# SWITZERLAND

## COUNTRY READER

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Constance Ray Harvey was born in New York in 1904. She received a bachelor’s degree from Smith College and a master’s degree from Columbia University. Ms. Harvey entered the Foreign Service in 1930. Her career was comprised of mostly consular work in Milan, Basel, Bern, and Lyon. Ms. Harvey received the Medal of Freedom in 1947. She was interviewed by Dr. Milton Colvin in 1988.

Q: Very interesting. Constance, I know that your next post after Italy was Switzerland. By now, the war clouds were gathering, the crises were coming, the lines were being drawn, and people began to see the possibility of another world war. Can you react to that in some way from your observations from Switzerland at that time?

HARVEY: You see, I was in Basel, right on the frontier. One thing that one has to grasp early was that the German Swiss were the most anti-Hitler people in Switzerland, more than the French or anybody else. They were next to it, and they knew what was going on probably quite well. They were, of course, afraid.

The summer of ’39, I spent a few weeks on leave in England. When I went back at the end of the summer, it was perfectly obvious to me that the English would fight. Of course, we know now, or we knew fairly soon, that Hitler had been informed by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, whom he had sent on a brief visit to London, that England would not fight. That was the Clivedon set, you know, those people would not fight, and were against it.

Q: King and country!

HARVEY: But I knew that this was absolute nonsense. I had never lived in England, but I had visited there many times, and I knew that it might be folly on the part of England, but they certainly were going to fight if Germany attacked. Of course, they were the first to reply to the attack on Poland.

When I got back to Basel, of course, a little before that, war did break out. It was the phony war to begin with, but everybody I knew in Basel had either a machine gun on top of his house or nearby, or he was instructed and had the gadget in his hand to blow up some of the bridges going across the Rhine. This was true all through northern Switzerland.

After the war, when I lived also in Zurich, I learned that people who had been in charge everywhere in the north, had had instructions that the moment German soldiers entered Switzerland, they were to seize certain German civilians who were the heads of a couple of manufacturing companies, and shoot them immediately. There would be no trial, nothing at all.
In any case, one of the jobs we had first in Basel was to get the pictures in the art gallery, wonderful Holbeins, wrapped up in blankets and rushed up to the center of the Bernese Overland somewhere. I can remember getting those out. There was sort of a gun emplacement place and blockades in front of the consulate, in case there should be immediate entry into Switzerland. Of course, that all passed, because the war just sort of calmed down, and nothing very dramatic happened.

I was transferred from Basel to Bern just after Thanksgiving of ’39.

KINGSLEY W. HAMILTON
Consular Officer
Zurich (1938-1940)

Kingsley W. Hamilton was born in 1911 to Presbyterian missionaries in the Philippines. He attended high school in China, the Philippines and Ohio. He graduated from the College of Wooster in 1933. One of his favorite history professors topics on world history influenced his interest in international affairs. This led him to graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and his taking the Foreign Service Exam. He has also served in Hungary and Switzerland. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 9, 1994.

Q: You went out to Zurich again in 1938, and you were there until 1940. What were you doing in Zurich?

HAMILTON: Most of the time visa work, passport too. Visas and passports were most of my official work, but I did a lot of economic reporting on the side, including spare time. It interested me. This was the time the Jews were leaving Germany so the demand for visas was heavy.

Q: Here you were, a young Foreign Service officer, in a country which was becoming...’38, things were really picking up. Munich had happened by this time, had Czechoslovakia been occupied? Austria had been occupied.

HAMILTON: Austria yes, in March 1938; Munich occurred in September 1938, as I landed in France headed for Zurich; and Czechoslovakia was occupied in March 1939.

Q: What was our policy, and how did you treat the applicants for Jewish visas? I mean for American visas, not just Jewish, but people coming in, people trying to get the hell out of the way of danger.

HAMILTON: Well at that time, of course, one of the first things a prospective immigrant had to have was means of support over here. Without some relative to provide an affidavit of support or somebody who would put up some other form of affidavit, he was generally out of luck, unless he was a professional coming to a specific job or, I think, a domestic with an affidavit from his
prospective employer. So it was primarily a matter of trying to determine the adequacy of means of support. Health and police certificates were also required.

Q: Did you feel...after the fact, and after the World War and the whole enormity of the holocaust became known, there was considerable criticism of the Department of State Foreign Service attitude on this. Looking at it, and trying to go back to the time, did you feel the pressures--one, to obey the law; but two, here's the problem and were you getting threats from groups in the United States? For example, Jewish groups saying we'll support these people when they come in.

HAMILTON: I don't recall myself ever seeing any group offering to help Jewish visa applicants. As far as concerns the work there in Zurich that I was involved in, I never encountered any threats either, but I did sometimes feel squeezed between the law and the need.

Q: What about the Swiss authorities? People coming in applying for visas were mostly non-Swiss I assume. Were they under pressure that if you didn't give them visas they'd be sent back? What was the Swiss attitude?

HAMILTON: I don't recall anybody who indicated that. Some of them did go on. For whatever reasons they left the country and finished up their applications somewhere else, maybe in Spain, Latin America, or elsewhere. Every now and then we'd get a transfer of an application from some other office like Stuttgart or Bucharest where it had been started. Many country quotas were so small in relation to demand that the day of the first application was significant. Few Swiss applied for immigration visas. The Swiss Government seemed fairly liberal about admitting applicants to Switzerland but I never learned the particulars of their rules or policy.

Q: I'm sure it was because it was a matter of priorities. You arrived there in '38, then there was the absorption after Munich of Czechoslovakia and Austria had already gone. In the first place, who was our Minister in our Legation?

HAMILTON: I'll try to remember...

Q: His name was Leland Harrison. But you say he never came out of Bern, or at least didn't come to...

HAMILTON: He didn't come to Zurich while I was there, as far as I can recall.

Q: That's very interesting because I notice he was there until 1947. He was there about ten years.

HAMILTON: That's right, he was there quite a while. Now that I have the name it's familiar. I may have forgotten, probably because I never met him, never had anything to do with him.

Q: The old Foreign Service wasn't that big a group. He was a career officer but obviously he didn't mix and mingle. As developments there you were there at the beginning of World War II, September of '39 although it was up in Poland but France was at war. Were the Swiss making defensive movements or not?
HAMILTON: Well, not what I'd call movements, but they started to put up tank barricades along
the frontier and on bridges over the Rhine in Basel. They increased military training and called
some to active duty.

Q: Did the onset of the war...albeit you were in a neutral country, what impact did that have on
Zurich's operations?

HAMILTON: Well, it didn't affect the work of the Consulate General particularly while I was
still there. In our daily life what was most affected was the gasoline supply. It was severely
rationed. For consular purposes there was a place where you could get a reasonable supply, but
they didn't want you driving all over the place just because you could get some gas. Road traffic
dropped way down.

Q: When did you leave Zurich?

HAMILTON: The end of January or beginning of February of '40.

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CONSTANCE RAY HARVEY
Consul
Bern (1939-1941)

Constance Ray Harvey was born in New York in 1904. She received a bachelor's
degree from Smith College and a master's degree from Columbia University. Ms.
Harvey entered the Foreign Service in 1930. Her career was comprised of mostly
consular work in Milan, Basel, Bern, and Lyon. Ms. Harvey received the Medal of
Freedom in 1947. She was interviewed by Dr. Milton Colvin in 1988.

Q: I'm sorry--Bern.

HARVEY: Bern. Well, I went up to Bern later. I went up there about a year later. They wanted
to get me and my mother away from the frontier, I think. Oh, I loved Basel; Basel is a fascinating
city! I want to say at this time, and even for the record: To be a consul general, which my consul
was--he wasn't a consul, he was consul general in Basel--was no great shakes; to be an American
Consul General in a European city. It didn't get you into the high society or anything like that.
The other people who would be there just sort of bumped along as best they could with what
friends they could make.

But Spiker {Consul General Clarence Spiker} had come from China; he'd spent his whole life
out in China, and he went back to China from Basel. In any case, they wanted him to have a few
years in Europe, just to get another reference--different kind of air. He went with one letter of
introduction from an English friend of his in China to somebody in Basel, who I think was not
English but a Basler.
He was immediately surrounded by all the finest people—the great elite of Basel—and I went right in on his coattails. We literally, over and over again, went to dinners with white tie; that was old Basel. Oh, it's a very funny city, but it's also a very attractive city. It has a lot of things going for it. A wonderful museum; the greatest Holbeins in the world are there—magnificent. We wrapped them all up in blankets and got them on a truck to get them up to the frontier when the war broke out. I was there when the war broke out.

Everybody I knew had either a machine gun on top of his house or he had everything ready to faire sauter les ponts, blow up the bridges. All that sort of thing was ready. German Switzerland was ready for the Germans, I can tell you that, far more than French Switzerland. They were right next to it and they were going to have none of it. Everybody I knew in Basel was just absolutely in a state of excitement. We never knew it was the "phony war" for quite a while and nothing very much happened, until later.

Most of the pictures were taken away and stored somewhere in Bern or somewhere else, probably in the mountains. I loved Basel; it was very interesting. I helped to broadcast—of course we didn't have television yet—the Basel Mardi Gras. It's called Fasching, in Basel. In Germany and in Zurich it's called Fast-nacht. That is really a great thing. I can tell you that Nice and New Orleans are nothing compared to Basel. They may be bigger, but it is really an event. For three days a very strict, puritanical city goes quite wild and does what it wants.

Q: Blows off steam once a year.

HARVEY: Blows off steam completely. It begins, in true Swiss fashion, by everybody going to bed early and getting up at 5 o'clock in the morning. They've had the dispensation from the Vatican for hundreds of years to have an extra day of this. In other words, Ash Wednesday isn't Ash Wednesday, it's a three day blow out and they certainly do. At 5 o'clock in the morning the parade comes down the Freistrasse, the little free street, down the hill into the big market square with all of these great illuminated signs. Everything that everybody has done amiss, or a little bit strange or funny or something, in Basel is depicted on these signs.

Q: Oh dear!

HARVEY: Oh, yes. People watch these pictures in the square. All the women are going around with their masks on. Nobody knows who they are and they pick up a lot of strange men. Everything goes in every direction. It's really quite thrilling. It goes on for three days.

Q: And did you join in, in costume?

HARVEY: No, I didn't do that, but I helped to broadcast the descent of the procession. I remember trying to get some words across to describe it.

Q: What radio station was this for?

HARVEY: I don't remember; it was something that was being broadcast in English, somewhere to the States, I guess. In any case, it was sort of fun. It's a very amusing town, and, of course, a
great university. Most people haven't really gone there or stayed there or lived there. It's really very fascinating.

Q: How does it compare to Bern? You went to Bern.

HARVEY: Yes, I was stationed in Bern. I'd been in Bern before. Well, I much prefer Basel; I like Basel more. Bern is a very attractive, nice city. My mother died in Bern. She died on the 10th of May, just a few days after Holland had been occupied. I never told her that Holland was being occupied.

Q: Oh, my word!

HARVEY: She was to be cremated, and it takes three days in the Canton of Bern for a permit for cremation to be issued because they want to be sure. She'd had this dreadful illness, but she had a rather easy death in a wonderful hospital just across the street from where we lived run by protestant nuns. A magnificent hospital; beautiful, loving care.

A very good friend, who was the military attaché--he and his wife were like my brother and sister to me--Barney said, "You can't wait three days. You've got to get a special permit to have it done immediately. We may be invaded from one hour to the next." The German Army was all lined up in the Black Forest, even with ambulances, to come right down the Schaffhausen Valley, through the Belfort Gap and behind the Maginot Line. They expected it to happen. So she was cremated immediately, and I had just a few people who came in. Most of the people had sent their wives and children away from the city, way down to the south of Switzerland, and already they had been gone. Then the line broke in the west, in the Ardennes, beyond where there wasn't any Maginot Line. But there wasn't any Maginot Line anymore.

The Germans knew the Swiss were going to be a tough nut to crack; it wasn't going to be so easy. But the whole thing just went the other way, just about a week later.

Q: I see; it was the Ardennes offensive that pulled them away from Switzerland.

HARVEY: Everything was in position to come. Our military attaché knew all about it.

Q: That must have been a frightening thing. I suppose you burned papers?

HARVEY: Well, we started burning before that. I went to Bern a little bit before my mother because I had to get an apartment there. I was there before Christmas, I think. It was just at the end of the year, the beginning of December I went up to Bern from Basel. My mother came soon afterwards. I had a place to live, you see, which I found fairly quickly.

I liked Bern. I was very fond of it, and I was certainly very fond of my colleagues in Bern. I had an interesting job in Bern. I was third secretary. They didn't have people working just on newspapers and things like that the way they do now; there wasn't any information service, so to speak. I did all the review of German newspapers and I also talked with some Germans who came there from Germany, and did other things that were all interesting things to do.
I was just thankful my mother was gone at that time, because of this awful business of this invasion. Of course, we didn't recover from that. Then France fell. I occupied an office with Warren Chase, another Foreign Officer who was married to a French woman. They had, I think, four or five children. He had left them in Paris, and he had no idea for over a month what had become of them. We kept saying, "You must try to get through to the embassy in Paris. You must try."

He said, "There's absolutely no use; they won't have any information. There's no use my bothering them. I've just got to wait." He would pace up and down in his office. His family had gotten out and gotten to Arcachon in southern France and were safe. But he didn't know that for quite a while.

All of this had been going on and I thought, "My god, I'm so glad my mother's gone and safe." I didn't miss her till the war was over, and then I was sorry she wasn't there.

Q: You didn't have time to miss her.

HARVEY: No, at that time I just felt awful. All these people were on the roads in France.

Q: Yes, with what goods they could take with them, and the roads were just clogged.

HARVEY: I knew a lot of people who went through that. And Switzerland had another close shave, but I was already interned by that time. Apparently in '43 they were also afraid that the Germans might go through to Italy. They were very alarmed by that. I remember when I was already stationed in France, that I used to go back because I still had my apartment with my things in it in Bern, although it was rented out. I would go back to Bern rather often, from France. And I remember saying, to a Swiss officer I was traveling with on the train up from Geneva to Bern that I knew about the reduits in the mountains, where they had all of this ammunition. In the case of invasion, by anybody, (but of course they were expecting the Germans) they were going to abandon the cities and just throw all their strength--army and everything--they would retire to the mountains and fight from there.

I remember--and this is very Swiss--saying to this officer, "Are you leaving your wives and children behind?"

"Oh, yes," he said, "of course. No doubt about that." That's why they were not an easy nut to crack. Now today, modern warfare is totally different; no connection. And you know, every mountain tunnel has been for years--everything in there to blow it up is right there.

Q: Still there?

HARVEY: Oh yes, sure. No doubt about that. Probably more so, and they've got airplanes inside these reduits now, and all kinds of things. There isn't any kind of safety in that. Not any more.

Q: Not any more, no. But they were willing to blow up everything rather than be taken?
HARVEY: Yes, and leaving your wife and children...he said, "Oh yes, of course." I was telling you about the elegant dinners in Basel, when we were all dressed up, and the Consul General had all these friends of the élite. After the war, that was very different. Instead of being looked upon as just sort of an ordinary, common, American official--but not in high society--people just practically fawned in front of us. They could have sent monkeys to be Consul General and they would have done the same thing. The power that we had suddenly acquired just went to the heads of them, and of us.

Q: Is that so? You could see it that clearly?

HARVEY: Well, of course, it's more clear . . .

Q: Having been there before, yes.

HARVEY: It's more clear as the years recede, but I realized that it was different after the war. Oh, yes, goodness, an American official--that was something very special.

Q: And this really was a sea-change, right after the war, wasn't it? Because the power went from England to us.

HARVEY: Well, it went to us, you see, for everything. There wasn't any doubt about it at all.

Q: Was there any Russian presence to speak of in Switzerland before the war, or at the time you were there?

HARVEY: Well, now let me think. I can't remember any. The only place I remember a Russian embassy was in Athens. In Switzerland I don't think so. You see, the Swiss had no ambassadors; they didn't send ambassadors anywhere--it was too expensive. The country couldn't throw their money away that way! They only had ministers.

And no country had any ambassador in Switzerland, except the French. They kept an ambassador there, and one of them I knew very, very well indeed, later on. He was an old friend, Henri Hoppenot. That was so they would always--except for the Papal Nuncio--be the head of the corps.

Q: Went back to the Congress of Vienna, I understand--these rules and regulations?

HARVEY: Yes, I'm sure it did.

Q: You had an active social life, did you? Did you have to entertain a great deal? Or did your circumstances change?

HARVEY: No, I didn't. Certainly I didn't in Italy; very little, really. There wasn't much time in Basel when it comes right down to it. I mean, we made friends; my mother made quite a number of friends in Basel, and also in Bern, but particularly in Basel. In spite of all the things that
happened to her, she could be as funny as all get out! Just very, very amusing. So she always had many friends. Then we weren't very long up in Bern. I did a little entertaining in Bern, but not very much. It was not something that I needed to do; you see, we didn't have any--at that stage of the Service, and at that point of my being in it--we didn't have any entertainment allowance yet. That had not yet been invented or probably only for the very top-notchers.

Then I left Bern on New Year's Day of '41--I was transferred to Lyon. The real reason was I had asked the Department for a transfer. I said I felt a little lonely without my mother and didn't seem to have that much to do, and I would be glad to be sent to London or anywhere where the action was.

They said, "No, we're not sending anybody to London. The only thing people are doing in London is issuing visas to get out of the country." One of my old chiefs, in fact my last chief from Milan, was then in Lyon and asked for me. So I very glad to go down and be with Walter Sholes in Lyon again. One of the non-career vice-consuls, he was then--also from Milan--came to Lyon, too. So that was sort of like old times for a while.

Q: It must have been. Now this was when? New Year's Day?

HARVEY: Of 1941. You see, we were not yet at war, and we were neutral. Then I began my nefarious life.

Q: Ah-ha!

HARVEY: Not right away, but pretty soon. I think I mentioned the fact that our military attaché, Barney Legge--General Legge--and his wife, Phyllis, were very, very close friends of mine, in Bern. Soon after I got down to Lyon, Barney Legge asked me if I would help him about some things that he needed help about. So I said, "You bet I will. No problem." And so I did. I got into a whole lot of business for our military attaché in Bern which did not go through the embassy at Vichy.

Q: I see, you did this on your own?

HARVEY: And on his own, straight across to the War Department, and it went on until I left to be interned. And after the war I was given the Medal of Freedom by General Legge. Quite a few people were who had been up to some monkey business--just to help out. The citation had to be changed in the War Department, because at first it had been written that I'd been of great assistance, etc., etc., since my arrival in January of '41 in France. They changed it to December '41.

MORTON A. BACH
Treasury Attaché
Bern (1944-1949)
Morton Bach was born in New York City in 1904. He worked with the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps from 1942, and afterwards was posted in Bern, Seoul, The Hague, Vienna, Luxembourg and Brussels. Mr. Bach was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: We move ahead to 1944. You were assigned to Bern as what, treasury attache?

BACH: No, I went out as a Foreign Service officer. They wanted to give it a Foreign Service complement. At that time (and I will get up on my little soapbox that I conduct lectures down at DACOR to this day), the legation was a relatively small operation. We had a minister, a DCM, two political officers, two economic officers, a general services officer, and an administrative officer. I arrived. This, I think, is rather interesting only because of the way it developed. The legation was in a series of private homes. The chancery was on one street and then about a block and a half away, there were three private homes in which different elements of the legation functioned. Then around the corner, there was still another one. I give you that as background for later. My office was on the second floor. All around the baseboard of the office was a series of shoe boxes in which there were all sorts of papers. After the regular legation functions, I could pick up a couple of these boxes and found out that they were copies of cables that had been sent in by the branch offices of a firm in Geneva which was in the forwarding surveying business of maritime traffic. For example, a ship landing in a seaport in the Adriatic with (I'm coming back to your bauxite.) was of interest to Washington. But what had happened to all this stuff? I went on and on and on on this. It was just endless. Some of it might have been outdated, but nevertheless, it was something that I thought was worthy of exploration. Here we were, still at war and the movement of commodities... My later boss, Walt Butterworth, was doing preclusive buying down in Spain. I went into the minister and said, "I've found these things." He said, "Oh, yes, I am familiar with it. The British also received copies of the same thing from this same firm," which was a family enterprise. They were of Eastern European Jewish background. I said to the minister, "I'd like, with your permission, to call them up and introduce myself and see if we can work out something that would be even more productive than what they are doing." So, he said, "Sure."

So, I went down to Geneva. But first I went into our American consulate down there. I was greeted by the consul. I am glad to see someone from the head office. He said, "Don't you people visit Bern and don't the people in Bern come down." No. Well, I put that in the back part of my head. I called on this firm. It developed into a very fruitful relationship. The type of information they gave us was more current and was even more useful than the background stuff, but it was a question of trying to put so much of the background stuff into despatches back to Washington for the intelligence people to pick apart.

Well, I went back to Bern. Then I thought it would be nice to call on the consul general up in Zurich. That was another one where it was sort of Hatfield and McCoy on various things, including what was public knowledge, that the two Busch sisters of Anheuser Busch, the beer family, were living in a hotel in Zurich and they still maintained their connections with family within Germany. Periodically, they would drive to the border, would be met on the German side and taken to their schloss up in Germany, which was contrary to the regulations at that time for American citizens to travel in enemy territory. But it was countenanced by the consul general.
himself. A little aside: he later married one of the sisters. The other sister offered her schloss to the Foreign Service. They turned it down. I also went to Bale (Basel). That was the beginning of a very fruitful exchange and also a good friend who was consul at that time, John Lehers. In all of this, I received a great break when the Curry mission (a major economist) from Washington came out. He was accompanied by one of my former bosses, acting director of Foreign Fund Control, Orville Schmidt. They lowered the boom on the Swiss during these negotiations, saying, "Taper off this large-scale shipment of munitions" that were being produced in the outskirts of Zurich at the Werkschaft Machinen Fabrik Oerlikon Bührle. Mr. Bührle is a former German who came down in the early stages of hostilities in Europe during a period when Hitler had decreed that no German could divest himself of German nationality. With his financial background and other influences, he became a Swiss. He had a big factory in Solothurn which was producing the 20 mm anti-aircraft guns which were shooting down our aviators and other factories producing fuses, etc. The war was still on. In Bern, you could hear the teacups rattling from the artillery fire in the Belfort gap. The Swiss were in reasonably good shape economically. The restaurants had plenty of food. We, the legation officers, were limited in our moving around Switzerland at that time by Swiss decree. They had no objections to our going to our consulates, but to call on firms with a possible investigative objective was objectionable to the Swiss. On Saturday nights, we would all congregate at the bar of the Bellevue Palace. At that time, Allen Dulles had his huge OSS operation. I knew so many of the people and they sort of assumed that I was part of it, which I was not. On weekends, no automobile traffic was authorized because of gasoline rationing. We also were under rationing coupons for food and household commodities (i.e., two chocolate bars per month, two eggs per week, etc.).

Before I divert from that, I have to come back to the Curry mission. As they wound up their business, Orville, with whom I had worked very closely in Washington, drew aside Eberhardt Rheinhardt, who was deputy finance minister (Swiss) and he said, "Eberhardt, isn't it wonderful how we Americans immediately adopt first names? (This was the first time they had met.) If you have any special problems, contact Mort (Bach)," which was a great honor for me. This all falls into place very neatly.

On weekends, the OSS people were the only ones who could drive, so groups of us, three or four in a car, would drive down to Geneva. By contrast, in the French part, rationing was a second issue. One could get a steak with a fried egg on it and up north the people were rationed two eggs a month. I give you that as background. One weekend, we went down to Dulles’ big old Swiss house on the border in the Ticino on the Italian border. This is where he would negotiate the Italian surrender. But this weekend (I only went down once with the group.) coincided with one of the OSS people who was the son of our then American ambassador to London-

Q: Wynett, who was governor of New Hampshire, I think.

BACH: I'm not sure.

Q: I think so.

BACH: He carried the Ciano diaries across the border. Of course, they were published and all the rest.
This leads me up to the end of World War II. Then, it was a transition. I have to fill in. Not too long after I arrived in Bern, Washington set up what was called the Safe Haven Program, which was to focus on the assets and the proclaimed blacklist at that late stage and offer general assistance to the legation. This is an incident in which I participated. I won't say it was a top officer, but one of the legal officers by the name of James Mann... Jim was assigned to the Treasury office in London. As this Safe Haven Program evolved, they decided to move Jim over to Bern. There was no Treasury office as such at that stage, although there was the remnant of what had been a custom Treasury officer who periodically had a desk in Bern and that was it. He would contact the banks as I would contact the banks. Jim Mann had a press interview in London. What he was going to do to the Swiss was cut them off at the knees and bring them back into what was appropriate. You know how that went down - first with the Swiss public; then with the legation. Here I was an alumnus of the Treasury Department. Well, I think I had met Jim while I was in Washington, but not really for any great extent did we see each other. My early activities were "The impact of your speech has already been felt. Now you are a part of the American legation try to adopt a more subdued action and then do your thing within the parameters of diplomatic niceties." It took some doing and I did not endear myself to my legation colleagues. I went out of my way to be close to Jim, to further this modification, if any. Then there was this influx of officers of the Safe Haven Program. Naturally, as a finance/economic officer, I was assigned to it along with all of these other people. There were some very interesting periods.

First off, World War II ended and the army set up as a great assist to the Swiss economy: the 10-day $55 GI tour. For $55, the GIs had the choice. You could go down to the Italian part, go to the German part, to the French part, to climb the Matterhorn, etc. Here I was, on the financial side of the legation. The Swiss had only allocated spending money of $50. These kids with money in their pockets... They had no place to spend what they got. All they wanted to do was buy watches to send home or to use themselves, or cuckoo clocks. I witnessed on the Jungfrau, which was one of the great tour attractions where you went from beautiful foliage and ended up in the snow, a GI bartering his jacket for Swiss francs. I came back and said to the minister, "Look, I've got to go down to the Finance Ministry. This doesn't make sense. These kids deserve more." I succeeded in getting them more spending money.

Q: What was our attitude before the end of the war about the Swiss system? Normally, a mission, a legation, an embassy doesn't like to upset the host government, so they don't get very tough. In the first place, you have Curry coming out and talking tough about "Stop sending these anti-aircraft guns and things over to Germany."

BACH: As background, Bührle was blacklisted right from the beginning. The Swiss said, "We can't do anything to a Swiss." Let's face it, Switzerland was surrounded by enemy territory. We recognized that they had to barter. They needed coal and lumber and certain metals. The Germans needed their financing and armaments. They were producing fuses and all sorts of strategic material, including those 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. So, the Swiss knew our attitude toward that and they appreciated it. But they figured that, other than putting them on the blacklist, we weren't going to go in and destroy his factory or anything unswiss like that. We did recognize, to come back to your basic question, that the German part of Switzerland was not that enthusiastic about the allies. They were German-oriented. With the Italians, you could play...
With Geneva, they were more amenable because they were oriented toward their French connection.

Q: It was wartime when you arrived out there. Was there much talk or concern about Jewish assets at the time?

BACH: No, definitely not. They were in the banking business. Anybody that gives them money, great. They will take care of it. Their attitude was, it's wide open; you can buy or sell gold over the counter at the bank; anything of that nature; insurance policies and the like.

Q: Were we at all concerned about the numbered Swiss accounts as far as American war profiteers? As things started moving, you had GIs who were selling gasoline. There were fairly big black marketeers.

BACH: There were and we were concerned about it. I will lead up to one of the incidents. One day, an American called at the legation. They announced that he was downstairs. I asked him to come up. He said, "I am an American. I am very familiar with the regulations about sales and purchase of gold, but I would like to ask for legation assistance in selling some gold." So, I satisfied myself with his credentials. He was with one of the organizations working out of the concentration camps in Austria. He said, "I have some gold." I said, "Well, please tell me the nature of it and where it's located." He said, "It's located in two jerry cans in the back of my automobile parked in front of the legation. In it are dental fillings, wedding rings, and the like." I said, "Where did these come from?" He mentioned the concentration camps. So, I called the minister and said, "This is something we haven't heard too much about. I think we ought to help these people. They are helping the victims out there in the camps." He said, "What do you have in mind?" I said, "I want to call the president of the Swiss national bank, explain to him what I have, and bring this man and his jerry cans down if you think we might do something constructive." The answer came back affirmative. They bought the gold with a caveat that the proceeds would be sent back to New York to the head office of the organization. It turned out this man was later Assistant Secretary of State for Refugee Matters. This was one of the earliest direct evidence of what was happening there.

Q: How did he get ahold of the gold?

BACH: Apparently, these organizations had free reign. The war was over. This all took place in late 1945 or 1946. It had to be before 1946 because then the U.S. government decided we had to negotiate with the Swiss. From Legation Bern, our consulate, Dan Reagan, Jim Mann, and yours truly, were part of the U.S. delegation negotiating with the Swiss in 1946 in Washington.

Q: What were you negotiating?

BACH: We were negotiating the disposition of the gold, the German assets in Switzerland that had been identified. There was an acceptance, but not part of the agreement of the unclaimed assets. We left Bern expecting to be in Washington in about two weeks. It took two months. We reached an agreement with the Swiss. They would liquidate the identified German assets, enterprises, in Switzerland, would part with gold that had been identified as German. For the
unclaimed assets, we would work it out, and Legation Bern would interface with the Swiss competent branches of government to carry out the terms of the 1946 agreement. Webster might have preceded it, but stonewalling originated with the Swiss. They did not carry out what they had undertaken to do in the liquidation of the designated assets. Right after VE Day, President Truman sent Ed Pauley, the oil man from California, out to the Far East to look at what the condition of Korea was. Then he came to Bern en route to the first Moscow Conference. Somehow, all of these people (Maybe it was because I had been in Washington during my Foreign Funds Control days.) either knew me by name or somebody said, "Look up Mort Bach when you get there." When Washington invaded Germany, they had to come via Switzerland to get transportation. They always came to my office and Ed Pauley ended up in my office. He said, "I am going to Moscow and I want 25 Mickey Mouse watches." You know, the ones with the moon and the stars and all the fancy combinations on the dial. Lo and behold, it coincided with the annual summer vacation of the watch industry in Switzerland. So, yours truly became... You asked what type of officer I was. I was the watch attache! I called up Zurich, Geneva, and Bern and found two here, one there. Finally, I got to a place where I had to call the president of two watch companies up in the mountains and they very cooperatively reopened their factories. Ed Pauley went to Moscow with his 25 watches.

Q: This is going back, but I want to catch it before I forget. How in 1944 could you go from Washington to Switzerland? You were surrounded by enemy territory.

BACH: No, the army had opened up via the Belfort Gap and trains were running across from Paris diverted away from bombed out bridges and so forth. It was an overnight trip. You got on at night and it was around noon when we finally arrived at the Swiss border. Then the train stopped, we all debarked, and walked across the Swiss border into Switzerland.

Q: Were we beginning to look a little more closely at what the Swiss had done during the war?

BACH: Definitely. During my time, in the early days, we had the big document center in Berlin. I had a colleague up there. I could get him eventually by telephone and check out names and would come back with things. I was in Berlin several times and also in Frankfurt. Treasury sent out a big team of my former colleagues who were headquartered in the Frankfurt area. The army was very cooperative, that branch, and they discovered all sorts of outstanding documents proving the "astute" fashion that the German bankers had utilized to camouflage the true owners of different corporations. Separate and apart from all of the Justice Department people going to I.G. Fahrben and the chemical companies, they went after the industrial companies. In one instance, the Treasury group found on the floor of a bombed out bank among the rubble documents relating to... "The covering document, this document by unanimous agreement divests all of our interests past and future to document B that is attached thereto." On a footnote to B, it says, "Pay no attention to number one. Our interest is maintained to perpetuity."

Q: When the war was over, did your job change?

BACH: Yes, it was negotiating with the Swiss constantly over many meetings. I became friends with very many of the Swiss who were part of the Swiss delegation, who I had known casually while the war was on, and then subsequently... I have to jump here. After Switzerland, I was
assigned to Seoul, Korea, where after the evacuation I picked up a tuberculosis bug and was grounded for a while. All of my old Swiss colleagues were in the legation in Washington. We were friendly. To this day, if I were to go to Switzerland, I would see some of them.

Q: When you were negotiating with the Swiss, were they as difficult as one might imagine?

BACH: It has been picked up by BBC and all these other authors of British origin. My comment was, "I'd have a meeting with Eberhardt Rheinhardt. Mort, I'll look into this for you." Nothing materialized. It was done nicely, but it wasn't fruitful for some of the tricky issues that we were trying to pin down that they had agreed to as part of the 1946 agreement.

Q: What were some of the tricky issues?

BACH: They were going to reveal information. First it arose in connection with stolen art. There was a top-notch team of experts that came over (representatives of the National Gallery, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the British Royal Museum) and were going around. They didn't make it easy for us. There was a firm in Lausanne, the Fischer Galleries. We knew that during the war all of Hitler's staff would come down and buy over the counter from Fischer and then cart it back to Germany. We tried to pin it down. Who was the original owner? Certainly, they must have records of where they got it in the first place. The Germans were typically German in that they always wrote down everything in such detail, that if they lifted it out of a castle, that painting was known to have been hanging in that castle - i.e., it was "liberated." That is one example.

Incidentally, while we are on the subject of art, one day I received a call from the foreign office. "We are going to have a meeting. Could you have your experts, wherever they are, come with you and bring along (I can't remember who else from the legation)?" We walked into a large conference room in the Swiss foreign office. Not a stick of furniture in there, but all around the baseboards were impressionist paintings, big oil paintings, all around this room. They said, "We want you to see what we have seized with the view of having them returned to their original owners." Eberhardt Rheinhardt was there and he drew me off to one side and said, "We went up to Bührle, a big art collector, and when we presented our papers, he allowed us in. When we selected this, that, and that, his comment was 'Are you telling me these are originals?'" Lynn Nicholas, who wrote that excellent book, “The Rape of Europe,” on stolen art, when I related that to her, she said, "I wish toheck I had known that. It would have been in my book. I couldn't stand Mr. Bührle." The National Gallery to this day is embarrassed that they had the big Bührle exhibit in Washington.

Q: Who was Mr. Bührle?

BACH: Mr. Bührle was this German I mentioned earlier.

Q: He was a German who became Swiss.

BACH: That's right, and he had this huge factory out in Oerlikon, a suburb of Zurich. He was also the collector of art.
Q: You left Switzerland when?

BACH: 1949.

Q: During the period you were there, were, particularly American Jews, but also other Jews, coming back to Switzerland to try to get back their money and all?

BACH: That is one of the things that I have been questioned on and I have repeatedly commented that during my stay, given the fact that our legation was in different private homes, conceivably, people of that type may have come, but I did not hear at any staff meeting and did not personally experience anybody coming in and saying "Can you help me?"

Q: That’s very interesting. By the time you left, was there any cloud on the horizon? Certainly by 1946, the enormity of what the Germans had done to the Jews and to others in their death camps and all was known. If one is sitting in Switzerland, you can say there must be an awful lot of unclaimed valuables here in Switzerland.

BACH: You see, we were up against Swiss banking secrecy. That gave them a large area under which they could say, "Well, we looked into it, but there is nothing of interest to you," glossing it off. The German part of Switzerland was more inclined to protect their clients. The French would talk around it, but wouldn’t do anything. Yes, there were some who went out of their way - like the Swiss firm down in Geneva. I can tell you a story involving them as an example of a partial reply to your question. But when I was transferred to Seoul, I received an airmail letter asking my view as to whether they should open a surveying office in Korea in view with the big American aid program. My reply was, "I think you ought to contact the head of the AID mission. I have my own views, but let's leave that for some other time." They came back a second time by cable, asking for a cable response. I responded along the lines of my first. I don't know how I expressed it, but it wasn’t an enthusiastic "Go for it."

Q: In other words, you didn't feel that the Swiss were deserving of any type of assistance.

BACH: No, I would have helped them. In fact, I eventually did try to help this firm get off the grey list (not the black list) because of what they had done on our behalf during the war. I received this letter: "Please tell us. We wish to reimburse you for your cable." So, I wrote back and said, "Why don't you wait until I come back via Switzerland and we can have a good old fashioned fondue and kirschwasser." Several weeks later, the APO called up and said, "There is a big package for you: a half a wheel of Gruyère cheese and six bottles of kirschwasser.

LEONARD L. BACON
Safe Haven Program
Bern/Zurich (1946-1947)
Leonard L. Bacon was born in New York in 1907. He joined the Foreign Service in 1945 and served in Switzerland, China, Germany, Laos, and Washington, DC. Mr. Bacon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Let me ask you a little about what you were doing in Switzerland with the Safe Haven Program. You were there from '46 to '47.

BACON: The very beginning of '46 to '47. That was to try to ferret out from the Swiss banks, art galleries--commercial art galleries, that is, and other places, and through records that were being discovered in Germany at the time, as to where the goods that people like Goring had confiscated and salted away in a neutral country. Many of the works of art, of course, were the forbidden type of modern art anyhow, but this was a good way of preserving for personal benefit. And also bank accounts. There were some side effects. General Ernst Kaltenbrunner was on trial at Nuremberg. As head of the Gestapo he had responsibility for labor camps, and at the trial he bethought himself of a visit by the Swiss International Red Cross to the camp to see how things were. He thought that members of the Swiss mission could testify in his favor. All they could testify to was what they saw at their visit which was two weeks before the end of hostilities. He was condemned and executed later on. But he wanted this affidavit signed. It took about three months to get from Nuremberg to Washington to Switzerland. By then the trial was nearly over. I took it to Berne pointing out that if it took three months to get back again after it had been signed, he'd surely be condemned and probably dead. So the Minister Counselor there said, "Perhaps you'd like to take it?" And I said, "That's what I had in mind." He said, "Don't you know that we can't get involved in judicial actions here in Switzerland under our treaty with Switzerland?" I said, "Yes, but the Swiss don't recognize this court. From their point of view it's not a court at all." So he laughed and said, "All right. We'll get you a military pass to get into Germany and get to Nuremberg." So I did. I saw the whole thing and the last few days; all of the defendants--including Goring--were still there. So that was something of a high point.

Q: Were you working on the accounts...there must have been many accounts of Jews from Germany who put their money in Swiss accounts and then they were killed, and these things must have been sort of in limbo.

BACON: I don't recall any particular action on that basis. Probably their relatives were doing what they could in that way. The Swiss had to modify their banking laws. Up to that time lawyers, trustees, and banks were under absolute prohibition of revealing their affairs to anybody but we put so much pressure on the Swiss that they did modify them for purposes of this exercise, Safe Haven. Lawyers and so on were free to make their statements. However, none of the statements could be revealed to the Swiss tax authorities.

Q: You came back in what...1947, and made a lateral entry into the Foreign Service. Were you part of the Foreign Service at that time?

BACON: It was called the Foreign Service Auxiliary. It was pretty much on the same basis, I guess you could say, as USIA.

Q: How did you feel? I mean did you really want to get into the Foreign Service at this point?
BACON: Yes, I really did. What I’d seen, of course, in Switzerland was pretty attractive and I felt competent in many ways, particularly speaking German and French, and I’d also taken a little Russian instruction in Zurich which I never got to use anywhere. And I’d seen enough of the personnel of the Foreign Service to feel that that was where I wanted to be too. So I passed the examination and went back to Switzerland and was notified shortly that my next post was Hangzhou.

Q: Did this come as a bolt out of the blue, or had you made any noises to that effect?

BACON: I've forgotten now whether I made...I don't think I was asked for any preferences, but at this time generalization was in everybody's mind. The world was divided into three major areas: one was Europe; one was East Asia, South Asia; and the third was Latin America. Africa hardly figured.

Q: Yes, it was all colonial and we had practically nothing in there.

BACON: That's right. South Africa would have been part of the British Empire, at least from our point of view. And the Arab world was more or less South Asia, from our point of view, at least Middle East where it was centered. So the idea was that everybody should spend a substantial part of his life in at least two of those three areas. And I had no interest at all in Spanish America, so I wasn't particularly surprised it was the Far East.


NILES W. BOND
First Secretary & Chargé
Bern (1946-1949)

Niles W. Bond was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a BA from the University of North Carolina and graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1938. His postings abroad include Havana, Yokohama, Madrid, Bern, Tokyo, Seoul, Rome, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In 1998 Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Bond.

Q: What was your next assignment?

BOND: After that, I went to Switzerland, assigned to the legation in Bern. I came home from Spain in the Fall of ’46 and took home leave. I hadn’t been out of the Iberian Peninsula for all of the four years I was assigned to Spain. And then I was assigned to Bern, and we had only been in Bern about five months when I was assigned back to the Department.

Q: Just a quick thing. What were you doing in Bern?
BOND: Well, I wasn’t sent to do anything in particular. I just went as a member of the staff. I went as Second Secretary, was promoted to First Secretary while I was there. And then, when the Minister left on transfer, he left me as chargé d’affaires ad interim, although I was outranked by three or four other people on the staff. I was chargé for several months, until his successor came and I left. (Incidentally, I know of no Foreign Service colleague who served as chargé d'affaires to more countries than I: five in all.)

Q: Why did you serve such a brief time in Bern? Less than six months, I believe.

BOND: The reason I was transferred back... The one responsible for bringing me back was Walt Butterworth, who had succeeded Willard Beaulac as DCM in Madrid. He had just been made Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, and it had been decided that there should be a Desk Officer for Korea which, until then, there was not. Korea was just sort of dumped into Northeast Asian Affairs, which was basically Japan. So Walt Butterworth was looking for someone for that job. It came down to the fact that he remembered me, and that I was the only one in the Foreign Service that he knew who had ever been in Korea. It was that simple.

It was very inconvenient for us because we had finally found a house after living for four months in a hotel. We were still unpacking our effects when the transfer came through. I was ordered to return to Washington by way of Tokyo and Seoul. And I talked to General MacArthur in Tokyo and to Syngman Rhee in Seoul, and to other State and Army officials along the way. In those days before jets, it took me quite a while to get home.

Q: How did you get to Korea from Bern?

BOND: Well, I took a train to Ostend, I believe, from Switzerland.

LLOYD JONNES
Marshall Plan, ECA
Bern (1948-1953)

Lloyd Jonnes was born in Ohio in 1924. He received a bachelor's degree from Antioch College in 1948 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1943-1945. Mr. Jonnes' career included positions in Switzerland, Austria, the United Kingdom, Libya, Turkey, Vietnam, and Indonesia. He was interviewed by W. Haven North on August 19, 1986.

JONNES: In the fall of that year we went to Europe so that I could study for one year at the University of Zurich before coming back to law school. At the end of the year in Zurich, quite by chance I was offered a job - a temporary job naturally - with the then U. S. Legation in Bern as they were setting up a small office of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the body administering the Marshall Plan, to keep the Swiss government informed on the program, but more importantly, if possible to help the Swiss participate with us in the provision of resources. The latter was the objective of the exercise. In point of fact, most of that work on that issue was
done in Paris through the negotiations to establish Swiss participation in the intra-European payments clearing system and thereafter the European Payments Union. In both instances Swiss credits were made available through these institutions to finance in some measure the trade of the other European nations.

Q: *The Swiss survived the war with very little setbacks?*

JONNES: Yes, in terms of the physical state of the nation for there was of course no fighting on Swiss soil. But, the Swiss had had a difficult war in the sense that at any time the Germans had wanted to, they, the Germans, could have invaded Switzerland, but the price would have been very high, I'm sure, inasmuch as the Swiss were determined to maintain their independence down to the last man. In any event it never came to war, but the negotiations - ceaseless negotiations between the Swiss and Germans over every aspect of the Swiss national being--took quite a toll on the Swiss administration. In retrospect one can only admire that the Swiss managed to get through the war intact. I think at the same time, those of us on the American side felt that the Swiss could certainly have done a great deal more than they did in terms of making life difficult for the Germans. And of course there is just now a major disturbance in our relations with the Swiss over their treatment of the Jewish communities during the war. The central fact of the Swiss economy is its dependency upon external trade. To live during the war, they were forced to do business with the Germans in one way or another.

In any event, the ECA started a small operation there -- a part of the economic section of the then US Legation -- designed to work with the Swiss on all aspects of the Marshall Plan.

Q: *Did your taking this position evolve from an earlier interest in international work or from an earlier period?*

JONNES: I think my first real interest came in seeing what Europe was at the end of the war. So far as Germany and Austria were concerned, it looked as if they could never, ever recover from the tremendous physical damage that had been done during the war. At the same time, intellectually, many of us had been conditioned by Keynes' observations at the time of the Versailles negotiations at the end of World War I that unless Germany was economically healthy, Europe was not going to be economically healthy. This was a necessary condition to the recovery of the European economic structure. It's impossible I think now to communicate the sense of impoverishment, the sense of despair and hopelessness that characterized much of Europe when we arrived there in the summer of 1948 to go to school in Zurich. Switzerland was the one exception because they had not really suffered physically and they were doing quite well, but in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany, all these places we visited it was deeply depressing and the question was what do we do about it. I think the American response through the Marshall Plan was a truly extraordinary phenomenon and in very sharp contrast to what was done after World War I. At that time, the question was largely one of punitive measures in that our European allies -- led by Clemenceau -- were determined that they would be recompensed in some form by the Germans for all the damage done during the war, not recognizing that only if the German economy were healthy would the Germans be able to even begin to pay substantial reparations. American policy in 1948 and 1949, and through the end of the Marshall Plan was extraordinary because I think the total value of the aid provided was on the order of $13.5 billion.
which in today's dollar would be as much as $100 billion—a massive infusion of economic resources. That Truman was able to put this through was one of the great political acts in the United States of the 20th century.

To have worked with this program, if only on the very edge of it, was fascinating because we in Bern were treated in effect as a small mission of the Marshall Plan even though the Swiss were getting nothing under the program.

Q: What were the Swiss supposed to provide - what were you trying to get them to do specifically?

JONNES: Specifically we were trying to make sure that they participated in the financing of those systems of intra-European payment clearings through which individual European nations would have additional import financing. The first of these was set up, I believe, in 1948. It was worked out at the OECD and administered by the Bank of International Settlements in Basel. In 1950 the European Payment Union was established, and here again the question was what will be the amount of credit facilities available, and again we were interested in having the Swiss provide the maximum that they could.

Q: Were the Swiss responsive?

JONNES: I haven't looked at data in recent years, but my impression was that they were indeed responsive. After all their own interests as exporters were at stake. One of our tasks was to maintain communications between the people in Paris who were working on these programs and the Swiss. While our colleagues in Paris could do that in Paris or in Basle, through the Bank of International Settlements, one of our chores was simply to maintain a flow of information on what was going on in Switzerland and in that sense, we were very much a part of the small legation staff working on economic matters.

Another aspect of my work in Bern was that the system of export controls on critical or strategic items going to the Soviets and their satellites came into being at that time, and I worked on that issue on occasion. Particularly, I did a great deal of reporting on the trade agreements that the Swiss were concluding with the various East European nations, but this was really straight economic reporting.

Q: And that was for one year?

JONNES: We were in Bern from 1949 to 1953. There were other responsibilities over time. After the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the U.S. military became very interested in procurement in Switzerland and because I was there and knew German and a great deal about Swiss industry, I spent much time in working with procurement people from the Department of Defense, taking them around the country and showing them what the Swiss could provide and did ultimately provide. The Swiss were very much interested naturally in selling to DOD, but this had little or nothing to do with the International Development Program.
Yet another task had to do with a very interesting aspect of technical assistance - actually, two small programs. At one point, the technical assistance people in Washington worked out a program to bring young apprenticed technical workers from the Marshall Plan member nations to the States for a year of work-study - on the job training and study at universities. The Swiss were very interested in this, but of course they would have to pay for it themselves. They were willing to do so, and thus we worked out a very small program under which each Swiss participant paid for all his living costs and travel himself, but effectively got the training and schooling for free.

Q: Do you remember what areas?

JONNES: Primarily in machine construction and metal-working, e.g., machine tools. The Swiss participants - very young men - thought this was marvelous because it gave them the chance to live in the States, to see America, and at the same time to do some study, say in mechanical engineering, and to work in an America plant.

The second program was actually part of an OECD program which was a form of work study but at the management level. Swiss entrepreneurs were very interested in the study missions to the States and here again they paid their own way together with a standard fee for all of the ancillary costs and participated. We had a remarkable selection of senior Swiss management that came to the States paying for it themselves, but nominally as part of the Marshall Plan.

Q: Where they could update their technology?

JONNES: Or at least see how they might do so. That's right because there were two aspects of the Marshall Plan. The primordial facet was to help the Europeans to cope with the damage and attrition of the war. But the European world had also gone through the terrible depression of the 1930's, and that too had left it's mark, perhaps most acutely in combination with the war. We in the US as a consequence of the war went through a technological explosion that the Europeans knew little of. Not only were they unaware of the dimensions of these changes, but their industry was still suffering from the stagnation and massive depreciation of their industrial base. For obvious reasons they were very much interested in trying to catch up, as in fact they did in the context of recovery.

Q: I take it that was one of the major contributions to the revival of the European economy?

JONNES: I think so. That's a big question, but certainly these programs were one significant element. The volume of technical assistance at that time was very great. Now I'm not talking of Switzerland, but what we were doing across the board. Yet another element of our technical assistance had to do with labor. Many in the organized labor movements in Switzerland were also much interested in what was going on in the States. Here, too, they would pay their own way to participate in those various labor programs that fell under the Marshall Plan. Here again, I was an intermediary between the Swiss and our Washington headquarters.

Q: You said you spoke German?
JONNES: Yes.

Q: Where did you learn your German?

JONNES: I began my studies at Antioch, and then studied at the University of Zurich. In fact the German language was why I was originally hired because the Legation didn't have any American German speakers on the economic side for some reason.

Q: How did you happen to pick up German?

JONNES: Well, because of my personal interest in the origins of "our" war, I had wanted to study somewhere in Germany, but the German universities were effectively closed to us.

Q: What did you major in?

JONNES: Political Economy. A lot of economics.

Q: As a result of your war experience, you were curious about the war's origins....

JONNES: Yes.

Q: What was your impression of the Swiss at that time?

JONNES: I was deeply impressed by their having brought together at least four different cultures into one nation--the Italian, French, German and what had remained of the Roman army culture in eastern Switzerland, the Romansch--and having survived the Reformation with all of its centrifugal forces. Also I was intrigued by their ability to work out economic problems of industry without violence. They had come to recognize--i.e., each side of the labor management conflict recognized--that they had to agree in order to survive. If they were going to survive economically, they would have to be successful exporters, the necessary condition of which was that they would have to be price competitive. And they have succeeded.

Q: Did you travel around Europe that time?

JONNES: I used to go to Paris regularly for one meeting or another at the Office of the Special Representative of the ECA. In 1953 I was transferred to Vienna. Quite a different experience. In Bern from 1951 I was the only ECA officer. In Vienna the Mission was quite large because Austria had been receiving substantial assistance from us. We were there until 1956. There initially my principal function was as an analyst of the balance of payments.

Q: But you were hired at that time...you were a regular employee?

JONNES: Well, I was a regular employee of ECA.

Q: Well, then you were reassigned to Vienna?
ROGER C. BREWIN  
Consular Officer  
Zurich (1951-1953)

Roger C. Brewin was born in Columbus, Ohio. He entered the U.S. Army in 1944. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Miami in Ohio in 1948 and a master's degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 1950. Mr. Brewin joined the Foreign Service in 1951. His career included positions in Switzerland, India, Bolivia, Paraguay, Iran, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: What were your responsibilities in Zurich while you were there from 1951-1953.

BREWIN: I began in the Consular Section issuing immigration visas and then spent six months in "notarials and invoices", then a year in passport work. But that time, two and half years had passed and I was transferred directly to Bombay.

Q: What were our interests in Switzerland at the time?

BREWIN: Not many. Bern, the capital where the legation was, was a very quiet place and I suspect it still is. It had a one officer Political Section; the Economic Section had some responsibilities on East-West trade--transhipment of sensitive commodities to the Soviet block. Switzerland was involved in that trade. Beyond that, it was just traditional diplomacy.

Q: Then you were in Bombay from 1953 to 1956. That must have been quite a jump from Zurich. How did you find matters in Bombay?

HENRY L.T. KOREN  
Political Reporting Service Officer  
Bern (1951-1953)

Henry L. T. Koren was born in New Jersey in 1911. He entered the Foreign Service in 1948 and served in Haiti, Switzerland, the Philippines, the Congo (Brazzaville), and Vietnam. He was interviewed in 1989 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well, your next posting was to Bern, which is not one of our most active posts, or at least I wouldn’t think it would be. You were there from 1951 to 1953. What type of work were you doing there?
KOREN: Well, I was in the peculiar assignment that they invented called reporter. It was a semi-intelligence operation. I can't remember. Special reporter is what it amounted to and beside the political section.

Q: Wouldn't this normally be the type of thing the CIA would do?

KOREN: Well, yes, but this is a brainchild of somebody in the Foreign Service who thought that there was some special activities that the Foreign Service officers could do and at least be complementary and supplementary to the actual intelligence operation.

Q: And, of course, I guess this is the time when the CIA was just being put together anyway, so it wasn't that strong an apparatus.

KOREN: It was a hell of lot more together than naught, but when I was in the CIA, it became CIA. It used to be known as the CIG, Central Intelligence Group. CIA was formed and there was going unit of the CIA in Bern.

Q: Was Switzerland at that point as much of an intelligence area between East and West as one is led to believe from all the spy novels?

KOREN: Right. I believe that was the reason we were sent there, that I was sent there at any rate.

Q: You can add these things on. Again, this is obviously an unclassified interview, but we are talking about something of almost 40 years ago. Looking back on it, did we get much good information there or was it mostly defensive?

KOREN: I would say that generally it was well covered and better covered by the CIA, and I was in great respects simply a fifth wheel spinning around more or less by myself. Whatever I got that what I thought was worth anything I would pass it by the CIA station chief and his people. The only thing I was able to get through the diplomatic channels was because of the consul in Basel, who was of Norwegian descent, and he had very good contacts. He was a great help to me, introducing me to people, and through them I got a copy of the communist manifesto, the first time we got our fingers on it. That was, as I say, through diplomatic means.

Q: You knew somebody who knew somebody who got it?

KOREN: And he knew somebody who produced it. That was very helpful, and I'm sure it went back to Washington by the CIA and not us, because we had a back channel but it was very, very . . .

Q: The Korean War came in June of 1950 and you were in Europe at the time. There really was a major shift toward realizing that we were in a period of confrontation, which is maybe basically still going on today in 1989. Did you in Switzerland see the machinery beginning to move into this new pasture?
KOREN: Well, I felt that, but mostly I would be, pursued by this what you would call this homosexual aspect, because, as I told you, the previous administrative officer had been kicked out because he was a homosexual, and lo and behold, there was a nest of homosexuals in the CIA in Switzerland.

Q: I might add, because times and mores have changed some, that homosexuals were considered to be at great risk from a security point of view, and with justification in that the Soviets would often use this as a threat of exposure unless you did things for them. So there you were.

KOREN: So there I was, in the one place that you would least expect it.

Q: Particularly in the CIA.

KOREN: The CIA and the section chief himself. So that sort of soured my outlook on the Foreign Service.

JOSEPH A. MENDENHALL
Economic/Political Officer
Bern (1951-1955)

Joseph A. Mendenhall was born in Maryland in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Delaware in 1940 and a master's degree from Harvard University in 1941. Mr. Mendenhall served in the U.S. Army from 1941-1946 and joined the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in Turkey, Iceland, Switzerland, Vietnam, Laos, and Madagascar. Mr. Mendenhall was interviewed in 1991 by Horace Torbert.

Q: They always thought you should be so pleased being a Foreign Service officer.

MENDENHALL: After a little over two years in Iceland, we received our transfer assignment to Switzerland. I was pleased because although we had enjoyed Iceland very much it was pleasant to contemplate a different kind of post which looked as though it might be better in the physical sense than Iceland had been. But I do remember after getting my orders Minister Lawson talked to me about the new assignment and said, "I can see you are pleased with that and I can understand it, but I am not sure it is going to be a very good assignment from a career standpoint as far as you are concerned, because the American interests in Switzerland are so limited that you are not going to be challenged very often". Well I just brushed this off because I was looking forward to being in the heart of Europe.

It turned out he was absolutely correct in his assessment of the assignment. The Swiss are so self-sufficient in almost every respect that the United States has never had any very substantial interests in that country as we have in so many others around the world over the past 50 years.
I found myself in Switzerland assigned initially to the economic section and doing the same kind of reporting that I had been doing in Istanbul at the outset of my career. So Lawson was absolutely right it was not challenging at all. The one thing that was new to me in my work there was the labor reporting activity. I had never had any association with labor before and I did learn what labor and labor organizations were all about. I made the acquaintance of and cultivated the grand old man of the Swiss labor movement, Conrad Ilg. He had been the head of the Swiss movement then for 20 to 25 years. He was the George Meany of Switzerland.

I remember almost literally sitting at his feet and listening to him as he would talk, reminisce, advise, instruct over the situation not only in Switzerland but that in Europe. He talked to me about Hitler's rise in Germany, which he attributed in very substantial measure to the great depression in the economic field and the extremely high unemployment in Germany. At that time, of course, we were in occupation in Germany and he said, "I urge you to always think of the German economy. Don't let it go into decline. If you keep the Germans reasonably happy economically then you will not have these terrible political problems, which we had in the 30s and 40s in Germany." I have never forgotten his advice.

Q: I hope you reported that.

MENDENHALL: I did. After several months in the economic section, I was transferred to the political section which pleased me greatly because at that point, seven years in the service, I still had had no political assignment. As political work was considered the glamor part of the Foreign Service and often the avenue through which to get promotions, I was very pleased to move over into it. The political section had consisted of four officers. This was the time when the Republicans came to Washington, and Secretary Dulles cut back on the personnel strength of the State Department and the Foreign Service and certainly as far as Switzerland was concerned, very wisely so. We were grossly overstaffed in that Embassy. We had four officers in the political section and were cut down to one. We had five in the economic section and were cut down to two. We had two science attachés and they were both abolished.

I might add a little personal note to this. My father-in-law, who was a German language expert who examined documents captured from the Germans during the war while in the Navy, in 1947 got a job with the newly established CIA, heading the research and intelligence activity of the CIA related to the UN and other international organizations. In 1950 his entire unit was shifted from CIA to the State Department. When Mr. Dulles arrived in 1953, this was one of the organizations he considered surplus. The whole unit was chopped down. My father-in-law lost his job and decided to retire at that point. Even to his death, just a couple of years ago, he never had any love for John F. Dulles.

As for my assignment to the political section, I remained in that for about two and a half years. Although it looked fairly good on my record I can't say there was anything very challenging about what I did in that area in Switzerland. Swiss politics are just as stable as the Swiss economy. Nothing very exciting ever happens in the Swiss political world.

Q: They just rotate chairman of the council don't they?
MENDENHALL: Well, there are seven members of the Federal Council and they usually are reelected and serve until death. The presidency rotates every year among the seven. The president is no more significant than any of the other Federal Councilor.

As a matter of fact, I might tell a little story about the man who was president when we were there, a Mr. Etter. The Swiss are noted for being rather tightfisted and he was typically Swiss in that respect. The story went around that Mr. Etter was seen one day riding on a train in second class. Someone asked, "Mr. President, why are you riding second class?" He said, "Because there isn't any lower class."

The Swiss, also, are noted for adherence to law and regulations. There is a story about the Minister of Defense during World War II--a man well-loved by the Swiss, but they tell this story about him. He was also a great devotee of trains and he had a passenger car installed on his front lawn. He and his wife used to go out and sit in it every evening because he loved trains so much. One evening someone saw him and his wife out there trying to push the car back and forward. They said, "Mr. Minister, what are you doing?" He said, "It says inside that you can flush the toilet only when the train is in motion."

Q: Did you deal in both internal politics and whatever foreign relations there were?

MENDENHALL: Yes. I also took my labor reporting over with me to the political section. Besides the old gentleman I was also very close friends with a young Swiss who worked both in the Swiss labor movement and an International Labor Federation in Geneva--not connected with the ILO, an organization of labor unions around the world. I found him one of my best sources of information as well as a very good friend.

I also took on a political reporting program that the State Department had inaugurated in Western Europe of reporting information that could be gathered in Western Europe about conditions in Eastern Europe. This was known as the peripheral reporting program. One of the four political officers had devoted his time completely to this field. When his position was abolished, I took on the residue of his work. There was nothing of very great significance that we picked up in that area in Switzerland.

Q: It was too hard for the refugees to get in to Switzerland...

MENDENHALL: They usually had been gone so long that they had nothing of any great significance to report. The one thing of some interest that I remember doing--in the summer of 1953 I was the duty officer for the weekend. I received a telephone call from that great old Foreign Service officer, Alex Johnson--I think he was then a deputy assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. We were then trying to negotiate an armistice with the Chinese communists and North Koreans in Korea. One of the issues was the establishment of a neutral nations supervisory commission. The proposal was that the UN with the US at the head of the Korean group at the UN would choose two Western countries and we hoped to put forward Switzerland and Sweden. The Communists would choose two "neutral" countries--theirs were Poland and, I believe, Czechoslovakia, communist countries from Eastern Europe which were about as un-neutral as any thing in the world at that stage. So I received a telephone call that Sunday. The armistice
agreement was on the point of being concluded, but the Swiss had not yet consented to participate. So I had to get hold of the Swiss to see if they would agree to take part and indeed they did agree within a few days. I simply transmitted the message. The armistice was concluded in Korea which ended the Korean War. I can't say I played a very significant role, but at least a minor connection with ending that conflict.

Q: I suppose the general run of international conferences was handled from Geneva?

MENDENHALL: Yes, that is right. Other than reporting Swiss reaction to the Conference on Indochina which started in June, 1954--Swiss press reaction. Switzerland was blessed with probably, in my judgment, the best press in the world. When I was stationed there, there were six good newspapers in Switzerland. About half of them in French and half in German. Their editorial reactions to events around the world were of some considerable interest because they were such responsible journalists. I wish I could say as much for the United States today, but I can't.

Q: Certainl, wherever I was during my entire career in Europe subscribed to the Neue Zuercher Zeitung in which everything was published. It may not have been very exciting, but everything was published.

MENDENHALL: As a matter of fact when I was stationed in Switzerland, the Neue Zuercher Zeitung had done three editions per day and none of the news was repeated in any of those three editions. I think the Neue Zuercher Zeitung is probably the single best newspaper in the world.

Q: But not very easy reading.

MENDENHALL: No, it isn't.

Q: By this time you were handling both French and German pretty well?

MENDENHALL: French, my German was never very good, Tully. I read the paper but with difficulty. I should have done more in German. I taught myself while I was there. But I never claimed it was very good. My French was.

Q: Who were your Ambassadors while you were there?

MENDENHALL: The first one was a man by the name of Patterson. He had been a political ambassador to both Yugoslavia and, I believe Poland [it was Guatemala] and then came to Switzerland as Minister. At that time there was only one ambassador in Switzerland--the French Ambassador. The French had insisted since the Napoleonic conquest of Switzerland that their mission be headed by an ambassador. The Swiss to save money would not let any other country raise their missions to the level of ambassador--they did not want to name ambassadors in reciprocity. By that time many of the countries were beginning to push the Swiss pretty hard on his including the Americans. The Swiss finally decided to go along, but not as long as Patterson was there.
I will tell you a little story about Patterson to indicate the kind of political ambassador he was. One day the Syrian Chargé came to pay his diplomatic call on the ambassador. The ambassador wanted the Syrian to point out on the map where his country was. The ambassador got the Syrian so confused by the time they got up to the map he couldn't point out his own country.

Patterson was succeeded by Frances Willis who is very famous in the Foreign Service as our first career woman officer to be named as an ambassador. Indeed, very surprisingly, the Swiss who did not even permit women to vote agreed to accept her as the first American Ambassador to Switzerland. I enjoyed very much working for her. She was a very precise lady who knew her own mind. I got along extremely well with her and enjoyed it very much. Not that I think any of us did anything of very great significance in our Swiss assignment.

Q: *I knew her only socially, but I thought she was intelligent...*

MENDENHALL: She was also a very human individual. When my family and I left Switzerland in June of 1955, we took a train from Bern, about 5:50 AM, for Genoa in order to catch a ship. She, the ambassador, insisted upon being down at the train station at that hour to see us off—a junior officer. This was rather typical of the very human attitude which she took towards all members of her staff.

Q: *Now after seven or eight years you were going home—nine years.*

MENDENHALL: Tully, here lies a story also. When I left Switzerland I was assigned again to Indonesia. Remember in 1949 I had been assigned there and hadn't gotten there. I was assigned to Indonesia, came back to the States on home leave, bought a car, and sent it off to Indonesia. Meanwhile the Department sent me to the Bethesda Hospital because during the last year I was in Switzerland I had suffered from a series of infections which, despite consultations with all the finest of the Swiss medical community, nobody had been able to diagnose. The Department felt it should be diagnosed before I went to a tropical country. So out I went to Bethesda. They didn't succeed in finding the source of my difficulties, but they did find in the course of the examinations that I had a kidney stone, which had never bothered me and still 35 years later hasn't bothered me. I was told then that it was too big to be passed if it ever became detached. The Department said, "You are going to have to stay in the US because the stone may be new and growing and we don't know what is going to happen to it. You have to be in a place where there is good hospital care." So my assignment to Indonesia was canceled and I was thrust upon the Department without any preparation.

**JOSEPH A. GREENWALD**  
Economic Officer  
Geneva (1952-1955)

*Joseph A. Greenwald was born in Illinois on September 18, 1918. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Chicago and a law degree from Georgetown University. His career*
GREENWALD: But why did I go to Geneva? Well, Tully, you will appreciate this. I got tired of hearing from Foreign Service officers that I couldn't really understand these issues because I had never served overseas. It was almost as simple as that. Someone came along and said there is a job, it was a Foreign Service reserve job, open in Geneva. And I took it just to see whether it was anything to that canard and how my family reacted to living overseas. We were stationed in Geneva from '52 to '55. Everybody enjoyed it, and I did, too.

By the way, for historical perspective, let me describe to you what change there has been in Geneva. Those were the early days before the inflation in government representation and before the United States was so heavily involved in all kinds of international negotiations in Geneva. We did not have a mission to the Geneva office of the United Nations. We had a consulate general and one person, that was me, working on all of the economic activities in Geneva. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ILO, ECOSOC, etc.

Most of my time was actually spent on a United Nations regional organization, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which at that time was headed by a Swede named Gunnar Myrdal. He is famous less for his work in the ECE than he is for his seminal book on US race relations: The American Dilemma. But he was a very stimulating guy. Most of my time was spent in the ECE, which was one of the few--remember this is the cold war period--one of the few organizations where the United States and the Soviet Union and Western and Eastern Europeans met together. That was the main part of my activities in Geneva.

**J. HOWARD GARNISH**
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**
**Geneva (1952-1956)**

*Mr. J. Howard Garnish was born in Rochester, New York and later obtained a degree in history from the University of Rochester. In 1943, Mr. Garnish joined the Office of War Information and served in Switzerland, Sweden, and Thailand during his career. Mr. Garnish was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1989.*

GARNISH: We had got back in the winter of 1952 and by October '52 we were headed for Geneva, Switzerland, and I was PAO there.

**Q:** Were you PAO for Switzerland or were you PAO specifically for the UN operations and the US representation in Geneva?

GARNISH: Yes. Geneva, of course, is not the capital of Switzerland; Bern is. And the country program was operated from Bern. We were part of the US Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, which -- when I first got there -- had a rather divided leadership. There was a Consul
General, Ed Ward, who was responsible for the normal operations of a Consulate General, and Tom Blaisdell headed the contacts with international organizations. I was a split personality, more or less, because, while I still had some responsibility for a normal USIS program in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, I was really sent there because of the emergence of Geneva as an international conference center. And, having come out of covering the United Nations, this was quite normal because Geneva was the European headquarters of the United Nations, while New York was the overall headquarters.

We got to Geneva in October, coming through a snowstorm across the Jura mountains into the city, and we were installed in the Hotel de l'Ecu, which was just across the Rhone River from the Consulate General. The Hotel de l'Ecu no longer exists. But it was an old hotel which had an interesting woman handling most of the affairs for the owner. During the war she had been in charge of a Swiss camp for American internees, that is, the American airmen who were shot down over nearby Germany or France and managed to land in or escape to Switzerland. She still heard from some of them.

There was an old joke about how the Americans flying over Switzerland would be told by the neutral Swiss, "You're over Swiss territory." And the pilot would say, "Yes, we know it." And the Swiss would message to them, "You must get out of here or we'll shoot." They had anti-aircraft batteries set up all over. The American pilots didn't take this very seriously, but the next thing you know, they were being shot at. And the pilot would tell the ground, "Hey, you're shooting low." And the Swiss would answer, "Yes, we know it."

We had a tremendous increase in conferences almost immediately after my arrival in Geneva. And, by the way, we had to stay at the Hotel de l'Ecu until February because we were after an apartment owned by a French couple who were preparing to divorce. The woman and her husband were so bitter that she, for example, would arrange for us to visit the place and he would lock up some of the rooms so we couldn't see them. We were about ready to give up on this when it finally was possible to close the deal.

That was a lovely apartment. It stood on the old city wall opposite one of Geneva's many beautiful museums. We had a little garden with a grape arbor at the side of the apartment and a narrow balcony atop the wall, overlooking a bus stop. In due time, our Italian maid brought a little kitten in from an apartment across the street. She named it Michou which, I believe, is sort of a corruption of Chou-Chou, a term of endearment in French. The kitten was supposed to stay with us only for a week while the other people were away, but of course what happened was that we adopted the cat.

My wife went out on the balcony one night, calling for the cat, "Michou, Michou." And a man at the bus stop down below responded, "I'll be right up, darling!"

We had just got into our apartment in February of 1953 when USIA decided to cut out the whole program in Switzerland. We were treading on eggs for a long while. One Sunday morning I got a call from the Ambassador, Frances Willis, in Bern. She said, "Mr. Garnish, please get up here for lunch. Ned Nordness is coming in and we want to talk about Geneva." Nordness was then the
USIA Area Director for Europe. I scrambled to get the last train possible to get there in time for lunch. But I made it.

And Frances Willis, whom I regard as a very able ambassador, told Nordness, yes, he could cut out the whole Bern operation except for one local employee who could read the German press and give her summaries, because she could read the French herself, and all the rest of the operation would be in Geneva, because of the conferences there. I thus became the country PAO by default. And I was allowed to get two employees. It happened that the Consulate General was cutting back, so I was allowed to select any two of their locals and I picked out a very competent secretary, Marthe Perrel, and Ernie Hinnen, who became practically everything. He handled the film program; we brought the films down from Bern, and he was the photographer for conferences and also checked the Wireless File early in the morning. He was a jack of all trades. These two have retired within the last few years. Both of them were great, and both of them have been here on trips to the United States and stayed with us.

Ambassador Willis’ sound judgment was confirmed almost immediately, because Geneva became flooded with a series of international conferences which demanded wide dissemination of the United States positions in the course of coverage. Geneva is the headquarters of more than 35 international organizations, including the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, the World Council of Churches, and on and on to the International Standardization Organization, which seeks agreements on all kinds of things including the standardization of screw threads. That really gets down to the nuts and bolts!

Obviously, coverage of many of these conferences was more than a one-man job, so I headed an accordion-like operation. With USIA assistance, I borrowed manpower as necessary. My principal source was Lem Graves' information team in Paris. It was a holdover from the Marshall Plan and was absorbed by USIA. Its members, Mike O'Mara, Dave Brown, Sandy Sanford, and Lem himself, were sent around Europe as needed to cover NATO, the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Union and whatever else required their coverage. Mike was borrowed so often that eventually the Agency transferred him to my Geneva staff. All of the others were borrowed at various times, and for real big conferences we had individuals, teams and secretaries from Austria, Yugoslavia, Spain, England, France, Italy and Germany -- and maybe I've overlooked some.

In 1949, I had been sent to Geneva as a member of the US delegation to the summer session of the UN Economic and Social Council, because the forced labor issue was high on its agenda and required extensive coverage. Later, when I was PAO, I was named a delegate to many of the sessions. But whether an official delegate or not, I usually sat in on our delegations’ morning meetings, so I had access to classified material, US positions and strategy, and could often pick up advanced texts of delegation statements.

Once, Andy Berding, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, phoned from Washington to ask me to substitute for him at a NATO meeting in Brussels. I believe that was the only transocean phone call I received in 16 years of foreign service. How times and communications have changed!
Meanwhile, I had to turnover our USIS in-Switzerland operation to Ernie Hinnen, a local employee. I scrounged films and publications from Paris, in French; from Bonn, in German, and from Rome, in Italian, and Ernie took care of their distribution to the three language areas of Switzerland.

Our conferences in 1953 included a session of the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War. And here's why Geneva is not your ordinary post: I was named a member of the US delegation, which was headed by Ambassador James Dunn, who came up from Madrid, and included Howard Donovan who was the Consul General in Zurich.

I was appointed, of course, because this was an exercise in public diplomacy, as we call it today, propaganda, if you will. The Commission had been formed in 1950 to try to trace all the World War II prisoners who were still being held in other places, or to account for them if they were dead. Almost all the belligerents had done a pretty good job of exchanging lists and tracing their prisoners. Most of them by 1953 had returned them, the exceptions being the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which, incidentally, had taken a big bunch of Red Cross nurses prisoner.

Several countries, but particularly Germany, Japan and Italy, had thousands -- well, I think Germany claimed millions -- unaccounted for. And from 1950, when the Commission was formed, until 1953, there was no accounting for the prisoners in the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Getting ready for this conference, Donovan and I got together a day or two before Ambassador Dunn's arrival and went over the material we had available. Of course, a lot of stuff had been sent from Washington. Donovan and I looked it all over and were very disappointed. It was all old stuff--not a single thing we could offer as a new development. But we agreed that I would try to put together an arrival statement for Dunn. I sweated over that. As I said, it was just a rehash of old material. And all this time -- eight years after the war ended -- the Soviet Union had insisted it didn't hold any prisoners of war. They had, I think it was some 13,000 so-called war criminals, but they didn't recognize that they had any prisoners of war and wouldn't account for even the dead.

Donovan and I went over my draft statement carefully, decided that was about the best we could do, and when Ambassador Dunn arrived we showed it to him. He said, "Okay, put it out." So I took it out to the Palais and made it available to the correspondents.

The strange thing is that, almost immediately, there was a hell of a reaction from the Russians. They had been claiming all this time that they had nobody, but they reacted. It really surprised me because of the staleness of stuff.

Well, to make this short, the Commission met in closed session, but I, being a member of the delegation, could attend the meetings and then I could brief the correspondents, which I did. We got a lot of publicity on it, partly because the Soviet reaction helped build the story. And soon
after our Geneva session, the United Nations General Assembly in New York approved the Commission's report and urged it to continue its good work.

I'm now going to condense this because it goes on and on, but in due time thousands of Japanese, German and Italian prisoners of war were repatriated. It was basically because of the Commission's work, but the fact that I was able to get to the correspondents to keep the story alive and build on the Soviet reaction helped, I think, accomplish the big repatriation.

Q: When they were repatriated, since they were from different corners of the earth, were they all repatriated through Europe? Or were the Japanese repatriated through Siberia and into Japan?

GARNISH: The Japanese Red Cross had set up an arrangement with the Chinese Red Cross, and through them they repatriated several hundred, I've forgotten the exact number. The Red Cross and the Commissioner for Refugees and so on all had a hand in this, but the Commission itself was the central point of operation. And there was also a lot of government-to-government work. The United Kingdom, for example, would send a list to Germany of Germans they had recorded as known dead, the details of their death and burial, and so on. They would indicate which ones they had as war criminals. And the Germans also supplied lists, as much as they could -- of course, none of the main countries in Europe had complete lists, it was impossible in wartime.

Q: But anyway, the Japanese prisoners who were released through the Red Cross into Asia, not into Europe?

GARNISH: That's right. In addition to all the regular conferences, Geneva in 1954 and 1955 hosted a series of very high-level sessions. John Foster Dulles, Bedell Smith, Alexis Johnson, Anthony Eden, Pierre Mendes-France, Zhou En-lai, Ho Chi Minh, Molotov and others came in 1954 to tackle the war-related problems of Korea and Indochina. Korea produced sterile propaganda exercises. The other, coming in the wake of the French defeat by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, yielded as many disagreements as agreements. The United States, holding out for United Nations supervision of free elections in Vietnam, didn't sign. And I recall that the final communique was held up until after 4 o'clock in the morning by Prince Norodom Sihanouk's insistence on Cambodia's right to join a defensive alliance. Such an alliance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), was just emerging, but the unpredictable prince promptly denounced it. And now Sihanouk is back in the news!

In 1955, the United States built a reactor on the grounds of the Palais des Nations for the first Atoms-for-Peace Conference. That conference overlapped the first Summit meeting, at which President Eisenhower conferred with the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France.

Eisenhower was good copy whatever he did. On July 17, he and Mamie attended the American Church. I happened to be head usher that Sunday, so it fell to me to make arrangements to seat the Secret Service detail in strategic places in the congregation. Across from our headquarters in the Hotel du Rhone was a toy shop. One day the President walked in there and bought a doll for his granddaughter. The story and pictures were carried around the world, as were developments at the Summit.
For those and a few other conferences, our staff swelled to 30 or more, brought from Washington and much of Europe.

Q: I want to backtrack a little bit, and maybe there's nothing to talk about, but the years you've been discussing were in large part the years in which we went through the McCarthy terror. I wondered if that affected you in any way, did you come in contact with any of that very difficult era?

GARNISH: I was very lucky in that respect because from time to time, while I was at the United Nations, I would be drafted when things were relatively quiet there to come in and run the news desk in New York, because they were often shorthanded there. We had a fellow who did the Latin and Spanish programs who was not a good writer and his idea of a good piece was to keep saying anti-communist, anti-communist, or communist, as the case may be. He wasn't subtle at all in his writing. And so the desk had to do a lot of rewrites of his stuff.

Well, along came the McCarthy business and he went to McCarthy and accused almost everybody, particularly all the slot men, that is, the chief copy editors, in the office, of being communist-inclined because of the editing of his copy. Some of them just up and quit. Some darn good people left because they didn't want to go through this whole rigmarole. And one of them defied the McCarthy committee and got away with it. But I never was brought into it.

I was, however, called upon to evaluate a couple of -- well, one of the good writers at USIA, and the principal public affairs man at the US Mission to the United Nations. In both cases, to my mind they were absolutely clean and I said so. But it was a very nasty period.

Q: I guess it was. That was your only direct brush with the McCarthy organization?

GARNISH: Yes, I never got called in. But the Consul General in Geneva was instructed to interview me about my loyalty. I had been a founder and officer of the Newspaper Guild in Buffalo, where we beat off some communist attempts to take over. When I went to OWI in New York I joined the union there. But eventually a communist clique gained ascendancy, so I dropped out because I didn't have the time to fight them. When I was interviewed in Geneva, I was fortunate to find my dues card, showing when I quit paying dues to the OWI union. I presented that, wrote a detailed statement, and heard no more about it.

Q: So you came out of it pretty free, pretty untouched.

GARNISH: I was just lucky, I think, because I happened to be out of the mainstream.

Q: Okay, we can go back to Geneva now. I just wondered if you'd had any experience with that era.

GARNISH: Yes, I had.
I was mentioning Ambassador Willis. One of the jobs I had on the other side of the picture, of course, was to nominate grantees to go to the United States. One of the papers in Lausanne had an editor who took almost every occasion to step on the United States. But I had the feeling that he could be brought around if he learned a little more about us. At that time Bern had as PAO George Freimarck. I talked it over with him and we agreed that the Lausanne editor was a good candidate for a grant. But that had to be approved by the Ambassador, and she read the French press. We presented the case, she said, in effect, no way, he has been giving us all kinds of trouble. We pressed it pretty hard and finally Miss Willis said, "All right, if you can get the DCM and the Political Officer to agree, I'll go along." And we finally got them to agree. Well, it turned out to be one of the best grants we ever gave, because that guy changed his whole attitude toward the United States.

