million program. There was, at that time, a state Department Chargé when I arrived. I arrived in September. A Chargé who, unfortunately, seemed to be anti-AID. An Economic Counselor who was anti-AID. I was told subsequently by someone in the embassy that they frequently would start a meeting of the economic staff by saying, “How can we screw AID today?”

Then we got an ambassador in October who was very interested intellectually, and very sympathetic with foreign assistance. But who said he was going to concern himself about the Russians, and he was going to concern himself with the Pakistani-India relationship which were the two most important things to him. He let the DCM and the economic counselor worry about AID. That was a real challenge. He let the DCM and the economic counselor, in effect, run the embassy while he worried about these other things, very important things. A very good man and an excellent ambassador in respect to those things.

But that meant I had to justify every single request for staff, one by one by one by one. I couldn’t get more than one at a time. Here I have this program and we had people who were unsympathetic, anti-AID, and all the rest of it. So, that was not a good experience. It was a fight all the way. It meant that the US direct-hire people, we worked ourselves to a frazzle. We were there at eight in the morning, or earlier. We worked at nights, weekends. Even though the design stage is less critical to intensive direct-hire staffing than implementation is, you can bring people in, contract people and have them do most of the design work. You kind of do the reviewing and stuff like that.

We were able to manage, as I say, to get together 12 projects. By the end of the first year, I think we had 16 or 17 people to try to implement and manage a program as large, as diversified, as complex in a country as difficult as Pakistan. It was impossible. By the end of my tour, which was four years, we had 45 direct-hire people but that was because we had a different ambassador. Who was willing, not only to let you do what you thought was right, but had confidence in you and your staff and supported you. The ambassador who came there shortly after I arrived was
transferred a year later back to Washington to head up the administrative part of state. George Shultz asked him to come over.

A week after the new ambassador arrived, the new economic counselor came down to my office and said, “Donor, I want to be the ambassador’s man on AID, on assistance.”

Q: Sound familiar?

LION: But, the new ambassador we happened to have was a fellow by the name of Deane Hinton.

Q: He had been an AID director?

LION: He had been an AID director as well as political counselor, economic counselor or whatever, in a couple of countries as we mentioned earlier. That’s not how he came out. He said -- let Donor do his thing and let the mission do its thing.

There was an interesting specific issue. Every project paper that AID has prepared in Pakistan, under the regime of the previous ambassador, the DCM and the economic counselor, had to be cleared by the economic counselor and the political counselor. When Deane Hinton arrived, I indicated that I didn’t think that was the right way to work. We didn’t clear their political reports, we didn’t clear their proposed labor programs. He said -- let AID do it. But because we were not stupid, I would keep them informed. I would tell them what we were doing, I would explain it carefully, I developed a decent relationship with the political counselor so that what we were trying would make sense to him although he did not have to give his clearance. So after Deane arrived, and after we straightened out the new economic counselor on who was in-charge of what, the relationship was fine.

We had some problems with INM, International Narcotics Matters, they had a man there working on drugs, narcotics. Big problem, Pakistan. Pakistan at that point was the largest producer of opium poppy and the largest basic supplier of heroin materials in the world. No longer so but was then. We had a lot of problems with the INM guy. He was interested in trying to do development work which didn’t bother us. We were not trying to do everything. But the kind of things he was trying to do were not effective and would not succeed in supplanting poppy. In fact, it became our judgment, that no crop substitution program would do the job. So that was not what we tried to do. In the AID stuff, we tried to do holistic development work, area development work, education, infrastructure, wells, health, as well as crop stuff. In fact, we succeeded in transforming one area which was the largest producing area in Pakistan of opium poppy, to the smallest poppy area. The only problem was that it went somewhere else.

Q: What were these people producing if they gave up poppy?

LION: Tomatoes, onions, both high-value crops. Crops that they had not grown before and crops that they could grow out of season from tomatoes and onions grown elsewhere in Pakistan. We did a lot of other things that were of interest to the people. We also went about the crop stuff in a way that was not brilliant but it worked. We had farmers who were part of a program of display,
demonstration farms. We would pay them to do it. People in the farms would come to see Joe Smith down the road who was doing great things with tomatoes, or whatever it was, that seemed to work. Gadoon Amazai, I think, is the name of the area.

One of the other things that we were able to do was to get the state provincial governor -- governors were quite powerful in Pakistan, there were several provinces -- the governor of the northeast province to agree to an enforcement program which was something that we were working on very hard. After a while there seemed to be some compliance. Less than we liked, more than one could have expected, not a lot but some. That took up a lot of our time.

We proposed to the government of Pakistan that it try to attack the opium poppy production problem throughout the country, not just in one place. So we had a contractor come and look at all the potential places and come up with an anti-opium poppy program for all of Pakistan. The government bought it and brought it to the meeting in Paris, the consortium, the AID consortium, presented it as its program and asked for pledges for that specific program in addition to the other AID assistance pledges that would be made. That was fun, that was exciting. That was kind of a bilateral assistance triumph. An example of effective collaboration, I must say.

Q: Did you get a good response?

LION: Some pledges, about two million dollars. We also got a pledge from UNFIDAC, the United Nations drug agency that has changed its name since then, it’s got another name. We worked closely with UNFIDAC in Pakistan which was a very good example of multilateral coordination. They finally accepted the enforcement criteria that they were not willing to push before. The UN agencies have a tough time being rigorous sometimes with the host government because the host government owns part of them, that sort of thing. UNFIDAC tried to do a good job too.

Actually, poppy in Pakistan is way down these days. It’s nothing like what it was and it’s not near Burma and Laos.

Q: Was the area approach, group of activities that were supportive of what the people wanted, was that your strategy?

LION: As I said, the strategy was to change the economy of the area, change the institutions in the area, change the infrastructure in the area, change the value of government service to the people in the area, all of those things. That helped. But also important was what was happening in Pakistan in terms of addiction. When I got there in ‘81, heroin addicts maybe you could count on your hand but there were 500,000 opium addicts with an opium infrastructure with cellars and basements and places where people could go. That was 1981. By 1983 or 4, it began to mushroom-hero inhibition. It wasn’t just poor trash, lower-class peasants. It was children of the elite who also got addicted. That began to change the mind-set of leadership in Pakistan. They were willing to do things. Corruption at the customs houses, they were going to start to go after that, it had been terrible.

Q: What other programs were you pushing?
LION: We had an irrigation program of major size in most of the provinces. Pakistan has one of the largest man-made irrigation systems in the world, in terms of mileage, I don’t know how many thousands of miles but it’s very extensive. It was in disrepair, it wasn’t managed properly. We worked with each of the provinces to try to strengthen that system, technical assistance, construction, maintenance repair, equipment, very extensive.

Another thing we tried to do, as I said, was to privatize commercial banking, get at least a couple of private commercial banks. I never succeeded in that. The mission did not succeed in doing that while we were there. It now has some but at least we broke the ground a little bit and helped prepare the day when it did come. We spent a lot of time on that.

We also tried to promote the development of a coal project combined with power, private sector ownership and management. We didn’t succeed with that either. It was called the LAKRA project. Put a lot of time and worry and effort. We got Washington, the bureau anyway, to support it but when it got reviewed by Peter and others around him, it was killed.

Q: Why was that?

LION: Among other things, people were worried about the potential Pakistan aid pipeline. You have to be careful how you correct people in positions of power. We pointed out that this was not a problem in Pakistan because we weren’t fully funding the projects. We were not successful.

Another thing that we worked on, I think it’s pretty good, it was relatively successful, was essentially the creation of a new university in the northeast, in Peshawar, in the northeast province. Working with a couple of US universities.

Q: Was this a general university?

LION: Yes. An important focus on agriculture but still a general university. Four-year, full university, full-blown, money went for all the usual things including construction, faculty training, technical assistance. We had a team there, up to ten people, all the time from the US universities. I understand that it came out pretty well.

Q: What’s it called?

LION: Northeast university something, I forget now what the name is.

Q: What American universities were involved?

LION: Illinois.

Q: This would be a university from the ground up, from scratch.

LION: Almost from scratch, there was something there but it was in terrible shape.
Q: Do you know whether it’s now essentially on its own?

LION: That’s what we think. It’s my impression. The last time I inquired about it was a few years ago and they said it was going okay, it was doing well.

We also had a population program of considerable size. You’d think in a Muslim society that would be a serious problem and it was for some people. The Mullahs, the clerics, were opposed to it. Although we did learn that the wife of one of the chief clerics was using contraception. It’s funny how you learn these things.

The person in-charge of the population program in Pakistan, on the government side, was a woman who had previously been the founder, the inspirer of the private sector NGO family planning programs. Atiya Iniyatula was her name. Very good, very strong, and very effective. She was in the cabinet, the only woman in the cabinet. Her husband was a general, that helped. I think she’s now with the UN family planning agency.

She was able to arrange a briefing of President Zia and 24 other Pakistani government officials on population-related issues. What is the population going to be like, given certain realistic assumptions, its composition. We did a Rapid presentation to Zia and Zia supported us. He supported that effort in a Muslim country. He compromised a lot with the right-wing religious elements but not on that issue.

So, we did that. We did population, drugs, narcotics, a lot of irrigation. We worked very closely with the World Bank. This is an example of good AID-Bank collaboration. The two agencies had their people, our guy on energy, their guy came from Washington, sat down and worked up a total program in the energy sector for five years with each agency clearly responsible for what-piece-of the program. It involved power production, conservation work, and it just pleased me that we were able to work that out.

Speaking of conservation, we were also able to make presentations to the cabinet on a number of occasions. In addition to the population one, we did one on energy conservation which showed how they could save 15% of their energy by simple reforms in various power plants and in the industrial sites where energy was important. That was useful.

We also did a presentation on vegetable oil. They had a two billion dollar a year bill on imported vegetable oil. So, we were able to propose to them an approach to that problem that would increase production, reduce imports, increase privatization, be much more rational and reduce the corruption that was involved in the whole sector.

So, we were pretty busy there.

Q: It was a class operation, as I recall.

LION: Next to Egypt, it was the largest program in the agency.

Q: Were you able to keep up with the annual requirement for the commitment of funds?
LION: We delivered all 1.625 billion

Q: In how many years?

LION: Five years. We obligated it all over time. But it was really a tough job for the first two and a half years, we really went crazy working as hard as I described getting project papers done.

Q: You had to submit them all to Washington for approval, and all that process?

LION: Yes.

Q: How were the Pakistanis to work with on those projects, programs?

LION: The government people in-charge of collaboration with AID and with other assistance agencies, the department and the ministry of planning were very good. Ejaz Naik was the head of it, very reasonable, thoughtful, could make decisions, made them. His people were very good. We developed very good relationship with them. The minister of agriculture, first rate, excellent man, well-to-do rich landowner in the Punjab. A navy man, he was an admiral. Intelligent, thoughtful, reasonable, trying to do the right things, very likeable. We had a very good relationship with him also. I played bridge with him, we played bridge with Ejaz Naik. Hinton had some people over at his house and we had a little bridge tournament. So bridge, besides being fun, was helpful over the years.

But we had problems with some of the individual states. The provinces are very jealous of each other. Every province resented the Punjab which was the most powerful province. In particular, Sindh was the province that resented the Punjab because it was number two. That’s where Karachi was located, the former capital. The Punjabi officials seemed to us, for the most part, to think that they were the cat’s whiskers who knew everything, didn’t have to be told anything. So you don’t tell them. You suggest, you offer. But they were very difficult to work with. The irrigation program suffered most from the difficulties we had with the provincial officials who were gods in their own areas. The central government was not all that powerful.

But I must say that the AID relationship with the senior government officials couldn’t have been better. In particular, for me, I had a wonderful relationship with the minister of planning, who later became the minister of finance and planning. Mabub ul Hak who had come from the World Bank. He had been with the World Bank for 11 years. We were very close. An outstanding development economist and a good person to work with.

Q: So you were constantly pushing programs

LION: There hasn’t been any government that I could see as a government in Pakistan, since I’ve been there, that’s really devoted to the poor. In contrast, Mabub ul Hak has very strong feelings for the disenfranchised and for women. He has done some very good work when he joined the UNDP as an advisor to the UNDP administrator.

Q: The Human Development Report and all that. But he didn’t carry any weight in the system?
LION: The Pakistanis, the ones we dealt with for the most part, were open. The projects we were doing were designed with their approval. They were projects largely selected by the Pakistanis. But there were some elements in the senior infrastructure, bureaucratic infrastructure, that were status quo, conservative, maybe even reactionary. They were, basically, more powerful.

In Pakistan they had developed something that we see in almost every poor country or in every third world country -- positive decision making is centralized, negative decision making is decentralized. Almost anybody can hold up anything. But when you want to go forward on an important issue or problem, decision, there’s one person whom you’ve got to say yes. That’s the way it was in Pakistan and in many other countries as well. But I had not seen it developed to the point that it had been in Pakistan. Of course it’s not just an institutional thing, it’s personality. The person who was the minister of finance had to make all the important decisions himself, you couldn’t get anything by him. For the most part, they were decisions that supported what his other people and we, AID, agreed should be done. Part of the problem was that it took weeks, sometimes months to get those decisions. Because things were so centralized, he had to make so many decisions, it was too much.

Q: There wasn’t any move to decentralize?

LION: I don’t think things have changed much since.

Q: What have you learned from your experience in Pakistan?

LION: One of the things I learned was how to make use of contractors. Our life depended on that. Generally, the success of your mission depends not only on your counterparts, the environment, policy framers and so on but on your direct-hire people, your managers. Of course, a core of foreign service nationals who have been there for ten years or so. The memory and what-not of the mission. But in this case, for the first year or two, our success depended on contractors. We had so few staff. So, that was one thing I learned as a technician, as a development manager.

Q: You used them in the design implementation.

LION: I don’t mean we used them to do evaluation work or management work. How do you work with contractors under a stress situation where you have to produce between ten and fifteen project papers in less than a year. Quality papers. There were several of us in that mission who were concerned with quality. Linda was the project development office and in charge of contracting. By the way, that was the first time that contracting and the project development office were ever put together under one office. I thought that made sense because you have to integrate the whole procurement operation with your project schedule.

Linda was always concerned with quality. Some of the division chiefs, the office directors and I, we used to go over every project paper line-by-line. We’d argue with the contractors, and tell them to go back and do it this way and that way. One of the things we insisted on was that the design include analysis of previous projects in other missions dealing with the same subject. We
included a Lessons Learned section in each PP and took it seriously in our design.

Q: I remember that.

LION: And how do you put them in your PP. In fact, AID sent people around to evaluate our PPs. Larry Harrison was one of them and somebody else did it too. They both concluded that ours were among the best in the agency. That was because of the collection of the people who were there. I would say, in particular, Linda and some of the office directors. I had something to do with it but it was a team effort. Our Lessons Learned emphasis was part of the reason for the high quality of the PPs.

So, learning how to get the most out of your contractors, and holding their feet to their fire, and demanding performance, and not accepting substitute personnel from the ones that they originally proposed. In particular, the chief of party. So I learned a lot there about that whole process. Interviewing the chief of party, you have to do that, the proposed chief of party. You do not accept without talking, seeing the person. If there’s any effort to “bait and switch,” you don’t stand for that. You put your foot down even though you’re in a hurry, even though you’re under pressure, even though you want to get started. It’s better in the year that follows that you do it the right way.

They don’t seem like significant things but they were important.

Q: Did you have trouble getting projects approved in Washington?

LION: Sometimes. Even though there was pressure to get it all done. We had the LAKRA project. We went through terrible times to try to get them to approve that. Limited support, limited support but then it didn’t work out. We never had an approved PP by central AID.

The education project in northeast Pakistan, we had to revise it several times to satisfy one or two individuals in Washington who thought they knew better than we did.

It was tough. It was a tough assignment. We were building staff so our capacity to manage, implement was stretched. As I said, at one point, by the time Linda and I left Pakistan, four years later, we had 45 US direct-hire which was three times the size when we first arrived.

Q: Were there other dimensions of your experience in Pakistan? Were you doing any policy dialogue with the government?

LION: We were doing it in a sectoral basis. We were doing it in fertilizer, we were doing it in vegetable oil, we were doing it in the energy sector, we were doing it in population. We made some progress.

Q: Any particular techniques in doing that that you found useful?

LION: What seemed to be useful were these presentations to this group of high-level, cabinet-level people. We’d explore it, we’d describe it, give the pros and cons of different options and
solutions. They seemed to find that effective. Personal relationships with the key people, we always know that, that was something we assiduously worked on. I worked on it with the minister of planning and finance, minister of agriculture and with the man who was in the water and power administration, WAPDA, the largest government organization in the country, 100,000 employees or something like that. He was very fond of this phrase that I’ve given you, “In Pakistan, positive decision making is centralized and negative decision making is decentralized.” He made a copy of that and put it on his desk.

The personal relations with key people, these rapid and other visual aid presentations. When I say personal relations, I’m including parties, social occasions, bridge games. AID has never (and it’s very difficult, if not impossible) evaluated the effectiveness and significance of out-of-office contact. I think we’ve gotten a lot of dialogue, sectoral and macro policy stuff, at least considered as a result of that kind of work. Speaking of evaluation, our emphasis on results makes evaluation very difficult. Because results are long in coming, frequently indirect, mission evaluations should put more stress on process, on mission operating systems.

Q: Any thing else on Pakistan come to mind?

LION: The last thing that I did that I was pleased with was to suggest another five-year program. Wrote up a big report, study, proposal, what-not, which the ambassador was very happy with and sent it around to people in the US government. Some of it, I think, was actually adopted. But we’ve been running into trouble with Pakistan. Up and down, the mission is closed now, if it isn’t closed now it will be.

Q: Were you involved with the Afghanistan sideshow?

LION: No. Ambassador Hinton asked me to head up the Afghan AID office. He wanted to put that in my portfolio along with the regular USAID Pakistan program. I pleaded with him not to insist that I do it. Because I said that it would compromise the whole AID program. It would politicize it. So he finally acceded and I proposed Larry Crandall who was finally sent there.

Q: Did you provide any support for that operation?

LION: Some backstopping. As much as he needed, as much as we could give him. Eventually he became pretty self-sufficient up there. We had a person in Peshawar, the northeast province, a regional AID person. This is one of the things that we needed to do because so much was done in each province and the governors and the bureaucracies there were so powerful, that you had to work with them. You couldn’t work on their projects with the central government. So we had a one or two person office in Peshawar, was had a one or two person office in Lahore, we had an office in Karachi. This was one of the things that we had to do.

Q: There was an element of decentralization. Was that really decentralized?

LION: For example, there were certain things that they did in Karachi that we couldn’t do from Islamabad. Karachi was the major port. So that meant all of the commodity assistance, all of the PL 480, all of the fertilizer, all of the energy commodities that we worked up within an energy
program that we had.

Working with the northwest frontier province, required somebody there working with the provincial authorities. Since our other programs, ag programs, irrigation programs, were province-by-province with different things going on in provinces, you had to have somebody there. So we did.

Q: Were there any moves to decentralize below that governor level in terms of involving a local community?

LION: We got into some community stuff in the narcotics effort. But we also worked very closely with the provincial government on that too.

Q: There was the rural development project in the very northern border area sponsored by the Aga Khan foundation and AID was involved, the World Bank, was that going on?

LION: It was going on and we were aware that it was an interesting project that seemed to be having a good bit of success. An increasing community participation, savings, production, employment and so on. But it was a very unique approach and it was not one that you could assure that AID could finance or provide. There was one man there who worked for seven, eight years. He was what made it work. Where do you get somebody like that who stays for seven, eight years in a God-forsaken place doing that kind of work?

Q: There was the anticipation, at some point, that that could be replicated throughout the country.

LION: Very difficult because of the unique aspect of it that made it a success.

Q: Any more on the Pakistan affair?

LION: I wanted to stay on after 1985. Why Peter decided that he wanted me to come to Washington to be his chief economist I’m not sure I’ll ever know. But we were just beginning to design the second effort, the second five-year effort. I wanted to complete that and get it started, launch it. I also did not want to work in Washington. So I kicked and screamed and sent several pages of cable telling him why it wasn’t right, wasn’t good for the agency, I wasn’t qualified. In fact, without my having anything to do with it, Mabub ul Hak sent Peter a cable and asked him not to pull me out of Pakistan. But you know Peter, when he makes up his mind.
Togo. Ambassador Johnson and her sister, Persis Johnson were interviewed by Ann Miller Morin in 1986.

Q: You just shifted gears and went right back. Tell me about Islamabad and your work there.

JOHNSON: Islamabad was entirely different. It was a new culture for me. I had been in Tunis from ’67 to ’69, so I knew a little bit of the Mediterranean Arab but I had never been in south Asia. I knew Muslims and basic things about the religion but it was all new for us. Fortunately we had a wonderful... The residence in Pakistan, Islamabad, was probably better than the one in Togo.

PERSIS: It was very nice. It was very different. We had a very nice residence in Togo. Islamabad was really outstanding, and the views...

JOHNSON: It was lovely. It was a new, it was a made city. It was designed by Doxiadis. It was a well designed modern city that was trying to find itself because the business capital was Karachi and it’s the major city and Lahore is the academic and cultural capital, but this one was up in the Punjab and they wanted to create it. So it was a growing city and we saw it expand quite a bit while we were there.

I enjoyed it because it was a bigger program. First of all, we have three centers in Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar, as well as Islamabad. We were building. They had started many years before, a cultural center, and the main thing was for us to finish that American center. So that took up a lot of time and energy and thought during the first two years I was there. But we got it; we pushed it through and we inaugurated it. It was a very, very nice center and we got some excellent programming going in it. So it was a challenge and also I was able here rather than all the different elements of the mission I was trying to blend the Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar operations into a country plan.

Q: In other words, you were over all?

JOHNSON: I was all over all of them.

Q: That's a big job.

JOHNSON: All four. I had a lot more people working for me in Pakistan than I had in Togo. We had seventeen officers there and about a hundred locals.

Q: What were those offices again? Peshawar, Lahore...

JOHNSON: And Karachi. Then we had a reading room out of Karachi in Hyderabad. There had been a center there but it had closed down.

PERSIS: What about Quetta?

JOHNSON: We didn't have anything there but we were talking about it.
Q: And you had seventeen officers and how many locals?

JOHNSON: About 98 locals. About a hundred.

Q: That is a big program. Who was your ambassador?

JOHNSON: The first one was Ron Spiers, who was outstanding, and the second one was Hinton, Dean Hinton. He and I didn't get along too well. You know we had different viewpoints. I certainly respect him as somebody who knows his business and he was a very successful ambassador there, building up American presence and influence in Pakistan. There's something you have to be a little wary about, I think. I thought we should reach out and meet the opposition, the young intellectuals. Well, he did, he also wanted to be in touch with everybody. But we were just two different personalities.

PERSIS: It was a very nice transition with Ron Spiers and seeing a new culture. It was very different. I had remembered the Arab culture of Tunis, visiting the second time with Marilyn there. This was a Muslim country but still not the same. Also coming from the open, happy, laughing, dancing culture in Africa, I found this a repressive culture in a sense.

Q: Are they very orthodox?

JOHNSON: Yes. There are a lot of fundamentalists there. Zia was trying to push Islamization. They had Islamic law and where women in the past, under the British, had come up, now they were trying to put them back in their place. The president was favoring the Jumiat-i-Islami, which was a religious party but it had political overtones. That was a hard thing. Human rights were being suppressed.

Q: It's difficult to live in a country like that, isn't it?

JOHNSON: Well, you know, it wasn't, because we knew a lot of the good people, too. There were bright ones and we worked with them.

PERSIS: Also for me it was the transition of household. Going from a household where you could trust everyone to one that was not like that. We had...

JOHNSON: ...a succession of cooks and bearers. At the beginning.

Q: It must have been rather difficult. You had lost Emile.

JOHNSON: That's right.

PERSIS: That was part of the problem because there was no one down in that service area who was in a sense a part of the household. And I couldn't get down there. But it's a different culture. It has a different feeling completely.
JOHNSON: And instead of everybody happy and laughing, they were always arguing. Persis had to mediate between. Everybody is jealous. They're all very... you know, if you've been in the Middle East. And revenge is the main thing. People killing all the time.

PERSIS: We were very fortunate in getting a head man in the house who took much of the load and straightened [things] out. I had to respect him.

JOHNSON: He was a very religious, good, good Muslim.

PERSIS: Truly religious, not just on the surface. So it became a very, very pleasant experience.

Q: How long did it take before you were able to get all this worked out and get the proper help?

PERSIS: It took about nine months to a year..

Q: Did it really?

PERSIS: Yes. But then it worked very well. And it will always be a very happy memory.

JOHNSON: Yes. Nice people there.

Q: I gather you ran the house there?

JOHNSON: She ran the household, yes.

PERSIS: Which was harder than in Togo because it was a larger household and not as easy to get the same attitude in the help.

JOHNSON: In fact the second bearer that we got is with us now. He was a very good person and we brought him back here and he runs the house for Persis.

PERSIS: He asked to come.

JOHNSON: He wanted to come. The driver wanted to come, but this one was very good. He's here. I'm just thinking I haven't heard him today. When I was out did you hear him get up? I ought to go down and see if he's all right.

PERSIS: He's probably gone out. He perhaps went out earlier.

JOHNSON: Luckily the first day I took him down to show him where the mosque was so that on Friday he could go. We paid for him to come here, of course, and since it was coming by in the area I asked if he wanted to go to Saudi Arabia to do the...

Q: Mecca?

JOHNSON: No, it wasn't... the Umra, but then it turned out it was the Haj season so with a lot of
negotiation and some advance money he was able... we got him to get a place to go on the Haj. So he came back from Saudi Arabia as a Hajji. So he's very religious and the first day when he was going down he met somebody who was a driver for a Pakistani with the World Bank who lives right in the neighborhood. So it was marvelous. He's met friends through him.

PERSIS: He goes to the adult school.

JOHNSON: The same thing we did for Emile. We got him into the Americanization school down at Georgetown where he meets other foreign students who are studying English. So he has other friends too. An outlet for him to get out. So he gets out every day for about four hours.

Q: Were you able to find supplies easily in Islamabad?

JOHNSON: Oh, yes. There was a big commissary there. And also on the market. Just about anything you want in the marketplace.

PERSIS: We had a very good garden and we had a lot of fresh vegetables. We never had to worry about that.

JOHNSON: We grew our own salads.

Q: I suppose you had a heavy entertaining schedule as always?

JOHNSON: As always.

PERSIS: That's good you know. At least you will see people.

JOHNSON: That's right, she didn't.

PERSIS: In Islamabad I didn't.

JOHNSON: She didn't go downstairs much.

PERSIS: I did when it was necessary when I could be helpful. I didn't feel the necessity there. No, what were we talking about?

Q: Nothing at all. We were talking about the entertaining.

PERSIS: But it was a beautiful house for entertaining. It was very well set up. We were very fortunate in being there. We were given the right kind of furniture.

JOHNSON: They refurnished it just before we got in. They went over it completely so it was very good. It was an FBO-owned house.

PERSIS: Marilyn believes in a lot of business over the dining room table. It was a small table, so they let us have furniture built. It was a huge room. It was just a beautiful. It was a modern
house. It had spectacular views from all around. We were fortunate in having the good sense not to overpower the house with some of our own things. We used only a few things here and there so that the house showed up.

JOHNSON: It was nice architecture.

Q: How long were you there?

JOHNSON: Almost three and a half years at the most. We got there at the end of January of '82 and we left in July of '85.

Q: Are there any special memories you retained of Islamabad that you'd like to talk about?

JOHNSON: I don't think so. Perhaps the apex, at the end, and the high point was when I did go on a trek, you know you always hear about treks. They have a very good group of Europeans and Americans and Pakistanis who have formed something called the Asia studies group, for people who are there to learn about the culture of the country and the geography and society. They had arranged a trek to a place called Fairy Meadows, up in the northern Karakorams, up to one of the base camps of Nanga Parbat which is the westernmost peak in the Himalaya range.

At first I didn't apply because there was a lesser trek and they said this is only for the experienced people who are hard climbers and have done lots of training, so I said that's not for me. But they canceled the one the week before and this - I heard that somebody was going on this trip, and I thought my goodness if she could do it, I think I could. Luckily it was a night we were having a reception for some educational group and our Fulbright professor was there and he was a very avid mountain climber. When I had called the British woman to ask if I could get into the group. She said, "Well, I don't know." She knew how old I was because I'd played tennis with her. She said, "You ask Hall," Professor Hall who was at the house. So I talked with him and he said yes he thought I could do it.

He said we would go climb a nearby hill in the Margala hills and we’d check and see how my stamina was. So we went out. I had a pair of old boots and luckily I had a sleeping bag and everything else that was needed for it. We went out and climbed and I was able to keep up and move along so they let me go and that was really very good.

There's a doctor who was an outstanding ophthalmologist, who works in a missionary hospital in Taxila outside of Islamabad, who also was about my age, and he had been training, running up and down stairs for months, and he had done a lot of trekking. So the two old-timers were there. We were often at the head of the line. We made it up to the base camp. So that was a wonderful experience of just walking in the mountains of northern Pakistan.

Q: How long do you stay? Just overnight?

JOHNSON: Oh, no, no. We flew up to Gilgit, which is a northern part in the Karakorams, and then we went by car across the Indus river and we climbed for a day to our first camp. We slept out there next to a rushing river. Then we climbed the second day to the Fairy Meadows.
there in time for lunch that day. So it didn't take too much. Then rested for a day and the fourth day most of us, some of them didn't make it, but most of us went up to a base camp. It was an international group. There was an Austrian girl, there were British, Australians, and there were three Americans.

It was the base camp of Nanga Parbat. Then we came back and rested a day. We came down in one day. No we didn't, we stayed overnight. It took us two days to come down again. About a ten-day trek. Then we came back by bus and car.

PERSIS: You had other memorable trips in there.

JOHNSON: You know another thing about Pakistan that's lovely is - I spoke of Taxila - is the old Greek civilization that was there. Alexander the Greek came through and the marvelous Gandaran art, which is a combination of... it's like the Buddhist but they all have Greek features because of the Greek influence on art there. It's a very rich country. Then the whole Indus valley culture. They have Mohenjo-Daro, which people don't know much about, but Mohenjo-Daro was something like Babylon, one of the old cities of an ancient civilization.

Q: Is there much of it left?

JOHNSON: They're trying to restore it, but unfortunately the water table has risen and all of the salts have risen and it's just crumbling away the bricks. It's been recognized by UNESCO as one of the world monuments to save. Millions of dollars are going into it. We've given a couple of million, the United States, to preserve it. I visited there and also because while I was there the war in Afghanistan continued and we built up quite a program in Peshawar out of nothing working with the people, representatives of the organizations that are there to help.

Q: Aid to victims?

JOHNSON: Yes, and then that worked with the Afghan refugee groups. There was a lot going on. It was important from that point of view politically.

PERSIS: What about Quetta?

JOHNSON: And Quetta, I went there. It was lovely.

Q: Where is that?

JOHNSON: Quetta is over next to Iran in Baluchistan, which is a very unstable area. The Soviets would love to come down through Afghanistan and through Baluchistan, which is in Pakistan and then take over Iran from that side, too. They would have a pincer movement on Iran.

Q: You went up there?

JOHNSON: Yes, I went to Quetta because we have some programs. It's an important part of the country. There's a military staff command college and we have an American military who is
there, and through him we send up some films and brochures, and also when we have an American participant speakers come out, we arrange for them to go there. We had a Fulbright professor in the university of Quetta.

PERSIS: What about the English teacher from Quetta?

JOHNSON: I worked very closely with an American professor of biology in a seminar, getting a seminar going up there. We helped him.

Q: I suppose you had to travel to all of your different...

JOHNSON: Yes, I did. I wanted to see the country and I drove all through the country. I drove to Quetta and then down to Karachi. When I first came in I drove to Karachi and I drove to Lahore and then to Quetta.

Q: But you took someone with you?

JOHNSON: The driver.

Q: The driver?

JOHNSON: Yes. I didn't go alone. The driver and I and then we went up to Peshawar frequently.

PERSIS: What about the time you went on a trip to that place up there where there was a hospital?

JOHNSON: Oh, yes. That was a private one with the Asia Studies group.

PERSIS: There were lots of trips and places to go.

JOHNSON: Oh, it's a fascinating country.

PERSIS: She got way up in the Karakorams.

JOHNSON: We flew up.

Q: Did you take advantage of the time to go over to India?

JOHNSON: Yes. There was a PAO conference, so I knew the Indian ambassador quite well and he gave us permission to drive, which we couldn't do at the time because of the problem with the Punjab. Also to take a Pakistani, they wouldn't let Pakistani drivers go in. They thought they were all spies. But I knew him and through that I got permission so that Persis could go down. Persis saw the Taj Mahal, by sunset, by moonlight, and by sunrise. We had a nice drive down and back. I flew back, I guess.

PERSIS: The last day foreigners were allowed to go. We couldn't go to the Golden Temple
though.

JOHNSON: No, not in Amritsar because of the problems.

PERSIS: We had to start from the border of Pakistan and not stop on the way down.

JOHNSON: Had to go straight through to New Delhi.

Q: You say this is the last day that foreigners were permitted... They closed the border?

JOHNSON: They closed the border

PERSIS: The Punjab border.

Q: Oh, the Punjab. Always some trouble in that part of the world.

JOHNSON: Oh, yes. Now it's just increasing, of course.

Q: Yes, unfortunately.

PERSIS: But those mountains are just spectacular. We're quite used to the Alps of Germany and Austria. But this... what is it they say? There are...

JOHNSON: More mountains over 20,000 feet in Pakistan than...

PERSIS: Than there are in the Alps.

Q: Is K2 in Pakistan?

JOHNSON: Yes, K2 is. Pardon me. K2 is the second highest. It's in Pakistan, right.

PERSIS: I thought you went to K2.

JOHNSON: No.

Q: Were you happy, both of you, to come back to the States after that time?

JOHNSON: Yes.

GORDON GRAY
General Services Officer
Karachi (1983-1985)
Ambassador Gordon Gray was born in New York in 1956. He received his BA from Yale and MA from Columbia University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1982. His overseas assignments include Karachi, Amman, Ottawa, Cairo, Baghdad and as ambassador to Tunisia. Ambassador Bray was interviewed in 2016 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

GRAY: I was hoping to go to an Arabic-speaking post, but there had been a number of Arabic-speaking posts available for the January class, to be in synch for when the Arabic course began at FSI (Foreign Service Institute). But I knew I wanted to go into NEA (the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), and the only NEA post on our list was Karachi, Pakistan, so I figured that’s close enough, so I put it at the top of my bid list. I was very popular among my A-100 classmates because no one else wanted to go there.

Q: You were in Karachi from when to when?

GRAY: I was there from 1983-1985.

Q: How was it then because now it’s a very dangerous place isn’t it?

GRAY: It was certainly not as dangerous as it is now. It was a few years after the Embassy fire in November 1979. I got there in February 1983, and there were still some people in Karachi and Islamabad who had been at post for the attack against our Embassy.

Q: Yeah this was a horrible experience where a bomb had attacked our embassy and nearly burned everybody up but luckily got them out just in time.

GRAY: Two servicemen were killed. A mob marched on the Consulate General in Karachi but someone who was there told me there were more robust countermeasures taken by the Pakistani authorities. But there was still some ill feeling, totally understandably, among those who had been there for that experience. In addition, driving outside the city was prohibited. There was a great word used in South Asia - “dacoits.” Perhaps it comes from Hindustani.

Q: That was the name of the bandits.

GRAY: Bandits, exactly. As a result, we weren’t allowed to drive outside of Karachi. When we arrived at post, the house we were assigned to needed some renovations, so we were staying at the hotel right across the side street from the Consulate General. On our third night in country, I heard a very loud noise that sounded like a bomb had gone off. But I was new and didn’t want to seem like I was a “Nervous Nellie,” so I called our sponsor. The phones worked, which I already knew was something you didn’t take for granted. In any event, our sponsor advised us to call Post 1, the Marine Security Guard who is always on duty at an Embassy or Consulate General. I called Post 1; the Marine advised us to come to the Consulate General, so my wife and I walked across the street. In fact, a bomb had gone off. It didn’t cause any structural damage, and I’m being somewhat cavalier because to my knowledge no one had been injured. France had recently announced an agreement to sell fighter jets to Iraq. There was a large indigenous Shi’a community in Karachi, and the presumption was that either they on their own or with Iranian
encouragement, shall we say, planted this bomb. A lot of hotels that cater to foreigners have offices for various airlines, and the bomb blew out all the windows of the Air France office at the hotel at which we were staying. As I said, the bomb made a lot of noise, but I don’t think anyone was hurt. So there was still an element of danger.

That was right after we got there, in February 1983. In December 1984 a Kuwait Airways flight – flight 221 - was hijacked with three of our colleagues from Karachi on board. The Agency for International Development (AID) had a regional inspection office in Karachi, because Karachi at that time had great air connections. Two of our colleagues were murdered: Chuck Hegna and Bill Stanford. Bill was killed on the tarmac in Tehran. A third colleague was brutally beaten but survived. The hijackers were Lebanese Hizballah and I later learned they were tied to Imad Mughniyeh, so I did not shed any tears when I learned of his death. Their demand was the freedom of 17 people in Kuwaiti prison in connection with the 1983 embassy bombings. I’ll never forget interviewing American citizens from the flight when they finally landed in Karachi. And I’ll always remember the graceful memorial service for Chuck and Bill, led by our Consul General, Larry Grahl, who said all the right things to comfort the community.

Q: Were there movements in Pakistan at the time? I’m trying to figure out was anything going on at the time in Afghanistan?

GRAY: There were, but can we go back for a second on security? I did a rotational tour as general services officer, then vice consul, so my first boss was the administrative officer. He had been an RSO who then became an administrative officer. He thought we needed a fence around the Consulate General in Karachi. Can you believe that in Karachi, Pakistan, a few years after the Embassy fire, there was no fence around the Consulate General? So a fence was installed. I am not talking about a twenty foot granite wall with concertina wire on top or anything like that. It was an iron fence, and it may have been eight feet high if that; it was not an obtrusive fence. Incredibly there were a number of people at the Consulate General who were wringing their hands saying, “Oh my goodness, why are you doing this,” which I did not understand at all, even though I was brand new to the Foreign Service. Just two months after my arrival in Karachi, however, our Embassy in Beirut was blown up, at which point the hand-wringers began to see the wisdom of the fence. (As an aside, when I was Ambassador in Tunisia I instituted a mission-wide ceremony to remember the victims of that bombing, in part because two were on temporary duty from Embassy Tunis.) I mention the fence to answer your question about safety in a broader sense, and to note that when I joined the Foreign Service there was a completely different ethos about security.

Q: I was in Athens during the ’60s and it was a glass building and a Greek-Cypriot had set off an explosion in the parking lot. He and an Italian leftist girl were doing this they had put it in a van but it went off too soon. They were killed but no one else was but there was no fence around us at all.

GRAY: They were different times.

Q: You mentioned that you were married.
GRAY: Yes.

Q: What background is your wife?

GRAY: She’s from Montréal. She is a registered dietitian and was getting her degree in nutrition at Columbia; we were both living in International House and that’s how we met. It was lucky because we were studying at completely different campuses. I offered her the opportunity of six months of Urdu language training followed by a two-year honeymoon in Karachi - who could turn down that offer? She did not, and we have been very happily married ever after.

Q: How did she find society and living in Karachi? I think in many ways she would have a more difficult time?

GRAY: She had only lived in Montréal and New York City, so it was different. In other words, she had not had a Peace Corps experience. Since she was able to find work right away, that may have made transition a lot easier than it would have been otherwise.

Q: You said you had two jobs: GSO and…?

GRAY: I had a rotational assignment, so I did one year as GSO and then one year as vice consul.

Q: As GSO what were you doing?

GRAY: Odd jobs. I oversaw procurement; supplies and equipment; housing; and the motor pool. That was always fun: trying to keep the air-conditioning running in armored cars that were not originally built to have armor added to them. In all seriousness, the job was fun and it gave me a good overview of how a mission ran. When I joined the Foreign Service, assignments were for only eighteen months if one was doing only one job. I figured that since I was devoting six months of my life to learn Urdu, I would rather have a two year tour. I was also very pleased to have two different jobs so that I could get a better sense of the Foreign Service right from the start.

I had an airport pass for my GSO duties, and I was also the newest Foreign Service officer, so I was often called upon to serve as a control officer. Many visitors would transit Karachi. The most memorable one was Congressman Charlie Wilson. The first time I met him was on the tarmac at the airport in Karachi. He walked over to me, stuck out his hand, and with a big smile said “Hi, I’m Charlie Wilson from Texas.” Given his height, his Stetson, and his cowboy boots, I had figured as much. He was accompanied by a young lady whom he introduced as a belly dancer, just as depicted in the movie. Years later I saw Charlie Wilson’s War, in which Tom Hanks portrayed the Congressman, and I thought he did a great job of capturing his essence.

Q: What were you doing on the consular side?

GRAY: In the morning I was interviewing non-immigrant visa (NIV) applicants, and in the afternoon immigrant visa applicants. There was also some American citizens services work, but not too much.
Q: Were you deluged with people trying to get to the States to work?

GRAY: Absolutely, and this was before there was an appointment system for NIVs, so I interviewed until there wasn’t anyone left to interview each day. I bet I did a hundred interviews a day. I think it’s a very valuable experience for everyone to have. It is good that it is still a requirement for tenure. Consular work is great for language skills and great for teaching new officers that they have to make decisions quickly, based on less than perfect percent information.

Q: Did you find it hard making these decisions? Some people really just can’t do it.

GRAY: No. In a few cases when I began, instead of making a decision, I asked the applicant to come back with additional documentation, using the 221G provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. I had a very experienced, very good Consul, who was also our next door neighbor. She said, “Listen; if you want a document and you tell applicants to go out and get that document, they will bring that document back. Make the decision.” From then on I just made the decision. You had earlier asked about the value of the A-100 course. I remember two very good pieces of advice we received in A-100 which on their own would have made the course worthwhile. One was to buy real estate in the Washington area. It was great advice, but at that time interest rates were perhaps 18 percent. I joined the Foreign Service after two years in the Peace Corps, and then graduate school, which was expensive even though I was lucky to have a scholarship. I wasn’t making a whole bunch of money, let’s put it that way. So it was great advice, but not great advice that I could implement. The other piece of advice, which was more relevant to your question, was being told “You were hired for your judgment.” That stuck with me my whole career. I think it was a very important piece of advice. I tried to apply that in each of my jobs, including on the visa line.

Q: I’m a consular officer by trade that’s what I’ve done mainly. It’s very hard for some people to make up their minds they are always asking for more and more paper in order to stall.

GRAY: Exactly. Colin Powell’s rule is to make decisions when you are in the zone between 40 percent and 70 percent of information, since you will never get to 100 percent in time. I also think it is very important for senior officers to understand the pressures that people on the visa line are going through. When I was the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Cairo, Maura Harty – the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, a great officer and a good friend as well – visited for our junior officer conference. We were talking informally over coffee, and I remember saying that I could tell her how many visa referrals I had sent to the consular section. (The answer was zero.) Maura, who was on top of everything, replied “I can tell you as well.” The reason the answer was zero was because front offices should not be monkeying around with consular sections; they have enough headaches.

Q: How did you see Karachi as a city and a political force then?

GRAY: At the time Pakistan was under military rule, and Zia-ul-Haq was in charge. He had deposed and later hung Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was from the Sindh Province. Sindh is where Karachi is located, and it was the base of his party, the Pakistan People’s Party. So from talking
to colleagues in Islamabad, Karachi was just a completely different climate than there was in Islamabad. It was a lot easier for us to mix with Pakistanis because they didn’t feel as if the government was looking over their shoulders. Islamabad was a government town and Karachi was a port city more interested in business. And obviously Zia wasn’t overwhelmingly popular in the Sindh Province in general.

Q: Did Pakistanis you met test you how you felt about India?

GRAY: It was certainly always on their minds, but I never got the impression they were testing; I don’t have a recollection of that. From their perspective, anything that went wrong in Pakistan was because of India – since they “knew” that they didn’t have to test me on that.

Q: Was there any place where the Pakistani immigrant and non-immigrants were going particularly?

GRAY: Yes, there are these magnet communities, many of which were in New Jersey, if I remember correctly. There must have been other areas as well which I knew at the time but it slipped my mind.

Q: Who was your Consul General?

GRAY: We had two. When I first got there it was Alex Rattray, who had been the economic counselor in Islamabad, and then came down to Karachi as Consul General, and then went back to the Embassy as DCM. The second Consul General was Larry Grahl, whose previous assignment was with INR. He also had a lot of AF background.

Q: How did you find the post?

GRAY: It was a nice sized post. At the time it was our third largest Consulate General after Frankfurt and Hong Kong. (I don’t remember which of those two was the largest.) We had a lot of folks with regional responsibilities based in Karachi. I would say that there were 51 U.S. direct hire employees - 51 is the number that sticks in my mind. It was big enough so that you knew everyone, but not too small and not too big. I guess was kind of a Goldilocks-sized post. It was good in that sense. We got to know the Marines very well. We played volleyball once a week with them, and there was a lot of mixing among different groups.

Q: Did the Indian side - I’m using the term subcontinent side of things - there having learned Urdu, did that wean you away from Arabic or not?

GRAY: Do you mean linguistically?

Q: I was wondering whether I mean when you are projecting yourself did you think about maybe this might be a more interesting area?

GRAY: It was a fascinating area, I was glad to be there, but our second tour was in Jordan, and I was glad to go to Jordan.
Q: You are getting a good mixture.

GRAY: Yes.

Q: Did you get to travel much in Pakistan?

GRAY: Not a too much. Part of the reason was, as I had said, you could not drive because of the “bandits,” so that meant getting on an airplane. While it probably wasn’t excessively expensive, when you are starting out in your career, you are watching your spending.

Q: Absolutely.

GRAY: I went to Islamabad a few times on business, and I went to Lahore a couple of times. Then-Vice President Bush was coming to Lahore, a beautiful city, and the post only had about ten American employees, so it needed lots of help, even though it was only a day stop. I went there for ten days to help out, which I enjoyed a great deal. Then my wife and I went back to Lahore because I wanted to make sure she saw it. We also went to Peshawar, and to Sri Lanka for one Christmas vacation.

ALBERT A. THIBAULT
Deputy Principal Officer
Karachi (1983-1986)

Principal Officer
Lahore (1986-1988)

Albert A. Thibault, Jr. was born in Massachusetts in 1941. He received his BA from the University of Windsor in Canada in 1962, his MA from the University of Toronto in 1963, and another MA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1964. He entered the Foreign Service in 1969. His career has included positions in Guinea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Thibault was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Al, off to Karachi. You were in Karachi from 1983 ‘til when?


Q: What was your job there?

THIBAULT: I was deputy principal officer and political officer.

Q: Who was the consul general?
THIBAULT: Well, I had two. The first consul general was Alex Rattray and the second was Larry Grahl.

Q: And '83 to '86, when you were there, what was the situation, would you say, in Pakistan?

THIBAULT: Well, let me first comment about the consul general and this ties in with the situation in Pakistan. I was told before coming to post, and I was transferring directly from New Delhi, that the embassy in Islamabad had not liked the reporting coming out of Karachi. Apparently it was too much focused on reporting on the criticism of and opposition to the government of President Zia-ul-Haq, General Zia-ul-Haq, who had seized power a few years before and had executed the democratically elected prime minister, Mr. Bhutto. I don’t know what the particulars were of post reporting which displeased Ambassador Spiers and others there but that was what I was told. So they appointed Alex Rattray, who had been economic counselor in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, to be the new CG and who turned out to be a first rate guy. I just mention this because it’s easy to get focused on the political environment but I think it’s also interesting in the context of what you and I are doing here in revisiting history to talk a little bit about some of these other issues. And I want to get back also to the relationship of a consulate to an embassy, at least as I experienced it, because then I went on from Karachi to be consul general in Lahore. So I spent a total of five years at subsidiary posts in the same country.

Q: You’d been dealing in South Asian affairs. Before you came there, had you picked up this split between the consulate general and the embassy? The very famous one with Arch Blood in the early Seventies, before Bangladesh was formed. We’ve had other ones of this nature but the Subcontinent seems particularly prone to this.

THIBAULT: I would differentiate. I would say that Pakistan seems particularly prone to this.

Q: I think you’re right, because I really haven’t heard much about India but Pakistan seems to be prone to this. Just give a feel, for a South Asian hand, before you went there, were you aware? Were people talking about this sort of thing?

THIBAULT: I honestly can’t recall that they were. In my job in New Delhi, which was focused on domestic politics, political reporting, I didn’t really, I can’t recall tracking very closely what was going on inside Pakistan, much less on the mood within our embassy there. So I can’t comment on that. All I’m saying is that this is what I was told in Washington and this accounted for the selection of this particular gentleman as CG. As it turned out, Ambassador Spiers ended his assignment and left Pakistan. In fact, I can’t recall that he was even at post when I arrived, I would have to check. Ambassador Deane Hinton then succeeded him as ambassador and was a very different kind of individual and had a very different attitude, as well, towards post reporting.

Coming back to your first question on Pakistan. It was a very different Pakistan than the one that we hear about and have heard have so much about, especially since 9/11, yet Pakistan remains, was as internally divided then as it is now. That has been its history since it was created back in 1947. What is today Pakistan, West Pakistan, for many years was on the margins of British India and less well integrated into the British Indian structure than what is today India proper. So you have very deep ethnic and regional divisions. Now all of the South Asian countries to some
degree or the other face this but Pakistan more than any of the other, by far, and they have fewer institutional mechanisms to deal with this. As reflected in the fact that you’ve had constant oscillation between democratically elected governments and military rule that extends to the present day.

Q: Well don’t they have an institutional point of view, maybe not from any other point of view but institutional point of view, don’t they have the same structure that India had? Didn’t the British leave them with the same structure? Was there something different?

THIBAULT: Well, there were a number of important differences that over time were crucial. First, you had difference in experience and perhaps even of quality of leadership at the beginning. Nehru, who took over as prime minister of India after being the leader of the Congress Party, second only to Mahatma Gandhi, had a very deep seated commitment to the rule of law and parliamentary institutions. But equally important, he remained on the scene for many, many years after Indian independence. He died in 1964. So his instinctive reaction, as crises arose in this new country, was to handle them in a way that was in accordance with these democratic norms and parliamentary institutions.

Pakistan, by contrast, its leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, died within a few months of Pakistan becoming independent. He’s considered the father of the nation of Pakistan. It’s hard to believe that Pakistan could have come into existence without this man of tremendous will and capacity to impose it on others and to arouse others as well. So that was a major blow to Pakistan. As I said earlier, you had, I guess it’s summed up by the fact that the very word Pakistan is an acronym, it’s an artificial word. It stands for Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sind. The word was concocted by a student in London back in the early Thirties, looking for a word that would have a common meaning to the Muslims of South Asia, but focusing on the particular areas where they were in a majority. And even then it did not include Bengal, what then became East Bengal, because they didn’t even think of the Bengalis as part of this movement. So when they became independent, they patched together these entities which had never historically in any sense cooperated or coexisted, even. The only common denominator for them was that they happened to be Muslim. They were able to play that card, the leaders of the Muslim League, who founded Pakistan, led by Jinnah, were able to play that card for fifty years until Pakistan was created.

But when it came into existence, in the absence of their leader, who could play, perhaps, the role that Nehru did, they were thrown on men of far lesser stature and far less skill and far more rooted in their own ethnic and geographic and regional roots. Jinnah had been a lawyer from Bombay, he wasn’t even a Sunni Muslim. He was not a practicing Muslim. He was the antithesis of the so-called Islamic leader that we have in mind in the post-9/11 setting. So in a sense he could appeal to everyone because he didn’t belong to anyone. And from the very beginning you had difficulties between East and West Pakistan, the east wing and the west wing, as they used to call it, starting from the fact that East Pakistan had a larger population than West Pakistan. And yet the leaders of West Pakistan were not inclined to allow majority rule, because this would mean that their institutions would be dominated by the Bengalis, for whom many of them had the utmost scorn.
Q: I want to return to the situation in Karachi.

THIBAULT: I mean all of this background info is relevant and came into play within a few days of my arrival. Karachi, which - I should explain here - is Pakistan’s commercial center, a city today of ten to 15 million people, and also an amalgam of different ethnic groups and Muslim sects. So within a few days of my arrival, we had the Sindhis, the people who inhabit the interior of Sind, the province in which Karachi is located on its coast, demonstrating in very sustained ways, against the military regime, which they claimed was dominated by Punjabis, led by General Zia himself, President Zia. In fact for my entire tour there, we were focused, in our reporting, among other things, on the ethnic tensions that existed in our consular district, which included Sind and Baluchistan, the latter is the province that is south of Afghanistan and is east of Iran, a very large province. There too, in Baluchistan, you had very strong opposition to what they considered a Punjabi-led military government. Since the Punjabis, who are the largest ethnic group of Pakistan, dominate the army, and you had military rule and you had officers on detail supervising and overseeing many aspects of local and provincial government, it became very focused on the Punjabis.

So the situation was different, as I say, from what it is today, twenty years later, in that, while tensions were great, while there was occasional violence, it was not Islamic focused. The Islamists who are so much a source of concern to the U.S. government today, were part of the political woodwork but they didn’t take the lead. They had their steady seven to nine per cent of the vote and some of their leaders were well known but Islam and the question of terrorism and related violence were just not issues at that time. Very, very far from what they are today. So we at the consulate, and I as the political officer, had contacts with a broad spectrum of political opinion there and with public opinion.

As I said, Karachi is Pakistan’s commercial capital. The business community of Pakistan is overwhelmingly concentrated there. There are many very sophisticated, very savvy, well traveled, well educated, well spoken people in the professions, in business, in the media and so forth with whom we interacted on a daily basis. That of course is our main role, if you will, in that Islamabad, being an artificial city, a very new city, had become the capital of Pakistan only in the early Seventies. Had become, technically, in the mid-Sixties but the government offices only moved up there in the early Seventies and was a totally artificial creation with just a population of bureaucrats and politicians at that time. In many ways the real life of the country was conducted in Karachi and in Lahore, which is why we had consulates in both of those cities. So that was our job, to report on that.

I should mention that the Consulate General at that time was the third largest in the world, believe it or not, after Hong Kong and Frankfurt. The reason is that a large infrastructure of U.S. embassy, warehouse buildings and offices, and residential properties had been developed in the Fifties and Sixties to support our relationship with Pakistan, because Karachi was then the capital of Pakistan. So when we moved those functions and built new facilities in Islamabad we left behind all this quite modern, relatively new, well constructed, very centrally located property that exceeded the needs of an average consulate. And what do you do with it? One answer was to place other USG offices, such as Customs, DEA, AID regional functions, etc. We had 80 US personnel stationed in Karachi in the mid-80’s.
A very large percentage of your Pakistani visa applicants applied in Karachi and were often referred to (us) by Islamabad. So we had a large consular operation there. However, security was not a major focus. I cannot even recall whether we had an RSO at post then. Since then, of course, Karachi has become a byword for a vulnerable post, having been directly attacked a couple of times, and witnessing the murder of several Consulate employees, threats, and the killing of other foreigners in Karachi.

Q: Well, but still, wasn’t there a concern about what had happened in Islamabad in ’79, the burning of our embassy? I mean, this is a sudden mob taking off. This could have been stoked up. Wasn’t it something you were concerned about?

THIBAULT: It was something that we were well aware of. I myself, traveling from Delhi, had attended a regional political officers meeting in Islamabad only a few months after the attack and had walked through the charred floors of the Embassy that had been set alight by the invading mob. At the time, the analysis was that most of those who attacked the embassy were not Pakistanis but were Palestinians, many of them, who were students at the university in Islamabad. And it immediately followed and was precipitated by the terrorist assault on the Grand Mosque in Mecca. So I think at the time it was viewed as sui generis and did not necessarily imply that there was a wider threat to American facilities and personnel in Islamabad or elsewhere in the country. Also, of course, when I arrived in Karachi the incident had taken place four years earlier and there had been no follow-through. The concern that we had, so far as there was one with security, was more with Iran, because the Iranian Revolution had taken place, and the seizure of U.S. hostages and there was a large Iranian consulate in Karachi. I should add there were at least forty or fifty consulates in Karachi at that time. It’s a rather large diplomatic presence there.

And there were many refugees who came out of Iran, such as Zoroastrians, or just people who found life impossible to live in Iran itself and they would come across the border into Baluchistan and would make their way to Karachi. Many were young men who were evading, escaping military draft. You recall the Iranians would just throw human waves of so-called religious volunteers in an attack on the Iraqis, and families who didn’t want their sons to be caught up in that would send them out. Many of them would turn up on us, looking for visas to go to the United States.

The attack on the embassy in ’79 had receded in our consciousness at that time, as I recall. I’m speaking more than twenty years later. But it was not an overwhelming, dominant concern. Again, I have to emphasize, and I’ve seen it, myself, as a DCM in Saudi Arabia and India, years later, that our focus, total focus, on security is a relatively new thing.

Q: First place, sort of the overall thing, was there, from the Karachi perspective and all, and when you had been in India, was there any real desire of India to take over Pakistan and was there any real desire of Pakistan to go to India? Was there any movement there at all?

THIBAULT: No, certainly, India accepts the existence of Pakistan. No, the Indo-Pak issue did not come to any head at that time. The Indians were concerned that the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan had resulted in closer ties between the U.S. and Pakistan and that we were providing military assistance to this military regime and that therefore this could pose a threat to them over the longer term, but no. You had many people in Karachi, in fact the city itself, the majority of people, are so-called *muhajirs*, which means refugees, and are considered almost a distinct ethnic group in Pakistan. These are Muslims of many backgrounds who had left India in 1947 and for years thereafter and had settled in Pakistan. Most of them came to Karachi. So there was a large Indian consulate in Karachi and many people would travel back and forth to visit relatives and visit religious shrines and so forth in India. So it was not a high point of tension between the two countries at that time.

*Q:* Well, what were you getting about, was there a tremendous disconnect in this very diverse society in Karachi and the outskirts? Was this a stronghold of Bhutto?

THIBAULT: There were, yeah, the Bhuttos themselves are Sindhis. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the Bhutto who had been executed, had her home in Karachi. The consul general, particularly Larry Grahl but also Alex Rattray previously, kept in regular contact with her and with people around her, as I did. She went to jail at that time for a period and we made it a point to maintain contact. This was not done not only to seek her views and thoughts on the current situation but it was also a signal we were sending to the regime that we disapproved of their crackdown on the political parties, that we supported democratic institutions, and a signal as well to the supporters of these parties that we were not so in bed with the military that we ignored or neglected them. We wanted to keep in touch with them. We wanted to have them come periodically to the United States. We wanted to engage in discussions with them. So in our representational work, we and I, particularly as a political officer, and the CG himself as well were constantly entertaining and receiving these opposition personalities and political people in general. Not only Miss Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan People’s Party but the Muslim League and others as well. An important part of our job was to keep in touch with these folks, doing so, I stress, with the full endorsement of the Embassy and Washington.

*Q:* Did you find, again, a certain disconnect that Islamabad and its area of interest and your area of interest were quite different. Islamabad, maybe, was more focused on the war in Afghanistan and the support we were giving. I would think Afghanistan would be far away from Karachi, or not?

THIBAULT: I don’t think so. Ambassador Hinton was a regular visitor, four, five times a year, six times a year, he would come down, if only for a day or two and often for a longer period. In addition, at his urging, the Embassy would bring together in Islamabad the political, economic officers, and consular officers on a regular basis to make sure we kept in touch with each other. There was a concern, both in Washington and I think on his part, he perhaps having been briefed on this and he deeply believed it, that it was important to keep the mission, the country team, defined in the widest possible way, in contact and the DCM did so as well. Under his leadership, we were never guided, if you will, told what we should be reporting or not reporting or taken to task for reporting that might be different from that of the embassy. Moreover, we reported directly to Washington without going through the embassy which, if I’m not mistaken, had been the case before.
Q: I would imagine, usually if there’s any dispute, the embassy usually says, “Don’t do this.” What about, how did the Afghan War business between the Soviets and the Afghan resistance forces, how did that play in Karachi, in your area during the time you were there?

THIBAULT: Not very much. I think the high point of the U.S. support for the mujahideen was more in the mid-Eighties and later. I’d say from ’85 to ’88 or so. So a little bit later than the period that I’m referring to here now. The main impact felt in Karachi was the refugees. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan resulted in an outflow of up to two million Afghan refugees and they were concentrated in camps all along the border, both in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. But many of the Pathans came also to Karachi and in fact the port, the stevedores and the labor connected with the port of Karachi, which was a rather major operation, was overwhelmingly Pathan. And there were certain industries, certain sectors like transportation, that they dominated. And there were sections of outlying areas of the town, of the city, where Pathans were concentrated. But as an issue, as something that intruded directly on us, no, not that much.

As I said, our consular district included Baluchistan province. As the political officer, I regularly traveled to Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, probably three or four times a year, usually with an FSN, a tremendous fellow who knew everything and everyone. There I saw the impact of the war in Afghanistan much closer up because the refugee camps were nearby. And the influx of Pathans had greatly disturbed the ethnic balance within Baluchistan between the Baluchis and Pathans which had existed before. And there were rumors of tribesmen crossing over from Baluchistan to go into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. In other words, some of these camps would be used as staging areas. So, as I say, in Baluchistan you certainly saw that closer up.

Q: I would think that in normal circumstances there would be considerable concern, particularly in those days, of Iranian aggression but at that point Iran was so busy fighting for its life with the Iraqis that this sort of took care of that, at least for a time.

THIBAULT: Well, the Pakistani government worked hard to maintain a good relationship with Iran. About 15 per cent of the population of Pakistan is Shia. Today and in fact for the last eight to ten years, there have been very severe sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shias and with lots of mutual murders and assassinations and mass killings. That did not exist at the time but there was a concern, definitely, on the part of the security agencies and the government of Pakistan that the Pakistani Shia might become influenced by the Iranians. So they worked hard to maintain a good relationship with Iran and to provide them as little rationale for interference in Pakistan and by and large I think they were successful in that regard. And as you say, the Iranians were preoccupied with their own affairs.

Q: Well, it later became an issue so raising it for the time, was anybody looking at what was preached in the madrassas? These were what, the religious schools.

THIBAULT: Not so much, no. The attention that we gave to the Islamic parties, and this was more, later, when I was in Lahore as CG, was more on the leaders of those parties and their views about the United States, about U.S. policies and attempting to talk to them about why we were working with Zia, why we had good intentions towards Muslims, why we believed that
they should work with other political parties in a democratic political context. But in terms of their local base and the role of madrassas, no, that was not a major concern, as I recall. I have to emphasize that in an era when terrorism was not the front-and-center issue regarding our outlook on the internal politics of Pakistan, the US focus was on promoting democratic institutions and an environment in which they might flourish. Hence, our constant effort to be in active touch with all elements of the political spectrum. It was a more innocent era, I suppose.

Q: You mention the security agencies.

THIBAULT: Pakistani security agencies.

Q: Pakistani security agencies. Were they sort of all pervasive? Did one feel that they were watching everyone? Were they a power?

THIBAULT: They may have been a power but they were not, there was no secret police a la Communist regimes or elsewhere. This was an autocratic rather than a totalitarian regime, as Jeane Kirkpatrick might put it. The army ran the country, not the intelligence agencies. So you had military officers in key positions. A lot of this was mediated, I should say, by – and in a sense, you only appreciate this by living there - by the fact that Pakistanis are gregarious, outgoing, very friendly people, very warm hearted people - and military officers are no exception. Family connection and school and other personal ties are all-important there. That’s how everything gets done. Military officers, many of them, were from the same social strata as the people that you dealt with and you saw. They were not a caste apart, sort of glaring over everyone’s shoulder and keeping people in line. It didn’t work that way. Many of them occupied their positions to feather their own nest, this was a great opportunity to enrich themselves. Now of course as diplomats we weren’t there engaging in anything that would attract their attention, or at least we hoped, anyway, beyond keeping an eye on our activities. But in the society as a whole, no, I did not feel they were watching everyone.

Q: There wasn’t people whispering that “Let’s not talk here” or something.

THIBAULT: No, quite the contrary, quite the contrary. They were very vocal.

Q: What about corruption. Was this an issue that was really affecting the operation of the country and were we looking at it?

THIBAULT: We were not looking at it. You know, everyone has his own definition of corruption. As I said a moment ago, the country operates, the society operates, on the basis of personal relationships and school ties and all of that as much as by law and regulation and established practice. And so we would not be directly confronted with this, except that our officers had to be definitely aware that our FSNs could be the target of those willing to pay bribes to them in the hope that they could facilitate visa issuance. This is not a problem limited to Pakistan, by the way. More broadly, you would have journalists who would tell you that there are payoffs, that military officers could not live the way they did without having additional source of income than their salaries. Not to mention many of the politicians who had come up in life as well. So that was there. We were not their nannies, so to speak, watching and
documenting this and reporting on it, as I recall.

Q: How would you say the United States, I mean, again, you’re dealing with a certain group, I mean the people you deal with, and how did they regard the United States, would you say?

THIBAULT: Well, there was a lot of cynicism about the United States in the sense that the common, constant theme, heard all the time, was that we talked the talk about democracy but didn’t walk the walk. Especially so in Karachi, being a political town where the political parties were suppressed or under the thumb of the military but yet not in jail, with the exception of Benazir Bhutto and a few others, but not in any way afraid to speak their minds. The press was relatively uncensored and I have to empathize that point and lots of newspapers were quite critical of Zia. The cynicism was nothing new in that I heard it often in other countries as well, namely that “you Americans claim to support democracy but you’re also in bed with the military dictator of Pakistan. We who are members of democratic parties, committed to everything you say you stand for, are not allowed to play the role that we should be nor is our country able to function on a democratic basis while you Americans are not only tolerant of but highly supportive of President Zia.” It’s exactly the same view that you hear today with President Musharraf, also a military dictator. Otherwise, let me just say, there was a very positive view of the United States as reflected by the desire to study in the U.S., to travel to the U.S., by the family ties with the U.S. that were widespread. As in India, I never encountered any hostility, on a personal basis. So it was put forth on this sort of rhetorical level.

Q: Did you find our exchange program or our visitors program a valuable instrument?

THIBAULT: It’s always valuable to have exchanges and particularly for Pakistanis to travel to the United States. And I was on the all-agency Mission panel that selected candidates from a national pool, traveling to Islamabad to ensure that our consular district got its share of IV (International Visitor) grantees, and to defend or promote our recommendations. We had to vet our selection of IV program participants with the government. We could not willy nilly send someone to the U.S. They had to be approved. So in a practical sense that limited the categories of people we could invite to those who were “relatively safe” from the regime’s point of view. So you had to work hard to identify those people for whom it would be a very meaningful experience but at the same time be able to get the government’s approval. But that’s always a very valuable program.

Q: Did you get any feel for, this is sort of mid-Reagan in American terms, a feel for how the Reagan Administration, at that particular time, viewed Pakistan and in contrast to India?

THIBAULT: Well, obviously with India led by Mrs. Gandhi and given some of the issues that I described in our earlier session, there was no love lost for the Indian government and for Indian policy on the part of many in the USG and in fact deep anger in some respects. By contrast, with Pakistan you had this close and deepening relationship between the government of Pakistan and the administration. The ambassador had, if not total access, something very close to it across the top of the GOP. The vice president, Vice President George H.W. Bush, visited on one occasion. Keep in mind, as an expression of how close that relationship was, that General Zia died in a plane crash accompanied by the American ambassador, Arnie Raphel. The other American who
was on board that aircraft was the commanding general of the military assistance program. That’s not a traveling team that you would have seen in India, believe me. So, yes, very different views by Washington of our relationship with the two governments.

Q: While you were there in ’83 to ’86 were there any incidents or developments we haven’t touched on?

THIBAULT: The key one, the one that is seared in my memory, was the murder of two of our AID regional auditors based in Karachi. They were not murdered in Pakistan. They were on an aircraft that was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists at Kuwait airport and flown to Teheran where they landed. This was in ’84 or ’85. The hijackers identified all of the Americans who were in the aircraft and, as I recall, these two gentlemen had official passports, perhaps even diplomatic passports. They were brought to the front of the plane, of the aircraft and were shot, and their bodies were dumped on the tarmac. So these were two men whom we knew very well and whose families lived in our midst, who were down the hall, if you will, from us in the office building. That was a very shocking event.

The summer in which I left, in 1986, within days of my departure from Karachi but prior to arriving in Lahore, terrorists took over a Pan Am aircraft at Karachi airport and murdered several passengers on board before the Pakistani special forces attacked the aircraft and there was a gun battle. The terrorists were killed but others were also killed, including American citizens.

Q: Who were they?

THIBAULT: I believe they were Palestinians, also. As I say, it was the pre-al Qaeda, pre-Islamist kind of terrorism that we’ve become all too familiar with. But it was a precursor to the terrorism that became more frequent in Pakistan.

Q: Then you went to...

THIBAULT: In ’86 I was assigned to Lahore. Ambassador Hinton very much wanted someone who knew something about Pakistan in Lahore. I had just been promoted to FS-1 and therefore was at grade for the principal officer position, having been deputy PO in Karachi, and the Ambassador made the assignment happen. While Karachi is the economic and business capital of Pakistan, Lahore is the political capital of Pakistan, because it’s the capital of Punjab province.

Q: Okay, well now you were in Lahore from...

THIBAULT: ‘86 to ’88.

Q: Again, compare and contrast, as they say in college.

THIBAULT: Looking at the consulate first, it was a much smaller operation than Karachi, for the reasons that I’ve mentioned. We had about 20 or 25 U.S. direct hire positions, plus dozens of Pakistani employees, while today the consulate barely hangs on with a very small handful of personnel - a reflection of how things have changed there. We had a large AID presence in
Pakistan, in Islamabad, as a result of our support for the Pakistan government; in addition to the military aid component to the US-Pakistan relationship, there was a very strong economic support dimension also, and AID worked very closely with the local electric utility in Punjab. And so there was an AID contingent in Lahore; in addition, there was a DEA office of three agents, DEA agents, who worked with their Pak counterparts, a significant consular operation, and USIA as well. We had our own library and a very active information and cultural program. And we also had FBO, because we built a new consulate building there during the time that I was there, at least we started construction of it. The biggest difference, of course, was that I was principal officer, although in Karachi, I should add, for about six months I had been acting PO between CGs.

So for me, personally and career-wise, it was an opportunity to expand my management experience. We were significantly closer geographically to Islamabad than Karachi was. Karachi represented a major trip, a thousand miles from Islamabad. That was one reason why personal contact between the embassy and the consulate wasn’t as frequent as it was with Lahore, where you could just drive down in a matter of a few hours, not to mention a flight of only thirty or forty minutes. So we had many more embassy visitors. It also put me in contact with the political leadership, if you will, of Pakistan. Not in the sense of the ministers in Islamabad but with many of the second and third tier politicians who could aspire to national leadership roles.

Q: Could they exist in a military government?

THIBAULT: Oh, yes, in fact there was a lot of co-opting, particularly of one of the major parties, called the Muslim League, there was a lot of cooperation. Remember that politics there is built on a society organized around clans, around caste groups, around tribes, around business relationships. In a poor country like Pakistan, the ability to deliver benefits to your followers, to your dependents, depends a lot on access to government and you cannot cut yourself off from them. Now in Karachi, which was the focus of the country’s international trade and foreign investment, you were less dependent on that than you were in Punjab. There the politicians were mostly major landowners. There had been no significant land reform in Pakistan, as there was in India. In India, for example, it’s very rare, it’s almost unheard of and it’s probably illegal, to have more than, to own more than a few hundred acres. Now you can get around it, there are ways of getting around it. But all of the big so-called zamindars, which is a local term for big landlords, were swept away in India in the Fifties. That did not happen in Pakistan. So you have, I believe to this day, people who own thousands and thousands of acres and own villages and in fact, if you will, own the villagers. That’s the way their society is organized. These often are tribal leaders, as well. So these are the people who are in politics and the senior ranks of the military. So they work closely together and the Muslim League is particularly identified with them in Punjab but even others as well. So, as a result, many of these men can aspire to play national roles. As I look at the composition of today’s Pakistani government I recognize many names of people I knew at the time, who were younger men then. So it was a different experience. I understand that today, the Islamist factor is much stronger and is largely divorced from these traditional elites. In my day in Lahore (and Karachi,) the Islamists were marginal players.

At that time, Ambassador Hinton, who had been a very strong supporter, if I may say so, having
ensured that I was assigned to Lahore, left Pakistan and was succeeded by Ambassador Arnold Raphel, who was also a good friend and had had previous experience in our region. He and I had worked on the desk together at one point, he on Pakistan and I on India. He regularly came down to Lahore and I would often travel up to Islamabad. So my relations with the embassy were still closer, if you will, than they had been in Karachi. Of course, being principal officer I had that additional entrée to the embassy. In some ways Lahore was very similar to Karachi, in that the American consul general has a very high profile. Unlike Karachi, where there, as I said, were fifty or sixty consulates, in Lahore there were only two: the U.S. and the Iranian.

I will cite an anecdote here. President Zia would frequently visit Lahore, because of the provincial capital, official business, the military corps headquarters was also in Lahore near the Indian border. His plane would land at Lahore airport and the foreign ministry, which maintained a protocol office, would summon the diplomatic corps to the tarmac to greet the president. It seemed to me at times that I was always on my way to the airport. With the diplomatic corps consisting of myself and my Iranian counterpart, they would always place us side by side. Our instructions on contacts were very strict at that time. So I might shake hands with him, say, “How are you? Hello” and that would be it. There was never any substantive discussion. And I asked our chief of protocol, a good friend, “Why do you place us next to each other?” He replied, “We’re all amused to see you guys react to each other.”

But the U.S. consul general cuts a very wide swath in the local papers, in the local social affairs. So I was a very visible personality and the representational obligations were very, very heavy. You once asked if I had any children. I have two boys but they both went to boarding school. One of these interviews should talk in some ways about the personal dimension. I don’t know how often this has come up in some of your sessions with other people, but a big factor for Foreign Service families assigned to countries overseas is, first, whether there’s an American school and secondly whether the American school is accredited. That accreditation is very important and particularly for high school because it forces you to decide whether your children will study there at that American school or whether you’ll send them elsewhere. And so for a family this is an important decision to make.

I should add that in Karachi my wife had taught at the American school, as she had also taught at the American school in Delhi fulltime. When we came to Lahore she taught there as well but the high school was not accredited and so we made the decision to send our children to boarding school in the United States. So when I mention all of these representational activities which would tie you up five or six nights a week, we were able to do that in part because our kids were not there. Although in the first year, my younger son was in the eighth grade and again, just to give that family dimension of it, he was one of the very few Americans in the eighth grade. All of his friends and peers were the sons of very wealthy Pakistani businessmen, the ones who could afford to pay the tuition at the school. I recall one evening, he came home quite late. He had been out with his friends, something I wasn’t too happy about, particularly the hour at which he returned, and then he told us that they’d had been joyriding in a car and the police, when it stopped them, the driver of the car had just paid a bribe to the policeman to get them out of whatever jam they were in. I said to my wife, “This is the mindset here and I don’t think it’s a very healthy one for an American kid to be exposed to.” His brother had already gone off to school and we decided we should do that for him, as well.
The Consul General’s duties often extend in directions that few folks in Washington give much thought to, much less ensure that it be listed in your typical job description, but they can be very time-consuming. One of the more unpleasant experiences of my Foreign Service career occurred in Lahore where I was honorary chairman of the school board, representing the ambassador. This involved the Lahore American School. Someone on our staff discovered that the school had two tuition rates, one expressed in dollars and one in Pakistani rupees and the conversion rate had not been adjusted in several years. So Pakistani parents who paid tuition in Pakistani rupees, and the school needed Pakistani rupees to operate, were paying a significantly lesser amount than the dollar equivalent paid by the USG to cover the tuition of our American employees’ children, absolutely contrary to U.S. government regulation. So I had to push this through and it represented a very significant and immediate increase in tuition for Pakistani parents and it faced enormous opposition and incredible resistance. But it was very clear what we had to do, if they were going to remain an American school, under the ambassador’s patronage. So, we got it through the board (all Pakistanis) but in the process, I really got a closer look at the less pleasant side of the Pakistani character, if you will. As I say, I remember that this whole issue persisted over a period of several months and became something that was very time consuming. Everything would be referred to me as if I should arbitrate. I couldn’t impose it; the board had to come to that decision itself. I simply said this is what the regulation is and I have to demand that you implement it. So it’s a dimension of a consul general’s work that I don’t think exists at the embassy level and it’s one you never hear about when you talk about policy issues. But in the here and now it was a big issue for me to deal with.

Not to mention also the construction of the consulate building, which required a great deal of effort to work the local bureaucracy, to support the FBO employee who was project manager, and to ensure - you were referring to corruption earlier - to ensure that our requirements of accountability, transparency, and of honest value for honest money be adhered to. So this, too, was a major preoccupation for me throughout my time in Lahore.

Q: Did we have any message, goal or something? Here you are with essentially a military, I don’t know if you want to call it rule, a dictatorship yet you’re going out to the political class and you’ve mentioned before they’re looking at you with a bit with cynicism. What were you doing, sort of political wise?

THIBAULT: Well, by being there and interacting with these people on a constant basis, we had in a sense our talking points and we would use them over and over again. We had a policy message which I’ve described before and which was carried over to Lahore. The very fact of our being physically present was very important because we were not only a sounding board, we could be a punching bag. In other words, they could vent with us, get it off their chests, and then hear an American official respond to them. I think that’s a role that’s hard to quantify but which is very important. And then you would travel out of Lahore to the district level, to some major cities in Punjab province to deliver that same message. You would tell people your door was open, so you’re in town, come and look me up so we can talk about these issues. That was an important part of it. The same with the public affairs office. And you work together on these issues, working with the media.
So the consular operation becomes very important in this regard, too, in the sense that we issued, at that time, many visas, it was a relatively high visa application/acceptance rate. The people who went to the US tended to be, through their family or themselves personally, were well-connected. The fact that notwithstanding their criticism of us they qualified for a visa in itself was an important message. As was the attitude that the consular officers displayed toward them, and you were always careful to make sure that their political views did not intrude on whether they qualified for a visa. And you talk to them, these were mostly junior officers, about the need for respect and courtesy and so forth, even when you knew someone was a critic of the United States. So it’s a posture that your office maintains which is important there. There’s a fundamental goodwill towards the United States or at least there was at that time.

**Q: Speaking of consular matters, was there a problem of Pakistanis trying to get maids into the United States or not?**

THIBAULT: Not so much on my watch but in Pakistan generally, I’m told, there were problems. Not so much with maids as with ineligible family members or young men who claimed to be students seeking to go to the United States. It’s always a problem with Third World countries; it was a problem in India, as I have already mentioned being raised by the Indian prime minister. People who have no ties, and they’d say, “Well, I’m 22, what kind of ties to do want? I’m not married, I’m not this, I’m not that.” So you have to balance that. You had to constantly be aware of the temptation to which our FSN employees were subjected, that they faced. Not to mention our junior officers. I recall a junior officer, this was when I was in Lahore, who received a letter, an anonymous note in the mail, saying, “Dear Mr. So-and-so, you don’t know me but I know who you are. If you are interested in making up to $500,000, please meet me at the Hilton Hotel at such-and-such a time.” He showed this to me. So the incredible demand for visas generated these pressures. People, often very important in local politics or the business community or otherwise, would refer visa applicants to you and the question was, how do you respond to them? This is something that I learned at a very early stage in my career and that I kept foremost in my mind to the last day before retiring. There is such demand for American visas that you have to be exceedingly careful in what you tell people, neither encouraging them, nor misleading them, nor brushing them off, keeping in mind at all times the responsibility placed by law on the consular officer. More important, as a manager, and I was a manager for almost twenty years, you have to make sure the message you give to your officers on the issuance of visas and the approach they should take, is one that is in accordance with all of our precepts. It’s very important, really important.

**Q: Lahore is close to the Indian border.**

THIBAULT: Yes it is.

**Q: I think I was talking with Steve Eisenbraun, asking him about Indian-Pak relations, as seen from Lahore. Can you talk about that?**

THIBAULT: Well, I recall very well, on my consultations in Washington, between Karachi and Lahore, the one and only time I was told this, that we do not want any reporting from Lahore on Sikh activities in Pakistan. It was explained to me that as we were developing our relationship
with General Zia and with the Pakistanis in support of the mujahideen and the anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan, in a sense we did not want the Zia government’s image tarnished in Washington by allegations that they were supporting Sikh terrorists in India. The time that I’m referring to was a period of enormous unrest in Indian Punjab. Punjab is a province that before independence was administered as a single unit and then was split between India and Pakistan. All the Hindus and Sikhs who lived in what is today Pakistan moved to India and the Muslims on the Indian side to Pakistan. Zia himself was one of these Punjabi refugees. In India, particularly after attack on the Golden Temple, which led to the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi in 1984, there was a campaign of terrorism by Sikh militants against the Indian government, which was repressed using absolutely brutal methods.

Now, it was a great temptation for the Pakistanis to encourage and support this, just as they had been (and still are doing) with Kashmiris and Kashmir. We’ll get to that when we get to my more recent assignment in India. They had a good way of doing that, because there are several major Sikh shrines in what is today Pakistan and they would allow groups of “pilgrims” to come over to visit those shrines. General Zia who was himself born in what is today Indian Punjab and speaks the local dialect, always made a point of meeting the Sikh pilgrim groups and could speak to them in their own language. Punjabis are a unique people, they are great people, whatever their religion, highly gregarious, and their language is famous for its level of humor. Zia, a quintessential Punjabi, loved that repartee. So there was an instant bonding. So I think he felt, both on a personal level and also on a state level, that a little bit of support kept the Indians off balance. So I was told, it was made very clear to me, that Washington didn’t want any reporting on that. Occasionally you would hear things and see things. I mean, Sikhs are very distinctive, just by their dress and physical appearance. And you would hear things. There were some Sikhs who converted to Islam at the time of partition in 1947, so as not to lose their land in Pakistan, but they still had those family ties. So they would tell you things about what was going on along the border only 15 miles away. Otherwise, it’s a heavily fortified border. Both sides have major military contingents that line it and there are major military installations along the boundary between India and Pakistan.

Q: I’m told, again, I think, by Eisenbraun, that Pakistanis kind of looked upon India, where they would go over the border, as kind of like going to Las Vegas. I mean, it was a lot more colorful. But maybe this was a different era.

THIBAULT: Well, there wasn’t much traffic across the border. There was more from Karachi, mainly because the people in Karachi, the so-called muhajirs, or refugees, came from northern India, central India. They didn’t live along the border. They could fly in and out. There wasn’t much traffic back and forth, at that time, between the two Punjabs.

Q: Now, in Lahore, was the action in Afghanistan reflected there or were you pretty far from it?

THIBAULT: I would say we were pretty far from it except, again, for the question of the refugee camps in far western Punjab. There were far fewer Pathans in Lahore than there were in Karachi. So we were all aware of it and there was very strong anti-Soviet feeling and very strong emotional support for the Afghans but otherwise I would not say that it impinged on Lahore directly. There were no terrorist attacks. There was no overflow from Afghanistan onto Punjab,
if you will, other than, as I say, the presence of some refugees, although not many. There were not many in Punjab province compared to the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan which together took in millions of Afghans, literally. By contrast, Punjab sheltered only a few thousand, probably a deliberate decision by the Punjabi establishment that runs Pakistan, in my view at the time.

*Q: Did Kashmir, I realize later you’ll be more involved but did Kashmir raise itself much while you were there?*

THIBAULT: Not really, although interestingly a good third of the population of Lahore is of Kashmiri origin. Not so much the result of Partition in 1947 as much as 19th century urban migration. The chief minister himself of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif, who later became prime minister of Pakistan, was an ethnic Kashmiri. That did not endear him to many Punjabis who are very conscious of their ethnic origins. But as an issue, no, I would not say at that time. It became so much later.

*Q: You find the political class that you were dealing with in Lahore a different kettle of fish than the one in Karachi?*

THIBAULT: Yes and no. There were far fewer businessmen involved in politics in Lahore than in Karachi. As I mentioned earlier, with the exception of Nawaz Sharif, who was himself a businessman, but again he had no deep ties in the province. His father had built up a steel business. There was a very large number of military, ex-military folks who when they retired from the army went back to their lands or established businesses and then went into politics. So to that extent there was that difference, yes. Just a different tone of politics because Punjab is the majority province of Pakistan. In Sind and Karachi and Baluchistan it was all the “we against them.” We’re the minorities who are being stepped on by the Punjabis. Obviously in Punjab you didn’t have that sentiment.

*Q: Any aftermath of the loss of the “East Wing”, Bangladesh?*

THIBAULT: Good riddance I think was the reaction, to the extent that it came up at all, which I don’t recall it ever did, in any substantive way. On a popular level, people would say that being rid of East Pakistan was the best thing that ever happened to Pakistan. There was never any emotional bond between the two wings or regions, that’s for sure.

*Q: Were there any events in India that were reverberating while you were in Lahore?*

THIBAULT: No, I can’t think of any, even though close as we were to India. I mean our focus was overwhelmingly on what was going on in Pakistan. No, I don’t recall that.

*Q: Did you sense any discontent or potential for problems later of the zamindar type of ownership of land?*

THIBAULT: No, no, the level of politics and the agendas that the politicians fought over were dressed up in democratic and populist language but it was essentially a fight over the spoils of
the system, not any fundamental reform. You always had a few, but no. There is a very different tone and content to politics in Pakistan than in India.

Q: India seems to have taken very well to British labor class rhetoric and all that. I take it that it did not do so in Pakistan.

THIBAULT: No, that had limited resonance in Pakistan, other than periodic populist spasms by the Pakistan People’s Party founded by Bhutto and now identified with his daughter. On the other hand, if you’re implying by that a pro-private enterprise rhetoric, no, that didn’t exist, either. It was “who’s on top and who’s getting what out of the system.” That’s really what it boiled down to.

Q: Did you find yourself dealing, in a way, as an American officer, not extremely well paid, were you dealing with sort of the glitterati of the Pakistan class, both in Karachi and Lahore? Did this rub the wrong way sometimes or not?

THIBAULT: No. We circulated at all levels. In Karachi, the consul general’s residence has to be seen to be believed. It was the ambassador’s residence before the embassy move to Islamabad and a very nice home, by any standard. I was in the DCM residence, the former DCM residence, also a nice home by any standard, especially in Pakistan. No, that was never an issue. Nor in Lahore, where I had a very nice residence. Again, these are very status oriented societies. Foreigners, whatever their economic and social situation at home, are immediately admitted, given pretty free access. And if you’re a senior U.S. government official in their country, you have access to just about anyone you want and you’re invited constantly, because you’ll add to the status of your hosts by accepting their invitation and attending their function. I should add that some of that mentality also exists among American hosts in Washington. Now, if I had been like the chargé d’affaires of a certain European country in Guinea, I mention this as an anecdote, whose official car was a Volkswagen Beetle, complete with flag, and where he would pull up to a reception or a government ministry, his driver would then run out and open the door for him on the other side, then you become a bit of a joke. But I had a very nice Buick, heavily armored. We had 19 people, retainers, at the consul general’s residence, if you add the cooks and the gardeners and the security people and you name it.

Q: Well, after this modest life you were living, in ’88 whither?

THIBAULT: Let me just conclude by, as I mentioned, days after Karachi there was the attack on the Pan Am plane. Within a month or so of my departure from Lahore there was a terrible tragedy in which Ambassador Raphel and President Zia died in a plane crash, having taken off from Lahore airport. There was much speculation that there had been some kind of tampering with the engine, that this was a planned assassination. But having very, very frequently seen the Pakistani presidential aircraft and the way in which it would land and without any real maintenance or attention then take off again, and it was not a new aircraft, it didn’t surprise me that the Pakistani government has always claimed it was mechanical difficulty. That was a very credible account to me, rather than some convoluted explanation otherwise.
JAMES A. LAROCCO
Deputy Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Affairs

Ambassador James Larocco was born in 1948 in Evanston, Illinois. He graduated from the University of Portland (Oregon), and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He entered the Foreign Service in 1973. His overseas assignments include Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Cairo, Kuwait, Beijing, and Tel Aviv. He was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near East Bureau 2001-2004. Ambassador Larocco was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2011.

LAROCCO: My role was dominated by working on Pakistan issues, which of course mainly related to the war. But not all. At the same time, we were struggling with the nuclear issue. This period is a prime example of clashing priorities, and both were high profile, high priority, high importance: working with the Pakistanis to defeat the Soviets while pressuring the Pakistanis on their nuke program. As is the case on so many clashing priorities like this, part of the battle related to the Hill, in this case The Pressler Amendment. The Hill, and rightly so, was deeply, deeply troubled because of the Pakistani nuclear program. We were fighting crosscurrents. It was a fascinating example of the tug between interests; on the one hand, defeating the Soviets. We couldn’t do that without working with Pakistan closely. On the other hand, they were developing a nuclear program that was anathema to our longstanding non-proliferation policy. What’s more, we viewed their nuclear program as destabilizing, not stabilizing the region. And we viewed it as fueling further proliferation in the region. Trying to balance that was very difficult.

Q: I am interviewing by telephone Ed Abington. He is talking about the horrible results of the embargo that was put on because of the Pressler Amendment.

LAROCCO: That was after my time.

During ’84 to ’86 the height of the Afghan war we put together this big aid program. The nuclear stuff was out there. We spent a lot of time on that. We had a nuclear trigger problem, all kinds of nuclear-related nightmares, but the full extent of the work of A.Q. Khan, not only for the Pak nuke program, but for proliferation, was not on our screen. Once again, if we only knew then what we later learned.

As a result of what the Pakistanis perceived as our “walking away from them and the region” once the Soviets were defeated, and then our singular focus on the nuclear issue with sanction put in place, our bilateral relationship with them has and likely always will be one of profound suspicion and distrust. At the same time, our shared geostrategic interests keep bringing us back together. As some of my Pakistani friends like to say, it’s a marriage with frequent separations, but divorce is simply not possible.

Q: What about the politics within Pakistan? Was there anything besides just keeping an eye on it? Was anything going on?
LAROCCH: The military role in governance was troubling, which has often been the case. Some pundits say that Pakistan is an army with a country. It has no identity of its own (unlike Egypt, as I described earlier as having arguably the strongest identity in the world). Some wags described Pakistan’s identity as “not India.” I found that both misleading and insulting, but I could never myself come up with a way to describe, even in a full paragraph, what the Pakistani identity is. And it wasn’t something I could feel, either.

Once again, keep in mind that these were the days when our prime directive – contain Communism, especially the Soviets – made defining policy and strategy quite easy. We always put that first, so the nuclear issue and governance, human rights, religious freedom, narcotics flows…all were there, but on the back burner.

In many ways, one could say that this was the best time to work in national security and foreign affairs agencies because the world was not fifty shades of gray, like it is today; it was very black and white. If it was anti-Soviet, it was damned good. It was the right thing to do irrespective of other issues, whether it was a military dictatorship or a nuclear program or whatever. And with zealous supporters on the Hill for the Afghan War like Charlie Wilson and Dana Rohrabacher, we did not have to worry about Hill opposition to any of the other issues…until the Afghan War was over, and this was well after my time on the desk.

Q: Was Benazir Bhutto a problem at all for you?

LAROCCH: Benazir wowed me like she did so many others. I had dinner with her, if I remember right, up at Harvard. She was charming, articulate and I must admit very attractive…with those big, dark hypnotic eyes…as everyone had told me. It was hard not to like her. She knew exactly what to say, even if her actions at times exasperated us.

Q: Were we concerned about developments in the tribal areas?

LAROCCH: Not like we are today. Not like we are post 9/11. There were viewed as an asset, not so much a problem. The tribal areas were our staging ground, our supply point, our training areas, and our launch pad for the Afghan War. It was an area of opportunity, not an area of concern. It presented all the advantages then for us that are disadvantages for us today.

What’s that old phrase: one man’s freedom fighters are another man’s terrorists? Osama bin Laden and other mujahideen were our freedom fighters at that time. We knew they were bad guys, but we also knew they were OUR bad guys who got the job done. It was all operational and tactical, supporting a clear strategic goal. The end justified the means, something that has gotten us and others in trouble throughout history.

It was military general turned government leader Zia Ul-Haq who truly cultivated the fundamentalists (whom we call extremists). He allowed them free rein to operate and grow, setting up their own schools as the Pakistan government did precious little for education, take control of social life in communities, destroy the Sufi philosophical underpinning of the Pakistani version of Islam. Some of this was related to his prime directive of thwarting India, so
once again, in his case, it was the end justifying the means. Pakistan is today paying a very high price for Zia’s strategy.

Q: The mujahideen were sons of bitches.

LAROCICO: To coin a phrase. They were tough guys, to be sure, but they were on our side, in our game plan. And they got strong funding from the Saudis as well. It was a cheap war. What was there not to like?

JOHN WOLF
Political Counselor
Islamabad, Pakistan (1984-1987)

Mr. John Wolf was born in Philadelphia in September, 1948. He was educated at Dartmouth College and graduated with a degree in English and American art. He joined the Foreign Service in 1970. He has served in Perth, Western Australia, Da Nang, Vietnam, Athens, Greece, Islamabad, Pakistan, and several high-level positions in the State Department. He was Ambassador to Malaysia and Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation. Ambassador Wolf was interviewed by Kenneth Brown in 2014.

Q: OK, so off to Islamabad.

WOLF: We had a great section. Jim Moriarty was my domestic affairs officer. Steve Kappes, who later would be the deputy at CIA, also was in my section. We had two amazing local employees. Our FSNs were extremely well plugged in. One had been a professor at Gordon College, Imtiaz ul Haq. He had taught the political elite of the Punjab and he knew everyone. And, he could get me an appointment with anybody. If I wanted to go see a minister, he would go sit in the private secretary’s office until the minister came out. And then he’d say, “Wolf-sahib would like to come see you.” More often than not, the minister would say sure, have him come down. In fact Ambassador Hinton once asked me why it was so easy for me to see ministers while he had to write a diplomatic note via the Foreign Ministry every time he wanted to see someone.

Q: (laughs)

WOLF I said, “Well, I’ve got Imtiaz and, and that’s my job.”

The other thing that we did with Imtiaz and his colleague was to stake them to tea money in the National Assembly cafeteria. They’d go about every day, and their table was kind of neutral ground where politicians from all sides would gather to gossip. Two or three times a week too, I’d have Imtiaz take a handful of blank invitation cards for lunches at my house (which was across the street), and they’d round up interesting groups that I’d then host. Great way to meet people. I spent a lot of time with a variety of jr. ministers, parliamentary secretaries and a variety
of Majlis members. The ambassador asked me, why I was spending all this time with a second-class politicians. I suppose he meant that Pakistan was run by President Zia; the foreign policy was run by Yaqub Khan; and the economy was run by, the minister of finance. But I replied that this was in fact my job, as political counselor, and over my years there, and for a couple decades thereafter, the people whom I used to host were Pakistan’s leading politicians/ministers, and even one provincial, chief minister. Pakistan was going through a political metamorphosis mutating from a military led government to quasi-civilian rule. They had started with 39 local elections, then elections to a new National Assembly, and it was still to be seen whether this could be done peacefully, and whether Pakistan would stay stable -- in the end, the process hasn’t been entirely peaceful nor stable, even today.

I spent a lot of time talking to the parliamentarians about how democracies work. And I remember I could say then that in our system we have Republicans and Democrats, they have very different views, but the nature of the system is that eventually they have to find a middle ground, not necessarily what one side or the other wanted, but still a path forward. It would be a lot harder to make that case today. But it was true in the ‘80s and they were all intensely interested.

The U.S. Pakistan relationship then, as now, was a difficult one. Pakistanis appreciated that we were helping them up in particular in regard to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. By then, the Mujahadeen were becoming increasingly potent as a fighting force, even as Afghan refugees were increasingly visible all across northern Pakistan. Many Pakistanis saw the U.S. as a special country, and many had relatives in the U.S., and some had been to school there. However, at the official level, there was a kind of “love-hate” relationship…including anxiety about U.S. ties with India and about our opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear program, which they viewed as much more vigorous than our opposition to India’s nuclear weapons program.

I traveled widely, to every part of Pakistan except the northern Sind province. And, wherever I went, I was treated with amazing hospitality, and genuine curiosity about America. Certainly, the reception was in part their code of hospitality, but I think it went beyond that.

Pakistan was a frustrating place, still feudal in most senses in the countryside. Corruption was increasing, as were sectarian tensions. Education and many aspects of public services were failing at an increasing rate. But the scourge of ethnic and sectarian strife present in 2014 wasn’t so evident in the eighties; I could still see most anyone, including the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which I suspect wouldn’t be possible today.

When I arrived in Pakistan in 1984 the embassy was just reopening in the chancery, which was burned out by rioters in 1979. A lot had changed but, in retrospect, much of the change was on the surface, and there were troubling currents below the surface. The issues for the political section were key security interests for the U.S., including Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear program, Pakistan’s political evolution and Pakistan/India relations. Leading the fray for us was Ambassador Hinton, who was among the most capable ambassadors of his generation -- of course he spanned generations. And he was colorful; Hinton stories had the quality of legends, and no one ever doubted where he stood on matters -- he was very forthright -- some would say blunt.
He had a unique working style. He’d come in in the morning have the usual meetings etc., then at 1:00pm or 1:30, he’d go back to the residence which also was on the embassy compound...And he wouldn't come back. He frequently had guests for tea though we rarely knew who those guests were. So he was doing his own political work. But it was always great because, you know, I would go to him hot with an idea, “Sir, I have figured this out!” And he’d listen patiently and then it would strike me “Oh-my-gosh, he already knows this stuff.”

Hinton pushed us to work hard. He gave us enormous latitude to do our jobs and he expected us to do them well. He held us accountable when they weren’t. He had quite a temper and his political counselor saw that temper more than once. He used to write notes on the top of almost every message and his handwriting was not very good. (He had a nervous condition that affected his writing). His secretary, Pat Brania, and I were about the only people who could decipher those notes -- I suppose since I got so many. Anyway, I used to put the notes in three piles -- the first being “pants on fire, got to get this done today.” The second was for things that had merit but were lower priority -- this week’s work. The third pile was... “the guy is crazy, I have too many things to do.” Every once in a while something would move from pile two to pile one, usually if he asked the same thing again. But he rarely pinged me on pile three.

Deane didn’t mind an argument, but at the end he expected us to salute and move on. Every once and awhile, I tested that rule. Once, I went to see him dead set against something that he wanted to put in “my” cable. After a bit of back and forth, Patty closed the door, and the volume kept going up. Eventually bam, his hand crashed down on the table, saying, “Wolf, now I’m mad,” whatever. I had enough sense to back off. Sometimes he’d vent on something or other, then realize he’d overreacted. And invariably, then, he’d come to my office, or raise it in the car, to make amends. To those outside the embassy, generally in Washington, the Ambassador was a fierce protector of his staff. For most of those inside, we’d walk across hot coals for him.