Q: That's really rather a remarkable case. Ordinarily they think they're being brainwashed and they won't allow themselves to be, so this is one of the real success stories.

GARNISH: It is. We also sent a Geneva editor over, but he had an open mind and we made out pretty well. But then I arranged another grant. The head of the International School in Geneva was a sort of Prussian type, Monsieur Rockette. We thought exposure to the American education system might help him. We managed to get him over. It did help—for about four months. Then he went right back to his old ways. So that was the other side of the story.

WILLIAM B. DUNHAM
Chief of Swiss-Benelux Division
Washington, DC (1954-1956)

Upon entering the Department of State in 1942, William B. Dunham assumed postings in Spain, Portugal, Brussels, and Switzerland. Mr. Dunham prepared memoirs entitled “How Did You Get Here from There?” in 1996.

DUNHAM: After serving as Assistant Chief of French-Iberian Affairs, the next move was to Chief of the Swiss-Benelux Division once we had completed the agreements with Spain. Jamie Bonbright, EUR's acerbic but always witty Deputy Assistant Secretary, characterized the move this way: "Too heavy for light work, too light for heavy work, so they made you a Chief!"

Once again, this new assignment begat an orientation trip in 1954 to the new domain. Doc (H. Freeman) Matthews, who had been our boss as Director of the Office of European Affairs, was the ambassador in The Hague and Andy Ronhovde, who had also been in EUR, was the Deputy Chief of Mission. They had arranged sessions that gave excellent opportunities to meet and learn from members of the staff and officials at the Foreign Ministry, and some gatherings that also provided chances to meet some other Americans living in The Hague and a few prominent Dutch citizens. They also left time for some quick visits to other parts of Holland, including the military cemetery near Maastricht in the southeast corner of Holland where my very best friend was buried. He was a paratrooper, killed by a land mine in a muddy Dutch field just ten years before. That was both the low point and the high point of the entire trip.
The Embassies in Brussels and Luxembourg City provided similar helpful experiences as did the Embassy in Bern where I met up with a good friend, Frances Willis. She was the senior and the most distinguished woman in the Foreign Service. I had worked with her in the Department and all of us who knew her were elated when she was appointed ambassador to Switzerland, the first time for the US to have an ambassador there - and a woman at that in a country where women didn't have the vote.

Frances had been just such a trail blazer throughout her long career and she continued to be so as she reached the top levels of the Foreign Service. She was appointed to the rank of Career Minister when it was instituted; when the Career Ambassador rank was established she was again promoted to that rank. All who knew her work and her contributions to our foreign policy and to US representation abroad knew she had fully earned such recognition and distinction.

Ann Miller Morin's book, *Her Excellency*, (a title we have always regarded as wholly inappropriate for our officials) does not include a section about Frances Willis. True, she was no longer around to be interviewed, and she is referred to by others who were interviewed. Inexplicably, however, the author made no effort to gather those and other comments and put them with a summary of Frances's career in a section devoted to the one who was widely regarded as indisputably the first and most outstanding woman in the American Foreign Service, including the first woman to hold three posts as chief of mission, as Morin herself observes.

Morin thought Frances Willis got ahead because she "had as her mentor the very influential Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, and she was much more of an establishment player and went by the book," whatever that means. Constance Ray Harvey, a contemporary of Francis Willis whom Morin much preferred, "did not achieve Willis' distinction," Morin states; she "had no mentor and was more of a risk taker." Ambassador Grew was long gone when Francis began to make her mark, and as for being a "risk taker" that doesn't strike me as necessarily a Good Thing; depends on what she means by risks I guess. Harvey herself is quoted by Morin as saying Frances "was regarded with the greatest admiration by her colleagues, including me. She was, to me, the great lady of the Foreign Service so far." Morin also quotes Clare Booth Luce speaking admiringly of Frances. She described her as "a wonderful woman. I thought she was une femme serieuse (a reliable woman). She was straight and very effective." So much for Morin's biases.

(I never met Mrs. Luce although during her years as Ambassador to Italy she was often in our midst consulting with the people on the Italian Desk. I had heard that she tended to be very direct and plain-spoken which was confirmed by an indirect encounter with her that was both startling and amusing. One day I had to go down to the nurse's office for something or other. As you entered there was a book where you were asked to sign in and indicate your complaint. As it turned out, Mrs. Luce had been the last one to sign in and as I wrote down my trouble I couldn't miss seeing what she had listed: "The galloping GIs!")

The two comments about Frances Willis Morin quotes that most struck me were one from Margaret Joy Tibbetts and a second about Rozanne Ridgway (the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs under Bush). Tibbetts mentioned a conversation she had with Frances in which the subject of women's issues came up; neither of them was interested at that time (1949). Frances "said it had been her experience that you did most for women by becoming a competent
"officer." In writing about Rozanne Ridgway, Morin quotes a comment a fellow ambassador made about her, "When she walked in the room, there was authority." Exactly the same description fits Frances Willis.

Those of us who knew and worked with Frances at home and abroad were well aware of such qualities. I have attended meetings where Frances, the only woman present, quietly and unobtrusively steered the proceedings and moved them along to useful conclusion. Nothing pushy or manipulative, simply a deft touch, good humor, impressive competence and the authority that brings with it. She was, in short, a first rate FSO.

The visit to Switzerland was, as one would expect, as well organized and helpful as the visit in Holland. In addition to all the official activities, there were some opportunities to travel about and also to meet officials and others socially. At one such affair Frances invited a large group to a film showing, with dinner before for a small group. I had the good luck to sit next to her mother, a tall, spare, unpretentious, Lincolnesque lady with a lively spirit and sense of humor. She kept all of us who were seated near her highly entertained. The dining room opened through a wide doorway into a large reception room and from our side of the table we could see a few people beginning to arrive as we were finishing dinner. The butler quickly closed the big double doors at which point Mrs. Willis confided, "He's doing that so they won't feel bad because they weren't invited to dinner, too."

One memorable person during this visit was a famous Swiss glider pilot who appeared at the big International Air Show in Zurich that Frances and I attended. It is a major affair and he was one of the major attractions for the Swiss. When his turn came he appeared out of the heavens sweeping across the airfield, doing stunts in his white glider. Finally he swooped around and made a perfect landing directly in front of the group of dignitaries in the front row of the stands. Out he popped dressed in a white flying suit with a white helmet complete with proper goggles, and -for a final flourish - a long, flowing white silk scarf tossed casually around his neck.

In sharp contrast a bit later was the "Flying Wing" which made a "fly-over." Looking like a boomerang, this great, black aircraft, with its bank of engines spewing long contrails of black smoke, had flown in from SAC (Strategic Air Command) Headquarters just outside Omaha and, having made its menacing appearance, turned around and headed back to Omaha. It was a briefly famous, controversial plane that didn't last - and a chilling sight that particular day. (As they say in the comics and cheap novels ... "Little did he know that a few years hence he would be making more than a few visits to SAC Hqs.")

Frances and I had opportunities to work together over the next few years. Then in the mid-60s we met again in New York which gave us an unexpected chance for one last escapade. I had left after 20 years to become Vice President and Secretary of my alma mater, Carleton College, just south of the Twin Cities, and she and I arranged a reunion on one of my business trips to New York where she was serving on our UN delegation. After lunch she suggested we should visit the "new" UN digs, since all I had ever known was the temporary place out at Lake Success when the UN was just starting up. That visit confirmed the then common expression, "Clothes make the man." I was wearing the subdued dark suit, white shirt, and tie so customary in those days and we walked in the front entrance, right past the guards who didn't bat an eye, and eventually
on into the room where shortly the Security Council would be meeting. What a contrast with these times 30 years later.

Swiss-Benelux Affairs was a quiet tour after the heady years with Iberia. The one controversy that threatened trouble was an old sore between the Dutch and the Indonesian over West New Guinea, or Irian as the Indonesians called it, a virtually pre-historic region. The story went that the Dutch wanted to hold on to it because that gave them a presence in the Far East and thus a right to take part in Asian affairs. For their part, the Indonesians thought it should have come to them when, after five years of off and on conflict, they finally won their freedom from the Dutch early in 1950.

Other than that, there was the usual business for us and the people at the Dutch embassy of keeping up on our governments' views and positions on various, current international issues. Ambassador van Roijen was a traditional, veteran diplomat, very professional and a bit detached, who ran a tight ship. He made regular calls at the Department and included all the right people in Washington at the regular flow of social activities at the Dutch Embassy.

One dinner party - they were always rather formal and stiff - was made memorable for me when I sat next to the wife of the then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a charming, lively lady. Somehow we fell to talking about pets which brought up the subject of the parakeet she was trying to teach how to talk. She labored steadily at this project, but with no success. And her husband, who scorned her efforts, offered no support. All he ever said about her project, she told me, was, "'Hell, honey, that damn bird can't talk.' But he could and that is exactly what he learned to say!"

LEWIS W. BOWDEN
Consular/Political Officer
Bern (1954-1957)

Lewis W. Bowden was born in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma and was raised in Kansas. He attended Yale University and then entered the U.S. Navy during World War II. He joined the Foreign Service in 1952 and served in many countries including Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Germany, the former Soviet Union, and Brazil. Mr. Bowden was interviewed by Robert J. Martins in 1991.

Q: After Yugoslavia you went to Switzerland.

BOWDEN: I was assigned to the Embassy in Bern where I spent three years. The first year in the consular section where I was the only officer and therefore the head of the section. That was a useful enterprise in terms of teaching me something about commercial relations between the United States and a foreign country. Then I spent two years in the political section, which was interesting, but because of the tremendous stability of Swiss politics...everything was predictable with a margin of error of 1 percent...the challenge of analyzing a political situation was not there. I doubt if anyone paid much attention to political reporting on Switzerland.
But it was a pleasant interlude. We had a son born there. I came to appreciate the Swiss in terms of very bourgeois mores and habits of looking carefully after their property and being correct in their relations with people. I also learned their great respect for money and how everything almost in this world can ultimately be reduced to the gold Franc. So there were pluses and minuses from three years there.

Q: Then you went back to Russian studies at Oberammergau.

WILLIAM R. TYLER  
Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs  
Washington, DC (1955)

William Tyler was born in Paris, France in 1920. He served with the United States Information Agency in France and Washington, DC. He then entered the Foreign Service and served in Washington, DC, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987.


TYLER: Yes, that was with the Soviets. It was the British, the French, ourselves, and it was Heads of Government.

Q: What were you doing there this time? This is 1955.

TYLER: I was then Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs in the State Department.

Q: So you were really taking quite a different role in this summit, or not?

TYLER: Not really, because all the momentum of the previous years, and whatever knowledge or experience I might have gathered, were not limited to one country. I mean, the movements of-no, it's a good question. It never occurred to me to ask it of myself. I was in Montana on vacation at the time when it was announced that the conference would take place, and I got a telephone call from the Department of State--I guess it was from the Secretary of State's office. It must have been Bill Macomber or somebody--saying, "Look, get back, you're going over with us to Geneva."

So I flew back and went to Geneva. It never occurred to me I would be, but since I was asked, it didn't surprise me that I was going to Geneva if there was going to be a conference with the Soviet Union. Chip Bohlen, Tommy Thompson, Doug MacArthur, also Livy Merchant, who was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and was my boss. Doug MacArthur was Counselor of the Department. Well, I didn't keep any notes, but I remember flying back from
Montana to Washington, and going to a cram session of forty-eight hours on what the chips were we were going to have to play with.

We had no illusions, but we had not--certainly there was no feeling that we were going to go through motions. We were going to prod and sound out Khrushchev as much as possible.

Q: I think it may have been Khrushchev and Bulganin?

TYLER: Pinay was the French Prime Minister.

Q: Yes. Was there any change? Did you find in your delegation, as far as how you observed the Soviets?

TYLER: No, I don't think the individual went over with any preconceived ideas, as a member of the delegation, to see how it would play when you started negotiating, talking. One thing I will say, it's sometimes easier to generalize if you start from a very specific point. I do know that Dean Acheson was not at all in favor of holding--any more than he had been in favor of Kennedy going to Vienna. I'd just come back from Germany, in '61 . . .

Q: Wait, but you were talking about Acheson, who was then the former Secretary of State, observing this from the sidelines.

TYLER: Yes, and I was in the Department, of course. I remember that when I had lunch with him, he said, "I don't know why we're going through with this exercise. All it does is provide a bigger platform for Soviet, psychological warfare and propaganda. They're going to make no concessions, and we're not going to get anywhere. So why give them the benefit of occupying center stage with us, when there's absolutely nothing on which we're going to be able to agree?"

He was saying that off the record, to me. And I said, "Well, I think probably that if we follow the logic of what you're recommending, then we'll never meet with the Soviets. I think the act of meeting--we're not going to lose our shirts with them, we're not going to give them anything. On the one hand, the advantage which they may derive from attending a conference with us, at that level, is surely more than offset by the disadvantage we would incur if we, as a matter of course, did not meet because we knew we couldn't basic agreement with them."

But I think he felt--and of course what upset him, and a lot of us felt was hurting--was the so-called spirit of Geneva, that fiction. . . The way the West was reacting to the possibility of a setting in of a thaw.

Q: This was sort of dubbed "The spirit of Geneva."

TYLER: By the press.

Q: And there was no thaw.
TYLER: Of course not, there couldn't possibly be. I think one of the most difficult things in my particular field of--if you like--public affairs, was how to isolate and define a factor. You can call it a confrontation, but the difference between a free society and a totalitarian society is how to isolate that difference without taking the position that you feel there is no point in discussing or talking, because you know the other man's position.

We were perfectly aware that the Soviet Union would derive a considerable, or short-term at least, advantage from appearing to be reasonable. But we knew, also, that we must continue to meet and discuss issues with them, in order to get our own story across--our own side for the free societies, and last, but not least, for the uncommitted world.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, JR.
Consular Officer
Zurich (1955-1958)

H. Freeman Matthews, Jr. was born in Bogota, Colombia in 1927 during his father's tour there in the Foreign Service. While growing up, his family also lived in Cuba, France, and Spain. He enrolled at Princeton University, but his graduation date was pushed back because of his service in the Korean War. After graduation, he went to work for the State Department in 1952. In addition to Egypt, he served in Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Vietnam, and Mexico. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 20, 1993.

MATTHEWS: We were transferred directly to Zurich which was a nice change. We arrived there in December of 1955. It was an enormous contrast to Palermo, of course. It was just fantastic. You could buy everything in the stores. My wife says that that Christmas, we bought more than we ever had before. We found a lovely house, down the lake in a little town called Thalivil, probably one of the nicest houses we have lived in. We were just lucky because the landlord was interested primarily in somebody who would take good care of his house. He had had experience with Americans before and he liked them.

My job in the Consulate General was passport and citizenship, welfare and protection officer. The consular district included the Ticino, the Italian Canton of Switzerland. In the meantime we'd learned pretty good Italian in Sicily and it actually got better in Zurich because I had to deal with anything that came up having to do with the Ticino.

Zurich was a wonderful change. The Consul General was an old friend of my father named Carlos Warner, who had been with my father in Cuba many years before. The Deputy was a wonderful guy named Wally LaRue who had lost one lung to TB while serving in India. I think Zurich might have been his last post. He had real trouble breathing. These were two very good mentors. It was a very enjoyable post. We had about 6 or 7 Americans and some very fine local employees.
So it was a very interesting assignment. Skiing was something we had never done before but we quickly adapted to it. We could ski 15 minutes from the house, it was wonderful. Of course fine restaurants. You could travel up to Germany and down to Italy and over to France, so it was a fascinating period. We had another son born there, a third son, Timmy, who is now a Lieutenant Commander in the navy and who just had a baby also, early this Spring. We were all very happy there. Some of the friends we made in Zurich are still good friends whom we run into from time to time.

My father in the meantime had been Ambassador to Holland. My mother died in 1955 from brain cancer. My father ran into an old friend who had been a secretary of his many years before, whom he liked but didn't have any romantic interest in at the time, named Helen Skouland, a foreign service secretary. After my mother died, he ran into her when she came up to visit Holland and they fell in love. some months later I made arrangements for them to be married in Zurich with a small reception at our house. Then they were transferred to Vienna, so he was Ambassador to Vienna while we were still in Zurich. We were able to travel over to Vienna to visit them several times.

Q: Did you get into any, were there any reflections or waves at all from the Hungarian revolt in '56, this is October '56.

MATTHEWS: There were numerous Hungarian refugees that came into Switzerland. The Swiss were very supportive of the Hungarian refugees. I think they had the feeling the United States should have done more to try to help them. There were accusations that Eisenhower had encouraged the revolt and then had done nothing about it.

Q: It was difficult.

MATTHEWS: The Swiss really leaned over backwards in trying to do everything they could to help the Hungarian refugees that came in large numbers into Switzerland. They found them jobs and did all sorts of things for them. They genuinely went out of their way to help them. I was not dealing with visas then but I think we probably did issue visas to some of them who went on to the States.

In my job, on the citizenship side, this was a period when various court decisions were dramatically affecting the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act that had to do with loss of citizenship. One after another the different provisions were being set aside as unconstitutional. The requirements on how long you had to live in the States or you lost citizenship; and who became a citizen automatically and who didn't; how you could lose your citizenship; all were being overturned.

I remember some of the cases had to do with dual citizenship. There was a provision in the 1952 Act that a person who lived abroad for 3 years after acquiring dual citizenship and who took advantage of the second citizenship, could then lose his American citizenship. Lo and behold if it didn't turn out to apply to the President of the American Women’s Club in Switzerland.

Q: Oh God!
MATTHEWS: I looked the case over and sent in a request for an advisory opinion on it. The Department came back and said, you've got to expatriate the lady. I made the argument that I didn't think it was constitutional, and I didn't see how you could do this. So I had to call the poor woman and expatriate her. She of course was livid. What she'd done was to get a Swiss passport and used it, and she hadn't been to the States for the required number of years. Anyway, I had to expatriate her. About 4 months later, an instruction came from the Department saying that the Supreme Court had held that that provision was not constitutional, and therefore I should give her back her citizenship. Which I did with some glee.

On protection side of the job, Zurich seemed to attract more than its share of nuts. The Jung Institute was in Zurich and we often wondered whether the people who came in claiming they were studying at the Jung Institute, maybe were being studied themselves. We had a number of weird cases.

I remember one spectacular case of a black GI who married a white German girl without the permission of his superior officer in Germany. They came to Switzerland seeking asylum. There was a tremendous amount of argument over their case. The Swiss were very sympathetic, I was too in fact. They also had two children. They were penniless, and despite how sympathetic the Swiss were, they wouldn't give them work permits. Our military authorities claimed he was a deserter and wanted him back I think this was another case where we finally gave them train fare to get to Paris or Cherbourg or Genoa to get a ship home.

Anyway, we had a large number of welfare cases that were interesting. You dealt with that kind of problem in Europe.

Q: Did you get involved at all with one of the major activities in Switzerland at the time—spying? Were you aware that it was sort of a meeting place?

MATTHEWS: There was a lot of talk of that. But there didn't seem to be a great deal going on. Major interest of course was banking. The gnomes of Switzerland. That was a very hard subject to learn about and that was not part of my job. The Consul General and the Deputy Consul General tried to pay attention to that.

Q: The concern of course being that people had secret accounts. At that time you couldn't penetrate that thing. Everybody who was of criminal intent or tax fraud intent plus other reasons, had their Swiss bank accounts.

MATTHEWS: You couldn't touch them. We had good friends in the banking community there. We made a lot of good friends in Switzerland. Some of them were sort of half-Americans, their wives were Americans. In terms of trying to find anything out about a specific individual, you never got anywhere. But it was interesting in trying to follow to the extent that you could what was going on.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the Swiss felt about the Cold War which was at its height. Did they really feel neutral?
MATTHEWS: They were proud of their neutrality. They wanted to make sure it was maintained. They were also very strongly anti-communist. I don't know what the percentages would have been but they had a small communist party, not anything significant. In Zurich especially it seemed to me that there was a very conservative group of people. They felt that we were correct in standing up to the communists. The Swiss always have a kind of superior attitude towards other people. No matter what wonderful thing you may have done lately, the Swiss could have probably done it better, faster, whatever. So there was a bit of that. And as I mentioned earlier, there was criticism of our response to the Hungarian revolution.

But I think in general the Swiss believed we were right in the lines we were taking. They certainly had no sympathy for what the Soviets had done in Eastern Europe. I think that the Swiss basically tried to be helpful to us. It was almost a positive neutrality they had as opposed to, say the Swedes, a different view.

Our Chiefs of Mission when I was in Zurich were, first, Francis Willis who was our first career foreign service woman Ambassador. She was succeeded by Henry J. Taylor who was a real character. A right-wing radio announcer for General Motors who was a political appointee. General Motors gave him a red Corvette before he came to Switzerland. And he toured around Switzerland in his Corvette with an American flag flying. He had a sad marriage, his wife was quite ill. He acquired a Swiss girlfriend, which unfortunately became rather well known around Switzerland. A lot of fun was made of him from time to time. He was not a wonderful Ambassador.

Q: I take it he didn't have much impact on where you were.

MATTHEWS: No.

Q: Just sort of an object of derision almost?

MATTHEWS: A bit. As far as Francis Willis was concerned, any piece of paper that came to us from the Embassy in Bern, even if it was a letter having to do with visas, (because Bern didn't issue any visas, and we did). Francis Willis would have seen it. She kept very close track of everything. Henry Taylor didn't care too much about visas. He used to attend the NATO Ambassadors meetings. American ambassadors from NATO countries would have meetings in various places. He met my father at one of these things. At the end of one of the meetings, he proceeded to stand up and invite everybody to hold the next meeting in Switzerland, which of course would have horrified the Swiss.

Q: A NATO meeting in Switzerland.

MATTHEWS: A NATO meeting in Switzerland. Anyway, he was a character.

Q: Then you left there and went to Personnel.
RAY E. JONES  
Secretary to the Ambassador  
Bern (1956)

Ray E. Jones attended the Lafayette Business College. After a year in Washington, DC working for the Department of Interior, he entered the U.S. Army. He served overseas as a court reporter in 1945. In 1946, Mr. Jones went to Berlin, Germany with the Department of the Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Korea, Germany, Switzerland, Vietnam, Liberia, the Netherlands, Sudan, and China. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1994.

JONES: After Dusseldorf I went on home leave and was assigned to Bern, Switzerland which was my first Ambassadorship with Frances Willis.

Q: Oh, this is a first for the Service, having first career woman and a first for you?

JONES: Yes, I think I was very lucky to get to be secretary to the Ambassador at that early stage.

Q: Well I had known her in London and she was quite a remarkable woman. Were there problems in Switzerland?

JONES: No, Tom. No problems at all. I must say, it was unique to have been assigned to her, because women in Switzerland do not vote.

Q: But they accepted her?

JONES: They accepted her. I must say she was old style Foreign Service and I learned a great deal from her.

Q: During your period there, I believe, the Big Four meeting took place, did it not? Eisenhower, and Khrushchev, and Bulganin got together. Was that ...?

JONES: I don't believe so.

Q: The spirit of Geneva arose from that? That would not have affected you in Bern? I think that was 1955.

JONES: No, Geneva was kind of a separate entity. We didn't do too much with Geneva.

Q: Were there many visitors in Switzerland that gave you problems, or was it routine?


Q: I see. Well, after your years with Willis you were transferred to the Department?
JONES: I had illness in the family and I was transferred back to the Department. 1956 to 1958 I was on the Israel/Jordan desk. I think we had the 1957 war.

WILLIAM L. BLUE  
Deputy Chief of Mission  
Bern (1956-1958)

William Blue was born in Memphis, Tennessee in 1914. He received a master's degree from Vanderbilt University in 1936. After studying at The Fletcher School, Mr. Blue joined the Foreign Service in 1941. His career included positions in Canada, Venezuela, Italy, Switzerland, Portugal, and Washington, DC. Mr. Blue was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: You did serve in Bern, Switzerland from '56 to '58.

BLUE: Yes, I went there directly from the NATO Defense College.

Q: Switzerland is just about the only Western European country that is neutral.

BLUE: Except for Spain and Austria.

Actually, it was good for my career because I was Deputy Chief of Mission, a class 2 job, when I was still a class 3 officer.

Q: Oh, yes. You were DCM.

BLUE: Frances Willis was unable to get her favorite so she went back to Washington to find out who was available and she must have chosen me for the job. It was a rather fascinating job. It was dull after being in India because we had no problems with the Swiss except over watches. We were trying to protect the American watch industry. We didn't succeed, but we were still struggling to protect it.

Q: Frances Willis was your ambassador. She was one of the first professional women ambassadors.

BLUE: She was the first.

Q: The first Foreign Service Officer...

BLUE: The first career woman ambassador.

Q: How did she operate? She was not ambassador there, it was still a legation there wasn't it?
BLUE: No, it had been changed to an embassy. She was opening all the classified mail. She was quite able but she still had a DCM mentality. She was certainly made an ambassador there because she was a woman. But she annoyed my wife by always emphasizing that she was a career Foreign Service Officer.

We got along very well. She was not hard to deal with. We had very little to worry about. We had a big CIA operation.

Q: I was going to say that Switzerland during the Cold War seemed to be a nest of intelligence operators on all sides.

BLUE: We also had an NSA unit.

Q: Yes, National Security Agency.

BLUE: The chief of the CIA was a man I was very fond of. He had a big staff, about ten people. Our political section had three. He was pretty good about keeping me informed. We had a problem when Henry J. Taylor came. We had to be very careful what we told him because he would go to Paris and talk to the American Mens Club using material we had discussed in briefings.

Q: Well, Henry J. Taylor. Can you give a little of his background?

BLUE: Yes. He replaced Willis and was apparently a friend of Eisenhower. He was assigned to Norway but said he didn't know anybody in Norway. However he did know some people in Switzerland, so they shifted Frances to Norway and sent Taylor to Bern. He had been a journalist; a correspondent for Scripps Howard. Had written quite a number of books. Also had a program on the radio for 11 years for General Motors called "Your Land and Mine." He was a super-patriot type. We got along pretty well. I had problems...trying to keep him from taking classified documents home and things like that. After I left he got himself in a mess. Somebody said to me, "As long as you were there he stayed out of trouble." I said, "Look, it was good luck on my part because he could have easily gotten into trouble while I was there, I did my damnedest to keep him out of trouble."

Q: What sort of trouble did he get into?

BLUE: Apparently some AP man came to see him about an article he wanted to write called something like "Switzerland, Center of Arab Activity and Espionage." In any case it dealt mainly with Switzerland being a center of espionage. The man showed his draft to Henry J. Taylor, and unfortunately Henry J. wrote in some changes. It came to light that he had had something to do with this and the Swiss were furious. They called him in, this was after I was gone, and gave him hell. The Department couldn't deny this. In fact the AP said that if the Department denied it they would release the draft with the ambassador's annotations.

Q: Finally they got you back to Washington.
ROBERT M. BEAUDRY  
Economic Officer  
Bern (1956-1959)

Robert M. Beaudry entered the Foreign Service in 1946 after serving in the U.S. Army during World War II. His career included positions in Ireland, Morocco, Switzerland, and Italy. Mr. Beaudry was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

BEAUDRY: But, that was pleasant as a post. We had four children by then. From there, after a month in the hospital and home leave I went to Switzerland where I was the number two man in a three man economic section in the Embassy in Bern.

Q: What was the situation in Bern at the time?

BEAUDRY: Well, there never is a situation in Switzerland. My big problem was that I used to do the monthly economic report and I had to find an inventive way to start the first paragraph. Of course, you have to remember that Switzerland doesn't allow any foreign governments to mess around in their economic affairs. We had a Lt. Colonel from the Army who had contracts for pasta from a Swiss company. He went to the pasta factory and the owner blew the whistle and the cops came to arrest him, thinking he was trying to get commercial secrets. They were very difficult on that score.

I found that every month in their statistics there would be about 30 or 50 people unemployed. I finally found out who the hell these people were. They were musicians in between gigs. But everybody else in the country was working. From the economic side the one thing we had in those days was end-use certificates to prevent East-West trade.

Q: This was to prevent the reshipping of strategic material from the United States to anywhere in Eastern Europe.

BEAUDRY: Exactly. Then on the other side there were elements in the US that said our watch industry was essential to national defense. The Swiss had 95 percent or the business and wanted 100 percent.

Q: We had Wesclox, Elgin and a few like that in Connecticut, I think.

BEAUDRY: The US government was having a series, one after another, of these deals where they would have a study to determine whether or not the jeweled watch industry...you see in World War II jeweled watches had played a role in artillery shell fuses and the like, but with the advent of proximity fuses, which was an electronic deal, it became much less important. So we had that as an issue.

Then we had the infamous Interhandel case. I.G. Farben had a subsidiary called I.G. Chemie.
Q: *I.G. Farben was a German chemical conglomerate.*

BEAUDRY: Yes. They had a big American operation, which were sequestered by the United States when we went into World War II. We were talking $200 million when that was real money.

So they said that was owned by a Swiss company called Interhandel, formed the day before we went into the war. The Swiss kept arguing that it was their company. That was a major issue because Cromwell and Sullivan, the big New York law firm...

Q: *Which was Dulles' law firm.*

BEAUDRY: Yes, that is right. They had the Swiss brief and there was a whole series of Department of Justice lawyers who were making careers on this case. And nobody wanted to deal with it because there was a lot of pressure on the Hill. The Swiss wanted it back. A lot of people said, "Look, you can't have it back." It was in the courts...beginning of putting evidence in computers, etc.

One of the interesting things, I would be with the Swiss Ambassador talking to the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, who is flipping a football around his huge office. It was all part of that Kennedy period when there was a lot of pizzazz.

Anyway, I drafted a letter that the Secretary of State sent to...

Q: *This actually was later wasn't it, because you were in Bern...?*

BEAUDRY: Yes, but I came back to Washington...

Q: *Why don't we talk about the Bern side first. You had two ambassadors while there, Frances E. Willis and Henry J. Taylor.*

BEAUDRY: Miss Willis was great, except she had one problem. She just focused on everything. I can remember sitting at staff meeting and her saying, "It was thus..." Somebody would say, "Well, I am not sure, Madam Ambassador." She would say, "I know it was." She would sweep out of the room into the file room, find the airgram and bring it back. That was great, except I thought it would limit her in a larger mission. But she was first rate. I enjoyed working with her.

She did the kind of nice thing. In those days when you went to a post you would say, "May I call?" and then go around and bring your wife, etc. When I did that to her she said, "Why don't you come to lunch and bring the family?" I said, "Well, two of them are house broken, but..." "Well, bring those two." It made a kind of family relationship for the staff...not that she wasn't demanding on having everything up to snuff.

The next person was quite different. Henry J. Taylor was a journalist, Scripts Howard. He was a columnist and had a radio show before or at the start of World War II for General Motors. So he
was very in with the General Motors crowd. We met every General Motors person whoever came.

He had his standing, this was the Eisenhower administration...

*Q:* Which was "What is good for General Motors is good for the country too."

BEAUDRY: Well, he came too, that Charlie Wilson. But what you had was, this man was the only journalist who had praised and supported then General Eisenhower for making his deal with Admiral Dalan, the French quisling in the North African campaign.

*Q:* This was December, 1942, if anyone wants to look it up.

BEAUDRY: The press really exploded over this, but not Henry J. Taylor. So that meant he was golden. Well, what can I say?

*Q:* How did he operate?

BEAUDRY: A guy from the Irish Embassy said one day, "You know your Ambassador drives, it is only about three minutes by car from his Residence to the office over there, why does he leave the house and go to the railroad station and make phone calls? Why can't he make them at home or in the office?" Well, he had all kinds of extracurricular personal arrangements, things of a nature that got him into trouble. He had a newspaperman staying with him. Pretty soon the newspaperman wrote an article about the revolution which took place in Iraq, in 1958. He said, "This was all financed through Swiss banks." Well, the Swiss government went "tilt." The Ambassador said he had nothing to do with it. And they said, "How come we have a copy with your handwriting on it?" They would have liked to have seen him go, but the President wasn't going to send him away.

*Q:* Was he messing around with that sort of thing?

BEAUDRY: No, he wasn't messing around. Some guy, a friend of his, had a story which may have had some validity, I don't know. But he didn't realize that he was no longer just another news guy with a buddy.

*Q:* Did he intrude very much in the operation of the Embassy?

BEAUDRY: Yes, he was a presence. He didn't intrude in the functioning because it was all pretty technical. The things, though, that he got into...some mountain climbers came to grief and he got all enthusiastic about doing something...he started from a newspaper base. Those were the things that interested him. Basically he was a good enough fellow. He didn't cause people any trouble. He never could get names of the personnel right. He would call me by my colleague's name and vice versa. It wasn't that he was senile.

*Q:* What was your impression of the Swiss financial system?
BEAUDRY: Not as smart as their reputation, in my view. We realized that the Foreign Service wasn't furnishing what you might call a hard economist or banker types, so Washington recruited a fellow, whom I still see, out of the Federal Reserve system. He came into the Service laterally and stayed in for 25 years...Tom Summers, who was assigned to Zurich, where he became quite close to the bankers. He gave us that professional dimension in our reporting.

Q: Well, were we, I don't want to use the word pejoratively, but were we trying to penetrate what the Swiss were doing economically just to have a feel because they had a disproportionate influence in the European economy because of their banking prowess?

BEAUDRY: You know, I never thought of them as having a disproportionate influence. They played a role, but I don't see the Swiss going out and saying to the Dutch, "You really ought to extend the polder and expand your economy in the north," or any of that kind of stuff. Established businesses would come in for financing. They did a lot of third world stuff under their secrecy business, which at the time the Embassy ignored. Maybe intelligence agencies did more, that I couldn't say, because we had nothing to do with that.

We went through things...during that period they revised their tariff. Well, you know, you have to support your exporters in all of this and it took an inordinate amount of time in a small office.

Then, on banking secrecy, later when I worked in the Department, we negotiated an agreement with the Swiss which helped to support our international drug operation and other white collar crime. I think it has worked fairly well. We do get assistance from the Swiss, including bank stuff now. That is since the early seventies.

Q: Well, then you left Bern in 1959, still in the Eisenhower period, and came back to the Department. What were you doing there?

BEAUDRY: I was the economic officer for the office of Swiss-Benelux Affairs which was in the Office of Western European Affairs. Later the Swiss were put in an office with Austria and Italy. Benelux was a natural. They were countries that were not dissimilar...mostly economically, commercially oriented and financially active, a high degree of intelligence and education and generally speaking they were a reasonable group.

Q: You were mentioning your dealing with the Swiss on the I.G. Farben business and going with the Swiss Ambassador to Bobby Kennedy. Could you tell me a bit about that?

BEAUDRY: Ambassador Lindt had an appointment with the Attorney General. This was early on in the first months of the Kennedy administration. As the man on the Desk dealing with these things I went along with the Swiss Ambassador. His position was...look, why don't you guys settle this case? You see these companies in the US (General Analine and Film), were functioning under a government manager put in by the Justice Department. There were people in America who felt, "Gee, we are not getting any financing to expand because nobody owns it, it is under a cloud. Why don't you solve it and let me buy it cheap and I can make a lot of money with it."
The Swiss on the other hand wanted to have time to make their deal and say, "Look, it is ours, you've got to give it back to us." They were trying to negotiate. At the Desk level we said, "You know it is cluttering up our relations with the Swiss all over the place." There were Americans in the broader financial area who didn't want the Swiss unhappy with us. It was much better for all of them that we had good relations.

So on the basis of improving US-Swiss relations the EUR Bureau favored a settlement. The lawyers at Cromwell and Sullivan who represented the Swiss were dying off. They had been dealing with this thing since 1941. So the feeling was, "Look, let's solve it." I did a memo to the Secretary and his instructions were to convert it to a letter from him to Robert Kennedy. The point being that somebody had to cut the Gordian knot and Kennedy had the moxie, they said, to do that. He said, "Okay, dammit, we will write legislation and push it through." And he did. I don't remember the details but there was a certain selling off of shares in this thing and the Swiss took a certain amount of money off the top of the sale. This got it out of the government, but didn't give it back to the Swiss, it was sold to Americans and others...I don't know who the purchasers were, but they weren't necessarily Swiss. And that seemed to solve the problem and I guess it still has, I haven't heard about it since.

Q: Yes, but the story about Kennedy and the Swiss Ambassador?

BEAUDRY: Yes, Kennedy had been down there waiting with his assistant for the Ambassador to come in. They had a football...they had their shirt sleeves rolled up...the AG's office was about 40 feet long and they could get a fairly long pass. It was very much what you had been reading about. In the '60s it was touch football--now it's jogging.

Q: One further thing on this problem. Was it our impression, it sounds like there had been a paper transfer just before war was declared so that the Swiss claim to this complex was pretty...

BEAUDRY: This I am pretty weak on. I guess what I should say is that their claim was sufficiently solid so that they could push it for 20-odd years and not be laughed out of town.

Q: Were there any other issues in this Swiss-Benelux time that you were there?

BEAUDRY: Yes, in a way and it is coming up again. That is the period when the European Community, as it then was, the Common Market Treaty was signed, in 1957. There was a big move at the time to sidetrack it. The six, as it was then, Benelux, Italy, Germany, France, had as part of their goal a community that goes beyond just a customs union. But there were a lot of other people, including the British, the Swiss and the Scandinavians and others, who felt that this would get them into all kinds of sovereignty questions and financial questions. Wouldn't it be better just to have a free trade area?

There was a battle in the Department. We on the Swiss Desk, reflecting our client, were sort of saying, "Hey, in the free trade area you could do this and that and could be assured that we weren't penalized, etc." Well the true community believers in Washington won that one.

Q: Well, this was led by George Ball, particularly in Western Europe.
BEAUDRY: Well, Ball, Schaetzel and Jack Tuthill and those guys.

Q: When you are talking about true believer you are really talking about TRUE believers, aren't you.

BEAUDRY: Well, they were. And they were right. What happened then was...that was when the US government weighed in, I believe. I was out there at the end of the line and was not privy to headquarters stuff. But that was when we got instructions not to go around giving the Swiss the idea that we think the free trade area is a good thing. They, in fact, formed their free trade area, called EFTA, European Free Trade Area. Portugal and Finland were included. Up until just a few years ago it still existed, although getting smaller all the time.

The Swiss concern was that 60 percent of their trade was with Germany and they couldn't stand to be excluded from the German market. That is what they were after. And so were a lot of these other people...the Austrians and people like that.

I have often felt that the degree to which the US government weighed in for support of the European community concept is perhaps not appreciated. Because in that period when it might have gone the other way...I don't know, but certainly we rallied to Monnet and all the "institution builders."

Q: We certainly pulled out all stops as far as that was concerned. And this was a real policy.

BEAUDRY: Yes. And we believed it for reasons well beyond commercial, financial and economic. It was the heart of our European policy after World War II.

HENRY S. VILLARD
Representative, European Office of the United Nations
Geneva (1958-1960)

Henry S. Villard was born in New York City in 1900. After receiving his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University he did post graduate work at Magdalen College at Oxford University. His career includes positions in Tehran, Washington D.C., Rio de Janeiro, Venezuela, Norway, Libya, and ambassadorship to Senegal and Mauritania. Ambassador Villard was interviewed by Dmitri Villard in July 1991.

Q: So in 1958 you were sent abroad again, this time to Geneva, Switzerland. What was your assignment there?

VILLARD: The title of my position in Geneva was United States Representative at the European Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations. This, as the title implies, involved chiefly representing of the United States vis a vis the other countries represented at the
UN in Geneva. For the other organizations in Geneva, such as the World Health Organization, I had direct relations with them; they included the Office of Refugees, the International Labor Organization, etc. It is an example of multi-national diplomacy at its best.

Q: It was also the site of innumerable conferences dealing with trade and tariffs, communications.

VILLARD: Also, for example, the high-level political conference on surprise attack, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and so forth.

Q: How do you feel the effectiveness was of your organization and staff in Geneva?

VILLARD: I think that we had an excellent organization, mostly specialists in various subjects, all of whom knew their business. We were unfortunately not able to represent the United States as effectively as we might in a social sense because of the action of the chairman of the House of Representative's appropriations committee, Congressman Rooney. He held the purse strings and for personal reasons he resented the fact that the incumbent consul general lost his job when I arrived at the post. He took out his ire at this by depriving me of all representation and housing allowances and we had to move out of a very satisfactory villa where we used to entertain our various diplomatic opposite numbers and move into a small apartment, which created a bad impression in Geneva. It was very embarrassing.

Q: How do you feel the interest was of the Department in your work at that time?

VILLARD: I think only a certain section of the Department was really interested. The trade agreements section of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades) in the Economic area of the Department was certainly interested, but not so much interest on the political side was apparent.

Q: In 1960 you were then appointed ambassador to Senegal and to Mauritania. If I am not mistaken you were originally appointed ambassador to the Mali Federation which included the country of Mali as well. What happened?

RALPH N. CLOUGH
Political Officer
Bern/London (1958-1961)

Ralph N. Clough was born in 1917 in Washington. He attended Lingnan University in China from 1936-1937. He graduated from the University of Washington in 1939 with a B.A. He received his M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940. In 1941, he joined the Foreign Service. His postings included Toronto, Tegucigalpa, Puerto Cortes, Kunming, Peiping, Nanking, Hong Kong, London, Bern, Taipei, and Washington D.C. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.
CLOUGH: There's sort of a link between the two. I was in Warsaw with Jake Beam for three years, from '58 to '61. The first six months, I was based in Bern, but then I was transferred in January to London. Really, I commuted from London.

Q: So really, your Bern and London assignments, basically, were still China-related assignments.

CLOUGH: I was still China-related. People often assume, because I was from the East Asian Bureau, that I was doing that job in London (they always had an East Asian guy in London), but I wasn't. Frank Galbraith was there at the time, he was doing that job. I was put in London only to facilitate my commuting to Warsaw. They gave me a job in the political section reporting on the Conservative Party and dealing with relations between Britain and Scandinavia, but that was the lesser part of my job. I had to keep up on what was going on in China, and I had to make a trip every few weeks. In three years, I made 25 trips from Warsaw.

Q: It's a pretty long, frustrating business.

CLOUGH: Yes.

Q: Sort of matches Phil Habib's performance in the peace talks on Vietnam in Paris, where he stayed on year after year going through the same threnody.

Q: (Kennedy) Weren't you the subject of a Congressional inquiry at one time?

CLOUGH: Oh, they got me mixed up with Cal Maillard, our interpreter, who was also stationed in London. The two of us used to go back and forth to Warsaw. He had told some newsman about how he spoke Chinese to some counterpart in the Foreign Ministry, and somebody in Congress decided to make fun of the State Department: Here's this guy specially trained in Chinese, but he's living in London. It didn't amount to much.

Q: Really tenuous charge. So when we're talking then about your Bern and London assignments, we're really talking still about the Warsaw Talks.

CLOUGH: Yes, that was my primary function in those places. Although after the talks slowed down and they didn't occur very often, they were able to spare me from London for other jobs.

For example, in 1960, I was sent to the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva for about six weeks. That was headed by... a lawyer in New York, the name escapes me. Anyway, he headed the Law of the Sea delegation. It was the last effort to get worldwide agreement on what we called the US-Canadian proposal for Six Plus Six: a six-mile territorial sea and a six-mile fishing zone. This failed by one vote. Anyway, that's beside the point.

The point is, they were able to spare me in London, because the talks in Warsaw dragged out. I had to go once from Geneva while I was on this special assignment to Warsaw and back for a couple of days. And then on another occasion I was sent with the Librarian of Congress to Hong
Kong and India to look into the situation of refugees from China. We spent three or four weeks on this round-the-world trip and writing up the results. So that shows you that the demands in Warsaw were not very pressing.

Then I was transferred in July of '61 to Taipei. This is where the two things get linked together. Because when I arrived in Taipei, one of the first things that was going on at that point was the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. It was linked to the admission of Mauritania. And Chiang Kai-shek was threatening to veto this proposal, because they regarded Mongolia as part of China, not an independent state, just a Soviet puppet, and therefore it couldn't become a member of the United Nations.

But the threat to do this was infuriating a lot of Africans, who wanted to see Mauritania get in. And Africa was a very important area for the Republic of China. To maintain its position in the U.N., it had to have the support of a lot of African countries. They were coming into the U.N. as independent states in increasing numbers, and we needed their vote on the China representation issue. So one of my early chores in the first week or two after I got into Taipei, was to talk to Foreign Ministry people, to persuade them not to take this foolish act.

Q: They probably agreed with you, didn't they? It was the old man who was holding out.

CLOUGH: Yes, it was the old man, and he...

Q: But they must have tried to convey to him that this was a disastrous policy in terms of upholding their position in the United Nations.

CLOUGH: Yes, I would hope so. Anyway, he finally desisted, and that crisis passed. In early '62, we began to get reports. Drumright was the Ambassador in Taipei when I arrived. I was the DCM, and this Mongolia crisis occurred while he was there. But then in March, the following year, he went on home leave. Averell Harriman had become Assistant Secretary, and he didn't care much for the position that Drumright took on the Taiwan-China issue. Harriman, I think, wanted to see some movement on the China issue. So Drumright proposed that on his way home he stop off in Manila, where there was going to be a Chiefs of Mission Conference, to which Harriman was coming. Harriman said, "No, you go right on. We'll have our DCM in Taipei come to represent you."

Q: So you were at that Chiefs of Mission meeting in Baguio in 1962. Because you remember I had made a presentation as Consul General, Hong Kong, with regard to what was going on in China and what the implications of this were. It delighted Harriman, because basically what I was pointing out was information that supported the thesis that we should be taking another hard look at what our basic China policy should be. And, of course, Chester Bowles, who was Harriman's superior at that time, being the Under Secretary, also shared that same point of view. And, furthermore, at that Chiefs of Mission meeting, you'll recall that Harriman was really quite dictatorial, and he was very short and sharp with certain people at the conference, particularly Sam Gilstrap, who was our Consul General in Singapore. You must have sensed, in other words, in 1961 when you arrived there, that the Kennedy Administration was taking a rather different look at the China policy, which was very difficult from your viewpoint, because
they were leaning a bit in the direction that was going to make it very uncomfortable for our representatives in Taipei.

CLOUGH: That's right, but I think the experience on Mongolia had a somewhat chastening effect on the Kennedy Administration, because they hadn't realized the strength of the Nationalist views and how it would affect the China lobby. After all, Kennedy had got in by a rather narrow margin. Schlesinger later said in his book that they had a talk about the China issue, and Kennedy said that we haven't got the political support to do very much on China. Let's leave that for the second term. And, of course, he never had a second term.

WINIFRED S. WEISLOGEL
Consular Officer
Geneva (1959-1961)

Winifred S. Weislogel was born in New Jersey on August 8, 1927. She received a bachelor's degree from Barnard College and a master's degree from Otago University in New Zealand. She entered the Foreign Service in 1956. Ms. Weislogel's career included positions in Geneva, Tripoli, Tangier, Rabat, and Lome, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on September 24, 1992.

Q: Well, then, how did your overseas assignment come about?

WEISLOGEL: By the way, I was living in Washington. I don't know where the interest first occurred, but I decided I'd like to learn Arabic. Maybe because esthetically it looked like a beautiful language and I wanted to know what these funny little squiggles were saying. But for whatever reason we had a new mosque built in Washington around that time and they were offering classes to the public in Arabic. So I went to the classes, and I began my studies of Arabic there, learned the basics of the language and the grammar. It was taught by the man who was the director of the mosque and the attached school. They also ran a school for Arabic speaking children of diplomats in Washington. So that was where I started Arabic. Originally, when I was putting in my request for assignment, I was torn because I wanted an Arabic country. That eventually won out, but I also was still interested in the Pacific Islands and the Trust Territories. That was kind of a secondary interest, but I did apply for an Arabic speaking country -- so I got Geneva Switzerland. And I still have a letter which I treasure which I received, and I was very disappointed. Imagine anybody being disappointed about going to Geneva . If I had to go now in the foreign service, go to Geneva, I think I really would be disappointed because I don't think I could survive financially. But in those days the dollar really was worth a dollar, not only that but I think we got about 4.7 Swiss francs to a dollar which is now down to nothing and you could live and you could travel in your vacation times while you lived in a city like Geneva.

Q: I remember in that era my wife and I traveled around Europe and I have a diary saying it was costing us a lot of money. It was running almost $10 a day for two of us. This is with train travel.
WEISLOGEL: But anyway, I took my assignment, it was consular officer. In those days we had a consulate general in Geneva. That was subsequently abolished. All the consular functions, except for those involving visas for foreign diplomats who were assigned to the UN in Geneva, were transferred to Bern and Zurich.

Q: *What were you doing then?*

WEISLOGEL: Strictly a counselor assignment -- that's where I learned the ropes. There were two men that I remember very fondly, John Bywater and Stan Lawson. They were old time consular officers. I don't think they even came in through the exam system, I think they came up the ranks. They knew all the tricks of the trade and they were great people to learn from. Stan Lawson in particular was very old school, a very courtly gentleman who could teach a person a great deal about the protocol as well as about the job requirements.

Q: *Any great consular problems you had to deal with while you were doing this?*

WEISLOGEL: Great consular problems....I remember there was one very, very well known. I don't even remember his name, if I did I probably wouldn't say it, but he was a nuclear physicist from the United States and he kind of went around the bend. He thought the US foreign policy was wrong and he decided to defect to the Russians. But somehow or other he came in and told us about his plans and I remember going in sort of a panic to the consul general and saying, what do we do about this thing, and he said well, you know, he's a free citizen, he's pretty much free to, we can't stop him. We don't have a police force. I learned a few things about the limitations. I always did say though, for somebody who’s going into consular work a degree in social work would be a lot more useful than a degree in international relations. Because, I had cases, I had a woman the Swiss authorities were very much concerned with because she was living in a hotel with her young son. He was about 9, 10 years old and she had a drinking problem they said, very serious. But they weren't worried about that so much as long as she paid her hotel bill of course the Swiss could care less, but what worried them was that the boy was not going to school. So they reported it to us and of course I went along to see her and it is the classic story of the alcoholic. She had perfume bottles in the room filled with booze, under her bed littered with empty bottles, and her little son. She had been taken away, she was so drunk. They had removed her anyway, she was causing a disturbance, but the little boy we interviewed and he said that he went out at night and put empty bottles in front of other people's doors so that they wouldn't know that his mother was drinking. That was really sad. Fortunately, the family had money, and the grandparents agreed to pay for the boy's tuition and board at the local international school in Geneva. So we stowed him there and we managed to get the woman into a clinic where she was supposed to dry out. But that was really a case. That was terrible. Talk about the classic situation, in the movie Lost Weekend where they hid the bottles in the chandelier.

Q: *Come fill the cup, I think or something like that. So, anyway, it was one of those situations.*

WEISLOGEL: It was one of those situations, yes.

Q: *Were you still pushing towards the pacific or Arabic?*
WEISLOGEL: I was pushing towards Arabic. Then I continued through, Ambassador Villard knew of this man, I think...

Q: This is Henry Villard.

WEISLOGEL: Henry Villard, he was there at the time. He was the Administer.

Q: He's still going in Los Angeles. We've interviewed him. His son interviewed him.

WEISLOGEL: His son at the time was at a private school outside of Geneva and they had a professor who came and taught Arabic to the sons of Arabs so that they would keep up with their native tongue. I was looking for an Arabic teacher so I was referred to him and he gave me lessons. Finally I met another couple, one of them as it turned out was a woman that they had me meet and we agreed to exchange our Arabic and English lessons, who turned out to be the wife of one of the very top chiefs of the Muslim brotherhood. He was in exile from Egypt, and he had taken refuge in Geneva but he was still active in the brotherhood. So I met a lot of interesting people through him. I also got to know a lot of the Algerian exiles; this was before the Algerian independence, the Evian meetings were going on. In fact, I remember giving a visa to a man who was just one of the students, but we were targeting them at that time with the idea that if Algeria gains its independence, it would be a good idea to have some contacts with the leadership. And these people, obviously the educated Algerians, with foreign experience, were going to be the new leadership.

Q: I was just interviewing John Baker yesterday, who was working on this and mentioned this in Washington how we were giving visas to young Algerians we thought would be leaders but putting it under the national student association or something like that so that we could have a little distance from this sponsorship so we wouldn't get the French too upset.

WEISLOGEL: That's correct. I remember I think I jumped the gun on one of the visas and I got my knuckles rapped properly for it because I was supposed to wait for the clearance and here the guy was going to get on the plane in two days. Of course that shouldn't have been a factor and I was still pretty inexperienced but anyway it turned out okay and he got his visa along with a lot of the others. But many years later, this was while I was on the Algerian desk in Washington, I went over for a conference in Algeria, Bill Eagleton was the Chargé d’affaires. At that time we did not have diplomatic relations yet with Algeria and we were under the auspices of the Swiss embassy. But Bill had a little get together and I was present along with, I think he was the director of American affairs in their foreign ministry and we got talking about the early days and his background. I said, "You studied in the United States, when did you get your visa?", he said, "Well, in such and such a year." I said, "I think I was in Geneva at that time and I bet I gave you your visa for the states." He said, "I have my passport here", and by golly, there the visa was in his passport. He had been one of those students. He had subsequently become the Director of American Affairs in their foreign ministry and, by the way, the Swiss Ambassador was also present at this little gathering and there I had been in his country at the time that I gave the visa, so we all got quite a laugh out of it. But it goes to show that, yes, some of these young people are well chosen and they do attain positions of importance.
Q: Were you encouraged by the consulate general to take Arabic lessons?

WEISLOGEL: Yes, I never had any problem in the consulate itself. I did this on my own so it was my own business, in fact I think they were rather intrigued by the fact that I had a few contacts with some interesting Arab people in Geneva. But of course I applied formally for the Arabic language training. I still have the letter. They turned me down cold. They said we do not think that women have any future in the Arab world because of the local attitude towards women and therefore your request is being turned down, but thank you for your interest.

Q: This is used all over the place, almost everywhere you turn.

WEISLOGEL: I wouldn't have argued with them for a place like Saudi Arabia, probably this is still not feasible, you're not going to get anywhere if the local people don't accept you. But as I went on to another assignment, I did get my Arabic assignment. I was sent to Libya next, of course, as personnel officer which I had no background for and no special interest in but I was also backup consular officer there and I did have to deal with local authorities on several occasions, many occasions. I never had any trouble at all because I was a woman, never. That was one of the more conservative countries.

Q: Usually it's not the person, it's the country they're representing.

WEISLOGEL: This is it. I probably have less of a problem, because, first of all, they look at me and they know I'm not a local woman. I don't look like an Arab. Secondly, they just simply put me into a neuter category. Whereas women who have been places in South America have said that they have had a lot more problems being accepted on professional grounds because they can be mistaken for local women and if they don't behave like local women then they are regarded as something else, but certainly not as professionals in the foreign service.

FREDERICK W. FLOTT
Political Officer
Geneva (1959-1962)

Frederick W. Flott was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1921. He entered the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included assignments in France, Iran, Germany, Switzerland, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Mr. Flott was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Again, we move on. You moved to Geneva from 1959 until 1962?

FLOTT: Yes.

Q: What were you doing there?
FLOTT: At that time, at first it was a Consulate General in Geneva, it later became the US Mission to the European Office of UN. I was the political officer in this group. Geneva was the venue for many international conferences. I served basically as an advisor to all these visiting American delegations, especially on Soviet matters...perhaps helping a bit with the liaison with the Germans, the French, and other delegations.

Q: At that time, could you describe what you would tell these delegations about negotiating techniques, or how the Soviets negotiated?

FLOTT: Quite frankly, the first time I got into the Geneva business, I was still serving in the Political Section of the Embassy in Bonn in May, 1957. The annual meeting of the ECE in Geneva was coming up—the Economic Commission for Europe, a UN entity. On the American side it tended to have as its head, as chief of delegation, a political appointee who was a good contributor to Eisenhower's victory, but who did not have time enough to become a full time Ambassador. He got the next best thing, which was an appointment as chief of the U.S. delegation to the ECE Plenary. The Embassy in Bonn and the Department asked to have me sent from Bonn down to Geneva, as a member of the delegation, with only one specific duty and that was to make sure the U.S. delegation did not inadvertently recognize the German Democratic Republic. I ended up doing other things and socializing with the Russians, interpreting a little, and helping with drafting. But basically that was it. Also, I had the job of cooperating with the Germans and seeing that the American delegation was helpful to the Germans in any way we legitimately could be. That was generally a successful effort, and after that I was assigned permanently to Geneva to continue doing the same sort of thing with a wide range of visiting U.S. delegations.

Q: What was the Soviet style of operating?

FLOTT: The Soviets, of course, wanted to throw their weight around. They wanted to behave like a great power. They did have certain inferiority complexes which they tried to overcome in a variety of ways. Sometimes by being reasonable; sometimes by being willing to learn, but mostly by throwing their weight around in a very heavy-footed way to show how big and tough they were. They, of course, wanted to exercise leadership in the socialist camp. From the point of view of individual members of the Soviet delegation, they had only one concern and that was to look good at home by being militantly anti-American, anti-Western, anti-capitalist. Very aggressively asserting their leadership in the socialist camp.

That made them look good at home, which was not only career building but also enhanced their life expectancy, because if they had not done it, their years might have been shortened.

Q: Was their ever a time when both delegations--the Americans and the Soviets--would get together and agree that "Okay, we'll give our anti-speech and you give yours, and then we'll get down to work".

FLOTT: I wouldn't say there was that much agreement, but occasionally references were made when the agendas for meetings were being set. If the Soviets would say that we want to address this problem, we might reply, "Well, if you put this item on the agenda, we will be obliged to
reply appropriately." There were slight exchanges of that sort, but there was no real coordination or co-conspiracy; there was a little bit of reaction occasionally.

Q: Were they sort of mirror images of each other?

FLOTT: The whole name of the game and the whole product of the exercise was largely posturing and not giving an inch. Our not letting them score any points that we could help, and their not wanting us to score any points they could help. The UN technocrats, the number-crunchers among the UN economists would try and write an objective description of just how bad the economy was in Eastern Europe and Russia. Of course the Russians would object and threaten to have them all fired and all. We would say, do tell us more, because they weren't telling us as much as we would like them to. There was that kind of game. There was no major policy formulation done at the time. There was just a constant, on-going effort, that we did for forty years, of taking their temperature and sizing them up; resisting their encroachments; making it very clear that they weren't going to be allowed to get away with anything. That is basically what we did. In a way it was done successfully. This may all sound rather negative. It was. But I really do not believe we could have done anything more creative or more positive at that time. The Soviets were just not ready to talk. We did not miss any opportunities; there were none.

Q: Did other delegations look upon the United States as people to do that sort of thing and maybe go their own way? For example the French.

FLOTT: Yes, the French wanted to exercise their sovereign and French right to be different and do something different from what we were doing. We listened to them politely and compared notes. The British had benign amusement at what they regarded as the sometimes excessive enthusiasm the Americans brought to their anti-Soviet efforts, but they didn't really dispute that we were on the right side of the issue. They just thought we were excessively militant. We didn't mind being known as that.

Q: As a professional sitting there dealing with this thing time after time and you had these delegations that would come out and many of the people were authorities, not even authorities, but political appointees, but really pretty naive in this type of world. All of a sudden they would arrive in a difficult negotiating arena. Was this a problem for you?

FLOTT: It could have been a problem, but I must say these political appointees were willing to take advice. They were team players. They knew we and they were trying to do the same thing, in pursuit of the same national-interest objectives. Even at my modest, second secretary level of access to them, any advice I gave to them on how to play the Soviets, I must say, they always accepted it. It was not that my advice was all that remarkable, but they were team players, good people who were willing to acknowledge that a professional in this business probably had some insights.

Q: Any horror stories?
FLOTT: Nothing bad, really. There were a few minor, occasional, little protocol flaps. There was one chief of delegation, a very wealthy American from the private sector--lots of money--and the group went over to a casino across the border, to Divonne in France, and this fellow went around handing out the French equivalent of ten dollar bills to all the American wives to play on the tables. His deputy, who was with him and from his corporation, realized that his boss was going a little bit far, so he collected the money discreetly and returned it to his leader. So there were very minor protocol flaps, but basically, these were very public-spirited citizens who were very capable of teamwork, and whose hearts were in the right place. They were trying to do a good job for the U.S., and usually they succeeded.

Q: You went from the quite gentility of Geneva to Saigon where you served from 1963 until 1966. I might say for the record, you have given extensive interviews on this to the LBJ Library, and I hope at some point I could have some copy of that.

DAVID E. MARK
Political Officer
Geneva (1959-1963)

Ambassador David E. Mark graduated from Columbia University in 1943. Shortly after completing a year of law school, he was drafted into the U.S. Army. Near the end of World War II, Ambassador Mark joined the Foreign Service. He served in Korea, Romania, Switzerland, Burundi, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Henry Precht on July 28, 1989.

Q: You left Moscow when?

MARK: In, I guess it was June 1959. I had arrived in June of ’57.

But at the last minute, Washington said, "Well, instead of going to Tokyo right away, could you please put in three months on TDY--temporary duty--in Geneva, because we have this conference going on to ban nuclear weapons." I think at the time, it was soon after the conference to discuss the scientific possibilities of banning nuclear weapons had ended more or less successfully. The final agreement had said that there were enough possibilities of verification scientifically to justify the political negotiation effort. But anyway, they told me, "Would you go down there, because we always have a sort of Soviet expert on the delegation, and our Soviet expert is being pulled away very suddenly for some other job. So until we get another one, could you fill in there?"

I said, "Sure." So I went down to Geneva for three months and began learning something about the subject. I fell into the hands of the extremely able disarmament crowd, including such people as Ron Spiers. And after three months, there was an adjournment. That was at the end of September 1959. These conferences always have periodic adjournments. And they said, "Well, you know, we're going to resume soon and go on up to Christmas. We will see how these things
go, but you've learned enough now. So couldn't you stay another three months, and we'll fix it up with the Japan desk about your Tokyo assignment." And I said, "Sure. It's okay with me."

Q: Did you want to stay in Geneva?

MARK: Geneva was a nice place. I went back to the States actually in October 1959 and got engaged at the time. I had met a lady in Moscow, an elegant American lady who was running the Anglo-American school there; she left the year before I did, but we corresponded. I went back to the States, and on that leave in October 1959, we got engaged. So Geneva was sort of closer to Washington than Tokyo, it seemed to me, and thus I went back to Switzerland for another three months.

Well, as you might imagine, by year's end, I had acquired six months of experience, had begun writing many of the speeches for the disarmament delegation for its formal presentation, had begun learning the details of the issues there, and had begun understanding something about how arms control efforts were evolving. This subject was the name of the game at the time; the nuclear test ban was politically important; and so the Department said to me, "Well, you know, if you want to stay in Geneva and don't want to go to Tokyo, you can."

The East Asian office was very upset. They said, "We've had this job vacant nine months now and it's an important job:, but, okay, we've taken our lumps," and I went back to Geneva. So I was there four years altogether, until the conference ended in July 1963. By the time it ended, much had happened. We always had a political appointee as the head of the delegation. Initially, it was James Wadsworth, who had been our U.N. ambassador for a while, and then, after that it was Arthur Dean, who had been the head of the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.

We had initially had a couple of very distinguished Foreign Service officers as chief of staff. When I first got there it was David Popper, who doesn't need any description, later Ambassador to Chile and Assistant Secretary for UN affairs. Then it became Charles Stelle, who died very suddenly later on but who was, of course, an old Iranian hand, too, like you, Henry (Precht, the interviewer). But anyway, he came to Geneva, and when he left, I became chief of staff, "Coordinator", of the delegation. Thus, I got heavily involved in the disarmament side. I finally received my promotion, because I had sort of worn away the stigma, I guess, of that lapse in Moscow, and because I had learned something useful about disarmament processes with the USSR.

Q: Did you like it? I mean, that technical business is quite different from what you had done in the past.

MARK: Right. But it was political too, because the aim of the conference--there were three countries negotiating it: Britain, Soviet Union, and the United States--the second aim of the conference was to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading to any additional nations, besides the first aim of stopping the testing; and this political aim was going to be realized through the clauses of the eventual test ban treaty. It was a very complicated formula that was going to involve bringing the French and the Chinese into the arrangement.
But no one could envisage in those days what happened subsequently. I mean that, in 1966, a separate treaty was concluded to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, which is still in existence. Our conference was just on testing, but since non-dissemination was then the side aim of the negotiations, we were heavily engaged in all kinds of political issues at the same time regarding non-spread, and we also wanted to set up the structure of a test ban verification agency. It got us into intrusive verification questions that were, you know, quite insoluble until more recent days.

Also, in the last year of the conference, the test ban issue was subsumed under the new 18 nation disarmament conference that was set up in 1962. We three nations maintained a kind of separate identity as a "subcommittee" within that larger conference. But our delegation--again it was still the same delegation--had now to spend time on the new conference's attempt, that went on for a year, to negotiate general and complete worldwide disarmament, nuclear and conventional.

Q: Did you take this all seriously?

MARK: Well, people didn't take the conventional disarmament side so seriously, but nevertheless there was the glare of publicity on it, and we had to come up with overall disarmament plans. We had all kinds of staged conventional disarmament plans, getting rid of planes, tanks, and artillery and troops and zones and whatnot. I mean, these things were thought out. They've only come to life really in the present day. But 25 years ago, we were discussing lots and lots of these same issues.

Q: But did you really think that you were doing work that would have a practical outcome?

MARK: Yes and no. On the nuclear test ban side, we always had hopes of success because, obviously, the Soviets had an interest there, too. But on the rest, no, we didn't. But nevertheless, it was an exercise in which for the first time we were forced to think about all these matters in a systematic way. I mean, if you were serious--and as far as world public opinion was concerned we had to seem to be serious--then what did you propose you do? What kind of disarmament plans; and what was wrong with the Soviet plans, because they had come up with them, too? So anyway, that was all.

Q: You were talking about your service at the Geneva disarmament conference.

MARK: Well, this conference went through a number of phases. Of course, to jump ahead, we do now have a nuclear test ban treaty; it's a partial test ban treaty. It doesn't cover underground nuclear tests. Our negotiations were aimed at concluding a total nuclear test ban, but we ended up with a partial one as a result of direct negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1963, that at the last stages brought in Averell Harriman as chief negotiator.

To jump ahead even further, after the end of this conference, I was sent for my senior Foreign Service training to Harvard to be a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, of which Henry Kissinger was then deputy director. And one could do almost anything one wanted during that year; and one of the things I did was to write a book about my nuclear test ban experiences. This
turned out to be a fairly lengthy book of a couple of hundred pages, and it does record my experiences, as well as describe the details and motivations of the four years of negotiations. Unfortunately, I never could get it published in the United States. I tried a number of university presses and they said, "But you don't have footnotes."

And I said, "Well, a lot of this is my personal recollection."

And they said, "Well, we're not sure it will sell very well."

And I said, "No, but that's why a university press exists." And in any event, the book finally got published in 1965 in German by the German Foreign Policy Association.

**Q:** *You didn't have to translate it?*

**MARK:** No. I didn't have to do the initial translation draft, but after each section was translated, it was sent back to me for correction--the German text was sent back for correction. It had taken me four months to write the book, but it took five months to correct the German.

But incidentally, and this is jumping ahead to the present day (1989), a friend of mine still on duty in the State Department in Soviet matters, who has kept up with disarmament types on the Soviet side all these years, was in Vienna in 1989 to talk with the Soviet diplomat who is now involved in negotiating with us on the conventional arms force cuts. I believe that's the conference that I'm talking about.

Anyway, this man, named Oleg Grinevsky, had been a very, very junior man at the time of the test ban talks. He was then just starting his Soviet Foreign Service career. But he said to my friend that he is now putting together all his recollections to write a book of memoirs about disarmament efforts from the Soviet point of view, but unfortunately, he didn't have any really solid recollections about the test ban negotiations. And my friend said to him, "Oh, haven't you read Dave Mark's book about it?"

He said, "I didn't know he'd written a book."

And my friend said, "Yes. He wrote a book but it's in German, unfortunately."

And the guy said, "Well, I don't read German."

So my friend said, "Well, I'll talk to Dave and find out whether he's got the original English manuscript." And I rummaged around and found an English original and sent it to my friend in Washington, on condition that he xerox me a copy, as well as xerox one for our Soviet colleague. And so now a Soviet has a copy of it and may look through to see how that contributes to his recollections of this conference and to his understanding of American negotiating positions.

But anyway, getting back to the time of the conference, the Eisenhower Administration carried the conference in effect up through November 1960. That's when we adjourned. We adjourned just about the time of the election in which Kennedy was elected. And this was the only Soviet-
American negotiation that survived the U-2 crisis in May 1960; it continued going. Much of our emphasis had been on test ban verification problems. How, if we got to a nuclear test ban, how could we be sure on our side that the Russians weren't cheating on the treaty?

Well, nobody had been talking about Gary Powers and the U-2, even though he and his colleagues in U-2s were flying over the Soviet nuclear testing site in Siberia, Semipalatinsk. So we had a lot of intrusion. We could see every time the Soviets began surface preparations for blowing up a nuclear weapon. I mean, there were extensive towers and testing equipment and whatnot, that one could see from the U-2.

Q: And presumably they knew we could see?

MARK: I would think so, because I had not been let in on the U-2, but while in Moscow in 1958, I had read a debriefing report of a defected Soviet soldier, who was really Polish, but had ended up in that part of Poland taken by the Soviet Union in 1944-1945, and who had been drafted into the Soviet army when he got of age. He had been a young boy at the time the war ended. And he told about being in a unit in Siberia which periodically got very agitated. Then, he heard from one of his officers that there was something hostile flying over now and then, but that there was nothing that the Soviets could do about it. He was in an antiaircraft unit, but they couldn't do anything about it and this got everybody very excited.

So, of course, that was the U-2. I didn't know its name then. Even after reading it, I thought, "Well, that's an interesting kind of defector's report." But, in fact, the U-2 was what was going on. So obviously the Soviets did know about it. They knew about it all too well.

But we had the U-2's information, and we also had technical detection possibilities which we talked about, and which meant tracking seismic events. I mean, earthquakes cause seismographs to register, and so do nuclear tests. But then the question was, "Well, if the Russians did it in certain kind of rock layers, wouldn't that tend to mask the seismic waves or cause us to confuse them with natural events?", natural events being the earthquakes. Then we got into the "big hole theory"; namely, that if you had a tremendous cavity in the earth like a salt cavern and the U.S. or the USSR did the explosion in that, it would muffle the sound. And there were, you know, scientific postulations that supported the "big hole theory."

So we said that, obviously, to be sure about things, you had to have on-site inspections. I mean unless you could have on-site inspections, you couldn't ever know what was a "natural event" or a man-made nuclear event, or whatnot. And so the Soviets, naturally, in that era said, "On-site inspection is espionage." But after much to-do, they said, "Well, we'll agree to three of them a year."

That was a tremendous concession. And they agreed to three of them without ever agreeing, then or later, on what an on-site inspection would consist of, on what specific steps the other side could take in terms of looking around the suspected place. That was another whole set of arguments that occupied days of meetings. But the question of whether a mere three could ever be accepted by us was not a very difficult one. The answer was "No." Three were never going to be enough. Because if you used one, then you had two left. And if you used one of those two,
you felt that you had none left, because if you ever used it, if you ever used your last one, then the Russians could test with impunity because you had no on-site inspections left.

Q: Did we really want an agreement? Did our side?

MARK: Well, I'm coming to that in a minute. [Laughter]

So what would be enough? Would five be enough per year, or seven, nine, eleven? The question you just asked, "Did we really want an agreement?" then came into play. A lot of people didn't want an agreement, and the top of the Eisenhower Administration was split very clearly. Defense didn't want an agreement; the Joint Chiefs didn't seem to want an agreement; State wanted an agreement; and Disarmament was not then a separate agency, it was within State; Eisenhower wanted an agreement, but only a sound and politically defensible one.

Everybody wanted to get rid of nuclear testing in the atmosphere because it was producing radiation. Strontium-90 was affecting milk and all that sort of thing. Testing was the origin of what we now call the "green movement," but those kinds of tests in the atmosphere could have been easily prohibited by a simple agreement. There was no danger of cheating on that. You didn't need international verification means other than what the U.S. possessed on its own; and our military would have preferred a simple thing of that sort.

But other people wanted a total nuclear test ban, not just an atmospheric ban. I even invented for one of my speeches at the conference, I think sometime in 1960, the phrase, "preventive disarmament." In other words, if we could prevent nuclear tests, we'd prevent all the weapons that new nuclear warheads could go into. As a matter of fact, from what we now know we couldn't have developed MIRV missiles, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. We couldn't have had them because, if we had had a complete test ban in the early '60s, we never would have been able to develop a warhead for a MIRV missile. As a matter of fact, our whole range of missiles would have been totally different, much, much simpler. The whole problem of large-scale disarmament would have been totally different if we had arrived at a nuclear test ban treaty.

Q: Why were some people opposed? Why were some people in favor? What was the motivation?

MARK: Well, some people, of course, didn't want to have agreements with Soviet communists under any circumstances. I mean, we find people more or less like that today. I would say the people represented by Richard Perle in current-day Washington (1989).

Q: People so distrusting of communism or fearful of the Russian power?

MARK: Or not wanting to reduce the United States to seem a mere coequal instead of a greater and better nation. You know, if you sign an agreement in which you pledge not to do what they're also pledging not to do, you give them legitimacy as coequals, and these people didn't want to give that status to the Soviet Union. They also thought, there were a lot of people who still thought, we could gain supremacy if we kept on testing. You know, we had more technology and we had more resources.
It's this old idea that has come up again in the Reagan years of spending them into bankruptcy. We have succeeded more or less in doing that, but we've done it to ourselves almost as badly in the course of it, so that's the irony of the thing. But in any case, there were those factors there in the 1960s.

And yet there were other people who were for disarmament, people like Ambassador Gerald Smith, who was already involved in those days and for years after, ultimately as head of the Arms Control and the Disarmament Agency, a Republican serving in all kinds of administrations. I mean these people believe that disarmament is one of the means by which we would gradually reach a Soviet-American entente, or at least an understanding about live and let live. And of course they were urging this in the Khrushchev era, so there was then already some reason to think that evolutionary possibilities existed.

Q: Did you get the sense that there was a similar division on the Russian side?

MARK: Not on those issues, and the Russians were extremely difficult to fathom then. We were only tentatively starting at that time what is now standard practice at disarmament conferences. It began for us in '62 when we merged the nuclear test ban into the new 18-nation disarmament conference. And the new aspect was that, after each meeting of the 3 nation test ban subcommittee, the sides would get together informally and just exchange notes, exchange remarks on the meeting, or sometimes use it as an occasion to talk informally about what might be going on in the other's capital. That began in 1962 and is, as I say, now standard practice, which led to the hit Broadway nuclear disarmament play, "A Walk in the Woods," that sort of thing.

But it had not happened before mid-1962. Before then, at most, we had lunch together every now and then, of which more later. There was also for me another incident. But the Russians were extremely tight-lipped about things. The only hint we got was that there might be a fight in Moscow about whether they should resume nuclear testing. Because the Soviets, when they went into this conference in 1959, had declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and we had not. I mean, we came to stop testing later, but we didn't declare it officially. So we went on testing in 1959, and then we did get into a short moratorium. But then we said that we were going to come out of the moratorium soon, whereas the Russians were still stuck with their earlier unilateral moratorium; and they obviously were uncomfortable militarily with this one-sided hiatus. We got a sort of threat from them--"Well, if the U.S. doesn't come around, and if the U.S. reserves the right to resume testing, then the Soviets would have to resume testing, and so forth." I mean, they finally did resume in--just to jump ahead--in September, I think, September 1, 1961, but this issue was clearly a problem for them within the delegation.

Also, there was some problem with their scientists. We got into such trouble in 1959 about how to distinguish seismic tests, which were natural events versus to distinguish natural events, that we decided to have another conference of scientists (there had been one in 1958). Indeed, we had a couple of them on different technical issues. And their scientists came to Geneva and clearly they were willing to say certain things about the difficulty of verification with instruments alone; and therefore they implied that one would need on-site inspections, but in saying this, they were
deviating from the official line. So much so that after one of these scientific meetings, when there had been a joint U.S.-Soviet declaration by the two teams of scientists, the Soviet government repudiated its own scientists officially at one of our political meetings. So that was another sign of some intra-Soviet disagreement, but that was not on the political side; that was on the scientific side.

Also, we did have the impression that the Soviet delegation took the lead at times in pressing Moscow to agree to adopt a certain position. It wasn't that they were taking sides. They were being creative in proposing ways around impasses with the U.S. and UK. We did feel that happen from time to time. But to get back to the American point of view, there were those differences, and the differences centered most visibly, though not uniquely, on this question of how many on-site inspections per year would be enough. And people in Washington in 1959 generally agreed that ten were probably as much as we needed to ask for, but they said, "Well, but look. We're in a negotiating business with the Russians, so you can't ask for ten because you'll never end up with ten. Let's ask for 20." So they asked for 20. And, of course, once they asked for 20, 20 became a sacred number, supposedly reflecting technical necessity. Everyone forgot, if they ever knew, that 20 had been put in there purely for bargaining purposes, but it became the "scientifically valid" number that the U.S. would need for its security.

Well, of course, there was nothing scientific about any of these numbers, even ten. It was just a value judgment about how intrusive you had to be to keep the Soviets honest, and there were some Americans who thought you really didn't need inspections at all, because you had photographic satellites soon that replaced the U-2. I mean, we had the first, I think, KH-4 satellites, not long after that, and though they weren't as refined as some of the later ones in terms of distinguishing objects on the ground, they certainly could tell about nuclear test preparations. Plus, as I mentioned seismology told us a good bit.

We said that, after all, you don't have to be 100% sure that the Russians had not tested. All you have to do is create a situation that would prove frightfully embarrassing for them before world opinion if they were ever caught red-handed. And you could create such a situation just by your seismic monitoring and a few on-site inspections. That would be enough. The Russians wouldn't dare cheat, particularly when you kept your powder dry, i.e. you kept yourself ready to resume testing whenever they cheated. Indeed, that was one of the conditions that the Joint Chiefs later forced us to append to the ratification protocol in the Senate, that we keep our powder dry, keep our nuclear laboratories going, be ready to test at a moment's notice.

So, anyway, toward the end of the--I guess it was in 1959 that we came to 20--December 1959--this demand for 20 inspections, and that, of course, became a hang-up for all the remaining period of the negotiations, this inflated number. There were lots of other issues that developed, and I can say with all modesty that you can find this recounted ad nauseam in my book on the subject, which is one of only two serious full-length books on the test ban. [Laughter] There other one was written by a law professor at, I think, either Michigan State or the University of Michigan; and I've been told by objective outsiders, who have read both, that if you want to really know what that conference was all about, you must read both books, that each by itself is not as good as taking them together. And I'm sure that very few people ever will so read or ever have done so.
Q: But did Henry Kissinger find your research, or the research you did for him in Harvard, interesting?

MARK: Well, it was written at Harvard, but it wasn't done for him. I don't know that he ever looked at it. I sat in on a course there that he gave, which was a seminar on world security issues. The head of the Harvard Center of the time, though Kissinger later succeeded him, was Bob Bowie, who was later Policy Planning Director in the Department. Maybe he was also an assistant secretary in the Pentagon at one time. He is still, now in his late seventies, very active in foreign affairs matters.

As I say, I attended this Kissinger seminar, and so for some years if we met thereafter in the State Department or wherever, he would say, "Oh, yes. That is my old student." [Chuckles] But that's about as close as I ever got to Henry Kissinger, despite a few occasional meetings later in the State Department on transient issues.

The conference on a nuclear test ban had a long break from November 1960 when Kennedy was elected, because he wasn't going to be inaugurated for a while and would then want to review negotiating policy. He was inaugurated on January 20. And so, after our last meeting in November 1960 we went to a farewell luncheon with the Soviet delegation.

There were three of us on each side, including me, and we ate in a very nice restaurant in Geneva. We started at 1:00 p.m. and everybody drank a lot, and the head of the Soviet delegation, who was named, Simyon Tsarapkin, later the Soviet ambassador to West Germany, drank more and more and more vodka. And about 4:00 in the afternoon that day, he pulled me aside and spoke Russian. Well, he always spoke Russian to me, but this time he spoke used the "you familiar" form, which he had never used before and never used again.

He started by saying to me, "David, I know what you did in Moscow, and it was a terrible thing for a young man to have done such harmful things against our great Soviet motherland. But, you're a young man still, and you can make up for it. There are things you can do which will right the wrong which you committed. I want you to think about that and I want you to do the right thing. And when you've decided to do the right thing, speak to Yuli over here."

Yuli was his number two. "Yuli" is Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, currently ambassador to Afghanistan, who I don't think was ever a KGB agent. I think he was pressed into service as liaison for the KGB just as I had been contacted earlier by the CIA. But in any case, I never responded to that effort. I just reported it to my boss and to the CIA; and Tsarapkin, after a few more vodkas, passed out dead drunk. [Laughter]

So the two delegations didn't get together again until March 1961. And I should say, speaking of Tsarapkin, just on the side, that once early in 1963, when we were still negotiating, at that time on general and complete disarmament as well, we were at a cocktail party that someone gave. My wife was there, as well, and Tsarapkin came up to my wife and spoke English to her and said, "I can't tell you how difficult it has been for me all these years sitting opposite your husband."
"Why?" she said, "What's the matter?"

He said, "Because he chews gum, and he's there all the time chewing gum while I'm talking and while everything's going on. It's a terrible habit, you know, and why don't you tell him that he should stop?"

So my wife did, and I said, "Well, the Soviets are right for a change." And not a piece of gum, despite much temptation, has crossed my lips since that day. [Laughter]

Q: But the Soviets seemed to have put into these disarmament negotiating jobs more senior professionals than we did. Is that a fair generalization?

MARK: Well, not any more. I mean, I think we've had tremendous professionals there, people like Ray Garthoff now.

Q: Ray Garthoff is now the Deputy Secretary of State; some Russians rose to that rank.

MARK: No, no.

Q: He's not even an ambassador.

MARK: No, though he has been an ambassador, ambassador to Bulgaria.

Q: Not to Germany, though.

MARK: No, no. Well, that was to West Germany for Tsarapkin, you know, and West Germany is big stuff for us, but East Germany is big stuff for the Russians. I should say that even this assessment has changed for the Russians since the 1960s. Their ambassador to West Germany is now important, and, indeed, one of their former ambassadors to West Germany is one of Gorbachev's right-hand men, Falin, who is now one of the secretaries of the party's Central Secretariat in Moscow.

Q: Maybe these people that were assigned to this job later moved into jobs that were much more important than comparable jobs on our side.

MARK: Right. Well, I think Vorontsov, for example, whom I mentioned, and there is also the guy who started out as a very junior fellow who now has my book manuscript in English, who is now leading the Soviet delegation on conventional disarmament talks. The Soviets have consistently taken people up through the ranks of disarmament negotiations. I mean, Karpov, who is the head of their SALT negotiations--START, I guess they call it now, Strategic Arms Negotiations, he's a guy who has also risen from the ranks.

Q: Why is it that our system hasn't made the same use of you that they did of the Soviet participants? What's the difference?
MARK: Well, first of all--

Q: I'm not trying to get you to defect at this late date. [Chuckles]

MARK: Well, I mean the Soviets generally don't have political appointees to various jobs. I mean, the heads of our delegations to these talks are invariably political appointees. Max Kampelman, for example, who went from Carter to Reagan, but he started out as a political link to former Vice President Hubert Humphrey, is a political appointee who has gained very professional expertise. But when I was in disarmament talks, Arthur Dean and James Wadsworth were politically connected, and there have been people like that all along in every negotiation.

Occasionally, a negotiation will have a Foreign Service officer as the head of it. Our negotiation to the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks, which dragged along for what, 13 or 15 or 17 years without getting anywhere on cutting conventional forces in Europe, got so dull that, even though it started off with Stanley Resor, who had been Secretary of the Army, ended up with professional Foreign Service officers as chiefs. But that was because it had become so unpromising, more or less. But, otherwise, we get political people put in at top and our able professionals are then the much relied on number twos.

Q: But so were the able professionals in the Russian side number twos and number threes.

MARK: And number one.

Q: But the number twos and number threes moved on up the ladder.

MARK: Right. Well, a lot of our people have moved to other jobs. Some career people do break through to the professional ranks. Walter Stoessel, after all, became Deputy Secretary of State.

Q: David Popper became . . .

MARK: David Popper became the assistant Secretary of State for UN affairs, ambassador to Chile, so it does happen. Take Larry Eagleburger, whom I first knew as special assistant to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach in Lyndon Johnson's Administration--and even then showing that he was a guy destined to go a lot further by the sheer brass of his decisiveness, willing to take on senior people in the Department, even though he was very junior in 1966. You know, he has arrived at the top.

Q: No, no. I'm not saying our people don't rise to the top. But what I'm saying is that people that have gone the disarmament route have not seemed to prosper to the same extent they have in the Soviet Union.

MARK: Well, Ron Spiers was in disarmament for years. That's the way he started out, and he has just ended up as Under Secretary of State for Management. He has now gone on to the U.N. as Under Secretary General of the U.N. He's been ambassador to Turkey and Pakistan and Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research as well as for Political-Military Affairs.
Q: Okay. I withdraw the point.

MARK: And let me say even more that the guy who got his first overseas assignment on our delegation in the test ban talks in 1960, and then went on with the 18-nation disarmament committee, has gone from entry level to Class 1—that was in the old Class 1 in the Foreign Service—faster than anyone in history—12 years—and is now our ambassador to the United Nations, Tom Pickering. He started out in that delegation and worked on disarmament affairs, and just everybody saw immediately that this was a comer.

Q: But not very long. I mean, most of his career was elsewhere.

MARK: He was there on disarmament, I think, two years.

Q: That's right, but that's not very long.

MARK: And then what did he do? I mean, then he went off to become a Swahili linguist and went down to Zanzibar.

Q: That's right. But what I'm saying is, my point, which maybe is an ill-taken one, is that disarmament negotiations are not necessarily the road to the top in the Foreign Service.

MARK: No, they haven't been, although Spiers got involved with disarmament again very heavily as the head of State's Bureau of political-military affairs. Jim Goodby has had a career that's been mostly disarmament. He's been off in NATO to some extent, but it has been mostly disarmament, and a very successful career.

Q: But he hasn't done anything much recently.

MARK: He was head of the European security talks on Stockholm and laid the groundwork, I mean, for the agreement with Moscow that we have on exchanging observers at each other's troop exercises in Europe, and on surprise attack questions. He has been ambassador to Finland and, you know, that sort of thing.

Q: I think that makes my point. But anyway, that's a diversion.

MARK: I didn't finish with one other thing about the test ban talks, and that was, I think, it must have been in early '63, when we were already part of the 18-nation disarmament conference. But it might have been late '62, but I think it was early '63. At the end of one of our meetings—this was a meeting on the nuclear test ban, which, as I noted earlier had become a subcommittee of the main 18-nation subcommittee, still consisting of just the British, Americans and Soviets, a Soviet delegation member came up to me. As I said earlier, we had then inaugurated, what is now standard disarmament practice, these information conversations, postmortems on the meeting. And he said to me, "I'm new on the Soviet delegation"—in Russian—"I'm new on the Soviet delegation and I'd like to talk to you."

And I said, "Go ahead. We're talking."
And he said to me, "No, but I don't want to talk here. I want to have lunch with you."

I said, "Okay. Where?"

He said, "Well, you know Geneva better, so you pick a place."

And I said, "Okay." And I thought of a restaurant a little bit out of town and said, "Well, how about meeting there?"

And he said, "When?"

"Well, whenever you want."

"Tomorrow."

"Okay. We'll meet tomorrow." So, of course, I told the CIA people about this right away, and they said, "God, why did you pick that restaurant? That's where all the spies go." [Chuckles]

I said, "Well, it seemed nice, out of town."

They said, "Well, we'll cover you there just in case there's anything funny going on here."

We got out to the restaurant and he was there; and he said to me that his name was Yuri Nosenko. He was the new security officer for the Soviet delegation; and he had come to me because he had to do some business with the Americans, and he knew that I was a CIA man. And I said, "But I'm not a CIA man. I've always been in the Foreign Service."

"Oh, no, no," he said, "I know about that, because I've read your file in Moscow, and it says you're a CIA man," going back to these incidents while I was at Embassy Moscow. [Laughter]

And I said, "I won't argue with you about that. What is the problem?"

And he said, "The problem is that, as the security officer of the Soviet delegation and a member of the KGB, I am given some dollars for emergency use." The dollars in his case were $900. In 1989 terms, that might be about $2,500 or $3,000. And he said, "I did something I shouldn't have done. I went to a bar. We're not supposed to do that, but I went to a bar and I got drunk, and the money was stolen from me. I've got to account for it. I've got to make it up. So I can give you some information that will be very interesting to the CIA, and all I want is my money." So I gave his presentation in detail to the CIA.

Q: He gave the so-called information?

MARK: No, he described the nature of some Soviet operations, without naming people or places that he would betray.
Q: There was no deal yet?

MARK: There was no deal. I didn't have the money anyway. And so I told the CIA people and they said, "Oh, he's just kidding you. He can't really, as a KGB man, believe that he can sell us two bits of spying information, and then that's that. Because once he does that, so to speak, he's in our clutches."

I should say that at lunch I had asked this guy, I said, "Okay, you're in trouble. Why not confess you did something wrong? You lost the money and you're terribly sorry. It will hurt your career some, but look, now you're going to commit treason. You want to turnover information to me that--

Q: You're trying to save his soul.

MARK: No. I was trying to understand a KGB man's mentality. But he said, "But I don't feel that way about things. I've been in the KGB a long time, and when Stalin was running things--and that was almost ten years earlier--we knew where we stood. I worked in the Kremlin guard unit at that time, and I knew I was defending the Politburo and I was defending the party and whatnot. Now with this guy Khrushchev, I don't know whether I'm coming or going. He's changing things all around the party, the system. He's making bad speeches about Stalin. That's not the Soviet Union that I grew up in nor the motherland that I want to defend."

Well, maybe this was a rationalization on his part, but it may be the way some people are thinking about Gorbachev at the present time. Who can tell? Who can tell? In any event, when I told the CIA people, they said, "Well, we'll just take him over from you. So you arrange a meeting place."

Q: Were they trying to dismiss him as not serious in order to get you away from the game?

MARK: No, no. I wanted to get out of the thing. I had no interest in following up on it. On the contrary, they were in dead earnest. I mean, what turned out--and I guess I can say this here; I don't know if I should.

Q: Sure.

MARK: Maybe it's still classified; maybe not. They succeeded. I mean, they got hold of him, and I guess they gave him his $900. But what they did was to turn him into a double agent. And Nosenko went back to Moscow for two years, and I was told later that he had been extraordinarily valuable to us for that period.

Q: Did he eventually defect?

MARK: Yes. Nosenko defected two years later publicly, again in Geneva. He was security officer for another Soviet delegation, and he openly defected, and the Soviets complained and the Swiss investigated, duly and whatnot, and the Soviets accused us, of course. I don't know the details, but I think that after two years of being a double agent, things were getting a little hot in
Moscow, or he was afraid they were. Ironically, he came here soon after Kennedy's assassination, and there was part of the CIA led by the then chief of CIA counterintelligence, James Angleton, which believed that the Soviets, through Lee Harvey Oswald, who, after all, had a big personal Soviet connection, had been involved in the Kennedy assassination. And they thought that Nosenko had been sent over here by the KGB to disabuse us of the idea of Soviet involvement.

Now, Nosenko did tell us that the KGB had had nothing to do with the assassination, because that is what he knew to be the situation. Angleton didn't believe it, and he, in effect, arrested Nosenko and kept him in a CIA jail for three years. Now, I thought that whole approach was ridiculous. How could Angleton, knowing of the two years in which Nosenko had been a double agent, and an extremely valuable double agent, knowing in effect that he had really first defected from the then Soviet Union in late '62 or early '63, let's say, how could he believe that Nosenko would do the Soviets' bidding and palm off a phoney story about Lee Harvey Oswald after Kennedy's assassination. It didn't make any sense.

But nevertheless, Nosenko went all through this. Angleton was finally overruled on this, and then forced to retire, not only for this, maybe, for other things, too. And some aspects of his story have come out in testimony before one Congressional committee. Not all about the double-agent part, but about Nosenko and his quasi-jail sentence that followed.

**Q:** What happened to him after this?

**MARK:** He has been successfully resettled here, and I don't know what his current name is or what he's doing or where he's living, but he has successfully resettled in the United States.

There's one other thing that happened in my Geneva days, and this has to do with the Berlin crisis which Khrushchev started in '58 demanding that we, in effect, recognize East German authority over West Berlin and threatening to resume the blockade and various other things. This was a crisis which dragged on until the middle of '61 when they ended it, in effect, by building the Berlin Wall that was, in hindsight, a defensive move which admitted their defeat on the issues raised three years earlier. But this had been, of course, a very, very hot and heavy matter for three years, and had been prominent at the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting in Vienna, I believe, in the autumn of 1960, before the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which Kennedy had--

**Q:** 1961, right?

**MARK:** The Cuban Missile Crisis was '62.
Ambassador Jean Wilkowski entered the Foreign Service in 1944. Her career included assignments in Trinidad, Colombia, Italy, France, Chile, Switzerland, Honduras, and an ambassadorship to Zambia. Ambassador Wilkowski was interviewed by Willis Armstrong in 1989.

WILKOWSKI: Yes. We had a good crowd of people in Santiago. I finished there in '59 and went on home leave to Hawaii. Then I went to the GATT tariff negotiations in Geneva, the Dillon round, and was there for about a year and a half. Very interesting assignment. I was deputy to Herman Walker on the U.S. team negotiating with the EEC.

Q: Sixty-sixty one.

WILKOWSKI: GATT was a very interesting assignment. It was the first time that the EEC had applied as an institution to the GATT for admission. As you know its accession had to be negotiated from the combined tariffs of the original six members covered in the Treaty of Rome of 1953. It was a very complex thing getting all the EC tariffs aligned and then negotiating from a single, new tariff.

I had a second job which was to head up the Spanish accession. The Spaniards were a bit skittish dealing with a woman, despite my efforts at trying to put them at ease speaking Spanish.

Assistant Secretary George Ball was not pleased when the Spaniards came to him and complained that "the U.S. negotiator handling the Spanish accession was too tough." This after I had first tried to ascertain if they were to be treated as "big boys" or as a developing country. As it turned out, the Spaniards backed off after 3-4 sessions and the negotiations weren't resumed until several months following the Dillon Round.

RUSSELL PRICKETT
Consular Officer
Basle (1961-1962)

Mr. Prickett was born and raised in Minnesota and educated at Hamline University and Harvard University Law School. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was assigned to Vienna as Administrative Officer for the US Mission to IAEA. His subsequent assignments were primarily in the economic field. They include Basle, Belgrade (two tours), and Tokyo. After Economic Training Mr. Prickett held senior positions in Washington dealing primarily with Trade Policy, NEA Regional Affairs and Financial and Monetary matters. Mr. Prickett was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: In the first place, when did you leave for Basle?

PRICKETT: It was I think June of ‘61, or maybe it was February.
Q: The admiral who was in charge, Admiral —

PRICKETT: Foster.

Q: — Foster: how was he? I mean, did he know what he was doing, or was this just sort of an assignment?

PRICKETT: Yes. He had been on the staff of Senator, or Representative, I think it was, Clinton Anderson, who was chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. He was a retired admiral. He and his wife were very prominent socially in Washington while they were there. The Admiral ran a tight ship. He was very, very good in the parliamentary debates, in the meetings. When we were talking about safeguards, for instance, he would say, “Mr. Chairman, there’s a sign above a saloon in Brooklyn that says ‘Too much beer is just enough,’ and Mr. Chairman, that’s the way we feel about atomic safeguards.” He was in his ‘70’s and one of the sharpest men in town, no question about it. He was a little stiff. One time I applied for leave, and he said, “Well, now how long have you been here,” and I didn’t get the leave. So I basically — I never had a real vacation until I was back home after both Vienna and Switzerland. I had to make do with stretch weekends sometimes.

Q: The Kennedy Administration came in in January of ‘61. Did that impact on your mission at all?

PRICKETT: I don’t believe it did. There were no personnel changes as a result of the change. The Eisenhower Atoms for Peace Initiative, which gave rise to the existence of the IAEA, brought in John McCone as the first governor from the US. He was a defeated congressman from New York State. I think he remained in that office, although he still resided in the States. He came over for the meetings. I do not recall any changes in policy directives. The Kennedy Administration certainly subscribed to the basic mission of the mission, that is to push through those atomic energy safeguards. You know, Eisenhower, by today’s lights, would have been considered a “flaming liberal,” a real internationalist. So it didn’t make a big difference. We listened on radio to the Kennedy-Nixon debates. I remember one of our mission members saying he wasn’t sure how he felt about a President coming into office who was younger than he was. He was a mid-career officer; McClellan was his name.

Q: Walter McClellan?

PRICKETT: No. I can’t remember his first name. Ed Brady was the senior scientific advisor.

Q: Well, you were transferred to Switzerland, to Basle, in ’61, and you were there for how long, about?

PRICKETT: I was there till June of ’62. Let’s see, from December of ’59 until June of ’62, that time was almost evenly divided between Vienna and Basle.

Q: What were you doing in Basle?
PRICKETT: I was the number-two man in a two-man consulate, and my boss was a political appointee who had been appointed as deputy information officer to Paris, I think, partly to handle the flack that came when our U-2 was shot down. He was a very sharp guy, very sharp. He had won a Heywood Broun Prize up in New Hampshire for exposing corruption in the Attorney General’s Office — by the attorney general, as a matter of fact. He said it was the only time in his life he ever carried a gun, because he felt threatened by some of that stuff. He was a New Hampshire man. I complemented him on the good looks of the women on the consular staff. They were all women, by the way. And he said, “Prickett,” he said, in his New Hampshire accent, “On my staff I will tolerate inefficiency. I will tolerate bad looks. But I’ll be god-damned if I’ll tolerate both.” So we had a couple of older women — one was the commercial specialist, and the other was the consular specialist, the passport officer — and then we had a bunch of very nice-looking young women on the staff. And we did not issue immigration visas. We referred them to Bern or Zurich, I believe, but we did a land-office business in tourist visas, but we issued hardly any to non-Swiss. We had a lot of Italian workers who were up in Switzerland as guest workers, *Gastarbeiter*, and they would come in and they would apply for tourist visas. We would ask them where they lived and why they hadn’t applied in their home consular district. Oh, it just wasn’t as convenient, and so forth, and we couldn’t consider that they were *bona fide* tourists; they were just looking for a way into the States. Oh, and of course, there was protection, too.

Q: *Can you think of any problems?*

PRICKETT: There were two substantial categories of students in Basle. There were theology students studying under Karl Barth, and there were medical students, who had, I assumed, not been able to get into a US medical school so they were studying abroad. A number of guys who were my contemporaries were theology students. We played basketball together. They invited me to come to the alternate Monday evening colloquia with Dr. Barth, which was a very, very interesting, stimulating thing. As for medical students, one of them got picked up by the police for exposing himself to some young girl on one of the bridges across the Rhine at Basle, and so it was my job to visit him in jail and to talk with the police, and we worked out a deal where if he promised to leave the country immediately, they would let him go home, and we accomplished that. The consulate was the entire fourth floor of the Cantonal-Bank in Basle, which was directly next door to the police station and just down the hill from the university. They had one reserved parking place for the consulate. So while Elias McQuaid, my boss, was still there, I parked up the hill by the university, and after he moved, of course, it was a big prestige thing to get my own parking place — and my own consular car. I remember, it happened one time that the boss came back from Bern and there was a new ambassador. I can’t remember his name. He was a man who cut quite a swath and was a political appointee. At that same time, the consulate had been given a new car. We had first one of the old Plymouths with the big, long fins, and it rode like a limo. It was big and it had a lot of space. McQuaid had a lot of kids, and it was a handy car for him. The substitute was one of the American Motors cars, which was a short, stubby thing. When McQuaid would go to Bern for the staff meetings — on Wednesday, I think — I would as a practice stop at his house on the way home for drinks and to get briefed on what had been taking place. My first question this one day was, “Well, how do you like your new car — oh, excuse me, what do you think about the new ambassador?” “Prickett,” he said, “let’s say I like them equally well.” “Oh,” I said, “what is your impression of the ambassador?” “Well, I get the impression that he’s a guy who would ‘let George do it’ — and then blame the hell out of George.”
Q: Were there any problems at that point with Swiss-American relations that you had to deal with?

PRICKETT: Hardly any, hardly any. A member of the Schindler family, that makes elevators and railroad cars, invited me to tour their railroad car factory in Basle, and punctuated the visit with lunch in their private restaurant up the hill from the Rhine River. And having plied me with food and drink, he then brought up the subject of the new ambassador, who was, I believe, a pharmaceutical entrepreneur from Missouri. He said, “Now, Herr Prickett, this is understand is a political appointment. We seem to be getting your political appointees” — I don’t know if he said actually “the residue of your political campaigns” or system, but that was the strong implication. Here I was, a young officer in my 20’s, on the spot to answer this one to a major industrialist in Switzerland and in Europe, and whether it was the good lord or somebody else who put the words in my mouth, I’ve given thanks ever since. I said, “Herr Schindler, there are three things that are true: as long as your country is as beautiful as it is, and as long as our relations are as good as they are, and as long as we have the political system which we have, I’m afraid that you are going to be receiving political appointees as your ambassadors.” I think I did it in reverse order, but I got it. And he, you know, took that in good spirit. I think I stated the case as well as it could have been made.

Q: Absolutely.

PRICKETT: It’s what we’ve lived with all around the world in one way or another.

Q: Was there any sense, was it permeating yet while you were in Basle, on the new Kennedy Administration, that this was considered by many, particularly in the United States, to be a fresh of breath air, a new era, and all that? Had this gotten to your post?

PRICKETT: Yes, yes, especially among the public. The Swiss, you know, in the upper echelons, were generally older and stodgier, and yet they were full of good will and willing to see what happened here. By the way, there was a joke back in Vienna when Kennedy was elected. The story is that their economic minister, I think, a man named Fieg1, loved to take a drink, and when somebody told him who had won the American election, the story was that he was in his cups and didn’t quite get it, and he said, “Kenne die?” — in dialect — “Nur beim Heurigen” — only at the time of the new wine season. Kenne die? ‘Do I know this one?’

Q: Yes. Well, did you by any chance, in your connection to Vienna and all, pick up any talk about how, when Kennedy made his famous visit to Vienna early on, and his meeting with Khrushchev, which did not go well at all.

PRICKETT: Right.

Q: Were you picking up any stories?
PRICKETT: I was in Switzerland at the time, yes. It was scary, and I think that establishment people were sort of nodding wisely and saying. Now this is sort of what happens when you send a boy to do a man’s job.

Q: Yes, I think this was —

PRICKETT: There was that general sense, and the younger idealists who thought this might be the second coming or something were all given pause, ourselves among them. And still, we were such optimists in our country that we didn’t really think that disaster was impending. For the Europeans, of course, this had come just after Eisenhower, and we had, you know, the man who won the war in the office. They weren’t really worried about us under Eisenhower.

HARMON E. KIRBY
Consular Officer
Geneva (1961-1964)

Ambassador Harmon E. Kirby was born in Ohio on January 27, 1934. He received a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University in international relations and served in the U.S. Army overseas for two years. His Foreign Service career included positions in Geneva, Madras, New Delhi, Brussels, Khartoum, Rabat, Lomé, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Kirby retired on September 29, 1995. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 31, 1995.

Q: What was the mission like at that time? We’re talking 1961 to...August 1961 to 1963. What was the mission to the UN?

KIRBY: The official title was the United States Mission to the European Headquarters of the UN. Again, I was in the Consular section. About half way through my time there, the Consular Section broke off and became a separate organization, a Consulate General, reporting to the Embassy in Bern and no longer to the Ambassador at the Mission. It was a heady time to be in Geneva—the early 60’s. The Mission was essentially a holding organization, a housekeeping organization for dealing with the European Headquarters of the UN, but it also had a large part of its responsibilities, looking after the needs of official U.S. delegations coming to Geneva (as they still do today) for one reason or another. This was the very beginning of the CCD, the Conference on Disarmament. I remember that Secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and a very large delegation came to kick that off. Of course, the Russians were there in force, too. It started off, I forget, you’d have to be a disarmament expert to remember how many transformations it went through, but the CCD started off as a committee of 16, I think, and then expanded to 24. Those negotiations came to town very frequently and were very high level. Early during the time I was there, there occurred one of many on Laos. Averell Harriman led the delegation for the United States. The U.S.-Soviet hot-line negotiations were conducted in Geneva, setting up the first direct communications hot-line between the White House and the Kremlin. Today, it seems like small potatoes, but as a Vice Consul, I was immensely pleased when the Ambassador invited me among others to be in the room when the hot-line agreement was formally signed by the United
States and the Soviet Union. They broke out the champagne afterward, and it seemed in its modest way like making history, well, it was. It was a grand occasion. While the pace of international conferences and negotiations in Geneva accelerated in the decades since, in the early 1960's you were beginning to get there a lot of negotiations on many interesting world issues. Another thing, it didn't affect us directly but one of the things we were aware of were the French-Algerian negotiations that were going on at Evian, France at that time. The Algerian negotiators were in Geneva or Lausanne and would go by helicopter or boat across the lake to Evian every morning. Those negotiations brought about Algerian independence. There were people down at the Hotel Des Bergues in Geneva briefing the international press on the course of those negotiations. So, at that time, in the early 1960's, one had the sense of Geneva being a cockpit of a lot of things that really mattered.

Q: Your work was mainly what?

KIRBY: In Geneva it was almost exclusively consular. There was an attempt made by our disarmament mission to get me transferred to them and that's something I would have liked to have done, had the State Department agreed. At the time, however, I enjoyed the consular work. It was a marvelous mission, I had some supervisory responsibilities, and the job was great fun and brought me into contact with a lot of interesting people. I used to spend my evenings talking to my pals on the disarmament delegation and some of the other delegations and they said, "You should really be with us!" Well, I said if there was a way to do it, I would love to. So, the Ambassador heading the disarmament delegation asked Washington, and they said that since I had been assigned to consular work for two years I should continue with it. But, doing consular work was fine. If you're interested in the atmosphere, I might say that it was an exciting time. I guess Geneva has always been an exciting place for mixing various kinds of people. It was an exciting place to be as a 27 year old Vice-Consul, my age when I first went there. One met extremely interesting people in many walks of life and I saw it as a part of my continuing education just to know them.

I'll give you a quick thumbnail example of the interesting things that turned up. One morning I got a telephone call from a woman saying that an American citizen--she gave me his name but it meant nothing to me--living in Geneva would like to come see me and asked whether he could come see me the following morning. I said of course. The next day a quite elderly gentleman came in, introduced himself and asked me rather earnestly whether it was safe for him to go back to the United States. And I said, "Well, sir, I don't know what the problem is, I think it's a safe place, what is the issue?" He then went on to describe himself. He had gotten caught up in the scandals of the Harding Administration in the 1920's (the Teapot Dome and that sort of thing). He described exactly how he was involved and what have you. I've forgotten the details now but he, like many at the time had beat a quick retreat from the U.S.--left town before the sheriff got them, as it were. And he had been away from the U.S. ever since. He was a very elderly man now, not in the best of health, and he wanted to go home and what did I think of that, he asked. Now, again, this was a man who left the U.S. in the early 1920's and we're talking in 1961, almost 40 years later. And I told him I didn't know the answer but if there was a specific question he wanted me to ask Washington, I could put it in a format that would presumably elicit an answer. He wanted to think about it, he wasn't sure whether he wanted questions put, even informally. Well, he never did come back to see me but at least I had been able to lay out some
parameters for him. People who had been very fleetingly touched by the Communist bug in their youth in Italy or France, particularly Italy, began to explore in the early 1960's whether they could receive visitors visas to the U.S. I remember one chap who was married to an American woman. Under our visa laws he was proscribed from entering the United States but wanted to discuss what his chances might be. He was an intellectual and sought to explain to me the whole background of Europe after World War II and what it had been like as a youth in that fluid atmosphere. Regardless of where one came down on any particular political issue, there were a lot to talk [sic] within Geneva. There were a lot of movie stars around. One of my most difficult mornings was keeping my aplomb and acting like a serious Foreign Service officer when Gina Lollobrigida came into my office to get a visa. She was as beautiful off the screen as on. Anyway, life in Geneva was great fun. And also, Geneva was good to use as a base for getting around Europe. So I traveled very widely.

Q: Moving from Gina Lollobrigida to something else. What about, I guess, it would be October 1962, there was the missile crisis in Cuba. It very much hit the UN, mainly in New York, but how did that hit you all?

KIRBY: The crisis unfolded so quickly that I don't think it affected our work, the work of the mission, the work of the Consulate, to any major degree. It certainly put a damper on the mood and morale of people I knew, however. Europeans tend to be a little more pessimistic than Americans. I was getting phone calls from people I knew from probably eight or ten countries. I had a very good Swedish friend in Geneva who said, "I know you Americans will do what you have to do and should do. I telephoned my mother in Sweden last night and told her the world is going to war and I don't know when if ever we'll meet again." I said, "Wait a minute, that's too dramatic." First of all, I always believed (and I know it's easier to say it after the fact, but I said it during the crisis) I always believed that we would find a way to get Khrushchev to back down. I believed that we would hang firm, hang tough and that we should. Looking at the balance of forces and looking at the map it was implausible to me that Khrushchev would go to war with the United States over Cuba once his bluff was called. I thus wasn't quite as pessimistic as so many people in Europe were--they were very pessimistic. I was in Geneva and you're in a little bit of a cocoon there, a little protected from some of the political winds in other European capitals. I didn't hear an enormous amount of criticism of the United States. The sentiment was more, "You Americans will have to do what you have to do." There was one spinoff from the missile crisis that affected our work in the consular section modestly in one area. I think this occurred some months after the missile crisis. Some issue relating to Cuba had arisen, and world leftist organizations and the leftist press had put out the word to lean on the United States. That we should be nicer to Castro on something--I frankly don't remember what the issue was. Suddenly there came to my office four young Americans whom I had never met. They were in graduate school around Geneva, and I think one or two were in the Institute des Hautes Etudes. Anyway, they were very upset by our government's policies and came to see me as a U.S. representative. I was the one they were sent to. I thought they were mistaken on the issue in question, but I asked them why they felt the way they did. We had about an hour together and they said well, that I had made an impression on them and had given them some things to think about that they hadn't previously considered. They noted that they had been planning to be in the forefront of a demonstration--in those days there weren't many political demonstrations in Geneva, but there was a group planning a demonstration outside the Mission--and they had been asked to be among
the organizers...the "up-front" people because they were American students. Apart from addressing the substantive issues, I told them why I really didn't think they wanted to do that and I said you know, it's going to be your call but you're talking now to an American official who is not that much older than you are (five or six years) and I can tell you the world is different from the inside, once you really study the issues. So anyway at the end of this session, they said I'd given them some things to think about and they weren't going to be among the organizers. They were going to think it over and they would probably march in the procession but that they decided they didn't want to be up front.

Anyway, the day came, Friday night, and I went outside the Mission doors and there was a demonstration, it was a rather modest thing, a couple of hundred chanting in front of the Mission after business hours. There were some Swiss, and some people from Geneva's international community. Walking through the crowd, I found the demonstrators good natured. The four Americans were there, chanting something in French about being nicer to Castro. They caught my eye and came over and said, well, we're not in the first row now. And I said, well, it's a bad compromise. I said, "Have you had enough of this, I'll buy you a beer, okay?" One of the four, to my certain knowledge, not very many years later entered U.S. government service--I won't say which agency--and also to my certain knowledge (because I kept running into him over the years) had a distinguished career with the American government. That's just a small thing, but gratifying nonetheless.

Q: A part of the growing up, but also it does represent the fact that if you can get relatively young Foreign Service officials to talk to people, they are going through this almost evolution to be able to talk and put things in reasonable terms, rather than black and white.

KIRBY: And it's not a face-less government, it's people. That's really an important part of what the job is all about.

Q: Did Africa intrude at all while you were there? The reason I ask this was I was somewhat to the south of you at this time in Yugoslavia, and we were getting involved in the Congo and the leftists around Europe were giving us a rough time over the Congo and Lumumba. Was there any reflection of that in Switzerland?

KIRBY: There really was not, Stu. Those issues really weren't very much manifest in Geneva at the popular or public level. I was aware of some of the things going on in Africa. I followed the cable traffic and several African leaders came to Geneva for one reason or another. People in power, people out of power...I remember, with colleagues, having lunch with some of the prominent players in the Congo who were visiting Geneva. They often just wanted to go off in the countryside and relax so I met some of them and listened to their lore and to what was going on.

One other thing that I might say about the time in Geneva, which is a bit out of context in terms of the question you just asked. But my comments relate to the broader question of what Geneva was like at the time. Another group I enjoyed meeting and getting to know in Geneva were refugees from the 1956 Hungarian crisis. There were a few young people around the University of Geneva as undergraduates, and some were doing graduate work at the University or at the
Institute des Hautes Etudes. There were a number of them who escaped with their lives as teenagers and came to the West. And I remember breaking bread a number of times with a few of them who had gotten scholarships to study in Geneva. One or two of them, as soon as they got their degrees, came on to the United States. At that time they were...they had a very big cross to bear. They couldn't return to Hungary where their lives would have been very much at risk. It was very interesting to get to know them and to hear about developments in Eastern Europe from them.

Q: Were you married at the time?

KIRBY: I was not married. I met the woman whom I later married while I was on that tour, however. My wife, Francoise, who was born in France actually grew up in Switzerland and was residing in Lausanne. However, she had started working for the French Foreign Service at their Embassy in Bern when I met her. I went to Geneva in August of 1961, and we met in January of 1963. We announced our engagement in July 1963 just before I left Geneva to come back for 10 months of full-time Hindi-Urdu study at the Foreign Service Institute. One of the things that I'd like to make a comment on here links up with what I said earlier--i.e., that when I came to the Foreign Service I was eager to go to Europe because I had never been there and I wanted to know more about Europe, but that I really hadn't thought of European affairs as a specialization for the Foreign Service. It was while I was in Geneva and traveling around Europe recalling the wider world and what I had thought about then exotic Japan when I was there in Army days, that convinced me that ideas I had about doing something in the underdeveloped world, that convinced me that I wanted to try to seek a Foreign Service specialization in the developing countries. And so, it was while I was in Geneva, and with that thinking in mind, that I asked the Department of State about going to India. And that then led to my language training in the fall of 1963. As I said, I came back here for Hindi training. Then I returned to Switzerland at Christmas time during the language studies, just long enough to get married. And my wife returned to the United States with me.

DAVID NEWTON
Rotation Officer
Zurich (1962-1964)

Ambassador Newton was raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard University and the University of Michigan. An Arabic speaking Middle East Specialist, he served both in Washington and abroad in positions dealing with Middle Eastern matters. His overseas postings include Yemen (three times), Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. From 1984 to 1988 he served as US Ambassador to Iraq and from 1994 to 1997 as US Ambassador to Yemen. A graduate of the National War College, he was also assigned there as Deputy International Affairs Advisor, and in 1997 he was Special Envoy to Iraq. Following retirement, Ambassador Newton joined Radio Free Europe in Prague. Ambassador Newton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.
Q: Well then, you were in Zurich from what about sixty--?

NEWTON: I was there from August ’62 to February ’64.

Q: What did we have in Zurich?

NEWTON: We had a consulate general at the time. We had in fact we had three consulates in the country. We had, I think about fifteen officers in the Zurich consulate general including an other agency contingent, we had a sizable one in Geneva separate from the mission, and we had a small consulate in Basel. While I was there, they closed both Geneva and Basel.

Q: So what were you doing?

NEWTON: Well, in those days it was a program called Central Complement if you remember that. We were supposed to rotate among the different sections in the post. Well, being a consulate most of my rotation was consular. I had eight months as a passport and citizenship officer, which was nice because there were only two of us. My boss went on leave for a while so I got to be the, sort of the one who did all the citizenship work. Then six months in the visa work. I think four months immigrant, two months non-immigrant I remember. Then four months with the commercial officer.

Q: Well, what, were there any particular problems in Zurich with the passport citizenship business?

NEWTON: No, no unusual problems. There were some famous people like Thomas Mann.

Q: Where did he live?

NEWTON: Lived, I’m not sure where he lived, but he lived in the German part. So there were quite a few of these people. In those days you had the law which said if you live overseas in a foreign country or live three years overseas in your country of origin, you’re subject to losing your citizenship unless you fall into all these different, one of these different categories. So that was a chance to spend a lot of time writing these and trying to be imaginative and help these poor people to get over this hurdle.

Q: I had that job in Frankfort at one point, and every, these were people basically who came back to Germany after currency reform of ’48. Things were pretty good then. So they came back and they didn’t want to leave, and they were going to be losing their citizenship unless they had medical problems. So they would go find a medical doctor and they were all having to go for water treatment and all this. Did you find that in Zurich too?

NEWTON: No, you have to find different reasons, and I don’t really remember all the different reasons but you could usually find something to get them through. Who was the, oh I remember getting a notarial for Paulette Goddard. She was married to Erich Maria Remarque, and they lived south of Zurich. Occasionally you would see people. We were all really upset with the consul, the head of the visa section, because we were waiting for My Fair Lady, and of course
the heroine was not an American citizen, Audrey Hepburn. We were all looking and he sneaked her in the back door one day and gave her the visa because she had to make a personal appearance and sneaked her out again in about five minutes. We really felt robbed. We were all waiting to see the beauteous Audrey Hepburn. It was fun. It was for the commercial part was fun too in a way because we had American week at the department store, and I had to work to get the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The store wanted an American Indian for the week for the department store, and I managed to get this professor of music at the Indian school in Santa Fe. He was a full-blooded Indian. I think he was half-Sioux and he brought a war bonnet made with human skin and everything. It was great. But we had a problem because they constructed a teepee in front of the exhibit at the department store, and basically they just wanted him to stand there and say “Ugh” every once in a while. He wasn’t about to do that. So we had a crisis. We solved that by getting him together with some Swiss musician who taught him how to yodel. So after that he was happy enough to stay. So for a first tour it was fun, but I mean, it was not the kind of thing I would’ve liked to do for the rest of my tour. Then so at the end of eighteen months we went off. I had a very nice consul general by the way..

Q: Who was that?

NEWTON: Howard Elting. He just passed away a very few years ago. He was there about six years, in retirement lived outside San Francisco. He was one of the first FSO’s to report on the Holocaust, when he served in Switzerland in World War II. Did you know him?

Q: No, I know the name though.

NEWTON: Yeah, very nice. Very nice.

WILLIAM TRUE DAVIS, JR.
Ambassador
Switzerland (1963-1965)

William True Davis was in the Navy, after which he started his own pharmaceutical company. His business merged with Dutch Philips Lamps of Holland. He was an Ambassador to Switzerland, as well as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: What led up to your becoming ambassador to Switzerland? You were ambassador from 1963 to 1965.

DAVIS: Yes. I was very surprised, myself. I had been a supporter of Senator Stuart Symington's for many years. He was from Missouri, my state. I had been very active in his run for the presidential nomination of 1960. That's when President Kennedy and Johnson, Humphrey and Symington were the four in contention. Of course, naturally, Kennedy got that. To the victor belongs the spoils, is normally the way it goes. (Laughs)
I was very surprised when I got a call, could I be at the White House on Wednesday. I was, and the President said that they were going to change the complexity of the ambassador to Switzerland, and they wanted someone in there who was connected with a large international company that was not a US-based company, and that I fit those qualifications, was also a Democrat, and would I serve. I said, "I'd be delighted to, and very flattered." So I did so.

My family and I were on the SS Constitution right out of Naples, when the news came that President Kennedy had been assassinated. I thought, "Well, this will be the shortest run of any ambassador," because I hadn't even presented my credentials, and it was time for me to submit my resignation. (Laughs) So I will give credit to the State Department, that within three or four hours after we had the news aboard the ship--we never did get an official message, no one got an official message aboard the ship. In fact, we were having dinner. The purser came to the table and said, "We've had some very disturbing radio reports. Please do not express any anxiety, but the captain would like to see you immediately in his quarters."

So I excused myself and went there. He said that, in his opinion, I was the senior American present aboard the ship, and he would like my advice as to what to do, because they'd been getting these radio reports, unconfirmed, that President Kennedy had been killed. So I listened to a few of them, and that was certainly correct. The airwaves were jammed, almost, with these reports. We were just outside of Naples. I said, "Can you get the Voice of America radio?" The wireless operator said, "Sure." He got that, and the Voice of America was giving the news out of Kennedy's death. So on that basis, I made the decision for the captain that we should therefore announce this news to the passengers and crew. So he asked me to do so over the public address system on the ship, and I did.

Later that night we had a mass, and Protestant services were held. I think one was at 11:00 and one was at midnight that evening, then had another service on the fantail the next morning, then put a wreath in the ocean as we were approaching Naples.

In the interim, maybe at midnight or so, I got this cable which came from President Johnson, saying, "No resignation anticipated or expected. Proceed Berne," Berne being the capital of Switzerland. That was the first official notification I had whatsoever.

Then by the time we docked in Naples early next morning, I got another message from the State Department to please represent the President at a Catholic mass in Naples that morning. Then we got to Genoa the next morning, where we disembarked, and I was asked to again attend on behalf of the President at another mass for Kennedy in Genoa. We stayed in Genoa the one night in a hotel, then drove from there to Berne the next day.

When we arrived in Berne, I guess the word had been around that I would be arriving. It was a misty, nasty kind of evening, but there must have been maybe 400 or 500 younger people, but not all younger, carrying candles and walking down the street and through the embassy driveway in a memorial service of their own to the President. I really think that maybe the people in Europe were so sympathetic and so more outgoing in their sympathy and feelings than possibly even here.
Q: I was in Yugoslavia at the time, and the same thing held true everywhere. It was a time that I don't think anybody who experienced will ever forget, because there was something there that just touched people more than almost any other occurrence I can think of.

Prior to coming to Switzerland, did you have any preparation, instructions, of more or less what we felt we should be doing there?

DAVIS: Not much. I came here to Washington and visited, of course, each of the Cabinet departments. I talked to a number of people within the Department, of course, but I would say no specific directions of any kind.

Q: Just the other day I was talking to an ambassador who was assigned to go to Nigeria in the middle of the Biafran War, and he had no particular instructions either.

You were coming from a multinational business. Did you have any particular feelings toward American embassies, the effectiveness of them or lack of effectiveness?

DAVIS: No. I had had no need to even expose myself to them at all, because I was primarily working for a Dutch company.

Q: How were you received? Let's talk about the embassy first, and then we'll move along to the country.

DAVIS: Very well. I was very, very happy with the relationships that were established. Everybody was extremely cooperative. I couldn't give anybody higher marks.

Q: Did you have any feeling that because you had come from outside the Service, that the Foreign Service establishment was holding back?

DAVIS: Yes, I had an anticipatory feeling of that type, but it certainly never developed. No, there was the utmost cooperation in every way. They went out of their way. I had a wonderful DCM, Henry Kellermann. In fact, I think he was a DCM for maybe three different ambassadors and chargé for two or three years, so he had a long tour over there. He was born German and, of course, spoke German, had a wonderful sense of the German people and German language. He was an ideal person to be in that post, too.

Q: Did you find that you could leave the administration more to the DCM? This is often the pattern.

DAVIS: Yes, very much so. We would have our staff meetings twice a week, and everybody would be updated as to what's going on, but generally, the DCM ran everything of that type.

Q: How about the rest of the staff? Did you feel that Switzerland was being shortchanged on personnel?
DAVIS: No. In fact, that's amusing. They had a political section and an economic section there in the embassy, each of about 12 people. To me, after some observation, I thought they both were doing exactly the same thing. So I decided I would merge the two together and eliminate about ten jobs. I remember Henry Kellermann, the DCM, coming to me when he first heard I was going to do this, and he said, "You can't do that."

I said, "Why not?"

He said, "The Department won't let you."

I said, "Well, if the Department won't let me, I guess I'll hear from them." And I never heard another word. (Laughs)

Q: It does often make sense. What were the United States’ prime interests that you saw as the ambassador there at that time?

DAVIS: From the United States' viewpoint, economically, selling the Swiss fighter aircraft, radar equipment, some armaments, and the Department of Agriculture wanted to get popcorn in there. (Laughs) They really spent a lot of time getting that done, too. I helped them a lot, you know, by putting in a popcorn machine and loaning it around to all these fairs.

Q: Was it that popcorn wasn't used?

DAVIS: No, they didn't know about it at all. It got to be funny. Before I left, you'd see little bowls of popcorn show up in hotels and in the bars and in the restaurants. (Laughs)

Q: Did you find you were able to use your expertise? You'd been a test pilot for the Navy.

DAVIS: Yes, I was able to speak as a pilot, so to speak, to those people. In fact, at that time we secured the contract that was available at that point for fighter planes, beating out the French Mirage.

Q: What plane was that?

DAVIS: I don't recall what model it was. Then I also remember in the radar field, the Swiss Government was about to buy a radar system from some other country, a Western European country, but this radar system was not compatible with NATO's system. I was trying to explain to these people, "My God, if you're going to put in a network that goes north and south across Eastern Switzerland and it's not compatible with NATO, you might as well turn it the other direction and expect an attack from the west." Those sort of things. You can make a lot of in-roads for economic benefits that way.

I had a wonderful relationship with the Federal Council. There are seven federal counselors, each representing a different area of their government. It's like a Cabinet member here, except that they are the absolute final word in their department. Then each of them takes turns, for one year at a time, in which they rotate the title of president of Switzerland. But that's only for ceremonial
duties. They still run the military or the post office or the agriculture, or whatever it is that is their primary function.

Q: As an ambassador, how did you deal with this? This sounds like a complicated place. Did you deal with the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

DAVIS: Yes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is one of those seven. You just have to get to know each of them and ingratiate yourself and them to you, and it's done on a very personalized basis. You do that.

At that time, Switzerland had 23 full cantons and two half-cantons, for a total of 25 cantons, which are like our states. I learned that no ambassador from any nation in the whole history of Switzerland had ever called officially on all 25 of the cantons. So I set that up as also a project to do. I know my colleagues, other ambassadors from the other countries, were scoffing at the idea of wasting my time, and why would I want to go to all of that trouble. I got about half-way through this project, perhaps two-thirds of the way through, and then the other ambassadors noticed the good press I was getting, so they all jumped on the bandwagon and started to do this. Eventually, I got all 25 done. When I got that done, then the foreign department put in a rule that they wouldn't allow these visits anymore without permission from them. That was primarily due, the foreign minister told me at the time, because the Russians and the Chinese wanted to do the same thing, and they didn't want them running all over their country. So that can't be done again.

Q: Is Switzerland in the United Nations?

DAVIS: No, they are not.

Q: So you were saved a tremendous amount of trouble, because one thing our ambassadors have to do so often is to say, "Please vote this way or that way."

DAVIS: Right. No, that's what makes Switzerland an absolutely delightful, wonderful post, because you don't have any AID problems, you don't have any military problems. About the only problem that was sticky at all was that we were drafting some Swiss citizens over here, those who were living here. (Laughs)

Q: During the Vietnamese War.

DAVIS: Right. That was about the only problem that I knew of. We got many Iron Curtain defectors because of the international meetings there, and getting them out of Switzerland, with no problems to the Swiss and their neutrality, was another thing.

Q: You had a consul general in Zurich. How did you deal with that?

DAVIS: The same way you would with any. To me, operating a commercial branch office is exactly the same thing. You have trust, you delegate authority, you give all the cooperation that you possibly can, and you expect that in return from the individual. We had a wonderful relationship. Howard Elting was his name. I would be in Zurich a great deal of the time just on
normal business and had a wonderful relationship with him. He's a fine man, he was extremely helpful and cooperative in every way.

Q: From an operational point of view, is it difficult to have your embassy in Berne, which is sort of backwater? I would think Zurich would be the hub of Switzerland.

DAVIS: That's why you'd be there so often. However, the embassy should be where the head of the government is. You've got the same inconvenience in Basil and Geneva. It's a little inconvenient, but it wasn't insurmountable, certainly.

Q: How was your relationship with the various international organizations? There are a whole series of them.

DAVIS: That's true, there are.

Q: Most in Geneva.

DAVIS: Most are. There are a few in Berne. In the international field, we do have an ambassador for international organizations based in Geneva, which is a part of the United Nations area. He primarily dealt with all of those. The ambassador in Berne technically should be interested only in the affairs of the country, but, of course, there is a little overlap both ways there. I gather that the personnel at the embassy felt that I should immediately almost get into a tug of war with the ambassador in Geneva, because that apparently is what had been done for many, many years. I couldn't see that at all. I made friends immediately with Roger Tubby, and we got along fine. I think this surprised my staff, because they felt that perhaps he was taking over some of our turf and his group felt we were taking over some of his turf. But that's not true; you can cooperate with everybody.

Q: You certainly can. This often is a matter of personality.

DAVIS: Yes.

Q: What about the problem which seems to have come up so often with Switzerland in more recent years, their banking practices? Was this a problem for you?

DAVIS: I wouldn't say a problem, after you'd make the Swiss position clear to the Justice Department here.

Q: How would you describe the Swiss position?

DAVIS: Having to do strictly with their Banking Secrecy Act. The background of that Act was interesting to me, and I inquired about it a lot as to why and how. Apparently that came into being in the mid-'30s, and it was brought about because in Nazi Germany, no one was to take any funds outside of Germany. But generally, the German Jews were taking their funds out everywhere and, naturally, to Switzerland because it was so close. There are more banks in
Switzerland per capita than anywhere in the world--450, I think, individual banks, as I remember at that time, and each of them had many branches.

What the Germans would do, if they suspected someone, they would make a deposit, let's say, of 100 francs to the bank account of so and so, whoever they're looking for, and they would get 449 banks advising, "There's no account here," and send the money back. But one bank would take it, and therefore they found out that way that there was an account for that person there. They violated a lot of Swiss neutrality laws in that regard, because they would catch these people there and interrogate them in the German Embassy.

In the German Embassy, which I always thought was very interesting, they showed it with a sense of humility, of course, but there were several jail cells down in the basement of the German Embassy where they detained these people and, I'm almost certain, would torture them down there. But that sort of thing is what brought about the Banking Secrecy Act, whereby it stated that any bank employee who gave away any information about any account would be subject to the equivalent of a $25,000 fine and six months in jail. That's pretty stiff stuff for a Swiss to understand. So they didn't violate that at all.

However, as I was there in the mid-'60s, the Swiss were feeling a little bit that this Banking Secrecy Act might be a little too tough, and having numbered bank accounts probably was giving them a black eye throughout the world, allowing people to do a lot of illegal things through the Swiss banks. So they were gradually phasing out the secret bank accounts. They started about the time that I was there, and I understand today that it would be very difficult to get a secret bank account. Some of the signatures of those secret bank accounts were interesting.

You might have somebody draw a picture of a rooster or a picture of an elephant, and that was your signature. If you were willing to chance that somebody else wouldn't know that, why, then go ahead.

Q: But that wasn't a prime problem for you.

DAVIS: Oh, no, not really. You got a request every so often from the Justice Department that somebody would be arriving on a flight from, let's say, New York, and it would turn out to be a very attractive blonde lady. I never saw her, but I saw pictures of her that the FBI had, that they always suspected of depositing skimmed money from the casinos in Las Vegas. She'd arrive there almost on the dot every Monday morning with a little satchel. (Laughs) It just killed them that we couldn't find out what the hell she was doing with it and how much there was. But the Swiss wouldn't allow that.

Q: What about your relationship with the Soviet Embassy? At that time we didn't have any relations with the Chinese.

DAVIS: No, we didn't have then, nor with the Cubans, of course, nor the Albanians, who were there, I believe, and North Korea was there, too. Our relation with the Soviets was formal. It was all right. I used to do a lot of hunting, and I had been in Alaska in the frozen Arctic Ocean, where I shot a very large polar bear. I was telling the Russian ambassador about it, and said that I'd
always wanted to mount an expedition and go into Siberia for the Siberian snow tiger, which is found up there. We were just chatting about this and he said, "Would you like for me to request permission for you?"

I said, "That would be great! See if you can."

So in about two months, he came back to me and said, "We have permission granted for you to do that if we can send a hunting expedition for Kodiak bear in Alaska."

I said, "Well, let me inquire about that." So I made a preliminary inquiry, and they said they didn't see anything wrong with that particularly, as long as it was on that basis. That's the message I got back from State. So I gave him that message, and I never heard another word from him.

Q: Switzerland has the reputation, I guess deservedly so, of being the "spy capital." Did this involve you very much?

DAVIS: Yes, a great deal, and that was the most interesting part of the whole tour. During President Kennedy's term, it happened right before I became ambassador, up to that point the CIA chief of station was always aloof and apart from the ambassador, and President Kennedy made that very clear, that the chief of station was under the ambassador as the other employees. So that brought about a very interesting situation. I had a relationship with the chief of station that was excellent, and I remember telling him, "I'm not going to interfere with your business, and I don't really want to know anything that you're doing unless it's something that could be potentially embarrassing to the United States or to myself." So we would have a briefing every few days. He would let me read the CIA telefax that came over every day to their people, just like the one State had. It was extremely interesting to see what they were doing.

Q: It really is a center for intelligence on both sides.

DAVIS: Yes. At that time I was told we had the largest group of operatives other than in Vietnam.

Q: How did Vietnam play in Switzerland when you were there? The great protests hadn't quite started.

DAVIS: No, it hadn't.

Q: But you were there during the buildup.

DAVIS: Right. The Swiss general public didn't think much of that. They thought we ought to be out of there, and at that point I was very hawkish in my own attitude, but finally came around to eventually recommending we get out of there, too. But at that point, they just didn't like it.

In fact, it was interesting. We had what was, I assume, the first demonstration that had ever been held in Switzerland against the Americans at our embassy. We got word from the Swiss police
who, by the way, were absolutely fabulous with the information they would get to us. We were told that there was going to be a demonstration, let's say, tomorrow morning at 8:00. We didn't know what the hell to do about this demonstration, having never had one before. We did have steel shutters on the first-floor windows, so we closed those. It was raining, and I thought, "That's a good sign. That will keep down the attendance."

So finally, about 9:00, there must have been 12 or 15 men with umbrellas, came and stood outside on the sidewalk, no signs, no noise, just stood there for about an hour and a half, and that was a Swiss demonstration.

Q: Would that they were all like that.

DAVIS: Yes.

Q: How about refugees, particularly from Eastern Europe? Did you get much involved with those?

DAVIS: No, I don't recall any.

Q: Were you getting any particular instructions from Washington of how to do various things?

DAVIS: No. It was mainly inquiries, such as one cable which said, "It's reported that Zhou En-lai is possibly in Switzerland. Could you possibly determine through discreet inquiries if such is so?" That kind of stuff.

Q: How about visitors? Were you deluged with American visitors?

DAVIS: A lot of them.

Q: Was this sort of a nuisance?

DAVIS: No, not a nuisance, because I always was happy to see them. Of interest, though, the average American family seems to think that a Swiss boarding school might be the greatest thing in the world for their children, so we'd have many, many, many inquiries of that.

I had a form letter or would talk to the people about it, but the average boarding school in Switzerland was a bankrupt hotel. The headmaster was the guy who owned the hotel that went bankrupt, so he would be happy to entertain your child for as long as you wanted to pay the bill. But most Americans get the idea that kids should go to Switzerland and learn French at the same time. Well, it's impossible to keep your scholastic standing up and learn a foreign language at the same time. So I would have to tell them, "Do you want your child to waste a year of school to learn French, or do you want them to do it the other way? Because you can't do both." But in my opinion, there are only a very few real good schools in Switzerland.

An interesting part of the embassy, probably more so than most embassies, in case of a war happening in Europe, every American that could find his way was probably going to come to
Switzerland. So we had a lot of information directives and assistance planned to take care of this onslaught of Americans that might come in case of a war. Part of that, because paper currency is no good in wartime, we had a tremendous amount of gold coins in the embassy--I mean a lot of them. Every month they would put these out on a big table and count them, to take inventory, and I'd have to sign that they were all there.

One day I went down to look at them, and I'd never seen so many gold coins in my life. I picked up a few and looked at them. My God, they had some in there with dates from the early 1700s and late 1700s. I got to thinking, "My God, the numismatic value of these coins is worth more than the gold content by a long way." So to start with, I wrote to Marshall Field's coin department, a store in Chicago that had a coin department, and asked them to give me a pricing on certain coins that were in the collection. They came back with a tremendous value on just this little sampling.

Then I wrote to the Treasury Department and State that these should be sold and we should either get just gold bullion in small bits or newer coins. Gold in those days was only $35 an ounce. The Department never did anything on it, and I still think they should. I'll bet those coins are still over there in Switzerland.

It was amusing that when I later got back to the Treasury, in talking to one of the people there in the international field, he said, "You know, your inquiry about those gold coins when you were in Switzerland got routed to my desk, and it's still there. I still don't know what to do about it!" (Laughs)

Q: You left Switzerland in 1965.

J. HOWARD GARNISH
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Geneva (1963-1967)

Mr. J. Howard Garnish was born in Rochester, New York and later obtained a degree in history from the University of Rochester. In 1943, Mr. Garnish joined the Office of War Information and served in Switzerland, Sweden, and Thailand during his career. Mr. Garnish was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1989.

GARNISH: Jerry Doster was then the Deputy Personnel Director. He got hold of me and said, "We want you to go back to Geneva." I figured that since I had sent them that memo, they must want me to go over for that affair. I asked how long they wanted me to be there? He said, "Regular assignment." So I had another four years in Geneva. In the meantime we had joined a country club here, never figured to go out again. So I wound up doing 16 years, almost completely consecutively, in the Foreign Service.
Between my first round there in the ’50s and my second round in the ’60s, Geneva had changed a great deal. The Mission had grown and USIS was a pretty big operation. Since Harold Kaplan was the PAO, I went back Deputy Public Affairs Adviser -- a title Jerry invented.

**Q:** On your second time around in Geneva you said the program had grown very greatly. What was the major thrust of the operation there at that time?

**GARNISH:** Besides the usual conferences, we had the forever ongoing disarmament talks, which required a lot of our attention. In addition, we had the Kennedy round of GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which went on and on and on. The boss of that was Ambassador Mike Blumenthal, who later was Secretary of the Treasury. Our ambassador heading the mission was Roger Tubby. Our staff covered the GATT meetings rather intensively.

At one stage, Blumenthal went down to Milan for a session with the Italians. Kaplan was also there in a supervisory capacity and I did the coverage. Blumenthal made a very major speech. To be sure of accuracy, I had taken along a recorder and taped his speech and used that as a basis for the story for the Wireless File and VOA. I showed my story to Kappy and it was sent.

At the end of the session we showed -- I guess it was Kappy who showed the copy to Blumenthal. He exclaimed, "Kill it." And added, "This was intended only for Italian consumption, not for the world." I got annoyed about this because Kappy had approved it and it was perfectly accurate. I burst out, "What the hell was I brought down here for if I'm not supposed to write the story that happened?" Unfortunately, that didn't do me any good, because he reported this to Tubby and I never got the promotion which I think I deserved.

**THERESA A. HEALY**
Political Officer
Bern (1964-1967)

*Ambassador Theresa Healy was born in New York in 1932 and received her BA from St. John’s University. Her postings include Naples, Milan, Bern, Brussels and Wellington with an ambassadorship to Sierra Leone. She was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin on May 10, 1985.*

**Q:** Sure. Did they call them cones at that time?

**HEALY:** I don't know that they did. I think they just said political work, political specialty, something like that. But since I had been doing political work for three years, to go abroad as a political office was a natural result, and to go to Switzerland was again a natural result, particularly because I had been taking French language training, I think in the early morning, and German language training in the early morning. So in January, ’64 I arrived in Switzerland for a very, very enjoyable and interesting three years as political officer there. I enjoyed my colleagues, I enjoyed my work very much, I enjoyed my living conditions, I enjoyed Bern very much. I had a wonderful tennis club with very, very warm and friendly people. I still keep up with Beatrice and her brother, Rudy, who were tennis playing partners. Beatrice and I did very well playing
interclub for the Sporting Tennis club. I can't think of anything unusual that happened during those three years. I did go home once in the three years but it was not home leave, I had to pay to get myself home.

*Q: What were your living arrangements, Terry?*

HEALY: I found an apartment. I had bought furniture back in '58, a few sticks. My apartments were undoubtedly very sparsely furnished. A couch, a chair, a table, one of each, kind of thing. But I did have enough furniture to take an unfurnished apartment. I was fortunate that the people who had the apartment before me were, I guess, Italians, and they had an Italian maid who was living in the maid's quarters in the basement of this three-story apartment building. And Elvira agreed to stay on and wanted very much to stay on, and could only stay on if I hired her. Elvira took care of the house for me on a part-time basis and worked elsewhere, I think in a factory. So I was very comfortable there and enjoyed it very much. The tennis was excellent, the skiing was excellent.

Then of course it came time to consider where I would go from there. It was '66 and everybody, it seemed, was concerned about what was going on in Vietnam. I thought a Vietnam assignment would be useful and fascinating and it was the thing to do at the time. I was not in Washington, I didn't thoroughly understand, I think, all the ins and outs, but I did write to the department and say I would be interested in going to Vietnam on assignment. Back came an answer saying, “We think that Saigon is a good likely possibility, in fact we have a job identified for you via six months in the economic training class, which had just been organized at FSI. I think I was in the third intensive economic training course.

I was very pleased to do this because after three years in Bern, I was beginning to realize just how important economics is. The economic section was twice the size of the political section. The intertwining of those two subjects in Bern is perhaps more common these days than back in the mid-sixties, but I remember thinking to myself, “I would be a more valuable political officer if I knew something about economics.” So when they offered this, I thought, “Fine, I'll learn economics, I'll be at home for six full months and have a chance to see the family a lot before I go off to Saigon.” I just thought this was working out very well indeed. I came back to Washington. The six months intensive economic training was very difficult. I don't think I have a flair for economics. I worked hard at it, though, and did very well in it.

**WINSTON LORD**

Negotiator, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Geneva (1965-1967)

*Ambassador Lord was born and raised in New York City and earned degrees at Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. After serving in Washington and Geneva, Mr. Lord was assigned to the Department of Defense before joining the National Security Council, where he was involved in China and Indonesia matters. He subsequently...*
served on State’s Policy Planning Staff. In 1985 Mr. Lord was named US Ambassador to China, where he served until 1989. From 1993 to 1997 the Ambassador held the position of Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Lord was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: What was the overall thing?

LORD: This was the negotiations under the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There had been every few years a general negotiation. The GATT was one of the post-World War II organizations set up to regulate trade among nations, and to try to free trade among nations. Every now and then instead of plodding along with various bilateral negotiations around the world, the feeling was to have a global negotiation with everyone who is a member of GATT getting together and try to have a global agreement. It had also the virtue of while you engaged in that, which usually took a lot of time, did hold off protectionist pressures in various countries because they were saying, well, we're now going into a negotiation and maybe we can free things up. So it had a way of freezing whatever tariff levels there were at the time, and tariffs were the most important although non-tariff barriers were beginning to get important, and keeping things from getting worse. So President Kennedy proposed that we have another one of these rounds and try to free up trade. There had been at least one before that in the ’50s, I forget what it was called. We were in the process of getting ready for that.

Of course, it turned out that - and we'll get into this - it lasted much longer than we expected. When I went to Geneva thinking it was going to be about a year, it turned out to be two and a half years, and the only reason it was ever concluded was because American legislative authority to negotiate, granted by the Congress was going to run out on June 30, 1967. So that turned out to be a deadline which speeded up the negotiations the last six months or year.

Q: As you were getting ready on your team, were you, I mean you and your team, looking ahead to see what the problems were going to be with the European Economic Community?

LORD: Yes, it was true that year, but it became even more frustrating when we got to Geneva. It was a very slow pace in negotiations, and the primary reason was because the EEC could not get its act together, primarily because of France. Generally you had the British, the Dutch, etc, traditionally looking for fairly forthcoming liberal trading positions, and the French to a certain extent and I believe the Italians were dragging their feet. I guess the Germans also were for free trade. But they had to get a consensus and so we really spent a good part of certainly that year waiting, when things were still preparatory, so it wasn't so vivid. But once we got to Geneva it was much more clear that we were just waiting on the Europeans to come forward with decent positions. Since they were so central to the negotiations, they held up the overall Kennedy Round. The fact is that you were juggling several balls at once. The fact that nobody could negotiate with the EEC was holding up the overall negotiation. So we essentially treaded water while they battled within the EEC, and the French were always introducing a protectionist element. Getting ready in Washington consisted, as I say, of compiling statistics, figuring out what our objectives were, what tariffs and other barriers to trade we wanted to try to remove, what we were willing to give up, consulting I'm sure with domestic interests, dealing with Congress, and just generally
shaping strategy for the negotiations. Then we went to Geneva and continued that, and began to interact with other countries but basically it was very slow going the first year or two in Geneva. This was terrific for my tennis game which I managed to sharpen. I won one of the major club tournaments there, and my tennis has never been as good ever since. We did a lot of traveling in Europe, it was very frustrating waiting around for the Europeans. So it was a slow period in 1965 and most of '66.

Q: Let's stick to the U.S. preparations. Were you particularly aware of anything that was almost sacrosanct that you knew politically you couldn't mess around with?

LORD: It's hard to remember in detail now. Certainly textiles was always going to be tough. We had certain agricultural problems as well I'm sure in terms of U.S. protection. But I don't recall in further detail than that.

Q: You know you're talking about the problems with the EEC, and particularly France. This was more than 30 years ago. Today if you were to talk about anything, you'd still be saying the problems with the European Union, of getting anything out of it is mainly because of France.

LORD: That's true. In the first place you have a generic problem, and that is the following, although we were in favor of the EEC then, and we still are in favor of a united Europe now. We think on the balance that having a stronger Europe promotes our national interests. Nevertheless, it presents a negotiating dilemma. While they are constructing their own positions, and negotiating among themselves, they won't talk to you very much because they have to get their act together to present a united front. So you try to have some influence while they're shaping their common position but that's very difficult. They feel this is an internal matter, and they've got to reach some internal consensus. Then when they reach a consensus, and have a common position, it's very hard to get them to change it. Because they sweated and labored to get to their common posture, then you take them on and in effect they say, this is the best we can do having compromised among ourselves. It's very hard to get them to move backwards. So you have trouble negotiating with them before they have a common position, you have trouble moving them after they have a common position.

Then on top of that, of course, it means that since they have to have consensus the most recalcitrant and slow moving and protectionist in the group holds up the others. And this was invariably France, and, although I don't want to be unfair to Italy, it includes Italy as well. But certainly France was the major culprit - generally, and with particular emphasis on their agriculture problems. And that has been a common theme ever since. In fact, the French can be a difficult for us in diplomacy generally, not just on trade, but on many other matters where with de Gaulle and since they like to show their independence of the U.S. and the greatness of France, and they have continued to be difficult. I was at a meeting a few months ago where Mickey Kantor was having a retrospective on negotiating...

Q: He was our...

LORD: He was our special trade representative under President Clinton through his first term. He was asked who was the toughest negotiating partner country that we faced. People expected
him to say Japan, or maybe China and he immediately said France. That was certainly true in Geneva as well.

Q: Do you recall any issues that came...in a way you were part of the internal negotiating procedures in the United States. We had to come up with a fixed position too, and we had our cultural interests, our industrial interests, etc.

LORD: That's correct. This did not really reach a serious stage until we were in Geneva. Not much went on while we were getting ready in Washington because there wasn't much movement in negotiations. And there was in fighting on an interagency basis I'm sure. I did not take much a part in that. And certainly while we were in Geneva that was done back here with Ambassador Roth when Ambassador Blumenthal headed our delegation in Geneva. And, of course, early on special interests don't want to tip their hand too much or make too many concessions even internally until they see what they're going to get from other countries.

Q: While you were gathering statistics was everybody sort of looking over the shoulder of these other groups to see what was coming up?

LORD: You mean other countries?

Q: I mean you have different groups within the State Department and other agencies dealing with Japan or with Canada or Latin America. Were you all working out your thing and just getting together?

LORD: That's right. I mean, you would work out your strategy versus your counterpart, in my case the EEC, but you had to relate this and talk to the other teams about how they were going to approach Japan and Canada and the others. If you made this concession to the EEC what would it do to your leverage vis-a-vis Canada and Japan, for example. So you had to meld this. I don't believe we did too much of that in Washington. I think the pace just hadn't picked up enough, it was more getting a lot of the statistical background and objectives with other countries in mind. I don't recall that we had detailed strategies at that point. It was probably somewhat premature.

Q: I must say that just thinking about the thing, it seems impossible just to get everybody to come on board. What was the trade-off?

LORD: Well, the American market is a big target for other countries in terms of our leverage, even more so today, but in those days as well we were a huge market for countries and therefore they wanted to get into our market. That, of course, was the trade-off we had with them.

Q: The Congressional side of things, was that taken care of at different levels?

LORD: Yes. I don't recall myself getting involved in that. And again, it wouldn't have been too frantic in the early stages while we were in Washington. Indeed, that would be done at higher levels, and particularly as we went down the home stretch it was done in Washington at high levels.
Q: Did you get any feel for the operation of the Department as far as the contributions of the various bureaus, all of the geographic bureaus, the Economic Bureau, for what you all were doing?

LORD: I don't recall right now great precision. Certainly there were no information problems. Whenever we needed information we could get it. But I don't have a clear recollection of exactly what we did day-to-day frankly, except as I say get a sense of all the negotiating areas, the barriers that we faced abroad, what our priorities were, and some sense of what we'd be willing to do and a lot of statistical stuff about trade patterns, and projections, etc. The overall team consisted of people seconded from other agencies. It wasn't just the State Department. So we drew heavily on Commerce and Agriculture, as well as the State Department bureaus.

Q: Did your team sit down and say how are we going to get the French, how are we going to work with the French?

LORD: Well, again, this heated up more when we got to Geneva, but yes, a lot of it was how do we work in individual capitals to try to influence them. So we'd go with circular telegrams to the British and the Dutch, and the Italians and the Germans as well as the French tailoring our positions either to encourage liberalization by some, or try to encourage the French to be more forthcoming. But as I said, it's rather difficult because they felt that they had to sort out their own position before they could really talk seriously to us. So my clear recollection, particularly as we got to Geneva, was one of frustration that we couldn't speed up the process in the EEC. Every time we thought there was movement there would be some EEC meeting and the French and perhaps others would once again kill the possible compromise.

Q: Sometimes, of course, the French may have been almost a stalking horse because the Germans certainly have had a highly subsidized agricultural sector too.

LORD: It wasn't just agriculture that they were dragging their feet on. It was the industrial area as well, and I'm sure there were certain areas that the Germans or even the more liberal members of the EEC wanted to protect and sometimes they would conveniently hide behind the French. So I don't want to put this all on the French. But I distinctly remember, and I'm sure it's accurate, that the French were the real culprits.

Q: In '64 you went off to...

LORD: We went in January of '65, I remember in those days we had the luxury of going by ship, it was wonderful and I love boats. I remember I was crushed the U.S. shipping line, I guess it was the United States had a strike. So I said, oh my God we don't get to go on a boat. Well, it turned out to be a plus because we were then authorized to take a foreign ship. So instead of speeding across in the United States, the United States would cross the Atlantic in five days...

Q: The United States was our fastest ship.

LORD: That's right. We had to take an Italian boat, Leonardo da Vinci, which took ten days. So we had twice as much fun, and twice the time, it was wonderful. Wonderful food, and very
pleasant. On that ship I met Bill Buckley, the famous Bill Buckley, a conservative commentator, TV, a Yale person. I expected him, by reputation, to be pompous and not to listen and to be didactic, and to be cold. He was just the opposite of all these things. He and his wife were extremely friendly and warm, and we have had a lifelong friendship with them ever since. Anyway, we went over there with our young daughter. My parents went with us, so we had a lot of fun. We had a terrific time.

Q: You were in Geneva...

LORD: January 1965 until June 30, 1967. So when I first took the job in Washington I figured at most I would be there six months or maybe a year. Even as we went over we thought it would be about a year or so, and it turned out to be two and a half years with very little happening frankly until about the last year, and only then because of the impending deadline of the U.S. legislative authority running out.

Q: It does point out this thing in negotiations that at a certain point you really have to say after this no more.

LORD: That's right, and I don't know if these ever would have been concluded without this deadline. Obviously we were crucial to the whole operation. Everyone knew that we couldn't go back to our Congress and get new authority. That we had to wrap it up by then, particularly after so many years of negotiations. And thus it was this deadline that was used by the two heroes at that negotiation to complete it. One hero was Mike Blumenthal, who did an extraordinary job. The other hero was the Director General of the GATT, a man named Eric Wyndham White. And the two of them really pulled this off down the home stretch. We can get to that in just a minute.

Q: Can you talk about developments from your perspective of this extremely important set of negotiations, because almost everything from now on was with built on that.

LORD: That's correct. There have been subsequent rounds, and the Tokyo Round, and then the Uruguay Round patterned after that. They always take time because by definition it's complicated. You've got all the major trading partners, all the interests at work, and we were trying not only get tariffs reduced, but begin to take a crack at non-tariff barriers. But this was the last negotiation where the tariffs were the overwhelmingly important item, and the end result was very successful. At the time we thought it was somewhat less than ideal. It was good, but we'd hoped to have even more. But looking back on it was a remarkable achievement what was finally pulled off. I was again the secretary, or executive secretary for the EEC negotiating team up until the last year, so the first year and a half. For maybe the last nine months, I don't remember exactly, I switched jobs with Tom Simons, another distinguished Foreign Service officer who had been in my A-100 course, and has since has gone on to be ambassador to Poland and a very high ranking Soviet expert and ambassador to Pakistan right now. So he came over and took my job on the EEC team, and I went over and took his job as special assistant to Mike Blumenthal for the last nine months. But before that from early '65 until toward the end of '66, it was very slow moving. Terrific for my tennis game, and a lot of skiing and traveling. I worked eight hour days but no longer than that, and often we had to make work. We were sitting around running statistics, waiting for the EEC essentially to get its act together. Every now and then I
would write a memo to Pappano sort of suggesting, here's a way we might break the deadlock. I once suggested, for example, that rather inching along with gradual trading off with the EEC, why don't we put all our offers on the table at once, conditional on getting a major response from them. It was probably a wrong approach, but I just wanted to try to think of things to try to get things moving, and what might speed up the process. So occasionally I'd write what I thought were some interesting memos like that, but most of the time we were doing statistics, and it was very hard to keep busy throughout the day. Very frustrating.

Q: Were you in contact with other national groups at this point?

LORD: The overall delegation was, of course, but our job really was with the EEC and obviously in Geneva. I don't think I ever traveled to Brussels. Our job was to deal with the EEC. There would be long periods of time we didn't even have meetings because they didn't have a position. So socially we would run into Japanese, Canadians, Latin Americans, and others. But the other teams were doing the negotiating with them.

Q: What about during the last part, and really the active part at the time you had become the assistant to Mike Blumenthal?

LORD: That's correct.

Q: Could you talk about his background that you're familiar with, and his method of operation?

LORD: He was extraordinary. I've been fortunate in working for very dynamic leaders of very different styles, that includes Fred Dutton that I mentioned. Jeff Kitchen and Alexis Johnson were very impressive in their own way. Mike Blumenthal was extraordinary. Then I worked for Henry Kissinger at one point and many others, George Shultz and Warren Christopher. So it has been a real variety. Blumenthal was a Jewish emigree from Nazi Germany through Shanghai, a little ironic since my wife was born in Shanghai. He had taught at Princeton, a Ph.D., and a distinguished education background in economics. He had been head of Bendix Corporation.

Q: An important American manufacturing firm.

LORD: I don't remember who would have appointed him - Kennedy being assassinated in '63, I think he must have been appointed by Johnson. I just don't recall exactly. Ambassador Roth was the other special trade representative, and then became number one, I believe after Christian Herter died. He sat in Washington but occasionally would visit Geneva for negotiations, but of course Blumenthal was head of our delegation sitting in Geneva. He was very young for that kind of senior responsibility. At the time he must have been mid-thirties, late thirties at the most. He brought both a business and an academic background. Very dynamic, very courageous in taking on Washington when he wanted to get some concessions for negotiating purposes, very tough with the other countries as well, very demanding of his staff in a good way but demanding excellence, very hard working, and a very brilliant tactician. He realized that he had to use our negotiating deadline to try to finally bring this thing to a close, and worked very closely with the Director General of GATT, Wyndham White to try to do that.
As his special assistant I was responsible for making sure that various cables and other bits of information got to him. I'd be note taker in some of his meetings. I would do occasional think pieces for him. I would be a channel of communication for other members of the staff. I also had access to very sensitive cables, sensitive in the sense of a commercial negotiating position that we didn't want to leak out, so they'd be sent in special channels with special code words. Even then we used NODIS and LIMDIS, but we had a code word, I think was “potatoes” for some reason. I'd be the first to learn that it had come in and only he and maybe one or two other people would see these cables. It meant, for example, you are authorized if you need it to make this concession on this sector, of this area, which would have been dynamite if it went out to the domestic industry. So this sounded like a nuclear secret but it was almost as sensitive.

I remember a couple of times I would even get woken at home - we were living at that time at Versoix which is about 15 minutes from our Geneva mission. We first lived in Annemasse on the other side of the lake. I remember a couple of times being woken in the middle of the night by the embassy's communications operator, getting an urgent message from Washington. I didn't mind doing it but I'd go in there and it would be some negotiating position which certainly could have waited until the next day. It had the requirement, if it's NIACT immediate, you've got to open it and act on it right away. Sometimes it wouldn't even be needed for a week or so, so I used to get furious with the White House. Francis Baton, who I have great respect for, was Deputy National Security Advisor in charge of economics and trade working for Walt Rostow at that point. Either he or his staff had the bad judgment in sending NIACT immediate occasionally in the middle of the night and make me drive in and it could have waited for a week let alone a day.

In any event, this was heady stuff. Finally we were on the move. Finally there was real negotiation of give and take, and of course sitting in the front office I could see all the negotiations, not just the EEC but with all the other major partners. I could also see the equally dramatic negotiations with Washington where Blumenthal was trying to get more negotiating flexibility. He'd often go back to Washington to press the various agencies and the White House to get more flexibility, and the kind of deals he was suggesting. So it was a tremendous education for me on negotiating in general, on economic negotiating in particular, on dealing with Washington on domestic politics, and the play of various interests, and juggling your interest with various interlocutors in Geneva, on how to play off the EEC, Japan and Canada, and other major negotiating partners, and how to gang up with some against others, to try to get movement. So it was a very heady, exciting period and the last nine months in many ways made up for the general drag of the first almost two years.

Q: Was the United States the driving force the whole time?

LORD: I think it's fair to say that, but clearly down the home stretch it was Blumenthal and Wyndham White, the latter, of course, being more neutral but working behind the scenes with Blumenthal. So we clearly were the driving force unquestionably. Blumenthal personally deserves great credit for the deal he brought off. Obviously Ambassador Roth was important sitting in Washington, but anyone would tell you that without Blumenthal on the scene there this never would have happened.