There was time too for fun, Islamabad style. The ambassador loved to play tennis and played often in the late afternoon. In fact, not infrequently when I had cables for him to approve, I’d go down to the residence and he sign (or amend our messages), but only after a couple sets of tennis...then I’d go back to the chancery for a bit of early evening work. A number of visitors played tennis, and that’s where I got to know Mike Armacost even better.

Q: But was it a well-run embassy aside for –

WOLF: Absolutely Oh gosh, it, was run like -- everybody had a responsibility, everybody had a task, everybody knew the priorities. He expected people to work together. I remember once we were in a country team meeting and two AID people came in late. It was a kind of “fasten your seatbelts moment” and we sat there awaiting the explosion. Eventually, he had a question of AID, and asked whether they coordinated whatever with USIS” “No sir, this is an AID program.” Then it came; Vesuvius blowing. It was Deane Hinton’s embassy and he ran it as an integrated mission. It came to me only years later how adept DRH was as a leader, particularly setting high standards, rewarding performance, and standing up for his people whenever the situation warranted. I tried to do the same when I became a COM, and Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation...but that’s getting ahead of the story.
Q: Who was the DCM?

WOLF: John McCarthy.

Q: Mm-hmm. And the -- this went on for how long?

WOLF: Three years.

Deane left in early 1987, a few months before I was scheduled to go back to Washington in early July. Arnie Raphel came in late June. He wanted me to stay until after the Fourth of July. So most of my time was with Deane Hinton. One last story. Once he was instructed to see President Zia to get Pakistan to back down its nuclear enrichment program. The meeting was just the President, Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary and me (as note takers). The ambassador was saying something like, “Mr. President…your enrichment is over the 8 percent redline we’ve discussed…you need to move back.”

Zia sat patiently quietly twisting his mustache like the villain (Snidely Whiplash) in the old Bullwinkle cartoons. At the end, still twisting his mustache, “Ambassador, there are some times when you just have to trust your friends, heh, heh, heh, heh.” I got it all. then went back to dictate the reporting cable. But the DCM had just remonstrated POL for too colorful writing (I think he termed it “dilettantism”), so I left out the mustache references. But when I was with the ambassador a couple days later and mentioned the vignette he told me, next time put it in… “That’s the sort of stuff that Washington loves.” Actually the master of reporting messages, replete with local color to give the context, was Ambassador Vernon Walters…his messages from a generation of meetings with foreign heads of state, including a variety of villains, are the best I ever read.

Q: Was there any sort of reporting or analysis duals between Embassy Islamabad, Embassy New Delhi? Any other local embassies? Sometimes they go back and forth.

WOLF: Yes --Harry Barnes in Delhi and Deane Hinton were two lions of the Foreign Service. But the analyses from Delhi and Islamabad often saw the same facts as…

Q: Night and day?

WOLF: Maybe not night and day, but there was always lightning and thunder whenever the ambassadors were involved. Speaking thirty years later, I think I say, objectively, that Embassy New Delhi saw our efforts to build ties in Pakistan as a zero sum game -- and for them India was the prize. They (the embassy) particularly railed against the security assistance relationship the U.S. had with Pakistan. Their messages sounded a lot like Ministry of External Affairs press releases. There were situations however where our analyses dovetailed, including on a couple of episodes where Pakistan was the provocateur along the disputed border in Kashmir.

Q: How heavily did the Afghanistan situation weigh on what you were doing?
WOLF: Huge. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the impetus for the Reagan Administration’s initiative to revamp U.S./Pak relations. We were actively engaged supporting the Afghan resistance, with Pakistan as the intermediary. There were millions of refugees all over the northwest frontier province, and we had a huge aid program aimed there and at the domestic economy. If you saw the movie “Charlie Wilson’s War”.

Q: Yes.

WOLF: -- there’s a lot of truth to that whole story of the way in which we fairly rapidly increased our support for the Mujahedin.

Q: Did you ever deal with Wilson?

WOLF: Yes, and he was every bit as colorful and every bit as supportive to the mujahedin cause as the movie portrayed. In the end, the war successfully forced the Soviets to withdraw, but at a severe price to Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, it was balkanized, tribal nature reasserted itself, but the new chieftains were much more strictly Islamic, and much more heavily armed, including with sophisticated weapons we had supplied. And the war led to much more violent, sectarian divisions also in Pakistan, and I suppose a step-up in the military’s omnipresence. We supported Afghanistan’s resistance with good intentions, but there were few Americans, myself included, who foresaw the second and third order consequences of our action. I don't know that it would have made any difference, because we thought we were doing the right thing at the time. But, it came back to haunt us 10 years later.

Q: Yes.

WOLF: This was another one of those places where the little personal things happened that gave great satisfaction. Mahela was again teaching English including to the wife of the former vice rector of Kabul University. The family had escaped from Kabul with two suitcases. At some point in time, they lost the chit that signified their registration in the queue for political asylum in the United States. We helped them to get it back; this time, again, it was one of the Peter’s, this time Laurie’s husband, Lee, the refugee counselor, who helped out. The FS world is small.

Anyway, five years later, we were sitting at home in Bethesda when we heard a tap on the door, and there the Afghan family was standing at the front door, but just passing by on the way to California, to say thank you. I think they gave us a small Afghan carpet as thanks (below the ethics limit)...and we still have it.

Q: Yeah, absolutely.

WOLF: Another, terrific assignment. Great people to work with, issues that were important although on several we made only limited progress if any. We succeeded on Afghanistan. India and Pakistan didn't go to war. But, Pakistan never stopped pursuing a nuclear weapon, and the move toward democracy remained hobbled by many factors including critically weak institutions and little regard for the rule of law. But Pakistan would remain an important issue for me in a variety of assignments over the next fifteen years, including especially when I headed the

Q: So you had terrific background for those sorts of assignments.

WOLF: And it started with that one little paragraph that I refused to clear in 1981. That proved an inflection that changed everything career-wise for me. Paraphrasing Frost, “two roads diverged, and the one I took made all the difference (for my family and me).”

Q: Never know.

WOLF: You never know. I think I mentioned before we started these conversations that I was telling a group of junior officers that, at some point, you know want to be on the other side of a wide abyss, and one simply needs to imagine a rope and jump. Deane Hinton was a terrific leader in that respect -- and then Arnie Raphel, encouraging us to stretch ourselves professionally. Both Deane and Arnie surrounded themselves with people whom they encouraged to take professional risks, to speak their minds and take responsibility.

Q: Make the leap.

WOLF: So that was Pakistan.

Q: So you left Pakistan in –

WOLF: As my tour was coming to an end in 1987 I remember I got a call from Ambassador Paul Boeker and his DCM Pat Theros, soliciting me to be DCM in Amman, Jordan. Mahela and I were pretty excited…”Well, sounds great…the Middle East!”

But, I’d barely hung up the phone when Arnie Raphel was on the phone. He was still the Principal DAS (PDAS) in NEA and he said in no uncertain terms: “Amman is out, John, don’t even think about it. I bought you, I paid for you, and you’re mine.”

Q: (laughs)

WOLF: So I went back to be the director of the regional affairs office in NEA, an office that directly supported the NEA PDAS.

Q: So that was in 1987.

WOLF: That was in 1987. Arnie by then was in Islamabad -- and I have one last story about him -- and Ed Djerejian was the new PDAS. Arnie Raphel was iconic also -- a Foreign Service classic. I remember seeing Arnie in a mid-career training film. And there he was -- tie down, shirt sleeves rolled up, talking about being effective in the State Department. Looking into the camera, he said: “If you want to wear those shirts with the little clips under your tie, go to EUR (European Bureau). But if you want to roll up your sleeves and do real work, come to NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs).”
Anyway, he came (back) to Pakistan where he had been a junior political officer in the ‘70s. My FSN’s, when we’d drive in the countryside, often use to talk about the Foreign Service officers who’d come before. It was interesting, like a flashback to “honored roll” in “Gunga Din.” There were a couple exceptions, officers whom Imtiaz and Amman regularly excluded -- “stricken from the rolls.” Arnie, however, was top of the register, their favorite of favorites.

I recall Arnie’s first day at work -- it was Friday, which in Pakistan was part of the weekend, and the new Ambassador came in to see the place. I was coming down from the Political Section, leaving the embassy and I heard the marines say, “Sir, can I help you?”

Arnie replied, “Well, I think I work here.”

I flew down the circular staircase to see Arnie, sporting a three day old beard, wearing a tee shirt, and looking quite unsavory, at least to our buttoned down marine. Anyway I introduced him to the new ambassador (and later told the gunny his detachment needed to check out the Ambassador’s photo before their next duty shift). Arnie’s first cable out was one he sent was to his friend, Rich Armitage, something like, “It’s great to be king!”

Q: (laughs)

WOLF: Arnie was one of those people who were equally capable of working effectively in Washington and overseas. He had an astonishing network of friends and collaborators all over the State Department and all over Washington. He worked very hard to place people into assignments where they would be involved on issues on which he was or might be working. I remember -- and we’ll come to talk about it later -- but I remember at his funeral a couple years later, at Arlington Cemetery after the plane crashed in Pakistan, I was standing with a group on a hillside and, I forget who it was, but it could have been Barbara Bodine, who said “Here we are, Arnie’s orphans.” We were a half a dozen or 10 people who had worked closely with Arnie Raphel. Arnie had impacted every one of our lives. Deane Hinton was the same. I saw Ambassador Hinton once, when he was coming back, to interview and “select” Panama country officer. He knew how critically important to his Embassy’s efforts that person would be, and he was determined to have someone with whom he had a mind-meld.

Q: Interesting. I wonder what the office director felt about that when it came to choosing.

WOLF: You know, I have a feeling that with Ambassador Hinton he said, “Sir, have at it.”

Q: (laughs) OK.

WOLF: Back to the story. I returned to NEA/RA.

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JOHN T. MCCARTHY
Deputy Chief of Mission
Islamabad (1985-1988)
John T. McCarthy was born in New York City in 1939. He graduates from Manhattan College in 1961 and entered the Foreign Service in 1962. His overseas posts included Belgium, Thailand, Pakistan, and Lebanon. He also served in numerous State Department posts in Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

MCCARTHY: I left in ‘85 to become DCM in Islamabad, Pakistan, working for a man named Deane Hinton, who is really one of the most respected diplomats of his generation which is just one generation beyond my own. Deane is, I think, 16 or 17 years older than I am. We met in the mid-70s. I've mentioned that I had already worked for him a couple of times, including in Brussels as his economic counselor.

I mean in a way, maybe other people tell you these things as well, I like the small family aspect of the foreign service. The way assignments come about. Going to Pakistan was no more on my list of priorities than going to the moon I suppose. But Deane, about a year before I went to Pakistan, had called me and offered me the job of consul general in Karachi.

I turned him down flat, mostly for personal reasons. I didn't want to go to Karachi, I didn't see a reason to be in the consulate, at any case. We had a daughter then who was going into her senior year in high school. I promised her and myself that I would not interrupt her high school career for an overseas assignment. It seemed to me that it was important for her to get 4 years in the same school. So I said no.

Deane raked me over the coals, told me I didn't know what was good for myself. That no more opportunities like this were going to come my way. This was 84 I guess. About 6 or 8 months after that, he asked me if I'd be interested in being his DCM. We were then about 5 years back in Washington. It made sense. My daughter was out of high school, she'd had her first year in college under her belt. It all made sense. We said, sure, we would do it.

So I was recruited largely, well it is and it isn't true, Deane is a very honorable man, he approached me but there were regular bidders as well. He actually first gave the job to somebody he didn't know whose name the system had coughed up. He explained to me, in a very nice letter. We are very close friends. He wrote me a very nice letter saying -- look, you're the person I really wanted for the job but I don't like manipulating the informal side of foreign service life so I went with this other guy. And then the other guy either had a personal health problem or somebody in his family did, and he washed out and Deane asked me if I would come.

I said, sure. I was still interested, it was the best of the jobs. There were several DCM jobs that I was looking for at the time. I had also put my name, or allowed my name, to be put on a couple of ambassadorial lists at that time. None of those came about, they were all small countries. Anyway, it came about in this kind of a way.

Q: So you were in Pakistan from when to when?

MCCARTHY: I got there maybe in August of 85 and stayed until June of 88, so 3 years.
Q: What was the situation in Pakistan at the time you arrived there?

MCCARTHY: It was fascinating. This was the heart of our involvement in neighboring Afghanistan. Here, I guess I have to be careful in terms of classification, I will give you what I regard as an unclassified version of a very interesting series of events that you can read in the papers almost any day just how extensive our involvement was.

This was a large embassy. We had 3 consulates -- Karachi, Peshawar and Lahore as well as the embassy itself. 500 Americans easily working there. A great big AID program. A country that I liked as well as any I had lived in. Thailand, I guess, and Pakistan were my 2 favorites in terms of the people and the kinds of things that were going on.

Pakistanis are very noble people, very lovely people, warm and friendly. This goes right down to the village level. My wife and I did a lot of walking. We lived on the outskirts of Islamabad, everybody lived on the outskirts of Islamabad, it's a very small town. Great hills for walking, full of traditional villages that went back in time hundreds of years. The sense of what was going on there. People would be very warm, they would invite you in for tea, they would be lovely.

The same was true, it seemed to me, of the president and major politicians that I was dealing with. They were nice people. You would have liked them whether or not you had to work with them. It just made life very pleasant. Just last week we had a guy for dinner, a Pakistani who was through town, who was a good friend of ours when we were there. We were reminded of just how forthcoming people tended to be. It was a place where you got an honest answer to an honest question.

Q: It sounds like a certain contrast to the Indians who can be very difficult.

MCCARTHY: This is a classic reaction, I think, of people who have served in both countries, I haven't. I visited India but I haven't served there. I think most Americans, somehow there's something in the Pakistani soul that lines up very nicely with most Americans. Whereas most Americans tend to find Indians just a little bit difficult to deal with. You can explain both phenomena in one way or another.

I certainly would come out on the Pakistani side of things if I had to take a vote. On the other hand, it's a complicated place that doesn't work very well.

You asked about foreign policy. We have a checkered past, or our relationship is a checkered one. This was 85. We were then in full recovery from the nadir of the relationship, which were the Jimmy Carter years. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Carter offered Zia, whom he didn't like viscerally because Zia was a military dictator who had his immediate predecessor hung. But again, that's a complicated tale with lots of elements that need to be weighed before you make up your mind about what was going on.

Anyway, Carter offered Zia a certain amount of military assistance. Zia's response was to call it "peanuts." I think, largely, because Zia was a very good politician who saw that Carter probably
was not going to be around after the next election and he would just as soon wait and make a settlement with the Republicans, which he did.

By the time I got there, we had a multimillion dollar aid program, both the military assistance and economic assistance. We were negotiating while I was there, I guess this must have been in 87, we were negotiating a new multimillion dollar aid package. It finally came in at something just over 4 billion dollars over I think a period of 5 or maybe 6 years, which the Pakistanis regarded as a major success. Obviously, it was. I think, in the end, a lot of that money never got delivered because of the things that happened subsequent to my time there over the nuclear issue as much as anything.

A period of very active involvement and very close cooperation over Afghanistan. As the DCM, my job really was to work for the ambassador, with the ambassador, both monitoring our activities in Pakistan and also working very closely to support Pakistani operations, Pakistani activities to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Sometimes you could really see yourself, I could see myself, with an Afghanistan range of activities and responsibilities; and a fairly separate Pakistani range of activities and responsibilities.

Not that they were contradictory but a lot of what we were doing really was with an Afghan focus. Most of our visitors, I would say, came to Pakistan because of Afghanistan. I must say, I don't think I've ever been more visited than during those 3 years. We had most members of Congress, who had any kind of foreign interest at one stage or another. Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, just lots of people pretty much all of the time. Mike Armacost, who was then Under Secretary for political affairs, we were negotiating. Everybody was negotiating for an end to the Afghan war through the UN. Mike must have come, sometimes it seems every 6 or 7 weeks at various times, then it would be stretched out, but probably 10 trips in the time that I was there.

Q: *It was no secret, even from the beginning, that we were giving some rather sophisticated weapons and training to the Afghans. I think the most noticeable one was the stinger missiles which were credited with making the Soviet air force less capable of operating as it had been.*

From your point of view when you arrived there in 85, you left in 88 is that right?

MCCARTHY: Yes.

Q: *How did you view our effort and what was actually happening in Afghanistan vis-à-vis the Soviet military, by the time you left, the development. Did you see this moving towards something or did you have a feeling this was going to keep going?*

MCCARTHY: It was moving. As you were posing your question, the other element neither of us has mentioned is what was going on in the Soviet Union at the time, these were the years of Gorbachev. I think the US government's first reaction to Gorbachev was, "a wolf in sheep's clothing." He talks a good line but you don't really believe that stuff, do you?

This had immediate implications for our Afghan policy because we were negotiating, everybody,
we, the Pakistanis, the Afghans, the Russians, were negotiating in UN forums in Geneva, in New York, about the terms of the settlement, about withdrawal of Soviet troops, and do you trust Mikhail Gorbachev or not. The answer is of course you don't trust him at the beginning because we know he's just trying to pull a fast one on us.

As time went on, I think bit by bit, not just individuals but I think each of us in a sense, parts of our mind would be converted to the fact that something has changed in that country, little by little. You'd find yourself saying something and then thinking -- do I really believe that. Is it as hopeless, should they be disbelieved as much as you would have disbelieved them in the past. Little by little, I think, people and parts of the bureaucracies swung around to the thought that maybe we could do business on this one; maybe this is a drain, maybe this is a distraction, maybe the man really would like to get out of this one. Because he's got bigger fish to fry in terms of trying to hold his whole country together and Afghanistan is too much for them. Other people would say fine, let's bleed him some more.

So, it was an interesting dynamic. And it was dynamic. There was nothing at all static about Afghan policy all the whole time I was there. The other fascinating element, is that every couple of weeks sometimes, certainly no less frequently than every couple of months, I would have to, as the DCM, the ambassador would often either not want to be there or would be too busy to be there, I would often shepherd senator so-and-so or congressman so-and-so up to Peshawar to meet the Afghan leadership.

The 7, ragtag is unfair, but the 7 assorted leaders of various resistance elements in Afghanistan, who at the time could barely disguise their disdain for each other, they ranged all the way from a guy named Ahmed Gilani who was known as Mr. Gucci. He did wear very good Italian loafers and nice well-cut suits. To guys with long white beards who would sit barefoot at a meeting and pick their toes. It was an odd bunch. Most of them, if not all of them, are still around. They're the guys who are still squabbling, I'm talking 85 to 88 and here we are in 1996, the Soviets are long gone from Afghanistan.

The policy achieved its principal objective which was to get the Soviets out. If the secondary objective was to restore peace in Afghanistan, we failed. The bunch of guys I used to see every couple of weeks are still around. They're still blowing up each other's ammunition dumps and any civilian house that gets in the way, this many years later.

You could see at the time that some of them hated us. These were very anti-western kinds of types, very fundamentalist in terms of their approach to modern life. They were taking our money and our support but not our ideas. You could see then that it was going to be very difficult for them to reconcile. But people, I said, other people said wait a second, these are Afghans, they always get along, it won't be long before they will come to some modus vivendi. Today they still haven't done it or they haven't done it in a way that keeps people from being killed.

Another thing that changed I think when I first got there, since the attainment of our objective seemed so remote - getting the Soviets to leave - it didn't matter so much in our day-to-day operations that we and the Pakistan government did have different ideas about what the future would hold for Afghanistan. I think Zia never hid his objective. He was looking for a way to
restore a much quieter kind of northwestern frontier for Pakistan. To get Afghanistan out of any possible kind of relationship with India or the Soviet Union, whom he really did see as a continuation of old Russian imperial expansion.

Zia had this great map that he would drag out -- it was a treat after his meals with the various senators and the congressmen, the old map would come out. He would show how little by little from the 1870s and 1880s to the 1920s, the Russians had spread from one Khanate to another in central Asia. He was after reversing that particular kind of thing.

Q: The Great Game.

MCCARTHY: The Great Game, that's right.

At any rate, it didn't matter in 85 and 86 because none of us, neither we nor they, thought we were that close to winning. By the time I was leaving I think it did matter. It was clear that things were turning our way. You mentioned the stingers. Things were turning our way much more radically than we had anticipated. That the Soviets really were reeling from their Afghan experience. What came next, whether Pakistan was able to install as an Afghan leader, somebody who was very much in their pocket or not; whether or not that person made the most sense from an Afghan or from an American point of view. Those were issues that we were having to wrestle with, probably a little sooner that we might have anticipated.

I think nobody in any of the groups, in 85 or 86, saw that we were going to win and win decisively in terms of getting the Soviets out.

Q: While you were there, this 85 to 88 period, were we looking at these 7 various groupings of Mujahideen who were fighting this thing and trying to discriminate from them or were we saying, oh hell, the enemy of our enemy is our friend. Were we aware that some of these people might not be so good for us in a later game?

MCCARTHY: Sure. You looked at these people from different points of view. One question was how much influence did they have among Afghan exiles. Was the king an element of Afghan policy. He was off in Rome, surrounded by a lot of corrupt relatives. Was he a useful piece or not. How much did any of these people relate to him. How much did any of them matter in political terms back in Afghanistan. So the political stuff - how much weight did these people have?

But I think really the major factor that we were weighing, at least most of the time that I was there, was are these guys fighting or not. To simplify, the way it seemed to be was that the ones you and I would feel most comfortable having a cup of tea with, had the fewest fighters on the ground. The ones that you and I would like to see go away as a bad dream, were the ones who were laying booby traps, ambushing Soviet convoys, blowing up the occasional tanks. This is a simplification but you could almost say that the best fighters were the worst guys from an American political point of view.

Q: This sort of duplicates the way we felt about the situation in Yugoslavia in World War II. That
Mikhailovic and the Chetniks weren't killing as many Germans as Tito and the partisans.

MCCARTHY: That's a very interesting parallel. I hadn't thought about that before and Yugoslavia is of interest to me because my wife is Yugoslav. I think you're right. You couldn't get what you most wanted. That the guy who would look like he would be the most moderate politician, if there ever was an Afghan government that you wanted to get along with, looked as though when he took your money he spent it on "infrastructure," not on fighting.

Q: Tell me a little about the Americans who grouped around this, both the official and the unofficial. I've been in a couple of war situations, I served in Korea during the war, particularly in Vietnam, I was there during the Vietnamese war. When you have a war our infrastructure, whatever it is, includes a lot of so-called experts, a lot of people who come around, opportunists, people who can talk fast, seem impressive. What was your impression of the American establishment that grew up around this support of this war?

MCCARTHY: First of all, it was kept very small because it wasn't our war. The official record would probably still deny that we were involved in this kind of activity, and we were. There weren't that many people around. There was, of course, an agency presence.

What we did was pretty much indirect. The Pakistanis have something called the ISI, it's their intelligence service. It was our conduit to the Afghans. We had very few direct contacts with the Afghans. Therefore, the establishment was small and it was traditional. The people who ran this were, by and large, I think I knew them all, I certainly knew the people I needed to know, you could get everybody into the ambassador's office. We had an Afghan group meeting a couple of times a week. We didn't need a larger, we could do that in the ambassador's office. There were not hundreds or even dozens of people running around on a daily basis working for the US government in this field. It was a more traditional embassy structure.

If you went to Peshawar, where we had our consulate, there were about 3 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan in those days, most of them were living in the northwest frontier province and Peshawar was its capital. We'd had a consulate there for some years but this certainly was its heyday period. There was a consul, a couple of vice-consuls, a few other people from some other agencies, but the official numbers were fairly small. The unofficial numbers were fairly small as well. People covered the Afghan war, press people, but not that many. There were a fair number of NGOs doing relief work of some kind or another.

Q: NGO meaning non-government organization.

MCCARTHY: Different kinds of charitable groups, Medicins sans Frontieres, the Red Cross had a big operation. But again, all of this was dynamic. As time went by, and it became clearer that the Soviets were going to move on Afghanistan, there was more fighting, there was more significant fighting, the number of press went up dramatically. The number of odd people, Peshawar did pick up a Vienna post-world war II kind of air for awhile.

It was both exciting and kind of spooky, who were those people? And not just Americans. If there were good guys like ourselves and the Saudis supporting the good Afghan Mujahideen.
Then there were also bad guys, Iranians floating around, and lord knows who they were supporting. But there were odd people in Peshawar and the numbers kept going up while I was there. I left in 88 and it probably peaked in 89 or so. I think even Peshawar has returned, not to normal, but I think the spotlight of international attention has long moved on.

But anyway, internally two good ambassadors. Deane Hinton first and then he was replaced by Arnie Raphel, the last of the 3 years that I was there. A very dynamic man who was very interested in the details of pretty much everything, very much on top of things. Good subordinates, good people from the other agencies. No total cowboys but people who would get out pretty far on the limb every once in awhile. But you could bring them back in. There were no major problems during the time I was there. Which was kind of interesting, nobody who was totally off the reservation on any issue. A lot of good active debate.

Very strong ambassadors, perfectly willing to listen to what you had to say, no matter how outrageous it was, either refute you or buy off on it after awhile. So, it was a good time. It was a very stimulating time.

Q: The Pakistan element here. What was your impression, both from you dealing and the ambassador's dealing, with Zia.

MCCARTHY: Zia is often seen poorly, at least for somebody who is interested in foreign policy of my day, of my generation. I went to Pakistan with a lot of conceptions about Zia that turned out to be wrong. I think I bought off on this Jimmy Carter stereotype of the hard-hearted dictator. He wasn't much like that. A lot of people who had been around for awhile, warned me that I came to know him in 85, he took over in 77. He had a long time to polish his act. He'd done most of the hard things, in his first few years in power. Bhutto, his predecessor had already been hung. Everybody else who needed to be eliminated had been eliminated.

That being said, I thought he was a remarkable guy, very much in tune with what needs to be done to run a very complicated country with a lot of problems. Pakistan is not rich, it's full of people. Zia, as well as most of his predecessors, made the wrong resource choices. A strong military, very little money into things like education and public health. Did they have choices, did they have options? Yes, and the mix could have been addressed a little differently. Not fundamentally differently because India has been breathing down their neck ever since Pakistan became independent. So it's a “damned if you do and damned if you don't” kind of place. Probably requiring a very strong hand at the top.

Zia was a strong hand, he had a human side. I think he was doing a very good job. Certainly by the time I got there, he was a skillful manipulator of almost irreconcilable internal pressures. Plus the added pressure of the war next door in Afghanistan.

The United States government coming at him in several different ways. Pressing support on him, if you're looking at the administration. Trying to cut it all off, if you're looking at people like Senator Pressler, all the anti-nuclear lobbies. Very hard.

The other thing, by the time I left, unfortunately I think Zia had run out of options. He had
manipulated the Pakistani political scene. He got rid of martial law, I think it was in the beginning of 87, and picked a civilian prime minister who was fairly lack luster. I think he was supposed to be that way. I think Zia saw himself, and even redesigned the constitution to fit that way, so that you would have a weak prime minister, a strong president and everything would go on very well. The prime minister, whose name was Mohammed Khan Jinejo, didn't quite see it that way, particularly as time went on. Tried to become an independent power base. Zia finally sacked him, not very long before I left. It must have been a month or so before I left. My thought then was, uh oh, this man is running out of options. Already Benazir Bhutto was back, ready to lead the opposition. The daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Smart woman, bright as a whip, not prone to listen to anybody who had anything to say different from what she thought herself. But anyway a real force.

Zia needed Jinejo or needed the end of martial law and the promise of a return to civilian rule in order to stay on top, I think, and in order to keep people reasonably content. Then he dismissed Jinejo, that was an inherent contradiction in the policy he had been pursuing for the last 5 years. He was out of options. Of course, no one knows what would have happened next because what happened next was that he was killed in a plane in August.

Q: Along with our ambassador.

MCCARTHY: Along with our ambassador. This all happened about 6 weeks after I left the country. I departed, Zia gave a farewell dinner for me, Arnie gave a bunch of farewell parties for me. It was a lovely way to leave a country. I felt that I had made important contributions, I was leaving a place that was doing pretty well from a lot of points of view.

Just a few weeks later, those two men, in a way I haven't thought about this before, but those two men, obviously, and the guy who ran our military assistance unit, a guy named Herb Rosen, a brigadier general, was killed in that crash. The man in Zia's office whom I called about 4 or 5 times a week, to make plans about visitors and to ask his advice, to tell him that we needed something, a Pakistani brigadier, he was killed. The guy who had run their intelligence service, he had moved on, he was chief of staff of the army, a close friend and a very lovely man, he was killed. In the space of just a few moments, and just 6 weeks after I left the country, 6 or 8 people, Pakistani and American, whom I had intimate relations with throughout the time I was there, weren't around anymore. It was very odd. It was really a very hard thing to deal with.

Q: How did we feel about the Pakistanis and what they were doing with the aid. You say they were the conduit to the Afghan Mujahideen. What did we feel? Did we feel that the Pakistanis were siphoning much off, was this a problem?

MCCARTHY: I could say that I can't answer that question because I don't know too much about it, that's more or less true. There was an effort to provide accountability. But it's difficult to account for things that you're not doing. And our official policy is that we weren't doing that stuff. Also, even the Pakistanis, once they turned over the stuff to the Afghans, then even their ability to do much accounting disappeared.

I think the people who were the accountants for our side, in other words who had this
responsibility much more than I did, built in a lot of fudge factors and had a lot of general formulas that they applied to the stuff. I think the common wisdom was that at every step of the way, somebody peeled something off. Not necessarily to steal it or to sell it, but to store it, in case the weather turned rainy. In other words, the United States might change its mind tomorrow. The anti-nuclear lobby might get a cut-off to foreign aid to Pakistan. Therefore, we better keep the stuff in supply.

I think there was a sense that you had to keep pumping in large amounts because at every exchange point somebody is going to be storing something. Then, of course, these were human beings you were dealing with, some people somewhere along the line were cheating, stealing.

There was an incredible arms market in a place called Dharra. A little town in the middle of nowhere in the northwest frontier province. It was a market town with stalls, just simple concrete structures with a front that opened to the street and 3 walls in the back, and a little counter and a guy sitting there. Instead of selling lettuce or bales of cotton, these guys were selling submachine guns and AK 47s, grenades, RPGs, and anything you could possibly want. If you said, gee what about a tank. He didn't have anything right in the building but he could probably get you one. Later on people said the same thing for something like a stinger. There were stories.

But certainly, there were several hundred arms merchants in this town selling just about anything. Much of it in fact Russian origin, Chinese origin, it was coming from anywhere. There would be very little US government issue because there just wasn't very much going into Afghanistan that had been manufactured in the US.

Q: Could you describe the nuclear issue and how it affected us?

MCCARTHY: Pakistan is not a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, neither is India. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

India has had a couple of peaceful nuclear explosions. Pakistan has had no nuclear explosions. There are nuclear power plants in Pakistan. There is a congressionally mandated requirement that we, the administration, render judgments, I think it was every 6 months while I was there, as to whether Pakistan is engaged in research designed to create nuclear weapons. Those certifications were very difficult to make because through intelligence we were aware of purchases of centrifuges which would be used in the production of enriched plutonium. We were aware of different exchanges with China and with others. The French were always in the market to sell Pakistan something or other in the nuclear field. We were always worried about that.

All the while I was there, maybe 10% of our time would be devoted to thinking about what was going on in the nuclear field in Pakistan. I think after I left, several years later, we were no longer able to certify that Pakistan was not trying to develop a nuclear weapon. So that was the sort of day-to-day concrete side of things.

Should Pakistan be concerned about its neighbor India? I think the answer is yes. When I went to India, I went a couple of times on business, I had some consultations, it didn't take very much to get some Indians. They weren't the Indian government when I went there but to get some Indian
thinkers who were pretty influential, talking about the fact that Pakistan was an aberration. That India really never should have been divided, that historically the country is a unit and needs to return to being a unit again. If I were a smaller, poorer country right next door, I think I would want to weigh carefully all of my options including the nuclear. I suppose the enlightened part of US policy at that time was trying to push both countries to adherence to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. We haven't succeeded yet.

I don't think it's impossible because neither country can really afford much of a nuclear establishment in terms of the cost involved. Somewhere down the road, if you can develop some kind of mutual trust, some of this is pie-in-the-sky. But it seems to me that in terms of nuclear tension, this is almost the last one that risks getting out of control. The kinds of things that people used to worry about in South America are not real anymore, the South African issue seems to have been resolved. So there aren't too many nuclear problems. The Koreas here, Arab-Israeli, from a universe that use to consist of 6 or 7 real flash points, you're now down to several and this is one of them and it's not insoluble. It's just very difficult.

Q: What about congressional, you keep talking about the anti-nuclear congressional establishment, did that play much of a role?

MCCARTHY: When I was there, the answer is no, because if you wanted a policy that had bipartisan congressional support, it was the policy which we never admitted publicly we were engaged in, supplying arms to the Afghan Mujahideen to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. So, you would get an occasional expression of concern from a senator whose main interest was nuclear but that was drowned out by the overwhelming hundreds of senators and congressmen who said -- wait a second, this is important but they're helping us in Afghanistan and we have to keep our eye on the ball.

So, no, it was only after the Soviets were gone that aid was cut. I think this was real Politik writ pretty large in the minds of the men and women in congress at the time. It was important but it wasn't as important as the anti-Soviet effort.

Q: During this period of time, how are relations with India with Pakistan?

MCCARTHY: US relations with India were, in fact, entering a very good period. We got along well and I think the relations continued to improve throughout the last decade. A lot of it is trade driven. India is a much bigger market than it ever was before. India has, little by little, opened itself to American and other foreign investment. India and the US have a more complicated range of relationships. It's easier to see the pros and the cons, the positives for both sides in various aspects of the relationship.

Pakistani-US relations have always been basically strategic and that hasn't changed very much.

Pakistani-Indian relations, while I was there, were not bad. I guess Rajiv Gandhi was prime minister. He and Zia got along okay. I think they probably had a certain degree of respect for each other. There was one period toward the end of the time I was there, when there were military maneuvers on both sides and people got edgy. But nothing much came of it. There were
several summit sessions. There is also the South Asian economic grouping.

Q: ASEAN.

MCCARTHY: Not ASEAN, there's a less known one for the countries around India.

Anyway, that group met twice a year at the summit level. Rajiv Gandhi and Zia started to have occasional meetings on the sides. They agreed that there should be conversations on things like military and narcotics. Which was a big problem for Pakistan and an emerging problem for India.

So that I think for the first time, probably for a long time, maybe a couple of decades, Indian and Pakistani senior civil servants started meeting every one in a while, discussing discreet issues and making little bits of progress. There was a, it flared up again later on and I think now it's probably calm again, it's something called the Siachen Glacier, which is a 20,000 foot high set of mountains and valleys, a glacier basically, that are in an undefined part of the Indo-Pakistani border. Tempers flare every once in a while and there's fighting.

When I was there, they talked about that and made some sort of progress reaching some sort of a settlement. It broke down later and there was even some terrible fighting.

Narcotics, I did a lot of stuff on narcotics when I was there. The Secretary General, the senior Pakistani civil servant, felt that his Indian counterpart was interested in doing things like improving their knowledge of what was going on across the border in the Lahore area between both countries. So there were little bits of progress. But sort of general bad feelings.

What else was happening. There was even some movement of peoples. I think some of the Pakistanis and Indians, there were more scheduled flights. There was more movement back and forth across the border. That's probably taken a turn for the worse because there have been bombardments in Kashmir from across the border.

But, it was a pretty good time for Indo-Pak relations when I was there.

Q: One of the interesting relationships sometimes, some embassy relationships like our embassy in Ankara and our embassy in Athens get involved in things. Tel Aviv and any of the Arab capitals. Obviously our embassy in India often is at odds with Pakistan but I take it that this was not a period...

MCCARTHY: No, John Gunther Dean was, I think, our ambassador most of the time that I was there, maybe somebody else came later on.

On nuclear, there would be occasional pissing matches. First of all, yes, there is this tradition that the two embassies disagree violently on lots of issues. The two men involved for most of the time that I was there, Hinton and Dean, didn't.

Q: They weren't from the area, they were professionals.
MCCARTHY: They had some grudging respect for each other, I'm not sure that they liked each other, but they liked each other's intellect. They would occasionally have some unpleasant exchanges of telegrams. Generally without copying them to Washington. And if they did, I think they all got eventually settled. I think the exchanges were pretty good, I think there was a fair amount of respect from both sides.

That, again, was probably one of the signs -- we encouraged visiting back and forth by senior people from both embassies. Their DCM came to Islamabad and I went to Delhi, the political counselors went back and forth, the ambassadors went back and forth. I think it wasn't bad given that your client and their client was frequently at loggerheads. It wasn't bad.

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Washington, DC (1986)

Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.

ABRAMOWITZ: During my time, Afghanistan was the major issue giving INR a voice in policy making. I became not an insignificant player in a huge bureaucratic battle in Washington. Much of the bureaucratic battle is described in George Crile’s book Charlie Wilson’s War and in a Kennedy School memorandum. The issue was how to help the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion.

Shultz used to have weekly meetings of senior officials-assistant secretary of State, DoD and NSC every other Saturday morning. It was effectively something of an inter-agency bull session. During the summer of 1985, the Secretary convened a meeting on Afghanistan. I started the discussion with a briefing which was very pessimistic about the likely outcome of the fight against the Soviets. The Soviets had introduced new arms and new forces which would decimate the insurgents as well as the local population. They were making progress against the mujahideen. When I heard that Rich Armitage, the deputy secretary, was going to Pakistan, I asked whether I could join his group. He said “Sure.” This was an opportunity to get into Pakistan without fanfare and to roam around relatively unfettered to meet Pakistan intelligence which was running the war and CIA and the leading Afghan insurgents.

I took the trip to Pakistan because I was concerned that the mujahideen were losing their war in Afghanistan. It was clear that Soviet air superiority, particularly introduction of Speznaz and more helicopters, was taking its toll, and that is the main reason I supported the transfer of the
Stingers to the mujahideen. Some counter measures were absolutely essential if the Soviets were ever to withdraw from Afghanistan. That was the U.S. government’s objective which I fully supported.

I mentioned earlier about the debate within the government about providing the Stingers to the insurgents. The debate was not whether we wanted the Soviets out of Afghanistan; everyone in Washington agreed with that. The issue was whether the Stinger was the right weapon system and whether the U.S. military could afford to transfer some of those weapons.

I spent two or three days there. I talked to some mujahideen, I talked to the our station chief, I talked to the Paks. I was trying to get some firsthand information about the progress of the insurgency. I was particularly interested in the CIA’s views about the mujahideen’s needs for better weapons, particularly ground-to-air missiles to offset Soviet air power. I had tentatively reached the conclusion that more of these anti-aircraft weapons were needed, but I was looking for confirmation. While the mujahideen had British blowpipes, they had limited effect against higher flying aircraft. My conversations and briefings reinforced my view that “Stinger” missiles were desperately needed and had to be supplied or the “Muj” would be severely hurt. The station chief told me that “Washington” was reluctant to provide these weapons. The alleged concern was that the mujahideen’s use of these weapons would identify the U.S. as directly providing weapons to the insurgents. That was indeed a case made in parts of State and CIA. I thought this was a spurious argument since by this time, the Soviets were well aware of our growing massive support for the mujahideen. Other objectors pointed to Pakistan taking opposition.

In any case, I became a proponent of taking action. I felt that we had to do something to help the mujahideen against Russian airpower. I must admit that my stance did obliterate the distinction between intelligence collection and analysis and policy making. It was undoubtedly unusual for the director of INR to become so deeply involved in a debate on policy. In part, I was placed in this position because I was the principal State representative on covert action programs. I became involved in part because my job in fact demanded it.

There were two people in particular whom were equally supportive of Stingers in the Pentagon: Fred Iklé and Mike Pillsbury, who had long been urging it. Senator Hatch was the most influential proponent on the Hill for supplying Stingers. Congressman Wilson was also a strong supporter, but on this issue played a lesser role than he had earlier on other issues dealing with Afghanistan, particularly raising the level of assistance.

The issue of providing Stingers became a bureaucratic battle with State/NEA and CIA opposing the transfer of the weapon system. Bill Casey didn’t seem particularly involved, but I always thought he objected because his staff was opposed to the transfer, but I was never sure why Casey’s position left me particularly puzzled since he would support any action against the Soviets. The U.S. military was opposed because it did not want to release any Stingers from its inventory. Armacost and I supported the transfer as did some parts of Iklé and Pillsbury.

We had meeting after meeting trying to resolve our differences. This went on for months during which more parts of State came to our point of view. Then someone threw in another monkey wrench: the story was that President Zia was opposed to the transfer of Stingers to the
mujahideen. Pillsbury convinced Hatch that it would be very helpful if the senator would take a trip to the area to make his own assessment. I went on that trip. During his visit to Pakistan, Hatch of course had a meeting with Zia during which he raised the rumor that the Pakistani president was opposed to the transfer of Stingers. Zia refuted that quickly and decisively; he said if course his government was in support of such transfer since it would help the insurgents. That was the decisive psychological turn. The opposition had run out of ammunition; the military was over-ruled and finally they supplied Stingers from its inventory.

There is no question that the transfer had an impact. We used to get reports of the number of helicopters that had been shot down; they were not exactly reliable, but there was no question that the Soviets faced a radical change to the situation on the battlefield. Not only Stingers, but far more assistance was being given to the resistance. I can’t say that the Stingers were the determinant factor in the Soviet decision to leave Afghanistan; I don’t know, but there was no doubt that it was a factor in Soviet calculation of the costs of their venture. I won’t go as far as the recent book and movie Charlie Wilson’s War has gone in its finding that the Stingers were responsible for the Soviet retreat, but I think there is no question that they contributed to Soviet policy development. The reports of their accuracy I found a little incredulous.

Just a footnote here: when I was the president of the Carnegie Endowment, I saw Shevardnadze when I went to Moscow to begin creating the Endowment’s Moscow center. I went with Strobe Talbott and Dimitri Simes. I said to Shevardnadze that I just had to ask him how important the supplying of Stingers was to the Soviet withdrawal decision. He got visible angry and said in no uncertain terms that the Stinger had nothing to do with the decision to withdraw. He would not acknowledge in any way that the Stingers played any role. The Soviets, they withdraw for their own reasons. Despite Shevardnadze disclaimer, I still believe they contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw. There is no question that the provision of the anti-aircraft missiles gave the insurgents renewed vigor and passion and greater world-wide publicity. At the time, no one had ever heard of Osama Bin Laden, although we were very aware of the questionable attitude and nature of the mujahideen. Unfortunately, the Pakistani really controlled arms supplies to the various insurgent groups.

The trip to Pakistan took place in January, 1986. On the way back, I got off in the Philippines. I stayed just a few days, but had an opportunity just to talk to a wide variety of people – politicians and non-politicians. The presidential elections were in full swing. I went to some of the rallies which were as enthusiastic as I have seen in a political setting. There was excitement in the air; people sensed that Marcos was coming to an end and that Aquino would win. Aquino was a very nice woman; not particularly impressive but very congenial, very dedicated, and very honest. At the first Secretary’s staff meeting after my trip, Shultz asked me for my view of the Philippine situation. I told him that I was very surprised by the vigor and enthusiasm I had observed in the Philippines in the campaign. I thought Cory’s meetings were more of a revival meeting than a political rally. It was an extraordinary movement in which people at all levels of society were participating.

DOUGLAS WATSON
Mr. Watson was born and raised in the Washington, DC area and was educated at California State University at Los Angeles and Harvard University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1966, he served in a variety of posts throughout the world, including Cairo, Athens, Madrid, Saigon, Quito, Islamabad and Port au-Prince, Haiti, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in the State Department in Washington, on Capitol Hill in the Pearson program and was a member of the US delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1991. Mr. Watson was interviewed by Thomas J. Dunnigan in 2000.

Q: What was your relation with the Pakistanis?

WATSON: Oh, I was there just a short time, less than a year. I had a good relationship with the government authorities and particularly with the police, the city planning commission. We had such a large property there. Things that we did that had to do with the electrical system or the sewage system or waste or whatever, that was something we always had to bring the Pakistanis in on because we needed their support to make it work. They were very cooperative, a very attractive people, too. Pakistan was really very foreign to me and to my wife. We did some hiking there. We also traveled up to Gilgit, Hunza, and a couple of other places up north, in small planes that maneuvered hither and yon, snaking through the mountain passes. We went over, of course, to Kathmandu and Delhi. We got to Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi. The Pakistanis were a very fine people. The souk, the bazaar, in Rawalpindi was very interesting, unique. We had been in souks before in Egypt, but Pakistan was quite different. It was a wonderful tour. It was not difficult. Deane Hinton and John McCarthy were superb. Our living conditions were good and the tour was short.

Q: What was the effect of the war that was going on in Afghanistan at the time?

WATSON: I think there was a lot of our involvement concerning which we probably are still closed mouthed.

Q: Well, the paper has been full of the fact that the CIA was giving supplies to Afghanistan.

WATSON: The Agency can speak better to that than I can.

Q: You probably had a large station in Islamabad.

WATSON: I would rather not comment.

Q: Did we have a lot of military there in the country?

WATSON: No, not very many. A small military. Of course, after we left and Arnie Raphel was killed along with President Zia, I immediately cabled Nancy Ely, Arnie’s wife, from Haiti, to “Come on down and stay with us if you like.” She is a wonderful lady, and now is our
ambassador to Zagreb.

Q: And she is a fine person.

How serious did the embassy consider the Pakistani nuclear program to be or was that much discussed when you were there?

WATSON: That wasn’t much discussed to my knowledge, but then there was much I was not privy to. It was very serious and it was something that I’m sure Deane had in hand and was working with at the Assistant Secretary Level.

Q: We had a science attaché in Pakistan or not?

WATSON: No, we didn’t have a science attaché. But let me add as an aside that a couple of folks who were there later had their own missions. Mike Lemmon, John Wolfe, and Lauralee Peters all became ambassadors. It was a pretty good staff.

ARMA JANE KARAER
Deputy Principal Officer
Karachi (1986-1988)

Arma Jane Karaer was born in Minnesota in 1941. She received her bachelor’s degree from University of Minnesota and during this time also attended Osmania University in India. During her career she had positions in Australia, Zaire, Turkey, Pakistan, Swaziland, Finland, and ambassadorships to Papau New Guinea, Soloman Islands, and Vanuatu. Ambassador Karaer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: You were in Karachi from when to when?

KARAER: From ’86 to ’88.

Q: Today is the 29th of June 2004. Arma Jane, what was Karachi like in ’86 when you arrived there?

KARAER: When I arrived, Karachi was just on the brink of falling apart ethnically and politically. The government of Pakistan was sitting very hard on that particular province of Pakistan. Karachi is the capital of Sind Province. The Sindese are ethnically different from the Punjabis who were running the country at the time. Their language of course is different and they are the ethnic group from which the Bhutto family comes. Benazir Bhutto had just been allowed to return to Pakistan after quite a lengthy exile in England and she was busy revving up her political party, which was her father’s political party, to challenge the government. The existing government had also adopted before I got there a policy of encouraging religious sentiment in the country, that is conservative religious sentiment. I think that the president was himself a
Q: Who was the president at that time?

KARAER: Zia ul-Haq. Zia had adopted Sharia law for Pakistan, and this had really encouraged the very conservative Islamic types. One of the things that really disappointed me when I got there, and it was a direct result of this resurgence of very conservative Islamic thinking, was the effect that this conservative outlook had on the accessibility of Pakistani cultural performances. I had missed the subcontinent so much since I’d left there when I was a student. I really wanted to come back. I found the cultures there absolutely fascinating and wonderful. Well, one of the results of the Zia religious reforms was that there could not be any performance of traditional Pakistani music or dance in a public venue in Karachi while I was there because if there was, the very conservative types would have gangs out in the streets threatening to burn down the theater and that sort of thing. The only performances that we were able to see of really fine music, and Sindhi musicians are some of the very best, were given on the grounds of foreign consulates.

Also, shortly after I arrived, Pakistan saw the emergence of the ethnic political parties that were supposedly defending the rights of the group that are called the Mohajirs. Now, the Mohajirs are Muslims whose forbearers were refugees from India at the time of Indian independence. They speak Urdu. They tended to be a much more educated group of people than Sindhis and Baluchis who were native to the provinces that made up Karachi’s consular district. The Mohajirs had quickly taken over most of the government jobs and were the professional people for the most part. Now, Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, but just as there has been a struggle in India over making Hindi the national language and therefore, disadvantaging the southerners that speak languages that are a totally different language group than Hindi, there was this same argument in Pakistan. The Sindhis and Baluchis found that they were being disadvantaged because of the dominance of the Urdu speaking people. And there had been a backlash against the Mohajirs. In 1986, some very violent young men started a political party that claimed to represent the Mohajirs, and they started demonstrating and burning and shooting on their behalf.

The Russians were still in Afghanistan and we were engaging them through the mujahideen. In Pakistan, the U.S. government’s principal concern was getting the cooperation of the Pakistani government in providing weaponry and support to the Afghans who were fighting the Russians. As a consequence of the war, there were quite a few Afghan refugees in Karachi. Additionally, since Karachi is the biggest seaport in Pakistan and the biggest industrial city, it also attracted people from all over the country who were coming there to find work, particularly the Pathans who are the major ethnic group in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. The Pathans were very much resented by the Mohajirs and the Sindhis. They are ethnically different, much taller, stronger looking men. Their complexion is much fairer. Their language, of course is different, and they would come to Karachi for the construction work and to work in the famous ship disassembly industry.

In addition to the intra-Pakistani feuding groups, there were those who were feuding elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly Iran, who were in Karachi and were busy assassinating each other there as well. It was a very dangerous place, but at that point Americans were not being targeted. Our main security concerns were to keep ourselves from getting caught in the middle of...
somebody else’s feud. The stuff we’re taught about, changing your route to work every day, came in handy in Karachi.

Karachi in my opinion is a very ugly city. Probably the only semi-beautiful thing in the entire place was the memorial built to the founder of Pakistan.

Q: Jinnah.

KARAER: Yes, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In the two years that I worked there, and I am not exaggerating, it only rained twice and then it was just a sprinkle. The dust was so thick on the leaves of the trees that I really wondered that they could survive at all. My youngest daughter, who was just four years old when we got there, spent those two years living in eternally sunshiny Pakistan. Later, when got to Swaziland, where it rained periodically, she was as mad as a hornet. This was not the way God meant the world to be.

My instructions from the consul general were that we were to....

Q: Who was the consul general?

KARAER: Larry Grahl. We were supposed to keep a distance from the opposition parties. He told me the Embassy didn’t want us to get the government upset by talking to the political opposition.

Q: Who was the ambassador? Deane Hinton?

KARAER: Yes.

Q: Well, you know, I mean you’re supposed to have contacts.

KARAER: My sentiments exactly. Well, the consul general and I had something of a tussle over this, but I convinced him that just calling on some of these guys was certainly not going to cause a big fuss. Some of them were Communists or they were left leaning rhetoric type guys which was normal for the subcontinent. I was finally able to make appointments and call on these people. They were very interesting and nothing bad happened as far as our relations with the Pakistani government were concerned. Benazir Bhutto sent a number of her people over when I first got to the country, because I had been written up in the local newspapers as the first woman to have ever had that position at the consulate..

Q: You mean the deputy consul general?

KARAER: I was the deputy principal officer, yes. However, being a woman anything doesn't count for much in Pakistan. A reporter from one of the conservative Urdu newspapers interviewed me because my husband was a Muslim. The first question he asks me was "What’s it like being married to a Muslim? I didn’t tell them that my husband is not a practicing Muslim. He is a child of the Turkish revolution. The last thing in the world he does is pray five times a day, but I didn’t tell the reporter that. I did tell him that I married a man, not a religion. Anyway,
Benazir Bhutto sent several people over to see me over the first few weeks I was there to say that she would like to meet me. I certainly wanted to meet her, but the consul general told me that she was his contact and I was to stay away. Okay, fine. I only ever met her just in passing at receptions to shake her hand.

**Q:** What were you getting from the Americans and maybe some of the other consulate people from other countries about the Bhuttos, Benazir and all?

**KARAER:** Okay. Politics in Pakistan is pretty medieval. The leaders of political parties tend to be the heads of big landowning families and each of those families runs its own estate like a feudal fief. As far as the people who live on those properties are concerned, the law of the country doesn’t exist. If they want to stay on the estate, the law is the landlord. Politics in Pakistan are not based on political philosophies, they are based on old rivalries between these families. In Pakistan, if the Bhuttos live on this side of the river and your father’s fiefdom is on the other side of the river, regardless of what your political viewpoint might otherwise have been, then you’re going to belong to the party that opposes the Bhuttos, because you’ve always been against one another. Also, as I mentioned before, intra-Pakistani ethnicity was also a big factor in politics.

There was a tremendous amount of kidnapping and ransoming of sons in Sind between these families, for example. Very few if any ever got killed as far as I know, but this was a major problem. The Sindhis felt repressed by the Punjabis, who were running the federal government. Benazir is a Sindhi. The Sindhi supported her Pakistani People's Party (PPP). She would tour through the countryside in a caravan of four wheel drive vehicles, and she would be greeted as the second coming by all of these villagers. In a sense she was a second coming, because the Army had hung her father when he was prime minister.

For us at the consulate, particularly for the consul general and for me, there was a really huge burden of social life in Karachi. I say it was a burden because I have never worked anywhere else where I knew socially so many incredibly rich people. They would constantly have parties. They were business people for the most part. A lot of them had American green cards or British passports, which they kept close at hand in case the tumbrels starting rolling and they had to get out in a hurry, but they really lived in Pakistan. They had their businesses there. Since nobody paid taxes much, all the money they made was theirs to keep and to spend. Now, because the Sharia was the law of the land, no liquor was sold in public places. These people had their suppliers and they would have one big dinner party after another where the liquor flowed like water. There were rules for the poor, and then there were rules for the rich.

I believe that they thought that having the heads of the consulates particularly the big western consulates, the British, the Americans and the French, at their parties gave them a cachet. My husband and I went to these parties because that was orders from headquarters, but I think there were only two families that we knew there who were our friends because they wanted to be our friends and not because they saw a great big American visa standing in front of them whenever they looked at us. Those two families we met in a totally different way than through these rich peoples’ parties.
It would be so bad that there often would be three invitations for the same evening, and no one would take no for an answer. You had to stop at each house for drinks or dinner. This was really exhausting. Although the invitations always said 8:30, dinner was never put out anywhere near that time. The dinners were always big buffets, of course, because nobody ever knew who was going to show up at their party. The food would never be served until 10:30. Then, this is typical on the subcontinent, after you eat, everybody gets up and goes. We’d come stumbling home at no better than 11:30. The Americans had to be in the office at 8:30 in the morning, because that’s when you start working. The Pakistanis of course didn’t come dribbling into their offices until 11:00 in the morning.

Once, after I’d been there for a while, I thought that some of these gatherings are such mob scenes, nobody will ever know if I don’t come. One man’s son was being married and we were invited to the wedding. We just didn’t go. There must have been, conservatively speaking, 2,000 people at that wedding reception. The next time I saw that man, he said, “Why weren’t you there? Why didn’t you come to my son’s wedding?” Oh, Lord.

The reason we were supposed to go to these was that the hosts and their guests were supposedly good contacts who had the inside skinny on what was going on in the town, and a lot of them did. Some of them were owners of newspapers and friends of the owners of newspapers and whatever, but for me it was something of a problem, because at a lot of these places, even among the sophisticated, they tended to have totally separate areas of the party for the ladies and for the men, and the only time that people would come together was when they were actually eating. I thought well these ladies are nice ladies, but they are not the people with the information..

Q: Yes, you were saying, you’re not going to spend.

KARAER: Yes, I mean there were women that I cultivated and talked to and had to my house for lunch that ran human rights organizations and women’s rights organizations, but they normally didn’t get invited to these parties. I would just stick there with the men so I could talk with the men and nobody ever really tried to stop me from doing that.

I also got to know my counterparts at the other consulates. When I first got there I paid courtesy calls on my counterparts at the other consulates in town. There were quite a few. I’ve been thinking lately a lot about one young man who was the deputy at the Iraqi consulate. He was assassinated while I was in Karachi.

Q: Who would, I mean was this an Iranian or Baath thing?

KARAER: It could have been an Iranian thing. There were a couple of different Iranian groups that were busy shooting each other and I suppose they could go after Iraqis as well. I don't know. We only knew that he’d been killed. One morning we literally got blasted out of our beds. There was this tremendous explosion. Fortunately quite a distance away from our house. One Iranian group had set off a bomb near or in the apartment building where their opponents were living and it was right next door to an apartment building where a lot of the people from the Russian consulate lived. A number of Russians had their eardrums pierced, but none were killed.
Then the second year that we were there the Russians left Afghanistan and we enjoyed glasnost. That was truly interesting, because one of my counterparts in Karachi that I really liked was a Russian. His bosses were sort of grumpy, gloomy looking gusses.

Q: Old KGB?

KARAER: Yes, the bosses may have been, but I checked and made sure that he was truly a diplomat. He wasn’t a KGB guy. They had plenty of them there and of course we didn’t have much to do with each other except on an official basis up until the Russians left Afghanistan. In fact just before the evacuation of Afghanistan, they had their national day and we had instructions that we were to send only one person to the national day and it should not be the consul general and it shouldn’t be any of our military people. That year the junior officer that worked for me laughed and said, “Oh, Arma Jane, do you get to be the one who insults the Russians this year?”

Now the Consulate's 4th of July party has a guest list of hundreds. We knew a lot of people in that town. But when I walked into the ballroom of the hotel where the Russians were having their reception, I couldn’t recognize a soul in the entire room. I mean, their contacts were so totally separate from our contacts. Anyway, I’m standing there feeling very sore thumbish and then some pretty ladies in beautiful Korean kimonos came fluttering through the door. I thought, “At last, somebody I can talk to.” Dumb me. I walked over to these people and I introduced myself. They stood there like they were frozen to the ground with looks of absolute horror on their faces. Then I realized I was talking to North Koreans.

Oh, I mentioned before that I thought that all of this affection that we were being shown in all of these invitations that we were being given were primarily because we were the dispensers of visas to the United States. Certainly the consul general’s office was absolutely bombarded by telephone calls from all of the great and good of Karachi who were calling to ask if we would give a visa to whoever this contact of theirs was. The best we would ever do for these folks, of course, was to get them an appointment so they wouldn't have to stand in a long, long line outside of our consulate. Those were the days before we had adopted our present visa fee policy, which makes applying for an American visa extremely expensive. In those days all these unemployed young men had to do was stand in a line in front of the American consulate and maybe they’d get lucky one day. So, I had some real run ins with some of these people. They would speak nicely to the consul general, but some of them ordered me, “You will do this for my friend.” When I found out that the friend had already been turned down for a visa by a consular officer, I’d refuse. We were not all that popular, but they kept right on trying.

One of my most interesting contacts was a man that I met sort of halfway through one of the big parties. He was called the mango king of Pakistan. Oh, Karachi is an ugly place. It is a violent place. It is a dirty place. But Pakistan produces the best and largest variety of mangos anywhere in the world. In all of my assignments, no matter how otherwise deprived the country might have been, I always tried to identify at least one thing that was better there than anywhere else. And it was mangos in Pakistan. This guy had a huge estate in central Sind, just north of Hyderabad, where he grew sugarcane and mangos. Almost all of the fruit produced on the estate was shipped to Europe. After we met, he sent us a crate of mangos. So, we tried to send something
back as a thank you. He wouldn’t accept, which my husband, being a Turk, wouldn't accept. "This is about my honor. I have to give you something in return. So, if he would take whatever my husband brought, then he’d send some more of something to eat over to our house. Finally I wrote him a note asking, "Have you ever heard of a potlatch? I think we’re engaged in a potlatch, and we’re never going to win."

The second year that we were there, his son was kidnapped, but in his case it was much worse than kidnappings suffered by other families, because his son was only 12 years old. In the other cases the sons of the reminders, as these landowners are called, who were kidnapped by political rivals, would be grown men. This was the first time that such a young child had been kidnapped, and he’d been taken right from the front of his school. Well, normally, the ransom is paid and the son gets returned. This man refused. He told the provincial government, and everyone he knew, "I know who kidnapped him, and I know the Chief Minister of the province knows who kidnapped him, and I expect the government to get him back unharmed." I was amazed at the reaction of all these other wealthy, vulnerable people with whom we were socializing. Most said, "What a terrible man he is that he won't pay the money to get his son back. " He said, "This political nonsense has gone far enough, and I expect the government to do this." He told us that he knew that the man who had kidnapped his son was a neighbor who had borrowed money from him before and not paid him back. When the fellow tried to borrow more money and he refused, the neighbor's next step was to kidnap the kid. Our acquaintance did get his son back after a while, but his refusal to pay ransom put him squarely in the anti-government camp in town.

Shortly after we met him, my father died, and I went back to the States for my father’s funeral. Then I brought my mom back to visit with me for the last three months that we were in Pakistan. She came to all these parties with me and she was amazed. My mother is far more observant, particularly of the way people dress, than I am. I remember coming back from one party at which I had introduced her to this man, and she said, “Arma Jane, did you see his watch? It was covered with diamonds!” I said, “Well, frankly, no I hadn’t noticed, but I did notice the buttons on his shirt.” The long shirts worn in Pakistan are called "kurta" and they have removable buttons. If you’re wealthy, you usually have gold studs in your shirt. Our acquaintance was a tall, big man, and when I was talking to him my eyes were level with his chest. He had diamond studs in his kurta. One late afternoon on a Saturday, my husband and I ran into him at the shopping area near our house. He was just running out of the grocery store. He’d come to buy some shoe polish he said. He was wearing the diamond studs in his shirt even then.

He invited us to come and visit him at his estate. This was momentous for us, because during the whole time that I had been in Karachi, I had almost never been able to leave the city, unless I had gone on a trip to the Embassy in Islamabad. Although I applied several times to make a trip to the interior of Sind, the Pakistani government had always turned me down because they said it was too dangerous. Now, I’m not a fool, and I had worked out these trips with the senior Pakistani FSN so that I would be going from one reminder’s estate to the next where I would be seeing villages and talking to people. I wouldn’t be staying overnight on my own in some small place, and I’d be under the protection of these reminders in every area that I was going to, but that was not good enough for the Pakistani government. I knew why. They did not want diplomats traveling in Sind. They didn’t want us to see what was going on out there.
The ambassador had made a rule that we were not to defy the government’s instructions, but since other American citizens could travel there for tourism without getting the permission of the government, if we were going for purely personal travel, or if we were going to an American installation, then we didn’t have to ask for the Pakistani government's permission. At the time we had a USIS library in Hyderabad. So I made one trip up there to call on our library staff, who made a luncheon engagement for me with a number of the journalists from up there. I'd also met a woman who was a member of the legislative assembly. She was very friendly and invited us to her house a number of times for small family gatherings. She also invited us to her daughter’s wedding, which was held on their family’s estate near Hyderabad. We went to that and stayed overnight there. One of the best photographs I have in my family album is of my husband and my little daughter standing on the porch of the little cottage on the estate where we had spent the night. Flanking them are very tall men with bandoleers over their chests and rifles in their hands. They had been assigned to guard us during the night.

The government people let me know that they knew that I’d been out there wandering around, and I didn’t make any excuses. Anyway, the trip to the mango king's estate was going to be my last chance to make a trip into the interior. In the meantime, my husband had become close friends with a brilliant young man who had gotten a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from MIT, returned to Pakistan, turned down a chance to work for their nuclear program, and went into business for himself building satellite dishes. Satellite dishes were a new phenomenon in Pakistan at the time, and he was able to build them locally and install them for people. My husband was running the American club in Karachi, and so he bought a dish for the club so that we could get the Armed Forces television network and the sports programs that they broadcast. In the process of buying this thing and having it installed, he found out what a delightful person this man was, and we became very close to him. My husband spread the word about what a good product he had for sale. Consequently, our host, the mango king, engaged him to make a satellite installation for the house on his estate. We'd already sent our kids to Turkey, because we were about to leave Pakistan, and so the cavalcade set out for the interior of Sind, our host, my mother and I in his Mercedes followed by my husband and our Pakistani dish-making friend in our Volvo. In front of our host’s car was a four-wheel drive vehicle loaded with men with AK-47s and behind my husband’s car was another Jeep loaded with men with AK-47s. Halfway to Hyderabad, our host stopped for gasoline. While he was out of the car, my mother, who had slipped her shoes off and was running her toe along something in the carpet under her feet, said, “Arma Jane, I think there’s a gun under here.” I said, “There probably is a gun there. Did you see all the guns around here?” We get to the estate and this is something out of Beau Geste, honest to God, except instead of sand we’re surrounded by acres of sugarcane, and rising up above the sugarcane we could see the walls of a mud fortress.

Q: Like Fort Zinderneuf in Beau Geste.

KARAER: Is that the name of it?

Q: Yes.

KARAER: This Fort Zinderneuf had watchtowers in every corner and a man with an AK-47 on each wall. We passed through big wooden gates into a large lovely garden with three modest
rambler-type houses and a swimming pool in the middle. We arrived just in time for lunch. Dessert was a sample of about 20 different kinds of mangoes that are grown on the estate. "Just take a sliver," our host said, "because you won’t be able to eat all of these." It was like a wine tasting. In the middle of the meal, a man joined us who was introduced as our host's half-brother. Our host’s father had three or four wives, so there were a number of brothers, but he is the eldest and the boss. The half-brother at the lunch table had a stick with him about eight inches long made of ebony. The top was encircled with diamonds. When he left, he left the stick lying on the table next to our host. Following lunch, our host invited us to tour the estate in his jeep. He took the stick with him, and when we get into the jeep, he was driving, he threw this diamond-studded stick on the dashboard. The men with the guns got into their Jeep behind us, and as we started off I asked, “Is that a scepter?” He said, “Oh, yes, that’s something our mother had made. When I’m not here the workers on the estate know that whoever has that is the one who is in charge, and they have to obey his orders.”

Q: Oh boy.

KARAER: Oh boy, yes. The whole time we were there, we had a nice time. We’d sit out on the terrace talking in the evening with our drinks. Standing well within complete eyeshot, but out of earshot, would be a man with an AK-47.

Q: Did the government play much of a role there? I mean it sounds like in this area the government wasn’t a player?

KARAER: We were never were able to find out just what sort of role the government played, because we weren’t able to talk to any of the government officials outside of Karachi. My boss, the consul general made a couple of trips every year to Baluchistan. That was his thing. He went up there and made the rounds of officials in Baluchistan, so I never had a chance to go there myself, but those were really wild and woolly places. Baluchistan is still very tribal and Sind appears to be governed, estate by estate, by the landowners. Believe me, you don’t want to be a Hindu villager in those places. I mean that has got to be the least civil rights situation that anybody would ever want to be in.

Q: Do they have something an untouchable situation there?

KARAER: Although Islam has existed in that area since the 8th century, Hindu culture remains a firm underpinning there. Even if you’re a Muslim, you don’t marry just any old body, you have to marry within the right family connections and that, in Hinduism, is called the caste system. Oh, that was another interesting revelation, not so much for me, because I’d seen it already when I was a student in India, but for my husband. Not too long after we got to Karachi, we saw Muharram, the Shia festival commemorating the death of Hassain and Hussein, the sons of Ali. As part of the observance of the holy day young men in every Shia neighborhood build towers made out of sticks and tinsel shortly before the date of the festival. They put them on push carts, like the vegetable sellers use, and they push them around the neighborhood. People admire the towers and give them money. It’s sort of like trick or treating in a way. The young men use the money to buy food and make some kind of big stew with rice. They feed whoever wants to come and eat.
The eve of Muharram, this type of celebration is at its peak. Now the Shia neighborhood of Karachi that we saw this in is one of the poorest places in town, and that’s pretty darn poor when you’re talking about Karachi. We weren’t supposed to be there. The Consul General had been ordered that during Muharram, all the Americans were supposed to stay in their houses in case rioting broke out in the city. We had many flashpoints in Karachi, when the religious sects or ethnic groups would clash. We were supposed to stay in our houses, so that we wouldn’t get caught up in anything. But I had seen Muharram celebrations in Hyderabad in India, and I knew it was something important to see. So, when the senior local at the consulate asked, “Mrs. Karaer, would you and your husband like to see the Muharram eve celebrations?” I instantly agreed. That night he and his friend picked us up. His friend was a young businessman from the Gulf, and he was driving the car. My husband was sitting in the front with him and the Pakistani FSN and I were sitting in the back. Seeing the towers and the stuff the people were doing, both my husband and the fellow from the Gulf were saying, “This isn’t Islam.” The Pakistani and I were laughing, because they were right. These practices are peculiar to Pakistan and they are Hindu. You know what they do with those towers after Muharram is over? They take them down to the seashore and they drown them in the sea. Do you know what they do with the images of Ganesh after the Ganesh Puja in Bombay? They take them down to the seashore and drown them in the sea. Anyway, both of them got their eyes opened that night. Yes, we’re all Muslims, but some of us are more Muslim than others. In fact, Islam as it is practiced around the world is very much affected by the culture in which it was planted. Therefore, the type of Islam that’s practiced in India is very Hindu say compared to the type of Islam that you see in Turkey or that you see in Saudi Arabia. Just like Christianity is practiced very differently in different parts of the world.

That night was fun and not a thing happened to us as we went around. That night was my one chance to go through a Pakistani slum at night and see all of these totally drugged up people lying on the corners. The only way these homeless laborers can get any sleep because of the noise and commotion that’s going on all around them is to take some kind of drug and go to sleep.

Q: I imagine one of your briefs there at the American consulate general was to keep an eye on fundamentalist Islam and its offshoots, how it was being taught in the Madrasa and all that. Were you getting that?

KARAER: No. I mean the only thing that our brief, as you say, touched on, was the relationship of Islamic law to human rights questions. As far as I know, the USG was totally oblivious to the possible impact on us of the spread of conservative Islam in countries like Pakistan. I remember reading the reporting on the mujahideen groups in Afghanistan and thinking that these guys that we were arming against the Russians were so much further removed from our basic values than the Russians ever were. When and if they won, what was going to take the place of the Communists that we wanted removed? In Pakistan, as I already mentioned, the conservatives had already pretty much closed down any kind of expression of their own culture as far as music and theater was concerned. I had always found this puritanical, Wahabi view of Islam, which forbids any kind of pleasure, to be ridiculous, inhuman. I had been introduced to Islam in India, together with all of the wonderful music and dance and poetry that was introduced by the Mughal
emperors. What was beautiful in Pakistan was their inheritance from that period of Islam.

**Q:** You might explain what a madrasa is.

KARAER: That’s a so-called Koran school where little boys memorize the Koran and don’t learn much else. On the other hand, sending children to school is an expensive thing on the subcontinent, because you have to buy shoes and school uniforms and books and poor families find it hard to afford schooling. Speaking of schools reminds me of the university. The university was always in a commotion and there was a lot of accusations of cheating there to the extent that the invigilators, the staff members who were supposed to monitor the exams, would get beaten up and thrown out and no one had much confidence in the value of the degrees that were coming out of that place.

One of the opposition politicians I interviewed was an attorney. He offered to have his son pick me up. The young man studied law at the University of Karachi. I asked him, “Does it bother you that people are cheating? Are they actually learning the law? Can you learn anything there?” He said, “Oh, it doesn’t make any difference, because like all my friends, after I get a diploma, I’ll go into my father’s practice, and that’s where I’ll learn”.

**Q:** What about the work of the consulate in dealing with the mayor and the government in Karachi. How did you find that?

KARAER: I didn’t have anything to do with that. We didn’t seem to have any difficulty with anything we needed to have done. No problem.

**Q:** How about the hand of the embassy on your operation?

KARAER: The consul general interpreted his instructions as not to do anything that would lead the people in the government in Islamabad to think that the U.S. government was trying to encourage their opposition. We would contribute to the human rights reports, but the final report was written in Islamabad. I always thought that their hand was quite light, but then their concern was far more about our ability to cooperate with the government than elsewhere. I remember the first time I went to Islamabad, because I had visited Pakistan when I was a student in India, but I had not gone to Islamabad or Rawalpindi on that trip. I was amazed because in 1979 our embassy in Islamabad was attacked by a mob and burned.

**Q:** I think it was ’79 right about the time of the takeover in Iran.

KARAER: Right. At that time some Shia militants had attacked the great mosque in Mecca. Immediately the word was circulated that the Americans were behind the attack, and so a mob that had been collected in Rawalpindi, which is a half hour away by bus from Islamabad, gathered around our embassy. The government didn’t send any police or military to disperse it and, in the end, some of our people were killed. The mob set the place on fire and the rest of our staff ended up in the communications vault, eventually crawling out onto the roof to escape the smoke. One of the officers that had worked with me in Zaire had gone on to Islamabad after that assignment, and he was one of the guys in the vault in Islamabad. When he and his family got
evacuated from Karachi, I was still in the States, and he told me about his experience. In Karachi
the consulate general is right smack in the middle of one of the busiest parts of the city with big
hotels around it. We always talked about what we would do if we ever had a mob attack
threatening the consulate. The consul general and I agreed that if we assumed there was even a
hint that something like that was going to happen, we were going to evacuate our people. We had
no intention of trying to defend the building.

I had rather imagined that the embassy was in a similar situation. Not so. Islamabad is like a
beautiful, big, green park. It is like the monumental part of Washington in a way. There are big
government buildings, but separated by large expanses of lawn and trees and gardens. Our
embassy is at the end of a road in the middle of one of those big green expanses. In other words,
it took a lot of doing to get a mob there. The only people who lived in Islamabad at that time
were middle class government employees who certainly weren’t in the mob. Bringing all those
people there took a lot of time. The first time I visited the embassy, I realized what a tremendous
betrayal of the American trust in the government this had been.

Oh, another thing that happened while I was there. I was talking to someone in the political
section on the telephone one day and he said, “I’m sorry. I think I’m going to have to call you
back. There seems to be something firing on the embassy.” I thought oh my God. We’re on the
radio listening to all this. An ammunition dump blew up on the outskirts of Rawalpindi.

Q: I remember reading about that.

KARAER: The outskirts of any subcontinental city is surrounded by the shanties of the poorest
of the poor. The explosion appears to have been a genuine accident. I don’t think they ever found
that anybody had done it on purpose, but it was really the height of carelessness to have kept
such a big ammunition dump so close to a heavily populated area. These shells were screaming
up into the air and crashing down all over. The American school was hit. Fortunately no
Americans were harmed, but other people did get hit and killed in Islamabad.

Q: Did the 50 year old confrontation in India play at all in Karachi from your perspective?

KARAER: Only to the extent that while I was there I took two trips to India and it was just about
impossible to arrange a trip to India from Karachi. You could arrange a trip to Beijing, but not to
India. Other than that, no, things were relatively quiet in that regard. However, Middle Eastern
politics impinged. About the second month after I arrived in Pakistan, a Pan Am airliner was
hijacked on the ground at the Karachi airport. It was loaded with passengers. They had started
the flight in Bombay and they had already loaded the passengers from Karachi, which included
three children of one of our senior FSNs. The hijackers were Palestinians. The boarded the plane
and said they were taking it over. The pilots had escaped from the airplane, and so the hijackers
couldn’t get the plane off the ground. They said they wanted pilots or they would shoot some
passengers. The Pakistani government decided not to comply, and the hijackers killed one man
after a while. He was an Indian with an American green card. They threw his body out of the
plane. That was quite an experience in a crisis exercise for our consulate. We had an operation
running in the consulate for about three days straight. We would take turns getting some sleep
and going back.
I had to deal with a newspaper reporter who tried to trick me into giving information that we didn't want made public. He pretended that he was someone from PanAm, but mostly I just wrote telegram after update telegram. In the end the electrical generator ran out of power and that caused the lights on the airplane and the air conditioning system to go off. Though at that point nobody was trying to attack the aircraft, the hijackers thought they were being attacked, and so they started to spray the cabin with automatic gunfire. They killed a number of people and very badly wounded one of the children of our senior FSN. Then the cabin crew and the passengers just started jumping out of the 747. A lot of the injuries that occurred after that were people with broken legs, because, can you imagine jumping out of a 747? There were Pakistani troops at the airport and they took over and got the hijackers. There weren’t all that many American citizens on the aircraft, and I think one of them was slightly wounded. I mean the Palestinians were after Americans in particular, but it was mostly Indians and Pakistanis who were the ones who ended up being killed or injured.

In the aftermath, we were trying to get the welfare and whereabouts information on all of our citizens. Everybody was out checking hospitals and hotels. The Marine Guards were recruited to go out to the hospitals and the different places where the injured and the survivors had been taken to find the Americans and find out what had happened to them and so on. But they were being buttonholed by all of the Indians who wanted us to take care of them too. I’d get these long lists with maybe one or two Americans on them and a whole bunch of Indians. It turned out that the Department did handle all of the notifications of all of the green cardholders that we came up with.

Q: Oh boy, what happened to the hijackers?

KARAER: The hijackers were tried and put in prison in Pakistan. I think just a week or so ago, I read in the paper that one of them who’d been released from prison in Pakistan was now being sentenced in an American court. They’re going to put him away for life. The FBI got to Karachi the day after the plane was released and worked with the Pakistani authorities. I don’t know what happened to the other two hijackers, whether they’re still in prison in Pakistan or if they’ve all been released.

Q: Did you have drug people, FBI, CIA and all attached to the consulate?

KARAER: We had the Agency and we had the Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs people, yes.

Q: How were relations within the consulate?

KARAER: Fine. The DEA guys were probably in the most danger of anybody on the staff. There was terrible, huge drug traffic going through Karachi and Baluchistan. The Pakistani army was right in the middle of it. Being able to actually do anything about this was pretty slim. As far as relations with the rest of us, it was fine. The consulate in Karachi at that time was I think the second or third biggest American consulate in the world because, in addition to the other agencies I mentioned, the Library of Congress had a large staff there collecting all books that are
published in that part of the world. We had a group of communications technicians who were based in Karachi, but they traveled almost incessantly, fixing and installing equipment all over the Middle East and South Asia. The Consulate was bigger than a lot of our embassies, so the consul general’s job as a manager was a bigger job than a number of American ambassadors would have, and the deputy principal officer’s job, in some respects, was like that of a DCM. One of the things that made my job interesting in managing that place was the different cultures within our consulate. On the one hand, we had people who were really intellectually interested in the local culture, we had the just-out-of-their-teens Marine Guards, and we had technical people who wanted to spend all their extra time at the club bar watching American football games. I called them the "beer and skittles group."

We had a wonderful American school there. It was really an outstanding school, and I think my kids were really lucky to have been able to go to it. Only about a third of the kids in the school were Americans, and of that third only a tiny fraction were other than ethnic Pakistanis. There were a lot of American teachers and their families there. One of the biggest communities of Americans in Karachi were teachers. My husband was running the American club, which was managed by our employee organization, but it also was the only bar in Karachi. Long before we ever got there, they had adopted a policy that anyone that had an American passport, businessmen, even merchant seamen, could use that club. It had a restaurant and a bar and a room where they showed movies. These old membership rules created a very delicate situation while I was there, because there were now quite a few ethnic Pakistani-Americans living in Karachi, running their own businesses. They wanted entry to that club. We were really worried, because as long as the place kept a low profile and nobody went stumbling drunk out into the street, the Pakistani authorities didn’t give us any problem with it. We were afraid, however, that if a lot of ethnic Pakistanis began using the club, and drinking there, we would have a problem. That was never really resolved in a very satisfactory manner, although by the time I left we didn’t have any real issues with the government on it.

My husband had a challenge trying to find programs that would meet the desires of such a diverse community. On the one hand, you had the beer and skittles group who only wanted a well stocked bar, access to the U.S. sports programs and darts. They wanted happy hours. My husband said, “Happy hours? They’re getting drinks at the prices of duty-free booze, what on earth do they want a happy hour for except to drink too much?” Then we had the businessmen, who were using the club’s restaurant as a place to entertain their contacts and wanted something a bit formal. On the other hand, you had all the teachers with their little kids who wanted a place to get hot dogs and hamburgers. Anyway, I think my husband did a great balancing act, but someone was always unhappy.

**Q:** How about movies because this could be a real problem because I imagine you’re getting American movies and you’d find that people.

**KARAER:** I don’t remember anybody except Americans coming to see those movies to tell you the truth.

**Q:** Was there any pressure to let the British or the German consulate people come in or not?
KARAER: Not when I was there. I think the British had their own club. People could bring guests, and we had a wonderful party that my husband and the Pan Am director brought off. It was an Oktoberfest party. Pan Am flew in a German oompha band and oh, boy did people have fun at that thing. Sauerkraut, the whole thing, it was really great.

Q: How about the missionaries? Were they a factor?

KARAER: I don’t think we had any.

Q: I thought a couple of years ago some missionaries were killed where a Christian school was going and they tossed a grenade.

KARAER: No, that was in a church in Islamabad.

Q: Oh, it was in Islamabad.

KARAER: A State employee and her daughter was killed in that. Yes, under the circumstances that existed in Pakistan at the time, I think you’d have to be a pretty undercover missionary to be a missionary. I used to go to mass at a little Catholic Church that was near our house. I think everybody who went there were people who’d originally come from Goa.

Q: Which had been Portuguese.

KARAER: Everybody had Portuguese names in that community. All of my household help was from that community. Nobody was bothering the church, but you certainly didn’t see anybody going out proselytizing outside of their own community.

Q: Was there ever any discussion among the officers there maybe with the officers at the embassy and all about why was it that India seemed to be with all its problems, it still had that multiplicity of ethnic groups and religions and all, it still seemed to have a viable democracy and Pakistan just didn’t seem to be going anywhere. It just seemed to be almost descending rather than rising.

KARAER: Yes, of course, people always wondered about that. I think tribalism explains a lot of it. In Pakistan, after Jinnah died, and he died fairly shortly after the creation of the country, ethnic divisions among the Pakistanis arose almost immediately. The Sindhis and the Baluchis had always resented the incursion of the refugees from India, the Mohajirs. I think they were looked down on by the Mohajirs who were for the most part much better educated. The inclination to a military lifestyle too might have something to do with it.

Q: Well, then you left there in 1988?

KARAER: Yes.
A native of Rhode Island, Mr. Mc Williams was educated at the University of Rhode Island and Ohio University. In the course of his diplomatic career he served in several South East Asia posts including Vientiane, Bangkok and Djakarta. Other assignments took him to Moscow, Managua, Kabul, and Islamabad. In 1992 Mr. McWilliams was engaged in opening US Embassies in the newly independent states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While his assignments were primarily in the Political and Economic fields, in Washington he dealt with Labor and Human Rights issues. Mr. McWilliams was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005-2006.

Q: Okay you got, what was your job, when did you go to Islamabad?

MCWILLIAMS: There had been growing concern in Congress that things were going awry in Afghanistan. There were a number of problems, particularly among conservatives in Congress, that they saw that, they felt that the United States was giving far too much assistance to the most fundamentalist elements of the mujahideen alliance, a concern that reporting was not as consistent or solid as it should be. And in order to respond to that growing concern the administration, remembering this is a Republican administration, of course, decided to acquiesce to their insistence that a special envoy be created, a position be created that would have opportunity to report from Afghanistan/Pakistan directly without any kind of interference from the embassy or the CIA or even, well to the State Department but the State Department would not control that reporting either, with the implicit understanding that much of this reporting would be shared with Congress as well. And the administration agreed to that and initially they had wanted this to be an ambassadorial level position but the State Department, perhaps anticipating, well, recalling that I had been doing a lot of reporting that they liked, basically the themes they liked, I think the feeling was, well we can trust McWilliams to do what he’s been doing, basically to be a propagandist for the war effort. So I was selected, there was initial…

Q: The person was who had you selected was?

MCWILLIAMS: I think Ambassador Raphel had a great deal to do with my selection because he liked my reporting. And he had a very good name on the Hill and certainly in the State Department. He was a great man.

Q: I wonder if you could go back because you know, we’re really talking about a very peculiar situation where you have Congress saying we don’t trust the embassy, the embassies really, the two embassies of what’s, well, I mean-

MCWILLIAMS: No, I think Congress’s concern very frankly was not, certainly not with the embassy in Kabul which was reporting what they wanted to hear pretty much. And I don’t think in a real sense it was a problem with the embassy in Islamabad, more it was a problem with the CIA.
Q: Did you get any feel back there, I mean obviously somebody inside the system is talking to people in Congress about this and did you get any feel any of the players or who was behind this? Because usually somebody in there-

MCWILLIAMS: Well I tell you, I think to some extent some of the mujahideen parties, particularly the royalists and the more sophisticated democratic elements from the mujahideen, would travel to Washington and would meet with congressmen and their perpetual complaint was you people are giving far too much to the fundamentalists, Gobadeen, Sayyaf, and basically you’re going to lose this because you’re going to get people who are really very anti-American in power out there. And I think that over time this consistent message was believed and accepted by a number of people in Congress because the CIA, working with ISI and the Saudis, were really very much pro-fundamentalists. And I think this was the principle concern in Congress.

Q: Okay. Well then, let’s talk about your impressions, your briefing before you went out there or was there much of one?

MCWILLIAMS: No, there wasn’t much of a briefing before I went out. It was all done very quickly. I was given like a week or ten days between assignments and just basically raced right out there. I don’t even recall that many sessions on the Hill. I think I met with staffers, I might have met with Senator Humphrey, I don’t recall exactly but it was very, very brief. I was out there before I really had a chance to breathe. But I had a very warm reception. As I say, of course Ambassador Arnie Raphel had just been killed so that the embassy was in mourning in a very real sense and Ambassador Oakley, who had replaced him had only been on the ground a week ahead of me, I think, he and I had known each other from the old days, the Vietnam days, he was the deputy assistant secretary when I was in the EAP bureau and we knew each other and I think had a reasonably good relationship. And he seemed to be in his own way extremely, effusively warm and congratulatory about my assignment and how things were going to work fine and notwithstanding the fact that I was going to have this free, this right to report, he knew we could work this out, arm around the shoulder sort of thing, intimidatingly friendly if you know Ambassador Oakley. And I was in my own way a little slow to, I recall, meet with the CIA people. I knew some of the people there and some of the lead CIA staff and I was friendly with them but I didn’t, apparently as it turned out, call on the CIA chief early enough and that was a problem I recall, initially, I waited three or four days before I actually called on him and that was taken as a mistake, I recall that quite vividly.

But anyway, I wanted very much to travel. One of the problems that I thought I understood with the embassy was that it didn’t get out very much. It was either reporting from Islamabad or reporting from Peshawar. And I said look, we have a major mujaheddin presence down in Quetta, various places along the border. We have mujaheddin, I’m going to get out there and visit these places, use my Dari, which is not too bad and get to know these people, get to know what their thinking is and so on. And so very early on I began traveling and this is what I think helped me a great deal because I began to get a perspective that was not current in the embassy. That is to say, genuine concerns and complaints among commanders because quite often the commanders would of course come back across the border and you get sort of firsthand what the situation was like inside. And the consistent theme I got was the notion that the ISI was
penalizing the democrats and the royalists and favoring the fundamentalists, particularly Gulbaddin.

Q: What was the reading, I mean, you obviously picked up some stuff when you were in Kabul but you’re now in Islamabad, about the ISI, which stands for what?

MCWILLIAMS: The Inter-Service Strategic Intelligence.

Q: Well, I mean, it’s basically the military’s intelligence out there, which was a power unto itself.

MCWILLIAMS: Even within the military, yes.

Q: What were you getting, where were they coming from and their relationship to the government of Pakistan?

MCWILLIAMS: This was of course during the period of Benazir Bhutto and the sense was that the military and particularly the ISI operated almost independently of the _____ politicians. And certainly vis-à-vis Afghan policy it was not clear that they answered to anyone, that they essentially ran the show and reported as they saw necessary to civilian officials. It was an ISI-directed war and-

Q: Where did they come out sort of politically or religiously?

MCWILLIAMS: I think ISI was significantly influenced by the man who’d been their greatest backer, this was General Zia, who himself was quite a fundamentalist but had this vision of strategic depth whereby Pakistan could only be defended effectively if it essentially controlled Afghanistan and thereby had connections to Central Asia and to Iran vis-à-vis their perennial adversary India, only to somewhat a lesser extent a concern about the Soviet threat to Pakistan. So I think ISI took a lot of its green, that is to say fundamentalist Islamic coloration from Zia’s patronage of that institution. He saw to it that the people in ISI were, to a very significant extent, fundamentalist as he was.

Q: Did you have any contact with the ISI?

MCWILLIAMS: Very, very little.

Q: I mean, did they avoid you in the field and all?

MCWILLIAMS: Certainly as it became clear that I was a critic I had little or not contact. I think the CIA working in partnership with the ISI essentially alerted them this was not someone that they wanted to get too close to.

Q: Well, I mean, did you I won’t say conversion but on the way to Damascus but did you have an epiphany as you started getting out there?
MCWILLIAMS: I had a series of them. And as I say it came in contact with Afghans, often very well educated Afghans, for example in Peshawar there were NGO Afghans who understood the problems of the society and were deeply involved. Also some of the mujaheddin, for example, one of my, perhaps my best friend was Hamid Karzai who at that time was a deputy to Mujadidi.

Q: Now the president of Afghanistan.

MCWILLIAMS: Now the president. And very wise and very, I think perceptive about the problems posed by our support for, through the ISI, Gulbaddin in particular. And of course there was the Saudi dimension which I didn’t focus on perhaps sufficiently but it was clear that the Saudis, working through Sayyaf also represented a very fundamentalist influence in the mujaheddin struggle.

Q: Did Osama bin Laden cross your sights?

MCWILLIAMS: No, no. Never did. He was there at the same time, obviously, although I subsequently had a wonderful conversation with a German journalist who recalled meeting with Gulbaddin and sitting next to him was a very tall Arab fellow whom he subsequently understood was in fact Osama bin Laden who was introduced to him by Gulbuddin simply as the man who handles my finances, which I thought was interesting. But no, I’m not aware that I ever met- The American contact with the Saudis was very limited because they were thought to be pretty radical.

Q: Well what were you picking up then? I mean, what, sort of what happened to you and how did you play this?

MCWILLIAMS: Well, what I had learned in the first month or so, maybe almost two months, I had written, I wrote a report in October which was very devastating to my relationship with Oakley and the CIA. What I was picking up essentially was that not only was there favoritism to Gulbuddin and Sayyaf, mostly Gulbuddin because the Saudis were supporting Sayyaf, but there was penalties inflicted upon other mujaheddin groups who didn’t defer to Gulbuddin, who didn’t work with him. Also it was clear that there was misreporting coming out of Afghanistan through the CIA and their contacts about victories which were magnified for Gulbuddin and diminished for others. There was a failed attempt to rally the forces to Gulbuddin in Kandahar region which was a disaster because the local Afghans turned against Gulbuddin. I reported in a dissent message, well it wasn’t a dissent message formally, it was just simply very, very different from what the CIA and the embassy was reporting in October, saying that I felt things were going very, very badly, that Afghans perceived a victory by a Gulbuddin-led alliance as being a very negative prospect for Afghanistan. I was also contending that we should not equate Pakistan’s best interests with necessarily Afghanistan’s best interests, we should not subordinate Afghanistan’s interests to Pakistan’s interests, which was the governing philosophy in Islamabad. So these things were not well accepted by the embassy or by the CIA but did, I think, touch some already. I think in Washington there’s already a sense that this was the case and I think they needed someone to articulate it. Because subsequently I heard from friends in the department, actually even some people in the CIA, that they had been waiting for this line of analysis, that they had been hoping for something like this, that they were getting some of the
same thing through contacts with other mujaheddin parties and so on. And this was very
difficult.

I recall one incident that was sort of typical for me. One of the parties had come to me with
evidence including videotape of an attempt by Gulbuddin to sell Stingers to Iran and they even
had, basically this one party had intercepted the convoy going to Iran and filmed the attack on it
and actually brought back parts with serial numbers of the Stingers which they gave me as
evidence of what Gulbuddin was capable of. And I presented this information in a package to the
chargé at the time, Oakley was out of country and Beth Jones was the DCM and she was-

Q: Who was the chargé?

MCWILLIAMS: Beth Jones.

Q: Beth Jones, yes.

MCWILLIAMS: And I presented all of this to her, videotaped parts with serial numbers and the
entire story and she thanked me for it. And some months, I guess maybe a month later, it was
still in ’88, I recall working on a weekend and needing some paper so I went into her secretary’s
officer to get some paper and opened a cupboard and there sat the whole package of information,
the Stinger parts and so on. It never left her office. And it just underscored to me that this
was an

embassy that wasn’t telling Washington all it knew.

Q: Did you find, you know, so often in an embassy and you go back to Vietnam or Greece or
anything else where at the top you have the ambassador, DCM and maybe the consular sort of
presuming a certain line, you know, let’s live with this government, let’s not upset things. And
then you get your junior officers who tend to get out in the field more and tend to be more
radical, I mean this is a normal age difference and all, saying hey wait a minute, this isn’t the
way it is and all. Did you sense that at our embassy?

MCWILLIAMS: No, there was very little room for that. This was an embassy with very little
dissent. And I found that I, particularly on those officers who had some responsibility for
Afghanistan, there was, I got some help. This included some consular officials out there who
assisted me in making contacts, providing me with information, insisting that their names not be
associated with the pass of information or something. But it was, I think, a staff which was to
some extent intimidated.

Q: Well, did you find yourself, I mean, I think of this bureaucratically and it sounds, you’re the
son of a bitch from out of town coming in to look at things and report independently and you
know, in any type of operation this person is not looked upon kindly.

MCWILLIAMS: Sure.

Q: Did you find yourself beginning to get frozen out of things and all that?

MCWILLIAMS: Yes, yes. I mean, that came a little bit later into the spring of ’89 but I was not
being invited into meetings. With congressional delegations coming in I was not part of the briefing team although that became rather difficult because a number of teams coming in, I recall one in particular, insisted on meeting with me, and in the ambassador’s home I met with them and as he proceeded to brief them in his way I briefed differently. And I can recall being told two or three times by a very angry ambassador shut up Ed, shut up Ed. This is in front of the team. The CODEL was obviously aghast at this and met with me subsequently. But yes, what the- the strategy was to get me out of there, to basically Ed was having problems mentally or something. I recall that there was an attempt when I went home for a week-and-a-half at Christmas, I’d just lost my mother so I wanted to get home for the rest of the family, there was an attempt to keep me there. That didn’t work. And then in the spring there was an investigation launched that was intended to basically strip me of my security clearance. The first allegation was that I was leaking the identify of CIA officials at the embassy and that led nowhere because I was not. Then there was- the investigation continued to role with a new allegation that I was an alcoholic. And then when that failed there was an allegation that I was homosexual. And that continued. And this investigation transpired without my knowledge except that the person charged with running it through State was a friend of mine in the embassy structure out there and he kept me informed as to where the investigation was going. But that failed. But there was an attempt not only to get me out of there but to strip me of my security clearance which would have ended my career. 

Q: Well I would think that you would be in a certain position of power because you were put in there to be the son of a bitch from out of town and that there would be- you would have a rabbi in Congress or somebody.

MCWILLIAMS: Well, I think essentially I did and that’s why they went to this extent to sort of strip me of my security clearance. When I was home at Christmas, ’88–’89, ’88 that would have been, I actually met with the assistant secretary, Murphy at that point, and-

Q: Ted Murphy, yes.

MCWILLIAMS: And sat down with him in a very brief meeting and said here’s what I think is happening and I think you ought to know this. And this was before the investigations and the personal pressure had begun but I remember him saying well, we think you’re doing a hell of a job, just keep doing what you’re doing. And I walked out of there thinking well, okay. So I went back somewhat recharged but as I say after that Christmas break and going into ’89 things became very difficult.

One of the key things that developed, as the Soviets had pulled out, there was a plan, essentially an ISI/Oakley plan, to attack Jalalabad. We had formed a government among the Tanzeeens, among the mujaheddin parties, this is the Afghan interim government. I should say a very staged affair that basically ISI and he Saudis and we arranged and ran, a very transparent, false effort on our part. But nonetheless a government was set up and the feeling was that we needed to get a position in Afghanistan for that government to sit. And Jalalabad near the Pakistani border was seen as the perfect place to go.

So a plan developed in January-February to attack Jalalabad and seize it and with that perhaps force the collapse of the Najibullah regime. The commanders whom I was friendly with,
particularly in the Peshawar area, Admiral Haq among them, were aghast. They said this will take six to eight months to plan. You’ve got to get the tribal chiefs in the area tied in. You’ve got to decide who’s going to attack where. We’ve got to get these troops trained for and we’re used to mujaheddin attacks, we’re not used to conventional warfare which this would have entailed. We need heavy artillery, we need air support. You know, we need weapons we don’t even know how to operate. So I had an extensive, I remember one, over one weekend meeting with Abdul Haq and the commanders that he brought to me saying we can’t do this, this isn’t going to work. And I came back with that and reported. I remember Abdul Haq saying at one point, again reflecting the resentment, deep resentment of mujaheddin about the ISI, his line was how is it that we Afghans who never lost a war must take advice from the Pakistanis who never won one? And I put that into the cable, I recall, and that really got the embassy angry because they were very pro-Pakistani and they hated Abdul Haq.

But anyway, I reported this, that this is not going to work and tragically in fact it didn’t. It was a terrible disaster. Lots of blood lost on the side of the mujaheddin. What had happened was pretty much what was anticipated, the various mujaheddin parties couldn’t coordinate, couldn’t cooperate. For example, as you probably know there’s a long road from Kabul to Jalalabad that was supposed to be cut so that they couldn’t resupply and one unit was going to maintain the cut there, they wouldn’t let them get across. Well they pulled off before the other team was ready to come in so there’s a surge of supplies that got through. Basically there was no defense against air so that our mujaheddin friends were being blown out of the flatlands around Jalalabad as they tried to attack the airport. And towards the end what they were doing was sucking up young people from the refugee communities who had no training at all, just throwing them in as cannon fire; tremendous bloodshed. And at one point one of them wore, fundamentalist commanders captured some of the Najibullah troops and slaughtered them and the point was taken by the Najibullah side you better damned well defend your position and don’t even think about surrender because you’re going to be killed if you surrender. And that got back to Kabul and essentially it steeled the resolve of the defenders, we’ve got to defend here. And it went on for a month and a half or so and eventually petered out and he succeeded in defending Jalalabad. And that gave new courage to his forces all over the country and frankly, Afghans being Afghans, they saw this defeat of mujaheddin as very significant and they began discussions with Najibullah and it gave him several years’ lease on life.

Q: Well there’s nothing worse in the Foreign Service than to predict something that turns out to be correct when the rest of the people come. I mean, what happened to you?

MCWILLIAMS: Well, by that point I was pretty much frozen out. We had these terrible situations where I’d write my report and while they couldn’t change the report the ambassador would add on a comment or the DCM or the station would add on a comment essentially rebutting what I’d said up above. But I learned the trick of basically catching this cable just before it went out and I’d add my own rebuttal to their rebuttal. So it was, apparently I’ve been told subsequently that these cables were great reading in the State Department because they could see the debate, you know, on paper and it was just very interesting.

Q: Well knowing Washington, did this get into Congress-
MCWILLIAMS: Sure.

Q: -and did this get to be a matter of press and that sort of thing?