Q: What brought people together?
LORD: First the deadline concentrated the minds. We made concessions, they made concessions. People realized, even the French grudgingly, that it was in everyone's interest to have this thing succeed. And that if we didn't the world probably would have slid back into protectionism, and it would have hurt everyone. Obviously there were some areas like European agriculture, and some other areas, where we never could make a dent. They probably didn't make much progress on textiles. I don't recall the details. So as you got down the home stretch, you began to see what things really had to be excluded from the final negotiations, or where you needed gradual tariff reduction on a much slower pace. And there'd be difficult areas domestically which you finally would make concessions on as long as you got something in return that you could use to justify the concessions you were making. So it was a multilateral process. I think it's fair to say that on the whole Canada was certainly reinforcing us. The free trade area countries in Europe, outside the EEC, the European countries outside the EEC, EFTA, was an important part, also for free trade on the whole. Japan, it's hard to think they were free trade, but I don't think they were as recalcitrant as the French-led EEC. Australia and New Zealand were for open trade. The developing countries had their own problems and generally weren't expected to do as much. So you had a lot of multilateral pressure to get this thing done. There was the combination of deadline, people seeing the gains they would make by opening others' markets and the dangers of failure and sliding back into protectionism if we didn't succeed, as well as the possible political overtones and bitterness among friends. I think all this plus the negotiating skill of Blumenthal and the steering skill and leadership of Wyndham White brought this to a head.

Q: Where was the real negotiation taking place? I would think that the big table of everybody sitting around would be...

LORD: Absolutely not. They usually would ratify things, as you say, and be more be more for propaganda exchanges. So it would take place in small meetings, maybe one-on-one heads of delegations, Blumenthal seeing the head of EEC one-on-one, or maybe with me or somebody else taking notes. Or Wyndham White bringing people together, some key delegate heads, so it would be in small groups and sometimes bilaterally and sometimes small multilateral groups. But you're absolutely right, it wouldn't be a formal thing.

Q: I assume you were somewhat removed from the actual head-on-head with the other delegations?

LORD: Well, I was although when I became special assistant I sat in on some of those meetings. But it was more apt to be either Blumenthal alone, or the head of the negotiating team, the head of the EEC team or the Canadian team, etc., that would be sitting in there. So I don't believe I sat in on too many of those but I was in some of them.

Q: Was it table pounding?

LORD: Well at times. Blumenthal, like a skilled negotiator knew how to play his cards, when to reveal his own concessions, when to be tough, when to threaten to walk away. But he would liven it with humor and politeness as necessary. But he could be very tough, and there were times, particularly with the EEC, and occasion with the Japanese as well, there would be table
pounding. My recollection would be that the EFTA countries and Canada and the developing countries were easier to deal with.

Q: *Were intellectual rights an issue?*

LORD: Not at all. I don’t recall it being a major issue. They have become more and more important in American negotiations as we have gotten into the information age, globalization, American competitive edge. Whether its software, pharmaceuticals, or technological and scientific, or literary intellectual property rights, all that has become a major market where we have a comparative advantage in recent years. It has really moved up on our priority list of our negotiations. In fact, in the Kennedy Round it was not, it was more the traditional industrial and agricultural tariff areas that were our main focus then. Machinery, chemicals, grains, these kind of things were the major center-pieces.

Q: *What about on the agricultural side? We had our subsidies, everybody else had their subsidiaries.*

LORD: I don't believe much progress was made. I'd have to go back, I'm sure there are exhaustive records, the EC was not going to move very much in its policy. So I think there were some modest gains in certain areas. Of course, this was very important, not only for us but for Canada, Argentina, and for other countries. So it was hard for some of those countries, in particular. We had very great agricultural interests, but for the Canadians or for Argentina and maybe some of the other free trade area countries (EFTA) agriculture was absolutely crucial. So the EEC was dragging its feet, but agriculture was not only frustrating for us, but it threatened the overall negotiations. So there was some modest gains, but as I recall, the Kennedy Round did not make much progress on agriculture compared to the industrial side.

Q: *Was it a last minute thing, or were you beginning to see light at the end of this particular tunnel as the negotiations progressed?*

LORD: Well, again, this goes back as you say and this is 30 years, but you had ups and downs. It was a roller-coaster for the last nine months where there were days where you felt, well we're going to make it. And other days, how the hell are we going to make it by June 30, 1967. And I recall that it really went down to the wire. Even a week before the deadline we weren't sure we were going to make it, and it got very dramatic and very exciting the last few weeks, and I'm sure there have been memoirs by Blumenthal and others that will detail this. But I do know it was a roller-coaster for several months. There were times when we were very worried that we were not going to pull this off. Other times when we felt we had momentum. It really went down to the wire.

Q: *I would have thought this would have been a difficult thing career-wise since there are Foreign Service cycles where you get assigned, and to be in something sort of open-ended as this you really couldn't feel you could bail out. I mean, most Foreign Service assignments come up in the spring and people move in the summer.*
LORD: That's a very good point. That was an additional frustration in not having an awful lot to do and waiting for the EEC. There was the feeling that this was supposed to be a two year assignment. In those days in the Foreign Service your first three assignments generally were about two years each, and you rotated even within an embassy, and they tried to expose you in many areas. So I had a feeling that three and a half years on trade negotiations was more than I wanted to invest, and as a general principle early in my career. It was slow moving. Two years of economics and trade would have been perfect, but three and a half years in any job at that point was really slowing me down. After nine months in Congressional Relations, a year and a quarter in Political-Military affairs, I felt like the clock had stopped. Now having said that, I was very fortunate on promotions although I like to think I earned them. But I got three promotions in the first five and a half years. So I was moving as fast as you possibly could.

Q: But you were beyond the threshold at that point.

LORD: I forget what the system was then. I started as what they called a FSO-8, I remember my first salary I think was $5200 a year. I went to 7, and then to 6, and then to 5. By the time I left Geneva I was an FSO-5. Which brings me to a career decision at that point, unless you have other questions on the Kennedy Round, this might be a good place to end it up at this point. We knew we would be finished one way or another by June 30, 1967.

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THOMAS W. SIMONS JR.
Office of the Special Trade Representative;
Secretary of Delegation/Special Assistant
Geneva (1965-1967)

Ambassador Simons was born in Minnesota and raised primarily in the countries of his father’s Foreign Service assignments and in the Washington, DC area. He received his education at Yale and Harvard Universities and at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. He also pursued studies in Europe. Entering the Foreign Service in 1963, Mr. Simons had several tours of duty at the State Department in Washington, DC and at the White House, dealing primarily with Foreign Trade and East European affairs. His foreign posts include Warsaw, Moscow, Bucharest and London. He served as United States Ambassador to Poland from 1993 to 1995 and as Ambassador to Pakistan from 1996 to 1998. Ambassador Simons was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: This is Christian Herter Jr.?

SIMONS: No, Christian Herter Jr. is the son; Christian Herter the father was a former Secretary of State. He had a bad leg that hindered his movements around. He had two deputies. One was in Washington, a man named William Roth, and the other was in Geneva, Michael Blumenthal, who had been a coffee negotiator and had come in under the Kennedy Administration and was then tagged as the negotiator in Geneva whenever we got to Geneva. We didn’t get to Geneva until January of 1965, so I spent 1964 in Washington really learning trade economics.
Q: This is the Kennedy Round?

SIMONS: It was the Kennedy Round of Tariff and Trade Negotiations in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Kennedy was gone but the Round was there, and the delegation was assembling. The U.S. had a very large delegation, 50 people broken down into teams. There was one for the EEC, the European Economic Community as it was then, there was one for Japan, there was one for Canada, there was one for kind of the rest of the world. Its situation was defined by John Rooney, I think, as the head of the House Appropriations Committee.

Q: Oh yeah, he was the God as far as the State Department and its appropriations were concerned. Kind of a horrible man, but...

SIMONS: …there were advantages: he didn’t believe that for delegations you should assign people so they could bring their wives. He thought people worked better if they were by themselves without families. Here was a delegation that was going out, that finally left in ’65, and it was going for years because the deadline set by the enabling legislation was in mid-1967. So all of us were rolling in money because we were getting $16.00 a day per diem for every day we were in Geneva, and all of us brought our families, paid for it out of our own pockets. I think for the next Tokyo Round they assigned people; they had learned their lesson. It was a real drain on the taxpayer because of John Rooney’s foible, but it was a great honeymoon assignment for me and Peggy because we didn’t have children. So we spent two and a half glorious years in Geneva. In the middle of it, at a certain point like a hole in a doughnut, the French walked out because they was having trouble with the EEC. It was not trouble over the Kennedy Round, but it was the famous year of the “empty chair” in European Common Market politics. Of course our negotiation ground to a halt. We younger people were delighted. Peggy and I took off. We hitchhiked all over Central and Western Europe in those days without children; it was great. She got her French down. She went to the Interpreters’ School at Geneva University. That would have been ’65: the back row of her class was all Chinese from mainland China, as we used to call it, and one day they just disappeared, they just evaporated. We then read that they had all been called home, but in order to preserve their chances of staying alive they’d all gotten off the train in Moscow and demonstrated and got beaten and arrested, so that their Cultural Revolution credentials gave them something to go on when they finally got back to China. So, mid-’60s. During that period the senior officers went crazy, because they had a year with nothing to do. I remember they used to come in on the weekends and read traffic. All the things that…you know, the Foreign Service culture.

Q: You were almost a GSO.

SIMONS: No, that was just for the first nine months, and then Blumenthal decided to change his special assistant and offered me the job. It was quite wonderful because he called me in, he said, “Would you like to be my special assistant?” And I said, “No.” Later on, at a later point, he said, “You know when I asked you to be my special assistant you really turned white.” I said, “Yeah, when I turned you down you really turned white.” He said, “Could I ask you why?” I said, “Sure, because my Dad was a line officer and I want to be a line officer. I figure if I’m smart enough
and if I can work hard and be patriotic I’ll do okay.” Now I said, “I know that staff people do better because I’ve seen them operate in the Department, but most of them I haven’t liked, and I don’t think that’s the way I want to serve. I want to get ahead on merit.” Blumenthal looked over at me and he said, “Tom, that’s very wise. That’s very sound. But I think you will find as you move along that knowing people is part of merit.” So that was his lesson and I finally took the job. So I was his special assistant in the office right across from him during that year. But of course it was a slow year.

Q: What were you learning economics and trade-wise?

SIMONS: I was learning about trade economics. I was learning about production, percentages of production and consumption. I ran a weekly newsletter of the whole economic press of Europe that I produced for the delegation, French, German and English, all of which I read. People sort of enjoyed that. I learned how the economic system works. I learned when trade is damaging, what the opportunities are. I did studies. I remember during that slow year they put me on special projects. One was Mexico and the GATT, because Mexico was for all those years not a member of the GATT.

Q: GATT being the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

SIMONS: It was the predecessor of the WTO, today’s World Trade Organization. I did a paper on world meat trade for which I learned about Australian and New Zealand interests and about our Western cattle lobby and the meat lobby. You get a sensitivity to the way trade impacts and the way trade is negotiated. It was most of my foreign affairs economics education until I started dealing with Communist countries, where you get into a different kind of economics and politics.

Q: What was the Kennedy Round about from the perspective of the Americans?

SIMONS: The Kennedy Round was an effort really to do away with tariffs as significant obstacles to trade in what might be the last era of U.S. industrial superiority. In other words, we were in the best shape in the world at that point and with Japan and Europe recovering we were unlikely ever to be in better shape to benefit from reductions that eliminated tariffs as a major obstacle. It was largely successful, I think. It brought tariffs down by ½ to 2/3. In many cases they were replaced by other barriers. In other words…

Q: Subsidies.

SIMONS: Subsidies, or health standards that protect German beer, protect the German market from our beer, and more recently it’s been genetic modification, all of those things. We had a bunch of our own. American Selling Price for chemicals was big at that point. Our tariffs were assessed on an invented cost, an American selling price, a system that was designed to shut out most of the European chemicals and did. So that was a tough negotiation. Agriculture was a tremendous problem because the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy was already in place and hard to get at because it’s not a tariff barrier. Anyway you learned about all of those things. You learned about trade wars. We had just come off a chicken war.
Q: Oh, this was very big, particularly in the Netherlands.

SIMONS: Yeah, the Netherlands and France and Israel. There was a great joke about Israel. But the reason was we were the first country to have a mass chicken industry up and running, and the Europeans were coming in behind us and wanted to protect their infant industry. We retaliated against Volkswagen buses and cognac and all their specialty products. So I learned a lot. I was never uncomfortable with economics after that assignment.

Q: Did you learn about negotiating styles in different countries or...?

SIMONS: Yeah, I mean, you had the nascent negotiating style of the Europeans, what is now the European Union. It was a work in progress, and it was always kind of a shifting target because it was the first major negotiation where the EEC Commission spoke for all the Member States. What they were negotiating was the Common External Tariff, which was a fairly recent tariff. They didn’t yet have all the social insurance and labor mobility provisions, that whole apparatus of the European Union that came later. Most of what the European Union was at the time was a Common External Tariff, and that was what they were negotiating, so it was hard for them. It was not typical. What was more typical was negotiating with Japan or Scandinavia, because they were like us. Although you did have EFTA, the European Free Trade Association, even at that time, which included Britain and Scandinavia. What I learned, I mean the clearest memory that I carried away, you did learn about national characteristics of civil services. You learned how the Germans were different from the Italians and the French.

Q: How would you?

SIMONS: Well, the French had this glorious old civil service that went back to the early modern period. It was highly self-conscious, highly educated, and it kept the country going during the whole postwar Fourth Republic. You were now under the Fifth Republic. But the French had a glorious tradition of self-confidence, were creative, were bold. The Germans, by contrast, still had a civil service that had been gathered from what the provincial Minister Presidents would give to the Federal Government when the Federal Republic was founded in 1949. So you still had a fairly low quality of civil servant in the Federal Government. Germany also had a great civil service tradition, but it was going to take another generation or two to recreate that, so you had insecure and not very well educated officials. You had some wonderful experts. We were friends with an expert who didn’t have a college degree, and he was really, really good and really smart. So you’ve got those national cells. You’ve got a kind of blitheness with the Italians, a sort of the devil-may-care approach, not very serious about detail.

The one thing I got as a major difference between Europe as such and the United States was that the Europeans tended to watch a very few issues very closely. In other words they would prioritize and identify the few things that they really cared about, and they were really watchdogs on that. The guy who was the French delegation -- they didn’t have a Frenchman on the European Commission, but delegations formed the national watchdog committee that met in Geneva to ride herd on the Commission delegation – was actually a Vietnamese by birth, and he remains a friend of mine today who is over seventy and retired. Later he joined the Commission and became the European Union’s ambassador in Paris. He was in the country when the French
war ended in 1954 and as a Vietnamese Frenchman, he chose France. I would watch him, and he was defending every French interest like a tiger, but there were only a few. Whereas the U.S. delegation, 50 people, computer equipped, huge, followed everything.

Q: This is tape 2, side 1 with Tom Simons.

SIMONS: Everything was a printout, and moreover we furnished everybody with statistics, and this is in the days before electronic computers. A lot of those we had were electrical. The old electrical adding and dividing machines, calculators they were called. We worked on those. We filled wastebaskets with the stuff, and at the end when we reached the agreement I had the job of producing two copies for every delegation down at the Xerox office with this ancient copying machinery, which we then carried in dollies up to the delegation room. I guess you could say it is the difference between a global power and a regional power – maybe that’s just the way it’s become recently - but we really did sort of take responsibility for the whole negotiation. The other countries were much more targeted, and I’m not so sure they were worse off.

Q: Of course we’ve got the problem we run across all the time, a country like France can decide which company is going to get the contract in Egypt and concentrate on that. We’re stuck with Lockheed, Martin and Boeing and what have you.

SIMONS: We’re competitive.

Q: We can’t allow ourselves to pick which we feel is the best and I’m sure in our delegation, I mean if it’s peanuts we had a representative for peanuts.

SIMONS: That’s true. We not only have a global power position, we have a full service economy. But it goes back further than that. I can remember reading in A. J. P. Taylor’s wonderful diplomatic history The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, his comments on diplomatic style. One of them pointed out that the French were probably the best diplomats, the best prepared, the sharpest, the smartest, but they tended to have only one issue, which was Alsace-Lorraine annexed by Germany, the blue line of the Vosges: everything circled around that one issue. So that extreme prioritization is something that goes back a long way in French practice.

Q: First place, the whole idea of the tariff: tariffs by this time were no longer seen by anybody as a means of raising revenue. Were they or not?

SIMONS: Well, I don’t think so at this point. In other words I think the sources of government revenue had expanded, the tax systems had been reformed. Other tax systems were much more dependent on indirect taxes than ours. A typical European tax system is very different that way. I don’t think that tariffs were considered important parts of government revenue, so I think that is one of the reasons why governments felt they could afford to do tariff reduction. It’s unlike for instance the liquor monopolies in Communist countries.

Q: This is where you make your money.
SIMONS: Yeah, and there are no ready alternatives, and that’s why when Gorbachev launched his anti-alcohol campaign in his early years in the ‘80s, one of the reasons it became such a problem was because it beggared the government, caused a huge loss of revenue. I think maybe some of the underdeveloped countries have excises that are still important for them.

Q: How did you find the Japanese at that point? They were just coming up, weren’t they?

SIMONS: They were just coming up. They have since gone beyond, but it was still the time of the huge Japanese delegation composed of representatives of every Japanese ministry: all watching each other, and all solidary in face of foreigners, which meant they said very little. It was almost impossible to get a decision out of them. It took months for them to work out their internal positions, but then when they did work out an internal position it could come very swiftly and be very bold. That was the Japanese negotiating style. I’ve worked with Japanese over the years and they have gone beyond that at the margin, but I think that probably is still Japanese negotiation style.

Q: How about the Brits?

SIMONS: The Brits (British) were not yet in the Common Market, they were still outside, and they’d suffered their veto.

Q: By De Gaulle.

SIMONS: By De Gaulle, after the Nassau meeting, I guess in ‘63 under Kennedy, so they were not in, and the French weren’t anxious for them to be in. De Gaulle was still there, so the French weren’t anxious to have them there. So they were independent. They needed tariff reductions as an industrial producer. They were contributory. They were smaller, they were leaner and smarter than we were, not quite to the French level, but they were bigger than the French and had more interests to represent. Yeah, they were good. Roy Denman, who was later the British, I think Commissioner for External Affairs once they joined what became the EC, who was certainly the EC representative in Washington for many years, was prominent in the British delegation.

Q: You were doing this when to when?

SIMONS: ‘65 to ‘67. From January of ‘65 when we went to Geneva until the agreement was signed in July of ‘67.

Q: Were you getting while you were there, either personally or through delegations, any reverberations to what was happening in Vietnam?

SIMONS: Yeah, sure. It was not really from delegations, because it was after all mainly a negotiation about industrial tariffs, so it was mainly our European, Canadian, and Japanese allies we heard from. It was sort of a disquiet and a fear that we’d be distracted by Vietnam, but you didn’t get into arguments over the rights and wrongs of Vietnam. You got those arguments within the American delegation, because with a 50-person delegation you get them; you know, Vietnam was a real weight on all our thoughts and all, I will say, our consciousnesses. It was
something we talked about. Most people didn’t quite know what to think. I can remember I knew what I thought because I can remember where it took place. I was with another member of our delegation, a friend, on the night after we had begun bombing in February of 1965, so it was a month after we got to Geneva that the bombing began. We were at a party overlooking the Jet d’Eau, the fountain in the middle of Lake Geneva, one of the most beautiful places in the world; and I can remember telling him that I didn’t think Communism was a gift to give to anybody, so it wasn’t a question of who is right and who is wrong, but I just didn’t think we could win this war. I told him I just don’t think a war like this is going to get the kind of support that it needs from the American body politic, and that was the way it always seemed to me.

**Q:** While you were doing these negotiations, was the Soviet Union sort of like a black hole or a presence there?

**SIMONS:** No, it was over the horizon.

**Q:** But I mean was there any influence?

**SIMONS:** No, you’d been through the Cuban Missile Crisis, that had happened three years before. We all lived through that, and then for something like this the Soviet Union was not on the screen. You had Czechoslovakia later.

**Q:** That came in ’68.

**SIMONS:** Yeah, but Czechoslovakia was a member of GATT. It had a suspended membership in GATT. It was not present. Poland wanted to get into GATT, but they basically didn’t fit, because these were non-tariff countries. Their trade was regulated not by tariffs but by other things, and they were not big traders. They didn’t bulk very large in the world trading system. The closest I got was a Swiss friend who had a color-printing outfit. He was my age and setting up in business. He’d bought a flatbed color printer from the Czechs and was trying to make that work. But they were pretty distant in those days. It was not a presence. Certainly not there, and I think not in the consciousness of most of us.

**Q:** How about the Canadians? The Canadians, when you get to trade particularly in those days, were not inconsequential.

**SIMONS:** They’re huge. They’re our biggest single trading partner, and they were then. They were big in everything. They’re big in agriculture, they’re big in lumber, timber, paper, and of course huge in auto parts. There was also the issue, I think, of intellectual property, I remember it being -- or I learned of it being -- an issue for them, the fear of being overwhelmed by American intellectual production.

**Q:** I mean this is a big thing, the fact that we put our ads in their magazines and everybody read the Saturday Evening Post or what have you.

**SIMONS:** Yeah, so there was a little bit of protectionism there, which you could understand. But I think the big issue was auto parts, and I think it was during the Kennedy Round that you came
to the agreement on auto parts that was basically a market-sharing kind of agreement, and it was sort of a breakthrough. I’m not sure on that looking back. Yeah, Canada was large. We had a very large team to negotiate with them, and they were tough to negotiate with. They were tough defenders of their commercial interests, and we knew it was important to them. It was important to us too because of the volume of trade.

Q: This went on until ‘67.

SIMONS: Summer of ‘67.

Q: By that time what had happened?

SIMONS: Well, you had an agreement that was to be passed into law by the national parliaments that fall. Basically it was before our authority ran out, so that the President could put it into law without having to take it back to Congress and have it picked apart. I mean that’s the nature of the trade negotiation authority. It provided for very substantial tariff reductions and for some reduction in non-tariff barriers too, but it was mainly a tariff agreement. What it did was it clear the way for every other round to concentrate on non-tariff barriers rather than tariffs because they became, I think with the Kennedy Round, pretty insignificant. That was an achievement.

Q: Well then, when you left there you felt pretty good?

SIMONS: Yeah, I felt good. We had a grand time. We hadn’t saved any money. Some of our more frugal colleagues saved enough to buy a house. We didn’t, partly because ever since I’d come into the Foreign Service I wanted to go to Poland.

DONALD B. KURSCH
Consular Officer
Zurich (1966-1968)

Donald B. Kursch was born in New York in 1942. He graduated from Harvard University in 1964 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1964 to 1965. His assignments abroad after entering the Foreign Service in 1966 included Zurich, Budapest, Moscow, Frankfurt, Bonn and Brussels. Mr. Kursch was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

KURSCH: Of course, then they sent me off to Zurich to do visa work like everybody else…

Q: You were in Zurich from when to when?

KURSCH: 1966 to ’68. I met my wife there. Or, I met her in Bern, actually.

Q: It was a Consulate General, and what were you…?
KURSCH: It was a Consulate General. We did all of the immigrant visas for Switzerland and most of the non-immigrant visas because Zurich was, is still, the major city in Switzerland and we did most of the consular work. That was the major purpose of the post. I mean, we had a commercial section that, basically, as far as I could figure out, compiled credit ratings on Swiss companies for American firms that wanted to find out whether Zender and Company was a reliable business partner. We had a deputy principal officer who was supposedly the commercial officer, but I don’t recall that he did a whole hell of a lot. And then I had this rotational assignment where I worked for him, and he really couldn’t find much for me to do. So the ambassador arranged for this exchange where the people from Zurich went down to Bern and the people from Bern went up to Zurich, the junior officers. So, I went down to Bern for four months, which was also very, very quiet, except I met my wife there, which was quite nice.

Q: What’s your wife’s background?

KURSCH: My wife is German-Swiss. She’s Bernese and comes from a Swiss farm. Her brother, her father, were farmers; her brother’s still farming right outside of Bern. We’ve gone back a lot, particularly when we lived in Europe. So, we were quite close to her family, and to her mother who is still alive. I’ve gotten to like Switzerland more with age.

Q: How did you meet her?

KURSCH: Met her in a restaurant. I was sitting here and she was sitting there, and we started talking, just purely by accident.

Q: Oh. Did you learn good Swiss-Deutsche?

KURSCH: I can understand some. My daughter speaks it quite well because we sent her back there every year to the farm in the summertime, and she has an American accent. But my in-laws don’t speak English. I managed to speak German with them. We maintain good ties with the country and we got married there.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were in Switzerland?

KURSCH: A man named John Hayes, from the Washington Post. I think he passed away some time ago, but he was the ambassador. My consul general was a man named Howard Trivers, who was an old German hand. This was his reward, it was his last assignment. The consul general jobs at the time were kind of rewards for people who couldn’t make ambassador. They were nice rewards. And Howard, he was quite good to me. He was a very old-fashioned Foreign Service officer. I remember he wore high button shoes to the office. But he was kind to me and quite helpful.

Q: You were there ’66-’68?

KURSCH: Yes.
Q: Well did you all have the feeling that where you were was a hotbed of espionage or was somebody else concerned with that?

KURSCH: Well, our cousins had a strong interest. I guess there must have been an interest too in the financial activities that went on there, but that was not my responsibility. We did have an interesting station chief in Bern, who was quite a character. He lived in Alan Dulles’ old house and he used to like to walk his bulldog across the main square at night, smoking a pipe, wearing his trench coat. So, it was no secret who he was.

Q: [laughter]

KURSCH: They had a major presence, maybe more out of tradition, than out of how much work they had to do.

Q: [laughter]

KURSCH: The consular affairs work kept us pretty busy. The political section, what I do remember in Bern is that they had a three-person political section, and I was the third person when I was rotated in, and their big job was preparing the weekly summary of political developments in Switzerland, called, “the Weeka” that they sent back to Washington and nobody read. When that was abolished in its entirety, it was quite a challenge for the section to find things to do. Bern, I think, even now is a fairly quiet post. Zurich is closed, although the Swiss are now UN members, and I worked with them in my last job in the Foreign Service quite a bit. I worked on a Balkan initiative and was able to encourage them to put some serious money into the initiative. So, that relationship was productive at the end.

Q: Any problems with visas, or was it pretty pro forma?

KURSCH: I think when you’re 23 years old, all of a sudden, you have a responsibility. You have a function and you’re making a difference in people’s lives. Of course, we didn’t really turn down many Swiss for visas, but all the Swiss at the time needed non-immigrant visas, and we did immigrant visas as well. And there were a lot of third country nationals passing through, and those could be a challenge from time to time. I remember being attacked in the office, or in the hall, by one person I hadn’t given a visa to. She tried to gouge my eyes out with her fingernails. Then I remembered my boss taking on a bunch of Haitians who were looking to get to immigrate to the United States and having to turn down a woman because she was illiterate. We didn’t see illiterates very often and I had to get out my Foreign Affairs Manual and look up the detailed requirements. We had a few interesting cases involving American citizen services. I had an interesting case once involving a young girl having to do something on the medical side that had been quite controversial, but I referred her to a Swiss doctor on the consular doctor’s list. But you made decisions. Another thing I did, and this is what endeared me to the consul general. This was the time when the Vietnam war was heating up, and the public affairs officer, the PAO, came up from Bern to Zurich to give a presentation justifying the war. I had been to the presentation and it wasn’t terribly convincing. The principal of the American School in Zurich, called up the consul general and asked if one of his younger officers could come out to talk to his high school students to talk and try to defend US policies. I was nominated to go out and do that.
and the teachers all attacked me. But they attacked me so strongly that the students sympathized with me and the principal called the CG up and said I’d done a very good job. So that put me on his good list.

Q: Well, after two years, by ’68, Vietnam really was heating up. Were you hearing at all from the Marines?

KURSCH: I sure did. The Marines tried to get me back. I got a letter from them one day… I can remember it. It was the night after I had been out with Miss America.

Q: One remember that...

KURSCH: I went to some event that Miss America was at, and had dinner with Miss America. The next day I got this letter from the Marine Corps, sort of a “Dear Fellow” letter. “You’re not going to regular Reserve meetings.” Well we didn’t have a Reserve unit in Switzerland, and they had excused me to do this. But they were after all these stray Marines who were not going to regular Reserve meetings, and basically gave me 45 days to get back into my Reserve unit or I was going to be called up for two years of active duty. So, I wrote to the Marines, of course. My consul general was away. I called up the embassy in Bern. I must say they weren’t very helpful. So, I looked into all sorts of possibilities. I tried to figure out, “could I join the Army Reserve?” I went through a rather tense period. And, finally, I was given the name of somebody in State personnel, and I called them up in Washington—then a bit deal--and explained my situation to them. I said, “Look, you guys sent me over here. Now you ought to go to bat for me and get me out of this mess or send me back.” And, I was quite prepared to go back on my own, if necessary.

[End of side one.]

Q: But you’re saying that your attitude was that if they don’t get you out of... help you on this...

KURSCH: Well, the State Department was terribly afraid of the military, and they didn’t like to ask for exemptions for people. They were very cautious. Generally, they could get people out of the draft by having a form letter they would send and your draft board would usually give you an occupational deferment. But, if you are already in something, the idea of getting discharged is a much greater challenge. I realized that unless somebody was really going to go to bat for me that I probably would be called up. Anyway, I finally did call this fellow up on the phone and explained my situation, and he said, “Oh, yes, let me look into this, and see what I can do.” Well about a week letter, a thin envelope arrives on my desk and I open it with a bit of trepidation, but my discharge is in there, an honorable discharge.

I saw this guy about a year and a half later, in fact, ironically, I think he went out to be the admin officer in Bern. I was in Bern visiting my wife’s family, and we were invited to an Embassy party. I went over to him and I said, “I don’t know if you remember me, but I just want to thank you for what you did for me.” He looked at me and said, “You’re a lucky son of a gun.” I said, “Oh?” He said, “Well, after our telephone conversation, I did call the Marine Corps up and I got some tough colonel there in the Pentagon, and he says, ’How many of these guys do you have?’ I said, ’Well, I’ve got this guy in Zurich and another guy in Paris He said, ‘Alright, we’ll let these two go. But we’re not letting any more out. We need bodies for Vietnam.’”
Anyway, then I was supposed to be sent to Vietnam on my second assignment, although again I didn’t know that because I’d put in my request to marry a foreign national. At that time, when you married a foreign national, you had to also submit your resignation, in the event the request was not approved. If it was approved, you were supposed to be assigned to Washington, D.C. until your spouse got citizenship. So, I went through the paperwork and did all that. The admin officer in Bern called up Washington, D.C. and said, “You need to have a Washington assignment now for Kursch; he’s getting married to this Swiss woman.” They said, “Oh, he can’t do that.” He said, “Well, you know, I told you this a month ago that…” The Department responded “but we got his orders here to go to Vietnam. He must have known this.” The admin officer replied “He didn’t know. I called you up last month about this” So they broke my assignment and sent me back to Washington. So, I didn’t get involved with Vietnam. I kind of lucked out there.

Q: Well, you went back to Washington in ’68, then.

DAN W. FIGGINS
Rotational Officer
Geneva (1966-1968)

Mr. Figgins was born and raised in Iowa and educated at Grinnell College and Syracuse University. After service with AID, he joined the State Department as an intern in 1963. He was appointed Foreign Service Officer in 1966 and posted to Geneva, Switzerland. Subsequent postings include USUN, New York, Buenos Aires and Washington, where he served as Desk Officer for Honduras and Nicaragua. Mr. Figgins was interviewed by Jeff Broadwater in 1993.

Q: What were your official duties in Geneva? Was that you first assignment?

FIGGINS: That was a rotational assignment so I had three different jobs. First I worked with the officer who represented the United States to the European Economic Commission. Then I worked with the officer that dealt with political problems of all kinds in all organizations that were in Geneva. Then I worked with the person who worked on the financial problems of all the organizations that the United States had representation to in Geneva. So I went to conferences of all kinds...international labor, world health, meteorology, telecommunications, anything that was in Geneva...and write reports on what happened. I didn't negotiate very much. I was quite disappointed in the first two years at how little negotiating responsibility I had. I would sometimes go along and listen to some negotiations, but as far as saying, "The United States wants to have a reduction in its budget share from 33 to 25 percent, please go talk to these three delegations about that," I didn't get that responsibility and thought I was quite underutilized. I just went and wrote minutes of meetings.

Q: So you were an observer.
FIGGINS: The people there thought they were teaching me by observation, but I felt that I could have learned better by doing without any harm to the United States position.

Q: Was that a typical procedure for a young Foreign Service officer in that situation?

FIGGINS: The typical first tour officer does visa work, so the first couple of years are interviewing people which although may be closely supervised still it is one person talking to another person. It is very much more independent and responsible work than I felt I had as an observer.

Q: You were in Geneva from 1966-68 and then from 1968-71 you were US delegate to the US Mission to the UN in New York.

FIGGINS: Yes, that's right.

Q: When you were at the USUN, was U Thant Secretary General when you went to New York?

FIGGINS: Yes, U Thant was Secretary General.

Q: Any impressions of him, any dealings with him?

FIGGINS: My impression is of seeing him sitting in front of the General Assembly an hour at a time without moving except for blinking his eyes. He had some kind of Buddhist peacefulness about him. The people who dealt with him said that he was concerned that the Secretariat people be contented and happy in their work.

Q: Was he popular with the Secretariat staff?

FIGGINS: I think he was. It is my understanding that in the last year or two of his tenure, which I guess was the period when you were in New York, he was in poor health and his activities were limited because of some physical problems.

Q: What did the American delegation generally think of him?

FIGGINS: I don't know. I wasn't aware that he was taking initiatives, putting himself in a position where he would be unpopular because he was trying to do something. I really don't remember a thing about his ever taking a leading position and having American diplomats or others react for or against him, which would be very, very different than say, Dag Hammarskjold who was almost run out of the UN by the Soviets who didn't like his peacekeeping initiatives.

Q: Well, U Thant had tried, I think, to get some negotiations started on the war in Vietnam earlier in the mid-60s, but that would have been before you went to New York. What about Kurt Waldheim, he followed U Thant? Was he there during your time? Help with the chronology.

FIGGINS: I'm afraid I can't, I don't know when he came in. But his reputation was that of a man who would cooperate with all sides and wouldn't offend any. It would be unlikely, for example,
in the opinion of people who knew him at that time, that he would have done as Boutros-Ghali has now in Somalia and ask for retribution against those who were suspected of having killed the peacekeeping forces. Kurt Waldheim had a reputation for not defending the staff of the UN or the UN operations, but rather simply being there to not offend anyone who was inclined to take offense.

Q: Some of the secondary sources that I have read tend to be fairly critical of Waldheim, implying or accuse him of being very ambitious, very sensitive to his public image and as you say not wanting to give offense or to take risks. Do you think that is an accurate perception?

FIGGINS: That jibes with the perception of Secretariat members who worked with him, not other diplomats. My impressions come to you from other Secretariat members who felt that he did not have the interests of the Secretariat or the United Nations's mission at heart. So anything you have said about him is not inconsistent with this impression that the Secretariat people who worked under him had.

Q: Let me ask you about a couple of people who were in the Mission, I think at the same time you were. William Schaufele. Does he ring any bells?

FIGGINS: I can't remember exactly what his position was, but I think he was with the US Mission in the late '60s and early '70s.

Q: I read an interview with him and he talked about Waldheim and suggested that Waldheim would bow too easily to pressure from the Soviets and the third world, and I just wondered what you thought about that?

FIGGINS: The Secretariat sources didn't particularly see him cow-towing to the Soviets and the third world any more than he would to Western Europe and the United States. Which is different, you see, from my own motivation which was not to serve the United States versus the Soviet Union or industrialized countries versus the third world, but my point of view as a diplomat was probably closer to the typical point of view of a Secretariat member rather than a diplomat.

EDWARD S. LITTLE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Bern (1966-1969)

Ambassador Edward S. Little was born in Ohio in 1918. He received an undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College and then attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He served in the U.S. Navy during WW II. Ambassador Little joined the Foreign service in 1957. He served in Ecuador, Spain, the Dominican Republic, Switzerland, and Chad. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: After that you went to Berne as the DCM from '66 to '69. How did you get that job?
LITTLE: Pure chance, like most of the other ones. I was in the War College. One thing about going through training like that is that as of a certain date you are available, as against being in a job where you can see what the possibilities are. You're available. In the fall of '65 I went to see the Executive Director of EUR. I thought I would like to go to a number two spot in Europe. I said to myself, I was number two in Latin America. I like being a DCM. I'll try it again. I told Fred Irving that and he said there wasn't much possibility because there wasn't much opening up. He mentioned Berne. I said, "Let's think about that." That started it on its way.

Q: When you were there the ambassador was John S. Hayes?

LITTLE: Yes.

Q: He's a non-career man. So you served as a DCM under two career officers, Ravndal and Bernbaum, before. Now, can you contrast that with serving somebody who is not a career person? Did your role change appreciably as DCM?

LITTLE: No. I think not, except that Hayes was a very bright man, very capable. I'm not one to say that he was a non-career therefore he wasn't competent. On the contrary, he was very competent. Because there wasn't all that much activity for two men like the ambassador or my own background, he did more on his own than the two career men that I had worked for before. That was his way and he was good at it.

Q: What was his background?

LITTLE: I think he was a vice president of the Washington Post for radio and TV stations and he had helped Lyndon B. Johnson in the '64 campaign with his television appearances. That's his background. He was bright.

Q: What were our principal interests in Switzerland and concerns at that time from '66 through '69?

LITTLE: Again, there wasn't all that much activity for two active individuals. I regarded Switzerland as a point of exchange of information between east and west. I told the ambassador I planned to do this and he said, "Fine." So it met over lunch with the number two men from all embassies, including the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia. I had a chance to at least keep the door open, nothing momentous went on, but it was an opportunity to talk about things, as far as I was concerned. In the days before I left, the first representative came from Washington to talk to the Swiss about a treaty which was signed two or three years later with respect to release of information on the secret Swiss bank accounts when criminal activity was alleged or demonstrated.

Q: This was at that time and for some time had been a matter of major concern because there was a feeling that Swiss bank accounts were being used to evade scrutiny by criminal elements.

LITTLE: That's right.
Q: Now we're talking about drug elements. In those days it wasn't as much drug as other elements. Until there had been pressure from other areas of the world, the Swiss had kept these accounts secret. It was probably the major attention-making concern.

LITTLE: There was a concern which then developed into discussions with the Swiss and eventually a treaty.

Q: How did you find the Swiss to deal with?

LITTLE: Very good. Not as open as say the Ecuadorians. They're different types of people. I was there for three years and it took me about two years to get to the point where I had personal relationships. They're slow to pick up foreigners. But very, very good. Direct. Well informed. I enjoyed dealing with them.

There's one thing about the Switzerland experience which is demonstrative of what the officials were like. You may remember Stalin's daughter was there, Svetlana. She left India and went to Rome and then to Geneva. The Swiss gave her, in effect, entry for an unspecified period of time. We never saw her. The Swiss took care of her, they had her in a monastery in Fribourg, near Berne for a period. Then apparently the press got onto where she was. They thought they could find her there. Then she went to the house of one of the senior officials of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office in Switzerland is called the Political Department. They have the minister and, as I remember, a deputy minister. Then they divide the world into two parts--east and west. The gentleman who handled the east part was in charge of Svetlana and her well being. The gentleman in the west had a house outside of Berne. Do you know Switzerland?

Q: Not too well.

LITTLE: Lake Thun--there's a little village called Oberhofen. He and his wife had a little place up on the mountain overlooking Lake Thun. They moved Svetlana from Fribourg--she went there. I didn't know this until later. Part of the approach was that the United States officials did not know where she was and were not in touch with her.

I remember Marvin Kalb came. The press was all over Berne trying to find her. The ambassador had been planning to go to Bonn for a chiefs of mission meeting just about this time. We talked it over and we thought he ought to just go ahead. Otherwise, why is the ambassador canceling his plans? I was then the chargé. Marvin Kalb came around. He's very alert and bright. The questions he asked were easy for me to answer. Did I know where she was? No, I didn't know. That sort of thing. Had I seen her? No, I had not. So he quickly retreated because he knew that I didn't know anything. I didn't have to tell any untruths. Simply that I didn't know.

Then the Swiss got a little restless, they didn't want to have her there forever. It was an annoyance. Washington sent us authorization to issue her a visitor's visa. So I told the man who handles the east--Svetlana at that time being in the house of the man who handles the west. I told the man who handles the east that this was the way it was. He said if I came down the next day he would have her passport. Is this of interest?
Q: *This is of interest. Yes.*

LITTLE: How we dealt with it. The ambassador went away and we dealt with it by not knowing-properly not knowing what was going on. I went down and I picked up the passport around quarter till five. I think our office hours were till five o'clock. I called the consul and I said, "Bob, after you close up, could you come up to me office?" The ambassador was back and we talked about how we would handle this. This was Bob Ode.

Q: *Who later was a hostage in Tehran.*

LITTLE: Yes. He had retired then went back for six months and got caught there.

Q: *He was a hostage during the 444 days.*

LITTLE: In Tehran. Bob came up to my office and I said, "I've got a little assignment for you." I showed him the telegram from the Department authorizing the visa and I said, "Here is Stalin's daughter's passport. Would you be good enough to go down and open up your safe and put the visa in and then bring it back to me?" He said, "Fine." I went downtown the next morning and gave the passport back to the man who handled the east and in about forty-eight hours she was on a plane from Zurich to New York.

Why were we there? We didn't now that Stalin's daughter was going to defect. We were there to take care of it at arm's length.

Q: *Switzerland being a neutral ground, did you have many defections or run-of-the-mill type people asking for refugee status?*

LITTLE: Very, very few that I recollect. The major influx of refugees was after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russians in the spring of '69. You'd see all these cars that had "CS" for Czechoslovakia. The Swiss had given them haven.

Q: *Did the embassy get involved in doing anything with them?*

LITTLE: No. The Swiss handled it. I may be wrong, but it's my clear recollection that we were not involved in that.

Q: *I couldn't decipher from the Foreign Service list what you were doing when you left Berne in 1969. You went to the State Department until 1974. What were you doing then?*

LITTLE: I was country director for what they called North Coast Affairs in the Latin American Bureau. What it meant was relations with Venezuela and Colombia.

**JOHN J. HARTER**
John J. Harter was born in Texas in 1926. Harter served in the US Air Force during WWII before graduating from the University of Southern California and joining the Foreign Service. Overseas, Harter served in South Africa, Chile, Thailand and Switzerland. He also worked in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for USIA and after retirement on Oral Histories. Harter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You were in Geneva from 1966 until...

HARTER: From July 1966 until May 1970, nearly four years. It was supposed to be a five-year assignment - three years, home leave, and two more years - but let's come back to why that changed later.

Q: What did you do in Geneva?

HARTER: I worked mainly on GATT affairs. For the first two years, I also spent some time on UNCTAD. The Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was nearing its final crunch when I arrived. A strong negotiating team represented the United States in those negotiations, comprising some 30 to 40 experts and support staff headed by Ambassador Mike Blumenthal. I was not a member of that team. Instead, I was one of the permanent U.S. representatives to GATT responsible for all U.S. interests in GATT except for the Kennedy Round. We were responsible for accession negotiations for new GATT members, regional trade agreements, trade-related balance of payments issues, and administrative matters, for example. Henry Brodie was the official U.S. representative to GATT, Herb Propps was the alternate representative, and I was an assistant or substitute for either or both of them. Henry and Herb were both FSO-1s, and Herb, having been steeped in GATT affairs for many years, frankly felt their roles should have been reversed. I replaced Doris Whitnack, who, for many years, had been a trade policy official in both State and STR [The Office of the Special Trade Representative (redesignated as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTR] in 1979)]. Doris couldn't stand Herb Propps, and that's why the position suddenly opened: She begged Washington to get her out of there as soon as possible. She was downright miserable! I arrived three months before she left, and the overlap was too long, but it afforded more than ample time for Doris to share with me her considerable knowledge of GATT and her dislike for Herb.

Q: Did you have suitable experience to fill that position?

HARTER: Not really. GATT delegates constituted a special fellowship. They were social intimates and they spoke a common language understood by few outsiders. Although dedicated to their separate national interests, they shared a faith in the power of international trade to shape a better world. The cognoscenti didn't quickly and easily absorb new initiates. But my economic duties in Chile, Thailand, and IO, reinforced by my economic studies at Harvard, gave me a good foundation, and I was well briefed before I left Washington by Jules Katz and several senior members of his staff, including Bob Brungart and Bill Culbert. Jules was appointed...
Director of the Office of International Trade Policy shortly before that. I had known him slightly when I was in IO. He had been an economic officer in the Office of Eastern European Affairs for some 15 years. I met him through Art Wortzel, who was then the public affairs officer in the Office of European Affairs. Art and I had lunch one day, and he brought Jules along. Jules then seemed to me quite shy, and I was amazed at the transformation in his personality after he became State's key trade policy executive. He was in command, very articulate, and somewhat aggressive - totally different from the individual I met in the early 1960s. Phil Trezise, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, shrewdly chose him to head the trade policy office because he saw Jules' potential and also because complex issues relating to the Eastern European countries were coming before GATT. Subsequent history confirmed it was an exceptionally good choice. Apparently it was Jules' personal approval - and a strong IO endorsement - that sealed my assignment to Geneva despite my lack of prior trade policy experience.

Q: Were you disadvantaged as a newcomer to GATT?

HARTER: Yes, I was! For the first few months, I felt severely underqualified. It took time to gain admission into the world of GATT lore. Doris was very helpful during our overlap, but Henry Brodie and Herb Propps were always busy and disinclined to inculcate a newcomer into that world.

Q: Did the Blumenthal team help you?

HARTER: Yes, some of them tutored me. So did the GATT Secretariat, especially Margaret Potter and Jan Tumlir, who patiently coached me on GATT precedents and mores during my early months there. Also, just by attending negotiating sessions and interacting with other delegations I gradually became familiar with the GATT world. Eventually I was a true believer in GATTology, convinced that continually expanding world trade is the indispensable element of a dynamic world economy.

Q: What were the duties of Henry Brodie and Herb Propps, and how did you assist them?

HARTER: Henry represented the United States at meetings of the GATT Council, the oversight body that authorized actions pursuant to recommendations of subordinate GATT Committees. Herb, as Henry's alternate, usually represented the United States in Henry's absence and at the more technical and legalistic meetings. I was on the U.S. Delegation to virtually all GATT meetings, except for those concerned with the Kennedy Round, and I usually wrote the first draft of delegation reports. At first, Herb heavily edited my drafts, but he gradually came to approve them with little or no change.

Q: What were some of the specific issues Brodie and Propps dealt with?

HARTER: Countless issues were on the GATT agenda, so it's hard to choose. Henry spent many hours on Poland's accession to GATT, for example, after Poland requested accession as a full Contracting Party in the late 1960s, having attended GATT meetings as an observer for several years before that. Jules Katz personally managed that accession, which was quite tangled,
technically and politically. I attended those meetings with Henry, and I usually wrote the reporting cables.

One item that Herb fielded was the so-called Tripartite Agreement, through which Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt tried to forge a special intra-LDC scheme through which signatory developing countries would reciprocally extend trade preferences to all parties to the agreement. The idea was to exempt intra-LDC trade from GATT rules, and Herb fought it tooth and nail. Again, I attended the meetings and I wrote most of the reporting cables. This issue ultimately evolved into an UNCTAD program that was identified as "Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries," which was eventually supported by a special division of the UNCTAD Secretariat.

Q: Was Japan active in GATT in those days?

HARTER: Japan acceded to GATT by 1955, when its economy was beginning to recover from wartime devastation. Japan was never prominent in GATT, but it became somewhat more visible while I was in Geneva.

Q: Were the communist countries members of GATT?

HARTER: The Soviet Union wasn't, but some communist countries were. Cuba, an original Contracting Party to GATT, was represented at major GATT meetings over the years. We would have expelled Cuba if that had been possible, but other governments wouldn’t support that. Whenever the Cubans attended a GATT meeting, they delivered bitter anti-U.S. tirades that sorely embarrassed and distracted Henry Brodie and Herb Propps. Czechoslovakia was also a Contracting Party from the beginning, but its representative was pretty tame. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was an energetic player in GATT affairs - but not as a communist country. The Yugoslav representative, a voluble man named Papic, was one of the most prominent Third World voices in GATT, along with the Indian and Brazilian spokesmen.

Q: What was the origin of GATT?

HARTER: That went back to the post-World War II period, when the international community created several new specialized agencies to be associated with the United Nations, including the FAO, WHO, UNESCO, and others. The older specialized agencies - the ITU, the UPU [The International Telecommunications Union and the Universal Postal Union dated from the late nineteenth century.], and the ILO - were also recognized as specialized agencies of the UN system.

The economic institutions were a special case. From the beginning, the U.S. Treasury insisted they must in no way be subordinate to the UN The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 basically envisaged the need for new international organizations to oversee the implementation of global rules aimed at preventing a recurrence of the "Beggar-Thy-Neighbor" policies that disrupted the world economy in the 1930s. The International Monetary Fund was supposed to ensure that national monetary policies and exchange rates were compatible with international order; and the International Trade Organization was to provide a framework through which governments could
negotiate reductions in trade barriers. The Bretton Woods Conference assumed the IMF and the ITO would cooperate to grease the wheels of international finance and trade.

The so-called "Havana Charter" was subsequently negotiated as a basis for the ITO, but the Truman Administration did not submit it to the U.S. Senate for ratification, knowing there weren't enough affirmative votes to approve it. Some Senators thought the very concept of the ITO was inconsistent with U.S. sovereignty, erroneously assuming the ITO itself would be empowered to reduce U.S. tariffs. Some Senators also opposed the ITO, which would have included all UN members, because they did not want the communist countries to be parties to a non-discriminatory trading system. These developments unfortunately coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, when U.S. foreign policy coalesced around the concept of "containing" communism. In the eyes of some, that implied a virtual embargo on trade with the Soviet Union.

A common view at that time was that excluding the Soviet Union from economic interaction with "free market" economies would hasten its economic collapse. Expecting that the ITO would eventually come into being, the United States and the Europeans construed GATT as a temporary agency that would implement the more urgent trade-policy provisions of the Havana Charter. GATT was therefore the center of several increasingly ambitious rounds of tariff cuts, beginning in 1947. In its early years, GATT basically comprised the European countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and several Latin American countries, but by the time I left Geneva in 1970 nearly one hundred countries were members. As you know, GATT recently morphed into the World Trade Organization, which resembles the original ITO concept.

Meanwhile, in addition to the IMF and the ITO, the Bretton Woods conferees agreed that a third international organization was needed - an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which came to be known as the "World Bank" - to finance and spur the reconstruction of the war-damaged countries of Europe. After 1947, the Marshall Plan basically took care of that, and by the late 1940s the Bank's agenda effectively shifted to development and its mandate was broadened to embrace special emphasis on stimulating the growth of Third World economies.

Q: Did you have primary responsibility for particular areas of the GATT portfolio?

HARTER: Yes, after Doris left, I was the U.S. Representative to all GATT administrative and budget meetings. That's how I became personally acquainted with Sir Eric Wyndham White, the Director General of GATT. He had a major hand in setting up and directing GATT between 1947 and 1967, and he closely monitored its executive and budgetary functions. I had heard at Harvard that he was a cardinal figure in the economic rehabilitation of the European economy and the continuing rise in living standards in the world economy following World War II. Nevertheless, neither Henry Brodie nor Herb Propps paid the slightest heed to the GATT budget. Whenever anyone in Washington tried to discuss it with either of them, the call would be bounced to me.

GATT was a unique target for U.S. budget-cutters because, technically speaking, it was not an "international organization." Our fiction was that GATT was merely an "executive agreement"
and a negotiating forum, and its supporting Secretariat was not sanctioned by U.S. Senate ratification. The legal presumption was that U.S. contributions to support its budget weren't part of U.S. contributions to the United Nations and other international organizations. That may sound like a nit-pick, but the practical result was that U.S. funds allocated to GATT, although relatively small, were a conspicuous "administrative" item in the State Department budget. They invariably caught the eye of Washington budgeteers. Accordingly I always received stiff instructions requiring us to cut every penny we could from the GATT budget. Actually, that may have been a good thing: It kept the GATT Secretariat slender, sleek, and efficient.

Also, as time passed, I was increasingly designated to represent the United States at meetings concerned with the trade of developing countries, especially those that focused on trade restrictions that developing countries claimed were necessary to rectify their balance of payments. GATT essentially required countries that maintained such import restrictions to defend them annually in formal on-the-record meetings.

The State Department tended to see those balance of payments sessions as pro forma and inconsequential because Article XV of the General Agreement bestowed on the IMF authority to sanction a government's imposition of import restrictions to safeguard its balance of payments. However, those meetings provided underutilized opportunities: I usually received excellent and detailed instructions that highlighted the adverse economic effects of bad economic policies, and the erring governments usually sent senior trade-policy officials to defend those policies. We could have made good use, in bilateral and other multilateral fora, of the official GATT reports that fully recapitulated the points we made in those meetings and the superficial rebuttals. With this in mind, Roderick Abbott of the U.K. and I floated a joint U.S./U.K. initiative to upgrade those balance of payments meetings, but our proposal wasn't well received either in Washington or London.

Q: Didn't the developing countries complain that GATT was a "rich man's club" that gave insufficient priority to their trade interests?

HARTER: Yes, they did, vehemently and incessantly. It was a mantra! In response, the GATT charter was amended after the first UNCTAD conference in 1964. Governments negotiated and adopted a "Part Four" of the General Agreement - new Articles 36, 37, and 38 - that specified that obstacles to exports of developing countries should receive special consideration under the aegis of a new Committee on Trade and Development, which met at least twice a year to oversee implementation of the new articles. I was sometimes the U.S. Representative to that committee and its sub-groups. Actually, we gave low priority to those meetings, because the total volume of U.S. trade affected was not substantial. After all, U.S. policy toward GATT was largely dictated by our immediate trade interests.

Q: When did the Kennedy Round end?

HARTER: Technically, at midnight on June 30, 1967, the deadline imposed by the legislation that authorized U.S. participation in the negotiations. Actually, the final exchange of concessions occurred during the frenzied hours after midnight, as Joe Greenwald, Mike Blumenthal, and a
few senior members of the U.S. team sparred with their European counterparts to cobble together the final Kennedy Round package. They "stopped the clock" at midnight to make it legal.

A friend of mine who took notes at those final exchanges after midnight told me the ultimate Kennedy Round concessions rested more on the negotiators' subjective sense of probable political support at the time of ratification than on the bulky statistical and technical studies that had been laboriously prepared by the bureaucracy to bolster their positions. He also said Wyndham White magnificently steered the negotiators around pitfalls and dead-ends during those final hours.

**Q:** *You knew Wyndham White personally?*

HARTER: Yes. He was charismatic in mediating critical policy debates, and he was down-to-earth in informal settings. I vividly recall a dinner party my wife and I attended at the home of Louis Halle [Note: Louis Halle was a member of the State Department policy planning body after World War II and a professor of economics in Geneva in the 1960s. (Halle is also well-known for his classic book about birding in the Washington area.)], at which Wyndham White's wife berated him as a "failure" because he never amassed a fortune. That helps to explain why, after the Kennedy Round, he accepted an executive position with a corporate organization that went bust soon thereafter. After that - and after his ensuing divorce - his life was sad.

**Q:** *Were there other reasons?*

HARTER: I heard conflicting stories about that. Some say he would have continued at GATT if his salary had been increased, even though he was disheartened when we did not press for continuing trade liberalization immediately after the Kennedy Round. We didn't try to persuade him to remain. We thought a Swiss diplomat named Paul Jolles would replace him, but Jolles declined. At the last minute the Swiss Foreign Office proposed Olivier Long as Wyndham White's successor, and, lacking an alternative, we accepted him without knowing anything about him.

Actually, Long had a distinguished background: He was a former Ambassador, a professor of economics, and a senior officer in the Swiss militia. His principal claim to fame before 1967 was that he secretly oversaw the negotiation of General de Gaulle's settlement with the Algerians. However, his subdued manner contrasted sharply with Wyndham White's extroverted, take-command style.

**Q:** *Did the Mission's GATT-related duties change after the Kennedy Round?*

HARTER: Yes, but not precisely as the Mission anticipated. Technically the Kennedy Round was completed by mid-1967, but Henry Brodie, Herb Propps, and I were still picking up the pieces into 1968. Henry and Herb assumed that after the Kennedy Round, they would be unambiguously responsible for the full range of GATT affairs. Joe Greenwald had promised Henry that his duties and his staff would expand after the Blumenthal team departed, but only John Bushnell came in at that time.
Q: Why the change?

HARTER: Well, from 1947 to 1967, Wyndham White resolutely pressed the international community, and especially the United States, to move from one round of trade negotiations to the next. He characteristically invoked the famous bicycle metaphor, which held that trade liberalization could continue only as a relentlessly forward-moving process. Otherwise, he maintained, protectionism would pull it down. The rationale was that as trade barriers are reduced - and as efficient overseas producers penetrate domestic markets - the increased competition will force inefficient producers to become more efficient or to go out of business. Inefficient producers will always lobby the government to protect them from the increased competition, the argument goes. When a major round - or preparation for the next round - is under way, the government can respond that all trade policy complaints are receiving priority in the context of the negotiations or the preparations for negotiations. At other times, it's hard for the government to provide politically acceptable answers. For twenty years Wyndham White invoked this rationale to persuade U.S. trade-policy officials to move from one round to the next, each more ambitious than the last. Following two decades of precedents, it was widely expected that a new round would follow the conclusion of the Kennedy Round, but Olivier Long at the helm did not try to force the next round as Wyndham White had done before him.

Q: What direction did U.S. trade policy take after the Kennedy Round?

HARTER: There was some debate in Geneva and elsewhere about that, but our senior trade policy officials at the State Department basically stayed aloof from that debate. They were preoccupied with the ramifications of GSP, preparations for UNCTAD-II, and the enlargement of the European Community, especially the question of U.K. entry into the Common Market. The Mission was well aware of those distractions, but it did not press Washington to direct GATT toward any particular course.

Q: Do you mean the U.S. position in GATT was passive?

HARTER: Well, the U.S. position wasn't really well-defined. As I understand it, Lyndon Johnson, perceiving no clear initiatives on overall trade policy from his principal advisors, asked Bill Roth, who succeeded Herter as the head of STR, to prepare a report on the world trading system. Roth apparently wanted to indicate possible future directions to the incoming Nixon Administration, and he depended heavily on a young man named Harald Malmgren to help him develop that report. Hal had been one of McNamara's "Whiz Kids" at the Pentagon, and he came to STR to work on agricultural trade matters. In 1968 and 1969 he represented the United States at a series of GATT meetings seeking to project a GATT agenda for the 1970s. Frankly, Henry Brodie and Herb Propps didn’t relate well to Hal: They saw him as an unguided missile without an official mandate. As a consequence I was usually designated to serve as the Mission's representative at those meetings. Hal was brilliant and easy to work with, and he exhibited a definite sense of where he thought we should go.

During my last two years in Geneva I basically served as Hal's man on the spot. Of course, that put me in a delicate position, because Henry and Herb - rather than Hal - were officially the principal U.S. representatives to GATT, and they wrote my efficiency reports, as rating and
reviewing officers, even though they really had no basis for observing or evaluating the work I did with Hal.

**Q: Were other governments represented at those meetings by the local Missions in Geneva?**

HARTER: Most were, but the leading participants were senior officials from capitals. Hal usually arrived at those meetings late, and he left early, and I often sat uncomfortably in his place at the beginning and at the end of those meetings. Each meeting would stall for time pending his arrival because the U.S. position was always critical, and no one but Hal knew what it was. He usually left as soon as the key conclusions were nailed down in principle, sometimes before they were formally enunciated. I prepared the reporting cables, which spelled out the recommendations Hal left with me orally. Hal virtually never briefed Henry or Herb about those meetings, but one of them would sign off on the cables after I showed his clearance in substance.

**Q: What were the principal GATT topics discussed in those meetings?**

HARTER: Hal saw those sessions as a preliminary exploration of issues to be negotiated in a future round, although no formal policy determination had been made that there would be such a round. The most important questions related to so-called non-tariff barriers, or measures that governments presumably imposed for purposes unrelated to foreign trade, although they sometimes gave their own producers competitive advantages in their own markets vis-a-vis foreign suppliers, thus distorting international competition. The trade-distorting effects of those measures were increasingly evident after tariffs were slashed in successive GATT rounds.

We began by compiling a comprehensive inventory: We asked countries to submit lists of measures other countries maintained that impeded their own exports. After the Secretariat consolidated those submissions into one large, unwieldy list, we broke the measures down into categories, such as government procurement policies, customs formalities, technical standards, and quarantine, health, and sanitary measures. Herb Propps, as an old GATT expert, grumbled every inch of the way that GATT negotiations would never reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade, but subsequent history proved him wrong. A separate series of meetings pinpointed the economic costs of agricultural subsidies, which Hal expected the next GATT round to deal with. Unfortunately, those measures remained sacrosanct until the Uruguay Round, which took place from 1986 to 1994.

**Q: Where did Malmgren get his official guidance?**

HARTER: He apparently had a loose oral mandate from Bill Roth. In addition, Hal kept his eyes and ears open for fresh thinking on trade policy, wherever he could find it. For example, he consulted closely with the Trade Policy Research Center, a small think-tank in London that identified non-tariff barriers as an appropriate focus for the next GATT round.

**Q: What was the process through which the United States ultimately launched a new round of trade negotiations?**
HARTER: It may be worth recapitulating that saga in some detail because it's an important bit of history that's not well known, even among trade-policy scholars. Here's my understanding: The report Bill Roth submitted to Lyndon Johnson late in 1968 urged the incoming Administration to sponsor a new round, and the Nixon transition team gave weight to that report. Prior to his election Nixon was apparently of two minds regarding trade: His instinct was to favor a liberal trade policy, but his 1968 campaign hinted that Nixon would protect textiles producers from foreign competition, because Nixon thought Kennedy's pledge of support for the U.S. textiles industry was crucial to Kennedy's narrow victory in 1960.

Nixon early on named Murray Chotiner, his long-time chief political advisor, as General Counsel at STR, giving him a vantage point for observing GATT. I was Chotiner's control officer when he came to Geneva for meetings of the Cotton Textiles Committee in 1969, and I found him perceptive and congenial. Presumably reflecting Chotiner's recommendation, in May, 1970 Nixon designated a Presidential Commission headed by Albert Williams, the IBM CEO, to take a close look at international trade and investment policies.

Q: Was the Williams Commission useful?

HARTER: Yes, indeed! It illustrated how a Presidential Commission can resolve a critical policy debate when its mandate is well-defined and its members understand and agree on the role they can play. It was an excellent group, and its staff, headed by Isaiah Frank, was superb. Its report in July, 1971 energized the Department of State and STR to press a broad GATT round of trade negotiations.

The OECD [Note: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is an international agency based in Paris through which the major industrial countries seek to coordinate their positions regarding international economic issues, looking toward expanded world trade and investment and the economic development of developing countries.] responded by launching its own study headed by Jean Rey, a former President of the Commission of the European Community, and its analysis essentially echoed and endorsed the Williams proposition that a new round of trade negotiations should be initiated as soon as possible. A GATT preparatory committee adopted that position in 1973.

Q: That was the beginning of the new round?

HARTER: Yes. A GATT Ministerial meeting in Japan in the fall of 1973 formally inaugurated the "Tokyo Round," although serious negotiations could not begin until the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that authorized the Administration to negotiate reductions in trade barriers. That finally occurred in January, 1975.

The Tokyo Round ultimately concluded with some tariff reductions and international "codes of conduct" that set limits to the use of specific categories of non-tariff barriers that distort trade, building on the NTB inventory that we compiled in Geneva in the late 1960s. Those codes were endorsed by the U.S. Congress in 1979 and were thus incorporated into U.S. law. They also became law in the European Community, Japan, and other OECD countries. Developing country members of GATT did not sign them at that time, but they later accepted agreements that
elaborated them at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which were conducted as "a single undertaking" [Note: This edited transcript incorporates factual information suggested by Bill Culbert, a principal participant in the meetings indicated, regarding these and other relevant developments that were not explicitly discussed in the 1997 interviews and are not otherwise well known.].

Q: Did you have other responsibilities in Geneva?

HARTER: Yes, the UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Center absorbed a great deal of my time. It was a unique institution, much praised by developing countries, although it received scant notice in Washington.

Q: What was the International Trade Center?

HARTER: Well, shortly before I arrived in Geneva, Wyndham White established the ITC as a small unit within the GATT Secretariat to advise developing countries on technical ways and means they could employ to expand their exports. At first its functions were not clearly specified - it was frankly a gimmick to preempt the ambiguous but firm declaration of Raul Prebisch at the 1964 Trade and Development Conference that he would establish an international mechanism to help developing countries expand their exports. Wyndham White took preemptive action because he thought such a body based in UNCTAD was likely to encourage export subsidies, which are wholly contrary to the GATT system.

Q: How did the ITC work?

HARTER: Initially it only supplied limited advice to developing countries on GATT-consistent policies and practices that might enhance their export performance. It was just getting organized when I arrived. Three gifted and inspired individuals were already there, each carving out a niche for himself: Herb Jacobson, the energetic and imaginative American Director; Victor Santiapilai of Sri Lanka, a skilled diplomat with prior export promotion experience, the Deputy Director; and Hatt Arnold, a prolific English writer who turned out an incredible volume of correspondence, studies, and manuals on export promotion.

Q: But it evolved into a larger and more vital organization?

HARTER: Yes, the ITC grew into a very proficient institution with a broad mandate. Paul Pauly of the U.S. Department of Commerce, a leading authority on export promotion, attended annual meetings of an expert advisory committee that gently guided the ITC. He helped persuade the Departments of State and Commerce that the ITC was a positive force in the world. I was the U.S. representative to specialized meetings on administrative and technical matters affecting the ITC.

Q: What happened to the ITC?

HARTER: Prebisch was eventually persuaded there was no scope for a separate export promotion agency in UNCTAD, and he encouraged the developing countries to press for the
transfer of the ITC from GATT to UNCTAD. We opposed that, but we agreed to set up a negotiating group to work out arrangements for GATT and UNCTAD to oversee the ITC jointly. I was the U.S. member of that group. Those negotiations were prolonged and tortured, and my instructions from Washington kept me on a very tight leash. We eventually hammered out a strange framework that called for the ITC to be largely autonomous, with GATT and UNCTAD equally sharing oversight and costs. The ITC expanded over the years, and when I returned to Geneva in the early 1980s I learned that the ITC employed more than one hundred individuals who fully occupied a four-floor building. By then it was globally influential. It backstopped numerous UNDP-financed and other technical assistance projects.

Q: Did you have responsibilities outside of GATT?

HARTER: Yes, during my first two years in Geneva, I assisted Henry Brodie in his capacity as the U.S. Representative to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, which met once or twice a year to review the work of UNCTAD Committee meetings between sessions of the Conference. During those two years we were principally absorbed with preparations for UNCTAD-II, which took place in New Delhi in 1968. John Bushnell joined our staff in January, 1969 as a full-time UNCTAD liaison officer, taking over my UNCTAD-related functions. Frankly, I was relieved to escape those UNCTAD responsibilities.

Q: Why don’t we stop here and pick up the discussion next time?

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[Begin September 3, 1997 session]

Q: John, you mainly followed North-South questions in Geneva?

HARTER: Yes. Victor Wolfe, your former partner, told me in 1984 he wanted to interview me on North-South issues as soon as your program was firmly established. He somehow knew that most of my Foreign Service assignments involved interrelationships between international trade and Third World development. Unfortunately, as you know, Vic died in a tragic automobile accident before we could schedule that interview.

Q: What do we mean we speak of "North-South issues?"

HARTER: That phrase may be anachronistic today. In the 1960s and 1970s it seemed an apt blanket term to cover economic tensions that characterized discussions in UNCTAD and several other international organizations. The term "North" in that context was taken to include the more industrialized countries associated with the OECD, mainly the United States, Europe, and Japan, and the term "South" referred to developing countries that generally lacked advanced industrialization, infrastructure, and capital investment.

These matters should be seen as the aftermath of the sweeping decolonization that transformed international affairs after World War II, as the old British, French, Dutch, and Belgian empires were liquidated in the 1950s and 1960s. Formerly dependent colonies, protectorates, and
territories suddenly became sovereign nations, even though their economic resources, Civil Service, and political underpinnings were too weak to cope with the rising expectations of their people. Some of these governments could scarcely deal effectively with their own domestic problems, let alone their economic relations with other countries. As colonies, they had been closely tied to their European sponsors, politically, economically, and administratively. Unfortunately, the developed countries really didn't focus on the economic problems of developing countries before the first UNCTAD Conference in 1964, mainly because they were fixated on and distracted by the Cold War.

Q: What were the major UNCTAD issues you worked on?

HARTER: The overriding UNCTAD issue in the late 1960s was the Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP, as we called it.

Q: Just what was the GSP?

HARTER: It was a controversial approach to trade policy that was supposed to compensate developing countries for their presumed economic disadvantages, in a sense comparable to affirmative action in the United States. It was a drastic breach of the most-favored-nation principle that had been the cornerstone of U.S. trade policy since the early 1920s. MFN essentially required us to levy "non-discriminatory" tariffs on imports from all countries with which we have trade agreements, and this principle was the core of the GATT system. In practice this meant any contracting party to GATT - that is, any member country - should import products from all other contracting parties at the lowest "bound" tariff rates that resulted from all preceding GATT negotiations. In the 1960s Raul Prebisch argued that this principle was unfair to developing countries on the ground that, for historic reasons, they lacked the economic infrastructure to compete fairly in international trade with producers in the developed countries.

Q: What did he mean?

HARTER: Prebisch maintained that exports of developing countries should receive preferential treatment in the markets of industrialized countries to offset economic disadvantages associated with their "underdevelopment". The industrialized countries, in other words, should impose lower tariff rates on manufactured products they imported from developing countries than on comparable products from other industrialized countries. Prebisch wanted all industrial countries to apply a general system of preferences to their manufactured imports from all developing countries. His theory was that those preferences would expand markets for such goods in developed countries and thus encourage their greater production in developing countries.

Q: Why did the United States accept the GSP concept despite its traditional adherence to MFN?

HARTER: After the Kennedy Round, it appeared that domestic resistance in all of the industrial countries would make it difficult to negotiate further tariff reductions, at least until domestic structural adjustments took place in response to the lower tariffs. Some trade policy officials, believing momentum in reducing obstacles to trade must be maintained, searched for alternatives to traditional tariff-cutting negotiations. In addition to focusing attention on NTBs, they
envisaged an alliance with those who wished to support Third World development by reducing barriers to developing country exports, and this led them to consider GSP. The turning point came when Australia requested a GATT waiver to permit it to grant its own special preferences to its imports from developing countries. Only the United States opposed the Australians, and that sent shock waves through our trade policy professionals in Washington and Geneva. They were already concerned that France, Belgium, and other members of the European Community granted special preferences to their former colonies in Africa under the Yaounde Convention, while the British did the same for Commonwealth members pursuant to the 1931 Statute of Westminster. We contended that all of those special preferences effectively discriminated against U.S. exporters. Meanwhile political pressures on the U.S. government to extend comparable preferences to the Latin American countries were increasing. Joe Greenwald, in particular, feared that the proliferation of many different preferential systems could cause the whole GATT system of non-discrimination to unravel.

Q: How did the United States approach the problem?

HARTER: Greenwald and Bill Culbert, his principal lieutenant on GSP, attended several meetings in London, New York, Geneva, and Washington as members of an OECD “Wise Men’s” group to negotiate the modalities. Once they hammered out a GSP scheme acceptable to that group, they sold it to other industrial countries in the OECD. Parallel negotiations within the U.S. Government were no easier, but Greenwald and Culbert eventually persuaded the relevant agencies that President Johnson should announce in his speech at Punta del Este in the fall of 1967 that the United States would support the GSP concept at UNCTAD-II in 1968. Greenwald and Culbert correctly anticipated GSP would dominate that conference.

The initial proposition was that all developed countries should extend preferences to all developing countries for a common list of products, on the presumption that a unified global approach would overcome domestic pressures in all developed countries. However, the theory insufficiently recognized the political strength in the developed world of such labor-intensive industries as textiles, footwear, and chemicals. Small plants in New England and the southern U.S. would face bankruptcy if they had to compete with cheaper imports from developing countries, and their communities would be devastated if those plants should be liquidated. There was therefore irresistible political opposition in North America, Europe, and Japan to a common list unless it was very short. Frankly, the original concept was never seriously considered by OECD governments. They knew their parliamentary bodies, sensitive to the vulnerable industries that would be affected, would veto a wide-open preference scheme. They therefore concentrated on developing politically acceptable schemes [Note: Paul Jolles, a prominent Swiss diplomat, famously proposed at UNCTAD-II that the developed countries should pursue "parallel but convergent" approaches to GSP - a mathematical impossibility!]. Nevertheless, once the GSP idea was absorbed in the international agenda, it developed a momentum of its own. Throughout the process we in Geneva were often asked by other delegations and the GATT and UNCTAD Secretariats to explain widely quoted public statements of our lords and masters and the intentions behind them. This was a central and emotional issue for many delegations, and we spent many hours, days, and weeks, trying to rationalize the latest developments, even though we were always on the periphery of the actual negotiations and we were rarely apprized of relevant details.
Q: Are you saying the GSP, as ultimately implemented, did not conform with the original idea?

HARTER: That's correct. Each country developed its own GSP scheme. The U.S. Congress, for one, put its own stamp on preferences: The legislation that authorized us to participate in a GSP scheme explicitly excluded textiles, footwear, and ceramics, and other so-called "sensitive" products. Those were, of course, precisely the products for which the developing countries wanted preferences, because they were the products in which they had a strong comparative advantage. They were also the products of small, inefficient factories in some U.S. communities heavily dependent on their production, communities effectively represented in Congress.

Q: Were there other shortcomings of the GSP scheme?

HARTER: Well, the GSP did not cover agriculture, which happened to be the sector in which developing countries overall had a very large comparative advantage. Moreover, as ultimately implemented, the preferences were unilateral concessions that could be withdrawn unilaterally, as contrasted with multilateral concessions that were effectively sanctioned by international law. And since they were subject to ceilings and safeguards, they did not serve as strong incentives for new investors in developing countries to embark on new ventures, thus denying a major tenet of the original rationale set forth by Raul Prebisch.

Q: Was the U.S. Mission in Geneva represented on the U.S. Delegation to UNCTAD-II?

HARTER: Yes, Henry Brodie was Greenwald's principal deputy on that delegation for dealing with commodities. Bill Culbert was on the GSP firing line.

Q: What was the G-77?

HARTER: The so-called "Group of 77" comprised delegations from the 77 developing countries represented in UNCTAD in 1964, where they functioned as a super caucus/lobbying group that tried to hammer out consensus positions that all developing countries could subscribe to. After UNCTAD-I the developing countries held their own mini-conferences to caucus as a group under the G-77 label before major UNCTAD and other UN meetings in New York and elsewhere. They still call themselves the Group of 77, although more than 150 developing countries are now associated with it. The developing country rhetoric that was forged at UNCTAD-I has echoed over and over since that time.

Q: Was the G-77 a monolithic group? Weren't there differences among them?

HARTER: Certainly, there were disparities in size, level of development, and economic interests, but in the 1960s, the developing countries were incorrectly perceived in UNCTAD as a more or less homogeneous group. By the late 1970s four distinct groups of developing countries could be discerned, each defined by different economic circumstances: The so-called Newly Industrialized Countries - the "NICs" - included countries like Brazil and Singapore that were developing competitive domestic manufacturing industries; a second group comprised countries that relied heavily on commodity exports, such as Malaysia and Nigeria; a third group included
the oil exporting countries, which were generally very quiet at UNCTAD meetings; and the fourth group constituted the least developed countries, or the poorer countries of Africa plus Haiti, Laos, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Afghanistan. Countries in the fourth group, of course, urgently needed grant aid, but they were largely ignored by the industrialized countries. The G-77 claimed to be an umbrella covering all four groups - and hence their demands swept over a wide spectrum. By the 1990s the OECD decided that such countries as the Bahamas, Brunei, Kuwait, and Singapore should no longer be identified as "developing countries."

Q: Who were the G-77 leaders?

HARTER: Different individuals were prominent at different meetings, depending on the interests of countries and individuals. From the beginning, India and Brazil often provided the most visible G-77 spokesmen. Both countries had highly professional diplomatic services, and they usually sent their most articulate diplomats to UN meetings.

Q: What was the U.S. attitude toward the G-77?

HARTER: We were the hard-liners! Most Americans who attended UNCTAD meetings were hostile toward UNCTAD. They correctly lamented that UNCTAD was institutionally biased against the United States. By reflex they opposed most G-77 initiatives, which, of course, were generally not economically sound or politically realistic. The Europeans often hid behind our skirts, grateful that we effectively rationalized why Group B couldn't do more.

Q: Were there other "groups?"

HARTER: The Group of 77 comprised Group A, the Asian and African delegations, and Group C, the Latin American delegations. Those two groups effectively merged at UNCTAD-I. Group B was the counter group that represented the industrialized countries. The communist countries of Eastern Europe participating in UNCTAD functioned as Group D, but they played a minor role in UNCTAD, individually and collectively. Yugoslavia and Romania considered themselves members of the Group of 77.

Q: What about the Soviets?

HARTER: They were the most prominent member of Group D, but they were not active participants in UNCTAD. There was a separate UNCTAD committee ostensibly charged with fostering trade between the communist countries and the developing countries, and a small unit within the Secretariat compiled statistics and published occasional studies related to that trade. In addition, the Secretariat facilitated occasional government-to-government negotiations, as by supplying translators and meeting rooms. Large Soviet delegations sometimes came to Geneva for those meetings. Developing country delegations complained to us that those negotiations were difficult and yielded little benefit to them. Incidentally, that experience illuminated the advantages of dealing with trade multilaterally.
Q: I assume each industrial nation was especially generous toward countries with which it had historic ties. Did UNCTAD provide a forum for working out fairness and largesse across the board?

HARTER: Well, the former colonial countries weren’t really as generous toward their former dependent territories as they claimed. In many cases, the net flow of resources continued to be from the newly independent areas to the European countries, even after decolonization. The Scandinavian countries and the Canadians - and sometimes the Australians and New Zealanders - were usually ahead of France, England, and the United States in providing real resources to developing countries in UNCTAD. Whatever the circumstances, the U.S. role in UNCTAD was always conspicuous because our economy was so dominant.

Q: Was there any overall formula for measuring the desirable level of aid?

HARTER: UNCTAD promoted the concept that each Group B country should extend assistance to developing countries amounting to one percent of its GNP. We objected to those targets, pointing out that the total amount of our aid far exceeded that of other countries, even though the total of our government-to-government financial assistance to developing countries represented only a fraction of one percent of our GNP. We also stressed that the absorptive capacity of recipient countries - their ability to utilize external assistance effectively - should always be weighed. The quality of aid, we stressed, was more crucial than its quantity.

Q: You're saying the monetary value of the aid we provide developing countries is not necessarily an indication of its impact on economic development?

HARTER: Correct. The military assistance we provided developing countries over the years exceeded the economic assistance we earmarked for education, health, agriculture, and transportation to raise living standards. The "aid" we granted clearly affected decisions of recipient governments directing the deployment of their own scarce resources. Beyond that, there has often been subterfuge in that much of the economic activity described as "foreign aid" was really designed to promote donor country exports. Also, we should keep in mind that a large share of total U.S. aid during the Cold War, whether military or economic, was politically inspired. Take our very large programs in Israel and Egypt, for example.

Q: Did you have other responsibilities in Geneva?

HARTER: Well, I was designated the Mission's liaison officer for CERN [Note: CERN, located on the outskirts of Geneva, is the world's largest research center for the study of subatomic particles. It is sponsored by an association of 14 European countries sometimes known as the European Organization for Nuclear Research. (The name "CERN" is an acronym based on an earlier French name of the association.)], but that merely entailed occasional transmissions of scientific communications between technical agencies in the United States and CERN.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?
HARTER: Roger Tubby was our Ambassador the first three years I was there. He had been Harry Truman’s Press Secretary. He was a warm person who knew everyone who counted in Geneva and Washington, and he had a good sense of what the Mission could accomplish. Incidentally, he asked me to serve as control officer for Senator Fulbright when the Senator participated in the 1967 Pacem en Terris conference in Geneva. I had met the Senator earlier and my wife and I welcomed the opportunity to escort him and Mrs. Fulbright during their visit. Tubby's DCM was Charlie Mace, an executive officer whose talents and interests effectively complemented those of Ambassador Tubby. Charlie was the twin brother of Howard Mace, by the way. They looked very much alike, but they were very different kinds of persons. I knew Charlie as a friendly, outgoing person, whereas my later encounters with his brother revealed the stern manner for which Howard was famous. Perhaps we can discuss Howard Mace later. Tubby left Geneva in 1969, after some six years.