MCWILLIAMS: No. It never got into the press until the very end. I got to say that, and perhaps this is a lack of professionalism on my part, but just as I had sort of been a briefer for the press when I was in Kabul, talking about the terrible Soviet occupation, I certainly was in touch with journalists in Pakistan. And I was certainly prepared to share things that I thought was important. And this would be only information that I was gathering, I certainly wouldn’t reporting anything that CIA had or the embassy had, but it became very clear that there was a new perspective out there on what was going on and as a consequence I had a lot of contact with journalists. So this is also basically bleeding into the press.

Q: Well how did you find this reputation went with the Afghan military leaders there in the camps and also with the Pakistanis? Did you find reflections against you?

MCWILLIAMS: I had very little contact with Pakistanis as I said earlier because I think it was clear the CIA didn’t want me talking to them because I would theoretically find things out from them that they wouldn’t want used. I think among Afghans it was appreciated that I was essentially accepting their perspective that Gobadeen was getting too much assistance, that he was getting away with things that, you know, he shouldn’t have been getting away with in terms of attacking other mujaheddin units, which he did.

Q: Well you know, you’re talking about this package showing Gobadeen was involved in, I mean, the missiles, the Stinger missiles were a very sensitive subject because we were extremely concerned that these might show up in the United States or something or somebody else-

MCWILLIAMS: Well and the notion that these, this particular batch was being smuggled to Iran for a price.

Q: Yes. I would think that- were you able one, to get the information out? I mean, I would think that it would be part of your mandate to, okay, you don’t have the package but say I have a package and send it by your own channel.

MCWILLIAMS: Well, to the extent that I’d already surrendered everything I had including the videotapes and the parts to the DCM, they’re in her possession at that point, I think by the time I realized that that had not been forwarded it was just one of a series of things that convinced me that, you know, I was not in a working relationship with that embassy and it became clear that they wanted me to leave and the way they did that essentially was to convince Congress and Washington that now it was time to get a senior, a more senior official into that position. And I argued strongly that I should remain for awhile as that person’s deputy to get him introduced to the same people, frankly, that I had come to know. But what they did actually was to send a message back saying that I had requested a termination of the assignment which in fact was not true. I’ve never seen that degree of dishonesty before in my career or since. And as a consequence I was terminated, brought back to Washington and there was no job for me at all.
Q: Well I mean, okay you have an embassy. And you know, embassies get reputations for clientitis and of course I think our embassies in Pakistan and India have had this sometimes relatively benign relationship but usually it’s been each embassy has adopted the position of the country in which they are. So, I mean, this is nothing new even though it’s a different enemy or a different thing.

MCWILLIAMS: It’s nothing new and I’ve certainly encountered it.

Q: But when you got back to Washington was, why weren’t you greeted, I won’t say as a hero but as an effective officer and let’s do something?

MCWILLIAMS: Well there was one thing that was done. They did an end of assignment OER for me from the embassy which was devastating but in an unusual, I’ve never had it before, the bureau wrote their own OER which was very flattering so you had that in the record. It was a sort of two-perspective thing. It was unusual also the week I returned a reporter, Steve Coll from The Washington Post did a, basically an expose on what had happened to me and he called me the night before it’s publication and I had not talked to him before, to check some facts, I said I can’t deal with this, this is not something I want to be a part of. But it was printed the next day and oddly enough it appeared when I was interviewing for my next job, that very morning, and I went through the interview, dreading, hoping the fellow hadn’t seen the article and there’s no reference to it but the interview went very well but at the end he said oh, that was quite an article on you this morning in The Post. And I sort of sheepishly said yes. But in any event he, I got the job so this was to be as the number two in our embassy in Nicaragua.

Q: You were given hot spots to go to, I guess.

MCWILLIAMS: Well that one was particularly interesting but, I can get into that later, I wanted to mention though for this that there’s a book called Ghost Wars by Steve Coll who actually wrote this article also which is a very good book on the whole Afghanistan period and gives in pretty good detail what was going on in ’88-’89 including a great deal more.

Q: What did, how did he find out what was happening to you? I mean, did you find yourself the subject of, I won’t say gossip but of conversations in the corridors of State?

MCWILLIAMS: Sure, sure. I mean, the embassy, the entire embassy knew what was going on and it was a consequence. The relatively inbred community out there, both on the diplomatic side and certainly the press corps were aware that things were amiss at the embassy. Actually I think the principle source for Coll’s article in The Washington Post was an embassy staffer, whose name I’m not even going to use, whom I didn’t think was a particularly good friend of mine but nonetheless she knew the story and I believe she conveyed much of it to him.

LOUISE TAYLOR
South Asia Desk Officer, USIA
Ms. Taylor was born and raised in Illinois and educated at Wellesley College, George Washington University and Boston University. After joining the Foreign Service of USIA, Ms. Taylor served in Washington and abroad in the field of Cultural and Information. Her foreign posts include Moscow, Kabul, Tel Aviv and Rabat. She also served in Washington as USIA Desk Officer for Afghanistan/Pakistan and for South Asia and as Policy Officer for Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States. Ms. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Then you’ve got Pakistan, which is just basically a troubled nation. How did we view it at the time? Were we trying to be equal? It’s a smaller population. It doesn’t have a government that functions very well. It seems to be either a nation being kept together or maybe Islam is just about the only thing that holds it together.

TAYLOR: At the time, of course, the Soviet Union had not yet entirely collapsed. We still looked at Pakistan as a strategic ally which was very important to us in the opening to China. Balance of power – the India-Soviet axis and the Pakistani-Chinese axis with the U.S. sort of hovering around all of those – was still a very important element of our thinking. Therefore, we did not look at Pakistan socially or politically in our internal politics with such a critical eye. We were getting along as best we could, concerned about the political inheritance that future generations of Pakistanis would have after years of corruption and increasing radical Islam, which wasn’t so radical then as it is now. Islam was not such a major concern. The concern in Pakistan today as then was keeping together this fragmented society, parts of which do not even consider themselves to be under the civil law of Pakistan, in the Northwest Frontier Province in particular. But I think that our relationship with Pakistan was governed by our perception of our need for military cooperation in the event of hostilities in the area. There is the fact that the Pakistanis and the Chinese had always managed to have a fairly reasonable relationship when the Chinese and the Indians were always very wary of each other. Our approach to Pakistan then was far less critical than it has become in the last four to six years. Of course, Benazir Bhutto was in power at the time and she had a lot of friends in the United States and had gone to school in the United States and was known as “Pinkie” by her friends at Harvard. I think that that very close feeling about the ties with her despite what was going on in her family also had something to do with keeping the positive relationship going with Pakistan. Every time I went to Pakistan, there was nothing but a positive reception for what we were trying to do there. But obviously given the scope of the problems in that country, the resources that we or anybody had, are and were very limited.

Q: Did you feel that there was like an iron curtain of Islam that precluded us from any real penetration or influence in certain parts of the society or the geography of the country?

TAYLOR: Not to the degree that we recognize now. There are just openly declared madrassas and religious movements which set themselves apart certainly from any contact with the West but also set themselves apart from the central Pakistani government. They have been influenced not just by what’s going on in Afghanistan but by what’s gone on in the general world Islamic movement. This was not such a major thing from ’88-’90, although I would say that there were
regions of Pakistan that couldn’t be reached simply because of the fact that they were isolated, the people were undereducated or poorly educated. We, at that time, had no resources to reach out to those people. There always has been that veneer of highly educated sophisticated westernized group of people in Pakistan with whom the U.S. has been able to feel comfortable and to work and to establish relationships. Perhaps a mistake that we made in those days was not going beyond that just as we didn’t go much beyond that thin veneer of people in the old days in Iran. We hadn’t been tracking what was going on in the bazaars with the mullahs in Iran and probably we hadn’t been tracking that very much in Pakistan also. Certainly my programs didn’t have much to do with that other than the fact that we would at least three or four times a year try to do a major program on something called comparative religions. We would put Pakistanis and Indians together and maybe throw in an Israeli or two, bring them all here to the United States and hope that there would be some sort of ripple effect when they went back. They had 30 days of exposure to a multicultural society which mostly deals with tolerance in its relationships with other religions and other cultures. That was what our effort was. But by no means did we reach down into the very poorest, most troublesome areas.

Q: These are essentially unreachable.

TAYLOR: Given the way our foreign affairs structure is set up, that is true. In the old days of AID, when AID was out there in the villages digging wells and building bridges and doing very simple rudimentary things, the village people got to know a real American. Same in the old days when USIA would literally bicycle around a 16 millimeter film and show the Marx Brothers with a sheet hung over a tree limb in the village served as the screen. We did that not when I was in USIA but in the older days – those were very simple things to do. They were very low tech. They were not very costly. At a certain point in USIA’s history we stopped doing those things as AID stopped doing village development. We moved under the Reagan era into the so-called privatization of major corporations and of particularly state-run corporations. Their resources and their personnel and their expertise shifted dramatically, as did USIA’s to a degree. It was said that we couldn’t afford to do both. I don’t know if that’s true or not. I always liked the idea of taking around a 16 millimeter film projector and getting out to a village here or there. People talk. If you live in a village in Pakistan or any country you have very little communication with anybody beyond the next village. But if someone comes around and shows “The Old Man in the Sea” and you haven’t seen a movie in three years and the only one you’ve ever seen is an American one and maybe some nice American comes along and has some Fanta for everybody to drink after the movie, that makes an impression and people talk about it. I would say that in some of these poorer regions, that kind of programming would still be effective today. Television hasn’t taken over the world and certainly nobody has Internet in those places. What they do hear on the radio or what they do hear at the Friday sermon in the mosque is all very one sided. I think we’ve made a mistake. I think we’ve made a mistake in closing our libraries, as I’ve said.

I think it is one small element of where we find ourselves now in being very, very, very out of touch with groups of what we now called “radical Islamists.” I don’t by any means presume to think that we could have stopped this, but I think that had we remained engaged at the grassroots level both through AID and USIA programs more than we have, we might have had a better impact and a better understanding of them and they of us. The action that we did take over the last 20 years was basically to withdraw, to retrench into the larger cities, and to deal only with
the elites. We called them our “target audience” in USIA. We used to have a secondary and a primary audience. The secondary audience would include village leaders.

Q: This is an awful thing. During this time, what was the attitude you got from our people within the State Department and USIA toward the Kashmir thing? A plague on both your houses? Could you characterize the feeling?

TAYLOR: This may be unfair to say, but my impression 11 years later is that we ignored it. We just wished it would go away. It wasn’t at full throttle at that time. The Indians hadn’t moved as many troops up to the front lines and neither had the Pakistanis. There wasn’t as much across the border. There was some. I felt very fortunate that when I was in Afghanistan we had made a visit to Kashmir just for a holiday and had stayed on a houseboat on Lake Dal and enjoyed Srinagar and just thought it was the most spectacular, beautiful place we’d ever been. We always intended to go back. Of course, we never did or could. But my impression is that the conversation you overheard in the Department about what to do about Kashmir is, “Well, let’s just hope it goes away. It’s just a nattering, nagging nuisance. If they would just be more rational and reasonable, then none of us would have to think about this.” I don’t think that we were heavily involved in trying to bring the two sides together on this issue. It was one of those things we got very tired out on. We can focus on six or seven issues but not 20, and that was one of them. But people on the ground, our embassy people, in all the sections, in both New Delhi and Islamabad, I think they thought about it all the time and talked about it. I don’t think they ever got Washington’s attention on it.

ROBERT B. OAKLEY
Ambassador
Pakistan (1988-1991)

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley was born in 1931 in Texas. He graduated from Princeton University in 1952 and served in the US Navy until 1955. Oakley joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and served overseas in Sudan, the Ivory Coast, Vietnam, France, Lebanon, and as Ambassador to Zaire, Somalia and Pakistan. In Washington DC, Oakley served in the Office of UN Political Affairs, the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, as the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and for the National Security Council. Oakley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kenney and Thomas Stern in 1992.

Q: Then in 1988, you were appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan. How did that come about?

OAKLEY: On August 17, 1988, a Pakistani plane carrying among others U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel and President Zia crashed, killing all aboard. We immediately held an emergency meeting to decide how best to handle the situation. That was chaired by General Powell. One of the conclusions was that an immediate replacement for Arnie Raphel should be nominated and sent at once to insure that there be no perceived gap which might be interpreted as a weakening of U.S. support for Pakistan. It was important that there be continuity in our activities in Pakistan, to insure that assistance to the Mujahideen continued, that the Indo-Pakistan
relationship did not deteriorate and that internal stability in Pakistan be maintained. Zia had been the sole leader for ten years; he was now gone and we were concerned about what might happen to Pakistan internally.

Some of Arnie's friends - the Armacosts, the Abramowitzs, the Oakleys and Dick Holbrooke - went to the Palm Restaurant that evening in a tribute to him. While there, I got a call from Secretary Shultz from the Republican National Convention in New Orleans. He told me that he was leading the U.S. delegation to Zia's funeral leaving the following day; he wanted me to be on his plane with two suitcases. I was not coming back because he and the President had decided that I would be the next U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. I said OK - it was a significant challenge, but did create some family problems. When I returned to the table and told the assembled group what I had just been told, Phyllis asked what that meant for her - she was Shultz's spokesperson at the time. I told her I didn't know; she would have to ask the Secretary. The next day she announced to the press that I had been appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan. The whole 24 hours were bizarre because neither Phyllis or I had any idea what fate would bring. We were apart for six months until Secretary Shultz completed his tour and Phyllis remained as his spokesperson. It was not the first time that Phyllis and I had been separated, but I certainly did not relish the prospect.

I certainly understood the need to replace Arnie as quickly as possible, since Zia's death had created new conditions on the ground that might have been quite deleterious. We had a big stake in Pakistan, both because of Afghanistan and because Zia had promised to hold elections, which we wanted to take place very badly. I was also a known quantity to the Pakistanis, having visited there on a number of occasions. They knew me from my NSC tours; they knew me from my days as Counter-terrorism Coordinator; they knew me from other previous assignments. During my second NSC tour, my brief covered Afghanistan, which had given me the opportunity to visit Pakistan with Mike Armacost. Therefore they knew that I had considerable familiarity with U.S-Pakistani issues. I think they must have been reassured by my appointment.

So I left for Pakistan in August and never came back, even for my confirmation hearings. I was given a recess appointment, which was processed while I was in flight. So by the time we landed, I was the official emissary of the President of the United States. Agrément had been received from the Pakistani government, all in the space of 24 hours. All I had to do when I arrived was to present my credential, which I did a day later. Because the way my appointment was made, I did not have the opportunity, as had my predecessors, to study Pakistan from an academic point of view, nor to learn Urdu.

I found a high degree of uncertainty and anxiety in Pakistan. No one knew who the perpetrators of the plane crash had been. The remaining leadership was convinced that it was part of a plot which would claim more victims in the forthcoming days. The fear was of course of destabilizing the country. I was instructed to try a) to calm the Pakistani leadership down; b) to insure that the arms supplies to Afghanistan would continue to flow; c) to make sure that the planned elections would take place; and d) that there be no rise in tensions in the Pakistan-India relations.

I worked on those issues on the Secretary's plane on the way to Pakistan. The CINC of
CENTCOM was on the plane; Mike Armacost was there as well and of course Shultz. That was a key core group which reached a consensus on a game plan. We sent warnings to everyone - the Soviets, the Indians, etc - to stay away from Pakistan. We did not feel that the plane crash was part of a general plot, but we had to be sure that no other country would try to take advantage of the power vacuum created by Zia's demise. We told the Pakistanis that we had sent these warnings.

We tasked the intelligence community to pay special attention to any information it might receive about threats to Pakistan. We told the Pakistanis that we had done that and that we would inform them of any significant intelligence that we might pick up. We despatched a top flight Air Force investigation team to the crash site, along with some State officials. I was able to negotiate an agreement with the Chief of the Pakistani Air Force and the President which allowed our crash team to merge with theirs so that we had a single investigative team. They agreed after I assured them that no reports would be submitted to Washington until after the entire investigation had been completed - so that no separate reports would be filed, which they weren't. Such agreement was just as much in our interest because we also were concerned about “leaks”, particularly of partial results. We too wanted the whole investigation completed before any reports were filed.

I had no idea of course what had caused the airplane crash. It took me about four days after the arrival of the investigating team - about a week after the accident - that I began to lean towards the accident theory. The team indicated that it could find no evidence - either inside or outside the plane - of any explosion. It of course could not be certain, but sabotage or ground fire did not seem to be the cause. That of course was the opposite of what most observers had believed; initially, most of the speculation was on a missile or a bomb. But the team never found any evidence of that. The team reviewed all the records maintained by the Air Force and Lockheed on C-130s; they found about 20 cases in which the plane porpoised through the air before hitting the ground, as the one that Arnie and Zia were flying on had done. In most of the other cases, the planes had not crashed, but it was entirely possible that this one had done so because it was lower. In most of the earlier cases, the planes were sufficiently high that the pilots were able to recover and land safely. Our team attributed the crash of the Pakistani plane to a) the inexperience of the Pakistani pilots with C-130s and b) the low level at which the plane was flying before its crash. In the previous cases, the fault seemed to lie with the hydraulic system; we believed that that was also the cause of the crash of the Pakistani plane. I was satisfied that the team had conducted a thorough investigation and that the crash was the result of mechanical failure. Until the report came in, I did not feel obliged to lean towards one theory or another. Our intelligence - which is not always infallible - had not picked up any indicators of a plot or any subversive activity by either the Soviets or the Indians or any of the known Pakistani enemies of Zia. Although we couldn't be sure, there was no unusual activity outside of Pakistan which might have suggested a foreign plot.

Of course, it was easier for we Americans to be more dispassionate about the event than the Pakistanis. They were very nervous; they were certain that some outside power was behind the plane crash. But they too began to wonder when no foreign action was forthcoming; then they turned to theories of Pakistani sabotage - by the Army or some political opposition. At one point, some Pakistanis even blamed the CIA - a convenient whipping boy. But none of the theories...
seemed very convincing and there certainly was no sign of any follow-up activity which might have taken advantage of Zia's demise. Tom Clancy, in one his books, attributed the crash to a laser beam emanating from a satellite under the management of some Soviet controllers in Central Asia.

After the team had reached its conclusions, I had long conversations with the President of Pakistan and the Chief of the Pakistani Air Force. I told both that I could foresee what might happen. Under most circumstances, Americans tend to look at accidents rather mechanistically, and the accident had not involved our President. However, we could nevertheless understand how they might feel. Our evidence was of course not 100% conclusive, but our best guess was that the accident was due to mechanical failure. If the Pakistanis however felt that the cause was something else, the final report should so state. And in fact, that is what the final report showed six weeks later; the Pakistanis maintained that although no definitive proof was available they felt that the accident was the result of a plot by person or persons unknown. The Americans said that we believed that mechanical failure had been the cause. I think you have to remember that South Asia is conspiracy-theory oriented - even more than we are about who killed JFK. It was hard for them to accept the accident theory, particularly since we had no hard evidence to support our findings. I thought therefore that the split conclusion in the final report was the best possible outcome; neither side could definitively prove its conclusion and therefore both sides were satisfied. Eventually, the issue died away.

I should comment a little about the Embassy staff. It was in a state of shock after Arnie's untimely death. It was a great staff: Beth Jones was the DCM - she had been handpicked by Arnie and had been at post for only about two weeks. Most of the staff were Foreign Service couples. For example, the Political Counselor's wife was the deputy chief of the Economic Section. The Economic Counselor's wife was the Budget Officer. Beth Jones' husband was the deputy PAO. I think that kind of staffing is a plus; it assuredly was in Pakistan in the late 1980s.

We all went to work trying to stabilize morale; everybody rallied around and responded in admirable fashion. I did not detect any resentment of my appointment, although I was not comfortable with the circumstances. Arnie Raphel was an extremely capable and popular diplomat; he was an expert and understood South Asia; he knew the language. The Embassy was his. He had picked the leadership personally. It was not an easy situation for the new fellow on the block to move into. But the staff responded as professionals should and pretty soon, we all developed a close bondage and a tight relationship. I welcomed that and it made my tour an enjoyable one.

I think the staff was satisfied after the investigation that Arnie's death was due to an accident. Fortunately, we were too busy to develop a "bunker" mentality. All of us had too much to do in trying to work with the Pakistanis to assure continuity and stability. The Embassy felt that it was functioning well under severe pressures and it received good support and commendations from Washington, which helped morale considerably. I kept the DCM that Arnie had chosen; it was one of my better decisions. She was invaluable and stayed in Pakistan an extra year after my departure so that the two top Embassy jobs wouldn't be turned over in the same year. In fact, I made no changes in the staff, except those demanded by the usual rotation policy.
I did add one position - courtesy of the CIA. Arnie was the only long-time South Asia specialist in the Embassy. During my first consultation in Washington - after having been in Pakistan for about two months - I tried in vain to get from the Department a political officer who really knew South Asia. I had never served in South Asia and I felt we needed more expertise on the staff. Beth Jones was also not an South Asia expert. Apparently the Department did not have an available officer. Of course, Arnie had not needed an South Asia expert because he was the preeminent one in the Service. Ed Abingdon, our Political Counselor, was an excellent officer, but was not a South Asia expert; none of the other political officers were either. Interestingly enough, this was a period during which we also had a shortage of Arabists. These ebbs and flows in personnel occur from time to time. So I asked the Agency whether it would be willing to lend me such an officer; it readily agreed. I got a real crackerjack who worked in my Political Section giving us a depth of knowledge of South Asia affairs that we had been lacking. He was very, very good.

Bill Clark, our Ambassador in New Delhi, was not a South Asia expert either. But he had people on his staff who had a sufficient depth of knowledge of the area. His DCM and Political Counselor had considerable South Asia experience. Bill and I were old friends and the first thing we decided to work together on was “peace” between our two Embassies. Before us, the two institutions had been as much at each other’s throats as had the Indians and Pakistanis. We were determined that was not going to continue. We agreed on a program of visits between ourselves and our two staffs. Furthermore, since Pakistan was under the military purview of CENTCOM and India was under PACOM [Pacific Command], we agreed that when those CINCs visited, they would visit both countries; that turned out to be very helpful.

Pakistan was preoccupied with Afghanistan, supporting the Mujahideen, and of course the Indians had to take the opposite stance - they supported the Soviets as they did on many issues. But relative calm was maintained between India and Pakistan until the Kashmir Intifada broke out in December, 1989. Then the situation deteriorated very rapidly. The Kashmiris revolted, very much like the Palestinians - and essentially for the same reason: no one outside was paying any attention to their grievances. They felt unrepresented politically because Kashmir was governed by a puppet government, installed by the government in New Delhi after grievously rigged elections in which very few participated, and brutally authoritative. So they began violent protests to call attention to their plight.

By December 1989, the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Pakistanis took much of the credit, since they had supported the Mujahideen. They became sufficiently confident that it started to aid and abet the rebellion, which had been essentially a totally domestic spontaneous event. The Pakistanis erroneously had come to the conclusion that their intervention in Afghanistan could be replicated in Kashmir and that the Indians could be driven from that land. In 1965, they had infiltrated some Pakistani army personnel, loosely disguised as Kashmiris; that incursion had blown up in their face because that was the cause of a war that they lost. After that Pakistan was dismembered in 1971 and by the late 1980s they were still determined to get revenge. They still wanted Kashmir - which had not been an issue between Pakistan and India since 1965. In 1989 and even today the Pakistanis maintain that Kashmir is the overriding issue between India and itself - without a settlement of that issue there can be no peace on the sub-Continent. But they forget that it was not an issue between 1965 - the end of the war - and 1990 -
the year of the Kashmir uprising. But in 1990, some Pakistanis concluded that by waiving the flag of Islam in Kashmir - as they had done in Afghanistan - they could generate enough ferment to force the Indians to withdraw from Kashmir. So they set up an operation which was analogous to what they had done in Afghanistan - with the major exception that we were an integral part of the Afghan operation, but they did everything they could to keep us out of the Kashmir operation. In Kashmir, they set up local religious parties which provided support to the rebels - so that they could not be accused of providing direct support. They assisted in the creation of new political-military movements - in opposition to the regime - which were supported fervently by Islamic fundamentalists. The Indians responded by increasing pressure on Pakistan as well as reinforcing their military in Kashmir. These forces threatened to attack and wipe out some of the Kashmiri training camps, which were located in North Pakistan. The tension began to build.

Bill Clark and I reviewed the situation and came to the conclusion that we might be seeing a repeat of the 1987 maneuvers - the famous “Brass-tack” exercise, unless we somehow managed to diffuse the tensions. A military confrontation, with both sides ready to spring, like we had in 1987, could have been an exceedingly unfortunate outcome. Rajiv Gandhi had been replaced by Singh as Prime Minister; he was very weak. Bhutto in Pakistan did not have the stature to control the army. So Bill and I feared that by the Fall of 1990 tensions could build up to a level that might cause armed conflict. Therefore we urged that some action be taken by the U.S. in the spring. We recommended that the U.S. initiate a concerted effort with the Soviets, Chinese, Japanese and the EU countries to have each of those governments bring some pressure on Pakistan and India - in their own way and on their time. We wanted Pakistan and India to know that other countries would not get involved in what all considered to be an unimportant side-show which was not worth armed conflict. The concerted efforts of all the major powers began to have considerable influence on the sub-Continent, so that by the time Bob Gates, the Director of CIA, visited in May, 1990, the tensions had already begun to abate. Both sides used his visit well by using it as an excuse to back off - which they had already decided to do prior to his visit. So Gates’ trip was very useful as a cover for both Pakistan and India and to insure that the tensions stayed in abeyance.

As I said, the Pakistanis and the Indians largely ignored Kashmir for fifteen years before 1990. The Indians were not overly upset by what Pakistani involvement there was in Kashmir during this period. Bill and I checked the records as best we could and found that, despite nine or ten high level meetings between Pakistani and Indian officials during 1989, Kashmir was never raised by either side. Punjab was always mentioned - with India accusing Pakistan of supporting Sikh terrorists - but Kashmir never. But then in December 1989 the Kashmiris themselves started an uprising. Then the Pakistanis became actively involved; they had always carried a resentment deep in their psyche that they had been wronged by partition. That bitterness had been dormant, but the actions of the Kashmiris reawakened those feelings. The Pakistanis felt that they could not ignore events right across their borders. Then it became a very hot domestic political issue - both in Pakistan and in India. In Pakistan, during the 1970s and 1980s, the military dictatorship did not feel a need to respond to public demands. So Zia down-played Kashmir; since there was no political opposition, he could afford to ignore it. But once an elected government took office in Pakistan, Kashmir became a political football - somewhat analogous to McCarthyism and the communist threat or the “loss” of China. Political leaders in
Pakistan could not be seen as “soft” on India - as Indian leaders could not be perceived as being “soft” on Pakistan. This phenomenon accentuated the political dispute between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto with recriminations tossed at the one in power about being “soft” on Kashmir. Since Sharif and Bhutto alternated as Prime Minister, one was always accusing the other of that “crime.” That makes settlement of the issue very hard to achieve as long as it is a hot domestic political matter. The Pakistanis, under the political circumstances of the 1990s, as well as the Indians, can not break that cycle of recriminations. If politics in both countries stabilized, then it might be possible to achieve some resolution of the Kashmir issue - if it were not used as domestic political football. Under present circumstances, the issue may heat up again some day - it is a festering problem on both sides.

The Punjab issue, on the other hand, has been reasonably settled. Kashmir could also be settled if the Indians would permit greater political participation by the inhabitants of the region and greater economic development for that land. If those matters were resolved to the satisfaction of the Kashmiris, then the Pakistanis would have a much harder time keeping the pot boiling. But I don’t see the situation moving in that direction; unfortunately, I think both sides are hardening their positions once again and in a couple of years, we may have another crisis. At this time, there are popularly elected governments in both India and Pakistan, who are trying to manage the problem. At the same time, Kashmir itself seems to be calm and the tensions between Kashmir and India seem to be at their lowest level in some years.

Let me turn for a minute to Pakistani economic development. The Indians, having abandoned their socialist economic theory to a large extent, are making good progress. The Pakistanis have not kept up because 1) India has always been far ahead of Pakistan in the level of education and training of its people; 2) India has a much larger middle class and a larger pool of skilled labor - evolved since independence. Pakistan in much of the country is still largely feudal; literacy is far from universal - for women it is about 33%. The educational institutions in Pakistan are far less competent than the Indian ones - both in terms of quantity and quality. As far as I am concerned, education is vital to economic development as we can see from the experiences of the Asian “tigers” - Korea, Taiwan, Singapore - all of which devoted major resources to their education programs. The importance of education is accentuated by the technological requirements of today's world.

Right from the beginning of her stewardship, we talked to Bhutto about the deficiencies in the Pakistan educational system. She was very interested in education. It just happened that our government had been considering a very large AID-supported education program. Implementation had not yet begun. One of the first matters I asked her after she became Prime Minister was to whom we might talk about educational programs. She gave us the names of her two top aides in this field. We had on our drawing board a program to enhance elementary education in Pakistan. I wanted to get her staff and ours together to work out a joint program. She readily agreed and our respective people developed a new program to overhaul primary and secondary education in Pakistan. It began and was moving along very well until we had to stop all assistance due to the Pressler amendment requirements.

We used Peace Corps volunteers and contract personnel working in the schools of the rural areas of Pakistan. Many new schools opened; many teachers were retrained. I had high hopes that this
program would really modernize Pakistan's secondary educational system. The Pakistanis were enthusiastic about it. But then we had to stop our assistance. The Pakistanis stopped their program as well because they did not have sufficient resources or interest to continue it. We never were able to change the cultural environment in which Pakistan education takes place; they still, beyond the educators, did not understand the importance of education in today's world for economic development and the society's long range blossoming. I don't fully understand their mentality, but it is clear that education is still not adequately rewarded in Pakistan. Furthermore, the military uses up so many resources that there is little left for any other purposes. The lessons that the Indians or the Southeast Asians have learned have not yet crossed the border.

Taxation was another major economic issue. There were very few Pakistanis who paid taxes—primarily the government employees. No one else paid taxes. Rich landlords - the landed aristocracy - pay no taxes because traditionally agriculture has been exempted from taxation. These landlords are represented in the national legislature by such a large block of votes that it is virtually impossible to change the tax laws. Some small progress appeared on the horizon because Mrs. Bhutto was interested in privatization; she tried to move forward with a program, but ran into opposition from labor groups which were always a major constituency of the Pakistani People's Party. When Sharif took power in 1990, he really moved ahead on the privatization program; actually at that time, Pakistan was moving faster in that direction than India. When India talked about such a program, it referred to a sale of 5-10% of state owned corporations; Pakistan talked about 50% and more. Sharif's program was beginning to move while I was still there and that was very encouraging. State corporations were being sold and they were rationalizing the production, making the enterprises viable economic entities. I found that process very interesting. For example, one of our major assistance programs attempted to assist Pakistan's huge water and power monopoly (WAPDA). It ran all the power sources - dams, generation facilities - as well as the power and water distribution systems in the country. Our program had been in effect for many years and had been one of our most important ones. We used it not only to improve the quality and quantity of the service, but also as leverage to try to convince the government to privatize it. We never got very far on the second issue until we stopped all U.S. assistance because of the Pressler amendment. The Pakistanis found that the revenue from the sale of power was not enough to continue to subsidize the government corporation. That forced the government to start to sell off parts of the corporation, using much of the spade work that we had done in the past decade.

A lot of other privatization has taken place, in part because with the demise of our assistance program the government no longer had the resources to subsidize these state-owned entities. That is really ironical. While we were providing assistance, we did not have sufficient leverage to bring about changes in economic policies in Pakistan. But as soon as our assistance ceased, those changes were forced on the government which used our plans to bring them about.

I might just talk a little about that period during which our assistance program was terminated. When Bob Gates visited in May 1990, we had just satisfied ourselves that Pakistan had resumed high level enriched uranium production as well as the manufacturing of components for nuclear devices. Those programs had been halted in early 1989, as result of explicit and implicit agreements reached between us and Pakistan. The Pressler amendment required the cessation of assistance if a country had a nuclear device - or all components which could be quickly
assembled to make a device. That provision had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1984 after Pakistan had breached the limitations imposed by the Symington amendment on nuclear proliferation. With the acquiescence of the administration, Congress passed the Pressler amendment which made the limits of acceptable nuclear development in countries receiving U.S. assistance much clearer and more definitive. Any country exceeding those limits would lose all U.S. economic and military assistance - with no Presidential waiver authority. That is probably the only law that explicitly denies the President a waiver authority.

At the same time, as a carrot, Congress authorized a major increase in assistance to Pakistan - up to about $600 million per annum. With PL 480 and some other programs - e.g. EX-IM [Export-Import Bank], OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] - the total annual U.S. assistance to Pakistan would have been close to $1 billion. So the pot was sweetened considerably. The amendment required the President to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device or all the components thereof.

In the Fall, 1988, the Administration had said that we were not sure that Pakistan was in compliance with the requirements of the Pressler amendment - there was a major dispute on this question within the administration. The Administration's intelligence did not fully confirm that Pakistan had exceeded the limits set by Pressler. ACDA thought that it had crossed the line. CIA wasn't certain. President Reagan decided to give the Pakistanis the benefit of the doubt. We did insist that free elections be held and that the winner be allowed to take office. The certification, required by the Pressler amendment, was delayed until December - after the Pakistani election. Assistance was suspended from October 1 to December. The predominant view in the administration was that certification could not be provided until after the election, which we hoped would be free and from which the winner would be allowed to take office. The majority of Congress did not object to this procedure, although there were some of course who thought that the Pressler amendment should be enforced immediately. Among that latter group was Senator [John] Glenn [Democrat, Ohio], who told Armacost and me that he thought that the Pakistanis had exceeded the limits and therefore he would vote against any further assistance to that country. But he did say that he would not lobby other members to support his position because he recognized that it would probably be a mistake to cut off the assistance - both in terms of sustaining the war in Afghanistan and of non-proliferation. He thought that the cutting off of assistance might in fact encourage the Pakistanis to accelerate their nuclear development program.

Both Reagan and Bush - outgoing and incoming Presidents - wrote letters to the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan, which I personally delivered to the addressees and I also gave copies to General Beg, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Both letters said in effect that the Pakistanis should cease and desist completely from any further work on their nuclear device. General Beg visited the U.S. in January or February, 1989. He talked to General Powell - the outgoing NSC Advisor - and General Scowcroft - the incoming NSC Advisor - and others. He concluded that Pakistan's best interests would be served by imposing a freeze on its nuclear program. That would allow the large flow of U.S. military assistance to continue, as well as economic assistance. I think also the Pakistan military did not see any imminent danger from India in early 1989; that took off pressure for any immediate nuclear device development program. Finally, Pakistan needed us because the war in Afghanistan was still on-going. The
Pakistanis froze their nuclear development program allowing Mrs. Bhutto during her summer, 1989 visit to the U.S. to announce to the U.S. Congress that uranium enrichment was down to 5%. Our intelligence confirmed her statement. That made everyone happy.

By early 1990, Indo-Pakistan tensions rose again because of Kashmir. The war in Afghanistan was well under Mujahideen control. General Beg, with the acquiescence of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, decided to reactive the nuclear program - doing precisely what we had asked him just a few months earlier not to do. By May, we knew for sure that the program had resumed. When Bob Gates [Deputy NSC Advisor] arrived, we took the opportunity to raise the issue with the President when the three of us met privately. We told him that we knew that Pakistan had done exactly what it had been told not to do. We said the same thing to the Prime Minister and General Beg. We told all of them that they had to stop. Nothing happened. In the spring and summer, I met with all three of the Pakistani principals at least once a month, separately. I reiterated again and again that we knew what was going on and we knew that no steps were being taken to cease and desist.

I emphasized that unless the nuclear program was frozen again, all aid would be cut off on October 1. I was open about what we knew. I expanded my circle of interlocutors beyond the “Big Three”. I tried to enlist the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, other military men, two or three other politicians. I warned all of them. I told the Chief Air Marshall that the U.S. would be unable to deliver his new F-16s. No one would believe me - because despite all our past threats, we had always found some way to keep the assistance flowing. No one would do - or could do - anything. Some would deny - unconvincingly so - that Pakistan had a nuclear development program. Each would suggest that I see someone else. But I kept repeating my message - over and over again. I told the Pakistanis that George Bush was not Ronald Reagan. Bush would be much more careful about adhering to Congressional requirements. He was much more straight forward. I advised the Pakistanis to read our domestic situation very carefully and not to be misled by history. I also noted that the Cold War and the Afghanistan War had ended and that therefore Pakistan's strategic importance was not the same as it had been just a couple of years earlier.

Pakistan had in 1990 a good many senior and mid-career military officers who had been trained in the US. We had an ever improving military-to-military relationship. A few officers, like Beg and his immediate entourage were caught by nationalistic fervor. He looked toward other Islamic countries, like Iran, as potential allies. That was unusual in Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalism was practiced by a small minority. But Beg and his people came up with a wonderful theory that if the U.S. attacked Iraq after the Kuwait invasion, Iran would join with Iraq and the two of them would take care of the U.S. One December 1990 evening, at midnight, Beg's intelligence chief called me to invite me to come to Beg's house. That was the first time he had spoken to me since the invocation of the Pressler amendment. He obviously wanted to impart some thoughts to me but didn't want anyone to know that he had talked to me. What he told me - and what he wanted me to report to Washington - was that if the U.S. used force against Iraq, the Iranians would attack us. I told him I disagreed strongly with his analysis, but he was convinced of his views. He had even devised a strategic theory - which we later managed to acquire - which postulated that the U.S. would incur large losses in the Gulf and would thereafter retreat from the area - as we had done in Lebanon many years earlier after the Marine
barracks was blown up. Beg predicted that all of the countries with which we had amicable relations - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc. - would be totally discredited, leaving a leadership vacuum in the Islam world, which would be filled by Iran and Pakistan. But I hasten to add that this totally skewed perception of the world was shared only by Beg and a small group around him. The rest of the military, especially those trained in the US, knew better. Beg became Chief of Staff only because most of the senior Pakistani generals were killed aboard Zia's plane. Beg was in a unique situation, which unfortunately is becoming more common, as fewer and fewer officers are U.S. trained - none since 1989. It is one of the consequences of cutting off our ties to the Pakistani military.

But I got nowhere in the summer and fall of 1989 with my warnings of the aid cut-off. The tensions with India had increased - the Pakistanis always accused us of letting them down whenever there was a confrontation with India. Furthermore, the President of Pakistan, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army had had a falling out. The Chief of Staff was trying to get rid of the Prime Minister. The two of them were not on speaking terms. Any decision on the nuclear program required the approval of the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff. That required communication between them. In the original decision to resume the program, the President and the Chief of Staff had agreed and Bhutto had gone along because she was afraid that she would be deposed if she had not. Eventually, that is what happened anyway.

I was “allowed” to interrupt my home leave in mid-September to return to Pakistan with another letter from President Bush to the Pakistani President, announcing that our assistance program would be terminated on October 1st because the Pakistanis had not terminated their nuclear development program. I had volunteered to deliver the letter since I preferred to perform that chore myself rather than burdening the Chargé or anyone else. For the rest of 1989 and most of 1990, I had to live with this new impediment to U.S.-Pakistan relations. The delivery of that letter was a unique experience in my life. It was a very uncomfortable experience which I did not perform with any great relish. I gave it to the President; I told him that I had talked to him about this eventuality for months. He was shocked and most upset because he, like most of the Pakistani leadership, never expected the U.S. to take such drastic action. Then we began to discuss actions that might enable Bush to reverse his decision. I told the President that I couldn't of course make any promises and that any proposed course of action would require the approval of both the Executive and Legislative Branches of our government. After I delivered the letter and spent three or four days in Islamabad, I returned home to finish my home leave. The Pakistani government did not release the letter so that the press and the public were really unaware of our decision until October 1 when our assistance programs were stopped entirely. In fact, as I remember it, the first public announcement of our action was made by some Congressmen - the supporters of non-proliferation.

Then the Foreign Minister, Yacub Khan, - a wonderful man - talked to Secretary Baker at the UN in October, 1990. Since I was still on home leave, I participated in that meeting. The two had frank discussion during which Khan outlined the actions that Pakistan could take - i.e. re-freeze the program. But the Pakistan government would not agree to destroy what it had already built. That was not acceptable.
My conclusion, after living through this most difficult time, was that the Pakistanis badly miscalculated the situation in Washington. They believed that they could resume their program without retribution. Furthermore, I think that they really believed that another conflict with India was a distinct possibility - in the near future. It is true that the Indians were responding strongly to Pakistani provocations - and that must be noted. The Indians were reacting to Pakistani provocations and even though Pakistan was concerned by possible Indian actions, they would have been in retaliation to Pakistani actions in Kashmir. So the Pakistanis could hardly be considered innocent; Indian reactions were in response to provocations.

In March, 1990 the Chief of Army Staff went to Tehran. He and I always had good relations. Upon his return, much to my amazement, he told me that he had returned “very reassured.” In puzzlement, I asked “Reassured by what?” He said that he had been afraid that Pakistan would have been in trouble had war broken out over Kashmir. But in Tehran, he heard the Iranians promise Pakistan their full support and that made him feel more confident. With Iran’s support, he was sure he would win a war against India. I looked at him dumbfounded. He repeated that Pakistan would win. I asked whether that meant that his forces would occupy all of India - a very large country. That query upset him. I then asked which Iranian had been his host. It had been the head of the Revolutionary Guards. I asked him whether he had seen his counterpart in the regular army. He said “No.” - General Beg wouldn't see him, which I found very interesting because I had heard from the Chief of the Pakistani Air Force that when he went to Tehran two months earlier, he had met his counterpart, from the regular Air Force - not the Revolutionary Guard Air Force - had had a very good meeting with him and had established good relations with the Iranian Air Force. In that case, the Pakistani Chief Air Marshall wanted nothing to do with the Pakistani Revolutionary Guard Air Force. The head of the regular Air Force had asked the Pakistani what he might able to do to reestablish some US-Iran military contacts so that the Iranians would not be forced to go to Moscow for their military equipment - a move that the Iranian general said would be a last resort, but one that he might have to take if he could not open a channel to the US. That came to naught but it was an interesting look into Iranian attitudes. Beg dealt only with the head of the Revolutionary Guards.

When General Schwarzkopf CINC of the Central Command visited Islamabad in April 1990, he brought with him the head of his intelligence unit. He told Beg that he had been advised of my conversation with him after his Tehran trip. Schwarzkopf said that he didn't know what the Iranians would or would not do for Pakistan in the event of a war with India, but he had brought his assistant chief of staff for intelligence to brief the Pakistanis on Iranian capabilities. Beg said he didn't want that briefing; he couldn't trust what the U.S. military would say. He was convinced that Iran would assist Pakistan and together, the two would take care of India.

Right from the beginning of my tour, one of the techniques I used to improve US-Pakistan relations - in part by reassuring the Pakistanis that their nascent democratic political process could continue without concern of outside interference - was to increase military-to-military cooperation. We accelerated the delivery of end items that were in the pipeline - like self-propelled howitzers, helicopters, naval vessels, etc. Under normal procurement practices, much of this equipment might have taken as much as three years for delivery. We managed to get it delivered immediately. Our Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force paid extended visits to Pakistan in 1989. The Pakistani Navy Chief of Staff spent a prolonged period in the U.S.
General Yeosock, who later commanded U.S. ground troops in Desert Storm, came to observe Pakistani military exercises and gave some advice. More Pakistani officers went to the U.S. for training. So we worked very hard to establish a close military-to-military relationship and I think it was a very successful program. Prior to this time, the close relationship had only existed between the Air Forces; by the late 1980s, we had done the same thing for the Armies and the Navies. That program became one of the serious negative consequences of Pressler; it had to be completely halted on 10/1/90 when the President could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device or components.

The aftermath of aid suspension was very uncomfortable for all of us in Pakistan. The Pakistanis did not seem to understand why “the U.S. had deserted” them. They pointed out that they had provided invaluable assistance to us in Afghanistan; they would not believe that it was sheer coincidence that the invocation of Pressler and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan happened at about the same time. They linked the two events and accused us of terminating relationships once their assistance in Afghanistan was no longer required. It was almost impossible to dissuade people from this point of view, even those to whom I had been talking for months warning them of the potential risks Pakistan was running by resuming its nuclear program. Most Pakistanis did not understand why we had not forgiven them this time, as we had in the past; they linked this to the Afghanistan developments. I think those Pakistanis who had a good understanding of their country's nuclear development program, had little comprehension of the potential difficulties the pursuit of that program held for US-Pakistan relations. As I said, in the summer, I did my best to enlarge the circle of influential policy makers to try to impress the dangers upon as wide an audience as I could quietly reach. My hope was to explain that the consequences of Pakistani policies would be very serious and detrimental and to try to bring some pressure on the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief of Staff. It didn't work.

We tried to get our point of view across as actively as we could after October 1. We didn't rush out to brief the press, but we did talk to as many Pakistanis as we could. Ultimately, just before my departure, I held a large press conference and gave a long interview to a newspaper editor - Mrs Maleeha Lodhi, now the Pakistan Ambassador to the US. I met fifteen or twenty editors in Lahore in the week preceding my departure. I went to great lengths to explain why the U.S. had terminated assistance. I made the point that Pakistan deliberately had passed the limits of U.S. laws; it had been fully and repeatedly warned; the U.S. should not be condemned for Pakistan's actions and the resulting consequences. I added that part of the problem was that Pakistan’s nuclear activities were so sensitive that only a handful of officials were aware of the full extent. The leadership knew what might happen - I had told them often enough; so they knew the possible risks and had chosen to ignore them. In a better democracy than Pakistan had, if the National Assembly and the media had been more aware and involved, the outcome might have been different. But since the information was so tightly controlled, there was no check on the few policy makers, and only inadequate discussions of both the nuclear program and the potential deleterious consequences. I suggested that the Pakistanis had considerable work ahead for them to insure that such catastrophic policies could not be carried on in the future. The politicians, the media and the people had to acquire more information and more influence to prevent episodes of the kind that we were going through. My emphasis was on the need for Pakistan's democracy to grow beyond just the popular elections which they were already holding.
I don't think that the Pakistani Embassy in Washington was in the loop. I am not sure that it sent warning signals. If any one did, it would have been the Ambassador, but I suspect that he was not involved. Only the Foreign Minister had knowledge of the nuclear program, and that was only because he had been one of Zia's confidants - otherwise, he too would have been in the dark. There were no conversations that I am aware of in Washington with the Embassy comparable to my missionary work in Islamabad. Frankly, much of what I did in Pakistan in the summer of 1989 was on my own initiative. The issue was so sensitive - in terms of how we collected the information - that most people just didn't want to deal with it. I was frank with the Pakistanis about what we knew - never how we knew. No one told me to stop talking to the Pakistani leadership; so I continued, even though I suspect that some people in Washington were not totally comfortable with my program. In addition to my own efforts, of course there was Presidential letters, letters from the Secretary of State, a visit by Bob Gates, etc.

But I think the Pakistanis were determined to proceed with their nuclear development program. General Beg was a unique person with a unique vision of the future and he was the “project leader.” The President was a disciple of Zia. The Prime Minister, as I mentioned earlier, was concerned about the backlash that any opposition from her might create. Furthermore, there was considerable Pakistani pride involved. They had manufactured a device, even over the opposition of the rest of the world. Their position was bolstered by the fact that the Indians had a device; they could not understand why the world would allow India to have it and not Pakistan, which they felt, was in mortal danger from India.

I have always wondered that if we had signed a defense treaty with Pakistan, which would have been operative in case of an Indian aggression, whether the outcome might have been different. I have no way of proving that, but I think it might have changed Pakistan's direction. From a Pakistan perspective, it would have seemed totally irrational to give up a nuclear capability in light of the perceived Indian threat, their lack of a U.S. security guarantee and in light of U.S.-Soviet antagonisms and Soviet support for India. For Pakistan to have done what we wanted it to do would have been comparable to France giving up their own force de frappe [French: strike force] - which it would never have done, even when under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We never accepted the Pakistan position, in part because the administration was constrained by the Pressler amendment.

I should say a couple of words about [Benazir] Bhutto. I found her very much influenced by her father. She tended to emulate her father's political approach. She was inexperienced, authoritarian - as he had been insecure - although she would undoubtedly deny it. Her male dominated world was bound to have an effect, which she tried to repress. She was also very vengeful - she always referred to actual or perceived damage had been done to her, her family, her father, her followers. She used that as a rationale for taking action against her enemies. That was also her excuse for such activities as corruption - ”my enemies practiced it; why shouldn't I?” There was a change in her position when the general charge of corruption - which I was able to discuss with her - was replaced by specific allegations about her husband. When that happened, it was the end of our dialogue on corruption. She then began to deny the existence of corruption. Before the specific charges, we at least had discussions about corruption; they were not satisfactory because they just led to a lot of rationalizations, but at least there was a dialogue.
I always told Bhutto that without even looking at the moral issue, the political reality of corruption was that at some stage, it would backfire on her; the people would hold her accountable and take their retribution. But as I said, when the issue became her husband, then there was total denial about the existence of corruption. And that stance continues, even today.

She was fiercely defensive about her husband. She was terribly in love with him; she could never deny him anything. And he took and takes advantage of that.

We talked about many things, both at her initiative and mine. She felt very close to the U.S., particularly her friends in Congress and people like Peter Galbraith. I had not known her before, and I was not nearly as close as Peter and some members of Congress were. She felt that the U.S. was her protector; she certainly gave people the impression that that was the case. One of my moments of enlightenment - which showed that I had not listened to my better judgement - came during one of the times she was having a very bad time with Nawaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of the Punjab and the leader of the opposition. She asked me to take a message to him, which in essence was a message offering reconciliation. She said that she was prepared to meet him more than halfway; she wanted to end the squabbling between them for the benefit of the country. I first asked Mrs. Bhutto whether she really wanted that message delivered. She said “Yes.” I then asked whether I really was the right messenger. Her response was that there was no one else that she and Sharif both trusted. I suggested that many people around her didn't want to see a rapprochement between her and Sharif. She said she knew that, but nevertheless she wanted to proceed.

I then made the same comment about Sharif's entourage. She said that she knew that there were many around him who opposed rapprochement, which was one more reason for her decision to ask me to act as intermediary. She then repeated her request for my involvement. I had serious doubts about this as an appropriate role for a U.S. ambassador. But Bhutto kept asking. Finally, I came to the conclusion that since our official policy was to assist the duly elected government of Pakistan to succeed, Bhutto's request fell into that framework. It was a rationalization. In fact, I made a serious mistake which got me much too deeply involved in the internal affairs of another nation.

I told her that I didn't know whether her hopes for a rapprochement could ever be realized. She had a lot of opposition to her goal within her own political family. But I said I would deliver the message, which I did. About a week later, I met her again. Then she told me that she had decided that Sharif had to go and that she had sent someone to the Punjab to finish him off politically by ousting him as Chief Minister. I was flabbergasted. How could anyone send a message of reconciliation to a person one week and the next week try to eliminate him? But that was Bhutto! Unfortunately that unpredictability was part of her modus operandi; this event was not an exception.

I was told of a cable from Ambassador [Tom] Simons [U.S. ambassador to Pakistan from 1995 to 1998] reporting on a conversation he had with the present President, Sardar Leghari, in which the latter remarked that he had to get rid of Prime Minister Bhutto (for the second time). I had to laugh because it sounded very much like the conversation I had with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990; he had made exactly the same comments about Bhutto as his successor had -
authoritarian, wilful, corrupt, unbending, unwilling to listen to advice, stubborn. Bhutto seems to get worse and worse; she is not growing. That is unfortunate.

In general, for most of my tour, we viewed Pakistan as an important ally. During my tour, its importance to us changed somewhat. In early 1990, Bob Kimmitt, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, came to Pakistan as part of a tour he was taking throughout the region. He did a superb job explaining to the Pakistanis that our priorities were changing in light of changing nature of the Cold War and US-USSR relations. He emphasized that the U.S. would be placing an increasing emphasis on human rights, non-proliferation, narcotics, democracy, regional stability and economic development. He gave the Pakistanis high marks on all of those issues - but this was before the India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir and the resumption of the nuclear program. He said that we wanted to work with Pakistan to rebuild Afghanistan. He praised the Pakistani leadership for its initiative in democracy and even said a couple of nice things about Pakistani efforts in the narcotics area, although they had a long way to go before we could be satisfied. On non-proliferation, at the time, Pakistan had frozen its nuclear development program and had agreed to bring their uranium enrichment program to a level below weapons grade. As long as the Pakistanis focused on these issues of importance to us, Kimmitt predicted that our relationships would continue close. So we were relatively satisfied with Pakistan efforts in all areas of concern to us. Kimmitt urged them to continue on their path because if we found them changing their position in any of the areas, then there would be troublesome times in our relationships.

What Kimmitt was doing was drawing a road-map for Pakistan which would enable us to continue close relationships with that country even as the Cold War was coming to a close. It was a masterful performance. At that time, the Pakistanis seemed to accept Kimmitt's perspective; they understood what was happening and what they would have to do to maintain a close relationship with us. But by three months later - May 1990 - we discovered that they were changing their program by engaging in just those activities which we had warned them would be unacceptable and had discontinued efforts which we encouraged.

I think that the Pakistani military really were concerned about a potential clash with India over Kashmir. At the same time, they were not as concerned about us as they should have been. It is true that we had turned a “blind eye” to their nuclear program in the past. Furthermore, I believe that in light of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the military concluded that our assistance was not as important as it had been.

I mentioned the insertion of Islamic fundamentalism into Kashmir, partly as a rallying point for the Kashmiri fighters. In general, I view Islamic fundamentalism as a country-by-country phenomenon with considerable networking throughout the Muslim world. This networking was facilitated considerably by the Afghan war. I saw that development analogous to the Spanish Civil War, when the Communist and Socialist parties throughout the world sent volunteers to Spain; that was a boost for Communist-Socialist networking and the Comintern - [Communist International] - which unlike the Muslim world, in fact became the central guide for Communist world-wide activities. Much of the Islamic networking centers on exchange of information; there is also some exchange of personnel. I have never seen any evidence of a central coordinating mechanism. In some cases, the fundamentalist aggression was perpetuated by individuals; in
some cases, by small groups; in other cases it was larger groups. But a lot of the fighting happened inadvertently when Islamic radicals - activists, fanatics - congregated in Afghanistan because they all wanted to be part of the jihad to get the Soviets out of that country. The influx of all of these fighters into Afghanistan just happened spontaneously; we didn't plan it, the Pakistanis didn't plan it - it just happened. It is true that the Iranians and the Saudis were busy recruiting and arguing about which country was doing the most to rid Afghanistan of Soviets. But there was no over-all plan. Much of the Afghanistan activity was based on pure fervor which spread throughout the Muslim world. That Islamic drive continued even after the Soviet withdrawal in part because the religious drive did not calm down and in part because the region was filled with young men who had been involved in some heady activities and knew nothing besides fighting. Some were pure soldiers of fortune who knew nothing except how to fire a weapon and how to use explosives. Some were also religious fanatics which gave them an impetus and incentives.

I think that the use of religion to achieve political objectives is hardly a new phenomenon in world history. It is certainly not restricted to the Muslim world. In a milder version, we find it now in the U.S. with the Christian Coalition which Ronald Reagan exploited so adroitly. The Catholic Church in Poland was an indispensable supporter of Solidarity against the Soviets. We can go back to the Crusades as another illustration of religion being used for political purposes.

I might just say a few words about Pakistan-China relations. This was not an issue of great concern to us in the period 1987-1990 because the Pakistani nuclear program had not passed the point of no return. Nor had China provided any missiles by then. So we did not have a major problem during my tour. Chinese assistance had been a problem during an earlier period when they provided Pakistan assistance in the nuclear technology and design areas. And of course, the relationship became a problem later in the 1990s, but it was not such when I was there.

On the other hand, the Pakistan-Iranian relationship was of great interest. Since the public disclosure of Iran-Contra, our contacts with Iranians were severely limited. The Pakistanis were helpful in providing us with their insights into Iranian affairs. I think they were good observers and for a while we used them actively. We used them as a conduit to the Iranians - in addition to the Swiss, the official channel - the Japanese and the Germans. The Bush administration eventually made the correct decision and limited the contacts with Iran to a single channel. The Iranians were very clever in their use of multiple channels; they confused us and kept us off balance. But during my tour, we did use the Pakistanis as one channel to Iran, primarily using the very capable Foreign Minister, Yacub Khan. I have already mentioned my conversations with the Pakistani military about their dialogue with their Iranian counterparts. That was part of our efforts to look into Iran.

I should not close my discussion of my tour as Ambassador to Pakistan without mentioning Mrs. Bhutto's firing in August, 1990. When Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator [Claiborne] Pell [Democrat, Rhode Island], came to visit Pakistan in August 1989, he sensed a shift in Pakistan politics. Pell had been a friend and strong defender of Bhutto, Sr. He had done his best to get Zulfikar Bhutto out of prison, or at least to save him from execution. In 1989, he told me that he didn’t like what he was sensing in Pakistan; he wanted to talk to Mrs. Bhutto. So we called on her, together with Peter Galbraith - who, as I indicated earlier, was a close friend of
Mrs. Bhutto. I was not sure what Pell would say in this meeting and neither was Galbraith. Bhutto was accompanied by her mother and three close advisors. She began to explain her vision of the Pakistan of the future. After an hour or so, Pell congratulated her on her presentation, but noted that it would take a long time to reach her goals. He said he hoped that Bhutto would be in power as long as Queen Victoria had ruled, but he thought that the way she was using her office she would not last as Prime Minister through the end of 1989. That came as a total shock; she had just arrived at the pinnacle of her power. He told her that compromise and consensus building were the key essences of a democratic process - not authoritarianism. Bhutto was completely stunned, knowing that the comments were coming from a friend.

But she did not change her behavior. By August, 1990, the entire country was fed up by her. The President had had enough, as well as a lot of her own people. The President, under heavy pressure from the Army, used his constitutional powers to remove her from office. I was surprised by the tactics, not by the fact. And now it has happened again, in precisely the same circumstances. As I noted earlier, when I heard about Ambassador Simons' report on Bhutto's latest demise, it occurred to me that I could have written the exact same report 16 years earlier. She was categorized by the President as authoritarian, willful, stubborn, corrupt. Neither father or daughter seem to learn from experience.

A. ELLEN SHIPPY  
Deputy Principal Officer  

Ambassador Shippy was born in Colorado and raised in New Mexico. She was educated at the University of New Mexico and the George Washington School of Law. After a tour with the Peace Corps in El Salvador, Ms. Shippy joined the Foreign Service, where she served first in positions dealing with Latin America and later in with those concerning Asian and African affairs. She served as Political Counselor in Bangladesh, Deputy Chief of Mission in Uganda and she served as Ambassador to Malawi from 1998 to 2000. Ambassador Shippy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: How about did Pakistan have any relations with them?

SHIPPY: Yes. Pakistan and Bangladesh had relations.

Q: Any particular problems or just...

SHIPPY: There is a big issue between Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Biharis. At the time of independence there was a large group of people who had originally come from Bihar, India, at the time of partition. They were Muslim, which is why they left India. They ended up in Bangladesh, but they really wanted to be in what was then West Pakistan. But when West and East Pakistan separated, had their war, and Bangladesh gained its independence, the Biharis were left stranded in Bangladesh, in refugee camps. The issue was how to get them over to what is
now Pakistan. That is a major issue that was a problem when I was there, and I believe still is a problem.

Q: Is it money or was it unwillingness to leave?

SHIPPY: No. It is Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept another large group of non-Pakistanis.

Q: Well then in 1988 you left there. Whither?

SHIPPY: Karachi, to be Deputy Principal Officer.

Q: Karachi by this time would be a Consul General?

SHIPPY: Right.

Q: A big one it must be.

SHIPPY: Yes.

Q: You were there from 1988 to...


Q: You were there during the Gulf War.

SHIPPY: Yes. We had “voluntary” departure, which was really “ordered” departure during the Gulf War.

Q: Well let’s say prior to that what were our relations with Karachi?

SHIPPY: Outstanding. But Karachi is a violent place. If you needed a Kalashnikov to take care of a problem, it was said you could rent one for an hour or so. Guns were all over the place. I was talking about the student groups in Bangladesh and their fights. In Karachi they had the same kind of fights only in Karachi they had guns, so there was a death toll and injuries were more severe.

Q: Well how does this affect the western community?

SHIPPY: For the most part it didn’t. The killing of the Americans, both private and U.S. government employees, happened after my tour.

Q: Some accountants I think weren’t they? I can’t remember.

SHIPPY: There were three oil company people killed, and in a separate incident, three people from the Consulate. We had guards and safe havens in our houses, but we didn’t have to travel in
convoy, we didn’t have to have protection and we traveled around Karachi and the consular
district as we wanted to.

**Q:** Well the example of the burning of Islamabad what was that, 1979?

**SHIPPY:** I believe so. We believed that is what made the department decide that non-essential
personnel should leave at the time of the Gulf War before the fighting started in the Gulf.

**Q:** Well until just before the Gulf War what was the main sort of purpose of our job of our
Consul General in Karachi?

**SHIPPY:** A lot of American services and visa services. We had a Pol-Econ Officer whom I
supervised. Both Joe Melrose, the Consul General, and I did pol-econ reports. Trade was
important. We had some American companies there. Citibank was there. Pakistan is a very large
country, and people in Pakistan are their ethnic group first. They put their Muslim and ethnic
group a long way before they are Pakistanis. The feeling of nationhood has yet to develop
strongly, so there are a lot of political things going on that are of interest to the United States.

**Q:** How do we view the War, the attacks, were we threatened by the extreme fundamentalist
groups? Were they the problem? Were they communists or were they something else?

**SHIPPY:** The religious fundamentalist groups, their role in the country was increased by
President Zia ul-Haq who really got religion into politics. I arrived in Pakistan about a week after
the plane went down with Zia ul-Haq and Ambassador Raphel on it. The fundamentalist parties
were not winning elections, but they were important in the political life of the country, and they
certainly influenced the debate and what was possible. In Karachi, in addition to the government
party, there were two primary political parties, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistani People’s Party (PPP),
and the MQM, a party of the Mohajirs (people who had come over from India at the time of
partition). The MQM won local seats, and a few in the National Parliament, and was a significant
political force. Much of the violence that occurred in Karachi was between the MQM and the
PPP.

My own impression is that Benazir Bhutto was a great political leader in exile. She was less
effective as an opposition leader; the concept of elected opposition to government and what the
role of the opposition should be, etc. -- they are still working out how to define that. Benazir was
pretty good as an opposition leader in Pakistan, but she didn’t govern as well as she opposed.
She’s charismatic. In English she is very articulate; her English is better than her Urdu. She is
very appealing to a western audience. She is also appealing to many people in her own country,
carrying the mantle of her father, a populist leader. But Pakistan just has not been fortunate in its
choice of leaders. Neither Benazir nor Nawaz Sharif -- for awhile they took turns being leader --
neither one of them served their country very well.

**Q:** Did we get much review of India-Pakistani relations, I mean across the border in India? How
were things going while you were there?
SHIPPY: We didn’t see a lot. There weren’t the border incidents like there have been on later occasions. We knew and talked with the Indian Consul General and his people. They were not particularly influential, but they were well-informed. Relations were really being handled in Islamabad.

Q: Was there much interest, you were there during part of the time I guess, the Iran Iraq war was over by the time you got there wasn’t it?

SHIPPY: I think so.

Q: Was there much when Saddam Hussein did his thing in Kuwait, was there much focus on Karachi or the gulf and what was going on in the gulf?

SHIPPY: No and yes. A lot of Pakistanis and, especially, a lot of people from Sindh, which is the province Karachi is in, had been employed in the Gulf. The money they sent back was an important factor in the economy. A majority of them were booted out, possibly during the Iran-Iraq war. I don’t remember the cause, but they were back in Pakistan. Not only was the money no longer coming in, but they were there and needing jobs or contributing to unemployment or under employment. So that was a factor. Baluchistan, which is the province next to Karachi, that is where Quetta which has been in the news recently, is actually very close to the Gulf states, and there is trade back and forth across the Gulf.

Q: Straits of Hormuz I think.

SHIPPY: Yes, you’re right. Baluchis traditionally formed the Sultan of Oman’s army. Then you have a connection with Zanzibar because the Arab trade routes used to go down to Zanzibar from Oman. In the early 1800s the Sultan of Oman took over Zanzibar and placed the seat of his Sultanate in Zanzibar. So there is a connection between Zanzibar, Oman and Baluchistan. You see Zanzibari influences in Baluchistan.

Q: What was your reaction when Iraq invaded Kuwait? Did you see this as affecting you?

SHIPPY: Certainly we didn’t think the Pakistanis were going to do anything to us. We reacted to it as an event happening to our colleagues.

Q: Did the Pakistanis, were they reacting any way to this?

SHIPPY: What I recall is, when it was talked about, they were against the invasion. They didn’t support it; the people I knew and talked to didn’t support it.

Q: Was there any thought as things began to develop, that Pakistani troops might be brought in?

SHIPPY: No. When and where?

Q: I mean to the allied forces.
SHIPPY: No. They didn’t support the invasion, but as I recall they weren’t willing to put troops to fight against it, although I may be misremembering here. I don’t know apropos of what, but we had a port visit while I was there. (This was not during the Gulf War.) A U.S. aircraft carrier came to call.

Q: A big deal.

SHIPPY: Yes. Ambassador Oakley came down, and there was a “fly out” with the Ambassador, the Consul General and various senior Pakistani officials to the aircraft carrier. The aircraft carrier never docked; the water was not deep enough. There was concern about security, but we went forward with the port call.

Q: There was no particular problem about traveling around town.

SHIPPY: No.

Q: Were there places you didn’t go?

SHIPPY: Just as there are places in DC I don’t go.

Q: Yes, but were there distinct sort of areas of unrest?

SHIPPY: No. On certain occasions, for example, around Eid time when the Shias and the Sunnis were having their annual disputes, there would be areas that you wouldn’t go, and you wouldn’t go watch the Shia procession. But for the most part it was not an issue. When I was there, Karachi had a population of about 11 million. It is not built up, it’s built out, so Karachi is an immense physical area. For the most part, Americans didn’t realize that, because you drove from the airport to the housing section to the downtown area. I would go out on my political meetings which might be in some remote area of the city, and I really did get a sense of the immensity of Karachi. We drove, we didn’t drive all over the city, but I have been to a lot of the city with a driver, sometimes accompanied by the political FSN, and I never had fears. The people in the street were invariably nice and polite, friendly.

Q: Did the way we waged the war in the Gulf have any influence on how people looked toward you or not?

SHIPPY: The decision was made in Washington to have an authorized departure which they said was to be treated as if it were an ordered departure. We felt that it wasn’t necessary. In fact, nothing happened. Our relations with the police were excellent. The thing about South Asia is that crowds, and even mobs, can coalesce rather quickly. I think there were maybe a few occasions where there were reports that a crowd or a mob was coming to present a petition or something, and the police set up barricades. No crowd ever got close to the Consulate while I was there.

Q: You left there when?
SHIPPY: The summer of 1991.

PHYLLIS E. OAKLEY
USAID Staff
Islamabad (1989-1991)

Ambassador Phyllis Oakley was born in Omaha in 1934 and graduated from Northwestern. She entered the foreign service in 1957 but was forced to resign in 1958 when she married Robert Oakley. She accompanied her husband to his postings in Sudan, Ivory Coast, France and Lebanon. She was reinstated as a foreign service officer in 1974 and has held a number of high-level State Department positions. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: We are now in 1989 and you are now in Pakistan where your husband has become the U.S. ambassador. How was the change from paid employment to wife?

OAKLEY: Bob’s assignment was a jolt out of the blue. As I mentioned earlier, our Ambassador to Pakistan, Arnie Raphel, was killed in an airplane crash when he accompanied President Zia on a visit to an army installation. Zia had been our great Pakistani ally during the Afghan “jihad” against the Soviets. Arnie was much beloved in the Department; he was very bright, very outgoing, full of personality, and fully devoted to the Foreign Service. Many people were devoted to him. I remember the morning of the crash quite clearly. We were meeting with Mike Armacost, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who was presiding at an August 8:30 staff meeting in the D Conference Room, when he was called out to go to the Operations Center. He returned absolutely ashen and reported to us that Arnie had been killed in a plane crash. The reports coming in were quite sketchy and no one knew whether the plane was brought down by accident, sabotage, or by weapons. This was mid-August and I think Shultz was in New Orleans at the Republican Convention. Throughout the day there were frantic telephone calls to Islamabad and it was decided that it was absolutely essential to send someone quickly out to Pakistan to assure the interim government that it had our continued support. The White House worked on a potential list of people who might be sent. I did a very short briefing, which essentially was just an announcement of the crash; I told the media that we didn’t have any further information at that time. Everybody was absolutely stunned.

In the afternoon, back in my office trying to catch up, Bob called - he was then the senior advisor on the Near East at the NSC (his jurisdiction included Pakistan and India). He asked me whether I was sitting down and I assured him that I was. He told me that he had just been asked to go to Pakistan. I could hardly absorb it! Shultz returned to Washington soon thereafter and prepared to fly to Pakistan to bring the bodies home and Bob was told to be on board with enough clothing so that he could stay for an extended period; he was going to be appointed ambassador. There was considerable concern, for Nancy Ely Raphel, Arnie’s widow, who had been a Department official, starting in the Legal Advisor’s Office and who then had worked on African matters. She was also greatly admired and respected and everyone was terribly concerned for her well being.
So Bob went to Islamabad and I stayed in Washington, working in Public Affairs. It was Chuck Redman who accompanied the secretary on his trip to Pakistan. I must say that I was somewhat peeved by that; I would have liked to have gone on that trip. Throughout that fall’s presidential campaign, people thought that Bush would be elected, but one couldn’t be sure. If Bush won, who would be Secretary of State? Would Bob be asked to stay in Pakistan? There were a lot of questions. So this was a period of great uncertainty about the future administration and Bob’s and my role in it. Bob and I had decided that we had spent so much time apart that we were not going to be separated again. So we had to make certain assumptions; we assumed that Bush would win the presidency, that Baker would be Secretary of State, and that Bob would be requested to remain in Pakistan as ambassador.

So I did not bid for a new assignment. By the end of January, Shultz was gone as was Chuck Redman. He was succeeded by Margaret Tutwiler, whom I mentioned earlier. I helped her in the transition and then I had to have a hysterectomy. Bob came back for the operation and some of the recovery period. After a bit of recuperation, renting the house, and packing up, I moved to Islamabad to join him in February, 1989. I happened to fly out on the same plane as Senator Pat Moynihan, who was on his way to visit the area, including a stop in Islamabad. It was one of those flights on which you knew every other passenger - first on the flight to London and then on Pakistani Airlines to Islamabad. I had gone out to Pakistan in the fall to see Bob once; he had left Washington in August but had returned briefly for Senate confirmation hearings, and said that he really wanted me to come out even if it was for a few days to attend the Marine Ball that is held on November 10. USIA was willing to send me to Europe for a speaking tour, talking about the role of a spokesperson and U.S. policy in general. So I went to London to meet with a number of British officials and journalists and on to Italy to discuss the same issues. From Rome I flew to Pakistan, where I traveled throughout the country for about a week, giving USIA-sponsored presentations on the role of the American press in foreign policy, how the Department and the press interacted, and the role of the press in a democratic society. That was very interesting experience because it was at the time Pakistan was preparing for an election - thanks in large part to Bob’s prodding and pushing for a free and democratic election after Zia’s death. Benazir Bhutto was elected. She was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter and she and her father were well known to the U.S. She was Pakistan’s first female president. So the Pakistanis were excited by their experience with democracy. They felt they finally had got rid of military authoritarian governments. It was also the time when the Soviets promised to leave Afghanistan. This arrangement, worked out by George Shultz and Gorbachev, was covered fully by Don Oberdorfer in his wonderful book of diplomatic history called “The Turn.”

So I went to Islamabad. I did not have a job and I wasn’t really interested in working in the embassy - where there were no positions available at the time in any case. But USAID was just beginning to implement its programs that had been developed to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. As the Soviets retreated, a temporary government was being set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, led by the seven resistance leaders. Efforts were made to give each of the seven confidence that they could work with the other six. So there was considerable activity about setting up an Afghan Interim Government, some of it visible and some of it under the surface, in part relating to Saudi Arabian assistance to fundamentalist groups. The conventional wisdom was that the government of Najubullah in Kabul - seen by some as a Soviet puppet - would fall soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, to be succeeded by the mujahadeen leaders who
would then establish a more permanent governmental structure among themselves.

Conventional wisdom was wrong. Najibullah did not fall; he was an able Afghan supported by a civil service structure that the Soviets had created. Women had a certain amount of freedom, which was unusual, in a very conservative society. They were professionals - doctors, teachers, judges. There were a lot of Afghans afraid of the conservative mujahadeen leaders, afraid of those who seemed determined to set up a conservative government and a society that adhered to their fundamentalist views. Tribal and regional leaders would become important once again and women would be severely restricted in their lives. So there were a lot of Afghans who did not relish those prospects and therefore continued to support Najibullah.

The AID Afghanistan Humanitarian Assistance program had been developed when Soviet pressure in 1988-89 on eastern Afghan provinces made it appear that the mujahadeen might be subjected to such hardships that they could not continue as a viable force operating there, next to their bases in Pakistan. So the assistance program was designed to help the people remaining in the eastern provinces and to try to prevent them from fleeing into Pakistan which already had the world’s largest refugee population. These refugees lived in camps supported by the UNHRC. The AID program included projects for education, health care, and agriculture. Logistic services were developed to deliver the material into Afghanistan. I should note that no American was allowed to enter Afghanistan; we established collection and training stations in and around Peshawar and the Afghans took it from there. There were NGOs - e.g. Mercy Corps, the Red Cross, and the International Rescue Committee - who did work in Afghanistan, supposedly without Americans. The ICRC, for example, had established several hospitals inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan - one of which I had visited earlier in 1983.

I thought that working for USAID in Islamabad would be a natural for me. It involved issues with which I was familiar - I knew the Afghan political scene and I knew congressional views. After the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, we continued to provide support to the mujahadeen who were still expected to take over the government once Najibullah fell. We tried to help them get organized into ministries. But in one sense we didn’t give them resources to govern, and old patterns of military assistance continued.

Q: In retrospect, we might say we concentrated on getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan and not Najibullah. He was succeeded in some respects by worse.

OAKLEY: I think as time went by it became clearer that Najibullah was a smart leader who had the support of a large number of Afghans. In retrospect, I think we should probably have tried to make a deal with him. It may not have been possible in the early 1990s because the Afghan leaders in Pakistan would have objected strenuously. The strongest military leader of this group was Gulbaddin Hekmatyar who was very conservative and somewhat anti-American. There was Ahmad Shah Masoud, Lion of the Panjshu Valley, a leader in northern Afghanistan where the Tajiks and the Uzbeks lived. There was a fellow by the name of Pir Gailani, who was a Pushtun hereditary nobleman and very westernized; he didn’t have much support. There was a leader by the name of Mojeddidi, with whom I had dealt often; he was probably the most westernized mujahadeen leader. He had a son who was a doctor in the U.S. The major problem was that these leaders, because of tribal, social, and religious differences, just couldn’t get their act together;
they could not find any common ground; they were constantly working against each other. As I said before, I have always felt that in most guerrilla-rebel situations there was some chief who eventually took control. For example, you had Tito in Yugoslavia and Ben Bella in Algeria. In most uprisings, one leader emerged to take over the leadership however ruthlessly. For many reasons, principally for control purposes, the Pakistanis had developed a divide-and-conquer policy or didn’t change it. Therefore these various factions were inhibited from uniting. The attitude of enmity was so ingrained that the rebel leadership just couldn’t get together. The Pakistanis seemed to back Hekmatyar; others resented that support.

I can’t say that I ever understood completely the politics of the situation as so much was handled by CIA and ISS of Pakistan. There were accusations that our assistance favored Hekmatyar. The response was that he was the most effective fighter and therefore merited major support. When AID hired me, I became responsible for working with the “interim” government in Peshawar to help them set up a public affairs and public relations program, including newsletters to inform the public about the interim government’s efforts. I also worked on the narcotic program, with which we hoped to start some kind of crop suppression or substitution effort. Poppy production was not nearly as large as it is today, but it still was much too high.

In the beginning, among the AID staff, I felt there was considerable resentment of me. That didn’t apply to Larry Crandall, the mission chief, who was very imaginative and had in fact developed the program on which I was to work. I liked him a lot; we worked well together. He saw the political requirements of having some one work with this new government to help bring things together. I really wasn’t qualified to be an education consultant or a public health worker or any other highly specialized technician, but I could do what Larry had outlined. In the second and third echelons of this AID mission, there was a lot of resentment. People were concerned about perceived nepotism. I think everyone acknowledged that I might know more about Afghan politics than anyone else in the mission, but there was the feeling that as the ambassador’s wife, I was being foisted on them. I saw it as just another experience in an area of change for spouses that I had gone through before in Zaire. One just had to ignore the resentments and do the job as best one could. Eventually, I think I overcame much of the resentment. Even the deputy mission director, who eventually admitted that he had opposed my appointment and that he had not thought that I would be a useful addition to the staff, said that he had been wrong and he thought that I had made a worthwhile contribution. I was careful to always be in the office on time; I was usually among the last to leave because I just could walk home within the Embassy compound.

I spent a lot of time in Peshawar working with groups like the Afghan Media Resource Center, which was headed by Haji Dahoud. He also worked closely with USIA on programs intended to encourage eventual democratic Afghan government. I think that a lot of good came out of these projects, some of which we may be seeing now. The AID program was not designed to help Afghans who lived in Pakistan. It was directed toward the delivery of services and goods into Afghanistan, particularly the east. For example, previous Afghan governments had had educational links with the University of Nebraska - they were again hired to send out a lot of experts on text book development for elementary grades, printing them (on Xerox machines) and distributing them all over the country. The basic themes of these textbooks were Afghan, but they had an overlay of American educational theory. Those were the only textbooks available to the children; in many places, AID clinics were the only health facilities for a wide area. So much
of the country relied completely on U.S. assistance.

I later headed - from 1993-1997 - the bureau that handled refugee affairs and was glad to have worked with a woman named Marissa Lino, who was the refugee coordinator in Pakistan. She was responsible for coordinating our tremendous assistance through the UNHCR for Afghan refugees. So we had a lot of programs to support the Afghans, and they had to be closely coordinated within the embassy in an effort to develop and follow a coherent U.S. position on Afghanistan. I was working with the CIA also, of course.

Q: Talk a little if you will about what changes were taking in the American psyche out in the area as we moved from supporting a rebellion to trying to put a government together?

OAKLEY: As I said, Pakistani policy had been to keep control of the divided Afghan leadership and we went along with it - we couldn’t change it and our object was to inflict damage on the Soviets. When the Soviets left, Pakistan reverted to traditional views on Afghanistan; it was extremely concerned about the revival of the movement which had supported an independent Pashtunistan that would have incorporated large parts of the North-West Frontier Provinces and the eastern part of Afghanistan, also populated by Pushtun tribes. The Pakistanis did not want this to happen. The Pakistan grand strategy was always to have Afghanistan closely allied to it if not under its control, in order to achieve “strategic depth” in its continued rivalry with India. A lot of people would say today, given modern weapons including nuclear ones, the concept of “strategic depth” has long outlived its usefulness. It is like the Golan Heights on Israel’s borders - what appeared to be a strategic requirement some years ago has been made obsolete by modern military capabilities.

I think that there were games being played and activities that we didn’t pay enough attention to. When we look now at the activities of certain Arabs who were sent on jihad, sometimes to Afghanistan just to get them out of their own countries (especially from Saudi Arabia, where they were perceived to be a danger to the regime), we can see that they were more dangerous than we had thought. So the whole picture was quite muddled. The problems created by the Afghan leaders didn’t help. The “seven dwarfs,” as some people called them, simply could not come together and agree to form a unity government. And the United States simply wasn’t very interested politically after the Soviets left. We did walk away.

I have given this era considerable thought; I didn’t, and don’t, have access to CIA secret operations and therefore can not have a complete picture. I have some suspicions about the Agency’s activities, but no documentary evidence. Nevertheless, I think we might have played our cards on the Afghan issue differently and might have thereby had a chance to build something in Afghanistan that might not have been subject to the stresses and divisions that it subsequently had to face. I admit that nothing was ever sure in Afghanistan. The conventional wisdom fell short, that Najubullah would fall quickly and the mujahadeen would easily take over.

Q: One of the criticisms of the Afghan leaders that I have heard was that they sat in Pakistan far behind the fighting and were not with their men, not to mention leading their men.
OAKLEY: I think that Hekmatyar actually did lead his fighters. Some of the others - Sayyaf, Mojaddedi, Gailani - were older and were not expected to lead the charge. In any case, these were political and not military leaders. I think the early decision to support all seven leaders and not to coalesce behind one overall leader was erroneous. I understand the motivation; Pakistan and the U.S. in the early 1980s felt that if a single leader were chosen - or forced on the others - the whole resistance movement might well have collapsed. Furthermore, there was a theory that a diverse opposition with multiple leaders would be much harder for the Soviets to defeat.

I think we need to recognize that the Afghan leadership issue is a very complicated one, with any number of writers who have tried to tackle it. There was a UN negotiating process underway during the late 1980s, led by Diego Cordovez of the UN. So there had been some prospect for resolution of the disputes between the Soviets, the Afghan government, the Afghan resistance, the U.S. and the Pakistanis. In the end, some aspects of the UN plan were adopted, but it did not become a complete peace plan.

I should mention that another difficulty in resolving the Afghan situation was that we were not talking to the Iranians, who had objectives of their own. They were housing lots of Afghan refugees; those refugees, although also supported by the UNHRC, were in a different situation from those in Pakistan. In recent times, we began to meet alongside if not with Iranians, and central Asian leaders as well as Pakistanis on the future of Afghanistan, because it was clear that fighting continued even after Soviet withdrawal because of outside support.

Without going into a full discussion of Afghanistan’s most recent history, there are a couple of important issues that I would like to mention. Everyone thinks that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was the zenith of the USSR’s empire. When they retreated, it was very much like the U.S. getting out of Vietnam - they decided that the cost-benefit ratio did not support further occupation of Afghanistan. We really did not defeat them or force them out - they made the decision.

It has been a very sad period for the Afghans; they were a very traditional society, as I have mentioned, but not intolerant. Many foreigners who lived in Afghanistan, working for governmental or non-governmental organizations, loved Afghanistan and its people. They have the most wonderful faces in the world. They are tall and dignified and attractive - and ferocious. In my AID job, I had to go to Peshawar almost once each week to meet with various leaders, to check on projects, and to confer with the Afghan Media Center. The first challenge was always how to get there. If you flew, it was on a very small plane that shook and shuddered; driving took three hours on some difficult stretches - two lanes with buses, trucks, and carts. We would cross the Indus River guarded by old frontier forts. Peshawar was fascinating, like Aleppo. It was very cold in the winter and men sat in storefronts eating, drinking tea. There were a few stores that dealt in antiquities - early Iranian, early Mogul. Then there were the rug bazaars and dealers in the old sections of town. It was a world so far removed from ours that one felt on another planet. It was an absolutely fascinating city.

I often stayed with the American counsel, Jerry Fierstein, who was an old friend - he had worked on the Pakistan desk when I was working on the Afghanistan desk. He was in the tradition of many good officers who had been assigned as consul to Peshawar; it was such a key spot in
Pakistan. There were a lot of other Americans there; it was the headquarters for all of the relief agencies. There was an American Club of some notoriety; it had dining and recreational facilities and a bar. For a lot of the Americans, this was their only refuge on their days off. There would be parties on Valentine’s Day, Halloween, etc. - rather wild, I was told. Once they held a California beach party; people came with “surf” boards - actually ironing boards - they held a wet tee-shirt contest – all good college fun. Young people needed to blow off steam - after a session at the Club, they would return to teaching English, managing computer programs, writing reports, and working in medical clinics. The Club was their refuge.

The Pakistani governor was an important figure in the Northwest Frontier Province because he ran the government - in the areas that were governable. He was usually a retired military man who thus had close connections to the army. There were some areas beyond Pakistani control, where Afghan rebels trained. Peshawar was always a fountain of information on what was going on in Afghanistan.

Once I came across a very interesting report on poppy production written by an aid worker, who had gone into the Helmund Valley, where in the 1970s the U.S. had provided lots of assistance for a huge irrigation and hydroelectric power project. The area became very fertile for cotton - and poppies - and the worker reported on the current valley leadership that he had found. I took the report and distilled it into a long cable back to Washington, also reporting on what we were planning to work out a deal with him. One day in Islamabad, the old Helmund Valley Afghan leader, Mullah Nassem, asked to see Bob. I sat in on the meeting, along with several others including the DEA representative. Mullah Nassem was willing to make a deal with us: if we were willing to provide a certain amount of assistance to resume power generation, he would see to it that poppy cultivation would cease. He also wanted irrigation ditches and power lines rebuilt in his province; he didn’t have the resources to do it on his own. After discussing the proposal among ourselves, we were prepared to accept it, which I think could have had a substantial impact on reducing poppy cultivation in that area of Afghanistan. We cabled Washington again with our plan. But Washington sent a blistering cable back, instructing us to cut off any further dealing with this leader. We were told that our plan was not acceptable and could be in violation of law, which prohibited any assistance being provided to a known narcotics trafficker. The Washington guidance left us speechless because it was so self-defeating. We wanted to know why we hadn’t heard anything in response to our first telegram on the situation.

The answer was obviously that someone in Washington had not been paying attention when he or she should have been. Unfortunately, in light of the silence from headquarters, the embassy had more or less given indications of being agreeable to the proposition. In fact, all the planning was proceeding well when Washington pulled the plug. I have always felt that Washington made a great mistake, or maybe we did by telling them. I think we could have done a great deal to nip the expanding production of heroin at that time if we had been willing to provide assistance so Afghans could have grown alternative crops. When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, I don’t think they used poppy production as a policy tool and later banned it. Nevertheless, there was expanding heroin processing in Pakistan, with production going to Europe. These revenues helped finance a lot of the continued fighting in the 1990s - but also kept farmers alive.

Later, that old Afghan leader was assassinated in one of the tribal wars, so that we didn’t have to
face his wrath - which in my view was entirely justified in light of our first meeting with him. This episode, I think, is an interesting sidelight to the Afghan picture of the last fifteen years.

When I first went to Peshawar in 1983 - I was then the Afghan desk officer and out for a familiarization trip visiting the refugee camps - my overwhelming memory was of dust. I still can see the long lines of Afghan men walking from the camps into the city, to the relief agencies, or Pakistani government offices, one after another all day long. The sides of the roads were always packed and there were not many cars. It was a drab and somewhat depressing picture.

By the time I returned in 1989, Peshawar was “Pajero-land.” I didn’t see as many people walking and the refugees by this time had acquired other means of transportation - trucks, vans, Pajeros, or other SUVs - it was a complete change from just six years earlier.

In spite of early resentment against me, I ended up enjoying my tour with AID. I learned a great deal about how that agency works - such things as the programming system, and the contracting system. I had to go to a two-week course in Lahore devoted to learning how projects are developed and managed. I came away from that session with the feeling that AID is so encrusted with bureaucratic barnacles - mostly imposed by Congress – that require that every step of the process be fully documented and traceable - that the agency had become an almost ineffective operation. It took so long to set up the projects and implement them that they often lost their effectiveness; I admit that there were often large sums of money involved In contrast, when I worked in USIA, where the amount of money was much less, there was an operational flexibility that allowed projects to be developed and executed very quickly. There were procedures, but they did not interfere with prompt response to whatever the need or the opportunity required. In AID’s case, if there was a long range development plan that had been approved by all concerned, then projects within that plan could be approved rather easily. But new initiatives were very difficult to mount. It took people like Larry Crandall, with his Afghan humanitarian program, to figure out how to work the system so that emergency requirements could be met promptly. He was a genius when it came to that; others didn’t have that same ability.

His plan was the most innovative one that I have ever seen. As I said, it encompassed education, public health, and agriculture. He found a couple of former Afghan agriculture ministers to work on orchards, getting people fertilizers, and assistance with irrigation to get fruit trees growing again. Crandall set up an Afghan trucking company so that the supplies for all of the projects were delivered on time and economically.

Q: Was Afghanistan in the late 1980s still in a war time situation or had the country returned to more or less peacetime?

OAKLEY: There was no question that the level of fighting that had taken place during the Soviet occupation had abated. But fighting continued, particularly in the east, and the situation was still very dangerous. American officials were not allowed to travel into the country. Individual Americans - e.g. journalists and some NGOs - went in, but they were few.

The infrastructure had crumbled after ten years. In the Afghan climate, with its extreme heat and cold, it is hard to maintain construction - roads, buildings - without constant maintenance. I am
deeply moved by all the reports filtering out now from Afghanistan about children dying of starvation and cold. The country has had a terrible drought for some time, food supplies are low, the Taliban is making a mess of governance, foreign entities are reluctant to provide assistance because of the nature of the Taliban’s policies, and as I said, fighting continues. The situation in Afghanistan is a real challenge for American non-governmental aid agencies. They want to help the people, but are reluctant to do so in light of the Taliban’s treatment of women. Everyone is in a bind.

Q: How did you as a woman find dealing with the seven Afghan leaders?

OAKLEY: Some would not shake my hand. They could not bring themselves to touch a woman. I tried to remember which leader would and which wouldn’t. Here and in Pakistan, of course, everyone sticks out their hands as a way to say hello, as a greeting. There I tried to curb that instinct. If they wanted to shake hands, they would have to initiate the process and I would respond. I wondered what power a 55 year-old woman could have that would impede some of these leaders from shaking my hand! It was, of course, tradition that stood in the way. Some of the younger American AID workers would become quite annoyed at the Afghan treatment of women – demanding the covering of heads, arms, and legs, if not the burqa. They wanted me to go with them because they thought that I added a certain amount of presence and gravitas and if I didn’t cover my arms in summer they wouldn’t have to either. But I tried to be on the conservative side and not create an issue. I had no trouble dealing with Afghans, frankly. They had known me from earlier incarnations and I was the wife of the American ambassador; and I was well informed and serious about what I was doing. It was a job entirely different from what I was used to; this was essentially field work - going out and seeing and evaluating the situation “on the ground.” I made a lot of good friends and I really enjoyed this aspect of the job.

My duties as wife of the ambassador were relatively easy. The residence was wonderful - it had been built in the late 1970s. It was very modern in a very dramatic setting overlooking the Margala Hills. It was in a compound that had tennis courts, a swimming pool, a commissary, medical services, and apartments for American personnel. I had traditionally opposed American compounds because they tended to separate Americans from the local community, but for a lot of the young embassy people it was an appropriate facility in a Muslim country. You could see young women driving into the compound with white knuckles because they had been subjected to so many rude remarks and sexual gestures by Pakistanis. Whenever a truck driver - and others - saw a western woman, it was an opportunity to behave inappropriately, to our western eyes. So when these young people entered the compound, they could get into their jogging clothes and run free, swim and sun bathe, play tennis and behave as they would in the States. The compound was a refuge from the hostile and difficult atmosphere of the streets.

I should mention that I had a very good household staff that made my job much easier. These were “bearers” or butlers who carried on the old colonial traditions - they wore turbaned hats and took great pride in their profession. We had a very nice cook who had a red beard - he was a Haji. He and I would work out menus and recipes. It seemed to me that we spent a lot of time worrying about food, which in fact was dwarfed by the many larger social problems – such as refugees and poverty. We had a lot of small social occasions - lunches or dinners. Several congressional delegations, or CODELs, came and then we would have large receptions. One of
the delegations was made up entirely of congresswomen, while Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister. They wanted to show their support for her. There were a lot of people interested in various aspects of Pakistan and Afghanistan; so we had quite a few CODELs. Senators Pell, Spector, Shelby, and Cranston were among the visitors.

We had taken our yellow Labrador dog with us, named Swinburne. He found several mates in Islamabad and had lots of offspring. We had two litters of puppies at the residence. I remember Senator Cranston sitting in our beautiful garden, designed by an American/Australian professional with long experience in Pakistan thanks to the encouragement of a much earlier Ambassador, Art Hummel, playing with puppies. He loved them.

On weekends, I would play tennis once or twice. We had our own pool that I also used on the weekend. There were not many social demands on me during the day. Everyone in the diplomatic and Pakistan communities knew that I worked and I was the envy of a lot of the diplomatic wives because without a job, life in Islamabad was very quiet. If I had an official lunch that took longer than normal, I would stay at the office a little longer in the evening. So it was really a very nice existence. There was a lot of serious talk at the dinner or lunch table. Benazir Bhutto and her husband would come quite often for small dinners; Bob would be off talking with her and various guests and I would spend hours with Bhutto’s husband, Asef. He would speak of how much he had given up so that his wife could be Prime Minister and how restrained he had to be in his position. He was a “bubblehead!” They boarded their dog, a yellow Lab named Sunny, with us for a while when they were moving into their residence. He was the “lightest” person I have ever met; he had no concept of what it meant to serve Pakistan or to help his wife serve the country. He was always consumed with his own “problems.”

Q: Wasn’t he charged with taking bribery?

OAKLEY: Yes. After her second reelection, the Bhuttos went wild with corruption by all reports. They were somewhat corrupt, or at least he was, while we were there. A lot of Pakistanis complained to us about what she and her husband were doing. Benazir and Asef were accused of taking a healthy cut of the government’s procurement expenditures as kickbacks. The share was considered to be beyond the limit in South Asia. I have always said that it is very hard to understand the limits of corruption - what is acceptable or when it is over the limit - in another country. Europeans never understood Nixon and his impeachment; our rationales were beyond their understanding and the practices in their countries. So I didn’t know when “corruption” in Pakistan or other foreign countries went too far and what was acceptable practice. But clearly the Bhuttos exceeded the norms.

Q: What was your impression of Bhutto as a Prime Minister?

OAKLEY: I think she was a disappointment. She had a wonderful academic background - Harvard and Oxford. As head of the Pakistan’s People Party, she would say all the right things about democracy and the rights of people, and it is true that she had to contend with traditional power centers - e.g. the landowners - and therefore had a difficult row to hoe, but she was simply not as effective as one would have hoped. She just wanted to retain power. In the end, President Khan dismissed her - an entirely legal act under the Pakistani constitution. That forced another
election, which brought Nawaz Sharif to power. He came in also with great hopes. Everybody thought he would be more effective than his predecessor but in the end, he too fell. After we had departed, Bhutto was reelected to her second term and the charges of corruption grew and grew, accompanied by a general feeling of dissatisfaction with her regime. She was followed by Sharif again; he was finally ousted in a military coup by General Musharraf.

Q: How long were you in Pakistan?

OAKLEY: I was there from the beginning of 1989 to mid-1991. By spring of 1991, we knew that Bob’s three year tour was coming to a close and I began to look for an assignment in Washington and I was offered several positions. Then Peter Burleigh called one day asking me to become a deputy in INR. That was more than I had expected; I thought it was just a terrific offer. I didn’t know too much about the “intelligence” aspect of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; what I knew I had learned on the Afghan desk and by watching the CIA work in Pakistan and other posts.

Our daughter was married in the summer of 1989 and was expecting a child in 1991. I had arranged her wedding from Pakistan; it was wonderful but not the smoothest operation imaginable because we didn’t have a base for such an event back in the States and we only got home a week before. So there were several reasons why I wanted to stay in the U.S. for a while; I had done my bit for AID. I think I was helpful to the Afghanistan operation, especially in explaining to CODELs what we were doing for Afghanistan to improve governance and unity and how the Afghan Interim Government could operate. I specifically remember Senator Gordon Humphrey’s (R-NH) visit; he was a leading hawk on Afghanistan. I think it was very hard for him and for everyone to understand why the Afghan Interim Government couldn’t get moving. They, of course, would point to the lack of resources - e.g. we hadn’t given them enough money. We would point out that we had not seen sufficient evidence that they could manage those resources to good effect. For example, there had been an earthquake in eastern Afghanistan. We thought that would at least bring the seven leaders together so that a certain amount of assistance could be cooperatively distributed to all the victims. Well, I went to Peshawar and attended meeting after meeting, which went on interminably. They (the seven leaders) wouldn’t accept anybody else’s suggestions; all they wanted was that the resources be allocated to each leader individually, and they promised to distribute them fairly to their people but without any reference to others. Their positions and attitudes were enough to make one pull one’s hair.

Q: Was there a second layer of command among the Afghan interim regime that might have been more responsive?

OAKLEY: In a way, yes. The largest number of refugees who left Afghanistan during the war went to Germany, followed by the U.S. and a few other places. Generally, these people were bright, educated, modern individuals who had had the advantage of various educational programs as well as close contact with the West. But when they returned, they were submerged in traditional leadership and unable to operate. In retrospect, this group of young well-educated people would have been far better off working for Najibullah. They would have been able to make a far more important contribution at that time to Afghanistan’s development.
Q: Was our policy toward Najubullah ever challenged or reviewed?

OAKLEY: Not seriously because the consensus or conventional wisdom was that he would not be able to hang on. During 1990 and 1991, it was thought that he could not last much longer and that the interim government would eventually come to power in Kabul. It was wishful thinking, in retrospect. But at the time, it seemed quite reasonable and our views were encouraged by the Pakistanis, who I think may well have been playing a double game. It suited them in some ways to keep the Afghan situation unsettled. It kept the Pashtunistan threat at bay, as well as other things. I wish now that we had done things differently. I am not sure that even had we done so, it would have had a major impact on subsequent events. Sometime, we overestimate our power of influence. In the final analysis, the future of Afghanistan had to be determined by its people and not outside powers.

A lot of non-governmental organizations got started or expanded in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. The Vietnamese situation had first stimulated interest in refugees; that was followed by the Afghan problems. From the mid-1970s, the U.S. government developed a Refugee Resettlement Program, which allowed us to admit to the U.S. certain refugee categories - generally with ties to the U.S. such as former political leaders or government officials. It made us feel good and gave those refugees a safe haven. Unnoticed or at least not discussed was another impact of that program. It, in fact, removed from Afghanistan a whole class of modern, educated Afghans. If they had stayed in the area and agitated for a competent government, that might have changed the course of history. Of course I can’t blame the refugees, because of their own safety and that of their families it would have been very difficult for them to reject offers of safe haven in the U.S. or in Europe. Even if their lives were not in danger, they had no jobs in Afghanistan and therefore their economic prospects were far better in the West. But their departure left such a void in the leadership class that it undoubtedly had an impact on the course of history. One could say we did the same thing in Vietnam to a certain extent. For short-term, valid reasons, actions were taken which may have contributed to authoritarian regimes and unwelcome political situations.

Q: Were the Iranians players in the Afghan situation in this time?

OAKLEY: No; at least as far as we knew. In the 1980s they had other fish to fry - the Iraqis. They did not seem particularly interested in trying to dominate their eastern flank. The Shia-Sunni split of course was ongoing. The Afghan Shia were concentrated in the central mountainous part of Afghanistan; the Iranians were interested in that part of Afghanistan, but couldn’t reach it easily. Sunnis lived closer to the Iranian border.

Q: How did “Desert Storm” play out in Pakistan?