Q: Who replaced Tubby?

HARTER: That was Idar Rimstad. I recently read the transcript of your interview with him, in which Rimstad said there was no real substantive job for a U.S. Ambassador in Geneva. He said the Geneva operation was really a management job, and since there was nothing for him to do he let the Mission's administrative staff take care of it. That showed how little he understood what was going on in Geneva. Rimstad said in your interview he never wrote a speech he gave, but he gave a lot of speeches. That was true. Unfortunately, when he read the speeches, it was obvious he didn’t have the foggiest notion of their substance. Before he came to Geneva, he held the top management job at the State Department once filled by Loy Henderson.

Q: What was Rimstad's approach to that job in the Department?

HARTER: Basically, Rimstad radically altered the personnel practices of Loy Henderson, who steadfastly refused to practice large-scale selection-out. In 1968 Rimstad, as Under Secretary, approved a major change in the precepts that governed promotions, and after that he forced many first-rate Foreign Service Officers into premature retirement. Nothing like that had ever been seen in the history of the Foreign Service. Whereas Henderson valued seniority, Rimstad lowered the priority accorded experience, at the behest of the Young Turks who seized control of AFSA in 1968.

Q: Who were the Young Turks?

HARTER: They were a group of young Foreign Service Officers, including Lannon Walker, Bill Harrop, Charlie Bray, Frank Weise, and Dan Newberry. They groused that their State Department careers were progressing too slowly because, in their view, the upper reaches of the Foreign Service promotion ladder were clogged by too much "deadwood." That was the term they used to refer to "the grey heads and the bald heads," as they called them, many of whom were Wristonies.

Q: What policies did the Young Turks advocate?
HARTER: Their simplistic panacea for reforming the Department's personnel system was to purge the Department's senior ranks by accelerating selection-out, thus opening opportunities for their own rapid promotion. They did not understand the trauma already inflicted on the Foreign Service during the preceding years by McCarthyism and Wristonization. They came on the scene just as the Department was beginning to recover from those ordeals. Anyway, while Rimstad was the Department's top management officer, the career of any officer who had not been promoted during the preceding two years was at risk.

*Q:* There was a general push in society at that time, not just in the Foreign Service, to make way for promising young people.

HARTER: That's true. Kennedy’s election as a youthful President portended a general rise of a younger generation to prominence. Unluckily, the change in the Foreign Service was abrupt, disruptive, and cruel to many individuals. Heavy selection-out of mid-level officers during the four years between 1968 and 1972 was unprecedented. Officers affected had no retirement benefits, and there was widespread fear of joining their exodus from the Foreign Service. By and large the establishment press ignored - or even disbelieved - what was happening, but a few reporters picked up bits and pieces of the story. Clark Mollenhoff, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist, for example, was among those who dwelt on the suicide of Charles Thomas at that time.

I first learned of all that in Geneva in 1968, when I received an unexpected telephone call from Dick Adams, who had been in the Political Section of our Embassy in Pretoria when I was in South Africa. Dick asked me to join him for lunch. I inquired as to his next assignment, and he said he was a victim of the new selection-out policy. He was in Geneva in search of a job. I was surprised because Dick had a reputation in Pretoria as a capable officer. Until then I was totally unaware of the new time-in-class policy. Dick asked when I received my last promotion, and I said that was in 1964. Without knowing more, he said immediately, “You’re in trouble!” He said the Department's new precepts for governing promotion had been drastically altered to favor the rapid advance of recently promoted officers over those who had been in class more than three years.

*Q:* Any final comment on your assignment to Geneva?

HARTER: Well, my most jarring experience in Geneva was an encounter with John Fishburn, the Mission's liaison officer to the ILO. One day, after I told him I admired Senator Fulbright, he asked me to stop by his office. For half an hour he grilled me on my attitudes toward communism, Vietnam, and the Cold War, while taking copious notes. Finally, he stood up and exploded in vehemence! In a nutshell he said no one with my views should be allowed to represent the United States overseas. Two days later Henry Brodie called me into his office and closed his door, which was usually open. In a stern tone he admonished me for having made indiscreet comments within the Mission. He didn't refer to Fishburn. Henry said I could not doubt that he agreed with me about the “folly and the horror” of the war in Vietnam. However, he advised me not to share my opinion on those matters with colleagues who held contrary views.
WALTER ROBERTS
Public Affairs Adviser to USUN Ambassador
Geneva (1967)

A naturalized American citizen of Austrian birth, Mr. Roberts in 1942 joined the US Coordinator of Information engaged in analyzing Nazi Germany’s internal propaganda. His subsequent career concerned primarily US Government information activities with the Voice of America, the United States Information Service (USIS) and the Department of State. His service abroad centered primarily on European Affairs, and particularly Yugoslavia. Mr. Roberts was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1990.

ROBERTS: I was assigned to Geneva in ’67 for two years as public affairs adviser to the American ambassador at the European headquarters of the UN.

Q: What were some of the interesting developments there?

ROBERTS: I learned at that time something very basic: that one cannot be a good spokesman unless one is an integral part of the policy making process. And since we in USIA are not an integral part of the policy making process, we are only very rarely in a position to be good spokesmen.

For instance, I'm told, our present director of information in New York at the United Nations, Phil Arnold, is included in every meeting Ambassador Pickering has. Even in the morning staff meeting, where only three or four people meet, he is included. In such a situation, the USIA officer can do a good job.

I found the job in Geneva very frustrating. There were, in my time, many important bilateral and multilateral conferences, ranging from disarmament to GATT. Most of the U.S. delegations came from Washington with their own public affairs officers, which was the right thing to do because they were in a far better position to explain policy than we who were not in at the policy formulation process. On the other hand, what was then our role? Some delegations relied on us for press relations, but they worked only when the delegation heads included USIS in their staff deliberations, which was not always the case. In these circumstances I did not enjoy the assignment, and after a while made it known that I would like to be transferred as soon as my tour was completed.

ROBERT LOCHNER
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Bern (1968-1971)

Robert Lochner was born in 1918 in New York and moved to Germany at the age of five when his father became chief of AP in Berlin. He attended a German
school and learned German. After he earned his German Abitur, he attended the University of Chicago where he earned his BA and MA. He returned to Germany with an ad hoc organization of the War Department: the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Following that he began doing USIA work and became head of the newly created news service for all US zone stations. He then became a control officer in Frankfurt until Radio Frankfurt was turned over to German management in 1949. He then became Chief Editor of the Frankfurt edition of the Neue Zeitung newspaper and later became head of the press section of the US High Commission in Germany from 1952-1955. Following his time in Germany he was Deputy PAO and later PAO in Saigon, Vietnam from 1955-1957. For the three years that followed he was head of the German Service and the West European Division. He was director of RAIS in Berlin from 1961-1968, and his final Post was as Press and Cultural Attaché in Bern.

LOCHNER: In my own case it resulted in my being banished to the clearly far less important position of press and cultural attaché in Bern, Switzerland. Mr. Marks never gave me an explanation, but I can only surmise that despite the success from the financial point of view in reducing the expense of RIAS, he was dissatisfied with what he must have considered my obstreperous tactics. I found out about the transfer through my predecessor in Bern calling me on the phone on Easter Sunday and saying he was glad to hear that I was coming down there. That was the first I learned about my being kicked out of RIAS. Mr. Marks, for whatever reasons, felt he had to announce this to the RIAS staff, so he came from Bonn to Berlin and called a RIAS staff meeting. He announced that he was so sorry that he had to pull me out to the far more important job as press and cultural attaché in Bern. I have never heard such derisive laughter from the German staff when he made that announcement.

Over all I would say that I was rather bitter that the reward from my own government for seven and a half years service at RIAS was exile in Bern. On the German side, perhaps to compensate, the same Minister of All German Affairs, Herbert Wehner, in a ceremony a few days later at RIAS with the whole staff present, awarded me one of the highest German decorations. Of course they had to get permission from the Agency to have it bestowed. While I appreciated that, it sharpened the contrast to how I was treated by the two sides.

As far as Bern is concerned, I asked my predecessor on the phone what they were doing down there--teaching democracy didn't seem to be among the priority tasks of USIS in Bern. He said that about once a year there is a press release. There was a pause. Then he said that they try to keep the Neue Zuercher Zeitung happy. I said, "Fine, but that probably doesn't consume much of your time." (Actually in my three years I went down to Zurich about once a year and had an hour's talk on U.S. foreign policy with the famous chief editor of the best Swiss paper, Fred Luchsinger, whom I knew well from Germany where he had been a correspondent a number of years. Anything more, I would have made a pest of myself.) I asked, "Anything else?" He finally remembered that that was the age of the moon landings and the Swiss were very interested in that. So during my three years about the only really useful thing I did was to provide film, tapes, etc. on our moon landings and to shepherd the Apollo 13 crew, the ones who didn't make it, but they came as official visitors to Switzerland and I was project officer for their visit. Other than that I simply sat out my three years in Bern and determined to retire at the end of it because I saw
no future for myself in the Agency. All my predecessors as RIAS directors had gone on to higher positions in the Agency. After all RIAS was the biggest overseas operation; in my case it resulted in the demotion to this really quite superfluous job in Bern.

I thought I would, as a taxpayer, go out with a bang by saving the taxpayer an unnecessary position in my opinion, so I wrote a strong paper why it was not necessary to have a PAO in Bern. Since on the political side the Embassy people agreed there was no need for a full time political officer either, I suggested the two positions be merged. The Bern Embassy was really important only in three areas: the economic side, because of the weight of Switzerland in that sphere; the CIA man; and the consulate because there was a lot of Swiss travel to the US. The political section had essentially no more to do than I did. So whoever decides these things in Washington could not apparently simply overlook my paper suggesting the abolition of the slot. My career in USIA still ended in total frustration because of what happened. They transferred the slot to Geneva where there was already a full time USIS man who was not basically needed because whenever there was an important international conference in Geneva, all the big shots from Washington came there. So the permanent man dealt with the eternal sugar conference and things like that. Far from saving the taxpayers a slot, the slot was transferred to Geneva. But that is not the end of the story. They waited a few years and then they reinstated the slot in Bern. So the end result of my efforts was that instead of one slot less as I had hoped instead of the two, they wound up with three. So that was the end of my career in USIA.

JOHN A. BUSHNELL
Economic Officer
Geneva (1969-1971)

Mr. Bushnell was born in New York State and educated at Yale University and McMurray College. An Economic Specialist, he served primarily in senior level positions at Latin American posts, including Bogota, Santo Domingo, San Jose and Buenos Aires, dealing primarily with Economic and International Trade issues. An assignment to the Staff of the National Security Council was followed by tours as Deputy Chief of Mission at Buenos Aires, Chargé d’Affaires at Panama City, and subsequently as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Bushnell was the recipient of several awards for outstanding service. Mr. Bushnell was interviewed by John Harter in 1997

Q: When a place is not so good, you refer to it in terms of the ancient Chinese curse: “May your grandchildren live in interesting times.” Your resume says that you left Costa Rica in 1968, but you went to Geneva in 1969. What happened in between there?

Q: How did that assignment come about? It was quite a change for you from everything that you had done up to that point when you transferred into multilateral diplomacy. This was pushing a change rather far, so to speak.

BUSHNELL: In 1968 State management was saying Foreign Service Officers shouldn’t be too specialized in one area. I had already had four assignments working on Latin American affairs, including my time in Washington. State Personnel said I should either come back to Washington or go somewhere completely different. I chose different. One of the possibilities was going to South Korea under an arrangement between AID and the Embassy which would have been somewhat analogous to what I had been doing in Costa Rica. However, I wouldn’t have been head of the Economic Section. That assignment was discussed with me, and I said it was fine. My priority was to stay overseas while our children were still in pre-school or the lower grades of elementary school with the idea they would benefit more from Washington area schools later. Then State objected to another detail to AID. Finally the Personnel wheels just ground and gave me the assignment to Geneva.

Q: What did you think about this assignment when you first heard about it? Did you have any idea as to what you’d be doing?

BUSHNELL: I had virtually no concept of what the work would be. My international organization experience was with the IMF and World Bank, not with the UN and GATT. But going to Geneva sounded pretty good. I thought that it would be a good place to live. In retrospect, I would not say that was necessarily the case. When we left Costa Rica, we were excited about going to Geneva and to Europe and working with the various international organizations. I really didn’t know what the job would involve even after I spent a couple of days in Washington. Then went to New York to consult with the UN and meet Perez Guerrero, who was in the process of leaving the UN in New York to become the Secretary General of UNCTAD.

Q: What had he done before that?

BUSHNELL: Manuel Perez Guerrero had been a minister in Venezuela several times, including of finance, planning, and mines – meaning oil. He had also worked for the UN in senior positions beginning with the League of Nations.

Q: Did you meet Jim Clughall and Julius Katz before you went to Geneva? They were the key, responsible people in the Bureau of Economic Affairs in Washington.

BUSHNELL: My assignment to Geneva was an IO [Bureau of International Organization Affairs] assignment. I met with John McDonald and other people in IO. I had some discussions with people in the AID Policy Staff about Geneva because I knew them. These were casual discussions about Geneva. My consultations in Washington were more debriefing about Costa Rica and Central America than looking to the future. I don’t recall anything about conversations with people in EB [Bureau of Economic Affairs] if I had any.
Q: What do you remember about Geneva when you first arrived there? I remember distinctly the day you arrived. Let me tell you what I remember about it, and you can add to it. You came in early 1969. We had really been run ragged during the 18 months before that. Henry Brody, Herb Propps, and I were working on GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] matters. Up until the end of the Kennedy round in mid 1967, Mike Blumenthal had a huge team in Geneva, composed of about 60 people, doing all of the GATT work. We had been promised that when all of his troops left, there would be other people coming in to help us with the load. You were the first of this group, a year and a half later. I was being run ragged, doing UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] and GATT work, so we were glad to see you.

BUSHNELL: I had no sooner arrived, had not had time to adjust to the time change or get my family settled, when I had to start helping a delegation that had just come from Washington for the annual UNCTAD Board debates. By this time I expected to go from the plane to work in the Foreign Service as that had also happened on all by other assignments.

Q: That’s always the case.

BUSHNELL: I began going to these meetings which, among other things, ran on into the night. I remember great difficulty explaining to my wife why I was coming home so late. While we were still in a temporary apartment and looking for a house to rent, one of the conferences that I covered at UNCTAD was the annual conference on olive oil. It was not of much interest to the United States. In fact, we didn’t have anybody from Washington.

Q: I had covered that the year before, in 1968.

BUSHNELL: I was just an observer. There wasn’t much going on at that conference, but, as was the case with many of these meetings, one had to spend hours at the Palais des Nations [the UN headquarters in Geneva originally built for the League of Nations] because you never knew when something was going to come up which would be of interest or importance to us, particularly some political issue. Then the olive oil meeting scheduled a night session; it was my wife’s birthday, and I had promised to take her to dinner so I invited my wife to go along with me.

Q: Did she go?

BUSHNELL: Yes. She could see I really did have to work at night and that there was a meeting going on. Fortunately, the debate was about the nuances of grading olive oil; neither of us could understand it, but I pretended I did.

Q: I could never persuade my wife to attend these evening or night meetings.

BUSHNELL: Ann found the olive oil conference incredibly boring. She occupied herself doing her fingernails down behind the desk. Nothing happened at this particular meeting, but at least it showed her that the work practices at that place were strange, to say the least.

Q: This was what was particularly frustrating to my wife. We never had a holiday. Everyone else had American and Swiss holidays. Usually, there was some kind of UNCTAD conference going
on, practically nonstop. They were all scheduled to end on Friday. However, by Thursday night
it was obvious that it would be late Friday night before it ended, usually at about 10:00 PM.
About half the time they even met on Saturday morning. More often than not, and particularly
toward the end of the session, we would have to get a report out. The next conference would
begin on the following Monday. It was really nonstop meetings, it seemed.

BUSHNELL: There was certainly that element to it. I wasn’t used to having many holidays. On
the contrary, I found that one of the nice things about UNCTAD was that at least for once during
my career I could actually schedule my time ahead. Over Christmas there were a couple of
weeks when there would be no conferences scheduled, and nothing would happen. At other times
there would be the occasional week when nothing would be scheduled. There would be a
summer session of ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council of the UN], and I was on the
delegation to that meeting, but late August was slow. Most important, there was an advance
predictability about all the meetings, so I could plan and actually take a week’s leave now and
then. My experience during previous (and future) assignments was I would plan to take a
vacation trip and then some crisis would come up and I wouldn’t be able to do it. Many plans
had to be canceled. However, in Geneva we managed to schedule three or four trips a year and
see much of Western Europe without ever having to cancel plans. However, you’re right that
UNCTAD conferences tended to be back to back during much of the year. There wasn’t much
time to write reports in between. A tremendous amount of time was spent at the Palais des
Nations, where I really didn’t do much particularly constructive, although I perhaps improved
my debating skills.

Q: One frustrating aspect of my assignment to Geneva was that, before a meeting began, all of
the other delegations wanted to know what the US positions would be. We almost never knew
what the US positions were going to be until our delegation arrived from Washington.

BUSHNELL: There was a certain frustration in always waiting for the position papers, but many
times that wasn’t an issue. After I learned the ropes, I found US positions were quite predictable.

Q: We always received the instructions rather late.

BUSHNELL: That was particularly a problem for GATT meeting. But in UNCTAD we were
generally against whatever change was being proposed. For the major UNCTAD Ministerial
Conference held every four years the U.S. would review its positions and try to make some
concessions. However, the rest of the time it was relative easy to forecast what the US position
would be, unless the issue involved some really technical points. When we were changing an
important position, it was generally done in the OECD, IMF, World Bank or some other form;
then one would know that the US UNCTAD position would change to be consistent.

Q: What did you think of UNCTAD, once you got into it?

BUSHNELL: I found it was hard to take it seriously. Of course, the whole UNCTAD conference
had been set up, largely over US objections, to try to get international decisions into a body
where control was on the basis of one country, one vote, instead of some kind of weighted voting,
as in the international financial institutions, or in GATT where a consensus has to be developed.

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Of course, the U.S. is never inclined to have decisions of importance to the U.S. made in that kind of international body where most of the members are poor developing countries with interests quite different from those of the United States. The developing countries were trying to use this kind of conference to extract more aid and trade concessions that they could otherwise obtain and to place the blame for their economic problems on the U.S. and other rich countries. By and large, the delegations and Geneva representatives from the developing countries did not come from the economic decision making structure of their countries, but rather from the political side of their governments. They were much better at making speeches about their great needs and expressing generalities than they were about advancing policies that might really help their countries but required better management of their resources or challenging vested interests at home. As a result, most of the time our job was limited to making clear that the U.S. wasn’t going to be ramroded into accepting their positions. If we didn’t vote for a resolution, it was unlikely that we would follow its provisions. Fortunately, during the time I was in Geneva, we did have a couple of constructive things going on to give a little positive flavor to our UNCTAD participation.

Q: Involving GSP [General, Scheduled Preferences].

BUSHNELL: Yes.

Q: Can you tell us about what GSP was about?

BUSHNELL: To help developing countries it was decided in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] that the developed countries should give trade preferences, i.e. reduced tariffs or no tariff, on products from developing countries.

Q: Hadn’t this come out of “UNCTAD II” [Second UN Conference on Trade and Development] in New Delhi? I think that Joe Greenwald should deservingly take personal credit for it. Of course, people always debated how useful it was.

BUSHNELL: It was an idea that had been around for a while. It had been debated in the OECD before the UNCTAD conference. The U.S. and some other countries had been opposed but finally agreed at the conference in New Delhi to try to move forward. It was Joe Greenwald’s work within the US government that was key in getting general agreement. The UNCTAD decision speeded up the technical work of the OECD. But it became clear that the various developed countries each wanted to implement its own GSP schemes with quite different approaches and it would be impossible to reach what had been envisioned as a common scheme, in which all developed countries would extend the same preferences to all the developing countries. The concern in the OECD was then that each of the major developed countries adopt a scheme that would give similar benefits to the developing countries. Only then could each country defend the GSP as a fair sharing of the burden against attacks from vested interests in each country that might be affected negatively by the preferences. Thus each country developed its own plan. The Japanese had their plan, and the U.S. had its plan. The Canadians had a different plan as did the EEC. Burden sharing was discussed in the OECD before the detailed plans were presented in UNCTAD. I went to many of the OECD meetings so that I would have the background for the later discussions in UNCTAD. Most of the US delegates to these OECD
meetings were senior officers from the involved Washington departments such as Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and STR (the President’s Special Trade Representative). Within the US delegation it fell largely to me, as the one hearing the requests of the developing countries first hand, to try to bring the perspective of the recipients into the debate in competition with the interests of one or another US pressure group reflected by the domestic cabinet departments.

Q: Did you go to the OECD meetings?

BUSHNELL: I went to quite a few of the OECD meetings in Paris.

Q: Herb Propps used to go to those meetings. Had Herb left by the time you arrived?

BUSHNELL: No, Herb was still in Geneva for the first months I was there. He left Geneva in the summer of 1969. I don’t remember that I went to an OECD meeting on GSP when I was first in Geneva so I probably went after Herb departed. Once or twice in the winter I took the overnight train, rather than fly and have the weather close in on me. The OECD meetings on GSP were constructive, but they were tricky. Even when the US plan was finally decided, there were lots of implementing details to be determined. We had quite a job explaining our GSP program to the Europeans and trying to persuade them to accept it and not try to renegotiate a plan which had already been approved in Washington after painful discussions and compromises. Washington was not about to change it.

Q: Do you think that this really had an impact on the developing countries?

BUSHNELL: I don’t think it represented a revolution. Of course the American consumer is the biggest beneficiary when he can buy a greater variety of goods cheaper. But there were real benefits for the developing countries in getting a little more money, because they got, in effect, some of the benefits of the lower tariffs and the increased demand for goods at lower prices. In the US scheme the tariff was reduced to zero. The developing countries could thus charge more for their goods and still sell cheaper to the US consumer. Moreover, trade would switch to the developing countries from developed countries that still had to pay the tariff. GSP encouraged substantial new investment to go forward in some countries.

All the GSP schemes had many exceptions where tariffs were not reduced. These exceptions were the concession to the domestic vested interests in developed countries. Unfortunately, the exceptions were precisely in the areas which were of greatest interest to the developing countries. The US GSP, for example, didn’t cover textiles, which was an area where, obviously, the developing countries were very competitive and US tariffs high. There were numerous other products which were covered, but in general these tended to be those of less interest to developing countries or products with low tariffs anyway. However, there were areas which were helpful, although generally not so much to the very poor countries as to some of the middle level countries. The more advanced developing countries were able to take advantage of the GSP and get more products into the US market. This was particularly the case with South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, which did a good job of finding those products which they could make more cheaply but where the small volume would not be criticized for taking too much of the US market. They did quite well in the US market. Also, a number of large US buyers, such as K-
Mart and Wal-Mart, were able to look more to developing countries to source goods at cheaper prices. The products could then come into the U.S. under the GSP. In that respect GSP opened whole new markets for a dozen so developing countries with a stable investment climate and a significant industrial sector.

Under GSP the developing countries didn’t have to do anything except ask to get this access to the US market. I considered this aspect unfortunate, although the developing countries of course liked it. Because developing countries were not required to begin opening up their own markets, an opportunity was lost to encourage them to open their often quite closed markets and thus get the increased efficiency and productivity that can come from competition.

Thus GSP was a step forward, and it was probably as much as was politically feasible for the developed countries at that time. Certainly it was easier for governments to please their consumers with cheaper imports that to raise financial assistance which would have required higher taxes. However, GSP did not make any basic changes in the world economic structure. It was something for the UNCTAD delegates of the developing countries to write home about. It was worthwhile for some policy-makers to come from their capitals and engage in this UNCTAD dialogue. It was certainly more constructive than much of the debate in UNCTAD.

**Q: Does anything stand out in your mind at this point about the GSP negotiations or any particular steps in the process?**

**BUSHNELL:** I had some difficult times. Explaining the US GSP scheme in UNCTAD was very challenging for me because I had not participated in the Washington discussions and thus did not know the nuances in the details. I only had what was in the brief and what I had learned in Paris. Often, the discussions would break down into smaller negotiating groups. We usually had two delegates from Washington, but the group often would break into three working parties. So I had to explain and defend many aspects of the US GSP on the basis of my incomplete knowledge.

**Q: Did Bob Lenhart come?**

**BUSHNELL:** Ed Cronk was the senior State delegate; he was deputy assistant secretary for international trade policy in EB. Jack Leary, who was in Cronk’s office, often came. Howard Worthington, the director of the State Office of International Trade, often led the delegation. Bob was more on the IO [Bureau of International Organization Affair] side. At times we also had delegates from USTR and from the Department of Commerce.

**Q: Did Clarence Stabule come? He was in the Department of Commerce at that time.**

**BUSHNELL:** I don’t remember him. At any rate, I was stuck in these working groups with nothing more than a brief which had few details. Many questions which the delegates raised were not covered in the brief. So I was in the awkward position of saying, over and over again, that this was something to be worked out, or something like that. Or I would go ahead on my own and make policy when there seemed to be a logical way of doing things, as was often the case. I would hope that Washington wasn’t too put out with my proposing to do things the logical way. I don’t remember that there were ever any great difficulties as a result. Although I
had participated in the OECD meetings, most of the detail issues were not covered there, and I had no way of knowing whether or not each particular issue was contentious in Washington or whether it had been decided.

*Q:* There were a couple of positive issues, and GSP was one of them.

BUSHNELL: The other main set of positive issues was in the commodity field. US policy was somewhat more open on commodity agreements then than it has been subsequently. Experience with producer/consumer commodity agreements in the 1970’s was that they did not work, while the OPEC success as a producer only agreement moved the developing country focus away from cooperative agreements.

*Q:* There was no other international institution which had overall responsibility for these issues.

BUSHNELL: Correct. There were free-standing organizations for some commodities, but the only place where governments could discuss commodity policy in general and work within the UN framework toward new specific commodity agreements was UNCTAD. There were coffee and cocoa agreements, although these were coming up for renewal; there was much discussion on these commodities. Then there was a question of what additional agreements might be negotiated regarding other commodities. Study groups were established to determine the first steps that might be taken on various commodities.

The underlying intellectual issue was whether it would be technically feasible and politically possible to work out a commodity agreement which made sense for both producers and consumers.

Examination of what historically happened in the free market indicated that free markets resulted in major problems for both producers and consumers of many commodities. For example, from the economic point of view it was certainly disruptive for the coffee price to be $1 per pound one year, $5 per pound the next year, and $1 per pound two years later. Producers either had a bonanza or bankruptcy; consumer budgets were disrupted. Because many small developing countries depended on one to two primary products their economies followed the commodity cycle, often with political as well as economic disruption.

*Q:* Some insurance arrangements can be negotiated on that sort of thing. The trouble is determining what the price level would be.

BUSHNELL: Many thought the problem with negotiating commodity agreements was just that consumers wanted low prices and producers wanted high prices. However, I found the real problems were quite different. The problem was how to deal with the underlying investment and production which affect how much product enters the market. That is, you’re not going to be able to control the price unless you control the quantity of the commodity available on the market. The problem with the existing coffee agreement was that it didn’t restrict how much a country could grow. It only restricted how much each country could sell on the world market, or better put the world market covered by the agreement. When the price was high, a lot of people planted coffee bushes. It takes six years before you first harvest coffee. That’s a relatively long
time during which market conditions change. Then, since much additional coffee had been planted in many countries when prices were high, there would be a really big increase in world coffee production six or seven years later by which time the price may already have dropped. Many countries than had large stocks of coffee which could not be exported under the agreement. Some of it would be smuggled out, and the governments would be under great pressure to market this stored coffee even though the price was low. If one country sold some of its surplus stocks, there was little effect on the market. But there was no effective policing mechanism to avoid countries competing with one another to sell beyond the Agreement quotas. On the other hand when coffee prices were relatively high and rising, consumer members wanted increases in the quotas to constrain price increases, but many producer countries welcomed the higher prices, especially those which did not have stocks and so could not benefit from increased quota exports.

Experience was showing that to give commodity agreements a change of working would require a great deal more international planning and control than most non-communist countries were prepared to contemplate. Some international body would have to allocate rights to increase production looking far into the uncertain future. Measures would be needed to deal with the problem of new countries not in the agreement introducing production. Even with good planning, if that were possible, the market could be affected dramatically by uncontrollable events such as a frost in Brazil destroying half the coffee harvest or a war blocking access to markets. In short it would have been possible to get agreement among producers and consumers on a desirable future price. But in the real world the measures available to work for this outcome were limited.

Q: Then, of course, there were negotiations on specific commodity agreements in the OECD countries. The OECD discussions were somewhat more general.

BUSHNELL: I didn’t participate in such OECD discussions. The commodity agreement on which I spent the most time was cocoa The International Cocoa Agreement was due for renewal. The agreement had been running for several years; there was a Secretariat, and the actual daily working of the agreement was in the hands of that Secretariat. Thus the UNCTAD question was whether the existing agreement was to be renewed and, if so, how it would be modified to be more effective. Such general issues were very much questions for UNCTAD. For the meeting on cocoa, I was asked to be the chairman of the consumer group, and I agreed to try to bring the consumers together. This was very difficult to do. In fact, finally the U.S. didn’t join the agreement that came out of that negotiation. The key problem was that there was no agreement on provisions to give the agreement teeth to deal with the amount of cocoa being supplied to the market, except to maintain the price by having a major buildup of stocks to be financed largely by consumers. The producers pressed hard to get commitments for financing from the developed countries, or guarantees of financing, for stocks. The U.S. had no way of guaranteeing such financing and would have had to ask Congress for advance appropriation of large sums. Congress had already refused to endorse commodity agreements even when they did not require significant funds.

By and large UNCTAD was not a very useful forum for these commodity negotiations because most delegates were not sophisticated economists and were not able to deal with the relatively complicated economic issues requiring detailed knowledge. Most producer delegates had only general instructions to get an agreement at X price level, without really going much further into
detail than that. Many consumer delegates were real experts on the commodity in question, but none had very feasible solutions to the difficult problems. Chairing the consumer group was a frustrating job because most consuming countries didn’t really have a position. Given the reserved US position, I didn’t consider it appropriate as consumer group chairman, in addition to being a US delegate, to propose any new approaches to the problems. I mainly listened to the positions of the consumers and tried to summarized where there was consensus or close to consensus.

Q: Some people get very emotional about these issues.

BUSHNELL: Much of the emotion is part of the show that developing country delegates feel they need to put on in UNCTAD. Some diplomats make a career out of UNCTAD, the UN, and several other international, debating institutions. UNCTAD is a place where relatively poor countries go to get help from rich countries, not on bended knee, but in a forum where, for example, Upper Volta has the same voting power as the United States. This situation leads to a great deal of posturing. At least I looked at many of the delegates’ actions and statements as posturing. One takes it for what it is and does one’s own posturing, and plays with the situation. I sometimes had great fun with this; this gamesmanship approach avoided the boredom of weeks of long speeches.

In UNCTAD there was a third group of countries, that is, the communist countries. These countries separated themselves from the developed countries and had their own programs to deal with developing countries. One negotiated with them separately from the negotiations with the developing countries. The developing countries tried to promote competition between the western developed countries and the socialist countries. Of course, as I was a US delegate, I was perceived by the Russians to be an opponent in every sense of the word, although most of the time our negotiating interests were not all of that different from theirs. Sometimes, when a debate was going on which was rather hard to handle and not one which we wanted to get very far, I would just go over and whisper in the ear of the Russian delegate. Most of the delegates would stop paying attention to what was going on and focus on this US/Russian interplay. Often, the Russian was quite willing to play the game. Maybe, after a half hour, he would come over and whisper in my ear. We would talk about something having nothing to do with UNCTAD, for example I would ask if he had seen a certain movie or visited a restaurant.

Q: Of course, on some issues, like the UNCTAD budget, the Russians were very much our allies.

BUSHNELL: That’s right.

Q: The Russians followed a hard line, even more than we did on this kind of issue.

BUSHNELL: Right. They were competing with us for the goodwill of the developing countries, but they didn’t want to pay much for it, either directly in trade concessions or indirectly through the UN budget.
Q: Regarding commodities, was this before the integrated program of commodities came up? Later there were 18 commodities. The idea was some developing country or another had an interest each. They tried to get all of the “Group of 77” countries behind this proposal.

BUSHNELL: I don’t remember a list of 18 commodities. However, one of the ideas of the UNCTAD secretariat was to have a standard agreement that would work for most commodities. For any given commodity only a limited number of developing countries which produce this commodity were interested, but, if virtually all commodities were packaged together, there would be something in the package for almost every developing country. I was involved in the beginning stages of this packaging. I personally thought it was a terrible idea because the differences in the production and marketing of commodities is just too great, say from tin mined in a few countries, through tropical tree crops such as coffee and cacao, to commodities such as wood which is really 100 different commodities, some produced by everyone. This issue was discussed in the Commodities Committee, one of four major UNCTAD committees, which each met twice a year. That committee was supposed to promote trade in commodities of interest to the developing countries. But it was just a debating society. The developing countries tried to come up with resolutions in which everybody would agree that there should be an agreement for one commodity or another. Our response was that you can’t say there should be an agreement without knowing something about what’s in it. We couldn’t agree, and the debate would just go back and forth but without any resolution. The developing countries followed the rule of the lowest common denominator. If any single country wanted to include a commodity, it would be put in. It didn’t cost anybody anything to put it in to keep that country happy. At times the complexity of these draft resolutions was really ludicrous.

Q: What about other UNCTAD issues? For example, invisibles and items related to trade.

BUSHNELL: The Invisibles Committee was another major UNCTAD Committee. UNCTAD wanted to get into financial issues such as the level of foreign assistance, but it started as a conference on trade, so the invisibles handle was used to develop what might better be called the Finance Committee. Of course, if it were called that, the U.S. and others would have objected because we believed the IMF and other international institutions had the mandate in the financing area. I was perceived in Washington and in the US Mission as being expert in international finance, perhaps because I had done so much work on monetary policy and been detailed to AID. I was left to do this committee without much support from Washington. The main thrust of the developing countries was to get agreement on a high target for the portion of developed countries’ GNP [Gross National Product] that should be given as financial aid to developing countries. For example, they wanted one percent of GNP from the developed countries to go to the developing countries. We weren’t about to agree to that; the U.S. provided less than half that much aid and Congress was already cutting back our requests every year.

What I tried to do was to agree that the developed countries, and the U.S. in particular, would support programs that made sense and yielded sustainable development. We would support solid programs, but we wouldn’t support countries or programs that squandered the money. I also referred to difficulties with aid in countries that had corrupt regimes, and I had pulled together several examples of aid projects that were total failures. I would give the developing country delegates the needle. If some delegate spoke strongly against the U.S. as being selfish and
exploiting developing countries, I would try to reply with an example of the waste of aid in his or her country. This approach really cooled down many delegates. Generally officials in their capitals paid little attention to what the delegates did in Geneva, but, when a negative story about a project in their country appeared in the press, capitals were on the phone to their delegates in UNCTAD telling them to make sure that did not happen again. One poor delegate was even called home in part because of such an incident; another from a notoriously corrupt country approached me at one point and begged that I not use his country as an example again because, if I did, he said he would be killed. I didn’t.

The Invisibles Committee also dealt with insurance, and US insurance companies which had worldwide interests paid a lot of attention to this part of the work. At some point earlier, before I was there, an UNCTAD resolution was passed which said in general there should not be wholly-owned foreign insurance companies operating in developing countries. Foreign insurance companies were supposed to enter into joint ventures of some kind with local companies. The US insurance industry was strongly opposed to entering joint venture arrangements in part because of several bad experiences with weak local partners. Moreover, various suggestions in UNCTAD papers dealing with the regulation of foreign insurance companies would have been disastrous for the large US companies. For example, UNCTAD staff did not seem to understand how reinsurance works. UNCTAD staff argued that reinsurance should be placed within the developing country. Of course, if there were a big disaster in a small country, all the insurance companies would be bankrupted and claims would not be covered. The advantage of placing reinsurance on a worldwide basis was precisely the spreading of risks among many countries to assure that even the biggest losses happening at the same time could be covered.

Tommy Thompson, a senior executive in American International Insurance Group [AIG], would always come to Invisible Committee meetings and other UNCTAD meetings when insurance was to be discussed. He was very knowledgeable about both the insurance business in general and the insurance business in developing countries. He had spend many years running the large AIG operations in the Middle East and elsewhere. His mandate from the US insurance industry was to avoid any troublesome new decisions in UNCTAD and try to get the resolutions already adopted modified. He could explain insurance in terms the lay person could understand. He could point out what was practical in the real world, and he could show how disastrous some of the crazy things being suggested would be. I arranged for him to spend a lot of time with the economists on the UNCTAD staff who handled insurance, and he was able to avoid a lot of problems by educating them before they sent papers to all the delegates. In the formal meetings we adopted a positive approach and tried to make suggestions that developing countries could use to build up their own insurance industry without using state action to chase out the foreign companies. I think we got across the point that the advantage of foreign insurance and reinsurance companies for developing countries was that they would be sure and have the resources to pay claims precisely when there were major problems stressing the economy of the developing country and its domestic companies.

There were at least three meetings on insurance while I was in Geneva. We made some real progress in moving away from the confrontational approach, but we did not get the earlier resolution changed. One benefit of having Tommy Thompson as a public member of UNCTAD delegations was that he had a large expense account, fitting a large company such as AIG, and he
would use these funds to take key delegates, secretariat professionals, and myself to excellent lunches at restaurants we normally could not afford. Several times he and his wife also entertained my wife and me. Another major UNCTAD committee was the Shipping Committee.

Q: Ah, yes.

BUSHNELL: Of course, the U.S. no longer had a large number of ships carrying cargo all over the world because our costs, particularly labor costs, were not competitive. Most US imports come on foreign flag ships. The thrust of the developing countries in UNCTAD was to try to get agreement on measures that would promote developing country shipping companies whether or not they were low cost. Shipping was thus a very important committee for the Scandinavian countries, Japan, Greece, and the U.K. which had companies doing much of the world’s shipping. Perhaps the biggest issue, while I was in Geneva, was what is called cargo reservation. The UNCTAD staff argued that developing countries could promote their own shipping companies by requiring by law that a substantial part of their imports and exports had to move on ships of their flag. Such cargo reservation is of course not efficient since shippers cannot use the cheapest or most convenient ships. But South American countries and some others were beginning to adopt cargo reservation measures which were creating real problems for the major shipping countries. The shipping countries wanted an UNCTAD resolution prohibiting or sharply limiting cargo reservation while the developing countries, at least the dozen which were developing a shipping industry, wanted an UNCTAD resolution with would endorse cargo reservation and prohibited reprisal measures.

The U.S. itself already had cargo reservation, in that some 50 percent of the cargo financed by the government had to move in US registered ships as well as most of the traffic between US ports including Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. Only with cargo reservation could US flag ships afford to pay US union salaries and still operate at a profit. Thus what was being proposed by the developing countries was a version of what the U.S. was already doing. Of course, the U.S. is better able than developing countries to afford the high cost of uncompetitive shipping with cargo reservation, and we tended to justify what is basically a large special interest subsidy as necessary to maintain the minimum fleet of cargo ships that we might need in a war.

The position of the developing countries, led by Brazil, was strongly for cargo reservation and restrictions to help the shipping industry of developing countries. Brazil had a rapidly expanding shipping and shipbuilding industry at that time. It hasn’t done so well since then because of cheaper Asian competition, but at that time it was seen as an up and coming shipping country which could take on other countries. Most developing countries didn’t have much shipping or a shipbuilding industry. I had quite a remarkable negative experience in the Shipping Committee concerning this issue. There would be a big delegation from the United States.

Q: Including some representatives of...

BUSHNELL: Private sector shipping companies, the Department of Commerce, the Maritime Commission, and from the Department of State. I was assigned as the US Mission member. As the US delegation was large and the main debate was between the leading developing countries such as Brazil and the developed shipping countries, I would do little with the US delegation. I
wouldn’t even go to their caucus meetings. During much of the time I wouldn’t even go to the Palais for the meetings of this committee. I would only go if there were some political issues which were outside the scope of shipping experts. In this case the Shipping Committee was meeting for two weeks. I had heard from various people on the US delegation that there had been difficult meetings of the US delegation. Delegates attending the caucus were reportedly swearing at each other and even throwing things at each other. They were reportedly turning over chairs. I was not present at any of these meetings, but I was told these things happened. The sharp caucus debate was whether or not the US would support a resolution against cargo reservation.

The general position in the paper approved in Washington was that cargo reservation was an anti-economic measure, raising costs. However, opposing cargo reservation in general would place us against a policy we followed in support of our own shipping industry. Of course, the US shipping industry didn’t want us to oppose cargo reservation which was its life blood. In Washington the issue had risen to The President’s Council of Economic Advisers, where Treasury and perhaps others felt we should oppose cargo reservation as the subsidy it is and maybe we should find another way of supporting our shipping industry. This issue was very contentious within the US Government and the US Delegation. Since it looked as if there was going to be a vote on a cargo reservation resolution, there was a question as to how the U.S. would vote. As the meeting was reaching its end, I was just an interested spectator.

As often happened, the meeting ran late into Friday night although I went home after checking with our delegation toward the end of the afternoon. The meeting continued Saturday into the night. I went home for a long dinner break and returned about 10 or 11 in the evening; the meeting was still going strong as Brazil was intent on pressing its resolution to a vote. On a humorous note, I was in the corridor outside the conference room about one in the morning when the wives of the British and I think the Swedish ambassadors in Geneva appeared. Apparently they did not believe it was possible their husbands were still involved in an UNCTAD debate at this time on a Sunday morning. Diplomats from other countries who were stationed in Geneva pressed me at every opportunity to tell them how the U.S. would vote. I asked our head of delegation, and he said it was not yet decided. Finally, the meeting ended with the resolution in favor of cargo reservation to be voted on Monday afternoon. The US delegation met, and the head of the US delegation from the State Department said he was leaving Geneva in a few hours and I would have to take over as chairman of the delegation as the only remaining State representative. He ordered the industry members of the delegation who had come from the U.S. to leave, and the representatives from other agencies had already departed or were scheduled to do so later on Sunday. Thus I became the US delegation. I asked how to vote. The head of delegation said he would be on the phone to Washington and I would get instructions Monday morning.

The following Monday morning I waited at my desk at the Mission for instructions. My phone was ringing off the hook with calls from other delegations, asking how the U.S. was going to vote.

Q: Maybe in Washington they had trouble getting clearance on the cable of instructions.
BUSHNELL: [Laughter] The time difference meant Washington was not even open for normal business at noon in Geneva. Finally that afternoon, just before I had to leave my office to go to the meeting, an immediate action cable came in from Washington. It said: “You are to make the following statement.” I can’t recall exactly the wording of the statement, but it was on-the-one-hand and then on-the-other-hand. The statement was consistent with voting Yes, No, or Abstain. I showed it to Bill Culbert and asked how I should vote; he said I could obviously vote however I wanted as long as I read the statement. Big help.

Q: It must have been fairly convoluted.

BUSHNELL: It was convoluted. I thought after more than two-weeks of discussions the U.S. should take a clear position. I asked Henry Brodie to telephone Washington and ask urgently how we should vote. He said: “I’ll get on the phone, but I probably won’t get an answer.”

I went to the meeting and decided I was in a difficult position and should do something to avoid an outcome that several Washington agencies wouldn’t like at all, but no position would satisfy everyone in Washington. The Japanese, the U.K., and other delegations we usually worked closely with were urging us to vote No. When I arrived at the meeting, other delegates crowded around; some claimed that the heads of their delegations had been told we were moving toward a No vote. I was approached privately by a good friend in the Japanese delegation. He said they had “terribly difficult” instructions, because they were ordered to vote against the resolution on cargo reservations and with the United States. He asked me to please tell him that we were going to vote against the resolution. A vote against the resolution, in effect, would be a vote against cargo reservation. I said the U.S. was not necessarily against the resolution. I decided I had to do something imaginative to avoid letting our friends down and/or creating a blow-up in Washington.

Before the meeting started I explained privately to the Secretary General, who was chairing, what I was going do. Before he called for the vote, I raised the US flag and was recognized. I said the UNCTAD procedures and its schedule had gotten totally out of control. We had meetings that were supposed to end on Friday. Instead, we went on through Saturday and Sunday, and here we were on Monday afternoon when all the other US delegates had had to go to other commitments. I said the U.S. has adopted a new procedure. Whatever it was that was under consideration, when a meeting extended to Saturday or Sunday and especially Monday, we would vote No in protest. We would vote No without regard to the substance of the resolution. If we couldn’t get an agreement by Friday night, other delegations shouldn’t look to the U.S. to support any resolution. I then read the text of the statement from Washington and asked to have it included in the record of the vote together with my procedural statement. This statement, of course, gave the Japanese, the British, and other major shipping countries great delight because I was voting No. I thought I had made a clear statement that I wasn’t taking any position on the resolution except that I was voting No because the committee hadn’t voted when it was supposed to vote, when I had members of the delegation from Washington present. Others voted much as expected. The vote was extremely close; my recollection is that it was approved by a margin of about one vote. Of course the US vote was recorded as a No.
I thought I had managed a difficult situation well. Washington could figure out its position in the future; the countries we usually worked with in UNCTAD were happy; perhaps this would even be a blow in favor of ending meetings on time. I reported back to Brodie, who had talked to Washington and had been unable to get anything except some chagrin in the Department of State that the head of the US delegation wasn’t in Geneva. Brodie and Culbert were very pleased with what I had done and even said they would support future No votes when meetings drag on. I prepared a cable reporting the position I had taken and the outcome. I thought it was a good day’s diplomacy. Some six weeks later I received a cable containing an official reprimand from the Department of State for not having properly followed my instructions.

Q: Oh, gees!

BUSHNELL: This was the only time during my career I received a formal reprimand. I was told that it would be placed in my personnel file. I thought this reprimand was not only unfair but just ludicrous. Henry Brodie thought it was just terrible and totally unfair. He protested by cable to Washington and eventually wrote a memo to go into my personnel file explaining that I had not had a clear instruction and had handled the matter extremely well. This reprimand never did me any particular harm. However, Brodie, Culbert, and I made some effort to find out what had really happened. First we found the Head of Delegation had departed on Sunday for Paris instead of staying for the Monday meeting in part because he was meeting his wife in Paris that day; he did have an OECD meeting in Paris beginning Monday, but several senior delegates of other OECD countries missed the first OECD day to stay in Geneva. Apparently, when the Head of the US Delegation had gotten back to Washington, his bosses were unhappy he had departed Geneva. Some agencies were unhappy because they had wanted us to vote Yes. Those in Washington backstopping this meeting apparently felt they had agreement with the Head of Delegation in their phone conversations that the U.S. would abstain; therefore they rushed out the US statement first thing Monday on that assumption without stating what they thought had been agreed informally and without interagency clearance. Thus although he had not told me how to vote, the chief US delegate protected himself by taking the position that I had been instructed to vote differently. Thus the reprimand.

Q: John, what about some of the other areas before UNCTAD, such as transport and technology? Do you have any particular recollections of that?

BUSHNELL: Technology was an area of great frustration in UNCTAD because, no matter how much the developed countries did, the developing countries immediately wanted more. Of course, a great deal had been done by developed countries toward the transfer of technology to the developing countries. The developing countries never mentioned how much they had been helped. Hundreds of thousands of people from developing countries have studied at universities and other schools in developed countries. They have learned a lot of technology that they have taken home, not to mention that a majority of technology is available at virtually no cost from the books and other publications of developed countries. There are all sorts of programs for governmental sharing of technology with developing countries. A great deal of AID [Agency for International Development] work is the transfer of technology through its technical and capital assistance.
The main complaint of the developing countries was that a couple of them had to pay substantial amounts in terms of patent and royalty fees to use technology belonging to the developed countries’ private sector. They argued these fees should be reduced. Our view was that privately owned technology is entitled to a return, and developed country governments do not control fees of the private sector. Developing new technology takes a lot of investment. If private firms don’t get a good return, the world won’t get the advancement in technology which is a benefit to everybody. I had a little speech. I don’t know how many times I made it. I spoke of the rapid advance of technology which is of so much interest in the developing countries. But developing countries don’t have to use the very latest technology. In fact, maybe they shouldn’t use the most advanced technology. The technology available two generations previous may be appropriate for their conditions with cheaper labor, more expensive capital, and fewer advanced technicians. In many cases technology with which there has been much experience can be introduced and used by less trained people. Older technology may no longer be subject to patent rights, or it is certainly available much cheaper. However, some developing country delegates thought their countries had a right to have the very latest technology for free. There was continued pressure and debate, although fairly unstructured, and not much in the way of viable ideas for progress.

Q: Sounds like sound and fury signifying little. Was the TDC program functioning, or the program for Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries in operation?

BUSHNELL: Yes, both of these were expanded while I was there. The developing countries would meet among themselves and try to find ways to expand trade or other cooperation. Unfortunately, much of the thrust for this program of cooperation among developing countries was driven by people from the Soviet Bloc in the Secretariat. UNCTAD stressed government to government trade arrangements instead of the governments merely setting the table for their private sectors. The same situation applied to the UNCTAD work to expand trade between the communist countries, non-market as they were called, and the developing countries. The Soviet government would agree to take x number of tons of bananas and to provide, in return, y number of tons of iron, some number of airplanes, or whatever they could sell. There were long negotiating sessions, and large delegations came from the Soviet Union and some developing countries. The main contribution of UNCTAD appeared to be translators and a free pleasant place to do business in Geneva. Eventually, once these negotiations and the trade really got going, the Indians and some others no longer negotiated with the Russians in UNCTAD. They had their own bilateral arrangements. However, for many countries that were just getting started in trade with the East, this was a painful process because they normally didn’t deal on a government to government basis and they were inexperienced in getting the views and inputs of their private sectors on trade details.

Reflecting this largely Soviet concept of government trade, some people in the Secretariat and in some delegations began to think that, from their posts in Geneva, they should run trade among developing countries. So as well as Honduras trading bananas to the USSR for iron, Honduras should trade bananas to Argentina for beef. They would promote bilateral negotiations and would have meetings for that purpose, particularly among those which had more non-market economies. The U.S. had little interest in this activity, considering it inefficient. About the only interest that I had was that, in preparing the UNCTAD budget, we needed to limit the amount of funds provided for translators for all of these negotiations. This translation service was becoming
a substantial strain on the UNCTAD budget. I tried to take advantage of this competition for resources to cut back on other activities of UNCTAD, for example by shifting committees which met twice a year to once and those that met annually to every other year so that UNCTAD could provide the translation and interpreting services to East/South and South/South negotiations. I thought fewer committee meetings would mean less work and less travel for the U.S. and would certainly not limit our ability to accomplish anything we might want to do in UNCTAD. This tactical approach on financing translation activity was not very successful. It ended up with the Department of State not holding firm in New York against increases in the UNCTAD budget.

Q: Could you explain the administrative budget problem for UNCTAD?

BUSHNELL: We had long budget discussions or negotiations every year. The UNCTAD budget was part of the basic UN budget so the U.S. was covering a mandatory 25 percent of the UNCTAD budget through required annual UN dues. Some of the activities of UNCTAD were supported by separate grants from individual countries or other international organizations. However, the basic UNCTAD budget was part of the UN budget. As part of the overall efforts by the U.S. and other developed countries to contain the growth of the UN budget, procedures had been set up so that the UNCTAD Secretary General would prepare his budget request and discussed it with interested member countries in Geneva. Comments of the delegations were supposed to be taken into account before it was sent to New York. I usually represented the U.S. in this process in Geneva.

There was not a lot of flexibility in the UNCTAD budget. The numbers were driven by how many meetings, how many interpreters and translators, and how many bureaucrats were needed, as well as how much it would cost to publish the proceedings. There wasn’t a lot one could do to cut back on the budget. For example, the shipping committee didn’t really have to meet every year. Why not meet every other year? Obviously, if we did that, there would be a substantial savings. One could push for this sort of thing. Generally, the best we could do was to resist an increase in the number and frequency of meetings. There would be other delegates who were pushing in the other direction, and we would wind up about even.

I didn’t have the impression that, as international bureaucracies go, the UNCTAD bureaucracy was larger than what it should have been given what it was supposed to be doing. However, by comparison with what it actually did, the UNCTAD bureaucracy was pretty large. Most of the Secretariat papers were of poor technical quality for example. Believe me, I had to read many thousands of pages of them.

Q: But there was a lot of pressure from Washington to hack away and seek to reduce the budget.

BUSHNELL: There was a desire to cut the budget every year. We received a cable from Washington every year to this effect. The Department would say there were many places where the UNCTAD budget could be cut back without doing any damage to anything but the Department would provide few examples.

Q: I think sometimes we wanted to do damage to certain activities.
BUSHNELL: We might even have wanted to do that. However, I don’t recall trying to use the budget to be particularly destructive. Almost all meetings were held too frequently. People weren’t ready to modify their positions that rapidly. Meetings went on too long; there was too much speech making, and all the work would be done in the last couple of days. Thus business was not conducted effectively. UNCTAD sessions were probably one of the least effective of UN activities, although I have little other experience for comparison.

Q: Many of the frustrations in UNCTAD are from working in the Group System. Group B comprises the industrialized countries and seeks to develop a common position to negotiate with the Group of 77, which includes the developing countries. This structure makes the system rigid.

BUSHNELL: Perhaps it does, but you have to have some kind of system. You can’t have over 100 delegations running around in an unorganized way, each negotiating for itself. That just won’t work. A great many countries had pretty simple instructions because, on most issues, they were just to go along with the group they belong to. That is, most of the developing countries vote with other developing countries. As a result, it was often hard to arrive at any consensus because there would usually be a couple of countries which had strong and determined views. Of course, the U.S. was often one of these countries There was a lot of diplomatic glossing over of differences. However, I think this kind of system is as good a way to arrange work as any. Obviously, Group B would have worked better if it had decided to use the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] as an effective coordinator to come up with common positions and then stick with them. Also the OECD could have provided a professional secretariat to prepare Group B drafts and even certain speeches on behalf of the group. In effect the UNCTAD Secretariat was such a secretariat for the Group of 77 and even to a considerable extent for Group D, the communist states. However, there were some Group B countries, such as France, that were too eager to court the developing countries to permit binding OECD coordination. Thus Group B had to depend on volunteers from among the delegates to perform the secretarial function. Too often I was struggling to understand a draft in French and determine if the U.S. could support it.

Q: The same thing could be said of the Scandinavian countries.

BUSHNELL: Yes, to some extent. The Scandinavians generally had more forward positions. A number of Scandinavian countries do give one percent of their GNP [Gross National Product] in aid, so they don’t have any problem with agreeing to that. On shipping, however, the Scandinavians have quite a tough position. It was often hard to get a really meaningful, group position, except on tactics. At least during the time that I was in Geneva, the general perception was that the U.S. tended to be the least willing to move toward the developing countries. This perception was partly because such countries as Japan, Germany, and Italy diplomatically hid behind the United States, saying little and letting the U.S. carry the ball.

Q: I think that’s been true from the beginning. How about the UNCTAD Secretariat? What did you think of it?

BUSHNELL: Perhaps my view of the Secretariat was unfair, but I thought the Secretariat could have made a difference if it had been willing to come up with more imaginative and balanced
proposals. For example, it could have recommended that, for the developing countries to receive some benefit, there would have to be some self-help effort by them to improve their own policies. Or, if the developing countries and the Secretariat had brought some balance into the debate by describing developing country policy changes that worked, the whole concept of UNCTAD would have been more fruitful. After all the principal responsibility for development certainly lies with the developing countries themselves not with the developed countries, although you would never know this by listening to an UNCTAD debate.

However, the UNCTAD Secretariat became, at best, one more reporter on the situation in the world. Its reports were not as good as those coming from a number of other organizations such as the World Bank and the DAC {OECD Development Assistance Committee}. Sometimes, its proposals were not technically sound. The UNCTAD Secretariat wasn’t a strong secretariat. I don’t know how it is now.

Q: *I think that it has been the same all the way through. Raoul Prebisch had left office as Secretary General of UNCTAD by the time you were there. Perez Guerrero was the Secretary General when you were there. Do you have any comment on him?*

BUSHNELL: I didn’t know Prebisch in that incarnation. I met Prebisch in Argentina later. I think that his ideas had changed significantly after he left UNCTAD. Perez was quite a sophisticated diplomat. He did not add much substantive leadership to the economic mix in UNCTAD as Prebisch had. He was able to maintain good relations with almost everybody, which was not easy. He was good at finding compromise language, which could be read in different ways and say different things to various people. Such diplomatic slight-of-hand may not have had much effect on the real world, but it had become the heart and soul of the UNCTAD game.

One of the exercises I participated in was preparations for the Second Development Decade. It was part of a UN wide effort. The UNCTAD assignment was to come up with recommendations. Thus Perez Guerrero convened an Advisory Group to help UNCTAD prepare for the Second Development Decade. The thrust for UNCTAD was that focusing on a second development decade would get the richer countries to do more for development of the poorer countries. The US expert was Isaiah Frank, then a professor at John Hopkins who had worked in State EB from 1945-63 including as DAS. Professor Frank was not familiar with the UNCTAD and the UN game. I was assigned to work with him; in effect I educated him on the UNCTAD game. Most of the other advisors either had UNCTAD experience or were educated by officers like me from their countries’ Geneva Missions. Thus many of the arguments and issues were the same as those we dealt with every day in UNCTAD. Especially when it came to preparing a draft for New York, the bargaining was much as it was in UNCTAD meetings. This draft was to lay out the goals for the next decade for development and development assistance including trade measures.

As was often the case in UNCTAD, a small group was brought together, this time by Perez Guerrero himself, to try to hammer out this draft of goals. Unusually, at the end of the day Perez invited the group, perhaps made even smaller, to his apartment to continue the work. As I recall, we worked two or three nights far into the early morning. The compromise language got more and more contorted. The U.S. was not in a position to make any major concessions; certainly this
is not where we would make such announcements. Thus we pressed for general and thus pretty meaningless language. I don’t recall that the final product had any impact.

This tension between the developing countries and a few developed countries was continual in UNCTAD. In these informal negotiation groups I frequently gave my little lecture that it would be easy for the U.S. to vote for some of these proposals, since they weren’t binding on us. However, if we didn’t intend to do what the resolution called for, or if we didn’t have any internal means for carrying it out, we were honest enough to the UNCTAD process to vote no. Moreover, where we voted no, there would be no chance of getting our Congress to approve the measures that were desired. Until we could see a way of doing it, we weren’t going to vote for things which we couldn’t live up to. Most delegates appreciated this approach, perhaps because they saw that an UNCTAD where everyone voted for lots of things to help developing countries but few implemented them would soon be clearly worthless, and their nice Geneva jobs might be gone.

Q: Were there other individuals in the UNCTAD Secretariat of whom you have any particular recollections, either positive or negative?

BUSHNELL: The head of the Commodities Division was Bernard Chidzero, an African.

Q: He was from Zimbabwe. In fact, when Zimbabwe became independent, he became the Number two man in the government, under Robert Mugabe.

BUSHNELL: Chidzero seemed very much a rising star. He seemed to understand the economic situation better than others. However, he was not very effective as a senior UNCTAD staff member. By and large, the UNCTAD Secretariat was staffed by people who were making international organizations a career and enjoying life in Geneva. They were not at the top of the ladder in whatever their area of specialty was. There were a few young people starting out there who had good potential, but they tended to be buried in the system. By the time a paper was edited by all of their bosses, there was little left of what they had originally put into it.

Q: Did you get involved at all with the UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Center?

BUSHNELL: Very little.

Q: Do you have any comment on that?

BUSHNELL: I thought the trade center was useful and tried to defend it in the budget, for example. I was not in favor of cutting that part of the budget. The Trade Center was an example of more practical help to developing countries in contrast to the diplomatic discussions in UNCTAD. Most of the Trade Center budget came from the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) and from voluntary donations from the Scans and others. The Trade Center basically provided technical assistance on such items as trade promotion, standards, and trade taxes to assist developing countries expand their exports.
Q: Could you comment on the US Mission? First of all, you were fairly independent in connection with many UNCTAD operations. You were probably more dependent on the delegations coming to Geneva from Washington than on the US Mission. Could you comment on Henry Brodie?

BUSHNELL: Henry Brodie was the Economic Minister most of my time there. His priority, and clearly his personal preference, was working on GATT problems. He attended some UNCTAD meetings. After I got my feet on the ground, he largely left UNCTAD to me, as did his successor. He gave me support in getting cables out. However, unlike other jobs I have had, most of the time I was not really on my own because I had lots of visiting delegates from Washington. There were only rare meetings which I attended without people from Washington in attendance. These visitors were officers who dealt with policy in the area being discussed, and I didn’t have any need to look to the US Mission for guidance. In fact, I didn’t spend a lot of time in the Mission. My Mission office was a place to write reports and read cables and UNCTAD papers, but that was about all.

Q: Henry Brodie was replaced by Bill Miller. Any comment on him?

BUSHNELL: No. Henry Brodie had been around UNCTAD for a long time. He was someone to go to when I needed advice and suggestions. As for Miller...

Q: Brodie was an expert on commodities.

BUSHNELL: Miller never had much to bring to the table on UNCTAD; he did not know the issues and didn’t really have much to do with UNCTAD. I think he distanced himself rather intentionally from UNCTAD, at least during the time that I was there.

Q: What about Herb Propps?

BUSHNELL: Herb Propps was a good economist. I had met him years before when he was in the Embassy in Canberra, Australia, and I was studying there. He was antipathetic to UNCTAD because no good, trained economist had a real professional challenge there. Fortunately, he didn’t want to have much to do with UNCTAD and, in fact, didn’t have much to do with it. He had been in Geneva for a long time and was a great GATT expert.

Q: He was a little reserved about everything in Geneva, including even GATT. He had the attitude that “those fools there don’t know what they’re doing.”

BUSHNELL: Trade negotiations are more about politics, especially domestic politics, than about economics. Now that GATT is the WTO [World Trade Organization] the political element may be even more obvious.

Q: Bill Culbert replaced Herb Propps about six months after Propps left Geneva.

BUSHNELL: Bill Culbert considered UNCTAD to be a joke. When he really had to do something there, he did it. He did some work on trade preferences. You really had to have a good
case that you needed him or an UNCTAD meeting would be uncovered or you didn’t get Bill Culbert to do anything on UNCTAD.

Q: Did you have any sense about other people in the US Mission? Was Roger Tubby still there when you arrived?

BUSHNELL: Yes, he was there. He had been President Harry Truman’s press spokesman. He was head of the US Mission to UN agencies in Geneva when I arrived, but he soon departed. I thought he was a wonderful guy, but I didn’t really know him. He had nothing to do with UNCTAD.

Q: What about Charles Mace? He was the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] of the US Mission.

BUSHNELL: He was a career administrative officer; he was a nice guy.

Q: He was a twin brother of Howard Mace, but they were very different. Do you remember anything about Idar Rimestad?

BUSHNELL: Rimestad brought Jules Bassin as his DCM. I had the impression they became more active, especially on budget issues. Maybe it was that they tried to get me more involved in the budgetary issues, even going beyond UNCTAD. They tried to look at the budgets of the other, specialized agencies of the UN. However, I really didn’t have the expertise to be much help. The concern was to hold down the increase in budgets because the U.S. paid 25% or more of the budget and it was increasingly difficult to get Congressional appropriations for international organizations.

Q: They were purely administrative people and both Rimestad and Bassin were uninvolved with substantive issues.

BUSHNELL: I don’t know. They certainly were not involved with the things I was involved in, even in the crises. We had one crisis involving ECOSOC [UN Economic and Social Council]. The head of our delegation to ECOSOC was a political appointee who wanted to have a big impact with a forthcoming policy speech. I don’t think he was going to advocate the 1% of GNP target as a goal for aid to the developing countries. But he was going to commit us to moving up some tenths of a percent per year in our aid and to reducing trade restrictions. These were all things the developing countries wanted to hear. I forget the specifics, but there were two or three things in this proposed speech which were clearly against our established policies. Some of us pointed this out to him. He took the position that he was hired to make policy. [Laughter] Fortunately, there were other career officers, who had come with him from Washington. I was mainly involved in pointing out to them where the problems were. I don’t remember that the front office paid much attention to the situation. I was involved in trying to quiet this head of delegation down. He was finally recalled to Washington and was relieved as head of the US delegation. He gave his speech and then was relieved. This whole performance was disgraceful, but it turned out, as we all knew, that he had not been hired to make policy. I was glad this mess occurred in ECOSOC and not in UNCTAD.
The summer ECOSOC meetings were among the low points of my assignment to Geneva. Normally ECOSOC meets in New York, but New York is pretty hot in August and a month or so in Geneva is pleasant for many delegates. In August UNCTAD has no meetings because the Europeans are on vacation or because ECOSOC takes up the UNCTAD facilities. Since I did not have UNCTAD work, I was assigned to the ECOSOC delegation during both summers I was there. Of course, it was cheaper to place me on the delegation than to send another officer from Washington or New York. Fortunately the pace of work was slow. I handled only a few issues such as economic reports and tourism. I enjoyed developing contacts with the Latin American delegations, and we even developed some drafts in Spanish especially on tourism.

The worst thing about the summer ECOSOC, and the most difficult, was the ECOSOC Council meeting room where the plenary met almost every day for many hours filled with endless, and usually meaningless, speeches by the heads of delegation. The chamber has a balcony above it, which is where the thousands of tourists on tours of the Palais file through and can then sit and watch the proceedings. You go back after a nice, Geneva lunch and a couple of glasses of wine, and you have to sit for three or four hours through boring and tedious speeches. Often I had to take the US place at the table as the senior delegates were busy negotiating. Most speeches were not even worth taking notes. However, woe to you if your head should nod, because some American tourist will be in the balcony and will look down and see that, behind the sign for the US delegation, the delegate is sleeping. You really have to look as if you are representing US interests or you might be at the end of a Congressional investigation of why the US delegate was sleeping.

Q: Did you like Geneva as a post?

BUSHNELL: It was a pleasant place to live and work, but UNCTAD work was not very interesting.

Q: Today is Monday, February 23, 1998. I would like to put a little of the UNCTAD material into a bit of perspective, before we go on to your assignment to the NSC [National Security Council]. You were there, beginning in 1969, so you were not really involved in a major conference. You were basically implementing the results of the New Delhi Conference of UNCTAD and preparing for the Santiago Conference.

BUSHNELL: That’s right. We were supposedly implementing the results of the New Delhi Conference, particular the agreement in principal to establish GSP [General Specialized Preferences]. Work was just beginning on preparations for the next Conference; at least, by the time I left Geneva in early 1971, we weren’t really into serious preparations. There was a big debate about where the next UNCTAD Conference would be, and there was great opposition to holding it in Santiago, Chile, where Salvador Allende, a Marxist, had been elected President in 1970. I don’t recall that it was a matter of tremendous moment to the United States although we supported having the conference in Geneva which would have been much cheaper.

Q: I think we have adequately discussed the major negotiations and institutions. How would you put these discussions in the context of the overall situation?
BUSHNELL: There was a basic point on which there was international disagreement, although in the United States there was virtually no recognition of this disagreement and certainly no general recognition that our position was shared by only a small minority of countries. It is convenient for the developing countries, both large and small, to try to get international decisions into a forum where the voting is one-country, one-vote, rather than some kind of weighted voting based on economic measures or even population. On this basis the overwhelming majority of votes are with the poorer countries. They see such decision making as in their interest, that is developing countries would like decision-making structures where they can use their votes to redistribute world income and make other decisions. They wanted to use UNCTAD and other fora to restructure world decision-making away from the concept of weighted voting as in financial institutions such as the World Bank where the rich countries have most of the votes, or even the UN, where the decision making bodies such as the Security Council are dominated by certain richer countries, rather than the majority of poorer countries. They argue such a restructuring would be more democratic, although I have never understood why one nation having one vote in analogous to one vote per citizen. The failure of the US body politic to even recognize that this disagreement exists is interpreted in many developing countries to reflect US arrogance.

The thrust of the developing countries and some of their supporters in developed countries was to put as many economic decisions as possible into structures where issues would be decided on the basis of one country, one vote. This thrust was the origin of UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], and the effort of the developing countries at the first conference and at later meetings was to get as many trade and financial issues into UNCTAD as possible. Before I was associated with UNCTAD, there was considerable tension between the developed, or richer countries, and the developing countries on how to proceed. It was ultimately decided that UNCTAD would operate on the basis of consensus, something like the UN General Assembly, rather than black and white, up or down votes. The U.S. and some other countries made it clear we would not be bound by votes in a forum where the richer countries are in the minority.

Gradually, it became clear that a voting process controlled by the poorer countries wouldn’t change the world. The question then became how to extract concessions from the developed world and how to use the potential votes of the developing countries to influence decisions. The richer countries developed a group feeling that they were the targets in an UNCTAD structure which gave the advantage to the developing countries. This entire issue of world economic decision making wasn’t of much interest to anyone in the United States or Washington in part because most recognized that it would be market forces, not votes in some international body, that would have the dominate influence on the world economy. But quite a few of the other developed countries felt it was time to give at least some kind of forum to the developing countries. Thus UNCTAD existed, but there was considerable reluctance in the U.S. to use this forum constructively.

There was also considerable tension in Washington between the Department of State, which sought to claim, at least at times, that it was in charge of US foreign economic policy, and other departments which had other, domestic, objectives. There was a feeling at State that we should show some movement in the direction of the developing countries at UNCTAD. But other
Washington departments, such as the USTR [Office of the United States Trade Representative], the Treasury Department, and the Department of Commerce, didn’t see anything of interest to them in UNCTAD. Essentially, they didn’t want to have much to do with it. These were some of the tensions we had to deal with. In order to keep UNCTAD functioning, we had to provide at least a certain amount of opportunity for a dialogue and tell the developing countries what the US positions were. We had to listen to the positions of the developing countries. With the exception of GSP [General, Specialized Tariff Preferences] and perhaps arrangements on a few commodities there was little which we could do that would change anything. So our work in UNCTAD was a form of dialogue.

Q: In the last session you made some reference to having met Raoul Prebisch in Buenos Aires; he had left Geneva by the time you arrived there. I said that perhaps we should discuss that later, but perhaps this is the logical time. Could you discuss the circumstances of your meeting him and what your impressions of him were?

BUSHNELL: While I was in the Embassy in Buenos Aires from 1982-87, Prebisch returned to Argentina and became an advisor to the newly elected democratic government. I got to know him fairly well; several times we had lunch together privately before he died. We had a lot of time to discuss both the Argentine economy and more global issues. However, we never really discussed UNCTAD issues.

Q: I met Prebisch in Chile in the late 1950s. When I was at Harvard University after that, I met him again and later got to know him when I was in Geneva for the UNCTAD negotiations. I became acquainted with his whole approach to things. My own sense was that his analysis of the global economy had some merit. However, it was his policy prescriptions that were not very sound.

BUSHNELL: Prebisch was a leading spokesman, during most of his life, for the accelerated development of the poorer countries. On a worldwide basis he was seen as one of, if not the leading spokesman, for what economists call the infant industry approach to development. According to this view one can develop the industrial sector of an economy by providing high levels of tariff protection, forcing industry at least to assemble in country what they produce, and thus building up a country’s industry until it reaches a critical mass where local industry can gradually become competitive with external sources of supply. As the industrial sector grows, it will train more skilled manpower and will eventually even be able to export. Prebisch was influenced by what happened in Argentina and other Latin countries during the Second World War when they were cut off from their normal imports of most manufactures by the war. Many industries sprang up to meet domestic needs, although they were generally high cost operations. Prebisch considered protection for such infant industries was the best way to get development. But he never argued that countries should be self-sufficient and try to withdraw from the world by developing a full range of self-sufficient industries. Prebisch was of the generation which believed in state economic planning. He believed states should give strong protection to those industries which the planners thought could eventually become efficient and even export, at least to neighboring countries.
He stressed that this kind of policy involved taking steps toward becoming more advanced and having more skilled and technically qualified workers and even reducing protection over time. Thus, over time, countries following these practices would become competitive at the world level and could engage in two way trade in industrial products. Prebisch’s theories had great appeal in a majority of developing countries during the 1950s. These countries saw that, essentially, they were producing raw materials which were exported to richer countries. Then most of their needs in terms of manufactured goods were bought from these richer countries. There was little opportunity for them to develop manufacturing and the middle class workers that they saw producing manufactures in developed countries. They felt they were kept in that inferior role, as they saw it.

Most economists agreed that some steps to promote industrial development made sense. What happened, by and large, particularly in Latin America, was that the policies were controlled by a local power structure which was controlled by the infant industries. Instead of improving their efficiency and reducing prices, the leaders of the infant industries developed political power and used it to protect their monopolies while doing little to increase efficiency or even train their workers. Profits were often high and quality low. Thus the new industries did not become efficient or export oriented. Unfortunately, these infant industries were controlled by people who were monopolistic in their approach, and the goods they produced were characterized by high unit cost and high unit profit. This tendency toward monopoly and protectionism defeated what had been Prebisch’s dream that people developing these infant industries with the help of protection would become more and more efficient. Perhaps the key misjudgement was to believe that the governments of developing countries could plan their development and operate independent of their new industrial czars.

The need for increasing efficiency just didn’t take hold in Latin America, while high protection continued, although there were some efficient industries developed in the shadow of this kind of protection. It was pretty much the same story elsewhere in the world. By the time I knew Prebisch in 1984, he had expanded his view and argued that you needed more than just protection. You had to push for efficiency in operations and training of workers and technicians. Development was a complex package, but it was harder to articulate that concept, and it certainly was harder to sell it.

Q: However, most of Prebisch’s formulas presupposed government intervention in the economies of the developing countries. Commodity agreements would drive the prices of raw materials artificially high. In terms of shipping arrangements and all kinds of other ways, Prebisch wanted to increase the flow of real resources from the rich countries to the poor countries. He thought that governments should be a central part of the process.

BUSHNELL: He certainly saw a major role for government in the economy, and he saw government as being more efficient and effective than it usually turned out to be. He thought governments were able to manage an infant industry policy which would, in fact, wean people off protection. He certainly saw a big role for government in terms of both planning and direction of what would be done. He thought government could effectively designate which industries, what kind of protection, and what steps could be taken to improve efficiency. He also, of course, wanted to see a transfer of resources in various forms from the developed to the
developing countries. I don’t think he considered such transfers to be related to his industrialization policies. His view of commodities did not grow out of his infant industry concept. What Prebisch saw in both cases was a need for planning. For example, in Latin America, when the price of coffee was high, many new coffee bushes were planted in most countries. Of course, when these bushes entered into production six years later, there was a glut of coffee, and the coffee price went way down. That result was created by the market. In his view, you needed to use the influence of governments on some coordinated basis to break that cycle of the rise and fall of prices. He felt people should only plant the number of coffee bushes that would meet increasing consumption at some sort of fair and equitable price. He thought that this could be done by some sort of international commodity agreements. He did not recognize how difficult it is to project future demand or to control economic actors in developing countries.

Q: But he thought you could do this on an actuarial basis, like insurance, which has a certain economic and theoretical foundation. When I was assigned to UNCTAD affairs in Geneva, some commodities experts said that Prebisch always wanted to peg commodity prices artificially high and even beyond levels which would provide coffee growers with relatively stable incomes. There would be greater incomes for the producing countries.

BUSHNELL: I’m not sure that attitude was really integral to his thinking. There was always great tension because producers generally thought market prices were too low, while consumers generally thought that they were too high. There is no magic, economic formula which tells you what the right price is. The greatest problem I found in UNCTAD discussions was that nobody wanted to talk about what was happening in terms of commodity production. I used to say I would like to go around the table and hear from the producing countries whether the price of cocoa, for example, was causing their farmers either to expand, contract, or maintain production at the same level. Were producers making plans about levels of production? What was the market reaction in each country to higher or lower levels of prices? That would tell more about what was going on and what problems of shortage or surplus would be faced in a few years.

For example, if nobody was planning to increase production, the current price was too low, as sooner or later producers would have to plant new coffee bushes. If everybody was planning to increase production, then the price was too high. But producing countries in UNCTAD were not prepared to hold this type of dialogue. Political groups in many countries monopolize power and information on such subjects as investment and are not about to share it with their own governments, let alone with foreign governments. The governments of the commodity producing countries were not able to deal with this sort of issue, which was of critical importance to make any commodity agreement work. In most cases the U.S. was not prepared to deal with these issues either. We did not believe in government planning, and we really had few mechanism to control production of those commodities where we played a role in exports. So in terms of commodity agreements about all we could do was play around with the size and nature of stocks. However, if we didn’t deal with basic production, we couldn’t exercise much control of prices in the long run just by dealing with stocks. So commodity agreements proved themselves not very feasible.

Q: In any event, this range of economic issues actually preoccupied you, in one way or another, during a large part of your Foreign Service career. Do you think these issues received the
attention in Washington which they deserved? Essentially, as you say, this was a problem for three or four decades after World War II. Did the existence of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] as an institution increase our power to deal with these issues? Or in fact, since OPEC was denigrated to such an extent, not only within the United States, but also in other developed countries, did OPEC’s existence tend to reduce the time that we devoted to the actual issues?

BUSHNELL: I’m not sure OPEC had much effect. It’s been a long learning curve for everybody, in the developed as well as the developing countries. Over the past 50 years we’ve learned an immense amount about what works and especially what doesn’t work in terms of development and we’re still learning. The Asian economic crisis that we’re going through now is perhaps the most recent learning experience with the development model which had recently seemed so effective now being called into question. The OPEC experience illustrates just how hard it is to influence commodity prices even for a commodity which is largely produced for export in developing countries by governments themselves. I think no one has found the magic answer for rapid sustained development. There are great tensions between what governments can and cannot do to promote development.

There are a lot of things which we now know are important and have proved important. We are much more advanced in this respect. But, when push comes to shove and there is a crisis, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] follows pretty much the same policy now as it did 40 years ago. That is, to maintain an equilibrium in foreign exchange rates, you have to maintain basic budgetary, fiscal, and monetary balance. That’s the central focus of the IMF. But the IMF generally does not make judgments on what are good or not good expenditures. The IMF says: “Cut expenditures.” For the IMF, cutting expenditures is the same if you eliminate two military divisions and the costs that go with them or if you eliminate, say, 500 high schools, and the costs that go with that. Those two actions are equal, fiscally, as far as the IMF is concerned.

Q: However, in fact there is a big difference between those two actions.

BUSHNELL: Yes. The World Bank sees a big difference, but it also has been slow to adapt to changing situations. Only fairly recently has the World Bank been willing to address the quality of spending programs. Where there are sensitive, political issues, such as the trade offs between military and educational expenditures, the World Bank has really not found a way to address the problem. The Bank may choose not to lend money for education if the country is closing high schools, of course. It is only recently that the World Bank has been a little more willing to walk away from a country entirely. What happened in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was that, if a country was foolish enough to close its high schools, to take an extreme example, the World Bank would not lend it money for educational purposes. However, the bank might still help such a country build hydroelectric dams. Money is fungible, and it is not clear the World Bank has played a very constructive role in respect to the development efficiency of borrowing nations’ own expenditures.

Now, the World Bank is more willing to walk away totally from a country where policies are perceived as being very bad for development. This change has been a long time in coming, and it really is only applied in cases of the worst kinds of performance. The World Bank and, to some
extent even the IMF, have become more willing to provide technical assistance in implementing some of these efficiency policies. They have done better staff work in trying to persuade leaders in a given country that good education is important. The two institutions have become more effective over the years in providing that kind of indirect, educational persuasion. However, I think that a more important function which the World Bank and the IMF have performed is their work in training economists from developing countries. They have trained thousands of economists in their institutions and supported academic work in house. Both they and AID have supported advance economic training, largely at US universities though also elsewhere. The result is a substantial corps of well-trained economists, worldwide. These economists are now reaching the point where they hold powerful positions in their governments. They have learned that the same basis economic theories apply throughout the world. They have recognized the general inefficiency of government and the difficulty of bringing to power enlightened, honest, and efficient governments such as some people like Raoul Prebisch dreamed about. As a result, these economists have been putting more faith in the market, and particularly a market which is worldwide in scope and therefore not likely to be driven by monopolistic or other narrow interests.

Q: Of course, the Bretton Woods institutions necessarily reflect the positions of governments. Since the end of World War II many governments, including that of the United States, have overwhelmingly been preoccupied with Cold War considerations. To what degree do you think that may have warped or distorted perspectives on Third World development?

BUSHNELL: Certainly Cold War considerations played a large role in justifying foreign assistance appropriations with the Congress and the public and in the allocation of both bilateral and multilateral aid. But I think the degree is a hard question to answer because one can argue that, absent the cold war, there would have been a much smaller assistance role for the public sector in the case of the United States and many other countries and relationships with the developing world would have been more in the hands of the private sectors. However, the Cold War had such a big effect on so many things it is hard even to speculate how things might have developed without it. Certainly military assistance would have been much less, but would that have resulted in greater economic assistance? If it had not been for the failure of central planning demonstrated in the USSR, would the world have realized the value of market allocation of resources as soon and as completely as it has?

Q: But the Cold War affected the purposes of the United States and its allies.

BUSHNELL: Certainly. But, leaving aside considerations of the Cold War, a lot of money went from developed countries to the developing countries. This money went largely for economic development. Certainly in the United States, and perhaps even more in other developed countries, there was a lot of support for helping poorer countries quite independent of Cold War considerations. Such assistance has only fallen gradually with the end of the Cold War. One of the arguments I, and many others, used in justifying economic aid to the developing countries, including contributions to the World Bank and to regional development banks as well as bilateral assistance, was the perceived view that in Latin America and some parts of Asia and Africa failure to help the countries develop might cause them to look to the USSR for help on their
number one problem – economic development. If we didn’t help these developing countries, the Russians would do so.

However, the Cold War was just one of many rationales for US assistance. If our Defense budget had been a third its actual size absent the cold War, how much assistance appropriations might we have gotten without a Cold War argument? Perhaps even more.

Of course, one of the factors that diminished the work of the international institutions and AID, in terms of the quality of their development advice and effort, was that from time to time situations arose where a small, dictatorial group ruled a country and followed pretty bad economic policies. Despite the bad policies followed by these governments, they obtained economic aid, both from the World Bank and AID, and sometimes even from the IMF, because they threatened, in effect, to throw themselves onto the side of the Soviets. In cases such as Egypt and India and for awhile Indonesia, governments even moved toward the Soviets and obtained financial assistance and special trade arrangements from the USSR. In some cases the Soviet Union could hardly afford to provide substantial aid in this perceived competition. Certainly in this sense, the existence of the Cold War was a major rationale for increasing and maintaining aid to the developing countries. US aid to Latin America increased sharply after Castro’s takeover of Cuba and after the communist Sandinistas took over Nicaragua. It is likely the high priority attached to certain countries because of the Cold War resulted in assistance resources going to these particular countries on a scale that would not have occurred had there been no Cold War. Thus the allocation of development funds was very much affected by the Cold War. No economy was in worse shape than the South Korean economy at the end of the Korean War in 1953. A large amount of aid was given on a sustained basis and over a long period of time to build up the South Korean economy; this aid had fabulously successful results. The priority was Cold War, but the result was one of the greatest economic success stories of all time. Some now argue that concentrating large amounts of assistance on a country with good policies is the most effective way to achieve exceptional growth and eventual graduation from developing status.

Much the same thing could be said in the case of the Republic of China on Taiwan. That is another case of the results of the exceptional transfer of economic development funds as a result of the Cold War. Certainly, if there had been no Cold War, there would not have been as much support for Taiwan from the United States. Other examples may be found in the cases of Greece and Turkey and certain countries in Africa. After the events of 1965 the Dominican Republic received exceptional aid flows and had exceptional growth for a decade. As the communist threat rationale diminished so did bilateral aid, but private investment more than made up for the decline.

Q: Israel provides another example of that kind.

BUSHNELL: The situation in Israel is different. Assistance was not primarily Cold War driven. To the extent the Cold War was a driving factor, we are now struggling to find a rationale to convince the American people and Congress that they should sustain or increase the flows of development funds in the absence of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has made it easier for the World Bank and the IMF to be tough with governments which have performed poorly.
because they cannot claim that they will go somewhere else if they are refused substantial funds. Thus the Bank and Fund can push for greater efficiency and effectiveness in using development funds.

However, I think that largely aside from Cold War considerations the movement toward market efficiency has been very substantial over the last four decades. This trend is even seen in the United States, although at a different level than in the case of developing countries. In this context we might go back to President Kennedy’s famous quote: “Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country.” No matter how you take that remark, it invites the government to play a bigger role. Certainly, during the Kennedy administration most people, including me, honestly believed governments could be good and efficient and could change things, particularly in the developing world. If you look at the U.S. during the Kennedy period, you will see that the government was on the cutting edge of development, for example building the interstate highway system, putting a man on the moon. That was an era when the government played a strong and decisive role. One little noted aspect of the Vietnam experience is that it was a big government project; when the project appeared to fail, the confidence of people in the government’s ability to accomplish was weakened. The view of government has changed nearly 180 degrees. Now the general view is that governments should get out of the way and allow the market to make decisions and that we should cooperate with the free market and permit it to work.

In the communist system the government made virtually all major decisions. One of the things that I encountered at UNCTAD, and which underlay many debates on the economies of the developing countries, was that in the USSR the price of bananas, for example, was set by the government. The government decided what price consumers would pay for imported bananas. That was a decision quite separate from what the USSR government would pay, for example, to Honduras or the Ivory Coast. Price fixing by the government was seen by many as a proper role, not only in communist countries, but by quite a lot of developing countries where government intervention played a large role in the economies. In many ways the economic model of these countries was closer to that in communist countries than the more capitalistic model in western countries. It is only fairly recently that we see fundamental changes in Latin America and some of Asia in this respect.

Q: Under what circumstances did you learn that you were leaving Geneva?

BUSHNELL: At Christmastime of 1970 we were going to Germany for a few days vacation and to shop for toys for our kids at the PX’s [Military Post Exchanges]. About a week before, the US Mission received a call indicating the NSC [National Security Council] was looking at me as a possible candidate for a job, and Henry Kissinger [National Security Adviser to the President] wanted to talk to me. I thought that was pretty exciting. However, nothing happened. We went ahead on our trip; I laboriously set out a list of phone numbers where we would be staying, so that I could be contacted if Kissinger called Geneva to talk to me. We came back, and Christmas came and went, so I thought that was a false alarm. I expected to be transferred from Geneva during the summer of 1971 after a two and a half year assignment. I wanted to get back on a summer transfer cycle as schools were becoming an issue and most assignments open in the summer.
Q: Did you have any idea of where you were going?

BUSHNELL: No, although I anticipated going back to Washington as Geneva was my fourth consecutive field assignment. I had no particular idea of where I would be assigned, but I thought I had a good chance for an assignment in EB (the Economics Bureau). This was before we had bidding for assignments. In the middle of January, 1971, a wheat conference was opening in Geneva, and a large delegation came from Washington. On a Monday while I was at the UN Palais des Nations for the opening meetings, I was called back to the US Mission in Geneva. Actually, I didn’t have a lot to do at this wheat meeting with so many from Washington and only one speech to be made. I went right back to the Mission, and I believe it was the DCM, Bassin, who told me I was being assigned to the NSC [National Security Council] staff.

Q: You didn’t have a talk with Kissinger?

BUSHNELL: No, he never called. I was told the NSC wanted me to return to Washington right away. I said: “What do you mean by right away?” I was told: “They would like you to be there tomorrow.” This timing was totally unexpected, but I saw it as an opportunity and an adventure. It was too late to get a plane that day, and I was not even packed, but the administrative people in the Mission found they could get me an airline ticket to Washington on the next day. This was supposedly a TDY [Temporary Duty] assignment at least to start, but the US mission thought I would be assigned to the NSC on a permanent basis after I returned to Geneva for a couple of months. I quickly packed my bag and left the next day for Washington.

JAMES F. LEONARD
Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Geneva (1969-1972)

James F. Leonard was born in Pennsylvania in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University and served in the U.S. Army from 1942-1946. Mr. Leonard entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included positions in China (Taiwan), France, Russia, and Syria. This interview was conducted by Warren Unna on March 10, 1993.

Q: So you commuted, or were you based in Geneva?

LEONARD: Commuted basically.

Q: And your specialty was chemical and biological?

LEONARD: Well, not at the beginning. The NPT had just been completed in that conference the previous year and it was going through the ratification process. So there was a question what the conference would do. It had a whole list of things on its agenda like the comprehensive test ban, etc. The Nixon administration was new to this. It didn't want to have its hand forced and yet it
didn't want the conference to sit there completely idle. Somebody came up with the idea of a treaty which would prohibit nuclear weapons on the seabed. This idea had been around for a while. So, we tried it out on the Russians and they said sure. It was basically a nothing treaty.

Q: There's never been any?

LEONARD: Never been any, never were going to be any, although other people would contest that. It was my belief then and still is now, but it served as a political gesture. It was clear that the big league, the center ring of arms control negotiations was going to be a US/Soviet bilateral over strategic weapons. An attempt had been made to get that started the previous summer. Dobrynin came in to see Gene Rostow who was Under Secretary, one morning, to arrange to set up that negotiation. As Rostow likes to tell it, that was the morning after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, so the Johnson strategic arms negotiations never got started. It became politically impossible. But it was picked up and it was pretty clear that Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers wanted to do it, but they wanted to take their time about it. So they fixed on this seabed treaty as something that would fill in a dull period and show that the US and the Soviet Union could deal with each other, could negotiate without engaging any really important interests on either side. The military had no intention of putting stuff there so you didn't have to override the Pentagon on the treaty. They were very cooperative, and probably the same was true on the Soviet side. We went ahead and did the treaty the first summer that I was in Geneva. But chemicals and biologicals came later. Those were on the agenda of the Geneva conference but nobody was doing anything serious about it.

Q: Let's just get back to the seabed. You had been in Moscow. You'd had some contact with the Russians. Did this serve you in dealing with these people actually in a negotiation or what?

LEONARD: Well, I suppose it did.

Q: Did you use your Russian for instance?

LEONARD: You could use it socially, but they spoke such beautiful English that it was useless.

Q: I see.

LEONARD: What I think was more important was they knew that I knew something about their background. They knew that I understood the constraints under which they were operating. Therefore I would not be unreasonable and hostile and embarrass them uselessly. I wouldn't take a sort of "let's score one on these S.O.B.s," you know. My opposite number was a good ten or twelve years older than I, a very experienced Soviet diplomat, but a very nice, solid person, and a decent human being. We developed a decent relationship, and this was even more true with his number two and number three who remain very close friends of mine right to this day.

Q: You said they understood you wouldn't needlessly humiliate them and understood their ... You built it up through your open expressions: "I remember ..."? How does this confidence develop?
LEONARD: It's just that they would see that we were not when we would make statements in the committee, or when we were talking with them in informal contacts standing around at receptions, we wouldn't try to score off them. You know... "You dummies, how can you maintain that such and such..." They were under very strong compulsions to defend absolutely ridiculous positions. They knew they were ridiculous, and we knew they knew it, and we knew they knew we knew it, etc. But why make a point of it, whereas you've had a lot of American diplomats who would take the other line with them and try to make them feel humiliated and embarrassed, and simply make them look bad, make the US supposedly look good in that kind of a situation. But these people, were confident that this was not going to happen because they were the ones who had gone through the NPT negotiation. That was one where the closest and most serious purposeful collaboration between the US and Soviet delegations was really essential to get a pretty ridiculous treaty through. You know to get the rest of the world to give up weapons and say: "It's fine if you keep them but we're not going to have any." That was rather a tour de force.

Q: You were not a part of that?

LEONARD: I was not a part of that at all.

Q: At least, these people were all veterans of that?

LEONARD: Yes, they all were.

Q: So now you have gone into the seabed one, and then to move on?

LEONARD: Yes, the seabed one took us ... well we had the treaty basically done after a year, but then it encountered technical legal problems because it dealt with matters of legal rights on the high seas. It ran into difficulties with a number of countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil who by that time were proclaiming two hundred mile territorial seas. The US wasn't having any of that, so we had to write a treaty that applied basically outside of the territorial waters of a state, and yet you couldn't accept that the territorial waters of some parties went two hundred miles off their coasts. It took us actually two years to completely finish the seabed treaty, but by the time we were in the course of the second year, it became clear what the next thing ought to be and that was that we ought to move from that into the chemical/biological field. What was not clear to us was how to move.

Q: Why was that the next logical step?

LEONARD: Well, in part because the US had prepared the way for it by its unilateral renunciation of biological weapons in 1969. This was basically a Laird initiative although I'm sure he didn't think it up on his own.

Q: (Mel Laird?)

LEONARD: Yes, but he pushed it through. The US in the fall of 1969 did in fact decide that it would ratify the Geneva Protocol which was almost fifty years unratified. It took quite a while
longer before we finally did it, but in principle the decision to ratify was taken, and a decision that we would give up biological weapons, but that we would not at that point give up chemical weapons. The name of the game became to get chemical and biological weapons separated. All the rest of the world was against this separation except for our British colleagues who had proposed it in the first place. So our first year or so of work on this issue involved trying to develop a framework in which we would get biological weapons separated out and get a separate treaty on them while giving some sort of convincing hostages to the idea of an eventual chemical weapons treaty. It was what the rest of the world really was demanding.

Q: We're in Vietnam now. Tear gas, herbicides, all this sort of thing. The world is really getting very stirred up about US use of chemical weapons. All right, how do you ... you're now an experienced diplomat but you're not a scientist. How do you prime yourself for these things?

LEONARD: Well, it turns out that in these issues, the level of scientific knowledge that a negotiator has to have is not very deep. You have always got at your side, just as you have lawyers who have all sorts of background knowledge on international law, you have experts with Ph.D.s in chemistry or biology or whatever, and you've got military people who know a lot about the actual weapons themselves. Anything that you do, any proposals that you put forward are framed in the light of that expert advice that you're getting from the people concerned. Well I happened to have been an engineer in college, but you could be a history major or an English major perfectly well and do the job without any problem.

Q: And there are no fast questions thrown at you across the table. You can always say: "I want to think about that, I suppose."?

LEONARD: Yes, or you can turn to somebody on one side or the other.

Q: So, these went on for how many years, getting these treaties?

LEONARD: I was in Geneva for three years. The first two years was doing the seabed treaty, and preparing the way for the BW treaty, and the third year we actually came out with a draft treaty on biological weapons, we and the British. The Soviet looked at it, and criticized it, etc., but by July they had agreed that they were going to do it, for whatever reasons, and I think now in retrospect, we can understand that some of the reasons were not very good, because they proceeded to violate the treaty as soon as they'd signed it. Their military did. I don't think their negotiators knew that at all. But the negotiators saw that here was something that probably was not of serious interest to their military establishment and therefore was a proper subject for arms control negotiations. And eventually, in the summer of '71, they got approval from Moscow to go ahead and we reached agreement on a text in the matter of four, five weeks.

Q: You were then head of the arms control disarmament delegation?

LEONARD: No, no. Gerard Smith was the head, and during all of this period, SALT I was going on. He was negotiating in Helsinki and Vienna, etc. Frankly we were a sideshow to that.

Q: Your ACDA work came to an end with the change of administration?
LEONARD: Yes. I was replaced in Geneva in the spring of 1972. Gerry Smith told me that he wanted me to do something else but it never became clear to me what it was. I think probably what he had in mind was having me go to the MBFR negotiations which were just beginning to get started in Vienna in the fall of ’72. The ones that Jock Dean eventually did. Whatever it was, it didn't happen, and in the fall of ’72, Smith decided to resign. You know, he had very bad conflicts with Kissinger during the whole START business, they came almost to blows during the summer of ’72. Then in the winter of ’72, ’73, with the end of Nixon I and the beginning of Nixon II, we had what we later called the ACDA purge of ACDA. Gerry left of his own accord. I don't think he was fired, but everybody else was fired. In fact, I then decided to retire. I couldn't be fired because I was a career Foreign Service officer.

Q: Smith was a political appointee?

LEONARD: Yes, the other assistant directors along with me and there were a whole bunch of us who were told that our services were no longer needed. I was basically sent back to the State Department and it was up to them to offer me a job. But I decided I didn't want it. I really was very indignant at this whole procedure. It was partly the specifics of what happened in ACDA and partly the more general business of Watergate which was by that time becoming more and more evident. So I simply retired in the summer of ’73 and took a job with the UN Association up in New York.

MELVILLE BLAKE  
Economic Counselor  
Bern (1969-1973)

Melville Blake was born in Lexington, Mississippi in 1924. He attended Mississippi State College. He joined the army and served for four years and then attended Georgetown University where he studied in the school of Foreign Service. Following his graduation he worked as an editor in the CIA for a year and then went to Germany. Q: That is what, a six-month course over there?

BLAKE: A six-month course, and we went at the beginning of January 1969. However, there was a rather interesting development in August of 1968. Anyone who could get away, including Wells, was on vacation. The Swiss Ambassador, Felix Schnyder, said he would like to present a note. I received him, and he gave me a note requesting that the United States negotiate a treaty of judicial assistance, a so-called bank secrecy agreement, under which we would be permitted to receive material from Swiss banks and their confidential records, and they would have the same right with U.S. banks.

Q: Very important.

BLAKE: I remember receiving the note and saying we would certainly give it every consideration we could. I think it was on a Friday. Wells was back on Monday, and I presented it
to him. We realized it was a very interesting opportunity and sent it up to the Secretary. It was decided that we should find out how serious the Swiss were by sending Nicholas Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney General, to Switzerland to talk to the Swiss government, the American Embassy officials, and representatives from Swiss banks. Now, at that time, this is the late ‘60s, somebody had written a book called The Gnomes of Zurich. There was great pressure to open Swiss bank accounts. Henry Morgenthau, District Attorney for the Southern District of New York, was putting a great deal of pressure on the Swiss. They were also getting bad press, which they considered harmful to their trade and tourist relations with the United States. The Deputy Attorney General came back and said, “These folks are serious. They do want to negotiate a treaty.” So, I prepared a note, which was sent to the Swiss Embassy, agreeing to undertake the negotiations.

For the record, I should note that the Swiss Government had made a similar proposal to the U.S. Government in the late 1930s, but President Franklin Roosevelt was so preoccupied with the impending war in Europe that the U.S. Government never took up the Swiss offer.

I went off to the NATO Defense College, just outside Rome, Italy, in January 1969. The NATO Defense College has the so-called North American tour. I came back to the Department on that tour, I think it was late March, saw Wells, and said, “When you speak to personnel, I still don't have an assignment.” He said, "Oh, yes, you really do have one. You just probably haven't heard that you are being assigned as Economic Counselor at Bern.” I remonstrated, "Geeze, I am at the NATO Defense College, and you are sending me to a neutral country." He said, "I absolutely insist on it. I want you there. Over the years, you have developed a number of friends in Treasury. They also want you there. What we'd like for you to do is be the combined Economic Counselor and Treasury Representative. It would be two-hatted."

Q: That is very unusual. Treasury doesn't very often put that on a State Department officer.

BLAKE: That's right. I decided, reluctantly, to go - reluctant for several reasons. First, with five children, two or probably three of them would have to go to boarding school. Second, I knew that Switzerland was very high cost, and, third, I thought I might rather have something a bit more varied. I guess, too, having been on the Swiss desk already, I was looking for change. On the other hand, how can one quarrel with an assignment to Switzerland?

Q: People don't fight assignments to Switzerland.

BLAKE: And, off we went, for four very pleasant years. I worked with Shelby Cullom Davis, a political appointee who was a Wall Street investment banker. I had some trepidation when I read in Who's Who that both Ambassador Davis and his wife were Ph.D.s from a Geneva university. I thought, “He is going to know an awful lot about Switzerland. It is going to be tough.” In fact, he was one of the finest people I have ever worked with, and one of the best ambassadors I have ever known.

Q: Well, how big was your section there?

BLAKE: Before I came, the Treasury Officer was in Zurich.
Q: No Commercial Officer?

BLAKE: The Commercial Office was separate. Its staff consisted of the commercial officer, a deputy commercial officer, and two or perhaps three local employees. I found that odd. I didn't see how you could separate commercial work from the overall economic area. I was really unaccustomed to that, but this had been the historical staffing arrangement at Bern.

I have already mentioned that the Swiss Ambassador had left a note in August 1968, on the negotiation of a judicial assistance treaty. Then, it took several months to set things up. As it happened, by the time I got to Switzerland in August 1969, they were ready to begin the negotiations on the treaty. That was the most important embassy activity for the next four years. So much so, I became so very heavily engaged with the banks that Dick Vine, the Deputy Chief of Mission, later told me that he felt it would be best not to combine the Economic and Commercial Sections but to leave them separated.

Q: Did you get into any question of selling U.S. defense equipment to the Swiss?

BLAKE: That was probably the major activity of the Defense Attaché Station. At that time, we were interested in selling an aircraft to them, so the Air Attaché was very important. Under the U.S. military system, the Principal Defense Attaché is designated back in Washington. For reasons of inter-service negotiations as much as anything, Switzerland was regarded as an army post, so the Defense Attaché was army. But, the only military activity in the country was on the Air Force side.

Q: Was the assistant attaché an Air Force Officer?

BLAKE: He was an Air Force Colonel.

Q: So that worked out then.

BLAKE: Yes, the Economic Section got involved peripherally in these negotiations, because I had close relations with the head of the Swiss Air Office.

Q: Any problems with the fact that the Swiss were our protecting power in Cuba? Did that cause you any difficulty?

BLAKE: No, not at all. That was the only work of any consequence that the political officer did. The Political Section consisted of one officer. He didn't even have a secretary. Domestic political affairs in Switzerland were really not very important in U.S.-Swiss relations, but protecting our interests in Cuba was quite important.

Q: What did your duties as treasury representative consist of?

BLAKE: The dollar was deteriorating at that time, and we had the fixed exchange rate system, so there was a great deal of activity with the banks. I would be away from Bern a week to 10 days
out of each month, either in Geneva or Zurich, but principally in Zurich. I would go to Zurich at least a week a month, then Basel or Geneva three days a month. I had very close ties with the central bank, Swiss National Bank, but also with the three Grosse Banken and with the more important private banks.

Q: Well, those sound like happy years in Switzerland.

BLAKE: Oh, they were very happy years. Perhaps, the most interesting thing there was the negotiations on the judicial assistance treaty. The backstopping team in Washington consisted of the State Department as the lead Agency, Treasury, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. From Treasury, came two sides, one was the General Counsel's office and the other side was the Office of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The Assistant Secretary for ATF also was responsible for the Secret Service.

Q: Was that finally concluded during your tour in Bern?

BLAKE: The negotiations went along in a rather desultory fashion for a couple of years. The main problem was to define a crime to which the treaty would apply. Then, the United States proposed that the annex of crimes covered by the Swiss Criminal Code be attached to the treaty and used to define crimes covered by the treaty. Then we had a viable negotiation. There were certain other minor technical aspects, and they could have gone on for years, but we were over the major hurdle. There were still some minor definitional problems, and, to a certain extent, negotiations on the judicial assistance treaty became intertwined with negotiations on the avoidance of double taxation. In time, however, these issues could be separated.

About March of 1972, the Ambassador went back to Washington. He went on his rounds of consultation, and among the people he saw was his old friend John Mitchell who was Attorney General. Upon the Ambassador’s return to Bern, he called me in and said, “Mel, I saw John.” I knew whom he meant. “He tells me that my highest priority here is to complete the negotiations on a judicial assistance treaty. It is very important for the re-election of President Nixon.” At that time, it seemed clear McGovern was going to be the Democratic candidate. It was equally clear who was going to win. I thought, “My God, this Republican administration takes nothing for granted.”

Q: I couldn't quite figure that one out when you mentioned it.

BLAKE: In any event, the Ambassador said, “I want you to draw up a plan to obtain Swiss agreement to the treaty so that the President can cite it as an accomplishment.” I went back to my office, thought about it, and began writing a memorandum.

Now, Switzerland is a country that runs on the basis of consensus. No Swiss government will agree to anything unless all the parties are on board. The Government doesn't like fighting with any segment of the economy. Once, Swiss President Celio introduced a rather inconsequential bill in Parliament. It was rejected by the Parliament, and he resigned on the ground that he had failed to consult adequately with all interested parties. The Parliament was very upset about it. They all rushed around and reached a compromise, and then the President withdrew his letter of
resignation, and they enacted the bill. It just shows how strong this need of getting everybody on board is for the Swiss. This had happened just before I had to write my memorandum.

In the memorandum, I noted that Switzerland runs on consensus, and the way to assure that the treaty would pass the Swiss Parliament was to make sure that all of the banks were on board. I attached a list of all of the members of the boards of directors of the five most important banks in the country, many of whom were industrialists or prominent in various professions, plus the principal owners of the more important private banks. I recommended that the Ambassador explain what was involved in the treaty to all of these people. If we got their assent, or at least willingness not to oppose the treaty, I reasoned that the Swiss Government would approve it.

Q: That we, the Americans, explain rather than their own government?

BLAKE: That's right. The Ambassador read the memo and said, “I am tempted to do this but what about the Swiss government? Shouldn't they do this?” I replied that I would confirm that we could do it by talking to my counterpart on the Swiss side, a fellow named Pierre Nussbaumer in the Foreign Office. I went to Pierre and said, "How can we move the treaty?" He said, "Mel, we are at our wits end. The banks are just dragging their feet. People don't like change." I said, "What would you say if we talked to the bankers? After all, you know the Ambassador, and you know how well known he is in the community." He said, "Oh, yes. Indeed, we would be delighted if you would do this." So I told the Ambassador of my conversation with Pierre.

The Ambassador then got in touch with an old friend Robert Lutz, who was the head of Credit Suisse. (Lutz had been head of Credit Suisse in New York. His son, Robert Lutz, Jr., was head of the International Division of Ford Motor Company and later became Ford’s President.) The Ambassador and I met with Lutz. The Ambassador said, “Bob, the negotiations on bank secrecy have gone on for three years. Actually, they began with a note your Ambassador left with the State Department in 1968. Do you think your friends and colleagues would object if I meet with them and explain what this agreement is all about and what we are trying to accomplish under safeguards?” Bob replied, “Some people would probably take offense, but they don't count. What you are doing is the sort of thing an ambassador ought to be doing, and that is informing us and giving us your government's views. Do go ahead.”

When we got back to the Embassy, the Ambassador said, " I want you to set up lunch or dinner with everyone on this list. For reasons of economy, let's make about five or six to a group." Over the next several months, we had lunch or dinner with every single member of the boards of directors of these major banks plus the leading personalities in the more important private banks. The procedure was to have a pleasant meal. Then, when coffee was served, the Ambassador would make some introductory comments and then ask me to explain the treaty’s main provisions. After 20 minutes or so, he would close with a question-and-answer period. The questions were very substantive, although there were several guests who seemed irritated. They felt they were being taken advantage of. But, the result at the end of all of this was evident when Bob Lutz got back in touch with the Ambassador and said, "I can assure you that Swiss banks will pose no objection to the judicial assistance treaty, and they have asked me to notify the Swiss Government."
Although we signed the treaty after the November 1972 U.S. elections, the Ambassador was able to tell John Mitchell that the Swiss were on board, and the Administration could rest assured that the Treaty would be signed in 1973.

We set the final round of negotiations in the Spring of 1973 in Bern. Perhaps to show their banks and their Parliament that they were making every effort to protect Swiss interests, the Swiss Government designated Ambassador Albert Weitnauer, one of their most senior and influential negotiators, to head the Swiss delegation. Our side was headed by a senior mid-level officer of serious mien, and we met for two days of negotiating comedy. Rather ponderously, our delegation head began to review the treaty, article by article and paragraph by paragraph. To Weitnauer, it was a done deal. He wanted enough show to demonstrate that he had been a purposeful negotiator who had stood up for Swiss interests, but he did not want the risk that such a detailed examination might flush some difficulty that had escaped everyone’s notice. Keeping the negotiations smoothly on track was his objective.

Toward the end of the first day, Weitnauer leaned across the table and gently suggested that he be asked a certain question. Then, he answered it and wrote the exchange on his note pad. Then, Weitnauer asked another question, etc. Occasionally, he would break the monotony by asking a question and guiding the answer. Toward the end of the second day, Ambassador Weitnauer closed his note pad and announced that the negotiations had come to a successful conclusion. We shook hands all around and basked in the pleasure of a job well done.

To indicate the importance the United States attached to the agreement, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Stoessel came to Bern in June of 1973 to sign it.

This was the first bank secrecy treaty the United States ever entered into and the first ever signed by a country based on an Anglo-Saxon legal system with a country that had a judicial system based on continental law. It established a precedent for the United States. Nevertheless, in August 1975, as I was preparing to leave Washington on assignment to Frankfurt, Germany, I was asked to meet with representatives of the State and Justice Departments. The Swiss Parliament had approved the Treaty in 1974, and the Swiss government was awaiting action by the Senate so that deposit of the instruments of ratification could be arranged. At the meeting, I was told that the U.S. government had decided that the Treaty was not as far reaching as we would like, and I was asked whether it would be feasible to ask the Swiss Government to renegotiate the Treaty with the object of increasing the number of criminal offenses to be covered by it. In other words, to expand on the annex which was based on the Swiss Criminal Code.

By that time, Ambassador Davis had left Switzerland. I doubted that the Ambassador who followed him would have the same influence with the Swiss government and the Swiss banks. It was certain that Switzerland would be offended if we rejected a treaty that had been given such careful consideration. Hence, I said that we had been fortunate to reach agreement on the U.S.-Swiss Treaty in 1973 and should send it to the Senate as soon as possible, reserving our concerns for expanded coverage for future negotiations with Switzerland and other countries. This
suggestion was accepted, and it is my recollection that the Treaty was sent to the Senate and ratified in 1976.

As I have said, the Ambassador was a gracious and focused host. He used working luncheons in his extensive travels around the country. Invitations to dinners at the residence with Mrs. Davis were prized. It was diplomatic entertaining that you no longer see, and it was widely and favorably commented upon in the local community. Once, however, this reputation could have produced perverse results.

You may recall the Investors Overseas Service (IOS), which was founded in the late 1950s or early ‘60s by Bernie Kornfeld. IOS was a sort of investment fund with incorporation or administrative dodges that took advantage of tax and other loopholes throughout Europe. The IOS charter was Canadian; its headquarters were in Geneva. Many of the tax dodges were based on Luxembourg law. Customers were primarily American servicemen or businessmen living abroad. It grew phenomenally with assets in the billions; it was so large that there was concern that, if the IOS bubble burst, it could hurt Wall Street.

The U.S. Government took a cautious approach toward IOS. Although IOS was not an American corporation, its portfolio consisted mainly of American securities, and it presented itself as an American fund. Kornfeld had hired James Roosevelt, the son of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1970 to shore up the company’s faltering image. I had met Roosevelt during the ill-fated cocoa negotiations when he was a Deputy to Arthur Goldberg at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and I renewed contact when he reported in to IOS at Geneva. Shortly thereafter, IOS got into serious trouble, and was taken over by Robert Vesco, a New Jersey welder who somehow got into investments and was rather successful. Vesco came to Geneva and said that he was going to turn IOS around. It was a high-wire act with a great deal of publicity, and the financial community closely followed every announcement.

One morning, Roosevelt telephoned me at Bern to say that Vesco urgently wanted to meet with the Ambassador regarding IOS. I told the Ambassador that we had no legal responsibility toward IOS but there was a real need to know what Vesco might be up to in light of the effect that developments at IOS could have on the stock market. It was a Hobson’s choice, but I thought that the lesser of two evils would be to hear Vesco out. The Ambassador agreed, and Roosevelt said they would arrive about noon.

Vesco and Roosevelt were accompanied by two fellows who, to put it mildly, would not have made it at the Wharton School of Finance. Vesco was of medium stature, stocky, and struck me as a strong-arm man rather than a con artist. He got to his point immediately. He said that Kornfeld had (expletive deleted) up at IOS, but he was going to straighten it out. His problem was that the press was giving him a hard time, and the Swiss were beginning to look over his shoulder a bit too closely. He needed the opportunity to explain his plan for IOS to top Swiss government officials and bankers, as well as the press in the most favorable setting. He knew that the Ambassador knew everyone of consequence in Switzerland and was held in high esteem. Hence, Vesco proposed that the Ambassador rent one of the larger restaurants (the Kornhaus Keller) for an evening and invite the top layers of the Swiss Government and banks. After dinner, the Ambassador should introduce Vesco, and he would take it from there. Seeing the startled
look on the Ambassador’s face at such audacity, Vesco said, “Don’t worry about cost. I’ll pay for everything.”

At this, the Ambassador turned to me and asked, “What do you think?” I replied that the U.S. Government recognized the difficult situation IOS was in, the importance to Wall Street and the world financial community of helping IOS out of its difficulties, which I was sure could be overcome. But, I continued, “Unfortunately, there was no legal or diplomatic basis for U.S. help to IOS, as it was a Canadian corporation.” I added that the Canadian Ambassador was a friend of the American Embassy and expressed confidence that Ambassador Davis would not object to introducing Vesco to him. The Ambassador added that he would be delighted to do so. Vesco glared at me, stood up, uttered a curt good-bye, and stalked out. We never heard from him or Roosevelt again.

I find the Swiss a very attractive people to do business with. Now and then, I might have found them a bit officious had I not approached them through many years of negotiations with the Italians on our civil air agreement, and had I not lived in Rome in a period when one day all the gasoline stations would be on strike; the next day all the metro and public transportation people would be on strike. At no time, were the garbage collectors in Rome ever off strike. It was really quite comforting and pleasant to be assigned in Switzerland, but the things that made it pleasant were the Swiss people themselves, their integrity, and their businesslike approach.

I want to recount three instances that illustrate the Swiss integrity, thoroughness and courtesy. When I joined the staff of the Office of Austrian, Italian, and Swiss Affairs in August 1966, the first matter I had to deal with was a demarche by Klaus Jacobi, the Swiss Embassy’s Economic Counselor. (Klaus was later Swiss Ambassador to Washington.) He advised that the Swiss Government was changing its domestic subsidy program for hog producers. As a result Swiss lard would become cheaper and lard imports would be disadvantaged. As the United States had sold 12 tons of lard to Switzerland in the last year for which they had data, the Swiss felt obliged to inform us and to ask whether the United States had a problem. Klaus added that the first trade agreement signed by the United States under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was with Switzerland. I contacted the Department of Commerce since lard is a processed agricultural product. Both the country specialist and the “lard” specialist were bemused that the Swiss would trouble themselves with 12 tons of lard. They couldn’t even find data that we had sold lard to Switzerland and, in the end, I was authorized to tell the Swiss that the United States had no objection to their proposed subsidy program.

Paul Jolles, the Head of the Swiss Trade Office, was probably the leading official in the country. I saw him from time to time. Once, I had a 9:30 appointment with him. I was about to leave the Embassy for his office, when the phone rang and his secretary said that the Ambassador would not be able to see me until 9:35. When I got to his office, the Ambassador said, "I thought that you would rather spend that five minutes in your office than in my anteroom." I love that punctuality.

With the Swiss you can get right to the point. I would like to illustrate that by my experiences on the negotiation of amendments to the U.S.-Swiss air transport agreement. The U.S. team came over from Washington to negotiate changes in our air transport agreement. It was a very pleasant
July. Two of the members of the team had arranged that their wives would join them for the last two weeks of the projected four-week negotiation. We met with Werner Guldimann, the head of the Swissair office, which was a combination of FAA, CAB, and any operation in State that had to deal with civil aviation. We had a team from the CAB, the State Department desk, the State Department Office of Aviation, and an industry adviser.

On the first afternoon of negotiations, Werner Guldimann made his presentation for the Swiss; he was their entire team. Then the head of the American team made his presentation. All those in the American side chimed in with several questions. After two hours had elapsed, the American said that, having just flown over, they were feeling a bit jet-lagged, and they asked to recess for the day. Werner said that would be fine.

As the team was leaving, Werner asked me to stay behind, which I did. He said, "Mel, this is terrible." I said, "What is terrible?" He said, "The pace. We will be forever negotiating this. I just don't have this much time. I can't tie myself up like this. What can we do to move the negotiations along?" I said, "I will talk to my people and see what we can do." He said, "No, tell me what do you really want out of this agreement." I said, "Well, what we would really like is…" and I spelled it out for him. He said, "I can live with that. Now, I will tell you what I want." He told me, and it was essentially less than we were prepared to give them. I said, "We can live with that." He said, "Fine, we have a deal."

The U.S. delegation was waiting for me in the street, and the delegation Head said, "What happened, Mel? Was he mad?" I replied that I would explain at the Embassy. At the Embassy, I said he just wanted to know what we wanted. "That's it? You didn't tell him, did you?" I said, "Well yes, I did. And, he said he accepts it. Then, he told me what they want." As I explained it, they recognized it was less than they were prepared to offer and we were getting a good deal. I have never seen such disappointed people. They returned to Washington two days later. We had a deal that worked out very well.

Q: That was a nice vignette. Well, what happened after you left Bern? You came back to Washington?

BLAKE: Yes. As I was preparing to leave Bern, the Department contacted me on an assignment to the Embassy at Vienna as Economic Counselor. With the exception of two years in Costa Rica, all of my assignments had been in Europe or on European matters, including two training tours in Europe. It seemed to me that was terribly parochial. Apart from that, the inspectors had been through Bern and had said that it would hurt my career to have another European assignment. So, I turned down Austria and came back, unassigned, to the Department.

When I got back, I was interviewed by John Hurd, Ambassador to South Africa, who wanted me as Economic Counselor, but asked that I wait until an assignment was found for the current Counselor. The European Bureau asked me to take six months training in Finnish and then go to Helsinki as Economic Counselor. That was in August, and I had three children in junior high and high school. Helsinki struck me as less promising than Pretoria. In either event, I would have had to uproot three children in the middle of the school year.
While I was weighing these alternatives, the Office of International Affairs in the Treasury Department contacted the State Department. They wanted someone who knew international banking and believed they had no one with that sort of background. The activities of foreign banks in the United States were becoming a political issue and certainly were an economic factor. Treasury wondered if they could borrow me from the State Department to handle international banking and other international financial affairs. That would be for a one-year tour. I took that assignment. As it turned out, I enjoyed the Treasury Department immensely and stayed for two years.

Q: Let's move on to your Geneva assignment. You arrived in Geneva in December, 1969. What were the main responsibilities of the U.S. Representative (Ambassador) to International Organization?

RIMESTAD: Management. The title had little meaning. You got the benefit of going to all the National Day observances of each country represented in the UN bodies. We had a small political and a small economic staff. The job was basically to manage the logistics for all the conferences convened by the UN specialized agencies headquartered in Geneva. I had very little to do with that; I had a good staff that handled these matters. Some of the UN agencies, like WHO (World Health Organization) did their own logistic work. All we needed to do was to tell them the size of our delegation, they would take it from there. I never gave a speech that I had written; all my speeches were written in Washington and one better not have changed a word. I gave these speeches once in a while to one or another of the UN specialized agencies when the Washington agency didn't send a high level representative to Geneva. There is a lot of political mileage to be obtained by taking an expert from Chicago and sending him to Geneva to give a speech. He was very honored. Maybe that speech should have been delivered by the US Ambassador, but no domestic political credit would have accrued. The US Representative was an Ambassador in title only. You are useful in helping Congressmen or other high-ranking officials. We had a very heavy visitors workload. We did everything possible to make these VIPs comfortable during their visits to Geneva. We would have dinner party for them. We had good relationships with the other European representatives who had the same problems. I would probably give a dozen large dinner parties every year.

As with other US overseas representation, if we were still in the sailing ship era, permanent personnel stationed in Geneva would have been useful. But today, with modern transportation, it
is much more effective to send people from Washington to give the speeches and attend the conferences. Only rarely—if someone would get sick for example—would the US representative have to stand in.

Q: What did your political and economic staffs do?

RIMESTAD: The economic officers would work primarily on GATT (The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs organization) which is headquartered in Geneva. I would not have anything to do with GATT—I wouldn't touch that thing. That had many people already involved. Washington watched those deliberations very carefully. The economic officers worked for me, but it was understood that the prudent approach was to leave them alone. I did a lot of work on the immigration and disaster relief programs that Sadruddin Aga Khan ran for a long time. I gave them a lot of checks and gave a lot of impromptu speeches.

But the Ambassadorial job in Geneva was essentially a managerial one. You also had to have a sense of when to step in and when to step out. You were dealing with a lot of egos. At one time, there was a fellow by the name of Walsh who was working with WHO. He was a friend of President Nixon; he ran Project "HOPE". When I met him, I told him that if he ever ran into a political problem that might become testy, to let me know and I would see what I could do. In reply he said: "What do I need some pipsqueak from State Department to tell me how to do my job" and he walked out.

Despite this episode and my other comments, I do believe that some resident US representation in Geneva is required because there are a lot of formal government notes to be delivered to the various international organizations and that needs to be done by a senior official. I had to go to the ILO (International Labor Organization) on many occasions; we had trouble with them. I would carry the formal note over and explain it. That's when I became familiar with that famous State Department record called the "Memorandum of Conversation". You would write it up before the meeting and then hand it to the person with whom you would have the meeting. They appreciated it; everybody appreciated that the staff work had been done ahead of time. This would preclude any surprises. Sometime the other person would have done the same thing; we would then sit down and make what modifications were necessary and come up with an agreed document.

It is important that we have some senior representation in Geneva. It is an all-year job with little time for vacation because one or another of the international organizations would be involved in a conference or some activity that needed monitoring. December and January were the slow months; otherwise there was always something going on.

Q: Were you satisfied with the role that the U.S. played in these international organizations while you were in Geneva?

RIMESTAD: We had the big fight with the ILO, which they brought on themselves. I knew the chairman—he was a Britisher. He had to make a choice of whether he would offend us or the Soviets. He appointed a Russian to be his deputy. I told him that we could never accept that. He
said that he had to make a choice between two unpalatable options. Finally Rooney, at George Meany's request, cut off US financial support to ILO. And we pulled out.

We were sufficiently involved in WHO; we were very forthcoming with WHO in terms of financial support which is what they needed. We were very active in trying to eradicate small pox, yellow fever, malaria and other major diseases. So I was satisfied with US involvement with the international organizations headquartered in Geneva.

Q: You left Geneva in May or June of 1973 after almost four years. Did you enjoy the assignment?

RIMESTAD: It was very pleasant, but at times not challenging.

SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS
Ambassador
Switzerland (1969-1975)

Ambassador Davis was born in Illinois and educated at the Universities Princeton, Columbia and Geneva (Switzerland). Before being appointed Ambassador to Switzerland in 1969, he worked in radio broadcasting and later in finance and investment banking. During World War II the Ambassador served with the War Production Board, and in 1944 he served as economic advisor to Thomas Dewey in his Presidential campaign. After departure from his ambassadorship in 1975, he returned to banking and insurance. He became well known as a conservative businessman and philanthropist. He died in 1994. Ambassador Davis was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.

Q: In terms of various initiatives of the Nixon Administration, I believe you went in July of 1969 to the post.

DAVIS: Yes.

Q: I believe the announcement was made on the 19th of April 1969.

DAVIS: Yes, that's right.

Q: What would be the Swiss reaction? In a formal policy sense, did you make demarches or were you involved in any way in the opening toward China? How was that very historic initiative perceived?

DAVIS: Really, we had, actually, nothing to do with that. It was other people on that side of the world, but we were very interested. One thing that we did do, which was a little different—this is toward Russia—when President Nixon, in the fall of 1970, went to Romania, this is, of course, one of the satellite countries, and was greeted, he gave a big speech at the airport. It was quite a
sensation for an American President to be going to one of the Iron Curtain countries. I then thought, "Possibly he's shown the way. Perhaps we should very quietly open up with the Russians." I had been there, and my wife had been there, and she had, by that time, written a book on Russia called *The Soviets at Geneva*.

We then, with the Department's approval, inaugurated luncheons with the top Russians, the ambassador and four or five of his colleagues and four or five other colleagues and myself, we had luncheons together every two months for some time. We really built up a kind of friendship with them.

But as far as China, we really had nothing to do with that; it was far away. But we admired what was being done by Kissinger.

Q: Another initiative was to begin the withdrawal from Vietnam. Were there any demarches or direct involvements that you had with the government of Switzerland during this critical period?

DAVIS: Yes. We were asked by the Department to try to influence the Swiss government so that they would take, say, the American side in Vietnam. But unfortunately, they're neutrals, and they just didn't want to do it. I could understand it, but we were disappointed.

Q: Let me move on, if I could, to Switzerland's principal objectives as far as the US was concerned, from your perception during your service there.

DAVIS: Oh, it's very friendly, extremely friendly. Of course, many Swiss have come to the United States. I happen to be president of the American-Swiss Association, and tomorrow night, Frank Carlucci, our Secretary of Defense, and his wife are coming up here. He is of Swiss ancestry, and he's receiving an award given every year for someone of Swiss ancestry who has succeeded here. It's called the Friendship Award between Switzerland and America. So many very friendly relationships. I can't think of any unfriendly part.

Q: Would there have been any aspect of the relationship during the 1969-75 period, where the government called you over and requested that you inform the President of the United States on a position that they took?

DAVIS: I can't think of any. No, they were very friendly and they still remain good friends. No, I can't think of any. I think they admire the American democracy. Of course, their Constitution was shaped a little bit on our Constitution, too, two sides of Parliament, etc.

Q: I think you may have touched on this earlier, Mr. Ambassador, but if you were to zero in on one or two of your most significant accomplishments, what would they be during that ambassadorship?

DAVIS: The real accomplishment was getting the Judicial Assistance Treaty, because a lot of people were not for it at all, at first. "Catch your own crooks." Then when we talked a little bit further, they thought, "Well, why do we have to sign a treaty? We'll just do it in an ad hoc
Then we had to persuade them to sign a treaty which would be signed and be a much more serious thing. But aside from that, I think that was what I was sent for.

It was a friendly country, anyway, but we did a lot in traveling. We would be in Geneva one night for dinner. We entertained a great deal in order to get to know them better, and we had some of the Swiss saying, "You people know much more than we do about our own population."

Q: I would say that is, from my experiences, diplomacy at its best, which is to facilitate a host country, a people's understanding of their own culture and richness.

DAVIS: Yes. Yes, I think so, too.

Q: Because of what you've said, there may be nothing that we can really capture here, but what was your greatest frustration during that six-year period?

DAVIS: I suppose the slowness with which we got the Judicial Assistance Treaty. I don't think they really wanted to do it at all, and I won't say any pressure was applied, but we had to keep at it. I think they really thought they'd have an informal understanding rather than passing Parliament or passing our Senate. But I think that otherwise, it was a very friendly. People said, without knowing it, of course, I didn't advertise what my mission was when I went there, and friends said, "You'll come back a better skier than you are now. You'll have a great time there," without realizing I really had a mission. (Laughs)

Q: The banking leadership undoubtedly would have been hesitant and cautious. Where did you find the leadership within the power structure of Switzerland to push on this?

DAVIS: They have, of course, the head of the banks, and he is a very key man. Actually, I'm having luncheon with him next week. He's over here. He's now not head of the bank; he's retired from that. I think they really had more importance than the politicians themselves. I think they are the ones who made the ultimate decision of, "Let's go along and do it with them."

Q: So you spent a fair amount of time cultivating him and other of his colleagues?

DAVIS: Yes. Yes, I did, and we got Paul Volcker to come over. He was then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. They enjoyed meeting him, a fine fellow. He came over a number of times. We would give dinners for him, and they all enjoyed meeting him. Then, of course, Arthur Burns came over, whom they also liked very much, a quiet man, but a very able fellow. So this was something we could, in a sense, give the bankers in Switzerland, and they enjoyed it. That, I think, helped.

Q: In respect to that service from 1969 to 1975, and this would be true of the entire embassy staff and your various posts throughout the country, is there anything you would have done differently?
DAVIS: I honestly don't think so. Maybe we could have gotten it a little quicker, but at the same time, it was all very friendly, and I think if we had tried to do it quicker or really tried to threaten them, I think that would have been the wrong thing. No, I honestly don't think so.

Q: It would have been counterproductive.

DAVIS: Yes, I think so.

Q: Since this is central to your service there, let us review the chronology. You arrived in July of 1969. When did you first make the demarche to the government in regard to the banking?

DAVIS: I would say about a half-year later. By that time, I had met all the people in the government whom I didn't know. I knew some of the bankers, anyway, because we had known them in Geneva, as well as in Zurich. I think it was about a half-year later that I took it up with them in a serious vein, that this was my mission. I wanted to cooperate with them.

Q: Did you have white papers? Did you have research documents that made reference to the mutuality of concern that you left with them, or was this largely verbal?

DAVIS: It was largely verbal, really. Verbal seemed to be a better way of doing it, not something in black and white, at the beginning.

Q: I think this a very, very important thing. This is the centerpiece, really, of your ambassadorship.

DAVIS: Yes, it was, definitely.

Q: In a quantitative sense, in the process or procedural sense, what evolved? If this was six months later, it would have been early in 1970 that you brought this to their attention.

DAVIS: Yes. That's right.

Q: The premier secret banking country of the world received an ambassador who knew them well, and your mission was very clear. What then was the next step after opening this as a concern with them? Who then took the initiative? Did they or did you?

DAVIS: I think it was joint. They said, in effect, "Won't you bring over some of your technicians from the Treasury Department, and we'll have technicians at a lower level, and they can talk about it?" And that's really what started. Then this went on. I was not present in those talks, and neither was the head of departments there present. This happened, I would say, about four different times before there finally was an agreement at a lower level, and then at a higher level.

Then Walter Stoessel, who was Under Secretary of State and a very fine fellow, a wonderful man (we saw his wife in Maine just a week ago; he, of course, passed on two years ago), an outstanding fellow, he then was brought over for the signature, which took place, I think, in the spring of 1974.
I came back a year later. We wanted to see how it would be received in Congress and also there, and that's really the reason I stayed on, enjoying it, also.

Q: *Most certainly. In terms of your overall view of US foreign policy towards Switzerland during this period, would you consider that this policy, which is very complex, naturally, was effective?*

DAVIS: Yes. Oh, I think so. It is being effective right now. They have the power and have used it, and I could mention several examples. I don't have all the names and so on, but there was someone who collected money from a lot of people, misguided, and then he took them to some place in South America. All of them eventually died. That's not a very clear story. I was out of the government then. It was considered that he was doing something dishonest, and he had the money in Swiss bank accounts. So the Department, then using this Judicial Assistance Act, was able to find out that he actually was swindling these people, and he was eventually, I think, put in prison, but, I'm sorry to say, not after a number of them had died. It was a terrible scandal probably ten years ago. I know that it's been used in other instances, as well, but that was an outstanding one.

Q: *In terms of the Foreign Service as we know it, this would be both in the richness of your bringing your background with national political movements, Governor Dewey on two occasions, and your other services with the government, and being the father of a son and of a daughter, would you have at any point in your relationship with them recommended that they seriously consider the Foreign Service?*

DAVIS: It never was actually brought up, but I would have certainly said so. I think it's a wonderful career. We found the people we were working with in the embassy really first-rate. We liked them all. Of course, they then go on to other countries for another two or three years, but we think it's a great service. I'm on the board of the Council of American Ambassadors, and I think very highly indeed of the service. I do. I think it's a wonderful career.

Q: *A career officer often is asked by others, and it's quite appropriate, and I hope you consider it a positive question, of the nature and the difference and, in that sense, the richness of our foreign service leadership, where some ambassadorial appointments are political and some are career. Do you feel that the mix is about right?*

DAVIS: That's more or less my feeling. In the very difficult posts, such as Russia, of course, it's always a career man. They've had very good people there. I think it is, it seems to me, about the right mix. At least I haven't heard anything really much to the contrary. Perhaps the career people. But I think they are perhaps used to it. England is political, generally Switzerland is, too, but not always.

Q: *Who was your predecessor?*

DAVIS: He was a newspaper publisher of the Washington Star. After myself, we had a couple, one by the name of Davis, and he actually was a career man and a very fine fellow. His father was head of the Technology Institute in Hoboken, a very high level one. His name slips me right
now, but he was a career man. Actually, he had been in Chile, and he had been blamed--this was later on--for the fact that the bombs killed Allende. They said he had something to do with that, falsely. My Deputy Chief of Mission, Dick Vine, who is a career man, also later on became ambassador to Switzerland. So Switzerland is kind of half and half. I think, generally, the Court of St. James is a political appointment.

Q: In terms of the career service and coming into Switzerland with a good view and grasp of the country, the culture, the mysteries that make Switzerland so dynamic and effective in the world scene, did you feel that more or less both your senior and junior officers that were on your diplomatic team in Switzerland were well trained and effective?

DAVIS: I thought so. We both did, my wife, too, and the girls that they had married, we thought they were all very good. They were, of course, performing without any salaries, which I gather is in some question now. I'm not sure exactly how far it's gone. We thought they were all very nice people and effective people. Yes, we did. I can think of only one, and I'd prefer not to mention his name, but Dick Vine and I both thought that this fellow wasn't quite up to it. He was in the consul side, and eventually he got another job. Otherwise, we were looking.

Q: Let's step back for just a moment. You mentioned that early on in your Princeton years, which would have been in the late 1920s, you were right out in the Soviet Union, one of the few Americans that happened to be there, fascinating, including Switzerland. But then you had the service in your early '60s as ambassador to Switzerland. I have just had reported to me from Mrs. Abby O'Neil (grand daughter of John D. Rockefeller) who traveled with you in the Soviet Union in August and September, that at 79, you're very hard to keep up with. What would you feel are the three or four most significant achievements since 1975 that in part were influenced by your ambassadorship to Switzerland?

DAVIS: I suppose it's a continuing interest in problem countries. We continue to go to Russia every second year. We were actually in Siberia last year, and we went again this year. We hadn't been before. And also in China. We're doing that every two or three years. Actually, this Council of American Ambassadors went three years ago. We had people at a high level giving us briefings and all of that. Of course, Japan, which is so successful, we've been going there. We go every couple of years, as a matter of fact. We're quite interested in it. I agree with the ambassador, Michael Mansfield, who had been the Majority Leader of the Senate on the Democratic side. He gave us a wonderful briefing, a very able fellow. I think he's over 80 now, and he's been there perhaps now ten years. But he gave us the best briefing, I think. This was with the State Department approval, about an hour and a half, more figures out of his head, but he also ended with this. He said he thinks that the future belongs to the Pacific ring, and I rather think that, too. But that he would say that to us, of course, it was in-house, but I agreed with him. He made a remarkable showing, I thought, Mansfield.

Q: An extraordinary man.

DAVIS: I thought so. Excellent.

Q: He accompanied the Crowned Prince and Princess to the United States in October.
DAVIS: I didn't realize that.

Q: I would presume that the Crowned Prince shortly will be the new Emperor of Japan.

DAVIS: Properly so. I didn't realize that. Well, good for him. I think he's a great fellow.

Q: As you have been describing the various experiences you've had--and we've touched on only a few since 1975, over a period of 15 years--could I conclude that in one sense you were formally the ambassador appointed by the United States in 1969-75, but you also have been very much an ambassador, perhaps without portfolio, since that period?

DAVIS: We've done a lot of traveling. We don't really do it in the summer, but in the early fall. We do regularly go to China and Russia and, of course, also Japan en route to China. We know the others in the Far East, Singapore and so on. But those, I think, are vital parts. I think if we want to hazard a guess at what's going to happen in the world, I think it's a good idea to know those places.

Q: Do you feel that your greatest influence in this 15-year period since 1975 has been on bringing insights from the Soviet Union and China and Japan and other countries back to key opinion molders in the United States, or in influencing the leadership that you have come into contact with repeatedly in these countries?

DAVIS: I think it's really the former. Actually, there is a certain reason. My wife, Kathryn, who had written a book on Russia, she has been called upon by women's clubs and the English-speaking Union, people like this, they're always looking for speakers, and she is really a speaker herself on Russia, China, and Switzerland, those three countries. So she likes to be kept up to date on it, and that's one reason. That's being put to practical use, I think. She's speaking at the Navigators of the World, something like that, at the Women's National Republican Club next week on Russia and Siberia. So that is something that's practical.

I think mine is more of an interest. I think if you understand these countries, it's fulfillment, I mean, if you're in finance, it's a good thing to understand. I've never actually had any problem with the Russian people themselves. When we go and travel, they smile and sometimes when you're having dinner and they're having a big dinner, it must be some anniversary, they'll send over a bottle of champagne to us, which is a very nice thing to do.

Q: You were recently with Ambassador Matlock in Moscow, who is a Russian expert.

DAVIS: Oh, yes. A great fellow, fine.

Q: Do you feel that the nature of our foreign policy and the way it's exercised through our embassies, do you feel that that is as effective as we could expect it at this point in time, both because of your optic, as ambassador to Switzerland, but also from your personal knowledge, with your frequent returns to the Soviet Union?
DAVIS: It seems so to me, but, of course, I think the Secretary is very important. He is getting around and doing a lot. Actually, this is between ourselves, Frank Carlucci, our Secretary of Defense, has to go back at 9:00 o'clock because he's having a meeting with Shultz the next morning at 7:30. But I think not only the ambassadors, but I think the overview of the State Department itself is valuable. Of course, the ambassadors will use business people and all where they can get their information. I know it perhaps can be done better, but I honestly don't know in what way.

Q: So you are very positive in terms of this experience, both in Switzerland and in your lifetime.

DAVIS: Oh, I think so.

Q: And would feel that our openings to the Soviet Union and to China are very relevant.

DAVIS: I think so. There are only a billion people in China. (Laughs) Only a billion. I think we need good relations, and I just hope we'll get them with Russia.

Q: Let me end by asking you, having done your early studies in the field of economics and monetary policy, finance, and having seen the birth of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, referred to as the Bretton Woods Institutions, how do you feel about this system, particularly with the experience in a very sophisticated banking environment in Switzerland, how do you feel about the current relevance and effectiveness of these institutions?

DAVIS: I wish I could honestly answer that. Of course, I've thought that Bretton Woods is better because we knew the value of each currency and all that, but I'm not really sure that I am aware of all the various things, such as Jimmy Baker has done this and all that. I feel the dollar probably was overpriced, but I don't have the real feeling that I can make a sound judgment. I really don't. I wish I could. It's more that I think we're all more comfortable under Bretton Woods, but maybe, as Jimmy Baker said, he was the one who really got the dollar down. In order to help our exports, maybe he was right. But I honestly don't have a firm opinion on it. I wish I had.

Q: This tape will be in the Association for Diplomatic Studies' Archives, and it will be reviewed by both graduate students, professors in the field of diplomatic studies, and undoubtedly career and non-career ambassadors. Would you like to leave them with any final judgment in terms of the impact of your career on your life and the possibility of anything they should keep in mind in considering a comparable career?

DAVIS: I think I and my wife feel our days in Switzerland were one of the happiest we've had, and useful. I would say a career in the Foreign Service would be a wonderful thing.

Q: Ambassador Davis, I would like to thank you ever so much for making yourself available for this interview. You will have an opportunity to inspect the transcript.

DAVIS: Thank you very much. I thoroughly enjoyed the experience.
JOHN TODD STEWART  
Economic Officer  

Ambassador Stewart was born in New Jersey and raised in New York City and San Francisco. He attended Stanford University and the Fletcher School and entered the Foreign Service in 1962. His first post in Munich was followed by posts in Venezuela, Geneva, Moscow, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Canada, and an ambassadorship to the Republic of Moldova. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: You moved to your next post in ’70, I presume?

STEWART: 1970. I was going to go to OECD to join Joe Greenwald, but then a slot opened in Geneva which was even more attractive. So I went to Geneva for three years. I was doing GATT work there, but I also handled the International Trade Center, an international organization consortium operated by GATT and UNCTAD in those days. And I went to an occasional UNCTAD meeting, too.

Q: Let’s talk about GATT. In the first, place, could you say what GATT means and then what you were doing?

STEWART: GATT is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was both an agreement, as the name implies, and also an international organization that grew up around the agreement. The organization was operated by the member states, called the “contracting parties,” through their permanent delegations with the assistance of the GATT Secretariat. The organization supervised the operation of the agreement and all the subsidiary understandings which were reached in negotiating rounds that had taken place since GATT was founded in the ‘40s. It also organized and supervised negotiations for further trade liberalization.

Q: Given that the General Agreement is very complicated, how did you figure out what the hell to do?

STEWART: There was certainly a lot of GATT law to pick up. But the Secretariat was extraordinarily good, and by that time people like John Jackson had started to write books about GATT so there were actually sources to turn to for the interpretation of various articles. As a result, it wasn’t too hard to pick your way through all this law, which had accreted over the course of many negotiating rounds. We had a full schedule of meetings, two or three every week. And there were only three of us who dealt with GATT—the minister, the head economic person in the Mission, who spent about half his time on GATT; my immediate boss, Bill Culbert, who spent 85% of his time on GATT; and myself who worked on GATT almost full time. The minister obviously took the most important meetings, Bill Culbert took the next most important meetings, and I took the others. But I had regular responsibilities, including the Balance of Payments Committee, which oversaw the exercise of the exceptions provided by Articles XII and
XVIII, which allow a country to impose quantitative restrictions on its imports if it has balance of payments problems. This, of course, was still in the days of fixed exchange rates. Then I also ordinarily handled the Committee on Trade and Development and its subcommittees, which oversaw the provisions of GATT which dealt with the special concerns of developing countries. Finally, I handled the administrative agenda, including the Budget Committee. This doesn’t sound like much, and in principle it wasn’t, except for the rather strange situation that the U.S. found itself in. The Congress at that time tried to pretend that the GATT didn’t exist. There was never any support for GATT as an organization so there was no regular appropriation for it, no line item in the international organization section of the State Department budget. Therefore, our GATT dues, which were rather modest in UN terms—16% of the total budget, based on our share of world trade—had to be taken out of the general international conferences appropriation for the State Department. That appropriation is, of course, always subject to Congressional appropriation pressures. One year the appropriation really got hammered by the Congress, and although the Director General of GATT ran a very tight ship—in fact, the Secretariat didn’t have enough money to do all the things they should have been doing—we couldn’t afford the rather modest increase that the Director General was proposing. The budget committee dragged on for four weeks as the Director General was on the phone with the Special Trade Representative and the State Department and God knows who all, trying to make Washington see the error in its ways. Again, this was a problem of not having Congressional support for a major feature of the Administration’s program.

Q: What was the reason for this?

STEWART: Arguments similar to those that are put forward now against the WTO, the World Trade Organization, were heard then: That the GATT was an encroachment on U.S. sovereignty, that these foreigners were trying to tell us how to run our affairs, and more particularly, that they were telling Congress that it couldn’t pass any damn thing it wanted to without repercussions.

Q: I would imagine your problem of having to rely on the international conferences appropriation was exacerbated by the fact that Congress and the politicians kept loading delegations up with all sorts of friends of friends. This is a considerable political payoff.

STEWART: Well, the international conferences budget must be one of the hardest in the Department to administer for exactly that reason.

Q: You mentioned the Secretariat. What did the Secretariat consist of?

STEWART: In the late ‘40s the objective of the U.S. and other major countries was to do in the trade field what they had already done in the financial field—set up an international trade organization, the ITO. In fact, an organizing conference was held in Havana and a charter was adopted there for the ITO. But the Senate never ratified it, and consequently the ITO never came into existence. However, before the ITO conference was held, a preliminary agreement was reached, called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which codified a lot of the practices which had been developed during the 1930s when the U.S. operated under our reciprocal trade agreement legislation. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provided a regulatory framework for international trade, which was supposed to be subsumed into the ITO. But the
ITO never came into existence, and the GATT therefore had to stand on its own. And to make things even more confusing, the GATT was never formally adopted but was applied under the terms of another agreement called the Protocol of Provisional Application.

The world trading system operated under these agreements until the formation of the WTO early in this decade. After the Protocol of Provisional Application was adopted and it became clear that the ITO was not going to go anywhere, the powers that be agreed that a small secretariat would be set up in Geneva, which had been the scene of much of the negotiating in the post-war period, just to service negotiating rounds. But little by little, in part due to some clever work by the Secretary General, Eric Wyndham White, the Secretariat took on other functions, including the substantive preparations for meetings of the GATT contracting parties and an increasing number of intervening meetings. Gradually the GATT turned itself into an international organization. Bear in mind that the Secretariat was not too large, just about 200 people when I was there. But extraordinarily good people.

Q: Were they recruited from the UN or did they come from member countries as direct hires?

STEWART: I think virtually everybody was direct hire. Of the old timers that were there during my time, I can’t think of anyone that came out of a League background.

Q: You are talking about the League of Nations?

STEWART: The League of Nations, yes. If somebody had worked for the League or UN in Geneva before joining the GATT, I am not aware of it.

Q: Part of your thing was balance of payments issues when you were there in ’70-’73. And this is when our chickens came home to roost all of a sudden in the United States. Most Americans had not been paying much attention to the balance of payments problems of the United States before the 1971 crisis.

STEWART: You are entirely right. People certainly weren’t aware of the U.S. balance of payments deficits. But the GATT Balance of Payments Committee didn’t deal in those days with any of the big countries. When Nixon imposed an import surcharge, the restriction was not referred to the Balance of Payments Committee, but to the GATT Council. I remember that meeting quite well because it happened in the summer of ’71, in August. And as you know, in August every self-respecting European is on vacation somewhere, and that’s when Connelly and Nixon pulled the plug.

Q: Connelly being the Secretary of the Treasury?

STEWART: Right. Included in the package of U.E. measures was a tariff surcharge on imports into the U.S., clearly a GATT matter, in addition to the monetary measures which fell under the jurisdiction of the IMF. Because of the surcharge an emergency meeting was called. Delegates assembled, but they were hopping mad. It wasn’t just the U.S. action, it was the timing, for almost everyone had been recalled from vacation.
Q: It’s hard to get a war started in August in Europe. It’s not by chance that World War II started on the 1st of September.

STEWART: And the upshot was that the meeting was held in the afternoon of an August day, but it dragged on into the evening and then dragged further on and still further. Under the GATT rules, you had to have a consensus to do anything. Consequently, nothing could be done without U.S. acquiescence as we would block consensus if a condemnatory action had been proposed. So negotiations were held in a back room between representatives of key countries and the U.S. delegation’s leadership. The rest of the delegates were sitting around in the main meeting hall. Somebody had had the foresight to bring a bottle of whiskey which was passed around, for it wasn’t until after midnight that some sort of compromise was reached whereby a working party was established with terms of reference sufficiently squishy to meet the U.S. objections. Then people went home.

Q: I assume that you were as caught off balance as everyone else was - you and your colleagues in the American delegation. This was the Nixon Shock.

STEWART: Very much so. And shock it was.

Q: What about this surcharge that was levied? This would seem to be contrary to all free trade principles.

STEWART: Well, it didn’t last very long. The idea, I suppose, was to give us more bargaining leverage in getting the international financial regime straightened out, and it probably was effective in that regard. This was a time when John Connelly was calling the shots on virtually everything in international economic policy. It was also a period when there was no major initiative for trade liberalization. The Kennedy Round had ended in ’67 and nothing was happening. There was no U.S. leadership in this period. And in part, I suspect, because everybody back here was pretty well transfixed by the impending or actual financial crisis.

But this changed in ’72. Carl Gilbert, who had been the Special Trade Representative, resigned and was replaced by Bill Eberle, certainly one of the more remarkable people whom I ran across in my career. His first appearance on the GATT scene was at the annual meeting of the Contracting Parties, the highest level of representation in the GATT. Eberle would not have been in office all that long when he appeared in Geneva, and it was very clear that his appointment foreshadowed something. The only problem was that no one was too clear what it foreshadowed. The Contracting Parties’ meetings offered an opportunity for general statements, and Eberle’s general statement was widely awaited. Typically, of course, when the U.S. representative goes off to such a meeting, his or her statement has been carefully worked out on an interagency basis and approved in the White House, with every comma examined and reexamined. But there was absolutely none of this in the post Nixon Shock atmosphere in Washington. Thus Eberle was able to show up in Geneva without any text that had received interagency clearance. In fact, he had no text at all. He simply raised the U.S. card and began to speak extemporaneously.

People were on the edge of their seats trying to get his statement down, not the least of whom were members of the U.S. delegation. He finished and people looked at each other, trying to
decide exactly what he had said. The responses varied - not in public obviously, but people I talked to - from “What a mish-mash of nothing,” to “That was the finest speech I’ve ever heard in a GATT meeting.” I was commissioned to get the tape recording from the Secretariat and to write out a text that we could distribute to the other delegations. I had a secretary type out something in a rough form, and then I tried to put it in some grammatical fashion. When the text finally appeared, it became the opening bugle for the next round of trade negotiations. So Eberle came to Geneva and launched the Tokyo Round.

Q: How about textiles? Nixon felt he owed to the textile states of the South his very close election, and he sure as hell was going to protect them. Did you get involved in textile protection?

STEWART: I did not. We had somebody on the delegation who was dedicated to that issue, the negotiation and subsequent operation of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. That poor man had my deepest sympathy, but textiles were his thing.

Q: I assume those were his marching orders?

STEWART: We were committed to negotiating a Multi-Fiber Agreement to replace the Long-Term Agreement on cotton textiles and apparel which had been in effect before.

Q: How about the Soviet Union? It was obviously not a member of GATT. But was there any sort of a shadow arrangement with the Soviets?

STEWART: We had no contact with them. Some of the satellites were GATT members. The Poles were already in the GATT at that time, and Romania and Hungary also acceded. Efforts were made to develop meaningful import commitments for these countries which mandated increased trade while recognizing that, in at least two cases, central controls over state enterprises were being relaxed. I can’t say that those efforts were very successful as the task was akin to squaring the circle. It was simply not possible to provide a meaningful accommodation for centrally planned economies within the context of the GATT, which was drafted to govern trade among market economies.

Q: Were there any countries that were a particular pain in your time, from the U.S. point of view? I always think of France, but maybe Canada or some other countries. Were we often at loggerheads with them or…?

STEWART: During my period the tensions in GATT were primarily with the European Community. The Secretariat took the rather interesting decision to seat the U.S. and the Community on opposite sides of the meeting room where the smaller GATT meetings were held. It was rather funny, for it looked like the House of Commons with the government and the opposition facing each other.

Q: Was France sort of the driving force in the economic policy of the European Community at that time?
STEWART: I think it would be going too far to say France was the driving force. The Commission itself had developed to a point where it was playing an independent role, obviously what the member states had agreed upon although it didn’t happen all that often in areas beyond trade. There were also frequent disagreements among member states, particularly between France and Germany, and of course Britain became an important voice once the British joined the EC during that period.

Q: Just from a historical perspective, you were saying that there was a prelude to the Tokyo Round. Basically, what was the Tokyo Round, what did it consist of?

STEWART: The Tokyo Round was the next major round of trade negotiations after the Kennedy Round. In the Kennedy Round we had dipped our little toe into the water of non-tariff measures with agreements elaborating or expanding the terms of the GATT instead of just lowering tariffs. Part of the Kennedy Round was an agreement on anti-dumping which elaborated the provisions on anti-dumping in the GATT. This effort went much further in the Tokyo Round because of the negotiation of codes on a variety of topics that were covered by the GATT but not as extensively as many countries would have wished. In the final Tokyo Round results, trade in services was covered to a slight degree, tariffs were cut substantially, and most significantly, the conditions of trade—subsidies, countervailing duties, government procurement, anti-dumping, measures that can have a very significant effect on trade—were treated in side agreements. The major players, the developed countries, had to adhere to these agreements while developing countries were not required to do so.

Q: What about Japan? Was Japan a member of the GATT at this time?

STEWART: Very definitely. And even during the time that I was there, there was a metamorphosis in the Japanese delegation that brought a new generation of Japanese to the scene who were far more fluent in English and more skilled in multilateral diplomacy. The Japanese had some of the best people in Geneva, in my view.

Q: What sort of role was Japan playing at this point?

STEWART: An increasingly active role. I think that is the best way to put it.

Q: Were they trying to protect their extremely closed internal market from everyone else? Was that their main goal?

STEWART: The GATT at that time was really not dealing with the kinds of things that the U.S. was addressing bilaterally with Japan—opaque government procurement practices, restrictive business practices, government guidance, all this kind of stuff. By the same token, there were many voluntary restraint agreements that countries had with Japan to limit the import of Japanese goods. So there was almost a different regime that applied in Japan’s trade than in the trade of the other developed countries. Except to some degree for the VRAs, voluntary restraint agreements, these restrictions were not subjects of discussion in the GATT. There was just no way to get a handle on them. The Japanese delegation generally attempted to make a positive contribution to the discussion of the general problems that were common to the contracting
parties. And in the Committee on Agriculture, for example, they certainly defended their rice quotas. But the GATT at that time was unable to deal with the many other issues which bedeviled U.S.-Japanese trade relations.

Q: When you left it in '73, what was your feeling - that things were in pretty competent hands and that you could look ahead and see that things should develop in a positive way?

STEWART: Very much so. Gardner Patterson, an American, had come on board as the GATT’s Deputy Director General, and his strategy before Eberle’s famous speech was to do preparatory work for the next round by picking out an area and seeing if it was possible to develop an agreement in that particular area. This is what we were doing during my tenure. If an agreement was possible, even though the terms might be unbalanced and the countries wouldn’t agree to them in isolation, he proposed to put the agreement up on a shelf. Then when the round started, the negotiators could take it down and either fiddle with the terms some more or just adopt it as a part of the final package. It’s pretty rare in trade negotiations to come up with an agreement on some specific subject which is so self-balanced that everybody feels he’s gotten the exact same degree of satisfaction from it. Typically in a round--in fact, this is why you have one--you include as many individual agreements as possible so arguably the overall package is balanced even though the individual components may not be.

Q: Capture the mood at the time, the feeling in your delegation, the Americans. Obviously you are up face to face across the aisle from the European Economic Community. The unification of Europe has been the cornerstone of American policy since World War II. We didn’t want the Germans and French to go at each other again. That’s the long and the short of it. Was there concern that we might be creating a monster that we might regret in the form of a trading rival that could meet us head to head?

STEWART: I think that there were always second thoughts about the Community, particularly in the agricultural field. The EC’s Common Agricultural Policy in those days involved heavy subsidization of production at guaranteed prices at extraordinary levels, high price barriers to imports, and then subsidization of exports. It was a beautifully balanced scheme worthy of Descartes, and largely French-designed if I recall correctly. But continuation of that scheme would have given everybody a great deal of trouble. It was fantastically expensive, and enlargement of the Community introduced more people, especially the British, who were highly unenthusiastic about having to pay the bill.

Q: This might be a good place to stop. In ’73 you left Geneva and whither?

STEWART: In ’73 I went back to Washington into Russian language training.

LUCIAN HEICHLER
Political Officer
Bern (1971-1973)
Lucian Heichler was born in Vienna, Austria in 1925. He emigrated to the United States with his parents in 1940 where he later attended NYU and was naturalized as a US citizen in 1944. He served in the US Army during World War II. He entered the Foreign Service and held positions in Germany, Cameroon, Zaire, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and Turkey. Lucian Heichler was interviewed by Susan Klingaman in 2000.

Q: Probably not all that much, yes. Well, after the NATO Defense College, where did you go?

HEICHLER: With characteristic Personnel logic, I was then assigned to neutral Bern, Switzerland, as political officer of the embassy.

Q: Of course, to a country which was not in NATO.

HEICHLER: Yes, that struck me as peculiar.

Q: It sounds strange having sent you for a year's training in NATO and politico-military matters and then you go to neutral Switzerland, although, of course, you did have the language, which would have been very useful, I'm sure.

HEICHLER: Yes. I had, in fact, both languages. I had French and German.

Q: Yes. So you were a political officer in the embassy?

HEICHLER: Yes. I actually played a dual role, because just about at that time USIA decided to abolish its program in Switzerland.

Q: Why was that?

HEICHLER: Budgetary reasons.

Q: I see, okay.

HEICHLER: And the embassy - I think it was the embassy as much as the State Department desk, I'm not sure which - who persuaded USIA to keep the program running under the direction of a Foreign Service officer whom USIA wouldn't have to pay. So the arrangement was that the political officer, in addition to his upstairs duties, would run USIS with its three Swiss national employees and supervise the very modest USIS effort. Thus I became, in addition to political officer, the embassy press and information officer and cultural attaché.

Q: Now how large was the embassy in Switzerland?

HEICHLER: It was fairly small.

Q: You were the one political officer - political officer/USIA?
HEICHLER: There was one political officer, one economic officer.

Q: Consular, I assume.

HEICHLER: Yes.

Q: Administrative.

HEICHLER: Yes, and a sizable CIA presence, as well as other Washington agency representatives such as an agricultural attaché, a legal (FBI) attaché, etc.

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

HEICHLER: Shelby Cullom Davis.

Q: Oh, yes.

HEICHLER: He was a non-career Nixon political appointee, a very wealthy investment banker who has left us the Shelby Cullom Davis Foundation, a name that you will find here and there around Washington and other places.

Q: And how was he as an ambassador?

HEICHLER: Well, the best that I could say for him is that he didn't meddle.

Q: He didn't meddle in what?

HEICHLER: In the work of the embassy.

Q: In the work of the embassy - all right.

HEICHLER: When I first arrived, we had an energetic and competent DCM, Richard D. Vine. The ambassador did his bit with a great deal of entertaining, which he did very well. He worked very hard at remembering the names of his guests. It was rumored that he put their names up around his mirror when he shaved in the afternoon and memorized them. He did well at that. He gave a black-tie dinner for 20 Swiss guests at least three or four nights a week and spent a great deal of his own money in the process. Other than that he didn't concern himself much with the political or economic work of the embassy. He let Dick Vine do it, and Dick, you know, was a sufficiently clever diplomat to let the ambassador feel that he, the ambassador, was in charge. He kept the ambassador informed, and there were no particular clashes. But basically, Dick ran the embassy.

Q: Okay, and how did the Swiss react to the ambassador - apparently fairly well socially, I gather?
HEICHLER: Yes. They didn't take him particularly seriously. They were well used to grief. They'd had much worse before him; they had much worse after him.

Q: *I was going to say, if the ambassador had the good sense to let the DCM run the embassy, I think that's a good arrangement, better than some, I would say.*

HEICHLER: Yes, and the Swiss had almost never had a professional diplomat as the American ambassador; in fact they've had to put up with some pretty awful people, both before and after Shelby Cullom Davis.

Q: *So what was the United States trying to accomplish vis-à-vis Switzerland?*

HEICHLER: First and foremost, to maintain good, friendly, stable relations - close economic and financial relations and the like. There were no real issues to be worked out. It was all pretty dull, because none of the business that's, you know, come up in the last few years had yet raised its ugly head. No one even suspected any of it, at least no one I knew..

Q: *And you're referring to Nazi gold and so on?*

HEICHLER: Yes, right, exactly. And also the Swiss refusal to take in Jewish refugees, even the Swiss suggestion that the Nazis put the big red letter “J” in Jewish passports to make them more easily recognizable

Q: *So at that time there was really no - *

HEICHLER: The Swiss kept feeding us the line about of their plucky, heroic resistance to the Nazis, their stout anti-Nazi attitude, and their threat that it would cost Hitler a million men if he tried to attack them, and that's why they were never attacked and all that good stuff. And the fact that they had fairly close relations with Germany during the war was never mentioned at all.