OAKLEY: That was very interesting, because Pakistan had for sometime enjoyed a certain amount of free oil from Kuwait. Kuwait had also been very active in assisting Afghan refugees. They had a very able ambassador in Pakistan and at the beginning of the conflict, Pakistan gave full support to the U.S. and Kuwait. When the Gulf War began, USIA sponsored various programs to discuss what was happening in the Middle East and to test Pakistani attitudes. It became clear that these attitudes were changing. From initial support, Pakistan moved to
growing opposition to what America was doing in Kuwait and Iraq. In looking back, I think a lot of this change was due to agitation by the traditionalists or fundamentalists - Arab conservatives who were aghast by the American presence in “their” part of the world, particularly Saudi Arabia. Also, a lot of Pakistanis had access to CNN; what they saw on that network provided considerable fodder for conversation. In the early days of the Gulf War, CNN focused on Israel and the threat that Iraq posed for that country - i.e., the missiles. It was the only part of the Middle East to which CNN had ready access. But the coverage gave the impression to a lot of CNN’s Muslim viewers that all the U.S. cared about was the protection of Israel. It never occurred to me that this coverage would have such a negative effect in Pakistan. Then there was repeated TV coverage of the amazing American military power. Pakistan became a somewhat inhospitable place for Americans; we had an evacuation even though one would have thought that when we came to Kuwait’s rescue - a close Pakistani friend - it would have been to our benefit. There were no links between Pakistan and Iraq. Yet it became clear even before the serious bombardment of Iraq started that we should evacuate dependants and employees who were not deemed essential. The American School was closed and most people left. I stayed on with the AID skeleton staff; we virtually ceased operations and we didn’t go to Peshawar. In fact, we didn’t leave the compound until passions had cooled. I was willing to be evacuated; I thought that this was what the decision-makers wanted and I was not about to fight it. But some told me that I had to stay if no other reason than to keep my husband under control! I was happy to do so.

Q: Of course, in light of our previous experiences in Tehran and Islamabad, the powers-that-be didn’t want to run the risk of any Americans being killed anywhere in the area.

OAKLEY: Absolutely, but I think it may have been an overreaction. But I did witness demonstrations in Rawalpindi and Lahore and one could see in people’s eyes a wild irrationality. There was no way to predict how events would turn out. One day, while running an errand in Rawalpindi with Bob’s driver - I was discouraged from driving myself because of the risks involved - I saw a mob gathering. The driver said it was time to go home - pronto. My initial reaction was to just drive around the scene; I thought we could bypass the problem and I could finish my errands. But my better judgement rose to the fore and I concluded that the driver was right and we hit the trail home.

Within the first few weeks of my arrival in Pakistan, there had been a riot in front of the American Cultural Center on the main street in Islamabad. This was the result of the publication of Suleiman Rushdie’s book and the reaction to it by fundamentalists. The U.S. was really not involved, as it had been published in the United Kingdom, but nevertheless we became the target and our staff people were surrounded in the Cultural Center. Fortunately, the mob did not close enough to the Center to do real damage, but there were a number of Pakistanis killed in the melee. So there had been just enough anti-American incidents to put everyone on edge during the Gulf War.

Q: Were you noticing the growth of a fundamentalist movement in Pakistan?

OAKLEY: Yes, but it was only in its beginning period and nothing compared to what it became later. I think fundamentalism grew throughout the Arab world. I think developments in Afghanistan were an important motivating factor, with the growth of the Taliban, in part
spawned by the madrasas in Pakistan. It was the failure of the Pakistani government to deliver social services to the Pakistani public - education, public health, transportation, etc. - year after year that certainly played a large role in the expansion of fundamentalism, since people turned to those who provided. The Pakistani government, of course, was always concerned about India and therefore devoted large resources to its military capabilities, which it couldn’t afford. Most governments were also tied to traditional pro-large-landlord policies - such as low taxes and no redistribution of land.

Q: What was your impression about Pakistan’s view of India as expressed to you by your Pakistani contacts?

OAKLEY: In my view, most Pakistani views on India were irrational. We knew a lot of people, of course, who had suffered in partition when their parents had been forced out of various Indian provinces and areas. In addition, we knew people who had been brought up in Bangladesh and who were bitter because they had not been well treated by the Pakistani government. But almost all of our contacts were irrational about India, I felt. That was particularly true for Pakistani in the military who were obsessed with India; India was not obsessed with Pakistan.

At one transitional point, Pakistan was led by Moen Qereshi, a former World Bank official who made a real effort to reduce corruption and provide good management. In his interim period, he did a lot of good work in collecting on old loans for the government and reallocating resources from the military to the social sector.

So it could be done. By the time I left Pakistan, my greatest concern was that population growth was going to overwhelm any possible economic growth - all the statistics showed birth rates outstripping any increases in social services. When Pakistan was created in 1947, it had 33 million people. By 1989, it was over 100 million. Worst of all, investment in social services and infrastructure - roads, power, schools, hospitals, etc. - had not nearly kept up with this population explosion. It was out of control. The growth of fundamentalism made it more difficult to deal with social problems, because of opposition from certain mullahs, not to mention the reluctance of the government to make needed investments. Any investments in the social sector had to come from outside. It was not an effective national system.

Q: Did our assistance program have some inhibitions about population programs?

OAKLEY: For Afghanistan, the emphasis was on helping women with maternal health and safe deliveries. Because of the Afghan war, many people had died or had left the country that there didn’t seem to be the same kind of population pressure. In addition, the conditions in Afghanistan, even in the best of times, were harsh. It was and is one of the poorest countries in the world. So family planning was not a priority in the Afghan program, but when some of us walked through those refugee camps, we noticed hordes of little children and we became concerned. I think we could have done a great deal more about family planning for Afghans. I met many people later, when I was working on population, refugee, and migration issues (I became much more knowledgeable and interested in the issue), who pointed out to me the results of our failure to mount a population program for Afghans. But in the late 1980s, it was not as much of a concern; the view of most Afghans and Pakistanis was quite fatalistic - “Allah will
provide.” But there is no question that an Afghan family planning program would have been useful; the demand was there. We had other priorities.

Q: Was there a certain amount of frustration among embassy and AID people that we were not doing enough about this problem?

OAKLEY: As I’ve said, there had been quite a good family planning program in Pakistan. It was not a question of changing views - it was simply meeting demand for contraception at the basic level. In a society like Pakistan, abortion is not a subject for discussion. The essence of a good family planning program is contraception; various methods must be taught and the means provided. It includes even such things as explaining reproduction to teenage girls, whose education is the key to later marriages and less reproduction. There were so many areas of reproductive health and population growth that needed to be dealt with - abortion was really at the end of the line and did not need attention, although I’m sure it went on.

But as I said, I left feeling that Pakistan was a population time bomb.

WILLIAM LENDERKING
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Islamabad (1989-1992)

A native of New York, Mr. Lenderking graduated from Dartmouth College and served a tour with the U.S. Navy in the Far East before joining the Foreign Service of the U.S. Information Agency in 1959. As Public Affairs, Press and Information Officer, he served in posts throughout the world and in Washington, D.C., where he help senior level positions in USIA and the Department of State dealing with Policy, Plans, and Research. Mr. Lenderking was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Okay. Back to ’89, where did you end up going?

LENDERKING: The job I got was PAO in Pakistan. I took Urdu for four months or so – it’s an interesting and fun language, but everyone I met and had to deal with in Pakistan spoke excellent English, in many cases with much more flourish than I did.

Q: I’ve heard this again and again, from people who have taken Urdu. It appears to be handy in the marketplace and that’s about it.

LENDERKING: Yes. So once I got out there I hardly used Urdu at all and it probably would have been more helpful to have studied Dhari or Pashtu or something like that, you know, what the Afghans spoke. Anyway, that turned out to be a very interesting and challenging assignment; not an easy one.

Q: You were there from when?
LENDERKING: Eighty-nine to ’92.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

LENDERKING: Bob Oakley had just taken over. His predecessor, Arnie Raphel, was killed in that mysterious plane crash that also took the life of President Zia-ul-Haq, who overthrew Benazir Bhutto’s father and had him hanged. A tough country. So Pakistan was in its usual state of upheaval and it was the height of the war in Afghanistan.

Well, here Zia is dead; what was the situation politically in Pakistan, both internally and vis-à-vis the United States?

LENDERKING: Well, first of all the war - the Russians had withdrawn from Afghanistan and the war to overthrow the Russian, I guess you could call him a puppet, Najibullah, was well underway. We were supporting a group of seven different factions with an incredible amount of clandestine assistance. So that was one issue. And the other issue was who was going to rule Pakistan, and while I was there, there were two non-military rulers. One was Benazir Bhutto, who was prime minister twice and Nawaz Sharif, who was her political opponent but both of them were heads of democratically elected governments. Both of them were regarded generally as corrupt and ineffective.

Q: Well, how did Bob Oakley use you?

LENDERKING: Bob Oakley was seized with the two issues that I just mentioned and he was a very forceful person. He was given, I believe, an unusual amount of latitude and policy formulation authority over those two issues. Those were the two issues that he cared about. He was always supportive of the USIA program, which was quite large. If you count all the gardeners and the different people in the various posts that we had, there were about 430 Pakistani employees, and 16 American officers in five cities. I also had authority over a small low key but substantial information program in Afghanistan. We printed up a newspaper, more of a newsletter really, and paid truck drivers to carry it into Afghanistan with them. Americans could not go into Afghanistan at the time; we had no relations with Najibullah’s government and there was a civil war going on as well.

Anyway, Oakley was supportive of USIS but he pretty much left us alone, unless he wanted us to do something in support of his main concerns, which we did, or if he didn’t like something we were doing. He rarely raised objections, but we had some sharp differences of opinion when Desert Storm got underway and immediately what seemed like the entire Pakistani population turned vocally and actively against the U.S. and for Saddam Hussein.

In addition, Bob Oakley was always willing to talk to visiting journalists who we recommended, mostly American and UK. In those days, we had some large very popular multi-purpose, multi-use libraries, called American Centers. When the Cold War ended, we closed these very effective centers all over the world and replaced them with gimmickry. Budgets were slashed, exchange programs were cut back – it was disgraceful. It seemed that even intelligent experienced people
had concluded that because the cold war was over, America didn’t have to compete in a changeable and sometimes savage world.

I’ll mention a couple of things; when I first got there, Oakley said you and your staff give some thought to programs you might do to lessen the decades-long hostility between India and Pakistan, because that is one of the big issues of our time. So we did and what resulted turned out to be one of the most interesting programs I was ever involved in. And I can go into that if you want.

Q: Absolutely.

LENDERKING: Well, what my counterpart in New Delhi, Len Baldyga, and I decided, along with people in Washington, was that we would bring together a group of people in both countries who were non-official but influential opinion leaders, either retired government officials or leading journalists and intellectuals. No one currently in office was eligible, to lessen the probability that they would merely take rigid official positions. And then, through a series of conferences and dialogue we would try to get some momentum going in favor of creating an atmosphere congenial to genuine rapprochement. We wanted it to be high level but we didn’t want it to have a lot of publicity because there were too many people on both sides who were strongly opposed to any activity like this. Oakley thought this was great and he had some good ideas and our ambassador in India also liked it.

Q: Who was that?

LENDERKING: I cannot remember who. It may have been Bill Clark but it probably started prior to his tenure. This was the same Bill Clark with whom I shared the frustration of studying Japanese for two years. Anyway, one day Oakley and I called on the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a very imposing gentleman, and we told him what we were up to and we asked his blessing. He said this is a good idea, but keep it quiet and keep me informed and go ahead. And Len Baldyga in India did the same thing.

And so we worked on this pretty constantly for about a year. It started off with what we called electronic dialogues, where we would get people into our center and the center in New Delhi and maybe there would be a TV screen or maybe it would just be a telephone hookup with a moderator and they would start talking. Well, just getting them to that stage took us months. There was bickering over whom the participants would be, how much time each would be allowed to speak, and other ground rules. In the beginning the participants didn’t want to have any contact with each other at all, so the only way we could get the project started was through a glorified telephone conversation. What was interesting was that all the participants knew each other, at least by reputation, and knew each other’s families, and so on. We wondered at the beginning whether they just wanted to throw mud at each other. Eventually we put on a series of these dialogues and we had some excellent American mediators who knew the issues and how to avoid unnecessary confrontations. Each program grew a little bit more complex, and more intimate, and some we did with a large TV screen with participants in the US as well. It was quite complex, but most importantly, the participants were superb, often brilliant in expressing their viewpoints and framing the issues, so what we had was a lucid and insightful framing of the
issues and what might be done to resolve them. The technology, by the way, was an outgrowth of what USIA learned from developing Charlie Wick’s Worldnet. The private sector had this, of course, but it was expensive and we lagged behind the private sector in technology. But we were way ahead of them, it seemed to me, when it came to something like reaching out to adversaries when they was called for.

Q: Who were the mediators? Any Pakistanis or Indians?

LENDERKING: No, for all their criticisms of the US, they wanted only Americans, because they didn’t trust anyone from India or Pakistan to be moderator. The whole project was frustrating and exhausting, but in the end it was worth it.

Q: In other words there was no great thirst on either side?

LENDERKING: Yes, there was a huge thirst, but the enmity was so deeply embedded that it was extremely difficult to get beyond that to a real discussion of the current problems and what the two sides might do. And this kind of thing was a new experience for them. They’d been sniping at each other for years, and now they were sitting down and talking to each other, although they were thousands of miles apart. A suggestion that one of the sides would think was inappropriate could set back the whole tenuous negotiation for a couple of weeks and then we would go at it again. But each time we did this there was more momentum built up. The first one was especially fascinating because we didn’t know what to expect, but the participants, about three on a side, were so good and so articulate that the dialogue was one of the best I have ever heard. The people were leaders in their fields, their ideas were good, the points were good, there was emotion, there was a lot of intellectual conviction and content, the people were really expert in what they were talking about and they did not waste a lot of time in ranting. It was really a serious dialogue. So we were all thrilled by this.

Q: On this initial dialogue, was the theme how do we get together or what can we do about it or...?

LENDERKING: The approach was confidence building. What are the problems, and how can you, Pakistanis and Indians, work towards a rapprochement? What are the areas where we can go forward and where we cannot? Where are the red lines and the sensitive points, and so on.

Anyway, this project went on for perhaps a year or so and despite the progress we had made, unfortunately the whole effort fizzled shortly after Len and I left. This was not because we abandoned the scene but because of extraneous events, that is, hostility on the ground between militants on both sides.

Q: There were attacks on the government and all.

LENDERKING: Yes. It became not feasible to carry on with the dialogue. It was too risky for the participants.

But one program before the finish was truly groundbreaking. After preparing the groundwork
with both sides, we rented a very nice villa outside of Lahore, which is right on the border, for a conference. And we were so nervous that something would go wrong and there would be an incident of some kind. But when the Indians and Pakistanis came into this house – we’d invited about 20 from each side -- which was a lovely house and we’d spent a lot of money to have good food and attractive surroundings -- it was like a family reunion. They all knew each other, they all knew each other’s families. Of course, they’d not seen each other for years, they’d had little or no contact, and it was very emotional for all of us to witness the warmth and friendliness and the tears and hugs. I just sort of faded away from that scene and watched it from afar because the participants took it from there and had a wonderful time talking and catching up with one another. Of course, the next day serious issues were discussed, but this icebreaker was one of the most successful events of its kind that I’ve experienced. It proved to us that things can often be done to bring adversaries together and start them thinking about resolving issues instead of fighting. So, we thought we were on to something special, but the militants soon created a different atmosphere and it was impossible to pursue these kinds of confidence building initiatives for a while. But now, in 2007, confidence building has been progressing for a couple of years and concrete achievements have resulted. I’d like to think that what we did helped to set a favorable precedent.

Q: Well, did you feel that the situation was always going to be screwed up by somebody - by militants who would launch an attack or raise something in Kashmir or tear down a temple or, you know, attack the parliament house or something? In other words, did you feel that the militants on both sides really had the upper hand?

LENDERKING: Well, they certainly had the potential at any time to derail these efforts. And ours was not the only initiative of this kind. A couple of other organizations on both sides were also trying to do these things so we were not exclusive in this. But it always seemed that, just as you said, something would happen and they would go off the rails. But you keep trying -- it was a worthy goal, a lot of serious Pakistanis and Indians were willing to put their prestige and even their personal safety on the line to try to bring something positive to the consuming issue of their lifetimes. So it was very exciting even though it didn’t come to fruition.

Q: Yes. In our lifetime we have seen France and German really do something. But there you did not have the awful poison of religion, which can really foul things up.

LENDERKING: Very true.

Q: Speaking of religion, in Pakistan did you have anything to do with the madrassas (religious education schools) and the schools in the tribal areas? Was this something we were looking at?

LENDERKING: Yes, USAID had a huge educational assistance and reform program, and some of it was aimed at improving rural education, in areas where the militant madrassas were strong. Those were halted because of the Pressler Amendment, which was aimed at deterring Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, and which failed to prevent that. So all the effort went down the drain.

As for USIA, we weren’t into assistance, but more into intellectual and political dialogue –
different but complementary aspects of the same problem, and we didn’t have anywhere near the resources that USAID had. But in Peshawar, we started a series of discussions, bringing together Afghan people, many of whom were mullahs, religious people who we thought were at least moderate enough so they would talk to us. A lot of them would have nothing to do with us, regarded us as non-believers and therefore inferior. But we persevered and managed to put on a few programs. We recruited a moderator from Yale who was familiar with the Middle East and Islam and had experience as a moderator. His name was Charles Norchi and he was excellent. We selected people very carefully and we had a few people from Christian groups, and the initial idea was to just establish a dialogue. But again, long story short, the sessions were very contentious and we decided to give it up. Here was the problem – it differed in substance from the Indo-Pak dialogue -- the Muslims were very articulate and interesting and they presented their views forcefully, but basically they had no interest in dialogue. They were only interested in telling anyone who was a non-Muslim what was wrong with their thinking, and they wanted to proselytize and show the correctness of their ways. Anything else they regarded as a waste of their time. Of course, you cannot have a dialogue with people of that mindset. Now mind you, these were moderates; these were not the most militant people. So that was a lesson for me, which I carry to this day and I am very skeptical of a lot of what is going on in the Islamic world and rather pessimistic.

Q: Yes. I think about back in the 19th Century when we were sending a lot of missionaries all over the place, the missionary movement was strong in the United States, and I happened to start doing some studying about missionaries in the Middle East, and they got absolutely nowhere with Islam so they spent most of their time working on Jews, trying to convert Jews to Christianity. I mean, it’s almost futile.

LENDERKING: For sure. I think it’s much worse in Muslim countries to be a Muslim who leaves his faith than to be a total non-believer. Militant Muslims believe apostates must be killed.

Now, there is one other thing I would like to mention, more on the political side than the USIS/cultural side. When I got to Pakistan our policy was already controversial, especially towards Afghanistan, and there was a guy in the political section, Ed McWilliams, who became a dissenter and Oakley and the other people in the embassy had his tour terminated. That is, they didn’t want him there because he thought the policy was wrong and said so within the Embassy. I only met him once and I saw a departing cable that he had written disagreeing with the policy of trying to form an alliance with these seven Afghan parties, most of which were radically conservative, and I thought it made a lot of sense. I thought, uh oh, here is Vietnam all over again, but I also thought I didn’t know enough about it although I had been reading frantically to catch up and get more expertise on this issue and this area of the world where I’d never served before and had no background. So I didn’t want to just say well, this reminds me of Vietnam and then go off on that tangent. But the more I saw the more I felt the policy was mistaken and that McWilliams was right. I concluded early on that our policy was bound to fail – that is, standing up a coalition government that would be anti-communist and friendly to the US. The people we were arming and supporting with a lot of money were anti-communist all right, and they were fiercely fighting the Russians and their Afghan supporters, but most of them were militant Islamists who hated us too. In other words, we were temporary allies of convenience.
Of course, Ambassador Oakley and the Embassy staff -- we had separate staffers for Pakistan and Afghanistan – were trying to make the policy successful and it just wouldn’t fit. So, I was convinced that a key US policy was doomed to failure, and although I didn’t know as much factually as many others in the Embassy, I was right. I didn’t want the policy to fail, but I just felt it could not succeed, and the tribal forces we had cobbled together would never be allies of ours.

I didn’t want to write any more dissenting cables or anything like that but we had people like Fulbrighters out in the hinterlands who had their programs on university campuses and I kept in touch with them and encouraged them. It was part of their position as Fulbrighters to write reports and they would often put in notes about what was going on at these rural universities, about the growth of Islamic militancy and anti-American feeling, and I found them very alarming. This bad news did not fit with the tenor of the way people were looking at things in the embassy. I mean, the ambassador and the political section were trying very hard to make the policy work with Afghanistan and they didn’t want to hear from naysayers. Besides, I could see the flaws in the operation, but I had no magic solutions. There weren’t any. Oakley told me one day that there were many enemies of Pakistan in Washington, and to report back to Washington all the negative aspects of the conservative alliance we were trying to build would only give the critics ammunition to gut the assistance programs, which was what gave us leverage to try to influence Pakistan and the Afghan leadership.

Q: How would you describe the policy from the embassy, what was the policy they were trying to uphold?

LENDERKING: The policy was to forge an alliance with seven different parties, one of whom is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, still one of our fiercest enemies right now. He’s still alive and has been allied with the Taliban all these years. But to form an alliance and try to hold it together required a lot of money. So we essentially created a shadow government in Peshawar, which would then be able to lead an uprising against Najibullah, the Soviet puppet. Even though the Soviet troops were out he was still in control. And then they would take over the reigns of government. Well, there was an alliance all right – we called them the Seven Dwarfs – and they had ministries replete with ghost employees and other bits of blatant corruption, and we were bankrolling it all. It was like something out of Gogol’s “Dead Souls.” And I thought, these guys are not friends of ours. In fact, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is an Islamic radical who would never be a friend of ours. And that was my conclusion.

Hekmatyar in fact got a lot of assistance from the CIA, he seemed to be a favorite. All this is documented with painful detail in two marvelous books, Charlie Wilson’s War, by George Crile, and Ghost Wars, by Steve Coll, who was Washington Post correspondent for India and Pakistan when I was there, and later became managing editor, and still later went with the New Yorker.

Q: Did Osama bin Laden come across your radar at all at that point?

LENDERKING: Maybe a tiny bit. At that time he might have been in the Sudan, I don’t remember, but I heard his name and that he was an Islamic militant, but I don’t recall learning anything beyond that about him.
Q: How about the Saudi influence? Talking about the Saudi Government; what I gather is that the Saudis around the Islamic world and elsewhere have made their pact with the devil in order for the Saudi family to stay in power, were financing Islamic schools which were teaching a rather virulent form of Wahhabism, or militant Islam. Were you picking up any of this at the time?

LENDERKING: I knew the Saudis were financing many projects around the world like schools, but I had no specific knowledge. You should call Bob Oakley back in and ask him about that because he forged a very close relationship with the Saudi ambassador, and the Saudi ambassador and the Saudis were very discreetly putting big money into the fight against Najibullah. I can’t give you a figure but Bob Oakley could. For one thing, he has a prodigious memory and if he’d be willing to discuss this whole period it would be fascinating, because he was the man in charge of US policy. Mushahid Hussain, a good friend and leading journalist (even though he regularly scorched us with newspaper editorials) who later became head of the Pak Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a leading political leader, once dubbed Oakley “The Viceroy.” The nickname stuck and all the Paks referred to him as “the Viceroy.” Mushahid and I concluded that Oakley secretly liked the nickname, but he professed to ignore it. In any case, I was not privy to much of the information that later came out during the period when Bob Oakley was at the center of US policy and which was discussed in the books I mentioned.

Q: What was your impression of democracy and its prospects in Pakistan? This is part of our mantra; we try to promote democracy. What was happening?

LENDERKING: There were certainly some impressive people on the side of the committed democrats, and the political parties, including Benazir’s, which was the largest and most popular, certainly had some able people in them. And certainly Bob Oakley was strongly supportive of the democratic process and we had some very good programs in USIA to get parliamentarians to the U.S., to train parliamentary staff, to provide a parliamentary library and things like that; all these things that would help provide the infrastructure for democratic governments. And so that was rather encouraging despite the fact that Benazir’s regime, according to Mushahid Hussain and other Pakistani friends, who said ruefully that her regime was corrupt even by Pakistani standards. Another civilian PM, Nawaz Sharif, who came to power when Benazir was kicked out, also did not head a distinguished regime. So in Pakistan you have a perennial dilemma – democratically elected civilian governments are corrupt and ineffective; the military governments that periodically overthrow them are also corrupt and ineffective and also lean hard on civil liberties. For example, they throw journalists who displease them in jail; Mushahid Hussain was one of them, and there were many more. Najam Sethi, a brilliant man, committed democrat, and who, with his wife, edits and publishes one of the best political and cultural weekly newspapers Pakistan, “The Friday Times,” has frequently been persecuted by military regimes. This see-saw represents a basic failing in Pakistan because there is a tremendous amount of talent there but they have terrible problems. And if you compare Pakistan with India, where the people have so many similarities, you have to conclude that over the years India has fared much better. The reasons for this are complex, but certainly one factor is the pervasive influence of a conservative and restrictive brand of Islam in Pakistan.
Q: You mentioned you had a small information program for Afghanistan. How did that work?

LENDERKING: Well, I didn’t start it, but I inherited it and I kept it going, providing the funds and a little input from time to time. This was all contracted out to Afghan exiles that we kept in contact with. I mentioned the newsletter and how we tried to circulate it. It was almost impossible to get any real, substantive evaluations on whether people read this product, but we had anecdotal evidence that people tended to pass those things around because they had some information and they were starved for information, at least those who could read. So we had to take a lot of that on faith, that it was worthwhile doing and that what we were doing was reaching some of the right people.

Much more impressive was the Afghan Media Resources Center, which we’d set up in a building in Peshawar and basically it was a marvelous repository of information – articles, photographs, documents, interviews, personal histories and more – about the Soviet occupation and the resistance. A priceless archive, really, and meticulously kept by the Afghans in exile in Peshawar who were on our payroll. Now, that is one project that was totally worthwhile and will assist historians forever. It was a trove of information to visiting journalists, many of whom came to Peshawar to write about the war. Of course the Afghans regarded the Center with great pride and reverence because it documented their struggles and provided a beacon of hope for the Afghan diaspora. I should say that outside of the funding, our touch on this Center was very light. It had an Afghan Director, Haji Doud, who I kept in touch with regularly, but he and his colleagues ran the Center. So I don’t take any credit for the Center, but my predecessors who got the project going and made sure it was a research and documentation center of high quality deserve a lot of credit. Eventually the archive was given to the Afghan Center at the University of Nebraska and that’s where it is today. So the records have been preserved; they have not been lost.

Q: When did you leave Pakistan?

LENDERKING: June of 1992. My next assignment, and final one in the career foreign service, was as a diplomat in residence and a senior research associate at the North-South Center at the University of Miami in Florida. Before we start there could I do just one little reflection on Pakistan?

Q: Oh absolutely.

LENDERKING: I will make it quick and then get back to your question.

My wife just got back from two weeks in Pakistan; she had not been there since we left in 1992. She was there on a project for her company, and they are bidding on a big educational contract. And she had occasion to call on Mushahid Hussain, who I just mentioned. He’s a big deal now; he was a pretty big deal then. But today, in addition to his political importance in Pakistan, he regularly comes to the US and lectures at Johns Hopkins and other universities; he’s invited to talk about Pakistan to CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific Command) senior officers in Honolulu, and so on. When we were there he was the most important newspaper columnist and also a vehement critic of US foreign policy. And for some reason he and I got along well although we did not agree on many of the issues. He was also a very devoted Shia and had close
ties to Iran. The embassy regarded him with deep suspicion and did not look kindly on any of my contacts with him, despite his prominence. Yet he was certainly within the Pakistani mainstream, had a graduate degree from Georgetown and many friends of all stripes in the U.S. His wife has a post-doctoral degree from Columbia University and has authored academic articles and books. And without going into all the history, he has gone through a lot; he’s been a minister of information; he was imprisoned by President Musharraf and other things. It’s ironic that in 2007 he is one of Musharraf’s most trusted advisers and part of his inner circle. Pakistanis are extremely hospitable, as are the people in all Muslim countries if you are their guest, and they also value good friendships. For these reasons, Susan was welcomed at a lunch there with him and his wife because I and a number of other American friends had participated in efforts to have him released from prison when Musharraf threw him in on no real charges. We wrote letters and did whatever we could to bring some pressure to get him released. And whenever he sees any of us he always thanks us for standing up for him.

And the point I want to make is that Ambassador Oakley pulled me aside after a staff meeting one day and said you are not to have any more contact with this man, ever. And I did not obey that although I kept it discreet. The reason for this edict is that the embassy distrusted Mushahid because he had close contacts with Iran and he criticized US policies. Some of the embassy folks also thought I was indiscreet with Mushahid when discussing various people in the Pakistani political firmament, but I never went beyond what was appropriate for an American official to say. In 2007 and many ambassadors and events later, Mushahid Hussain is regarded as a key friend and contact of the embassy, and has kept the ambassador apprised of crucial events as Pakistan struggles to shift from military to civilian rule yet again and increase the pressure on Islamic extremists.

Shortly after I was ordered not to have any contact with Mushahid he invited me to a dinner at his house. Among the guests were the former foreign minister, several high ranking government officials at the highest level – much higher than mine, by the way, a mere counselor of embassy; several of the top columnists and opinion makers in Pakistan and the British ambassador. And Susan and I were the only people from the American embassy. The conversation was stimulating and well-informed, obviously. Other people from the embassy would have benefited from being there too, but they were not invited because they regarded Mushahid as an enemy. We behave in this way time and again with foreign elites and it does us no good at all. Once again, we have an example of an embassy deliberately cutting itself off from very people we should have been in closest contact with. We’ll never have a really successful foreign policy if we only talk to people who agree with us. Of course, we shouldn’t be chasing after people who are avowed enemies, and we should recognize when critics are too rigid to ever shift their thinking. But we have to know the difference between fierce critics and outright enemies, and know where each is coming from. Anyway, I was a forceful advocate of U.S. policies and I didn’t argue with Oakley – he was the boss, but I thought his edict was humiliating and wrongheaded. As later events proved, I was right.

But anyway, the point I want to make is that deep down this man, Mushahid Hussain, is a good friend of the United States even though he was critical and we should not ignore such people.
Mr. Esch was raised in Wisconsin and educated at the University of Oregon and Vanderbilt University. He joined USAID in 1987 in the Office of International Training, and in 1989 joined the Foreign Service, working in the Office of Education Study of Human Resources Development (HRD). Continuing in this general field, Mr. served in Moscow and Ankara with USAID. He also served in the State Department as Desk Officer for Pakistan and Afghanistan and in the private sector dealing with educational development. Mr. Esch was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

Q: You said you worked in Pakistan quite a bit?

ESCH: Yes. In 1989 I left the Office of International Training and became a Foreign Service Officer. I went immediately after orientation to Pakistan.

Q: What was your job there?

ESCH: I was Human Resource Development Officer (HRDO) and worked in the Office of Education and Training with David Sprague. David ran the educational side and I ran the training side. At that time it was Aid’s largest training project that they had ever had. Per month I was moving a million point five, a million point seven some months.

Q: Just for training?

ESCH: Just for training. That wasn’t all just AID money. Part of it was that AID was doing administrative support to Pakistani’s for the Pakistan government. We were getting money that we were moving also for the Pakistan government.

Q: Training in-country?

ESCH: No, training in the U.S. The Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Education both had participants that they were paying for, but we were providing the administrative structure for and carrying their visas for them.

Q: You weren’t paying the training courses?

ESCH: We weren’t paying the training courses. At that time in Pakistan we were moving the money, and talk about moving money. The banking system was so bad the a couple of times I physically had to go with the government person in the car to go pick up cash money of twenty or thirty thousand dollars. It had to move from one bank to another and they didn’t want one person to go alone because it was actually being moved to a U.S. government account and we had to move it to another bank. They wanted me to be present to make sure nothing went wrong.
Well how would I know with that much money. But it was really funny. We were taking a private car to do this even.

Q: How many people were we talking about in this training?

ESCH: We were talking, at times in the U.S. we had anywhere from four or five hundred in the U.S. at a time in both Masters and Ph.D. programs. We had a small program for undergraduates at community colleges for people from Baluchistan because there weren’t enough from Baluchistan that could even make a Masters program. AID had decided, based on looking at leads they had looked at, and decided that undergraduates they weren’t going to pay for, but they would pay for Masters and Ph.D. programs, so we were doing a number of training programs in that. There’s a whole issue on the nuclear problem between Pakistan and the U.S. And I personally got very involved in that issue. It so happened that Donna Wolfe (this was in the days when I was with the Office of International Training) had really pushed for collecting the blue copies of the IAP-66A’s which is visa form for AID participants. That particular blue copy was supposed to come to the Office of International Training but a lot of them weren’t. What would happen is these AID FSN’s would hold them until they had a whole slew or whole packages. They just wouldn’t send them in on any regular basis so Donna had put a push on them. I very proudly brought Pakistan’s one day to Donna and said “Look at what my AID mission in Pakistan did. Here’s all these blue forms.” There was quite a pile of them. She said “Just leave them here on the table. We’re having a senior staff meeting and I’ll show them that we’re having an impact out there and we’re working.” Partway through their senior staff meeting I was called to come in there immediately. I went in and on the visa form it said nuclear energy. This was totally against the law! What is this and what’s going on? I made the very first call to Pakistan and was working with a man by the name of John Champagne over in the Bureau at that time. Champagne helped me and we got Andy Herod, who was the Foreign Service Officer out there. We got Andy out of a party as I remember, and they spent all night looking themselves because they hadn’t caught it. Their staff had typed it up but no one had caught that that’s what they were doing.

Q: Were forms from the nuclear agency?

ESCH: Well some of them were from agriculture, some of them were from medicine, some were from other things but the question on the American side was “Are you sure that they’re not going back to the nuclear agency?” There were these borderline things and some were really clear. Some were from the nuclear energy agency. What we did was immediately notified McPherson’s office.

Q: You were arranging courses for them?

ESCH: Oh they were in school. They were in Ph.D. programs and things. The way it got caught was that Joyce Keyser, who was doing a lot of the programming for Partners for International Education and Training (PIET) happened to be sitting there bored in the meeting. She didn’t have anything to do with Pakistan and she was just sitting there bored, just flipping through these and all of a sudden starts discovering these things. She said “I think there’s an issue here that’s really serious.”
Q: What was on the visa (inaudible) out of this?

ESCH: They put down the title of the degree or the degree objective. The staff typed it just as they were told it was and so we had to transfer each of those people (first we had to identify them) and the Andy and those guys worked all weekend identifying how many there were, because we only had the visas that were being renewed at that time. The visas could have been around from an earlier period. Then we had to transfer them all to government of Pakistan funding. That was okay, we could manage them but we could not pay for them. So we transferred them all to Ministry of Science and Technology or Ministry of Education.

ESCH: It wasn’t a problem legally, because you could come here as a private student and learn that. That was not an issue, but the U.S. could not support that. It was one of those things we thought may get in the news but it never did. Then I was working with Tunisia and discovered one day...there was a phone call that a man was working in the military...it was over a visa issue that the guy actually couldn’t get a j-visa because he’s actually military. He can’t be in the U.S. on a J-visa, he has to be on an official military visa. And so “no, no he’s an AID participant. What do you mean he’s military?” “Well, he’s active military and he’s teaching at the university.”

“So he really isn’t in the military, he’s really only teaching.” “That doesn’t matter. He’s still in the military.” That raised such ruckus through the troops in Washington that we had to transfer that man off of AID. He couldn’t come. He was blocked from coming and so he came through the Ministry of Science and Technology Program for Tunisia and he went on their program which they administered. So sensitive to that issue, I got a phone call from the contractor for Education and Development, and voiced some frustrations one evening saying “we have these people going for training in the U.S. in ballistics.” I said “What kind of ballistics are you talking about?” and I discovered that we were training military people under AID funding in the U.S. I just didn’t ask the right question before.

Q: I’m surprised that the mission didn’t know that.

ESCH: So we went back into this mode, this was only two or three months later. They identified those people and got them all out. I flew out then and as John Champagne said to me “I hope you land safely and they don’t shoot the tires out because you’re the bad guy. Rocky Staples was the Mission Director then and I no more than got more than fifteen minutes into AID at that time than I was called into Rocky’s office for a meeting. This was a little bit by design because he knew I was coming. Rocky wanted to know why the Pakistani mission was being singled out for this special monitoring. I went through the history of how each of these was discovered, that it was totally by accident and fumbling. We didn’t really try. It wasn’t a part of anybody’s monitoring system, it was a part of the system. He then understood what was really happening and that we weren’t going after him in any way. He had some major problems with the size program that they have. I think that was one of the reasons why the Pakistan Mission wanted me to come out right away, when I decided to join the Foreign Service and there was a position available, was to help on some of those kinds of issues.

Q: Besides the training, what was you role as (inaudible) welfare?
ESCH: It primarily was training. That was the major....

Q: Local training too?

ESCH: Local training. We did quite a bit of in-country training and we had management training teams for both the public and private sector at that time.

Q: This was government training or government civil service type of training?

ESCH: It had been up till the time I got there, and then we were introducing private sector training and we did entrepreneurial training for both men and women on how to start up new businesses and how to run family businesses.

Q: Were you contracting with some institutions?

ESCH: It was with institutions that we contracted with, as well as we had own trainers and we had groups of consultants in other places.

Q: Local institutions?

ESCH: Local institutions and local consultants. Then we’d use some Americans when we first started a new course. We did things with the Civil Service Training Academies in all of the different regions of Pakistan, and then we did things with the Lahore University Management Sciences, I think it was. AID gave them money and then we used some of their faculty to run some of the courses. There were several other institutions in Karachi but I’m not remembering what the names were of those institutions. Some of them would come to a Training of Trainers on a particular subject or a particular topic. We started a Trainer’s Certification Program there, but I don’t think that survived because it was really AID driven and AID funded. We tried to get some other organizations to take over, but there just wasn’t the collaboration. There was collaboration with AID because we were an outsider, but not collaboration within Pakistan on some of those issues.

Q: How did you decide what training should be emphasized?

ESCH: Basically there was a huge training program for the Inspector General’s Office of the tax department, and that was driven primarily by their interest to come up to some U.S. standards. They had approached the embassy and then the embassy approached AID. Others would be that they would hear that somebody was interested in some training and talk about needs. When we did some of the private sector things we went out and actually talked to businesses about what they wanted and what they thought they needed to get some other small and medium sized businesses. There were some very successful programs with how to start new businesses up and that was done by medium sized business entrepreneurs who ran that program. They ran it very well and it got paying for itself quite well. Women entrepreneurs, women in leadership, things within NGO’s, we did some of those kinds of programs as well.
Q: Using U.S. trainers, by and large?

ESCH: U.S. trainers and some regional trainers. We had a woman from India that used to come over and do some of the things with women because she had quite good experiences and models from India that were very applicable and materials developed from that.

Q: Were there any issues involved with anything you had to do with in that realm?

ESCH: Pakistani participants... I could tell you stories, Haven, for hours about the cross-cultural difficulties of bringing them to the U.S. There was the situation of the first group of the Baluchis who came to the U.S. and were in Jacksonville, Florida, and how the first time they came to the beach they chased women all over the beach... The whole group chased them. (Inaudible passage) learned not to take them to the beach in the first few weeks that they’re in the U.S. You just don’t do that. Their point was, anybody who is clad like that obviously is out to have a sexual relationship. Why else would they do that? ...lots of those kinds of cross-cultural misunderstandings.

Q: Did you have a lot of cultural training and orientation before they left?

ESCH: We would do a two-day pre-departure program for everybody. If you were taking government servants from either Lahore or Islamabad or Karachi we did the two day program, but when we were taking people from Baluchistan or Peshawar we would do a three and four day program, depending on what we thought was needed to put in the requirement to get at some of the cross cultural issues, to get at some of the rules and things, this is how we’re going to handle this. The long-termers we did almost a week, a five day program before they departed to come to the U.S. I had a staff of contractors at thirty-five, I had five to seven people on the AID staff at times, and there were about thirty-five to forty people here in the U.S. doing placements and monitoring.

Q: It was a huge program.

ESCH: It was a massive program, it really was, and I think that it had major impact in Pakistan on people. For example, several of the Baluchis who came to the community colleges have some really wonderful stories about how the community colleges took them in, and took care of them and worked with them to bring them up to speed. They had no problems taking off once they caught up for the most part. We had very few serious problems with them. Then how they applied to come back to the U.S. to go for actual four year degrees. Part of it was somebody would say “If they could afford the four year degree, why didn’t they go for the first two on their own?” Part of that is that the families had never had anybody who was college educated, and didn’t see the advantages of doing that, but when the girl or boy would come back the would say “Hey, I know a lot more and I want to go get a four year degree.”

Q: Were there problems of reintegrating in their home country after four years in the U.S.?

ESCH: We worried about that at times and we found that a number of them - well I left before the four year people were really back- but after being out for two years coming back they got
pretty good jobs. Some of them went back to school because they didn’t get the jobs they really would have liked to have gotten because they couldn’t compete against a four year degree which they can’t in the U.S. either. They could see the need for more training.

Q: What do you think of the impact of this program on Pakistan?

ESCH: I think that some of the moderation that you get on occasions was because of our program. I personally tried to look at the number of students coming to the U.S. whose parents probably came to the U.S. underneath our short-term programs. There’s a direct relationship. There is a point that you can go back to in the middle eighties when you could actually see the number of visas being issued by the Brits drops off, and the number to the U.S. for students picks up, going to undergraduate programs. I really think that shift took place because we exposed the parents to America in short term programs. I think financially there’s been a huge payback to the U.S. from that. I also think that business-wise there’s been quite a few businesses that do business with the U.S. because they now know people here and there’s a relationship there. I don’t think that you always get the moderation in all parts of the government but you get some of that moderation in the government.

Q: What about the Pakistan government’s performance?

ESCH: Leaves a lot to be desired at times.

Q: You mean the impact of the training and all?

ESCH: I think that there are individuals within those systems who have made some changes within those systems. I don’t think that overall the systems have changed or improved. But then and again, if I think about the people in those training institutions, and the people those people are training today, compared to who trained them, I think you have more up to date people. You have people who are more aware of the world and you have a more holistic world-view being transmitted there. I think you have ...clearly a market for international products has developed there that wasn’t there before AID and the whole Afghan war situation; a demand for products, a respect for products and an appreciation for them that wasn’t there. I think there’s quite a bit of impact on the size program that it was, and then if you realize that most of the money that was spent by AID comes back to the U.S. anyhow.

Q: I was also thinking about advancing Pakistan’s development.

ESCH: I do think it has done that. Can I point to any specific major systems that have changed with that, I probably couldn’t do that unless I went back and we did some database searches. The database still exists for all the Pakistani’s; the Academy for Educational Development does keep that and uses that system to develop systems they are now using in the NIS and the E&A Bureau, for tracking all participants. It’s a very good system, much more user friendly than the things that were being developed under the Office of International Training. I thought it was a much better system. Part of it is the Pakistani who started it out was in itself probably a good system.

Q: What do you do with a tracking system?
ESCH: One is to report to AID and therefore to anybody else that you need to as to how many, what types, where they’re from. We used them very often for follow-up meetings. We never did Alumni Association because I personally have very negative impressions of those. If Alumni Association starts locally with local energy, then it will last, but things that AID does or USYS does lasts about as long as USYS and AID does in the field. So, unless it starts up locally, I’m not one to say I’ll start it because I’ve seen these things come and go so often that it’s a waste of effort. I feel similar about newsletters. Newsletters last as long as you’ve got money and take a lot of effort to put out. Yes, they’re nice but they’re a major effort and I think the resources can be used better for some follow-up meetings and things to connect people up. The tracking system used to provide lists for the Ambassador or a director or deputy director when they were traveling, so they would know who was in that area and what businesses or organizations they were with. A number of times both AID directors and Ambassadors had meetings with small groups, only five or ten were encouraged. You didn’t have to get all of these people involved, but if you just let some of them know that you’re just checking back and seeing how they’re doing. I used the list for a few trips myself. You would generate them for specific regions or topics.

Q: Did you do anything to try to help these people keep up to date because if you back off then you’re isolated, and you don’t have access to the development there for you?

ESCH: Basically at the end of each of the courses, AID was giving them money that we would set aside for either bringing in professional magazines and books relevant to their things, or access to e-mail. We were working on that in Pakistan at the time, because that was just starting up. Today I’d say that would be an excellent thing to be able to do. We used to bring in lots of magazines and books that got sub-distributed out from the contractor. One of the things in that whole situation was that lots of participants never understood that AID sent them. They understood that the Academy for Educational Development sent them because AID ran the program at both ends, which one do you remember? You remember the one that you call up if you have a problem. You don’t call AID in that kind of a situation. So we had some people telling IG or evaluators that they never went for AID training. No, AID never sent them. The Academy for Educational Development, that great American organization, they sent them and that hurts, on the AID part.

ESCH: I sat through a number of their orientations and the stuff they hand out and things and they had it well identified, it was there, but I always put it back to that personal thing you know. Who calls you about the VISA? Who calls you about your placement or if you’re in the U.S., what telephone number are you given? You’re not given an AID phone number. I think that’s part of what comes from that.

NICHOLAS PLATT
Ambassador
Pakistan (1991-1992)

Ambassador Nicholas Platt was born in New York City on March 10, 1936. He
graduated from Harvard University and subsequently entered into the Foreign Service. He has served in Windsor, Taiching, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo, Zambia, and the Philippines. The interview was conducted by Paul McCusker on July 25, 1994.

Q: Did you get to Kashmir?

PLATT: Well, I got to the part of Kashmir that the Pakistanis administer. And I got all over the country. I thought it extremely interesting and exotic. It was the year that the Soviet Union broke up and the Afghanistan war ended and the mujahideen left Peshawar and went back to Afghanistan and started fighting against each other. But it was a kind of watershed year. It was a very good place to be watching from. I literally saw the Soviet Union collapse in front of our eyes. The war come to an end and started up again in a new form. We were the ones who were providing all of the assistance for Afghanistan. We were in effect the embassy for Afghanistan, if you wanted to call it that.

C. DAVID ESCH
Pakistan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1993)

Mr. Esch was raised in Wisconsin and educated at the University of Oregon and Vanderbilt University. He joined USAID in 1987 in the Office of International Training, and in 1989 joined the Foreign Service, working in the Office of Education Study of Human Resources Development (HRD). Continuing in this general field, Mr. served in Moscow and Ankara with USAID. He also served in the State Department as Desk Officer for Pakistan and Afghanistan and in the private sector dealing with educational development. Mr. Esch was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

Q: Well, we can come back to it. After you had your tour in Pakistan, what was your next assignment?

ESCH: I returned to Washington and became the Pakistan-Afghanistan desk officer for the two countries and did that for about six months while I tried to pass my language requirements to stay in the Foreign Service. I spent a month in Guatemala since I was studying Spanish and once again did not pass the test. After the experience with the desk I left the Foreign Service.

Q: Do you want to speak about your experience at the desk?

ESCH: Yes. Pakistan and Afghanistan programs, while they were not large at that point, because they had come down quite a bit in size from their heyday, were still very high profile programs in so far as the Administrator’s office went, and in so far as specifically the Regional Administrator for Asia went.
Q: What year was this?

ESCH: That was in 1993. I was on the desk from May until the end of November. There was a time coming back on Pakistan, closing out and the mission was trying to close out...

Q: Why were you closing out?

ESCH: Because of the nuclear issues and we had to close out by law.

Q: The whole operation?

ESCH: The whole operation except for some humanitarian assistance programs that did not deal with the government. Those have been running since then with NGO’s.

Q: Closing the mission entirely?

ESCH: Closing the mission entirely. They did close it in the end of 1997, I believe, or the beginning of 1998. Wait that was in ‘93, let me back up. So it must have closed in ‘94-95 that it must have closed.

Q: Was there much resistance?

ESCH: The Pakistani’s were very understanding, the ones that we had dealt with officially. Prior to my even leaving we were in the closeout phase. The Pakistani’s were quite understanding that they didn’t like it but they knew they had no choice. That was the way things stood between the two countries. They didn’t hold it against people personally or anything, they were very sad to see people go.

Q: On the AID side or on the Hill or anybody?

ESCH: The Hill was very clear that we needed to go ahead and close out. That was where they were going to stand and that was where they were going to stay. They were open to the idea of providing some assistance directly to NGO’s to assistance people in health and humanitarian areas. All this was to keep it small so as not to encourage the Pakistani’s that we were changing our minds.

Q: Do you feel this was very damaging to the work that AID had done before?

ESCH: I personally, yes, because I feel that the moderate forces in Pakistan which AID had helped, and some of the people who were not of the elite group but still of the intelligencia group had a voice because the Americans were around and we were there and encouraged them through the projects and work and just our presence. I think that when the Americans pulled out, that what you had was their feeling much more isolated and much more alone. I think that some of the programs and projects for democracy, for governance, for participation such as in irrigation and some other areas, I don’t think that you had that following.
Q: Were the Pakistan participants moved?

ESCH: From the U.S., they were all transferred to the Pakistan government and they set up their own structure to handle them.

Q: Administratively?

ESCH: Yes. They all got phased out in a very orderly manner and fashion. It was a very total closing down. It was one of AID’s largest missions ever. It wasn’t the largest but it was one of the largest programs, especially during the Afghan war.

Q: What was the effect of closing the Pakistan mission?

ESCH: The whole refugee piece, a lot of the weight of that shifted to other international agencies. There was help through UN agencies and the U.S. government was helping through that but they could not do it directly.