Q: *Right. And that's all been very recently revealed.*

HEICHLER: Yes, long after my time. I had basically rather a boring time there. Now this little anecdote may amuse you. This was, after all, my first political job since Berlin. In Berlin I had gotten very spoiled. I had no basis for comparison, Berlin having been my first and only political post. And I was in Berlin during the crisis years. I was at the center of the universe. To me it was only natural that not only the Department but the White House and even the President read our cables--

Q: *Yes.*

HEICHLER: --and was interested in every last bit that we could dream up to report. And naively, when I got to Switzerland, I assumed that it would be the same there. So I began to cast about for things to report on, there being nothing obvious to do.

Q: *Now, you see, you should have gone after that Nazi gold.*
HEICHLER: Yes.

Q: *But none of us knew that was lurking in the background.*

HEICHLER: Being somewhat interested in political theory, although not schooled in it, I decided to draft a series of what we still called "despatches" in those days -- later known as "airgrams." For instance, I wrote a long and learned treatise on the rather peculiar nature of the Swiss government, with its presidency rotating annually among the seven federal councilors, and I wrote a series of long essays devoted to each of the major Swiss political parties represented in Parliament. And all this stuff went off to Washington, where it sank without a trace.

Q: *I'm sure they went into the files somewhere.*

HEICHLER: And I remember the put-down I got when I came back on my first home leave and consultation. The then head of AIS - the Austria-Italy-Switzerland Desk - this was before -

Q: *All right, yes, okay.*

HEICHLER: Beaudry (I think it was )...-

Q: *Austria-Italy-Switzerland was one Desk in the Bureau of European Affairs, obviously. Yes, I'd forgotten that was the combination at that time.*

HEICHLER: It was the office that preceded the EUR/CE Division.

Q: *Okay.*

HEICHLER: Anyway, whoever the director was -- it might have been Beaudry, I'm not sure - anyway, we had a pleasant hour's conversation in his office, and he figuratively patted me on the head and said that they already had a lot to read and didn't consider it necessary for me to send in all this stuff, and if I would just report on the outcome of the Swiss elections every four years, it would probably do. I felt rather put down by that.

Q: *Yes, I can well imagine. Well, I can see that it would have been something of a - what should I say? - boring, stagnant - whatever - situation in a sense, because Switzerland was not involved in NATO, which was the big thing in those days, nor was it in the European Community -*

HEICHLER: *Nor in the UN.*

Q: *Nor in the UN. How did the Swiss see their role in the world - or didn't they?*

HEICHLER: Well, they did see their role in the world as standing firmly on their principles of strict neutrality and non-involvement and their traditional role as arbitrators of disputes, if called upon. They were extremely proud of having gotten into this business way back when, and that produced an interesting little job for me.
I don’t know if you have heard of the so-called Alabama Claims.

Q: Vaguely, I do recall.

HEICHLER: The Alabama was a Confederate raider built in Britain which preyed with deadly effectiveness on Northern merchant shipping during the Civil War. After the war the United States government sued Britain for damages; we calculated that Britain owed us $15 million by way of compensation. For the first time in history, the two nations agreed to submit this dispute to international arbitration and to abide by the decision of an international tribunal. A panel of five judges was assembled in Geneva, consisting of representatives of the U.S., the U.K., Italy, Switzerland, and the Emperor of Brazil. The panel found in favor of the U.S.--and Britain actually paid up! The deliberations or the trial, or whatever you want to call it, were held in a large, elegant room in the Geneva City Hall, a room which was then named the Salle de l'Alabame - the Alabama Room - and was used to sign the charter of the League of Nations at the end of World War I.

When the centenary of the settlement of the Alabama Claims rolled around in 1972 or 73, while I was in Bern, the government of “the Republic and Canton of Geneva” approached me as the cultural attaché of the embassy, announced its plans to celebrate this anniversary and asked for some United States assistance in terms of mementos, exhibits, and anything else that we could provide for them. I enthusiastically got into this act and corresponded with Washington, which came up with some good stuff from the Archives. I went back and forth between Bern and Geneva a few times to help set up this exhibit, got a chance to visit the beautiful, impressive Salle de l’Alabame (done up all in red), and I had a great time. It was a nice diversion. I had actually known about the Alabama Claims from a graduate course in diplomatic history I took in 1947.

Q: Yes, that’s where my vague recollection comes from, yes. But I recall - as you know, later I was on the Swiss-Austrian Desk in the Department - the Swiss are very prickly about their neutrality and their sovereignty and so on. During your tenure in Switzerland did you have any problems with U.S. government agencies wanting to do business directly on Swiss soil? You know, the Swiss always wanted agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission or the FBI to make the proper routings through the Swiss government itself before doing anything like issuing subpoenas and so on to Swiss. Did you have any problems like that?

HEICHLER: I was not aware of them.

Q: Or was that later we just had all kinds of pressures?

HEICHLER: I had no personal experience or knowledge of this. We had an FBI -

Q: -attaché.

HEICHLER: --attaché, the so-called legal attaché at the embassy, but I never talked to him about his work.
Q: Well, he probably did know all the niceties that he was supposed to do with the Swiss. It was just later, I think, particularly, when I was on the Desk, that the Securities and Exchange Commission people used to be sending in subpoenas and so on directly to Switzerland, which made the Swiss government extremely unhappy.

HEICHLER: No, I was blissfully unaware of those things, I must say.

Q: Well, Dick Vine was very much aware of it. He always mentored me on that particular issue when I was on the Desk. I would imagine -

HEICHLER: I mostly concentrated, as I said, on the bit of political reporting and the contacts that I maintained and on the USIS program, which, when I got there, consisted mainly of a film lending library and which I expanded to publicize our space program. There was an ambitious, interesting man in Lucerne trying to start a Swiss air and space museum, which may still exist for all I know, and he and I worked together to try to get him some American assistance in the form of space rocket models and things like that.

Q: In any event, I'm sure living in Switzerland must have been very pleasant.

HEICHLER: It was pleasant. And it was dull. The Swiss were not particularly pleasant to live among, being obsessively fond of litigation, rude and rather harsh. We were lucky in having good neighbors, but... And we did have a lot of contact with “built-in” Swiss friends through the Swiss-American Society which I served (as part of my job) as the American vice president. There had to be a Swiss and an American vice president. And we did a lot of social stuff -- parties, dances, excursions -- which was fun.

Q: And the diplomatic community in Switzerland - was it an active group, or not? There must have been a lot of countries represented.

HEICHLER: Quite a lot, I think. At least 60 missions, maybe more. And yes, it was active. I don't recall off-hand that we saw very much of one another. Our ambassador had a regular monthly luncheon with the Soviet ambassador, at whose initiative I'm not sure, but once a month they would come to us or we would go to them, have a meal and a polite, restrained discussion which never led to anything. It was more *pro forma* than anything else.

Q: Okay, so is that it for little neutral Switzerland?

HEICHLER: That's it for little neutral Switzerland.

Q: And after Switzerland? This would be now -

HEICHLER: That was 1973. I finally came home, after almost 14 years of nearly uninterrupted overseas service--
MAX W. KRAUS
Public Affairs Advisor, European Office of the United Nations, USIS
Geneva (1972-1975)

Max W. Kraus was born in Germany in 1920. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956 and served in Italy, Cambodia, Zaire, France, and Switzerland. He was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1988.

Q: Shall we talk about Geneva for a while?

KRAUS: Okay. Let us talk about Geneva for a while.

Q: Did you go directly from Paris there or did you come back to the states?

KRAUS: No, I went on a direct transfer again. I seemed to specialize in direct transfers.

Q: You certainly did.

KRAUS: Geneva, of course, is different from all the conventional USIS posts in the sense that you do not have a country program.

You are accredited to the European office of the United Nations and the other international organizations. Your audience, really, is the media that is accredited in Geneva and the other correspondents who come to Geneva to cover special stories.

My job as public affairs advisor was to act as spokesman for the important delegations that did business in Geneva including, for instance, the SALT II delegation when Alex Johnson headed it and the CSCE delegation during the Geneva phase and the whole number of other things.

Let me tell you an anecdote about Geneva. I arrived in Geneva in September of 1972 and succeeded George Wynne. Shortly after I arrived in Geneva, I had to do a new country plan. I looked at George Wynne's country plan and made a few changes and sent it back to Washington.

The year after that, I looked at this country plan again and found that all the things that I thought were going to keep us busy and occupied had not happened and a lot of unexpected things had happened -- mainly --in connection with the Kissinger visits to Geneva when he was wheeling and dealing about the Mid-East on his shuttle trips.

Q: Because it is a news connected job?

KRAUS: Yes. So, I decided that writing a country plan for Geneva was really useless and I did not send in a country plan. I never got any queries from Washington about the country plan until I was already officially off the payroll in 1975, when I retired.
Q: When you retired?

KRAUS: Yes, but they had extended me until my successor, Dan Hafrey could arrive. One day I got a telephone call from our desk officer in Washington who said, Max, there must be something wrong with our files, we cannot find an up-to-date country plan for Geneva in our files.

I said I have a very simple explanation for that. I have not submitted a country plan for the last two years. He said, oh?

Q: I hope you explained why.

KRAUS: I did. The following year the agency decided that Geneva should not do a country plan, because you just cannot predict what is going to happen.

Q: That is a very good story.

KRAUS: After five-and-a-half years in Paris, and three years in Geneva, I still had a year to go on my tour, but I decided that the next assignment would be too horrible even to think about.

Since, including my military service, I had 34 years of government service, and, at that time there was a ceiling on the executive branch salaries, I decided to turn in my suit and see what I could do other than flacking for the U.S. government and retired.

Q: Are there any other Geneva stories that you --

KRAUS: Lots of Geneva stories. Again, they are in the book and you are welcome to look at the manuscript.

JOHN E. HALL
Commercial Officer
Bern (1972-1976)

John E. Hall was born in Niagara Falls and was educated at Kenyon College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and has served in a variety of posts in Switzerland, New Zealand, Liberia, and Canada. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

Q: And where did you go from there, John?

HALL: From there back here into FSI’s Economic Studies Program, then to the Department of Commerce on a detail as the France Desk officer for two years. After that, German language training, then off to Bern as the second of two commercial officers. That was at the time when State’s commercial work overseas...
Q: And you were there with your German language training, and well as your economic and Commerce Department experience...

HALL: And my French. Which language I found myself then and subsequently using more than my German.

Q: Is that partly because many of the German-speaking Swiss were quite adequate in English?

HALL: Yes, and in fact were quite comfortable and anxious to speak it, whereas it was my experience that the Francophone Swiss, even if adequate in English, preferred not to use it.

Q: Of course your German allowed you to read ________________ and there were certainly times where German was useful...

HALL: Oh, without question. Certainly on both of my assignments in Switzerland, I did public speaking in German and things like that. I found as a general rule that I got more mileage out of my French. In fact, when I was DCM in Bern at one point I sent in a cable recommending that my own position be language-designated in French rather than German, simply because I felt, not because I had both, but that in that particular role French was the more important of the two languages. Not to my surprise, the recommendation was never enacted.

Q: As I served with you at the same time, but only for two years in its earlier incarnation, while you were at the Commercial Section, I felt the same way, except that, unlike you at that time I did not have any French and I wished I did. There were certainly many occasions where it would have proved useful and valuable, whereas the German was certainly helpful at times, but I'm not sure it was essential.

HALL: Well, the idea was to have both… you know, Ray, as well as I do the caliber of the FSN staff there. And we certainly had ready access to informal translations of the local papers, for example. It’s preferable to read them yourself in the original if you could, but you always had that to fall back on. I found that on the streets it was French that I used more often.

Q: Since you did come back later on as the Deputy Chief of Mission why don’t we leave Switzerland aside at this point as you may have some reflections that cover both periods of your assignment, and go on to where did you go from Bern? That was about 1976.

WALTER B. SMITH, II
Delegate, Middle East Peace Conference
Geneva (1973-1974)

Walter B. Smith, II was born in Providence, Rhode Island in 1929. He received a bachelor’s degree from Princeton University in modern European history in 1951. Shortly after graduating from Princeton, he entered the U.S. Army, where he was
stationed in Germany. Mr. Smith's career in the Foreign Service included positions in Poland, the Soviet Union, Israel, and Washington, DC. Mr. Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 17, 1993.

SMITH: I was summoned back to Washington by [Under Secretary of State] Joe Sisco on December 30, 1973, as was Bob Oakley, who was my counterpart as chief of the Political Section in Beirut. That was done because [Secretary of State] Kissinger, as you may recall, at the peace or non-peace conference in December 1973 (which the Syrians, at the last moment, refused to attend), created the illusion of an ongoing peace conference after he and the other principal [figures] left. I do not know whether he appreciated its value at the time, though he did very quickly after that, but this was a device to keep the Soviets somewhat distracted by implying an important [degree of] collaboration with the United States. It gave [the Soviets] a place of seeming prominence, namely, in Geneva. It was a way of keeping them out of his hair as he dealt with the parties concerned. To do this, he had to have somebody, some ostensible interim or acting chief of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva. That was why Oakley and I were summoned back to Washington on December 31, 1973, given our marching orders, and sent initially, with Mike Sterner, to Geneva to be a "pretend" U.S. Delegation to the non-existent Middle East Peace Conference, at which the Soviets had their former ambassador to Egypt and Iran as our counterpart.

Sterner was by now a Deputy Assistant Secretary. So there was at least a smidgen of Soviet face-saving in having Sterner there. But Sterner only stayed for a week. I had a wonderful time with Sterner in Geneva. Sterner and I went to school together. Oakley had gone back to Beirut, and from that point, until the end of April 1974, Oakley and I took turns, leaving our posts in the Middle East to go and sit for two weeks [at a time in Geneva].

Q: Were you told that this is what you were doing or were you given something to do but not much?

SMITH: It was self-evident why we were doing what we were doing. And we were given absolutely nothing to do. We were told not to leave Geneva either. One weekend I did go down to Monaco to see an old friend who lives there. I did this with some apprehension, I might add, because even on the weekends we were supposed to be there, in Geneva, and visible to the Soviets and on call, for the Soviets or for Washington, whoever wanted to be in touch with us. The Israelis, at Kissinger's insistence, kept a delegation there, too. I happened to know the Israeli delegates. They were Foreign Ministry people who were as frustrated as I was at this fiction. That is what I was doing [during the period] from January to April 1974. In fact, my two sons were scheduled to be confirmed at St. George's Anglican Cathedral in Jerusalem in April 1974. Because, as often happened, I had no travel orders, I finally telephoned Roy Atherton from Geneva and said, "Please see if I can't go back to Israel for this coming weekend, to be present at my sons' confirmation." And Roy arranged it.

Q: How about the Soviet delegation that was there [in Geneva]? What were you doing [with them]?
SMITH: The Soviets were sore with their delegation head Vinogradov, who had botched things recently as Ambassador to Egypt. They were using [this occasion to "punish" him]. They were not stupid. They figured out what Kissinger was up to and were very frustrated. I think that Kissinger met with his Soviet counterpart at some point, somewhere in Western Europe, to "stroke him" and pick his brains, so that the Soviets could continue the masquerade of major power collaboration for their own people. I do not know how we figured out that the Soviets wanted to "punish" their ambassador, but there was no question that this was the case.

Q: Well, if you have to be "punished," Geneva was not the worst place in the world to go. It could have been Khartoum [Sudan] or some place like that.

SMITH: That is true. We would go and call on this Soviet ambassador every third day or so, just so that he would know [that we were there]. We had nothing to say. We had to "invent" things to say to him. In fact, he was a likable man.

That takes us up to the spring of 1974, and then, of course, Kissinger began his Syrian shuttle--about the time we wound down this silly exercise. Actually, after I left Geneva, Bob Oakley had to continue to hang around there for several more weeks. As I remember it, this began in April or May, 1974.

JAMES H. MORTON
Administrative/Political Officer
Bern (1973-1975)

James H. Morton was raised in Illinois and graduated from Monmouth College and the University of Chicago. He joined the Foreign Service in 1964. His career included positions in Luxembourg, Greece, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Washington, DC. Mr. Morton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

MORTON: In 1972 I went from the Secretariat to Switzerland. This was a very strange assignment.

Q: Where in Switzerland?

MORTON: Bern, where I did a job that was half administrative and half political. It essentially, I have to be honest, was a product of the fact of my relationship with Joan Clark, who was in charge of EUR/EX in those days.

Q: This was from when to when?

MORTON: 1973-75. Switzerland is a great place except it is full of Swiss. It was very pleasant. Again from a political standpoint nobody much cared. During the whole time there were two issues. One was a referendum to throw out all foreign workers, in which case most outside observers said 80 percent of the Swiss industry would grind to a halt. It almost came to pass
which shows the attitude of the Swiss. And the second one was that a Swiss Canton was thinking of withdrawing from the federation. Now that did not exactly catch the attention of the policy makers.

Another thing we were doing was selling jets to the Swiss Air Force which generated a little more interest.

So it was a very quiet two years.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MORTON: A fellow by the name of Shelby Cullom Davis, who was a reinsurance magnate. A man who usually fell asleep at staff meetings and a man who...and this is no exaggeration...would get in a car and say, "Drive me south." The chauffeur would drive him south and when he hit a border he would wake him up and say, "What direction now?" And they would bounce off the border and go elsewhere. He would disappear two days at a time like that. An unbelievable character and we were mostly happy he was gone most of the time.

Q: What were you doing and how did you work in this situation?

MORTON: We seldom saw the Ambassador. When we did he was affable, glib, and we knew nothing was taking. He wasn't absorbing anything. He just was there because it was a nice lifestyle. He frequently, when he wasn't driving in the car, he would be out of the country. We had a very good DCM, a guy named Roy Percival who took it all in stride. Nobody was too up tight in Switzerland. So we just functioned. We more or less didn't have an ambassador, so we went about our business and worked for Roy.

Q: What were you doing?

MORTON: It was very strange and it happened from Bill Hall's time as Director General. Bill Hall felt very strongly that political officers in the Foreign Service always were the ones who got up top, for one reason or another, not necessarily good. But they were the ones who got up to the managerial level and became the managers of the Foreign Service. That was one reason that the Department was so poorly managed because political officers never had any management experience. The "New Diplomacy for the 70s" was the first time I can recall that emphasis was put on management in the Service. So Bill Hall felt strongly, and I think a lot of people agreed, that they had to do something with these narrow political officers to broaden their horizons. One of the things was...most political officers as junior officers did a consular tour, but they didn't get near admin. So what Bill Hall decided to do was to set up a system whereby at some stage, possibly mid career, a political officer would go off and do an administrative tour or management tour. So when I left there Bill said, "I want you to be an example of this. You are going to go off and do it." Well, I believed it was true as well and at that time I thought I would like to be a top manager and thought this would help. So I got in line. The thing is somewhere along the way I turned around and no one ever got in line behind me. I went out and was a one person experiment.
I have to say, as a political officer all of my career, that this was one of the most challenging things that I did since my consular tour when you really have to work and make some people decisions and that sort of thing. But Bill left by that time and nobody saw the wisdom of that way.

So I was the administrative officer in Bern and then tried to keep up and do some political stuff as well. I engaged such important issues as complaining bitterly to Washington about the lack or tardiness of Washington in increasing our cost-of-living allowance because the dollar was sinking against the Swiss Franc. These are important diplomatic issues. So that was some of the battles I fought, other than managing the budget of a mid-size embassy.

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Q: Well, going back to Switzerland, were there any other things you wanted to cover?

MORTON: The personalities are always interesting. After Davis we had former Senator Peter Dominick from Colorado come. He was dying of Lou Gehrig's disease so we kind of lived through that. He was a nice gentleman and this post was sort of a last plum for him.

RAYMOND C. EWING
Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs
Bern (1973-1975)

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1936. He graduated from Occidental College in 1957 with a degree in history. Ambassador Ewing’s Foreign Service career included positions in Japan, Pakistan, Italy, Switzerland, Cyprus, Tanzania, and Ghana. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1993.

Q: You were there from 1973 to 1975. What were you doing in Bern?

EWING: This was really my first opportunity to be a supervisor, although during the last half of my time in Rome I did supervise a couple of officers and a secretary in a unit of the Economic Section. In Bern I was the Counselor for Economic and later for Commercial Affairs as well. That was a good chance to be more integrated and involved in our Mission--certainly with the Ambassador, although Bern was obviously a smaller post than Rome and with fewer American interests to protect. I often have said that I probably had the best job in that Embassy. The Swiss, obviously, are very interested, very involved, and very knowledgeable in economic matters, not only in their own country but really worldwide, both of a financial nature, but also involving corporations, communications, transportation, and so on. The Swiss are not members of the United Nations and don't really participate politically in any international organization but are very involved in things like the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. They were very interested in GATT and generally in the international economic organizations, even those of which they were not members. These included the IMF and the
A continuing dialogue with the Swiss Government at the senior level, which is primarily what I did there, was a large part of my responsibilities. All of this seemed to be of interest to Washington. We did a lot of reporting, and that was a lot of fun.

The other thing that we, of course, did concerned the financial markets in Switzerland. I spent a lot of time visiting Zurich, Geneva, and Basel to talk with bankers and get their thoughts about the U. S. dollar, the price of gold, and international financial questions. Of course, the energy crisis broke, and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] raised the price of crude oil. There was a lot that the Swiss had to say about that, at that particular time, too.

Q: What were the Swiss interested in getting from you? What were their concerns?

EWING: I think that they were interested in getting from us the views which Washington and the United States Government had. They are a neutral country and are very independent. They also wanted to cooperate to the extent possible. So what they wanted was as open a dialogue as possible. Certainly, that's what we tried to give them.

Q: While you were there, you must have had rather close ties to our Treasury Department.

EWING: A lot of the reporting which I did on the Swiss economy and on the views of both government officials and bankers on international financial matters was primarily of interest to the Treasury. At that time the Treasury Department did not have a Treasury Attaché in the Embassy in Bern. Later, I think within a year or two after I left, they did assign a person there. But at that time we did all of that reporting. Yes, we recognized that much of what we did was of no interest to the Swiss Desk Officer in the Bureau of European Affairs, and probably of very little interest to anybody else in the State Department. But it was of major interest to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other agencies of the United States Government in the economic area.

Q: Were we pushing the Swiss to play any role, say, when the energy crisis came?

EWING: Well, we wanted as much solidarity and cohesion among the petroleum consumer countries as we could possibly get. We got involved fairly quickly in trying to set up what became the International Energy Agency, based with the OECD in Paris. We wanted the Swiss to be very much a part of that, as they have been, from the beginning. The Swiss are very much oriented toward the private sector. They were not inclined to making government to government deals, to the extent that some of the other countries did.

Q: What about bank accounts--numbered Swiss bank accounts?

EWING: Not long before I went to Switzerland we reached agreement on a judicial assistance treaty. That took effect and allowed for the exchange of information or handling requests for information under certain circumstances. So to some extent that dealt with a major irritant in our relations. We tried to make that work effectively during the time we were there. We had some visits. The Swiss, obviously, were not going to give us everything that we wanted, but at least this treaty established some parameters and structure for requests that we would make.
Q: *Were you involved in either trying to implement or to expand this treaty?*

EWING: Not to expand, because it was still in its early days. We wanted to work with what we had. I was involved to some extent with this question in the Embassy. The Consular Section handled some of the requests for information to the Swiss Ministry of Justice. I had liaison and contact with the Banking Commission and, of course, with some of the banks, too, as well as with the central bank, the Swiss National Bank. On occasion I would accompany visitors [interested in such matters]. So I was involved with that, though I was not the main action officer within the Embassy for specific requests for particular information.

Q: *I'm sure that everything was spelled out very neatly in the treaty. As we all know, when hard charging prosecutors--I'm talking about American prosecutors--want something, they don't pay as much attention, you might say, to the rules as one would wish they would. Was this a problem?*

EWING: I think it was a problem--certainly a potential problem. Usually, we would hear from the Swiss if somebody, say, a prosecutor, went directly to a bank or to somebody in the Swiss Government. They would not respond, they would not deal with him, until the request was put back in the proper context, in the proper channels. They would tell us about it. Part of the problem was information. Some people didn't know how to go about making a request. In other cases they were trying to go as far as they could until they were stopped. I don't remember it as a major issue. It was sort of a brush fire. It had some potential, but, usually, we were able to control it.

Q: *How did Ambassador Shelby Cullom Davis operate?*

EWING: I happened to like him and actually had a lot of affection for him, although some people in the Embassy, and certainly some of the Swiss, didn't have too high a regard for him. He came from an insurance background. There were two things about him which I particularly liked. One was that, as far as my area of responsibility was concerned, I had a full opportunity to have contact, make demarches, transact business, and do reporting with very little second guessing or direction from either the Ambassador or the DCM.

Q: *Who was the DCM at this time?*

EWING: The DCM was Roy Percival. He had a very strong, economic background himself. He certainly read carefully what I did and made some good suggestions but didn't feel that he had to make all of the contacts himself. And the Ambassador didn't, either. I think that during the whole time I was there with Ambassador Davis only once did he have a meeting at a higher level in the government on an economic question. That was when the Swiss called him in about something that they wanted to protest. In terms of dialogue with the United States Embassy on most economic matters, they were quite happy to talk to me. And that went up to fairly senior levels. The second thing I liked about him was that he knew an awful lot of people in Switzerland. He'd come there often before he was appointed Ambassador. He loved to travel in the country. He liked to meet new people and he liked to socialize. One of the things that he did was to hold a
series of small lunches with bankers, not only in Bern, but especially in Zurich, Basel, Geneva, and Lausanne. We arranged those and were always able to go along with him. It gave us a wonderful opportunity to meet senior Swiss bankers. It wouldn't have been easy for an economic officer in the American Embassy to make an appointment and walk in and see them. Through these lunches and social engagements we had opportunities to meet lots of key people. For those two reasons I had a lot of respect for him and enjoyed working for him.

Bern was also a great assignment from the family point of view. It was a wonderful place for children to grow up. They liked the school and skiing. There were a lot of good things about it.

Q: Then you headed back to [the Bureau of] European Affairs [in Washington]?

EWING: Yes. I was assigned to Bern for three years and expected to stay until 1976. My family expected to stay as well. However, early in 1975 Joan Clark, who was then Executive Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, called me and asked if I'd meet with Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman, who was coming to Switzerland shortly thereafter with Secretary of State Kissinger. [Hartman] needed a new Special Assistant. She said that it was a great job and asked if I wanted to be interviewed for it. I said, "Okay." I was interviewed, we seemed to hit it off well, and he asked me to come back to Washington a year early. From a career point of view, this was excellent and led to some good things. But from a family point of view it was difficult, because our kids were very happy in Switzerland, they liked to ski, they liked their school, and had a lot of independence to move around the city. They were disappointed to come back, particularly our eldest, who was going into seventh grade. They found the change not particularly easy.

ARVA C. FLOYD
European Security Council Negotiations
Geneva 1974

Arva Floyd was born and raised in Georgia and educated at Emory University and the University of Edinburgh. After serving with the US Army in World War II and in the Occupying Forces in Austria after the war, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Djakarta, Indonesia in1952. His foreign postings include Indonesia, South Africa, Martinique and Brussels, where he dealt with matters concerning NATO, European Security and Disarmament. In his Washington assignments Mr. Floyd also dealt with these issues. From 1978 to 1980 Mr. Floyd was Foreign Policy Advisor to United States Coast Guard. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

FLOYD: I overlooked something when I told you what I did from '74. I went directly from the European bureau - I was still attached there administratively - and I joined our negotiating team in Geneva for the second phase of the negotiations for the European Security Council. We tended to downplay these negotiations, while they were underway. We didn’t send a full-time negotiator out there; we had U.S. ambassadors from nearby places in Europe come over and do it. They did double-duty – in their bilateral assignment to the country to which they were accredited and in
their position at the conference – with the result that the senior career fellow who was there would often be running the U.S. delegation. That was my role for several months. It was very interesting.

I went from there to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in Washington, DC. It had an office of international relations, with an assistant director of the agency as director for the office. I was supposed to be the deputy assistant director for this office of international relations. It turned out I was the acting director for about a year, because the fellow who had been tapped to come in and run the show couldn’t get accredited as he couldn’t get approved by the Senate.

Q: Why was that? Was this a problem of outlook or the person?

FLOYD: A combination of both as seen through the lens of Jesse Helms. I don’t know what the specifics were. The fellow who was supposed to get the job was John Newhouse, who was a fairly well-known journalist and writer on strategic and other matters. He was a very nice, intelligent fellow. He would have done a good job, I’m sure. He had somehow gone afoul of and gotten entangled with Jesse.

Q: When you were there, how were these negotiations? Were we making progress? How did you feel about the negotiations at the time you were dealing with them?

FLOYD: Well, we made gradual progress. It was a very slow-going matter, because we had about 30 countries participating. The conference had 2 ½ basic agendas. One was to be a declaration on the principal governing relations between states. What the Soviets had long wanted was an agreement, as formal as they could get it, which recognized to the extent that they could get it, the permanence of the divisions of Europe and the existing boundaries of Europe. They were never going to get a non-aggression treaty, which they occasionally proposed; but they wanted something.

One of the reasons they weren’t going to get much at all is that, of course, we couldn’t afford politically to recognize the permanence of the division of Germany; nor could we do anything which even suggested that the quadripartite rights, which went back to the post-World War II agreement and which implied special Allied rights in Berlin, would be undermined. So, finally, the Soviets fell back onto an effort to get a kind of UN-like declaration on the integrity of nation-states, the inviolability of frontiers and so forth. That was one area of the negotiations.

The other area of the negotiations, which was of more interest to the Western democracies, was the so-called freer movement of people, ideas and information. And finally, it was called a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, so we felt that the conference had to make some sort of declaratory gesture with respect to economic and trade relations, and also with respect to military aspects. So those were the 2 ½ or 3 ½ areas.

Q: What area were you dealing with?

FLOYD: Well, at the time I was in Geneva, all of them really. I was acting head of the delegation or deputy to the ambassador if he was there. So I followed them all. The true
centerpieces really were the declaration of inviolability of frontiers and the so-called freedom of movement idea. I may pursue this a little bit, and I think it has a certain general interest.

The sense during the period of preparation before the conference began and when it was just a proposal and the concern of the United States government, was that this was just a conference for show; but, that while it had no real substance to it and was just another of the Soviet peaceful coexistence, so-called initiatives, if we went off and signed an agreement with the Russians about nothing in particular but which sounded good, it would greatly undermine support for our military activities. We were also afraid that the European countries would get caught up in détente fever and would basically give the Soviets whatever they wanted, in the way of a declaratory outcome. It turned out that people also assumed that the Soviets were being very cunning and were very patient negotiators and that they would inevitably, at the end of the day, wear down and wear out Allied negotiators, and would get the better end of the deal.

None of those things happened. The Europeans suddenly became interested in these negotiations and took a much firmer attitude towards the Russians than we were sometimes inclined to take because Henry Kissinger was very involved in SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) and other things, and didn’t want to bother the Russians over this, unnecessarily. So that worry came to nothing. The Soviets got very little out of these negotiations that could have done them any good. They got so worn down by the U.S., and especially by the Europeans, that the declaration, which had begun as the substitute for this general declaration and non-aggression pact that the Soviets had long wanted, came down eventually to the statement that the parties agreed that they would not assault the frontiers of other states. That not only says almost nothing, but the use of the word “assault” in English is very bizarre, and doesn’t sound right. What happened there is that that was the word the Soviets used in their English version of their own proposal. So we decided, cleverly, that the Soviets didn’t know how to write English, and we would just leave them with their own words. That would make the whole thing even more ridiculous.

And finally, the Russians actually had some problems with respect to all of this. While the Helsinki declaration dealing with international relations and the principal relations among states, (or however it was entitled), didn’t go beyond anything that was said in the U.N. charter or in other U.N. declarations, the fact that it was negotiated among these European states, east and west and others, gave it a kind of symbolism in Eastern Europe which the U.N. document didn’t have. You suddenly had Helsinki groups spreading all over Eastern Europe. These were reformists, who really became a thorn in the side of the Eastern European communist governments, as well as the Soviet Union. So, all of this came out far better than one might have expected. It was, as I indicated, basically a declaratory type of exercise and didn’t result in any hard agreement. But the Soviets probably came out with the shorter end of the stick.

Q: Some people have called this one of the factors causing the breakup of the Soviet Union as it did allow a cover for dissidents and all.

FLOYD: Yes.

Q: And the Soviets were never really able to deal with this.
FLOYD: They had great trouble dealing with it. And, as I said, they got very little out of it. There was a specific area where this really did hurt the Russians. This is interesting. I was not then involved in Europe; I was following this from this country. But, we all remember that at a given point the East Germans, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, were suddenly trying to leave East Germany in much larger numbers than before. This was a real problem for the East Germans and, therefore, for the Russians. One of the things the East Germans were doing was to get into Czechoslovakia in some fashion; but then, the Czechs, who had a very hard-line communist government, wouldn’t allow them to go across the border from Czechoslovakia into Germany.

So this stream of potential refugees from East Germany got itself diverted into Hungary. And from Hungary, you can cross the border into Austria, which some of them were doing. So the East Germans got furious and, of course, the Soviets also got furious at the Hungarians for allowing this, and protested saying, “We have these agreements which require us to honor each others’ political concerns, and so forth.” And the response of the Hungarians was, “Yes, but there’s this international treaty which overrides this, the Helsinki Agreement, that talks about the freer movement of people. So we can’t do anything about this.” One thing wrong with the argument is that the Helsinki Agreement was never a treaty. But never mind; it made the Hungarians feel more comfortable in allowing the East Germans on; so sure, that was a major factor.

Q: At the time that you were dealing with this off and on, did you have the feeling that this was not number one on the priority with Henry Kissinger and company?

FLOYD: Oh, very much so. Henry never understood it, really. He wasn’t interested in it; he didn’t ever really get his mind around it. It was generally assumed that our negotiators in Helsinki were expected, certainly by the Russians and maybe also by Henry, I don’t know to what extent this might have been true, to simply give away the ball game right there, quickly. That didn’t happen; and the Russians were fairly disturbed by this, apparently. They made their objections to Washington; but, Henry was not about to do anything which would publicly show his hand in this, because he realized that whatever he might think of this whole process, it was the only détente initiative that the Western Europeans had available to them at that time.

Many of the Europeans were involved in the MBFR negotiations – the force reduction negotiations, but that was kind of low-profile and didn’t attract much public interest. But the Helsinki negotiations were a highly public thing, and the Europeans didn’t want anybody to give away the store openly in public. In fact, as I indicated earlier, they were much firmer about much of this stuff. So, the suspicion of what Henry Kissinger might do if he ever got his hands on the process was such that when the so-called Geneva phase, the second phase of this story after Helsinki – Helsinki worked out the agenda; Geneva negotiated all of the texts which fell under it – started, we in European affairs decided we were not going to give our negotiator any written instructions as doing so would have meant clearing it with the National Security Council staff, and that would have invited the kind of interest from Henry Kissinger we didn’t want. We just let it start, to let it keep a low profile. We just explained to him what the issues were and so forth.
Some of the traditional career diplomats who went over as deputy head of delegation and often head of delegation, were stunned by this whole approach; they couldn’t conceive of such an arrangement. They were appalled by it, so they didn’t stay any longer than they had to. However, we had a third-ranking member of the delegation over there who knew the issues and was very active, and he filled in.

GEORGE JAEGER
Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe
Geneva (1974-1975)

JAEGGER: I arrived in Geneva in April of 1975 to join a thoroughly frustrated American delegation of a dozen officers to the ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’ who had been there for well over a year trying to negotiate the terms of what came be called the Helsinki Final Act - and, so far, had gotten virtually nowhere. In fact the 35 western and eastern nations, plus the Vatican, who comprised the CSCE conference, had not been able to agree on much more than chapter headings and a few scattered paragraphs here and there - the rest being blank space where language would have to be inserted.

Q: Let’s first recall the background. The Helsinki process derived from the USSR’s longstanding desire for a European Security Conference to ratify its post-war borders which went back to Molotov’s proposals in the fifties, no?

JAEGGER: That’s right. The USSR had again and again resurrected the idea of a multilateral European conference to confirm its post-World War II borders and serve as a de facto peace treaty. This, of course, implied Western acceptance of the division of Germany, recognition of the GDR’s western and eastern boundaries and confirmation of the USSR’s grip over Eastern Europe and the Baltic states - issues which in fact came to haunt President Ford and probably led to his defeat after the Final Act was solemnly signed in Helsinki, on August 1 1975.

The most important price the US and our European allies hoped to exact in return was extensive human rights language, including cultural, religious, economic and journalistic freedom, with which to combat Soviet abuses and weaken its totalitarian grip. Curiously, Kissinger did not originally see human rights as the key issue for the West, since he was focused on resolving the tangle of major diplomatic questions still facing a European settlement. In the end he came to understand that getting Brezhnev to sign up on human rights was probably the major accomplishment of the whole process.

Q: We won’t go into the whole complex history of the Helsinki process, but perhaps you could give us a brief overview to set the stage?

JAEGGER: As we said, Nixon and Kissinger had originally been lukewarm about this project, which gained momentum after the Berlin treaties of the early 1970’s which validated Brandt’s Ostpolitik and ratified the division of Germany. US reticence moderated further after it was
agreed that decisions would only be reached by consensus, that the US and Canada would be full participants and that real gains might also materialize for the West, i.e. implied Soviet acceptance of NATO and the US presence in Europe, and opportunities for making Brezhnev accept human rights provisions.

Others, particularly the French and their diplomatic allies, Belgium, Italy and Spain, had other motives. Under France’s leadership, these countries had for some time seen an over-arching, permanent East-west security structure, which the CSCE promised to create, as a way of reducing NATO and American influence, without entirely eliminating them. By steering closer to Moscow than the other allies, they were therefore both occasionally troublesome and influential.

The French also played a major role in the Mediterranean context, where countries like Malta, Italy and some on the north African littoral wanted the Med to be recognized as an entity with special interests, issues in which I became much involved.

To promote these and other, partly inconsistent interests, participating countries formed informal caucuses in which they coordinated their positions: For example there was a NATO and a separate European community caucus; the more neutral counties, including Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Malta, Cyprus, Lichtenstein and the Vatican, tried to be peacebrokers with a relatively more muted agenda; the Mediterraneans met to work out their positions, etc. So it was a very complex conference, not only because of the number of states involved, but because each of the groups had special interests which it pursued.

Q: We obviously won’t be able to go into all these subsets, but explain at least how all this was officially organized?

JAEGGER: Essentially in three major and some minor ‘baskets’, each of which was negotiated in separate large conference rooms by 36 representatives of the participating states all sitting around a very large table.

Basket I dealt with Security issues - such as sovereign equality of the participating states, refraining from the threat or use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, etc., as well as confidence building measures and notification of major maneuvers and military movements - subjects which caused particular difficulties.

Basket II focused on Cooperation in Economics, Science, Technology and, interestingly, the Environment, calling for free, unimpeded trade, business contacts, exchange of technical information, industrial cooperation, scientific exchange, tourism etc.

Basket III was the famous human rights basket, “Humanitarian and other fields,” which dealt in detail with facilitating family contacts and reunification; freer travel and tourism; encouraging sports exchanges and meetings among young people; improved conditions for journalists; improved access to and exchange of information; greater cooperation and exchange in all aspects of culture and in education - in short the whole range of human rights issues which would make for greater openness behind the Curtain.
Lastly, there were two special ‘Baskets’, one on provisions which should apply to the ‘Mediterranean’; the other, called the ‘Follow-on’ Basket, to determine the vexed question whether the Helsinki Final Act would be a one-off event, would result in one or more follow-on conferences, or become a permanent organization - which in fact it did: First as the CSCE (the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) and, more recently, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), which has been much in the news because of its work organizing and supervising elections in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere.

Q: What then was your task when you got to Geneva?

JAEGGER: The head of the American delegation, Ambassador ‘Bud’ Sherer - an affable and very able career officer who had been Ambassador in Prague - asked me to be the American representative in the Mediterranean and the Follow-on baskets - negotiations which involved two separate sets of frequent meetings at the International Conference Center at which my 35 colleagues and I would, as a result of Soviet Bloc obfuscation, accomplish virtually nothing for weeks on end!

Throughout April and May, as for many months before, the Soviet Bloc delegates would get up in turn, spout virtually the same lines and refuse to budge. As a result, we all had lots of time on our hands for leisurely lunches and long walks on the Geneva waterfront, and doubted that the negotiation would come together soon, if ever. All this was, of course, intensely frustrating, particularly since I missed my family and hated my antiseptic Swiss hotel. All this induced a severe stomach ailment which vanished as soon as Pat came to join me at the house of old friends in Montreux.

I have since read Jack Maresca’s book “To Helsinki: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975”, Duke University Press 1985 - he was Bud Sherer’s Deputy, and the coordinator of our delegation - who paints a more nuanced picture of gradual, perhaps even accelerating progress as roadblocks are successively overcome in Geneva, by Kissinger and Gromyko and others in the capitals. He had the broader view since he bases his account on discussions in the Coordinating Committee of delegation heads. All I can say, is that that was not apparent to me or my colleagues at the negotiating level. What does stand out is my recollection that, toward the end of May, Bud Sherer called Maresca and me in urgently, and said, “The Soviets have just called up and said, ‘Would we come over to their residence?’” That was unusual.

So the three of us went over to the Soviet residence. There was Yuri Dubinin, the tough, lanky Soviet DCM, later Soviet Ambassador to the UN, then to the US, with his leg casually draped over a chair. He handed us all a drink, looked at Bud Sherer and said, “Well, Bud, how much is it going to cost us to cut the mustard?” Sherer said, “You mean for the whole thing?” Dubinin said, “Yea, how much?” Bud Sherer, still clearly astonished, said, “Well, you know how much. You’ve got to sign onto all the human rights language, the religion language, the journalism language, and all the rest.” Dubinin said, “Fine.” We said, “Well, how are you going to do this given the record over the last 12 months, because we wont go back on our position. Dubinin said, “Oh, we don’t expect you to. It’ll work out.”
Q: He got new instructions from Moscow?

JAEGGER: That’s right. When Sherer asked, “What brought all this about?” Dubinin replied, “Well, he’s [Brezhnev] decided that he wants the [Helsinki] conference to happen, and wants it on the proposed date, so we’re going to finish it.”

Q: So what happened?

JAEGGER: For the next six weeks we watched this amazing process in all the baskets, including mine, in which the Soviet bloc countries, who had been stonewalling for many months, would gradually take turns in moving, step-by-step, from their previous rigid positions. When time was up we had a text close to 90 percent of what we had wanted and, as Dubinin had said, the road was clear for the formal signing of the Final Act at Helsinki on August 1, 1975!

Q: So essentially you had your way and didn’t have to split the difference with Moscow?

JAEGGER: Certainly there was some negotiating. But basically they inched systematically toward our positions, even though during these last six weeks they made us work hard for it.

Q: Trying to understand this Russian turnabout, how much did it have to do with West Germany’s Ostpolitik?

JAEGGER: No doubt German Ostpolitik was the key underlying factor, since confirmed post-war German and Polish frontiers were essential from Moscow’s perspective before Soviet detente could go much further. But there were other things in it for the Soviets, i.e. the Final Act by implication ratified Soviet control of the Baltic states and seemed to confirm its grip on eastern Europe. Another major factor was Brezhnev’s vanity, since he clearly did not want to miss starring at Helsinki, which he saw as the most important post-war conference since Versailles. Tactically the turn-around was made possible by the secret negotiations between Kissinger and the Soviets while we were in Geneva doing our working level stuff - a parallel high-level track to which I, at least, was never privy to. I suspect that Bud Sherer too was at least partly in the dark, since he seemed as surprised as the rest of us over the Russian turnabout.

Q: Did you get over your illness?

JAEGGER: Quickly. This final phase was a much happier and satisfying time. After committee meetings I took the train to Montreux, where Pat would pick me up for the short drive up to Baugy sur Clarens where Pat, Christina and I were staying with her cousin Edita and her husband Franco in their lovely old farm house. I wrote my daily reporting telegrams while speeding along Lake Geneva, spent a nice evening with Pat, Franco and Edita, and then trained back to Geneva early in the morning, when I would hand in my telegram. Washington never realized that there was a time gap between my meetings and the dispatch of my reports. It was in the end a happy and satisfying time.

Q: Did you have any dealings with the Soviets outside the official meetings at the conference?
JAEGER: Yes, the most telling encounter involves a lunch at an elegant Geneva restaurant with the coordinator of the Soviet delegation, a very bright, competent diplomat, to celebrate the conclusion of our negotiations. After several toasts, I said to him, “You know, what I simply can’t grasp is why in the end you accepted all the human rights stuff. It will undo the USSR.” He looked at me with amusement - we were munching on some very nice smoked salmon at the time, part of our non-proletarian lunch...

Q: Laughter

JAEGER: …and said, “Mr. Jaeger, please! I thought you were experienced diplomat. I think your question is, if I may say, naïve! Do you really think that the Soviet Union will pay the slightest attention to any of this?”

Q: He said that?

JAEGER: Yes. I said to him, “You know, let’s meet 20 years from now and see who has been naïve. I think you will find that these words you agreed to will have a corrosive effect on your system, like water dripping on a rock! As your people hear about them, and we will of course make sure they do, they will want you to live up to them, and step by step the Soviet Union is going to be forced to accept a lot of these principles, with far-reaching results.”

Q: You said that?

JAEGER: Yes. Which, of course, they did. Although we parted on friendly terms, he left unconvinced that the USSR had signed more than a scrap of paper of no consequence.

As the USSR disintegrated some years later - in some significant part because of the human rights campaigns, reinforced by Soviet commitments in the Final Act, I often thought of that lunch, and was rather proud of what we had wrought.

Before we all left Geneva, Bud Sherer asked me if I would do a wrap-up telegram assessing the CSCE negotiation, which would put what we had negotiated into its broader perspective. Apparently he and people in Washington liked the telegram. I myself always thought it was too long, too wordy, and wished that I had George Kennan’s gift of dealing with great issues in plain and simple terms.

Be that as it may, the argument I made in that concluding telegram was the same one I made over lunch with the Soviet diplomat, that the impact of the Helsinki text on the Soviet Union would be that of water dripping on stone. Although the totalitarian Soviet system seemed impregnable in 1975, over time, perhaps over a long time, the fundamental principles they signed on to at Helsinki would wear them down and undo their regime. In retrospect this has been the case. The Helsinki Act was a major turning point.

E. MICHAEL SOUTHWICK
Ambassador Southwick was born in California and raised in California and Idaho. Educated at Stanford University, he entered the Foreign Service in 1967. Basically an Africa specialist, Mr. Southwick served largely in African posts, including Burundi, Rwanda, Niger, Kenya and Uganda, where from 1994 to 1997 he was United States Ambassador. He also served in Switzerland and Nepal. In his Washington assignments, he dealt with African and United Nations matters. The ambassador was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

SOUTHWICK: I packed off to Geneva, which was also exciting, because it was a European assignment and I’d never had one before. I’d been in the Third World, Kathmandu and Kigali. I was hired by someone at the office of the special representative for trade negotiations named Harold Malmgren and he was kind of the boy wonder of the ’60s Kennedy round trade negotiations. In the ’60s as you know the trade function moved out of State where it had been for decades if not forever and moved into an office which was part of the executive office of the President. The State Department still had a considerable role because it had an office in trade and a lot of the people who were involved in trade negotiations were people who had come out of the State Department. I didn’t feel that it was an entirely alien thing and the staff assistant job is very much connected with the chemistry between the individual and the boss and Malmgren and I hit it off pretty well. So, the big variable then was that the administration did not have a mandate from congress to do a trade negotiation, but they expected to get one. They wanted to be ready to roll as soon as the mandate came. This was the summer of 1974. I went over to Geneva to help set up the delegation which was going to be a resident delegation, something that we had never done before. It was anticipated that the negotiations would take two, three, four years. I helped get office space, set up the offices, do a lot of the administration liaison work at that stage. We had a very tiny resident operation, STR as it was called, in Geneva in a building about five blocks down the Rue du Lausanne away from the mission which was in the Proctor and Gamble building at the time. I went over there and it was just one other resident Foreign Service Officer, somebody named Carlos Moore who was an economist, Ph.D. economist and we had a secretary and that was about it.

Q: Okay, well, first you were there from when to when?

SOUTHWICK: ’74 to ’76.

Q: What was the status of trade negotiations? What had been going on before so that when you, what were you all going to be doing, but a little more background?

SOUTHWICK: The trade negotiations were and still are conducted in rounds and there are big multilateral efforts every 10 or 15 years to reduce tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers. A lot of this work is mathematical when it comes to tariffs. A lot of it is more theoretical and more practical with regard to things like non-tariff barriers like quotas and subsidies and so forth. You can get very arcane, I found out, as I went along. There were people who were very specialized with PhDs in what seemed to me to be obscure recondite aspects of this thing. There had been in
the ‘60s the Kennedy round of trade negotiations, which was widely regarded as successful and helped pave the way for this prosperity that the whole world enjoyed in the ‘60s and into the ‘70s. There’s also thinking among trade circles that it’s like a bicycle: it has to keep going or everybody falls off. You have to keep liberalizing. If you don’t keep liberalizing, the forces of protectionism will gradually gain hold. The idea was to do another round of negotiations. This one was going to be called the Tokyo round because the ministerial meeting that launched the negotiations had taken place there. It couldn’t take place unless the United States had authority to do so from Congress because constitutionally Congress has a big role in trade setting tariffs. We were waiting for this bill and there were a lot of complications with it because a trade negotiations bill is a big magnet for protectionist forces as well as liberalization forces.

Then a big issue as often is the case, which was not specifically related to the bill, gets entangled with it. This was the question of emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. At that time the Soviet Union was very restrictive in allowing Jews to emigrate to Israel or to any other place for that matter. Eventually a compromise was reached on this called the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. I had already been in Geneva several months by then, but I think it was in December of 1974 when this amendment came on, which specified what the Soviet Union had to do and the bill was passed.

Now, in the meantime, the person that hired me, Mr. Malmgren, for some reason didn’t catch the fancy of the leadership of the White House. Remember 1974, this was Nixon resigning and Ford coming in. Ford came in with a somewhat different crew. It certainly wasn’t wholesale, but he had some different people among who was Donald Rumsfeld and somebody named William Walker. He was a protégée of Rumsfeld. Mr. Walker, who was the chief of presidential personnel in the Ford White House, decided he wanted the job that had originally been slated for Malmgren. He was a political appointee obviously well wired with Rumsfeld and saw this as a stepping stone. As I learned, I didn’t know about this totally then, a lot of political appointees come in and it’s not just to serve their country for a few years, it’s to do something that launches them in the private sector in a very big way. Bill Walker decided that the route for him was to get expertise in international trade. That would land him a good job on Wall Street or in the banking industry or somewhere. Anyway, it would be a route to this. He knew virtually nothing about trade.

As I began to learn in this case with the Republican administration, there are some animosities, suspicion and so forth about the career service, the Foreign Service, or the civil service. You’re dealing with a set of prejudices there which do not seem to afflict, if you want to put it that way, the Democratic Party so much; although it’s there, I believe, frankly in both parties. I ran into this and when Walker got there he was new to it. He was uncertain and he was a very aggressive person, extremely intelligent in many ways.

Q: Where had he been?

SOUTHWICK: I think he came out of Illinois. His detractors said he got his start handling the parking lots for some of the Republican leaders. Then he had moved following Rumsfeld a bit.

Q: Rumsfeld is from Illinois.
SOUTHWICK: Yes, an Illinois Republican. Walker had never held a job for more than about six or seven months and I guess the biggest job he had was when Nixon established a wage and price control board. This was to help stem inflation. He had a stint on that. This White House job, chief of presidential personnel, was a very good job. It was also a very good job from which to land your next job ergo the trade negotiations job. He was the assistant STR and the person put in charge of him was somebody named Frederick Dent. He had been the Secretary of Commerce. Frederick Dent was a very wealthy Southerner, I think from one of the Carolinas, family fortune in the textiles industry. This was very important because textiles are one of the most heavily protected sectors in the United States.

Q: Nixon did everything he could for textiles.

SOUTHWICK: So, putting Frederick Dent there was a way to tell the textile industry, don’t worry too much. You might have to worry a little bit, but don’t worry too much. You’re not going to get sold down the river. Well, with this change I was suddenly working for somebody who, as I said, had these prejudices about career people.Walker also had these anxieties because of the invidious comparisons people were constantly making about him with regard to Hal Malmgren, who everybody regarded as sort of the stellar trade negotiator. He didn’t get the job and this person with the zero qualifications got the job. None of that bothered me. I mean my job was to support him; support the delegation in every way I could, but there was, to put it mildly, a personality clash. So, this tour, after he arrived, took a definite turn for the worse for me.

Q: Well, let’s talk, first before we get into the personalities, which are very important in this, but here you are the new boy on the block too in economics.

SOUTHWICK: Yes, I didn’t know anything either. So, that should have been a bond between us.

Q: How did you see them going? What were some of the currents and eddies in this process?

SOUTHWICK: Well, we gradually built up a delegation of people from STR, people from the Commerce Department, from the Agriculture Department.

Q: STR is?

SOUTHWICK: Special Trade Representative. That was the nickname, or the acronym, for it. So, we ended up with a delegation of about 25 people full time. A lot of them were extremely capable people. People, who were wonderful as, I don’t want to say mentors, but people from whom you could learn a lot, and I formed some very good associations with any number of these people. I got involved in a lot of different kinds of things, so I could tell that things were not going as well as they should be vis-à-vis Walker. After some months he brought over someone from the White House to be his special assistant. I found myself moved out of the office next to Walker and moved down to another floor in the mission. Frankly, I didn’t mind at that point because I felt things were going badly. I just felt getting away, sort of redefining the job, might be a way of surviving for a while.
Q: Well, how did you find other members of the delegation, the American delegation reacted to Walker and to the negotiations?

SOUTHWICK: Well, his style was fairly aggressive. His style was basically humiliating and putting people on the spot and so forth. He did this at staff meetings partly in an effort, quite frankly, to just show people who was boss. Some of these people were like GS16s and 17s from other agencies. On a personal level it was sort of palpable. I wasn’t the only one who was having trouble with this person. At the same time we were all professional. They were representing the different agencies in Washington; different constituencies and they didn’t necessarily think that their job was to help STR or help the United States of America, which was something that I can’t say came as a shock. I wasn’t that naïve, but I was surprised at how prominent those kinds of what I would call sectarian narrow kinds of considerations drove what people did. In an embassy we know what the hierarchy is: a typical embassy, with the ambassador in charge and we’re all working there. I think the State Department, and I still think this to this day, we are better at representing the national interests than any other agency. Absolutely. There’s very little doubt about it in my mind.

Q: Well, of course the other side argues that the State Department, for good relations, will sell out the textile industry or the toilet bowl industry or what have you.

SOUTHWICK: Yes, we’re looking for in some sense the good of the country as a whole. That means that we’re not defending certain specific items sometimes, and this is why the trade function was taken away from us because the State Department was not regarded favorably. This was a huge lesson for me: that you have to pay attention to domestic politics. You have to pay attention to that, and you should not feel its something that’s dirty or ugly or something to be avoided which I think a lot of Foreign Service Officers do.

Q: Did you feel that was because the delegation was not sort of overly cohesive?

SOUTHWICK: It wasn’t very cohesive really at all, but it had a number two who was State Department who was an experienced economic officer who had done a lot of the trade negotiations. He was well regarded.

Q: Who was that?

SOUTHWICK: Bill Colbert. I had a decent correct relationship with him, but not a terribly good one. I don’t think he was going to go out of his way in particular to help me deal with the problems I had with Walker.

Q: What were you doing? I mean first when you were working for Walker, what were you doing then?

SOUTHWICK: Sometimes it was going to meetings with him and writing at meetings. Sometimes it was little oddball chores. A lot of it was sort of the administrative management liaison so that we were still setting up this office suite on two floors in the Botanic Building in Geneva and we were also getting him a house which took a lot of trouble. I spent a lot of my
time because the real estate market in a place like Geneva was very tight and he felt that he was the most important person there. We had a couple of other ambassadors there at Arms Control and Disarmament in the same building. They thought they were the most important. The representative of the UN there, of course he thought he was the most important. It was also this kind of junk. It was a very balkanized mission. It wasn’t an embassy. It was a mission and you had people there who would be there for much longer than a Foreign Service tour. They were there to represent the United States at things like the World Meteorological Organization or Telecommunications Union. It’s a UN city. We were there with the GATT, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. People were dealing with different organizations even within the mission and representing different constituencies in Washington.

Q: Did you get any feel for how Walker was in dealing with other countries at these meetings when you were taking notes?

SOUTHWICK: Well, I think at the beginning he was edgy and uncertain. As I said, he was very intelligent and I have to give credit where credit is due and he did learn very quickly. He did become very astute about the issues, and as time wore on I think he did gain respect, sometimes grudgingly, with people both within the delegation, and also the colleagues that he was dealing with in other delegations. Not enormously, but he did have respect.

Q: Was during the ’74 to ’76 time, granted you were sort of all setting up and all, but were you having any feeling of momentum as far as what they were doing?

SOUTHWICK: It was very slow and very problematic. The big issue in trade negotiations then and now is agriculture. The Europeans had the common agricultural policy, which was highly protectionist. We were highly protectionist too, although we didn’t want to admit it. You might say that we’re bad, but they’re worse. They were worse, but we were both bad. It was a kind of a three way fight if you wish. It was the United States, the European Union and Japan. They were the three major trading entities in the world, but everybody else was sort of like the junior varsity or you don’t have to pay much attention to it. The Third World was not really either well equipped to negotiate, or were terribly represented, because this was not like the UN, it did not have universal membership.

Q: Did the Soviet Union play any role there at all?

SOUTHWICK: I remember them being there, but they were not a big factor in trade.

Q: What about within the European Union what about Germany and France? Did you get any feel for them?

SOUTHWICK: Well, this is it. In that arena the enemy was the European Union which is sort of a strange thing. It was shortly after the point where the UK had entered the European Union. It seemed to me like we were dealing with eight or nine countries; I can’t remember. It certainly wasn’t the original six, but it was a couple of others. It was my first taste of dealing with the European Union because they have a lot of difficult, huge internal coordination problems. As everybody who has dealt with them knows, the European member statesmen spend enormous
time hammering out their common position. There’s blood all over the floor. The thing gets set in cement and there’s very little room for change after they set their position. It’s a very tough thing and then they don’t like countries like the United States trying to manipulate the process of their internal negotiations so that when it is finally concluded it is something that the rest of the world can deal with. That was kind of a good object lesson. I was picking up a lot more then, even though I felt more and more uncomfortable, and this is the only tour that I ever had in the Foreign Service where I finally got on the phone and said, I want to curtail. I’m ready to complete my tour for the two years and then I want to get out.

Q: The latter part when you had been supplanted by a White House person what were you doing?

SOUTHWICK: It was mainly the administrative stuff, less and less substance as time went by. I was talking and I didn’t mind in a way because I felt that my idea then was to go back and take the economics course and do something more mainstream with economics in the State Department.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Swiss?

SOUTHWICK: My wife didn’t like them at all. She found them aloof, uncommunicative, concerned only about money. Geneva is a very strange town because there’s a large foreign population and the Swiss are there to benefit from that; basically as they do from the rest of the world. The Swiss stayed out of World War II. They were a haven for a lot of stolen money from around the world. They treated foreigners not very well, particularly the desk workers. So if you wanted to write some kind of essay about all of the things wrong with the Swiss you’d fill up a lot of papers.

Q: How about dealing with them as a sort of from the administrative side?

SOUTHWICK: They were correct. I mean they’d been doing this for decades, so they had a well set up bureaucracy for dealing with that. I think basically it worked pretty well. You would think that the European society, a developed country, worked pretty much like us, like we do. I had come from a third world country and I thought that things would work a lot better. I found that they didn’t work a lot better. There’s a heavy bureaucracy, everything was highly bureaucratized. The Swiss pay a lot of attention to detail. Somebody said that they have a lot of rules. They enforce them all and everybody regards themselves as a policeman. I think there is that kind of mentality. Maybe you can blame all of this on Calvin.

Q: Yes, they don’t strike, one doesn’t hear about famous Swiss jokes.

SOUTHWICK: No. I mean, I think all of us have learned in the Foreign Service that people are people, and pretty much they’re the same everywhere you go. We had some Swiss friends, but it was a little bit harder to break through.

Q: Also, to be saying, when you’ve got a large resident foreign community which comes and goes at a certain point people who live in the country say oh, the hell with this. It’s not worth making friends because they’ll be gone and what’s the point?
SOUTHWICK: We had some friends there from our Rwanda days, a Swiss American couple, and they were about our age and were beginning to have children at the time we were having children and that was kind of a saving grace for us to some degree.

Q: Then you in ’76 were leaving this haven of tranquility?

SOUTHWICK: Yes, what I would have to say then, and in retrospect, it was probably the least pleasant Foreign Service post that we had. We did travel. We had our second child. Our son was born there in Geneva and there were some good aspects to it. I formed some good friendships. I learned a lot, but a lot of what I learned was learned the hard way; dealing with this country is very difficult.

Q: Yes. Do you know what happened to Mr. Walker?

SOUTHWICK: He went on to a firm in New York to handle an aspect of non-tariff barriers called Counterfeit Merchandise. He developed and this was like phony Rolex watches, phony Cartier watches, phony Levis. There was a big area there for the international community to develop rules and enforce them.

HELEN WEINLAND
Consular Officer
Zurich (1974-1976)

Ms. Weinland was born and raised in New York and educated at Mount Holyoke College and Ohio State University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, she served in Zurich, Berlin and Prague and at a number of African posts, including Lagos, Nigeria; Kigali, Rwanda as Deputy Chief of Mission and Kaduna, Nigeria, where she served as Consul General. She also served in Washington as Desk Officer for the Philippines, Nigeria and Zimbabwe as well as Officer for United Nations Affairs. Ms. Weinland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

WEINLAND: I arrived in December of 1974 and I was there until December of ’76.

Q: What was the post in Zurich like at that time?

WEINLAND: There were five officers and one support staff, a communicator, and a bunch of Foreign Service Nationals. I was the junior of two consular officers. There was a commercial officer; there was a political officer and a principal officer. My immediate boss, the senior of the two consular officers made it clear he had had enough visa work in his life to last him until he retired. I did the visas and by the time I left, I was doing 20,000 visas a year.

Q: These were mostly non-immigrant visas?
WEINLAND: I only processed one immigrant visa, because they were generally done in Bern. The one immigrant visa was actually a very interesting case but all the rest were non-immigrant and mostly visitor visas.

Q: Let’s talk about the atmosphere in Zurich at the time. How did you find it?

WEINLAND: I always say Switzerland is a wonderful country to visit and a country I would never, ever be able to live in. I know this is not everybody’s idea but the Swiss, I don’t know if they have changed but they were very self-satisfied, quite well off. They had a lot of temporary workers from Italy and Yugoslavia whom they did not treat very well. The city was extremely clean, very peaceful and pretty dull. I did do a lot of hiking in the mountains while I was there, both with a Swiss friend and with various American friends who came to visit. It was very beautiful, and a wonderful way to clear the head after issuing visas all week long.

Q: There’s a movie, I think called Bread and Chocolate, which shows the life of a woman, of guest workers there, Italian guest workers.

WEINLAND: And it was pretty much on the money. There is another wonderful movie that I don’t think was ever distributed in this country called Die Schweizermacher, which had to do with immigration and becoming a Swiss citizen. That was pretty much on the money too. They are not very open to granting Swiss citizenship to people.

Q: How did you find the sort of community with your consul general?

WEINLAND: I would say I was the only person in the consulate who was able to get along with all the others. You know, I was so junior, I didn’t have a lot of turf issues. I don’t think the principal officer liked my immediate boss very much and I don’t think my immediate boss had huge amounts of respect for him. I liked them both.

Q: Who was the principal officer?

WEINLAND: It was a guy named Jim Nelson, a nice man with a wife who didn’t take herself too seriously. My immediate boss was a man named Jim Huffman whom I am still in contact with. There was some chemistry between them that just didn’t work too well.

The commercial officer had a number of personal problems that I won’t go into here but that was a really tough thing for all of us to have to deal with.

The political officer was very sophisticated, a lot of fun, also with a wonderful wife. I can remember they took me out to dinner the night I was in the middle of packing out and I said to her, “This must get easier after you have done it a couple of times.” And she looked at me with this look, “You must be out of your mind.”

Q: Tell me about the immigrant case.
WEINLAND: The immigrant case was Alexander Solzhenitsyn. He had been thrown out of Russia and had been granted refuge by the Swiss. He was living in Zurich with his wife and I think they had three children, one of them hers by an earlier marriage, and the mother-in-law. So there was a big family group. He had already gotten a non-immigrant visa to go to the States to do some lecturing.

The first time I issued a visa to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, he wanted a non-immigrant visitors’ visa to come to the States for some lecture or research, so it was just he who was applying. He had come in to see the consul general and when I was called up to the consul general’s office, to meet him, the consul general handed me the passport and then I shook Mr. Solzhenitsyn’s hand and then the Consul General said, “Mr. Solzhenitsyn wants to travel to the States” to do this and that and the other and I said, “Oh, OK.” I opened the passport and the first thing I see is the notation “212(A)28.”

Q: Which is . . .?

WEINLAND: Ineligibility because of a communist affiliation, this person whom the communists had a year or two earlier thrown out of the Soviet Union. So of course, rather awkwardly, I said to him, “Mr. Solzhenitsyn, I see that there is this notation and I am going to have to ask you about why this says you have this affiliation or used to in the past.”

So we had to do an interview. He spoke fairly good English or German, maybe we did it in German, and it turned out that as a youth he had been a member of Komsomol, which was nearly obligatory for youth in the Soviet Union. So I said, “There’s no question that your attitude toward the communist regime in the Soviet Union is one of opposition, so I can’t see any problem getting you a waiver” and that’s indeed what we did; we got a waiver of ineligibility.

But then of course, he came in for the immigration visa. He wanted to keep it very hush-hush because I think he did not want the Swiss officials to know that he was planning to emigrate to the United States. He was obviously very paranoid about the KGB keeping track of him as well.

So we did all the interviewing in my office. I had to get a waiver for his mother-in-law because she had been a member of the Communist Party. So he came in with her. She spoke only Russian, so he was translating to me in German. The kids were too young to have to worry about. Then the wife also, I can't remember if she had a communist affiliation or not but for immigration visas of course, there was a great deal that had to go into documenting their opposition to the communists and all that.

I do remember during the interview with the mother-in-law, I said to her, “Can you tell me anything about your opposition to the Communist Party and how you left it?” Solzhenitsyn then said to me, “Well, it’s obvious. She was by then my mother-in-law and she was reading all of my books.” She wrote something that supported some of his books or something like that. I was trying to be cute, and I said to her, “Well, if his books were banned in the Soviet Union, how is it that you were able to read them?” This was very foolish on my part because you didn’t joke about things like that with Alexander Solzhenitsyn. “Well, of course, she read them in samizdat (self-publication), and I said, “Oh, OK, fine.”
Q: Samizdat was the process of underground publication in the Soviet Union.

WEINLAND: Yes. So ultimately, we got all the right waivers and all the right documentation. We had to recreate all their personal documents like birth certificates and marriage certificates and divorce certificates. They had not been able to bring those papers out of the Soviet Union so we had to create an affidavit for each one, all sorts of papers with red tape all over them and seals and everything else. Then the final visa was actually issued by the visa officer from Bern and the Foreign Service National who did immigrant visas there. They came up to Zurich and actually did the fingerprinting and the technical part of issuing the visa. So it was sort of exciting to be part of that.

Q: Did you get any feel for the international community in Zurich? Was it sort of spy versus spy?

WEINLAND: That was not in my portfolio. It was, however, the time of the Bader-Meinhof Gang and the Rote Brigade in Italy, these terrorist groups.

Q: The Red Brigade, these are homegrown, leftist terrorists, not particularly affiliated with anybody except themselves.

WEINLAND: Yes, but doing horrible things; murdering and kidnapping and the rest of it. I think there was a certain, not at my level, but a certain amount of keeping track of who was moving back and forth across Switzerland and also the money flow. I think that money flow was something that was very much of concern.

We had three visits in all from Kissinger in Zurich. I think I am right in saying the first one was with the Shah of Iran and I am trying to think in the context of ’74 to ’76 what they would have been conferring about. It would have been prior to the Shah’s having any serious domestic opposition but it could have been to do with petroleum issues or money laundering, stuff like that.

The second and third Kissinger visits were for him to meet with the South African foreign minister and others to try to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe, what was then Rhodesia. The meeting with the Shah of Iran was just a lunch with no overnight stay, but the other two meetings were a couple of nights each. Those were pretty intense. He came with a really big group of people. I am sure they got some way down the road toward resolving some of the issues and getting the South Africans to get their dirty hands off supporting the Smith regime.

MANUEL ABRAMS
Deputy Chief of Mission

Manuel Abrams was born in Pennsylvania in 1919, and graduated from the City College of New York in 1939. His career has included postings in Frankfurt,
Q: Your final position in the foreign service, I have you in Geneva in the US mission from 1974 to 1977, again as the deputy chief of mission. What does the mission in Geneva do?

ABRAMS: The US mission in Geneva does two related things. One it has a regular staff of representatives to the various organizations of the UN in Geneva, and the second related thing is that it plays host to the hordes of Washington delegates to various Geneva meetings.

Q: Other than playing host, which could be a time consuming thing, did you try to provide some continuity between the visits of delegations and all?

ABRAMS: That's where the regular staff was involved. In the case of Geneva the meetings and the visits are a much bigger role than they usually are in an embassy.

Q: Did you have problems meeting the desires, of the delegates?

ABRAMS: No there wasn't any real problem. There was real continuity. Many of these Geneva organizations are very old and predate the formation of the UN. They were taken over by the UN when the UN was formed. They have a long tradition of getting together and working out international standards or whatever the case may be. And the people in Washington were ones who had been doing this for years, so no it was not a particularly great problem.

Q: Any particular episodes that you would focus on?

ABRAMS: One interesting episode that occurred when I was there was our walking out of the ILO.

It was the first time we walked out on any UN body. We have since done it in Paris at the UNESCO. I really thought at the time that UNESCO was the worst but ILO was pretty bad too. Bad, in what sense? Bad in the sense that this organization, which was supposed to set labor standards and review labor activities and encourage good working conditions in various countries was getting itself involved with all kinds of political matters that it had no business getting involved in. This was an interesting example, where the field and Washington saw eye to eye and at the same time.

The initiation of the walk out began when the UN mission in Geneva sent a telegram to Washington making a recommendation that we do just that. Washington agreed with the recommendation and then we went through a process of sending letters and so forth and having all sorts of meetings with our allies, some of whom had meetings with us trying to dissuade us. We finally did walk out.

Q: There must have been something that sparked it.
ABRAMS: Yes, we had that sort of thing in other UN/Geneva organizations. Such things as the attitude towards Israel, or the PLO, in the days when we would hardly admit there was such an organization. When the ILO began to debate political problems, we left.

Q: *Puerto Rican nationalism was brought up, and these were things that were brought up to tweak the United States.*

ABRAMS: That kind of issue also arose, but we never let it bother us very much.

Q: *Were there any attempts on our part to make the organization understand that we wouldn’t hang around? Was the problem one of other nations or was one leading sort of a cadre in the ILO, carrying the ball?*

ABRAMS: There was a fair amount of sympathy for our view, not openly, on the part of the ILO employees. But the problem was the other countries. Certainly we had a general problem of a double standard in that the investigations into unfair labor practices in the east bloc was very different from investigations anywhere else. But that certainly troubled me less than other things because once you admit a country such as a USSR, which has independent labor movement, into the ILO, you have to have different standards.

Q: *How did you view the role and the effectiveness of the Soviets in this kind of international organization?*

ABRAMS: They had a good mission. It was interesting. They had a number of capable people. They were the only mission with three DCMs, one of them KGB, of course. So in terms of carrying out Soviet policy they were effective. In terms of their role there, sometimes they did well; they were able to line up countries on their side quite often. But this was a period when the Cold War was not at its height or at its depth. It was also a turning point in terms of ending the war in 1975, when the Armistice was signed by Israel and Egypt and Syria. It was before Carter. This was the Nixon/Ford Administration. It was the time of the Kissinger Shuttle Diplomacy. It was the Kissinger Shuttle Diplomacy that resulted in the Armistice, which incidentally was signed in Geneva and I was very happy to be able to observe that.

Q: *Were there any other international agencies that gave you any problems?*

ABRAMS: Not particularly. The WHO (World Health Organization), too did a bit of dabbling in political matters but leaving that aside, they were a very effective organization in dealing with health matters. It was nice to see a UN organization that effective. One interesting thing about the Geneva organizations, as compared with the organization in New York, is that most of the agencies in Geneva have specific functions which most of them carry out quite well in the interest of the world. Rather than the debating society you have often had in New York.

Q: *So you felt you were dealing with a lot of technical people, dealing with technical problems, for the most part. Obviously things would crop up.*

ABRAMS: Also there was one activity that was more along the lines of my experience, which was GATT.
Q: That's the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

ABRAMS: Part of our staff was a permanent mission to GATT.

Q: I take it that you were pretty happy to be there at that time dealing with people dealing with general problems.

ABRAMS: That's right. They dealt with real problems and in a real way.

Q: Did you retire in 1977?

ABRAMS: Yes I did.

HARRY I. ODELL
Deputy Chief of Mission
Bern (1975-1978)

Harry Odell graduated from Brown University and later attended graduate school at the Fletcher School of International Affairs at Tufts University. Prior to attending Brown University, however, Mr. Odell had served in the US Army Air Corps during World War II. His Foreign Service career began in 1950 and it took him to places such as Germany, Israel, Sri Lanka, Greece, Jordan, and Switzerland. In addition, Mr. Odell has held several positions within the Department of State. He was interviewed by Peter Moffat in April 2000.

ODELL: I had at that point been negotiating to become consul general in Dusseldorf. Martin Hillenbrand was the ambassador to Germany. He had been in Berlin while I was there. I think that could probably have happened eventually, but out of the clear blue sky, I got called by Joan Clark. Joan and I had had our difficulties in the past, but she called me and said that a job had come open and would I be interested in going to Switzerland as DCM? I said, "Well, what about Dusseldorf, Joan?" She said, "I don't know what’s going to happen to Dusseldorf." So, I thought over this and said, "Well, maybe I'd better take this one. I did. Whether that was wise or not, probably not. I'd probably have been better off as consul general in Dusseldorf, but who could tell?

I went to Switzerland and I was DCM to three ambassadors. The first one was Dominic, who was actually from Colorado. He replaced Gary Hart, who wanted to be President, and got in trouble with bureaus. Peter Dominic was a senator from Colorado. The Dominics are a banking family from New York. They were around a long time. Peter had moved as a young man to Colorado to dig his own fortune, which I think he had made, and then became a senator. I don't know how he came to be ambassador. Anyway, he was there very, very briefly and then I was chargé for quite an extended period of time until Nat Davis came. Then he left and then Marvin Warner came in. Marvin subsequently went to prison in Ohio, not for anything he had done as
ambassador in Bern, but for violating banking rules and regulations in the state of Ohio. The federal government tried to nail him, but he slipped out of that one. The state of Ohio got him. He actually went to prison. That was an interesting experience. I was struck... Nat Davis was totally CIA gunshy. He wouldn’t even have the CIA station chief and his wife to dinner in the residence. He included them in the Fourth of July reception, but that was about it. He was so afraid that anybody would think he had a CIA connection. But Dominic, who was a republican, and Warner, who was a democrat (both political appointees) - all the CIA had to do was say something and that was important. Of course, it wasn't important, but the mystique of the CIA had really come through to these guys.

Q: Of course, there was a substantial presence of that agency in Bern.

ODELL: Oh, yes. But actually, that was one of the more pleasant aspects. When I arrived, the station chief was a fellow named Fred Alner. He had had polio. That is another thing. He had been in Indonesia and he had polio. The guy that replaced Jack Morrie in Athens had been in India and he had had polio. My wife always wondered whether the CIA had been experimenting on these guys. Fred had this infirmity. He was quite reactionary in his attitudes, but was very bright and a lot of fun to be with. I thoroughly enjoyed knowing Fred Alner. He is a friend of mine until right now. I liked him a lot. I think he played pretty fairly to me. This was a Stansfield Turner period. Fred would show me directives he had gotten from Stansfield, which made it pretty clear that Turner didn't want Fred getting too cozy with the State Department types. Fred would show me these things. He would say, "You understand, Harry, that officially, I'm not supposed to like you very much." Nat Davis, because of this Chile thing, was very afraid that he would be part of the CIA circle. But the other two guys... Dominic wasn't there. He was sick and left quite soon. But Warner made his mark. You hear these horror stories about political ambassadors, but the (horrible???) thing about Warner was that he was basically good looking. He danced well. He had a good singing voice. Women found him very attractive and he found women very attractive. He was rich and bright. There is no doubt about it. Warner was bright. But he was quite divorced from reality in that situation. Some of these things are kind of funny. He had to present his credentials. The Swiss are quite formal on that sort of thing. So, you had to wear morning clothes and so forth, which I didn't own, but I rented. Marvin was getting all ready for this and was quite interested and concerned. So, he asked me to come over to the residence the day before and tell him what was going on. He said, "I want you to see my clothes." If you remember the old movies with chorus boys in the background dancing and so forth, he had a very light outfit, tails, pants, and everything, but it was... He said, "What's the matter?" I said, "Well, it isn't really what you're supposed to be wearing." He said, "Well, what am I supposed to be wearing?" He said, "How the hell do I get that?" This was the day before. I said, "Well, we'll go down to the place where I got mine." So, he went down and they fitted him. It didn't fit, but they got him an outfit that he wore.

Then he was divorced and he liked girls. The CIA had a very attractive young woman working for them, so he decided that she should be his companion and he started going with her. Of course, new ambassadors immediately got on the circuit that was being played by other ambassadors and so forth. So, he took this gal with him. He went to one party, the Romanians. They didn’t know that he was bringing this girl. They had to run around and find a place for her to sit and so forth. He went down to Zurich and decided that a young Australian woman who was
working in the consulate general was very attractive, so he took up with her. Then he took up with a very, very attractive young Swiss woman who worked in the Consular Section of the embassy. He had these girlfriends. I'll say he had good taste in girlfriends, but it wasn't really what he should have been doing so overtly. If he wanted to do this sort of thing, for God's sake, go off someplace and do it. He's Jewish. Alright. There was a Jewish community in Switzerland, which was very old, had been there a long time. It was very well integrated but was still a Jewish community. It was very dignified, very proper. They decided this was the first Jewish-American ambassador that had ever been there (and there weren't very many Jewish ambassadors from any country, except the Israeli, I guess) and that they would have a dinner in his honor in Zurich. So, what does he do but show up with this Australian girl. I was told by a Swiss banker, Hans Beyer... I said, "What happened" and he said, "Nothing happened. We went ahead with the dinner, toasts, the welcome, and everything else, and just pretended that this was perfectly normal. But it was very strange. People don't understand that sort of thing. It's a strange thing to do when you think about it." But the climax came that Carter was President at the time and he had a secretary named Susan Clough. Warner had gotten to know her, so he invited her to come over to Switzerland. But the occasion he chose was two big things a year in the diplomatic community. The diplomatic corps (the ambassadors and chargé) gave an annual white tie dinner in honor of the government of Switzerland. The President would be the guest of honor and other the other consuls would be there. Everybody of any importance would be there. When I was chargé, you were notified by the dean of the diplomatic corps. When I was there, that would be the Papal Nuncio, "Please pony up." There was a lot of money that had to be put up. This was done down in Belding Palace and it was a real big clambake. It cost a lot. The Papal Nuncio made a speech and the President made a little speech.