Q: Anything else inaudible.......in that position how did you find it?

ESCH: I found it very good to be a desk officer, because you really do learn a lot about other agencies. In my position I had several things to do with the Treasury, several things to do with OPIC and Import Export Bank as well, because the closing down of the AID project was impacting some of the major investments by U.S. private corporations in the energy sector.

ESCH: Well, because AID’s money had to be pulled out, the whole deal was very rocky. A couple of generator plants did not go on and only one did. They consolidated all their resources to do the one but not the other two. There were going to be three. The power sector was really impacted by AID’s pulling out. Not that AID had that much money in it but AID’s money was key to quite a bit of other money.

Q: Did you have a sense that (inaudible passage) in terms of dealing with the primary issue of liberation?

ESCH: Obviously not, since they blew up the bomb. I think most of us felt they were always very close and probably had the capabilities to do it, it just wasn’t fully recognized or put together as parts. The others piece is: why is Pakistan, of all the other countries, singled out for that? We certainly have not terminated our assistance to Israel or any other country because of it. Only recently, after they blew up the bomb did we do anything with India, when in fact we knew India had the capabilities too for a long time.

Q: What made Pakistan selected out?

ESCH: Well, it’s always been curious to me as to how and why the U.S. Congress and popular press seems to have singled out Pakistan for that kind of sanctioning, and they did. Now once they blew up the bomb, it’s a different situation today, but at that time it was hard to explain to Pakistani’s and hard to explain to American colleagues here in the U.S. about why that was the
Donald Camp was born in New York in 1948. He received his BA from Carleton College and an ND from University of Chicago. He joined the Foreign Service in 1974. His overseas assignments include Colombo, Bridgetown, Beijing, Chengdu, and Kathmandu. His sister, Beatrice Camp, is also a Foreign Service Officer. Mr. Camp was interviewed by David Reuther in 2012.

Q: Now, out of that assignment you come back to Washington. How did you get the assignment in the South Asia Bureau on the Pakistan-Bangladesh-Afghanistan Desk?

CAMP: Well, the State Department made me a China hand, and I’m very happy for that, but I’d come into the Foreign Service intending to make a career around South Asia. And so I was eager to go back and use some of what I’d learned in a management position in the South Asia Bureau. The job there as the Deputy Director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Bangladesh Desk was a new part of the region for me. But I wanted to reestablish South Asian credentials.

Q: Let’s look at the organization of the South Asia Bureau and then the Desk. Who is the Assistant Secretary and who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary that would have been responsible for your area?

CAMP: The Assistant Secretary was Robin Raphel and the only Deputy Assistant Secretary was Gib Lanpher. Robin was an area specialist who’d served in Islamabad and Delhi. Gib was new to the region, but an old friend. He’d been my CDO (Career Development Officer) when I came into the Foreign Service, and had assigned me to Chinese language. SA was a very small bureau, recently established, just getting its feet wet. It had two Regional Offices: India/Nepal/Sri Lanka/Bhutan/Maldives, and Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh. They had six officers each. The bureau had a Regional Affairs Office that was about the same size. So it was a tiny bureau and frankly not very influential in the building. It was a new upstart that had just been pulled out of NEA a few years earlier by congressional mandate.

Q: Now, when you’re Deputy Director did you have a desk portfolio or were you exclusively a manager?

CAMP: The Director at the time was Lee Coldren. Lee was an expert in the region. He asked me to be the backup for all of the Desk Officers. We had two people for Pakistan, one for Afghanistan, one for Bangladesh. So I had to know all the countries, but I was supervising the
Desk Officers and managing the office. Let me say a little bit about our priorities at the time. Afghanistan at this point was in a fair amount of turmoil. We were coming to the end game of the Soviet invasion. We had the special envoy to the Afghan mujahedeen Peter Tomsen. Our Afghan Desk Officers were not normal desk officers; we didn’t have a mission in Kabul and the officers had to work with both SA and with Tomsen’s independent office. They worked closely with our consulate in Peshawar, which had been our main window on Afghanistan after our embassy had closed.

Pakistan was still in the policy deep freeze dating to our sanctioning them under the Pressler Amendment when we could no longer certify that they were not building a nuclear weapon. We had to cut off assistance and our valuable relationship with the military establishment. So we had a very limited relationship with them.

And Bangladesh never got the attention it deserved. It’s one of the largest country in the world. But in South Asia, we had India, we had Pakistan, we had Afghanistan, so we had other priorities. Bangladesh was a country that was developing quietly on its own and we had a good relationship with them, centered around our assistance program.

Q: Tell us a little more about the Pakistan deep freeze.

CAMP: We’d had a very close relationship with the Pakistani military, which for years had been what was called the iron frame of Pakistan. We had an active IMET (International Military Education and Training) program, we had an active sales program. That all ended after 1989. So we had no contact with the Pakistani military for 12 years and we’re paying for that now, I think.

Q: No contact means the other guy’s stereotypes really begin to take a hold on his mind.

CAMP: Yes. And the US had benefited for years from a positive image in Pakistan. Their senior military had all had at least some professional training in the US. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff who became President, went to our Command and General Staff College earlier. But he also went to China for training. And in the decade of the ‘90s officers went to China rather than the United States. There was still a British program, so some would go to Sandhurst. But Pakistan was not getting any of the training we’d provided through IMET.

Q: You would have worked with the embassies here in Washington. How did the Pakistan Embassy look to you? Did they understand what their problem was?

CAMP: Pakistan has always had pretty good missions here, very professional. Often a political ambassador, but very savvy. In that era, we had a woman by the name of Maliha Lodhi, who was a former journalist, very well plugged in in Islamabad and very effective at cultivating official Washington, including the State Department. She did as good a job as she could, but she was facing a relationship that was really dead in the water because of the Pressler Amendment. One of the interesting problems created by the Pressler Amendment, which Maliha Lodhi and we helped resolve in the mid-’90s, was the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. Pakistan had been paying on a regular basis for F-16s, which were being built down in Fort Worth, and when the Pressler Amendment hit we told them, “Sorry, you’re not going to get these planes, at least during the
duration of the Pressler Amendment.”

And they said, “But we’ve already paid (hundreds of millions of dollars). Can we have our money back?”

“No, I’m sorry, that was paid to Lockheed -- we have no way of getting that back for you.”

So Pakistan was stuck. No planes, no money. During the sanctions period, they kept paying Lockheed regularly in the expectation that they would eventually get those planes. And then we also hit them with storage fees, because they were being stored at the aviation boneyard in the Arizona desert. So Pakistan felt really put upon. They really, really wanted those F-16s. But by the mid-‘90s they came to realize that they were not going to get those planes, so they wanted their money. And we had no way to provide that money. We didn’t have assistance programs that we could have used because of the Pressler Amendment. So we had to develop a very sort of creative way, that was not totally satisfactory from the point of view of Pakistan. As I recall, we used one of the few forms of assistance that was available to us, which was PL-480 money, and we provided wheat and other items and waived the payment. And therefore, they eventually got much of their money back from their payments from their F-16s. It was not a satisfactory situation, but we were doing our best. Ambassador Lodhi was doing her best to find a way to work this through Congress to get money back to the rather straitened Pakistani Treasury.

Q: And how would you characterize the Bangladesh Embassy?

CAMP: Bangladesh did not have as strong an embassy as the Pakistanis. I don’t think they had as well developed a diplomatic corps. We didn’t have many big bilateral issues. The issues that loomed large then included an AFL-CIO challenge to Bangladeshi labor laws. Bangladesh was just beginning its garment industry which was a big employer. But they had exclusive economic zones in which labor rights were severely restricted. So the AFL-CIO brought a case against them to cut off their GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) privileges. And Bangladesh had to make the case that they were providing full labor rights to workers in the export control zones. The other thing that we worked on with moderate success (and it wasn’t in our ability to fix it) was the shaky India-Bangladesh relationship. At the time, India was in desperate need of energy. We were interested in helping Bangladesh develop. And Bangladesh had enormous reserves of natural gas. So we asked the U.S. Geological Service to do a survey of Bangladesh’s natural gas reserves with the goal of demonstrating to the Bangladesh government that they could take care of their own needs and also sell to India, which they were hesitant to do. The survey showed, just as we hoped, that the reserves were enough to satisfy Bangladesh’s needs for many years as well as provide a surplus for India. But because of political problems, the long term deals were not made and the gases just sit in the ground in Bangladesh. We were also unsuccessful at getting the Bangladeshis to allow cargo transit rights from Chittagong Port up to the far north-eastern provinces of India. There was too much distrust at that point between Dhaka and Delhi. I’m not sure why we were carrying Delhi’s water on these two issues (energy and transit rights) except that on both Bangladesh stood to benefit economically. Unfortunately, Dhaka’s destructive politics of personality between the two political leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, meant that the government was not going to do the right thing.
CAMP: Pakistan has had a long tradition of alternating between military rule and civilian rule. There was a period of about eight years in the 1990s when Pakistan had a modicum of civilian rule and could not make a go of it for a variety of reasons, including poor performance by the two political leaders. Benazir was the most prominent politician. Despite her popularity abroad, she was not a very popular or successful Prime Minister. She had a major problem with her husband, Asif Zardari, who was famously known as Mr. Ten Percent because of the corruption in that period. He was later President of Pakistan as a legacy of Benazir’s assassination. So it was not a very positive era for Pakistani democracy. Nawaz Sharif, of the Pakistan Muslim League, elected in 1996 also made a botch of it, in particular by trying to consolidate all state power in his own hands. He was so hated by the Pakistani elite that even some of the most dedicated of democrats were calling for the military to step in. And he was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf in 1998.

Q: In the same time frame, the Taliban is expanding its influence in Afghanistan assisted by the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). Did that slowly come to your attention at the Desk?

CAMP: It certainly did. In the period 1995 to ’98, the Taliban was on a roll, expanding from its Pashtun base in the south to Herat and Kabul and then they marched north and basically occupied most of the country, except for the area that the Northern Alliance had always controlled. My boss, Robin Raphel, has since been attacked unfairly for being too willing to deal with the Taliban. In the late 1990s, the Taliban were becoming the de facto government of Afghanistan. We never recognized them. Only three countries did -- Pakistan, UAE (United Arab Emirates), and Saudi Arabia. But we made the decision that if they were going to be in charge we needed to at least talk to them. I was sent out on one such trip in 1997, I believe, starting in Peshawar. I picked up the Consul General in Peshawar, Brad Hanson. He was the Afghan expert. I was the policy guy/novice from Washington. We went to Kandahar, and Kabul, and Mazar-i-Sharif and Sheberghan in the north. It was quite an interesting trip.

The purpose of the visit was to reiterate our message to the Taliban: “Give up Osama bin Laden, his presence in Afghanistan is unacceptable. He is under your protection. That is our major issue with you.” And implicitly, “We can do business with you, Taliban, but you’ve got to give up bin Laden to us.” In the retrospect, I think this was the right message. But of course we never succeeded. The message was subsequently sharpened by people more senior than I to “Give up bin Laden; whatever bin Laden does while he is your guest in Afghanistan you will be held responsible for.” It was very pointed and unfortunately, very prescient.

So Brad and I ventured to Kandahar, which was the spiritual heart of the Taliban. The most senior meeting we had was with the Central Bank Chief there. They were very polite in response to my message and they used the same language they used with everyone else: “The Pashtuns have a tradition of hospitality; he will not do anything to harm you, but he is a guest in our land. We could not ask him to leave.” It was totally unsatisfactory, but that was the message.

We went up to Kabul where I delivered the same message at the Taliban Foreign Ministry. And then I went over to our embassy, which had been empty for years, but which was still guarded by
a minimal Afghan staff that had stuck with us. Brad Hanson from Peshawar brought along their salary to disburse. It was very difficult to pay by any other means than direct cash transfer, so he would come up periodically. It was very emotional to meet these people who had stayed on through all the tough years as our embassy’s locally-employed staff. After our embassy reopened, after 9/11, one of the employees was named Foreign Service National of the year and flown to Washington to receive recognition.

After Kabul, we flew north on a plane operated by the resident UN mission, which was the only means of transportation within Afghanistan in those days. They had a few fixed-wing planes and flew on a scheduled basis between their operations in the major cities of Afghanistan. We flew from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif over the magnificent Hindu Kush and then rented a car to drive through northern Afghanistan to Sheberghan, which was the redoubt of one of the warlords, Dostum, who’s an Afghan of Uzbek ethnicity. That visit was to check in on one of the few remaining non-Taliban leaders in Afghanistan. He was very much the tough warlord. He’d been a communist during the times of the Soviet invasion. He changed his stripes as quickly as anyone, but he was the leader of the Uzbek community. He had a weird palace up in Sheberghan that someone compared to a red velvet brothel. The interior decoration left something to be desired. But we were received warmly and stayed in his guesthouse and had an audience and a feast with General Dostum. He told us of his intention of keeping the Taliban out of his area of NW Afghanistan but at that point he couldn’t provide any help or leverage in getting the Taliban to give up Bin Laden.

The Taliban, I’ll say for the historical record, at least back in the ‘90s had no interest in picking a fight with us. They were domestically oriented, they were terrible on human rights, they were terrible toward women, but they just wanted to take care of Afghanistan and forget about the rest of the world. Their sin -- and it was a major one -- was harboring bin Laden and not realizing or not accepting what he was up to.

Q: One of the neighbors nearby is Iran. How is the Desk looking at Iranian influence over Afghanistan, Pakistan?

CAMP: I tend to think that we also go through cycles in U.S. foreign policy on how do we deal with Iran. They’ve been in the deep freeze since 1979, obviously. But we accepted at the time, as we were dealing with the Taliban, that Iran had a legitimate interest in the future of Afghanistan. And we tended to talk to them through other channels, primarily the Swiss, about Afghanistan. There was an attempt to create a structure to deal with Afghanistan at the time. It was called the “Six Plus Two,” which was the six border countries of Afghanistan, plus the United States and Russia. And so we sat down with Iran in that Six Plus Two forum. And in fact, the Iranians, for sectarian reasons because the Taliban were strong Sunnis, had very little incentive to work with the Taliban in the first place. So we were in the same place on the Taliban in those days. Things changed later. But in those days it was the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Q: Now, getting back to Pakistan, one of the things that was evolving was the rise of fundamentalism. Pakistan had basically been a fairly secular educated and structured society. Did you see that during your period?
CAMP: Yes, although to a more limited extent than has occurred since. President Zia-ul-Haq had introduced Islam in a major way into the army. Where the army had previously been proudly secular, it now was becoming more fundamentalist. The officer ranks still in those days came from the westernized elite of Pakistan and was not particularly fundamentalist. That has changed as the society changed. The Islamist parties in Pakistan in those days could turn out a demonstration at a moment’s notice and bring people out on the streets. But they never got more than 10% of the vote in elections. In the mid-‘90s, we were aware that fundamentalism was a growing issue, but it had not become the problem that it did subsequently. What one did see, and it was rather discouraging as an American diplomat, was a change from the days when America enjoyed a very positive image in Pakistan. Famously, the trucks would have F-16s and other symbols of U.S.-Pakistan friendship painted on them. But our cutting off of aid during the ‘65 Indo-Pakistani war and later our denial of the F-16s created the sense that America, as a Pakistani would say, is a fair-weather friend. That distrust has grown over the years.

Q: Were we concerned at all by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency and its activities?

CAMP: The CIA had had a longstanding relationship with ISI dating back to the Jihad against the Soviets. In the mid-90s, there was still some unwillingness -- even in the face of the intelligence -- to believe the worst about the ISI. Certainly everything they were doing in Kashmir at the time was a serious problem, and we were quick to jump on it when we could find out about it. Our main concern with ISI was their activities in Kashmir and their attempt to stir up trouble there.

Q: Now, you just mentioned one of the great issues in South Asia is Kashmir. You’re watching from the Pakistan side of it. How does the U.S. look at Kashmir and the Pakistani and Indian claims?

CAMP: We are really careful about how we approach the Kashmir question, and we’ve had basically the same policy for years. The mantra is that Kashmir is an issue that needs to be resolved between India and Pakistan, taking into account the interests of the people of Kashmir.

Q: We don’t do borders.

CAMP: We don’t do borders (laughs). But we have periodically over the years, starting way back in the ‘50s, attempted to help in a hopefully productive, and sometimes ham-fisted way, to get India and Pakistan to resolve this because it’s the source of so much of the problem of South Asia. The fact that India and Pakistan have this border dispute is so poisonous that it has held back Pakistani development over the years, it’s kept India and Pakistan from developing a productive trade relationship, and a productive bilateral relationship of all kinds. India would prefer that we butt out, although they’ve been nicer about it in recent years. Pakistan has always thought it was in their interest to enlist our support to help with bigger India to try to find a settlement that they -- that would redound to their benefit. But we’ve pretty much had the same policy status quo since 1947.

Q: Now, there was some point in which the conflict went from national armies facing off to
private terrorists being encouraged to do nasty things back and forth. Where was that process in the time that you were on the desk to ’98?

CAMP: At that point the ISI was quite active in training irregulars, in encouraging intrusions across the line of control, and causing problems on the Indian side of the Line of Control. We would often tell the Pakistanis that this was unacceptable and dangerous and deleterious to their interests as well regional security interests. But they were having none of it. This was part of their national plan. We always thought that it risked a serious crisis with India. Toward the end of my stint on the Pakistan Desk, this became even more of a crisis because both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May of 1998. We’re going to get to that, a whole different story. But at that point it became a potential nuclear conflict.

Q: As you say, let’s get into that a little bit later. But in the summer of ’97, the South Asia Bureau turns over in the Front Office. Robin Raphel leaves, Rick Inderfurth comes in. Did the management style or policy emphasis change with that?

CAMP: Assistant Secretaries of the South Asia Bureau always try quite properly to avoid being seen as a partisan of any country other than the United States. Unfortunately, countries make their own decisions as to what they think the perceived biases of these people are. And Robin Raphel quite unfairly, despite having served in Delhi as Political Counselor, was perceived by the Indians as something of a partisan to Pakistan. The perception dated to a statement that she once made about the status of Kashmir that was blown up out of proportion. But Rick Inderfurth came in with a clean slate, without that kind of perception. He came in without a lot of South Asian experience. He was a political appointee and a good one. But he had to learn South Asia on the job.

Q: One thing I want to explore, you were saying earlier that you didn’t think South Asia as a bureau had a lot of clout in the department. What does that mean?

CAMP: I would put it in terms of resources, first and foremost. We were shortchanged in people, we were shortchanged in funding. There were crises in the Middle East, there were crises in Africa. We didn’t get the help we needed. There were two full-time India desk officers. I’d come from East Asia where the China desk was 15 people or so. So resources were out of whack and it took us a long time. 9/11 made a big difference. But before then we were very limited in assistance funding, management funding, personnel, et cetera.

Q: The next major event while you’re on the Pakistani Desk is that on May 11, 1998 India conducts a nuclear test. At the same time, you have this Kashmir tension. So that must have really riled the waters.

CAMP: It was a great shock. And before we get to the geo-strategic and regional implications, it’s worth saying that we were caught flat-footed about India’s intentions. And we shouldn’t have been. The Congress Party had lost an election a few months earlier to the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party). And part of the BJP’s manifesto had been pursuing India’s nuclear weapon program. But, because India had not tested a nuclear device since 1974, our intelligence agencies and the rest of us didn’t take it as seriously as we should have. On May 11, 1998, I was sitting in the morning
staff meeting chaired by Assistant Secretary Inderfurth. At about 8:45, the Staff Assistant came in and said, “Sorry to interrupt, but CNN is reporting that India has just exploded a nuclear device.”

Rick Inderfurth said, “Get our Ambassador in Delhi on the phone.” That was Dick Celeste. And he had just come from a meeting at the Foreign Ministry where this had been explained to him, that India had taken this step and the rationale behind it. The CIA was caught flat-footed, the embassy was caught flat-footed. The Indians had been very good at keeping the secret. They carried out tests on May 11\textsuperscript{th} and more on May 13\textsuperscript{th}. The consequences for India-U.S. relations were immediate. US law requires a cutoff of all U.S. assistance when a nation undertakes a nuclear test. The other thing that the American foreign policy machinery immediately put into force was an effort to prevent yet another horse coming out of the barn, and that is Pakistan, which everybody knew had nuclear capability but had never demonstrated it. Strobe Talbott was the Deputy Secretary of State at the time and had taken special responsibility for the South Asia portion of the world and it was decided that he would immediately travel to Islamabad to try to convince the Pakistanis not to respond. The first problem was to get an invitation from Pakistan for this trip. They did not particularly want to see Strobe Talbott because they knew exactly what he was going to say to them and knew that he would put on whatever American pressure could be brought to bear. Strobe was a man of action. We did not have the full go-ahead from Islamabad, but we assumed it would be forthcoming. So Strobe, accompanied by Inderfurth, Bruce Riedel from the NSC and myself from the Pakistan Desk, set out for Tampa, where General Tony Zinni, who was then the Commander of CENTCOM, had arranged a plane to get us out to Pakistan as fast as the U.S. military could. When we reached Tampa, we realized we couldn’t get any further without an invitation from the government of Pakistan.

Rick got on the phone to our ambassador in Islamabad and to the Foreign Ministry, but to no avail. Finally, Zinni called the Chief of Army Staff, Jehangir Karamat and said, “We need to come. Make this possible, make this happen.” I think it was the military connection that did it. Karamat gave his OK and so therefore did Nawaz Sharif, who was the Prime Minister at the time. We took off in Tony Zinni’s personal plane which was as I recall, a rather aging 707 military variant, but it had a very important capability. It could be refueled in flight. So we flew nonstop from Tampa to Islamabad with two in-flight refuelings, which were amazing to behold. The military’s capabilities are tremendous. We landed in Islamabad with a schedule of high-level appointments to try and convince the Pakistanis to hold off testing a nuclear weapon. This was a long shot from the beginning. Strobe Talbott has written of this visit (“Engaging India”) and I can’t add much to that. The Foreign Ministry was dismissive, Karamat was politely dismissive, and Prime Minister Sharif was conflicted and probably worried more about his army (which controlled the nuclear stockpile) than the Americans. The Pakistanis made pretty clear to us that they were not the slightest bit interested in making a deal. They didn’t say they were going to test but we were not surprised when they did so on May 26\textsuperscript{th}. So Pakistan was now also the target of our sanctions. Their aid had already been cutoff, but we had other tools as well. We had something called the “Entity List” which was a list of companies who were effectively denied access to any exports on the Commerce Department’s export control list. We had innumerable committee meetings in subsequent weeks to establish companies in India and Pakistan that had sufficient connection to the defense establishment that we needed to place them on this list. The goal was punitive as much as a lever to encourage them to reverse their nuclear weapons
Looking at the nuclear tests in retrospect, Pakistan was inevitably going to respond once India tested. And in a sense, India made a mistake with those tests in May 1998. Because for the first time, they created an equality that hadn’t existed between the countries. India had always had an overwhelming superiority in conventional munitions. That played itself out in the 1965 and 1971 wars. When it became a nuclear standoff, frankly you’ve got mutually assured destruction. And you had an equality between India and Pakistan and I think it affected the way those two countries have looked at each other and interacted ever since. They’re more cautious, because Pakistan now has the means, if they should ever, heaven forbid, exercise it, to destroy the major cities of India. So pre-1998, they were the weaker power. Now in many ways they’re militarily equal.

National Security Council Director for South Asia
Washington, DC (1999-2001)

Then the visit to India was over and it was time for Pakistan. This was the most difficult part of the trip. It had already been decided that the President would not for security reasons stay overnight in Pakistan. In fact, it turned out to be a five-hour trip. Almost all of the journalists and staff went directly from Bombay to Dubai to meet the party after Pakistan. It was only a small group that went to Islamabad. The President flew in a small plane, a C-20, I think. There were two of those and then the rest of us rode in this big C-5, which we laughingly called “The Target,” because there were these two small planes and this enormous plane that looked like Air Force One landing in Islamabad. But we landed without incident. The President and the group was whisked off to the Presidential Palace. We had negotiated with the Pakistanis and had insisted on an opportunity to address the Pakistani people directly. He gave a speech broadcast throughout the country about the importance of democracy and the importance of freedom -- this in a country which had just had a military coup months earlier. He also sat down with President Musharraf for a couple of hours. It was a very brief visit and everyone knew that it was a very brief visit and that this was not equality with India. I’m not sure if the Pakistanis really were happy with that visit, but it was important that it occurred.

One vignette. The Pakistani official lunch was long-delayed because the Musharraf meeting went over time. When we all sat down, the food had been sitting on the table for a while. I advised the Americans at my table to avoid the macaroni salad to avoid intestinal trouble. I could see the main table from where I was sitting, and my heart sank when I saw the President talking animatedly with Musharraf and shoveling everything into his mouth, including the macaroni salad. I stayed behind in Islamabad but I later heard that the President had been very ill on the next stop on his itinerary, where his important talks in Geneva with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had been interrupted frequently by trips to the bathroom. I can’t tell you for sure that it was the macaroni salad, but I certainly believe so.

MICHAEL G. ANDERSON
Political Officer
Michael Anderson was born and raised in Illinois and educated at the University of Illinois and the University of Chicago. Entering the Foreign Service in 1973, Mr. Anderson became a European specialist, serving at posts in Poland and Italy and on the Poland desk at the State Department in Washington. Mr. Anderson also had a tour as Political Officer in Islamabad, Pakistan. Other assignments concerned Arab-Israel affairs, Population and Refugee matters and Peacekeeping and Humanitarian affairs. Mr. Anderson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: You were in Pakistan from what 1996 to?


Q: What were you doing in Pakistan?

ANDERSON: I was just doing the same thing I always did which was domestic political reporting. I supposedly spoke Urdu but I never got more than a 1 plus 2 or something after 11 months of Urdu. But everybody that I dealt with spoke pretty good English and I had a guy with me all the time to do my interpreting.

Q: What was the situation when you got there in 1996 in Pakistan?

ANDERSON: The Benazir Bhutto government was kind of controversial and there was a danger that is was going to be, lose an election and be replaced by a Nawaz Sharif government. I think I got there in the summer of 1996 and the election must have taken place in about October and Bhutto was actually defeated. The Pakistan Muslim League Party was the one that won the election. The Peoples Party was defeated so Nawaz Sharif came back in. I think he had been prime minister before. Bhutto was out. The problem with the Bhutto government I suppose had a lot to do with the perception of corruption. Her husband Asif Zardari, who is still rattling around over there; I see he was just let out of jail but now he may be going back, had been known as Mr. 10%. Anybody who wanted to import anything into Pakistan had to pay him 10% fee on their imports. He was supposedly amassing a huge fortune, living like a king. She, Bhutto, herself, was popular among the people down in the Sindh where she grew up. Her family was from that area but they were not that popular over in Punjab, which was Nawaz Sharif’s stomping ground.

In 1996 we had a pretty good relationship with Pakistan although we had cut off any kind of aid, so I guess we couldn’t call the relationship too good. No foreign aid or military assistance because since 1990, I believe, since they had an uninspected or uncontrolled nuclear program which eventually was going to result just before I left there in the detonation of their first nuclear weapon. I think about May or June of 1998. Bilaterally I thought we were in pretty good shape. Nawaz Sharif came in and the first thing he did was to clamp down on weddings. He said that the people were spending too much money on weddings so he decided to place a limit on that. The guy, I don’t know where he is today, but he was a little bit of a kook you know. He was living a sheltered existence. He was the son of a relatively rich father I think. His father had some kind of
a business that made shoes or something like that. They had amassed over the years a large fortune. He lived in a big compound down outside of Lahore. It’s eventually going to become a scandal and one of the reasons he was overthrown, because again, like Bhutto, they were siphoning off millions and millions of dollars and he was building this place. I think it had a wall around it. It’s funny because we never heard about this while I was in Pakistan, but after I left all these revelations came out. That’s when Nawaz and Musharraf had this confrontation and Musharraf wouldn’t allow them to land or something like that. Maybe it was Musharraf they wouldn’t allow to land, I can’t remember what it was. In any case, the overthrow of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1998 took place after I left. Most of the time I was there Nawaz Sharif was the prime minister. He was trying to install people that were sort of more Islamic I guess. He pretended that he was the defender of the Islamic faith I suppose in Pakistani politics whereas Bhutto was much more secular, westernized. They may have both been educated in England. She definitely was western educated and very westernized. As you might expect, a woman in Pakistan, with that kind of power, well it’s a rather precarious position to be in. Nawaz Sharif was a little bit detached from reality I would say. He had all these crazy ideas. Like for instance, one of his big things in his previous administration had been the yellow taxi cab campaign. He figured the way to defeat poverty in Karachi and elsewhere was to help these guys, and there was a need for taxis. The government was going to subsidize the purchase of taxis. I don’t know, maybe he owned part of the taxi company or something. They had thousands, hundreds anyhow, of taxis that were sold at very, very low prices to people in Karachi and elsewhere, maybe Lahore; wherever they had a market for them. These guys then would start their little businesses and they were supposedly going to, I don’t think it amounted to anything, but then he was noted for his yellow taxis. Then he wanted to build a super highway. Pakistan never had, I mean its roads were just a disaster. It looked like there had been a war because they were all filled with craters, they weren’t just potholes, but they were craters and trucks had to drive around them and if it was dark and you fell into one of those things, you’re dead. So he built this expressway. It was in his first administration that he started it and then Bhutto came in and he had to stop. Then he came back and he finished it. It runs from Islamabad or outside of Islamabad down to Lahore, which is the distance of about 150 miles I guess. It was built by a Korean firm which they paid a lot of money to. It’s not exactly regulation in terms of some of the hills are very steep and some of the curves are very sharp, but compared to any other road in Pakistan it’s certainly a great improvement. The thing is most Pakistanis don’t have cars, they don’t drive at high speeds and the road was always empty. I think we drove down there, down to Lahore a couple of times and other intermediate points. You could drive for miles and not see another car on the darn thing. I guess it had a toll. You had to pay a toll. That’s another reason nobody used it. It was like building a castle in the desert or something. It was just really a waste of money. He had other ideas about how he was going to modernize the country and so on.

Then he appointed a guy as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court there who was really, he looked like an old, kind of imam from the village or something. He had a little beard here. He was considered a throw back to some earlier era and nobody could figure out why he brought him in. I guess it was just cover. He just wanted to have somebody in there he could say, “See how close I am to the Muslin fundamentalist”, or whatever this guy represented. I guess the guy was also close to Nawaz and Nawaz felt he could control him. It created a huge brew ha, ha about that. I don’t know exactly how that all worked out. What you found was that Nawaz Sharif, and I find this true of quite a few politicians, he had a very, very strange agenda, you know what I mean.
He didn’t seem to recognize or see what the real problems were there and he wasn’t addressing them and of course a lot of problems that were really, serious problems, economic problems, problems with these crazy terrorists of one sort or another, the Shiite-Sunni conflict that was going on. All the mess that was going on in Pakistan, he never really addressed those things at all. He was off dealing with what I would call his own little personal ideas. As a result people got a little tired of him. It became clear that this guy, he was never going to get around to dealing with the real problems. He didn’t seem to know about them or really care about them. Then it became known that he was enriching himself and his family and everybody else. Huge sums of money were flowing into his coffers and he was overthrown.

Q: Our relations I take it were not really terribly good if we were cutting off all sorts of aid, military and all that?

ANDERSON: Well, yeah it had been like that since 1990, and no, there was no strategic reason for us, after the overthrow of the Soviets and Afghanistan, this is really where it all goes back to. Of course the Pakistanis resented the fact that we had been great friends with them when we needed them as a base for operations against the Soviets, but then once that was taken care of we just cut them off so that wrangled.

Q: What was the situation along the border, near the Khyber Pass and that area at the time?

ANDERSON: Of course the Taliban had succeeded in grabbing control of most of Afghanistan by 1997 or so and they were supported by the Pakistanis, what do they call it, ISI or their Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. It’s interesting because it had the same initials as the International School of Islamabad and they finally changed the International School of Islamabad to something else because they said “Oh, we can’t have this ISI, it’s too controversial,” once it became clear that that was one of the major funders and supporters of the Taliban. Just as they had been and still are perhaps, supporting the mujahideen over in Kashmir. The thing about Pakistan is that you’ve got a government and then you’ve got all these other organizations that are operating there without any government control. You can talk to the government, but that doesn’t mean that they really, you never had the sense that the government was really in charge of Pakistan, of what was going on. Maybe, periodically and sporadically there would be an assertion of governmental authority in various parts of the country, but in the meantime there would be long periods during which many parts of the country where the government was really not asserting any authority in those areas and that would of course apply to that area along the border with Afghanistan; the so called tribal areas. Those places were under the control of local warlords and figures of various sorts. They ran things in their own area and the government had very little to say about it or was really not interested as long as they, whatever, paid their taxes or whatever it was the government wanted out of it. Of course that was clear from just the fact that the infrastructure was a total disaster, since the British times, it didn’t look like they had done anything. It was just run down to almost nothing. The railroads and roads were just absolutely impassable. To me there was no sense, in other words that there was a functioning government in much of Pakistan. It was really on the verge at any given time of collapse. Then what often happens when there is such weakness, is that in order to assert themselves when they strike out, they use excessive violence to deal with disturbances and so on. They go and machine gun a bunch of people. You get the picture. It was a failed state. It still is as far as I’m concerned.
It never held together really, as a unified country. Punjabis and Sindhis and Baluchis and the Pashtuns and so on, all speak their own languages. The local feelings are very strong. There is very little sense that central authority is going to do them any good. The only thing, I guess you could say that holds it together even a little bit, is the army, but it can’t be everywhere. In fact, the army has its own internal divisions, like this ISI thing. There is definitely an area of the army that, to me anyhow, is kind of outside of anybody’s control which is a law onto itself. It was pretty chaotic.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?

ANDERSON: Tom Simons again. I don’t know if he was happy to see me there or not but there we were. Just a coincidence. I had no idea, neither did he.

Q: How did you operate? Was there a parliament that made any sense to make contact with?

ANDERSON: There were members of parliament that I did see. The parliament, well yes, I mean it met once in awhile and just had long winded debates and really didn’t have too much effective power. I travelled around the country quite a bit with Amman Khan who was the chief local in the political section. Amman and I would travel to visit with the various local notables and so on. They had all these different titles. There was this old pre-independence ruling class there, the ones the British cultivated. They still saw themselves as kind of, well they had been overtaken by events I suppose, they didn’t really have that much control but they were still in many instances in the countryside. You had the local notables and you’d go and see them and they owned huge quantities of land and the people who worked on that land were pretty much serfs. They owned vast tracts of land. One guy, a Nawab, I went with somebody from the consulate in Lahore. I can’t remember. It was down on the border. I’m sure these kind of people exist in all parts of the world but he was on the border with India. It was in the area of Bahawalpur. He had a private plane and he flew down there and back. We met up in Lahore and he flew us down there in his private plane. He was a pretty good pilot but he didn’t really trust himself so he actually sat as co-pilot and an American guy who really knew how to fly the plane, which I was happy to see, handled the controls most of the time. Me and the guy from the consulate sat in the back. He flew down there. He had his own air strip right next to his home there. We drove around, spent the day at these various palaces and so on. Took us out and showed us the desert by night and said out there is a big castle, palace of some sort in the desert. It’s kind of interesting and the thing is that I feel these people are pretty irrelevant to what is going on. In other words you’ve got an old ruling class that really does not take any interest in running the state affairs and then you’ve got this new ruling class, sort of these politicians who are totally opportunists as best I can tell, have no interest in the state. There is no working class, no labor unions. There is nothing that would sort of form a kind of organized, mass political movement of any sort. There’s the religious aspect, the Muslim League and Bhutto with his Peoples Party did create a kind of personal following and that was good. Really in the final analysis, really all there is is the army.

Q: Were we paying any attention to the, madrassa schools and also this very fundamentalist, very anti-American movement that was going on?
ANDERSON: Not enough evidently. We certainly did not have a good grasp of the depth of the anti-Americanism there. Most of that of course was centered in Afghanistan with Bin Laden. The Taliban were such a strange medieval phenomenon. My office mate, Joe Novak used to go up to Afghanistan a couple of times a month. He would fly in with the Red Cross plane and so on. They had an aid program there and he’d fly into Kabul or into Kandahar, some of these other places. Even off to Mazar e Sharif. At that time there was an ongoing war of the northern forces against the Taliban and this had been going for several years and then the Taliban eventually pushed those people way back into the mountains and took control of Kabul. That all happened within that two year period I was there. I could see it going on then. I was not directly involved in it. The Taliban, I didn’t really cover them. I think that was mainly a kind of intelligence agency operation since we assumed that those folks were all potential terrorists I guess. We knew about it but I guess in a sense we thought, oh well, that’s not our problem. The thing is the money for them was coming from the Saudis, it still is I suppose. Gosh, if you want to find a hate-filled religious training center, go to Saudi Arabia, you don’t have to go to Pakistan. There wasn’t a single Pak who was in one of those terrorist camps, they’re not terrorists, they may have been a few who eventually appeared as Al Qaeda reps but I would say 99% of the Pakistanis are not anti-American. They’ve never seen us as the great Satan.

Q: Could you travel around or were we concerned about personal security?

ANDERSON: No, I travelled everywhere and mainly the thought was, oh gee, you shouldn’t be out on the road at night because there are bandits down in Sindh especially in Sukkur. There was a terrorist threat because in fact we did have a number of alerts. Bin Laden’s name was mentioned. He said he’s going to get us and that sort of thing so we should be careful. In terms of travel, I suppose people thought you’re probably more likely to be shot on your way to work than you are out travelling around the countryside because your path was well known. Like I say, we travelled around Punjab and Sindh more than any place else. Those were the most populous areas. I went once over to visit where my cook and house guy lived in Kashmir. A lot of the people from Kashmir had come down into Islamabad for jobs. So I had a four wheel drive car and a driver, I actually hired the driver from the embassy and he took us up there one weekend to this Rawalkot is the name of the town which was sort of hanging on the side of a mountain there; a steep valley in Kashmir. We found a funny little hotel there that we stayed in and then went to visit him up at his house which was even further out of town. So I travelled there. I remember at that hotel that the guy who was the owner of the hotel, I don’t think they got many Americans staying there. There was me and two interns who had come, two summer interns I took with me. We were sitting there at the table in the dining room of the hotel, so called, and he came out and you know he said, “Well, I don’t hate Americans, no. It’s just some of the things they do.” In other words, he protested too much, immediately. I said, “Oh, okay, then we will just be on our way.” In other words, underneath the surface I do think that there was a great deal of anti-American feeling, especially in a place like Kashmir where perhaps they blamed us for the fact that the Indians were still fighting them and they weren’t able to take over that area. They blamed us for Israel and they blamed us for anything that was wrong with their lives. It basically came down to that. You can see that America became, for a lot of people, an obsession, no doubt about it. It wouldn’t matter that there was no factual basis to most of the problems that they attributed or most of the nastiness and so on in the world that they attributed to us. It had nothing to do with us, but the fact that being who we are, we’re the ones who are going to be blamed.
Q: Well the Brits use to get this and now it’s our turn.

ANDERSON: I guess so. It’s the price you pay, I guess for being number one if you will and that’s the way it was.

Q: What about India and Kashmir, did that play much of a role?

ANDERSON: It’s an interesting relationship certainly. The Indians of course have a High Commission there in Islamabad. That is what they call their embassy. They are both members of the Commonwealth you know. In the capital of Pakistan there is an Indian embassy, a big Indian embassy and a lot of Pakistanis just love to go to India because they can speak the language there, not just English but also Urdu. Of course there are millions of Urdu speakers in India so they feel kind of at home there. They view India as, they have a love-hate relationship with India I suppose. They view it, almost they envy it. There’s freedom, the color, the good-looking women, the movies. In other words it’s like going to Las Vegas or something. They view it as sin city down there. At the same time you can see, especially the male portion of the Pakistani population, that to them India is an object of desire you know. They go there to have a good time. Then on a more sophisticated level the journalists and some of them recognize that India is a free country with a democratic press or free press and they respect that and they kind of want to emulate that. The military, I guess, I didn’t speak to them much about it, but they come out of the same roots. In fact many of the people in India who are in the military are probably Muslims too. So this is a strange relationship that they have with India. It’s almost like a civil war in a sense, still. You go down to the frontier, outside of Lahore. I don’t know what it is called there, it’s a changing of the guard that they have there every day. We went down there and took that in.

Q: Both the Indians and Pakistanis go to great lengths to put on a show don’t they?

ANDERSON: Yeah, the military flourishes and all that sort of thing. They really do. They sort of march like that, you know. I guess they’re trying to, it’s almost like fighting cocks you know, prancing around. I don’t think we understand that relationship. It’s not a relationship that Americans would really be able to get into. It’s too, I’d say incestuous or something. I’m not sure if it will ever settle down. Of course there is a lot of nastiness about Hinduism. They don’t like Hinduism. They figure it’s dirty. A polytheistic thing and of course they would always tell you, “Oh Ghandi drank his own urine.” They always think that is something you should know. They feel that the Indians are dirty, that a lot of the religious aspect of it is unclean. It’s interesting because Pakistan is a sewer you know. It’s an absolute pit of sewage and a mess of all sorts. Any of their towns or cities, I call it plasticbagistan because there are plastic bags everywhere, in the trees, in the gutters. Everything is sold in these God awful little plastic bags. It’s just ghastly. It stinks. You get off the plane, like I suppose almost any third world country, it takes a while to get used to the smell. So the idea that they should look down their nose at India as being an unclean place, I think is absolutely ludicrous. But it doesn’t make it any less true.

JANEY DEA COLE
Ms Cole was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York and was educated at Hartwick College, the University of Hawaii and Virginia Polytechnic Institute. After working in New York City several years, she joined the United States Information Agency in 1980. During her career, Ms. Cole served in Dacca, Caracas, Katmandu, Calcutta, and in Islamabad, where she was District Public Affairs Officer. In Washington, she served in the East bureau of USIA and was a Congressional Fellow on Capitol Hill. Ms Cole was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Well then, you were in Pakistan from when to when?

COLE: I went over in ‘99 and was evacuated right after President Clinton visited in 2000.

Q: Well, in this relatively short period what were you doing?

COLE: One of the things I did was reform the IV (International Visitor) program. There were two problems similar to those that had existed in India and had been addressed in reforms made by Ann O’Leary which I took as my model. The first problem arose from the fact that all elements of the embassy had a hand in making the nominations and this could result in a good deal of blood on the table. The second was that the nominations were made less with US policy objectives in mind than as rewards for people who had been useful in one way or another. We took the Mission Program Plan (MPP) and broke it down into goals in priority order and asked the participants to select a goal and list their IV nominees under that goal in priority order. We had 30 grants altogether and we were able to use ten of those for the first of each of the participants. This kept the participants happy. However, we did eliminate DEA’s (Drug Enforcement Administration) first choice because he had been to the U.S. two years earlier and so selected DEA’s second choice. Then we would proceed to start going down, going down the remaining list.

Q: The Clinton visit, how did that work out from your perspective?

COLE: Oh, it worked out wonderfully. But in the end it was a waste. Clinton displayed a great deal of courage, he gave a great speech directly to the Pakistani people explaining, thought not in so many words, that the Cold War was over and that we no longer had to put up with their political nonsense; their military dictatorships, their brutality to one another, their inter-communal violence. That continued good relations would require changes in behavior. The Pakistanis really got it; they understood what he was saying. But, unfortunately the war on terrorism changed all that and now we’re back to needing them and have to put up with their political practices.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there? What part did he play in public diplomacy?
COLE: That was Ambassador Milam. I felt the front office saw us as wayward children in need of discipline. There was not much understanding of what public diplomacy was and what it could do for us. There was one occasion we wanted to give an IV grant to a member of a Muslim, but not a fundamentalist group, but as far as the DCM was concerned this was pandering. But I argued that we didn’t have a choice. People like this are representative of Pakistan and if we don’t nominate some of them it will look bad. That was the argument I used that worked. But it required steady ongoing pounding.

Q: Well, did you find Pakistani society was difficult to work with?

COLE: Yes, it was. First of all, you’re posted in Islamabad, which is a sort of Brasilia-like invented city. It’s a beautiful city, but it is not in South Asia. It isn’t until you go 20 minutes away to Pindi that you actually enter South Asia. In Islamabad you’re talking to an extremely small group of extremely westernized people. In Karachi and Lahore, to the extent that we still have them there, our people are talking to people with real power and real authority. In Islamabad we were just talking to an extremely small set of political opportunists and military officers. They viewed using guile as necessary for a small country to survive. I don’t think I’ve ever been lied to so much. Indians didn’t tell you lies; they were proud of what they’d achieved and they would step up to it. Pakistanis were in a different situation and so they would stick to their guns and tell you that, no, no, no, no, this was an indigenous uprising in Kashmir.

Q: Well, was there anything cultural that you could do in the short time you were there?

COLE: Yes. One program in particular involved an American dance group led by a Korean-American named Dana Tai Soon. His group had a Kennedy Center grant to do a dance based on Alexander the Great. He applied to us for a grant that would take him to the site of Alexander’s campaigns. We were able to fund the trip with support from Air Pakistan, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Religion.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling that, particularly in Pakistan, this very strong fundamentalist force within Islamic society made it almost impenetrable?

COLE: No, nothing is impenetrable, nothing. You can always get a book translation program going and send people a book in Urdu. Everybody likes a book. And everybody especially likes a book when it’s followed up by a visit from a young lady of quality. In your community you don’t see women other than your wife, but you’d certainly like to get a glimpse of that American girl, you know, and you really like your book, and you may come to the presentation in your party headquarters, or mosques. There’s always a pathway; we just have to spend the time and the energy to find it. And we also have to respect the whole concept of keeping the channels of communication open. We’re not necessarily promoting a specific program; we’re not targeting what we’re doing that specifically. We’re just finding out who is friendly in this essentially hostile environment. We’re finding out who can be seen in public with us. We’re letting somebody over there with a child who wants to go to school in the U.S. know who it is they can call We’re building bridges that other people may walk across at a later point. That was something that would seem particularly difficult to get across in Pakistan. Of course, people were scared to death and for good reason. It was a very dangerous environment. And there was also an
argument that had some validity that public opinion did not matter in Pakistan. And I argued it depends on how you define public. We need to find lots of ways to be seen in public with the Pakistani military that won’t embarrass us or that won’t imply that we approve of what they’re doing but will keep them friendly, keep them open, let them know who we are, whom they can talk to and who does what over here. But since it wasn’t political or economic reporting it didn’t seem as worthwhile.

Q: Why were you evacuated?

COLE: I was evacuated because I had became very ill, increasingly so. I returned only briefly to pack out and collect my mother, my cat, and my effects and bring them back to the U.S.

KENTON W. KEITH  
Coalition Information Center  
Islamabad (2001)

Ambassador Keith was born and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. After graduating from the University of Kansas he served with the US Navy before entering the Foreign Service in 1965. An Arabic speaking Officer, Ambassador Keith served as Public Affairs Officer and/or Cultural Affairs in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria, France and Brazil before his appointment as US Ambassador to Qatar. His Washington service included several tours in senior positions with USIA. Ambassador Keith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Today is March 15, 2002. Since we last spoke you returned to service following the events of September 11. Can we go over this period?

KEITH: In late October 2001 I was asked if I would return to active duty service on a limited appointment to go to Islamabad, Pakistan, establish an information center for the coalition, and serve as media spokesman for the coalition. For several weeks, conversations had taken place between the White House, the Department of State, Pentagon, the British prime minister’s office and the government of Pakistan about the establishment of the center. Major issues of staffing and location had already been addressed, and much was in place in Islamabad when I arrived in November.

On a daily basis the press contingent in our briefing center was composed of the world’s television networks and correspondents of its major newspapers. But of special relevance to the Center was the Islamic press. Usually, more than half of the audience was composed of journalists from the Muslim world, including Pakistanis, Arabs and East Asians. My staff and I engaged actively with the Muslim media. We made a special effort to work with the Arab press. I made myself available for background and on-the-record briefings and a number of on camera interviews.
My job was two-fold: First, to counter the misinformation that bedeviled our efforts in Afghanistan, basically involving developments on the military front, but also on the impact the war was having on innocent civilians. Second, to counter the belief in much of the Muslim world that the Coalition was engaged, not in a war against terrorism, but a war against Islam. The basic hostility of the Islamic media was a reflection of public perceptions throughout Islam. Reaction to our bombing was extremely negative. The Coalition was believed to be acting without authority, without proof of a case against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and especially without the proper regard for innocent life.

Q: How long did you stay in Pakistan?

KEITH: It was an expensive operation to run, with a staff drawn from various countries who had to be supported. We decided to close down the operation when Kandahar fell to Coalition forces and the so-called Northern Alliance, marking the end of major combat operations. There was still fighting going on in remote areas, but the Taliban was a spent force in terms of being able to take and hold territory.

Q: What do you think your center accomplished?

KEITH: Well, certainly we took the media field away from exclusive exploitation by the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad. We were able to refute his outlandish claims as soon as he made them, rather than waiting for many hours while London and Washington reacted. But did we change the anti-Western attitudes in the Islamic world? No, I think not. And of course Bin Laden is still at large.

But we did leave on a rather optimistic note. The Coalition can be proud of the fact that the widespread starvation predicted for the winter of 2001-2002 in northern Afghanistan by international organizations was prevented by a truly massive effort, at the heart of which was the U.S. Also, there is some room for optimism for the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai seems to have the respect of most of the political factions in Afghanistan, and has gotten off to a reasonably good start as interim leader. The Bonn pledging conference has established the will of the developed world to come to Afghanistan’s aid with billions of dollars. I would say that the elements are in place for a positive, if challenging, future for the country. But the U.S. and our coalition partners will probably need to assist Afghanistan in many ways for years to come.

End of reader