Well, then the next thing was that the government, of course, gave a much lower scale of party for the diplomatic corps. Warner decided he would invite Susan over and she would go with him to the party that the diplomatic corps gave for the government. Well, the problem was that it was made very, very clear... The rule was that it was chiefs of mission and their spouses. If you didn’t have a spouse, you didn't bring anybody. That was the rule. So, one, he didn't have a spouse; two, he didn't tell anybody that he was bringing this woman. He showed up late, of course, with Susan Clough. The drill at those things was that at the Bellevue, you got there and there was a half hour of cocktail hour, if you will, where you drank champagne and milled around. Then you would all troop in and take your place. As chargé, I was way down at the table, you know. But anyhow, then the festivities would continue. I wasn't there of course, but Warner showed up at the end of the cocktail thing, just when they were just about ready to move into the dining room, with Susan. At that point, the chief of protocol realized what was going on here and he explained to Warner that there was no seat for her. So, Warner went to the foreign minister and said, "This is the President of the United States' secretary. You've got to have a place for her." The foreign minister said, "This is not my party. This is the diplomatic corps' party. I am a guest here. I can't do anything about this." So, the Papal Nuncio's assistant, a young priest, tried to explain to him that there was simply no seat for this woman at the table. So, they all went in and sat down. By this time, everybody was buzzing, I gather. Warner came in alone and people thought, "Well, he's going to go take his seat and that will be the end of it." He went up to the head table and spoke to the President of Switzerland and said that he wanted this woman seated. The President was sitting there as the guest of honor next to the Papal Nuncio said to him in effect, "Mr. Warner, I'm a guest here. This is not my party." So, he left. Boy did that cause some talk in town!
That really caused some talk in town! He thought for a couple of years that I had told the press. Not one word appeared in the Swiss press, but it got into the Herald Tribune, I think, and others. The thought I had told the press, but I didn't. I ran into him two or three years later and told him I absolutely did not leak any of it to the press corps. The only thing I had done was, the next day, I had gone down to the foreign office and quietly asked if I could see the chief of protocol and asked him to tell me what had gone on. I wanted to know. He told me.

I don't know whether Warner served out his full term or not, but he got in trouble with the banking regulatory authorities. He went to jail for a couple of years.

Q: Were there any major issues going on at that time in Swiss-American relations, the banking?

ODELL: Yes. The very early flurries of what in recent times became an issue, this bank secrecy question. The Swiss banks, ironically, were taking the position when I got there, that they had to have this bank secrecy. "Look how much good work we did in World War II protecting all these Jews and others from having their money confiscated by the Nazis." The big issue we had (and my name was on one of the documents) was, we were attempting to negotiate what was called officially a judicial assistance treaty in which... Shelby Cullom Davis had been involved in this. For certain types of offenses, the Swiss would agree to make available or allow banks to make available to our investigators documents necessary to prosecute somebody under quite restricted circumstances. But we had persuaded them that it would be in their own best interests to relax to some extent on the bank secrecy question. The Swiss were always double-edged. It forbade a bank or anybody working for a bank to release the information and it forbade anybody to seek the information. You could get put in jail for going around asking a banker these questions and if the banker answered the questions, he could go to jail. So, the idea was that we were pursuing people for income tax evasion. Well, income tax invasion is not a crime under Swiss law. It is an offense or something, but it is not a crime, not something you go to jail for. So, he would do that. But the idea was that if somebody was laundering money they had gotten in the drug trade or something like that, under limited circumstances, we would be allowed access.

But the question of the bank accounts of Jews and others from World War II, that came up a couple of times. The Swiss at that time took the position that they had done all the investigating necessary and there wasn't any money. I didn't believe them for one minute, nor did anybody else. There had to be more money than that. Come on! People have been putting their money in Switzerland since the French Revolution and before. These Jews and others, any sensible person with money in Europe for generations has always stashed some of it in Switzerland or someplace. So, it stood to reason that even if they weren't trying to evade the Nazis per se, there were bound to have been affluent Jews and other affluent people who had money in Swiss banks and when the great cataclysm of World War II came, that money would have been bound to have been there. I tried to tell them after I was working for them in the American-Swiss Association that this is not going to go away, fellows, this is going to come up sooner or later. Of course, it did. I think Shelby Cullom Davis thought the same way. He became president of the American-Swiss Association later on. I think he felt that they were being a little bit foolish in being quite so difficult.
You've brought me pretty close to the end of my career. I retired and took this job as executive director of the American-Swiss association, which had been formed after World War II. During World War II, particularly in the latter part of it, American-Swiss relations got kind of nasty. Once we no longer found Switzerland useful as a neutral island in the middle of warring Europe, we began pushing them pretty hard for their relations with the Germans during the war. Some Swiss properties in the United States were seized and things were kind of unpleasant. So, a small group of Americans and Swiss who had dealt with each other for generations - they weren't quite clear how they would do this, but they formed a little group called the American-Swiss Association to sort of keep in touch with each other and through business connections to kind of keep channels open so these things didn't happen again. They had a very distinguished list of corporations and individuals who belonged, but they didn't do very much. The executive director at the time was an aging public relations fellow. He was leaving them and they were casting around for a successor. At the time, I had become quite sure by then that the Department wasn't going to make me an ambassador. I didn't know what to do at that point, whether to just sweat out my remaining time or what. I talked to some people, talked to my wife, and decided that that job would be good, so I did and worked for them for five years.

It was very hard to develop a tangible program because there wasn't anything tangible really to work with. But what we did with some success was, we tried to get prominent American political figures to visit Switzerland under very nice but very informal circumstances to get them to know some Swiss and know Switzerland a little bit better in case some problem came up. We were focusing on senators. We did get several senators to come to Switzerland. Who was that big tall senator from California who after he retired got into trouble? Well, we started with him and then word of mouth... Bradley was on the list, as was John Glenn. Who was the senator from Massachusetts who developed cancer? Brooke. And the Utah senator who went up with the astronauts. Anyhow, what we got was, these guys would come over. They would get first class travel over and back with their wife. They would spend about a week in Switzerland and to keep the Senate Ethics Committee off their back, they would give a lecture at the university or the technical institute or whatever. Then they would be guests of Switzerland and treated very nicely and assigned as their control officer, if you will, or escort officer, would be a Swiss senator. I don't know any of them who didn't thoroughly enjoy this and come back with the feeling that the Swiss are pretty good guys. It was very difficult to get it going consistently. If you've ever tried to get a U.S. senator to do something and pin him down if he in fact is going to do this... Who was the one from Oregon, not the one who got in trouble? He had been governor of Oregon? He was all set to go and at the last minute had to cancel. That put the Swiss into an awful tizzy because they had made lots of plans. He came up to New York and talked to us. We had lunches in New York. Visiting Swiss dignitaries would come and we would arrange luncheons and things like that. I did that for five years. We were living up in New York and still had a house in Glen Echo and decided that I would come back to Washington. So I left there and came back down. I worked in Freedom of Information and luckily got assigned to USIA as the only declassifier working there.

RICHARD L. STOCKMAN
Position not specified
Geneva (1975-1977)

Richard Stockman was born in 1940 in Kansas City, Missouri. He went to seminary at Cape Girardeau in Missouri, and was then drafted into the U.S. Army in 1963, where he spent most of his tour in Germany. Mr. Stockman entered the Foreign Service in 1966 as a communications specialist. He served in Brazil, Honduras, Singapore, Togo, Switzerland, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Stockman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Well, then we have you leaving there and going to Geneva from 1975-77. Having gone from high cost Singapore to go to high cost Geneva was this a problem or not?

STOCKMAN: It was a problem as a matter of fact. It was literally going out of the pan into the fire. Of course, salaries had increased slowly and gradually with the years, but as everyone knows Geneva was one of the more expensive Foreign Service posts around in those days, and I suppose still is. But I would have to say that the pluses far offset the minuses. The beauty of the country, the educational facilities available...of course I am talking only about the tangible benefits, we haven’t talked about the job yet...but it was a hard decision to make in some respects. After all one would be giving up the drivers position and fall back into the pack which is difficult after having a taste of attending country team meetings, doing planning with an admin officer one on one, to again take a secondary seat.

Q: This is always one of the hardest things to do. That is why we are able to keep our small posts staffed, people feel much more they belong.

STOCKMAN: Well, I had lobbied and made every effort on my own part to obtain some kind of upward mobility. As you well know in the old days of the Foreign Service it never hurt to have a godfather around, which we all realized existed.

Q: A godfather being sort of a patron who you can get advice from.

STOCKMAN: But you know if you were of such a mind, and I certainly was, I wanted to see as many of the Bureaus and areas of the world as possible during my career. Of course there was give and take if that was your philosophy, you had to take the good with the bad. Also in the bidding process we had to indicate high, low and medium bids. Well, anyway, it was a stroke of good luck. Things turned out for the better. Ironically it led to other assignments, I think. Whether it was by accident or fate, I don't know.

We got deeply involved from day one. Geneva was an extremely busy post. There were all kinds of work requirements. This was, of course, the Carter Administration years. I remember one of the first dramatic things that came out of the White House and the OMB was the attempt as you can remember to find more sources of revenue. One of the prime targets was the overseas community paying more of their share. Well the attempt to put all of our allowances into the income bracket scared the wits out of most Foreign Service people. How in the world could we ever afford to pay taxes on the educational allowance, travel, etc. It was absurd and as it turned out it didn't happen. But it was certainly food for thought.
Anyway, as far as the post went the disappointing part of it professionally was that unless you really made a conscious attempt to get to know individuals, one on one, it could be a very impersonal, typical European post. You went to work, you left work, and there was very little social life and friends outside. Certainly the Swiss were not people to make friends with easily. They were rather cold and austere. But, again, I think the success that one has, especially in the communications field frequently is through the contacts that your wife and children make. I have to really give them credit that what social life we did have came primarily through those contacts and a few others we had known before. But one could still do an awful lot on an individual basis. Morale was not the greatest. Joe Meresman was probably one of the real positive lights at that post.

Q: *What was he?*

STOCKMAN: He was the Admin Counselor. He labored continuously for staff personnel, in particular, citing the enormous cost of trying to live there and there was very little support from the IO Bureau.

Q: *IO being International Organizations.*

STOCKMAN: He basically did not win a lot of battles, but he certainly convinced us that he was on our side.

The interesting part though was that at this particular time on the job the age of communications, the technology and the improvements, were starting to surface and we were making some very dramatic changes in the technology that have an impact to today and will continue to do so.

Q: *Can you give an idea about what you are talking about?*

STOCKMAN: Yes. We changed our operation entirely from a purely mechanical electrical machine type manual operation to computers. This was just a huge dramatic change in modes of operating. Very few people in those days had any prior experience with computers. Most people kind of feared them. It was new to everyone, officer and staff alike. Of course, in Personnel the bead counters' first reaction was "Oh my God, this is the perfect justification for downsizing communications staffing pattern." Well, that turned out to be entirely false. There is a learning curve with any new change in any profession, but certainly converting to computers. The learning curve exists to this day. We simply can't keep up with the developments. The life expectancy of these things is normally three to five years before there is another generation causing a new learning process. So that was my introduction to the real world of technology in communications.

Q: *How exciting.*

STOCKMAN: It was.
I suppose the other revelation that surfaced was the fact that not everyone can cope with this change. We all tend to think that with younger people come bright minds and better prepared people, etc. That was not necessarily the case as we found out and learned through personnel and staffing changes there.

Our tour was only two years but nevertheless we were supporting all of the SALT talks, the whole establishment that would go back and forth between Geneva and Washington and the UN. We supported the Multilateral Trade Negotiations; ACDA, arms control; and the whole realm of other visitors to the United Nations there in Geneva. Of course it was not accredited to the country, the capital was in Bern, we were accredited to the United Nations which many people really don't understand. So it was truly a unique assignment.

I think the one aspect of work that is lost sight of is that as everyone knows Jimmy Carter very much advanced human rights and it was a huge operation there this Human Rights Division. I am trying to recall the name of the man who was so successful, it escapes me now. Oh yes, Ronald Palmer.

Q: Actually you can fill some of these names in. You will be getting a draft for editing.

STOCKMAN: They were a very small section, very dynamic and very dedicated to that particular interest. But there were huge numbers of refugees who were coming out of the Communist Bloc countries, filtering through Vienna, Austria out of Moscow. So we were required to support this effort in communications. In every case it meant an exchange of telegrams on a given individual or family for every refugee. The UN, of course, was the organization that carried out the details and made it happen. But the US mission was tasked to do that. It was a huge workload.

Q: Did you know if there were other UN communicators there and if so did you have much contact with them?

STOCKMAN: No. In fact I honestly know very little about the UN communications system as a group. I have heard a little bit about them through a much later assignment at the UN a year ago. They, of course, do have this communications section. But I don't think it is anywhere near as sophisticated as what the US government has.

Q: And then you moved from Geneva to what strikes me as being rather interesting but marginal post, Dublin.

HAROLD W. GEISEL
Administrative Officer
Bern (1975-1978)

Ambassador Harold W. Geisel was born in Illinois in 1947. He received his BA from Johns Hopkins and his MBA from the University of Virginia. After entering
the Foreign service in 1971, he was posted in Brussels, Oslo, Bern, Bamako, Durban, Rome, Bonn and Moscow and served as Ambassador to Mauritius. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 30, 2006

Q: So you went to Bern from when to when

GEISEL: I did. From ’75 to ’78.

Q: Now what job did you have there?

GEISEL: I was the admin officer, the head of admin.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

GEISEL: I had three of them, one of whom was hardly there at all; in fact, I don’t know that he ever got to post, Peter Dominick, a Colorado senator. He thought he discovered that he had MS after he was confirmed or something like that and he resigned before ever going there and then he found out he didn’t and he tried to get it back but he couldn’t. And so for the longest time the DCM was the charge, his name was Harry Odell. And then we had Nat Davis, who Kissinger had kicked out of AF after they disagreed on Angola and he was banished to Bern. There’s another guy who I just adored. Interestingly enough, do you know what he’s doing today?

Q: What?

GEISEL: He’s very old. Well, he went to the Naval War College as a faculty advisor after Bern but then he retired and was for many years the only liberal arts professor at Harvey Mudd College.

Q: Yes, it’s part of that Pepperdine-

GEISEL: Exactly, yes. But Harvey Mudd is all engineers and whatnot. And I visited him out there last year as a matter of fact. He’s very old. But he, I admired him tremendously. He was the most honest man I ever met in my life; he’s such an honest, modest, decent guy, I thought the world of him. He was followed by the biggest scoundrel I ever worked for, who did literally end up in prison, a guy named Marvin Leon Warner. He didn’t end up in prison for what he did in Bern, he was only ultimately withdrawn for what he did in Bern but that was after my time; it was a great embarrassment. We had a motto about Marvin; we said he screws everything that isn’t nailed down.

Q: I have to say, Switzerland has a reputation for having some of the worse, not necessarily crooks but scandals.

GEISEL: Oh, absolutely. Faith Ryan Whittelsley, who came later.

Q: Yes, and others who, you know, practically turned the residence into a paid hotel.
GEISEL: Yes.

Q: I mean, all sort of things. And then you had the man who was TDY in Arlington Cemetery.

GEISEL: Oh Larry, Larry Lawrence, yes.

Q: Yes.

GEISEL: Yes, I knew him very well.

Q: Anyway. Well let’s just talk a little about Bern.

GEISEL: When we get into the right time I’m one of the reasons that he was mistakenly put in Arlington Cemetery when I was in a very different job.

Q: What was Bern like?

GEISEL: Oh, as a town absolutely beautiful. What were the Bernese like? Some were really obnoxious. I was learning German and I had a poem: (recites part of poem in German). The translation is: There’s a tiny policeman in every Bernese. He has an opinion about everything even though he can’t do anything about it. It’s far more poetic in German.

Q: How’d you find working conditions there?

GEISEL: Oh it actually was very pleasant in the embassy. Moral was really good. It fell when Warner got there but again, idle hands were the devil’s workshop. We had one political officer who recommended the political section be abolished.

Q: I take it that this was not a place where you had to deal with a corrupt both government and workforce and all that?

GEISEL: No, no. Our problem was our Swiss workforce made more money than we did. I had what was called my class of 43. They were the three heads of the admin sections who all begun work for the embassy in 1943, four years before I was born. My secretary made more money than I did. I mean, the dollar was exceptionally weak and the Swiss franc exceptionally strong. But they were very good employees. It was very pleasant. Ultimately, of course, I was bored, I think most people there were bored.

Q: I would think, just on the surface it sounds like a boring place, you know.

GEISEL: Yes. Well, in that sense we were very happy when Marvin Warner came because, God, did he juice it up.

Q: Well you’d been post management officer. Did you suffer there from the problem that you were probably part and parcel of, particularly in the Canadian post where if we had problem
people or particularly women, sick mothers, I mean they ended up shoving them to the consular section in London or all along the border posts, you know, a lot of marginal-

GEISEL: Yes. I’ll get back to EUR post management because I forgot that my first secretary in EUR was a lady who had come from, I think it was Ottawa, and she had been arrested for shoplifting in Ottawa so she was sent back to us. Now, once you got to know her, you realized there was no way that she would have been shoplifting deliberately but she was so utterly absentminded and out of it that I would literally put my life up that she walked out with something without ever realizing she’d put it in her bag. But yes, I know where you’re coming from.

Q: With Nat Davis, I have to say something because I heard it just the other day from David Passage, who’s working for Henry Kissinger, and apparently Davis, during the time you were there was given instructions, he went into the Swiss government and then 48 hours later was told to go back and say those instructions are no longer operative.

GEISEL: That is absolutely true.

Q: And Passage said Davis sent a thing saying you know, it’s undignified for the American ambassador to do this.

GEISEL: That is true, that is true.

Q: And Kissinger sort of- Passage said he drafted, as a matter of fact, saying Nat, I offered you freedom but not dignity, you know.

GEISEL: I never knew that. Well Davis kept all that to himself. But I’ll tell you how Davis was so badly hurt by Kissinger. During that time that I was there and the work entirely fell on me, there was a meeting between Kissinger and it would have been Dr., no, would it have been Vorster? Yes, Vorster I guess, the prime minister of South Africa, would have been, I think that would have been ’76.

Q: Botha?

GEISEL: No, no, no, no, it was Vorster. Botha wasn’t in, that came much later. And…

Q: This is tape two, side one with Harry Geisel. Yes.

GEISEL: Okay. So we had this enormous meeting and in those days of course we thought it was unbelievable, I think Kissinger had 20 cars in his motorcade and he still had the Secret Service. If you remember when he moved from national security advisor to secretary he had the Secret Service which went with him and it was a lot of work and we loved it. Davis had gone up with us to greet Kissinger. Kissinger gets off of the airplane and is just about to go in the helicopter because we didn’t want him in a motorcade, and he looks at Nat and he says hello, Nat and he turns his back on him and ignores him completely. We’d reserved a room for Ambassador Davis, which was hard to get and he just came to me quietly, said Harry, I’m going back to Bern. But
the story gets worse because this was concluded and it was concluded if I remember on a Monday. And on a Thursday afternoon, maybe it was even Friday, heaven help us, I get a call from SS/EX saying that Kissinger was coming back two days later and maybe three days later at the most, I think it was two days, and he was on his way to Africa somewhere but he was going to overnight as a rest stop in Bern and the Swiss knew all about it and I should contact so and so in the Federal Political Department, which is what they called their foreign ministry in those days, and you know, get on with it, do the best you can, Harry. And of course it was hell for us, there were no hotel rooms, you know, you can just imagine. So I go trotting up to the ambassador who I told you I loved dearly but I was furious, and I said Mr. Ambassador, how could you do this to me? And he said what do you mean? I said I know that this was very, very, very close hold but, you know, if you would have just given me just a few more hours. And he said what are you talking about Harry? And I said the Secretary is coming here in two days. Do you realize what I have to go through? And he turned absolutely ashen because they had not told him. So I think that bears well with what David Passage told you earlier. I mean, that insult to Nat Davis broke my heart. But anyway, we got through it.

Q: How did the embassy in Bern relate to all the other embassies up in Zurich?

GEISEL: Well no, not Zurich, Geneva. Zurich we had our consulate general.

Q: I mean Geneva.

GEISEL: But in Geneva we had an enormous mission. Well, they were very laid back, we had very good relations. But the mission in Geneva, as is the want of any place that was even more overstaffed than we were, obscenely overstaffed, had us do some of their admin work. I remember we had to set up a local compensation plan involving a pension plan because, if you remember, there had been all these problems with our FSNs (Foreign Service Nationals) who were on civil service retirement and then of course when the dollar crashed they were terribly hurt, none hurt worse than the ones in Switzerland, of course, because while their local pay when they were working was in Swiss francs, when they retired, the annuity was in dollars. And Congress did something that I thought was very fair; essentially Congress said we’ll bail you out but no more FSNs go on civil service retirement, you’ve got to set up a retirement scheme. I worked for over a year with a local insurance company setting up a full retirement scheme for the Swiss and the mission of course joined it but didn’t do anything except sign even though all the money came from the mission. But, all that being said and done we had great relations with them.

Q: Okay, let’s talk about your relations with the crook.

GEISEL: Yes, Marvin was a crook. I mean, he did go to jail. He didn’t go to jail for anything he did in Bern, he just sort of left in disgrace. But that was after my time that he left in disgrace.

Q: But what was your connection with him?

GEISEL: Well, I was the admin officer, of course, and if I’m not mistaken I was the only other Jew at post. Not that he was at all religious, nothing in any way. We also were briefly sharing the
same girlfriend, which I didn’t know about until later. Marvin was a character. At first we got on very well because I just decided to ignore his bullying- he was tyrannical and of course everything was go, go go, do, do, do. And I remember how, actually, our relationship turned and that really says what it was all about. He had me for lunch, well had a bunch of us at the residence one day for lunch and was giving himself and us a big pep talk about how important the embassy was and how all these important businessmen were coming to his conference to do this and it just showed people didn’t understand the embassy needed more people, etcetera, etcetera, and I said oh, come on, they’re not coming here because of the embassy, they’re coming here because it’s Switzerland. And he said there’s Harry Geisel, has something to say about everything and knows nothing about anything. And you know we got on after that but there was no love lost between the two of us.

Q: I mean, was there problems while you were there of womanizing?

GEISEL: Oh yes.

Q: And how did this-

GEISEL: Well let me give you an example and I’ll name names because the lady is old enough now that I doubt she cares. One time I got a frantic call from the ambassador’s chauffeur that they couldn’t find him. He was ultimately found in the Ratskeller but I’ll go back. He used to invite various ladies to visit him and he had a motto, he never dated anyone older than 25 but this lady was an exception because her name was Susan Clough, she was Jimmy Carter’s secretary, and she was an attractive lady, not probably up to his standards but being Jimmy Carter’s secretary certainly had something to do with it. And he was invited that night to, it was a Friday night, to the dinner, the annual dinner that the diplomatic corps gave for the government of Switzerland, the seven ministers, the federal council; I don’t know how many there are now. And he- it was white tie and of course the Swiss, it really was a racket because the Swiss really did all the work but then sent the bills to the ambassadors to pay for it. Anyway, it was at the Bellevue Palace Hotel and you know the Swiss well enough to know that if it’s at the Bellevue Palace Hotel it has a beautiful view and it’s palatial. So he brings her there but there’s a problem. He hadn’t told her about it so she came in a short white dress. Everyone was in white tie and tails. And eventually, now, I put this all together because you’ll see the story got very involved and everyone in the embassy got involved, they were all in wherever they were, the antechamber drinking their little wine before dinner and a young lady from the federal political department, from protocol, is passing out engraved seating charts and Marvin goes up to the chief of protocol, a man named Ambassador Gotret, and of course you can imagine a Swiss chief of protocol is about six foot two with a beautiful mane of impeccable gray hair and mellifluous speaking voice in many languages, and Marvin, who came from Cincinnati but he grew up in Bur’ham, A’bama, Marvin says mah fren’ isn’t on here. And Gotret says well of course not, she wasn’t announced to us. And he says but you don’t understand, she’s from the White House. Oh but she wasn’t announced to us. Ah want to see Graber. Pierre Graber was the head of the political department. He does the same thing and Graber says well she wasn’t announced to us and aside from that the dinner is for ambassadors and spouses only. And I’ll get into that too. So he stalks off and everyone else goes in and the place of the American
ambassador was very conspicuously empty but that’s not the end of it because a few minutes later the president of Switzerland, the presidency is a figurehead position, it rotates among the federal councilors, the president’s usher, goes up to him and says the American ambassador would like a word with him. The President that year was the minister of justice and police. And before the president could say get rid of him and all of this was heard by all of them, the ambassador comes up and says you’ve got to do something, she’s from the White House. Well the president says quite loudly apparently, well what can I do, Mr. Ambassador, or Your Excellency, I suppose he would have said, I’m only the guest of honor. And Warner stalks out and that’s when I get the call from his driver because he has disappeared. And as I said ultimately he was said, in white tie and tails in the Ratskeller. You know what a Ratskeller is?

Q: I don’t.

GEISEL: Ah. Well, a Ratskeller is the German word, it’s in the basement of the town hall, and a lot of towns in Germany and Switzerland they have a restaurant there to make money. And he’s there eating with Susan. Well, come Monday he is furious. He thinks the United States has been embarrassed and humiliated and he goes off to complain to Graber. No, I’m wrong, Gotret, the chief of protocol. Well apparently Gotret got up on his hind legs and said no, you don’t understand, you’re not a career person, you don’t know how these things are done. So Warner comes back to the embassy furious, blaming everyone but himself though nobody knew anything. I was the first to find out. I mean, I knew because of the chauffeur calling me that there’d been problems although I didn’t know the nature of the problem. I got tipped off by his protocol assistant, a young British woman who called me, very upset after he had balled her out first. And I thought this won’t be the end of it and it wasn’t. And he proceeded to call just about every officer in the embassy in and ream them out for not telling him the way things were done. I was called in too but I kept my counsel, I didn’t let on that I knew anything.

Well, the story gets better because I knew one of his favorite girlfriends, not the one that we were sharing, it turned out, but an American girl who was actually a junior officer working for the Agency at the time, and she asked me to come to lunch a few days later and she said I’ve got to tell you this, you’re not going to believe this. Marvin had taken her that night to a party at the Greek ambassador’s place. Now, they loved, everyone loved inviting Marvin because it certainly livened things up. And apparently Marvin had decided to blame the papal nuncio because the nuncio was the head of the diplomatic corps and the nuncio was apparently the person who had announced spouses only because he was tired of the various African ambassadors who were all there for one reason only, to put their guys’ money from the diplomatic bag into the Swiss bank account. The Nuncio was tired of them taking their white hooker girlfriends with them to the party.

So Marvin decided it was all the Nuncio’s fault. So after the dinner and before the men and the ladies split off, he came up near the nuncio and he said: listen everybody, listen everybody, I want you to hear this poem. Now, the poem was a limerick from Playboy. The nuncio no speaka the English but I suspect someone told him and Marvin said, “There once was a man from Siberia, who had a complex inferior. He did to a nun what shouldn’t be done and now she’s a mother superior. Ho, ho, ho, ho, ho.”
And it was interesting, some years later The Herald Tribune actually had a story about him, before he was out, and the story was headlined, “Some call the American ambassador to Bern an embarrassment.” And the actual story was about him getting a whole bunch of American cars and putting them on the lawn of the residence and putting up balloons and whatnot and inviting people to see the American car fair. Which I don’t think was all that bad but in the Swiss context it was terrible, ambassadors didn’t do things like that, at least not in those days. But that was the gist of the story and there was also something in there, there was also talk about other things that he did which were even more embarrassing. Ultimately, from what I’m told, the Swiss actually most unusually went in and said, you know, couldn’t you ask this guy to leave? They never PNG’d him of course.

After that, there was a scandal, you might vaguely remember. Remember, there was a thing called the Home State banking scandal, Home State Bank was actually an Ohio Savings and Loan and in the, I believe it was the early ’80s, late ’70s, I think early ’80s, there was a big, big, big deal about banks that had been badly run, very badly run, criminally badly run and Marvin was one of those guys. I don’t think that he was accused of stealing money as much as he was of gross mismanagement. I don’t know the details but he did end up in the Ohio State Penitentiary. And after that he married a young girl and declared a fake bankruptcy. He was also married to Susan Goldwater. Do you remember her from TV here? Very pretty girl. I don’t think she was Goldwater’s daughter, I believe she was married to Goldwater’s son, that’s what it was, she used to have a program on WTOP. Marvin went through three, four wives, I think.

Q: Well anyway-

GEISEL: He spent about three years in jail and he ultimately died, allegedly bankrupt in Florida but you know, in Florida there’s this big racket where you keep your house and he had one of these huge estates. I knew one of his honest bankers, if you will, a guy who used to sell him banks, so I sort of kept up on him.

Q: Well he was the ambassador when you left?

GEISEL: He was. I think he came in ’74 and I left in ’75. No, no, what am I saying? I got there in ’75, of course, and I left in ’78 and I think he came in ’77 if I remember right.

SIDNEY FRIEDLAND
Political Officer
Geneva (1975-1978)

Sidney Friedland was born in 1932 and raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1955 with a degree in history. Following graduation, Mr. Friedland entered the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Austria, Canada, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland. Mr. Friedland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 1, 1993.
FRIEDLAND: I served in Geneva in the mission, from ’75-’78, and shortly after, my arrival there, we went off the board of directors, antedating the UN, League of Nation's system, the UPU had a requirement that the total rotation, well in the UN system, there are a number of permanent seats, and in virtually every other UN organization, we are on the quorum membership of the governing body, always on the board. On the UPU, we were not always on the board, maybe 10 years out of every 15, we had to rotate, and this was the period which we were off, which made the job a little more interesting, in a way, because, I had to keep up with what was going on by allies that were on the board, the UK, or Germany, or France or whatever, but it was basically the UK. When there was a board meeting, which there was three times a year, I would get my instructions from Washington, and then my British co-chairman of a Western contact group, basically a G-7, have to try to make our point.

Q: The period from ’72 -’78, because we were both in Washington and Geneva, essentially dealing with the same matters, what were the major issues or concerns?

FRIEDLAND: It was a pretty benign time, we were getting out of Indochina, and it was not a major concern. China had gotten into the UN, I think in ’72, our major concerns, up until the time China and East Germany got into the UN system was keeping them out, and those were the basic political issues, and keeping extraneous political issues outside the UN.

Q: Were you under pressure fighting with the Soviets over frequencies for political purposes rather than commercial purposes?

FRIEDLAND: Not really. ITU was one of the only organizations that allowed membership by companies, so there would be a frequency conference and the US delegation would have members in the industry there, RCA, General Electric, and happily, this was good because it gave us a very nice way of handling receptions during general conferences, because we would get money. Whereas, if we’d go to AT&T and . One thing we had to do is get hold of this because we had a large potential for wild cannons.

We had to try and keep close control of these delegations, which would sometimes be hated by businessmen, and some of these guys were totally out of favor with US policies, a major part of the job. I was often put into the middleman situation because the delegation would consist basically of government people, regulators, and the representatives of the industries that they regulate, there was a lot of static and tension, but I was a political person, but I was not a communications person, so I was in the position where both sides trusted me. Although it got to the point where I was having trouble with my boss, Carl Gripp, a political officer and my associate for one year was Mike, the fellow who was US consul General in the Congo during the riots and he had people killed. Mike Hoyt. Boy, just to talk to him just about the Congo. He was my colleague and I was told that the two communications agencies were mine, I would be the IO rep at meetings and all of this. Gripp would take the Transportation Agency, a KO in Montreal, and INCO maritime organization. So, we would handle our own agencies and he would monitor, but I would be the US rep at the conferences. Cliff was a consummate bureaucrat. He was the head of a two-man office. So the first thing he started doing once we came on board -- we came on at the same time -- was establish a third position. What he planned to do was have the new
person take charge of the maritime and transportation agencies, and then he would do the conference representation, whatever -- only he didn't put it to me that way. He said that he would take over the maritime and the transportation agencies. In other words, he'd go to the conferences but the 3rd person would do all the scut work, writing the position papers, the Congressional budget presentations and whatever. Once he got the third person, and it was Mike Hoyt, and Mike Hoyt was amenable to this. But then I was told after Hoyt came on that, Friedland, you won't be going to any meetings any more. You'll be doing the papers and I'll be going to the meetings. I said, But that's not the way my job description. This was with one year to go, the third year of a three year tour. I said, I'm sorry, I can't agree, and if you want, I'll go to the Desk. He said, Well, it's not necessary.

Q: *The Deputy Assistant Secretary*...

FRIEDLAND: He said, If you feel you have to do that, do it. I did it. And my job description was unchanged. There were further ramifications to this because I had been scheduled to go to Geneva on my next assignment to replace the person in the Embassy who was responsible for these two organizations, which was at that time known as the Telecommunications Attaché. It was interesting that Gr _, my boss, was in the running to go to Geneva as the Political Counselor, although there was some talk of abolishing the job because the main thing the Political counselor did in Geneva was to keep China and East Germany out of all these various international organizations. Then we recognized them. So there wasn't all that much for the Political Counselor to do.

But at any rate, Gr then left me alone for my last year. I did the same thing I had done for the two previous years, and then ultimately did go to Geneva to take that position. Ultimately, Gr went to Geneva, too. Couldn't keep busy. Wasn't enough to do. He left me alone but he started going after -- they had an officer there that was the person on the spot responsible, the resident US rep to these various organizations, because there's quite a few of them -- the ILO, WHO -- fairly meaty UN organizations there, and we had an attaché to perform duties for most of these organizations. One thing I remember, looking ahead, is that Gr tried to -- he claimed political reporting duties for the specialized agencies, for all of them, and insisted on attending meetings, on his own reports. He had tried to do this without consulting the resident reps themselves. And one day the representative to the World Health Organization, who's a HEW person, former Marine, caught him trying to back-channel some message about his agency. When Gr came into his office to explain, this ex-Marine colonel said, I don't want to see you around WHO, I don't want to see you mention WHO in anything you send out of this mission, I don't want to see you in my office any more. And with that, he got up, grabbed the guy by the scruff of his neck and the back of his pants, and threw him out of his office. At any rate, those were very good times, really, to be both the Desk Officer and the rep in Geneva.

Q: *You left in '78 and you went where?*

FRIEDLAND: Back to Washington again.
Q: When you left NATO, where did you go?

PEREZ: I went to Geneva to the Strategic Arms Talks, SALT II. I was nominated for the rank of U.S. Minister by President Carter and confirmed by the Senate. The rank was for my period of service on the delegation.

Q: You’d do that for about a year, I take it.

PEREZ: Yes.

Q: What was the status of SALT II at that time?

PEREZ: It was dragging on. We were reaching the end of the line, and by then had successfully resolved most of the major issues. By the time I left most of them had been resolved except for some remaining technical issues.

Q: Was there a feeling that this is going to work and we’re going to have something?

PEREZ: There were those who favored an agreement with the Soviets, and there were others who were still suspicious of the Soviets and were concerned. There were mixed emotions. As you know, the Congress because of the opposition to it never ratified SALT II. There had been uncertainty once we negotiated the agreement as to whether or not it would be ratified by Congress. To try to get Congressional support President Carter made every member of the Senate automatically a delegate on our delegation. Hence they were free to come to Geneva and actually participate in our meetings. We spent a lot of time briefing them and arranging their meetings with the Soviets. One visit I remember in particular was that of Senator Ted Kennedy. Minister Semenov, the Chief Soviet negotiator, invited him to lunch and I accompanied him. The reason for the invitation, I suspect, was that he was being talked about as a presidential candidate. When we entered the Soviet compound he was enthusiastically greeted by all of the people there. It was a very warm and genuine reception reflecting in part, I suspect, their admiration for his brother

Q: In a way SALT II wasn’t ratified but one of these non-ratified observable treaties, wasn’t it? Or was it being observed?

PEREZ: In general, it was, yes, although it had no legal status since the Congress had not ratified it.
Q: Did you get any feel for the Soviet side of things there?

PEREZ: I worked closely with them. I would normally meet at least two days a week with my counterpart who was Minister Karpov. They, I think, had pretty much the same problems as we did. They were subject to strict instructions from Moscow, and they weren’t very free to do anything independently on their own, as was our case. We were not in a position make independent proposals without Washington’s instructions, but we did seek to have some modifications in our position to enhance the negotiability. Any significant negotiating change would entail a major bureaucratic action in Washington and approval by the President. We were both playing the game of trying to fulfill our instructions as we saw them.

Q: By the time you got there was there pretty much mutual agreement between the two sides of where we were going, or were we haggling over small points? How was it at that time?

PEREZ: By that time I think that both sides had pretty much agreed that it was time to get an agreement and that we were moving ahead to wind up the remaining details, mostly technical issues.

Q: You left there in ’78. Where stood it at that time, by the time that you left?

HOWARD MEYERS
US Representative, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
Geneva (1977-1978)

Howard Meyers was born and raised in New York City. He attended the University of Michigan and then Harvard Law School, before joining the U.S. Army in 1942. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955, working mainly in the Arms Control area. He served in several posts in England, Japan, and Belgium, as well as in the U.S. Mr. Meyers was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 2000.

Q: Well, forgive me, you were being offered Geneva?

MEYERS: Well, this was a great surprise, and I didn’t think much about it in any way. Some time went by and then at 5:15 on a Thursday evening, I was called up to the office of the expectant head of ACDA, Paul Warnke, and his appointment had been held up in the Senate by the distinguished Republican Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, who claimed he had all kinds of questions he wanted to ask. Warnke asked if I would be ready to go to Geneva, leaving at noon on the following Saturday, to be present for the entire session, which would last for three or four months, it was four months, and I said, “Of course.”

Q: This session of the Conference of the...
MEYERS: Committee on Disarmament. Now called the Conference on Disarmament and it has changed in to important respects. The first is that in the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet and American representatives were co-chairs, expected to develop the Committee’s plan of work, which was very important because the Committee operated then, and always has, and still does, on the basis of consensus. No, it has moved up from, I think it was 32 in my day, to something like 72 now, and the Chinese have come in and the French have come in so it is much more complicated, but at least, thank goodness, they do not have this system of American and Soviet co-chairs. That was I think by all odds the most difficult job I ever had. It was a great strain.

I was doing two things. I led a delegation first to the Conference to prepare for the treaty review of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, which is a very important one that you don’t hear much about, in which the various powers agree that they will not site nuclear weapons on the seabeds beyond their territorial sea. That was quite an experience. That job was done first. That resulted in a minor first-time event. The chair of that Conference was the Polish Ambassador. He was very objective. This was a very large conference, I think we had well over a hundred states represented and the need both to try to move the proceedings along and to get agreements, when we were disagreeing on such important points as the amount of money that we were going to contribute, I had a somewhat acid exchange with the Indian representative on that particular point till with help from my colleagues at my back, I drew out what a difference it would be in the amount of money; it was very minor. I no longer remember the sums, but what the Indian was proposing and what we were proposing amounted to a relatively small amount of money as to what our support costs would be. This was just an objection just to be objectionable on the part of the Indian government, really.

The Polish representative did a superlative job in moving the Conference along, helping resolve disagreements, and being absolutely fair and objective. My Soviet colleague, to my surprise, approached me at a reception one time and asked whether the United States might possibly agree to support the Soviets, if they proposed, or we jointly proposed, that the Polish representative be the chair of the review conference. I said that I would certainly support that, but that I would have to find out what Washington thought. To my enormous surprise, they agreed! It was the first time that the Soviet Union and the United States had jointly proposed something of this order. I think it was a triumph of common sense in Washington and nothing that I argued in my cable of proposal. That was one nice aspect of what was otherwise a rather dull conference.

When we moved on to the disarmament conference, that was a different matter. In the first place, I started the bilateral discussions with the Soviets on chemical warfare. They brought in experts, we had one expert, who continued on with this subject for years. It was the beginning of what, I think about 14 years later, was a treaty, very much in our interest, because of the inspection problems, broadly supported by the chemical industry in the United States and held up for purely ideological point, or grounds in the Senate, as you know. That was one advance. The other was trying to move forward discussions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I cannot say that we made any progress in any discernable way on that subject. It took many years. I picked up, in other words, where I had been unsuccessful with Harold Brown and tried to move it forward, with support and directions from Washington, now, not just my own views, but I very thoroughly
approved of this effort which got nowhere. That’s really about it. We did work out, in the committee, a forward-looking work plan, but that was about it.

There were a couple of funny occasions during the meetings. One I remember vividly was a luncheon at the Finnish Ambassador’s, which he was using trying to push forward his candidacy for chair of a committee, as being in the European interest. The Soviet representative, a career officer who was a Chinese specialist, named Likhachev, first name was Victor, and who was as tough as nails, but a first class professional. The two of us were explaining how our countries were regarded as both Asian powers, as well as European powers, in almost exactly the same language. It was genuinely funny. I was trying not to laugh while this was going on, because we would pick up each other’s comments at the end of the comment, and very smoothly carry on and it did not matter we were both saying the same thing. That was very amusing. I enjoyed that. Anyhow, the conference came to an end after almost four months. I returned to Washington, I cleared out my desk and I wrote a whole series of notes and comments that I thought would be useful for my successor representative, and who was interestingly enough, an old friend and colleague, the former legal advisor at State.

Q: ...elder...

MEYERS: He was a fellow elder at the same church in Georgetown. This was of course the end of my Foreign Service career, because I turned 60 years while I was away on this assignment and the Foreign Service act provided in those days (I retired under the Act of 1946), that if you did not have a Presidential assignment task, which is what the job held then was, you would have to retire at age 60. My successor, Adrian Fisher, was to be the chosen U.S. representative to this committee, so I wrote a whole series of notes I thought would be useful, I packed up my books and I went off to write a study for a group of papers that were being put together by the U.S. Information Agency on various policies of the new administration. I wrote one on the nuclear foreign policy of the new administration. Then formally retired. But I found myself back in the State Department as senior reviewer for classified document declassification. In fact, another man, Clay McManaway, and I put together the Department’s centralized declassification system. That was the end of that part of my formal career, although I did carry on in two other part-time jobs for the State Department.

Q: ...Freedom of Information work you did, which has certainly become a major user of Department resources.

MEYERS: Indeed it has and will continue to do so. It is one of these usual experiences, I was standing in a coffee line in the Department in this period after I had retired and while I was preoccupied with writing this very complicated paper, trying to make sense out of the Carter administration’s nuclear policy, and I ran into a personnel officer from EUR who had been with me in London who said “Would you be interested?” And as I’ve indicated, I always said yes to questions like these and the next thing I knew I found myself going over declassification requests for documents still classified that were in the purview of the Bureau of European Affairs, which had the widest purview. 80 some odd percent of requests under the Freedom of Information Act in those days were for documents in EUR. They were hopelessly swamped. I helped alleviate this issue.
One day, we had a meeting of all the Deputy Assistants on this subject and the questions which was posed by the senior to the others was “Well what do you think of this operation that Howard and the others are involved in?” and they all said, “Oh, thank God, it enables us to do our work and we have a chance to see what is being proposed and disagree with it if necessary; we rarely do. It is just great.” Then I was asked the question, and I said, “It is all very interesting. I think things are going along very well, but I have never been anywhere where you can get so many divergent views on exactly the same problem as is in this Bureau.” Next thing I knew I was tasked with writing guidelines, so I did and we cleared them. Other people remember Warren Zimmerman in different ways, an absolutely superb officer, an Ambassador, but I remember him as a tough nut when it came to protecting the interests of his parish, jurisdictionally. We argued like mad over fine points of language, in working out what was a very useful statement of policy and how to deal with issues. We were so happy with our very obviously, very widespread appreciation in the Bureau that we tried to sell it to other bureaus. At least one other did adopt it. As usual, NEA was way ahead of the rest of the Department, less constricted for some reason - very forward thinking.

Then the decision was made, when Clay McManaway was brought in by Larry Eagleburger, that we needed to have this on a Department-wide basis, with a couple of exceptions, one of them naturally being Diplomatic Security. Then we struggled for a year, trying to put together procedures and, in my case, writing the policy proposals for each functional and geographical area, clearing it carefully with the bureaus concerned in order to have a comprehensive system. There were some strange aspects to this. I remember going up to the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Inter-American Affairs Bureau and saying to him, “Look we can’t go forward like this - in fact we can’t go on like this. Why should I have to consider that anything having to do with tourism in this bureau must be cleared with the desk? This is absurd!” That’s the sort of attitude we had to overcome, and did, successfully. This particular man has remained a friend of mine ever since, a very sensible and hard driving officer. This, however, then faced us with the problem of incorporating, the Department’s civil service bureaucracy in the A bureau, the Bureau of Administration. That proved and is still a much more difficult issue: How to move paper rapidly enough to satisfy exigencies? The Department does poorly in this respect. It has tried, but it has done poorly in my judgment. I do place the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the paper movers. That’s about all that I really ought to say about this subject, because I would then become more indiscreet than I have already been. I would like to go back...

ROGER A. SORENSON
Deputy Chief of Mission
Geneva (1977-1979)

Roger Sorenson was born in Utah and graduated from Brigham Young University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1960, serving in Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Ireland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Sorenson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.
Q: Then you moved to Geneva, where you were DCM from '77 to '79. What do we have in Geneva, and what were you doing there?

SORENSON: At the time I was there, we had ambassadors to disarmament negotiations that had been going on in Geneva since the end of the war; we had an ambassador responsible for GATT negotiations then in process -- the so-called Tokyo Round; and we had a Mission to the European offices of the U.N. and to the specialized agencies of the U.N. located in Geneva. These included the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization, the International Meteorological Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, and a small organization concerned with the drug problem.

The Mission is responsible for U.S. relations with all these organizations, and provided administrative backstopping for the GATT negotiators and for the disarmament talks as well. I went to Geneva as DCM and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN office in Geneva and to its specialized agencies.

Q: It sounds like you were more a hotel-keeper than anything else, you know, with delegations coming in and out, all being experts and all this.

SORENSON: That was certainly a major function of the mission. Delegations would come from Washington for crucial meetings and/or major negotiations, but in interim periods the mission itself had responsibility for our ongoing relations, which meant that we had a mission officer, usually a specialist, assigned to work with each of these agencies. Obviously the mission was responsible for keeping in touch and reporting on developments within these organizations that affected or were reactive to U.S. policies. Finally, either the Ambassador or I was always included as a ranking member of each delegation that came, sometimes indeed as head of the delegation. I had the pleasure, for example, of signing on behalf of the United States an international treaty on patents and trade marks, on which occasion I received full powers from the President. This, too, was just housekeeping of sorts since obviously I hadn't engaged in the technical negotiations that led to it and which had gone on for some years, but it was lots of fun.

I was also in Geneva as chargé d' affaires when the decision was made to get out of the ILO, and I participated in that decision. That was a case where there was tremendous stress within the delegation, and I sometimes felt like a resident psychiatrist trying to calm some of our more emotive delegates, one of whom stormed into my office one day demanding to send a dissent message to Washington. As it turned out, the mission had never sent one and the instructions and regulations for doing it could not be found. We had to send to Paris to get them. In this case, I was able to inform the dissenter that this particular device was not intended for members of visiting delegations that had come to implement specific instructions.

Q: Did you have an ambassador there, or a number of them?

SORENSON: I went there at the beginning of the Carter administration. An ambassador -- a political appointee -- was named about four or five months after I'd been there.
Q: I would have thought that you would have found yourself, with this very heterogeneous melange of agencies, all of which, as you say, were very highly specialized, having a hard time getting a grasp on how to keep everybody on track. How did you operate in this situation?

SORENSON: It wasn't easy. Endemic to the situation was a constant tension in Washington between the domestic agency having a primary technical interest in a given international organization -- the natural and obvious interest in the International Health Organization (WHO) was, at the time, our domestic Department of Health, Education and Welfare, for example -- and, of course, the State Department's IO Bureau.

Q: IO being the Bureau for International Organization Affairs within the Department of State.

SORENSON: Exactly. And this tension existed on a number of levels. By the time I went to Geneva, even the specialized agencies of the UN had long since become ideological battlegrounds between the East and the West -- a struggle that had become increasingly bitter as we both strove to influence the ideological orientation of the Third World. Within the UN this eventually led to the establishment of a group of third world countries who identified themselves as the "non-aligned" precisely because they did not wish to take sides in this struggle.

Political struggles of a regional character -- such as, for example, the Israeli-Arab issue -- intruded into the technical work of the specialized agencies as well, and was a constant source of heartburn. In these struggles, the mission ostensibly fought to keep political issues from intruding into the technical considerations of the agencies. In fact, however, as a representative of the IO bureau, I not infrequently found that it was the State Department itself that introduced political considerations into the so-called technical debates.

For example, whereas in the ILO we constantly struggled to have certain labor practices in Eastern Bloc countries identified as being incompatible with the operations of a free labor movement -- and we were no doubt right -- on the other hand we became obsessed when Arab countries tried to raise the question of Israeli treatment of workers on the West Bank, in which case, in my view, we were dead wrong. This is simply to illustrate the manner in which domestic political interests had a way of injecting themselves into what should have been purely technical considerations.

There was another area, too, where the State Department's role was occasionally at cross-purposes with the interests of our domestic Departments having a primary interest in the work of the specialized agencies. This had to do with control of the budgets of these agencies. For better or for worse, Congress had made the Department of State responsible for justifying the U.S. contributions to the budgets of the U.N. specialized agencies. You will immediately grasp the problem if you reflect that the Department of State has no deep appreciation of, or direct interest in, these technical operations, and it therefore finds it extraordinarily difficult to muster much enthusiasm for the arduous task of justifying their respective budgets before Congress. This was a constant source of tension between IO -- and, by extension, State Department people at the mission -- and representatives of the domestic agencies primarily concerned with the technical work being done.
Here again, over time, I concluded that our overall approach was wrong. I believe, for example, that the budget for paying the US contribution to the ILO should be included and justified in the Department of Labor’s budget, rather than in the State Department’s budget. And this should be so with Agriculture for FAO, Commerce for WIPO, HEW (now HHS) for WHO, etc. My view is that these domestic agencies are in a better position than the State Department to judge the marginal utility of the last dollar appropriated by Congress for each of their areas of specialization, that is to say, whether the last dollar appropriated would be better spent on domestic programs or for international programs that presumably support our interests.

This is a constant source of friction, and the unwillingness of the Department of State to make the case before Congress for the work of the specialized agencies of the U.N. has been the cause of the United States’ falling into deep arrearages in recent years. What is even more outrageous is that the State Department only clings to the privilege of controlling U.S. contributions to the budgets of these organizations for its own narrow bureaucratic interests, that is, to justify the existence of the responsible bureaucracies -- batteries of small-minded clerks obsessed with notions of zero-growth budgets regardless of the importance or significance of the work being done. In my view, our consequent failure to conform to our international obligations in this area has, in recent years, been despicable. It has also been a violation of international law.

Q: What was your impression of the operations of the United Nations as you saw it in Geneva?

SORENSON: With a few exceptions, I felt they were well run. I do not subscribe to the notion that these organizations are filled with incompetent people who do nothing except draw enormous salaries -- a view often subscribed to by the IO bureau. Certainly, the agencies of the UN have their faults, but I found them to be generally as well run as agencies of the United States government -- perhaps even better run in many cases.

Ironically, in my estimation the worst run UN agency in Geneva while I was there was the Disaster Relief Organization -- the biggest disaster in the UN system, I used to think -- and one of the reasons it was a disaster, again in my view, was because a retired American General who had been appointed deputy head of the organization at our behest was determined to impose American military concepts of command and control on an organization that could at best only try to coordinate the voluntary contributions of member states when emergencies arose.

Q: What sort of relations did you have with the U.N. in New York? I mean, our USUN mission in New York.

SORENSON: Both missions operated under the direction of the IO bureau. While our mission in New York was, of course, the more important of the two and frequently gave the lead in enunciating policy positions during the debates in New York, we nevertheless operated quite independently, being primarily concerned to make sure the positions that we took were consonant with policies being laid down in Washington and enunciated in New York.

As one might expect, a number of common issues and themes were being addressed throughout the U.N. system. For example, this was a period during which the Third World was trying to gain acceptance of something called the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO was
to be a new system of economic relations among states that would have promoted the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries on the grounds that the wealth of the developed countries had been unjustly acquired through colonialism and imperialism. The NIEO was expressed in endless initiatives aimed at getting us and other Western countries to agree to its underlying thesis and supposed remedies.

I have already referred to one such initiative, which was to try to get us to agree to commodity stabilization programs covering the major raw materials produced by the Third World and to finance these programs through a common fund, which the Third World demanded that we, the consumers of raw materials, finance. Of course, whenever we looked into these kinds of schemes, they turned out to be primarily aimed at transferring net resources rather than stabilizing any prices.

Another example: with the same objective in mind, Third World countries tried constantly to mandate technical assistance programs in the U.N. technical agencies with themselves as beneficiaries. This was a particularly difficult issue for us since the Third World controlled a majority of the votes in organizations to which we were bound by treaty to contribute. This meant that they could, in effect, convert these agencies into resource transfer mechanisms from what we had conceived as their original purpose -- agencies doing work of common interest and benefit to all.

Looking back, the variations on this effort to erode Western interests were endless, in which connection I'll mention just one final example: in WIPO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (the umbrella organization responsible for developing international patent and copyright law), Third World coalitions were always trying to introduce resolutions calculated to weaken and erode patent rights. They justified this by arguing that patent law was an artificial construction of developed countries aimed at exploiting the less developed and perpetuating inequalities. I found it absolutely fascinating to observe the transparent ways in which the Third World would try to cover these attempts at blatant theft with an intellectual patina, always dressed in NIEO robes.

Intellectual ideas, they argued, were bound to emerge in any event as a consequence of social and intellectual evolution and could not therefore be claimed as a property right by any one individual just because the idea happened to occur, as it were, to him or her first. If not him or her, it would have occurred very soon to someone else. They referred to this notion as "simultaneous convergence." Of course, what they could never explain was why the idea always seemed to occur first in the mind of someone from a developed country.

The foregoing is a long way of explaining that I thought of us as playing a rearguard action fending off the NIEO in the UN system where our and Western interests generally were under genuine attack.

Q: Did you find yourself fighting the battle of Israel a lot in those organizations?

SORENSON: Very much so.
Q: Trying to exclude Israel from them.

SORENSON: In almost all of the technical organizations there were persistent efforts to get at Israel, not necessarily to exclude Israel from the organization, but certainly to hold them accountable for their actions in the occupied territories and in this way, obviously, to get at them politically. In the World Health Organization, for example, one could invariably count on a move to try to condemn Israel for its health policies in the occupied territories, or, at a minimum, to ask for an investigation of health conditions in the occupied territories.

Mind you, considering how long the territories have been occupied, they may have had a point when one considers the stresses that the occupied have been under for at least a generation, but of course that represents a personal view.

Officially, we were always supportive of the Israelis, even to the point of being slavish. Their ability through their supporters in Congress to control State Department policy was something one could only view with a sense of humiliation. For example, while making my initial round of calls on my counterparts in other diplomatic missions in Geneva, my Israeli colleague promptly ticked off not only a list of upcoming issues that concerned them but the positions that I would be expected to take. He was providing what were clearly intended to be marching orders. It was so blatant that I felt compelled to respond that I would have to see what my instructions from Washington would be on each of the issues raised.

Q: You left Geneva in 1979 and went to Rome. How did that assignment come about and what were you doing?

Q: What did you do after 1977?

ELLIS: Yes, I was only there two years, and I got a direct transfer really quite unexpectedly as consul general in Zurich.

Q: That must have been fun.

ELLIS: Yes, it was. That was really quite unexpected. I went from basically number three in the Economic Section in Vienna to be consul general in Zurich. That was an interesting period. I was
there for three years, 1977 to 1980. There was a good deal of interest in, of course, financial matters and the relations with the Swiss banks. A fun part of my job was being responsible for relations with Liechtenstein. I was the only person with separate accreditation to the prince in Vaduz and would be invited there two or three times a year.

*Q:* The gnomes of Zurich, the Swiss banking community, were renowned, particularly in that period, about not letting anybody know what they were doing. They were making money, doing it on their own, and they weren’t listening to anyone else. I assume you were put there because of your economic background.

ELLIS: That’s right. However, the ambassador was Marvin Warner for most of the time. He had a string of savings and loans in Florida. There was an excellent economic counselor in Bern who had a background also in finance, and there was a Treasury attaché in Bern. I had a financial background, so there were plenty of people trying to get information and find out what was happening with the gnomes of Zurich. They were very nice people and pleasant but I personally found that when any major decisions were made, the president of the Schweitzer Bundesbank would get on the phone to the chairman of the Fed or the Secretary of the Treasury, and would not go through any intermediary.

*Q:* What were you doing?

ELLIS: I did some commercial promotion. One of the biggest challenges was indirectly a result of the financial situation. When I arrived in Zurich, there were 2.50 francs to the dollar. When I left the ratio was 1.50 franc to the dollar. The dramatic strengthening of the Swiss franc and, of course, the German mark meant there was a great deal of interest in traveling to the U.S. at bargain basement prices. This was, of course, before the days of the visa waiver, and I found that my visa issuances went up 40 percent the first year I was there and then 40 percent again the next year. I tried to cope with this without any increase in staff, so that was a real management challenge to try to do that.

I asked for a very valuable resource, which I don’t know if they have it any more in the Department, called a CAT team, Consular Assistance Team. I asked for one and got one. They basically came up with some ideas for making some minor structural rearrangements and physical rearrangements in our work space. Because they recommended it, I was able to get the money to do that. It was helpful to have them come out and say, “Yes, you do need this,” and then we were able to get the money to do it.

I was a firm believer that we should give good service to the applicants. People who are Swiss or permanent residents in Switzerland were not in the “look out” book; they were almost automatically good cases. I tried to handle those as efficiently as possible. I encouraged people to go to travel agents and to mail in their passports rather than to come in. If necessary, I had all the officers in the consulate on particularly bad days stamping visas.

*Q:* Switzerland being such an international community and Zurich being the center of this, did the non-Swiss who were there cause interest problems for you?
ELLIS: No, they didn’t. If they were permanent residents of Switzerland and if they were Italian or Spanish or whatever, they were considered just about as good as Swiss. Obviously, we were much more careful for people who just happened to be there. We started, toward the end of the time I was there, processing some people from Iran because the U.S. embassy in Iran was closed. I remember one case where an Iranian visa applicant had come in and was turned down. He was very irate. At the end of the day, we found a briefcase in the waiting room. Since he’d gone and come back, and then was turned down, we were very concerned. I called the police, and they had to come and very carefully remove this briefcase. It turned out, of course, that the guy was just so irate that he’d forgotten his briefcase.

Q: *Did the East-West tension cause any problems there?*

ELLIS: I did have one political officer on my staff who followed East-West matters because there were people from the East Bloc that came to Zurich.

Q: *What about the wealthy Americans who were settled there? They have a tendency to die by the time they get wealthy. I was wondering if this caused any particular problems for you?*

ELLIS: Well, I had a very good consular staff who would take care of death cases. There was a large American community, particularly in Ticino, the Italian-speaking canton. There was also Franklin College, an American college down there, and TASIS, an American high school. Since I spoke Italian anyway, I would frequently go down to the Ticino to meet with the American community down there and the American schools and give some talks and speeches. We had an American woman down there who—she wasn’t an honorary consul but she was sort of the unofficial American representative--helped us out a lot and arranged things for us down there.

Q: *It sounds like you had a very professional staff including people who knew banking and the whole business. Was there any progress made at that time when you were there on opening up the banking process?*

ELLIS: There were negotiations in Bern on that. I was not involved but I think it was concluded after I left Switzerland. Eventually, we did get a judicial assistance agreement with the Swiss whereby they would agree to cooperate at least in some cases.

Q: *Were there any unsavory characters coming across your radar who were over there because the money was there or they were moving their money?*

ELLIS: There are always people with scams. A lady came in who claimed she had some stolen uranium that she wanted to return to the U.S. government, of course, for a price. She even had some samples. We had them shipped back, and they were analyzed and found to be very depleted. It wasn’t what it was supposed to have been. That was a rather complicated matter, and it eventually turned into a protection case because the lady was arrested by the Swiss authorities.

Q: Well, you left there in 1980.
Born and raised in Indiana, Mr. Burch studied at St. Meinrad Seminary, Purdue University and the University of Tubingen, Germany. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service, where he served primarily in African countries, including Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Zambia. Other assignments took Mr. Buche to Canada, Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as to the State Department in Washington. He was an Amharic language specialist. Mr. Buche was interviewed in 1993 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: This is the 15th of December, 1999, the Ides of December. John, you were in Geneva from 1978 to -


Q: When you went to Washington before starting off in Geneva, what were you hearing about refugee affairs and what you were going to be dealing with?

Buche: When I went to Washington, I was told that refugees were becoming a more important aspect of U.S. foreign policy and that there were discussions underway with Congress to set up a new bureau in the Department for refugee affairs. In the meantime, refugee affairs were being handled in the Human Rights Bureau, which had been set up by President Carter. The Bureau was under Pat Darian, the Assistant Secretary. I also learned about the budgeting for refugee affairs within the Department. I did not realize that as a Cold War holdover, the budget for refugee affairs was separate from the State Department's regular budget. I did not know all of the ins and outs of why that distinction was made back in the 1950's, but the exception was still valid. There was the State Department budget, and there was the budget for the Office of Refugee Affairs. I think the intention was to isolate the refugee budget from the partisan battles over the State Department's budget. Refugee issues had become a non-partisan Cold War requirement, and Congress decided to handle it in that fashion. I learned what was going to be required of us in Geneva, as far as projections concerning refugee numbers and the funds needed to process and care for them. I learned about the international humanitarian organizations we would be dealing with in Geneva: the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). (At the time, IOM was named the InterGovernmental Committee for European Migration and subsequently, the InterGovernmental Committee for Migration.)

I went to Geneva, and within a few days after arriving, I was told I would be the acting chief of the section since the Counselor for Refugee Affairs, Ed Brennan, had just been diagnosed with cancer, and he left to return to Washington for medical treatment. Doug Hunter, whom I knew from my time in Bonn (he was the Consul in Bremen) arrived in Geneva at the same time. So we two newly-arrived officers were to take over responsibilities for an expanding program for refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and liaison responsibilities with the
international organizations for the program for refugees from Southeast Asia. The SEA program was growing at a fast pace as more and more people began to leave Vietnam in boats. This was 1978, and the fall of Saigon and the collapse of South Vietnam occurred in 1975.

Q: There was a continuing flow?

BUCHE: Yes, a continuing flow. They were coming out in ever-larger numbers. The outflow seemed to become larger in the spring and summer of 1978 than it was right after the fall. The Vietnamese Government allowed this to happen. All sorts of Vietnamese were getting involved in renting, selling, or stealing boats, and selling places on the boats to people who wanted out of the country. The numbers were really quite large. This was quite a concern to the United States, as well as to some of our allies in Southeast Asia - the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Hong Kong. The boat people were landing in these countries, but none of the first-asylum countries wanted to keep them permanently. They were obliged to offer asylum because of the Refugee Conventions they had signed, but they decided that it was not in their national interests to offer permanent resettlement to the refugees. When the numbers were relatively small, they took them in and requested the U.S., Canada, and Australia (traditional countries of immigration) to resettle them. That arrangement worked for a while, but as the numbers increased, we and the other resettlement countries did not keep up with influx. The refugee camps became overcrowded. The first asylum countries began to refuse to allow the refugees to land. They gave them additional fuel, food, and fresh water and pushed their boats back into the sea. The U.S. Government stepped up its rate of acceptance and began to ask non-traditional immigration countries to take in Southeast Asian refugees. Some non-traditional immigration countries had been resettling SEA refugees since 1975.

Q: I imagine France would be in that category.

BUCHE: Yes, it was.

Q: Proportionately they have more Vietnamese than any other country.

BUCHE: I think that is correct. As the former colonial power in that part of the world, France had a long tradition of accepting Laotians, Cambodians, and Vietnamese. The French were, of course, taking in refugees who had some connections with the old "patrie," i.e. those who had served in the French colonial administration or military, had attended French schools, or had close relatives in France. The non-traditional resettlement countries, such as the UK, Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Nordics were quite reluctant to take in Vietnamese because they were already seeing increased influxes of Eastern Europeans. The U.S. Mission in Geneva was heavily engaged in working with the international organizations in that city, as well as with the other diplomatic missions to coordinate the myriad problems involved in caring for, processing, and resettling Eastern European and Southeast Asian refugees.

Q: I'd like to know, where did you fit in? What actually were you doing in Geneva?

BUCHE: I will try to describe the work of the Mission and my own role. The Mission was a hybrid creation.
Q: Was it United Nations?

BUCHE: No, it was an American diplomatic post accredited to the United Nations and other international organizations, instead of to a country. The internal structure was similar to any large American Embassy. There was an Ambassador, DCM, and various sections headed by Counselors. I was the Acting Counselor of the Refugee and Migration Section. We had nine Foreign Service Nationals in the Section. They were responsible for formulating budgets, auditing the Non-Governmental Organizations which we funded, keeping a central registry of refugees whom we were assisting under the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, and liaising with the international humanitarian organizations on funding and budget issues.

Q: You were under an ambassador and had overall responsibility for doing what?

BUCHE: Yes, I was under an ambassador. The Mission was set up with an economic section, a political section, an economic section, a small consular section, and as mentioned above, a refugee and migration section. There was also a legal section in the Mission because of the legal and treaty aspects of our membership in the various international organizations. There was also a CIA station attached to the Mission.

Q: Who were your ambassadors?

BUCHE: William Van den Heuvel was our first ambassador. He was a political appointee from New York and had come from the humanitarian world. After he made his career and fortune as a lawyer, he went into humanitarian work. He had been associated with the International Rescue Committee, Amnesty International, and the UN Association. He was quite knowledgeable about refugee affairs and the international organizations we were dealing with. Ambassador Van den Heuvel was like a gift of God to me because I was just learning the nuts and bolts of the job. He and the DCM, Roger Sorenson, were deeply involved in refugee issues before Doug Hunter and I arrived, so we had excellent guidance on what needed to be done. After about a year, Van den Heuvel resigned and was replaced by a career diplomat, Gerald Helman. He brought Don Eller with him to Geneva as his DCM. (Roger went to Rome as head of our Mission to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.) When Reagan became President, he replaced Ambassador Helman with a political crony, Geoffrey Schwaeb. Schwaeb was the Chairman of May Department Stores and a big financial contributor to Reagan. In the spring of 1979, the Refugee Counselor position at the Mission was filled by Steve Palmer. After a year of running the Refugee Section, Steve was called back to Washington by the Deputy Secretary for a special task and was replaced by Frank Sieverts. Frank was in charge of the Section for a year, before he was recalled to Washington to open up the position for Karl Beck. After several years in Geneva, Doug Hunter resigned from the Foreign Service to work for IOM. He was replaced by Robert Paiva, who also resigned after two years to work for IOM!

Because there was so much U.S. domestic interest in refugees, the Mission was actively engaged in working with the UN, the ICRC, IOM, and the NGOs. There were frequent international conferences held on refugee issues. The first one was three months after I arrived. The U.S. delegation was headed by Vice-President Mondale. You can imagine the complexities when a
Vice-President gets involved in an international conference. He was there for several days. But before Mondale and the official party arrived, we had teams of security people, several Assistant Secretaries to conduct preliminary negotiations, dozens of journalists, and additional secretaries, public affairs specialists, and working-level officers from the State Department. The way these conferences normally play out, much of the groundwork is done beforehand. Then the big names come in from the capitals, make speeches, do some bilateral work, put the finishing touches on the declarations, give press conferences or interviews on the "success" of the high-level gathering, and depart.

There were constant conferences, but fortunately only two in Geneva at the Vice-Presidential level, but the idea was to push the concept of burdensharing among the potential refugee-resettlement countries and to come to some sort of an agreement on how to assist and to reassure the countries of first asylum, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Hong Kong that they would not be stuck with tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of refugees. An understanding was reached that if the first-asylum countries would take in the refugees, the UN would pay for their upkeep, and then they would be resettled. That meant that Congress had to be brought on board (for funding and to allow the U.S. to take in tens of thousands of refugees each year). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees had the responsibility to protect and care for the refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention (signed by most governments). That UN agency also had the task of coordinating the understandings and speaking out when parties did not adhere to what had been agreed. Of course, the UNHCR needed large sums of money to carry out its mandate. This was something the UNHCR had always done very well on a limited basis. With the outflow of thousands of refugees daily from Vietnam, the UNHCR was not prepared to meet the burgeoning crisis. They were basically Europe-oriented and were beginning to handle large-scale refugee crises in Africa, but they were not staffed to handle simultaneously another major crisis in Southeast Asia.

They were particularly weak in the resettlement aspects, since in Europe, we, the Canadians, and Australians processed our own refugees. (Israel was beginning to receive large numbers of Soviet Jews, so the Jewish Resettlement Agency was also involved in the processing in Europe.) The High Commissioner at the time was Paul Hartling, a former Prime Minister of Denmark. He responded to the pressures (and increased funding) from the U.S. and our European Allies and augmented his staff to meet the worldwide crises. My office was called upon to work with the UN and other humanitarian organizations to meet the crisis in Southeast Asia and still manage the ever-increasing outflows of refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While there was not the problem of the first-asylum states of Europe, particularly Germany, Austria, Greece, and Italy, turning back the refugees, they were also concerned that they not be stuck with large numbers. They counted on us and the other resettlement countries to take most of the refugees. Fortunately for the program, there was fairly wide support in the U.S. for offering haven to the Eastern European refugees. This was part of the Cold War mentality.

Q: We’re still talking about the Cold War era. The Cold War was in full fledge, particularly after 1979.

BUCHE: It was August 1978, when I arrived in Geneva. The number of people coming out of Eastern Europe, and asking for asylum in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and Greece had
been growing by twenty to thirty percent annually since 1975. The U.S., the Canadians, and Australians years ago had worked out an agreement to help these first asylum states by taking for resettlement most of the refugees who entered Western Europe. The exceptions were the East Germans (who were offered West German citizenship immediately upon reaching the country) and those refugees who had close family members in Western Europe. The Canadians and the Australians were looking for migrants, and we were doing it for political and/or humanitarian reasons.

In 1977, the USSR began to drop many restrictions to legal emigration for Jews. They were coming out of the Soviet Union by train to Vienna. The Jews would be met by representatives of an American NGO, HIAS, as well as by the Jewish Resettlement Agency. They would indicate their preference to go to Israel or to the U.S. (or elsewhere, other than Israel). They would then either be flown to Israel within a few days, or processed in Vienna for resettlement elsewhere. In 1978, the overall numbers of Jews coming out of the U.S.S.R. was growing dramatically, but the ratio of those choosing not to go to Israel was increasing. (These were the so-called “split-offs”.)

The U.S. Government believed they should have a choice. This is where the Israeli Government and the US Government had sharp differences. The Israeli Government maintained since the Jews were coming out of Russia with visas for Israel, they should go first to Israel. If they did not like living there, then they could go elsewhere. We said our laws on asylum did not permit that, since once a refugee has been resettled, he or she had no claim as a refugee for a second country of resettlement. This issue was a bone of contention between our two Governments, especially since the numbers were going up of those who decided to split off and settle in the West.

Q: What was your office’s role in this Jewish migration?

BUCHE: We funded from our office the operations in Vienna of the organizations involved in the initial questioning and processing. Once a Jew decided not to go to Israel, we picked up the costs of care and maintenance of the refugee in Austria, until we could resettle the person elsewhere. This was an arrangement that we worked out with the Austrian Government. The Austrians agreed to be a conduit, but they were not going to pay for care and maintenance or allow them to stay in the country, unless they had ties with Austria. The reasoning of the Austrians was completely in conformity with the Refugee Convention of 1951, since the Jews had the right and a means to go to Israel. Some of them eventually did stay in Austria, but not very many. My office’s responsibility for a refugee ceased as soon as the person was resettled either in Israel, Europe, or a traditional country of immigration. Until that happened, however, our office paid for care and maintenance, including clothes, pocket money, health costs, school supplies for children, and burial costs in a few cases. When I arrived, the Jews on our care and maintenance rolls in Austria numbered about 10,000. Shortly before I departed, the numbers had risen to 30,000. We worked primarily with two Jewish and two non-Jewish NGOs who were in daily contact with the Jews. These former were HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Assistance Society), AJDC (American Joint Distribution Committee), and the latter were IRC (International Rescue Committee), and Austria Caritas.
Q: I would think that these latter organizations would shy away because, after all we’re talking about people who have a place to go. I would think that there would have been the idea of putting their resources elsewhere.

BUCHE: They wanted to help on an ecumenical or humanitarian basis. The IRC was founded in the mid-1930s in New York to rescue Jews from Hitler’s Germany. Most of the Jews who broke off in Vienna and wanted to go elsewhere were helped to do so by HIAS and AJDC in a partnership arrangement. But there were other NGOs which were already working with the non-Jewish refugees and decided they would help because, for one thing, it smoothed out the peaks and valleys of workloads. The Jews were very regular in coming out of the U.S.S.R. They needed exit visas and were allowed time to pack up and say good bye. While their numbers were growing, we could plan in advance. Whereas the number of refugees from Eastern Europe was up and down, depending on so many aspects. Very few of them actually “climbed under or over the Iron Curtain”. They came out as tourists or part of teams or delegations or they had permission to join family members. There were some very dramatic escapes, but most of them came out in tour buses or trains with permission. The non-Jewish NGOs did take some of the Jews, and we encouraged them to do so. By the same token, HIAS processed some Pentecostals and Evangelicals from the Soviet Union because it had a large staff of Russian-speakers. Our office reviewed and approved the NGO budgets, incorporated them for submission to Washington, and after the funds became available to us, we apportioned the money and audited the expenditures. Because of the long lead-time required by Washington for the budgets and because the budgets were based on future estimations of the number of refugees each NGO would handle and for how long, until they were resettled, there was a real need for intelligent estimations and informed guesses. We could adjust budgets for the NGOs within our overall ceiling without reference to Washington, but if we grossly underestimated the overall levels of incoming refugees, we would have to go back to Washington for a supplemental. Since a supplemental request to Congress was acceptable only for large-scale emergencies, we were encouraged to over estimate and be prepared to return the money at the end of the fiscal year to the Treasury. By a combination of good estimations and favorable luck, we came very close to the real numbers each year.

In addition to the work in Geneva, several of our local employees in Geneva would travel to the NGO field offices to audit the accounts and serve as advisers in the day-to-day operations. We also used American accounting firms to audit the NGOs. Once a quarter, Doug or I would visit the NGO field offices in Vienna, Rome, Paris, Munich, Istanbul, Athens, or Bucharest for discussions with the NGOs that we were funding. Our visits gave us a good comprehension of the “big picture” of the U.S. Refugee Program in Europe, as well as acquaint us with the numerous fine points and the many local variations.

During our visits, or sometimes between visits, we would receive requests from the NGOs for additional money. Sometimes it would be a request for an extra $50,000 because of an unexpected influx or the funds to hire an extra driver. Sometimes it was a minor sum for a new electric typewriter. We tried to be very reasonable and accommodating. We knew the NGOs were operating on a shoestring in many cases. We knew what their salaries were, and they were not getting rich. Some of the more difficult decisions concerned medical cases. The NGOs had authority to cover emergency or life-threatening situations if the host government would not pay,
but there were also cases where a person needed a major procedure, but not on an emergency basis. Seldom would the host government pay since the immediate need was not acute. We would usually consult the USG-approved “panel physicians” and follow their recommendations. If the refugee was being processed for Australia or Canada, we would ask the panel physicians whether the operation or procedure could be safely postponed until the refugee arrived in the country of resettlement. We sometimes even followed that route for U.S.-bound refugees, if there was no significant danger in postponing the operation, because refugees in the U.S. came under Medicaid, for the first two years. If there were any doubt, however, about the safety of putting off the operation until after resettlement, we would authorize the procedure in Europe.

So that was what we were doing in Geneva. We were running our own Eastern European refugee program and doing the political and liaison work, and the information gathering from the international organizations in Geneva for the USG’s Southeast Asian program. Since there were also larger numbers of Africans refugees and displaced persons coming under the UNHCR care and protection, we reported on that area. We would get the information, send it to Washington, and Washington would make the decisions about how much money should be given to the UNHCR, to IOM, or the Red Cross and for which purposes. Our office at the time processed the USG payment checks for those organizations.

Q: Would your office be talking to refugees, or you were one step removed, making decisions?

BUCHE: We did not speak with many refugees in Europe. We visited Traiskirchen, a refugee camp outside Vienna, and a camp in the Munich area. Yes, we observed them, but we seldom talked to them about substantive issues. Doug and I sat in on a few interviews and asked questions, but our job did not involve the processing of individual refugees. We had the experience of refugee camp visits, but our job was to concentrate on the big picture by talking with the heads of the NGO units in Europe, UNHCR, IOM, and Red Cross officials, as well as State Department officers in the countries of first asylum. We were on the phone almost daily with Washington and followed up by sending cables.

During my time in Geneva, refugees were a major preoccupation with Washington. It was a significant domestic issue - not necessarily partisan, but an issue. Many Americans were concerned, on both sides of the equation. Some people wanted to limit the number of Southeast Asian refugees; others advocated a generous admissions policy. State governors, as well as Congress and the White House were united in their desire to bring more order into the process. The fall of Vietnam and the easing of restrictions on travel in Eastern Europe meant that unprecedented numbers of refugees were being admitted to the United States, usually on an ad hoc basis (the parole authority of the Attorney General). The process was disruptive. It was clear to many that Washington needed a new way to handle the USG response to the worldwide refugee problem. The State Department’s Human Rights Bureau was proving not to be the place for the responsibility of managing and funding the processing of refugees.

There are some basic differences between human rights and refugees regarding international organizations, NGOs, treaties and conventions, fora, and funding, as well as domestic constituencies. Perhaps with different leadership at the time in the Bureau of Human Rights, both aspects could have been accommodated. The reality, however, was that refugee problems were
given second priority by Assistant Secretary Derian in favor of human rights issues. The dedicated officials on the refugee side of that small Bureau overcame or worked around her reluctance and performed magnificently in meeting the demands of the ongoing crisis. Nevertheless, the Carter Administration and Congress decided that a new bureaucratic structure was required to handle refugee issues.

In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act. This Act did many things. It codified which Department was responsible for what. Roles were defined for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice, and the Department of State. It created the equivalent of a new Bureau in the Department of State, the Bureau of Refugee Programs, headed by a Director. The first Director was John Baker, who lasted for a short time before he went to another bureau. Congress decided not just to create a new Bureau-like entity in the Department of State, it also created a structure above the Bureau involving a Coordinator and a Deputy Coordinator with a dozen staff positions. This structure soon proved to be unwieldy and almost unworkable. The first Coordinator was Senator Dick Clark. His job description called for him to coordinate with all the players, HHS, INS, State, Congress, the Governors, et al. The Coordinator in theory was to be responsible directly to the President and to take his orders from the White House. It possibly could have worked, but in reality did not. Dick Clark soon after taking the job, resigned to become involved in Senator Kennedy’s bid for the Democratic nomination for President.

The next Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator were the two men, Victor Palmieri and Frank Loy, who had worked on the reconstruction of the bankrupt New York Central Railroad into Conrail. The idea was to bring a successful team from outside of government and let them put a management structure into place to deal with refugee problems. They made a good beginning. Then came the Mariel Cuban refugee crisis. The President decided to run things out of the White House, and marginalized Palmieri and Loy. President Carter became, in effect, the refugee coordinator. With the election of Reagan as President, Palmieri and Loy resigned. With the frequent changes at the top of the new refugee bureaucracy, it should be no surprise that there was much confusion in the ranks regarding priorities, assignments, and follow-through. We were trying to compensate for Washington’s disarray by including more specific recommendations in our reporting. We thought that would make things simpler in the Refugee Program in Washington. They would have the information we obtained, as well as a recommendation on what to do as a result. We were also operating under a cloud because the new team was not sure what they wanted Geneva to do or how it should be structured. How much financial authority should we have? Should we continue to run the Eastern European Program as before, or should it be revamped to place it under Washington’s control? In the near term, there was no alternative to maintaining the status quo in Geneva since the new bureau was in no position to take on any new tasks. We assumed from what we were hearing from Washington that eventually Geneva would lose much of our current autonomy. There would likely be a restructuring of the Eastern European Program. Instead of a centralized control of the NGO operations in Geneva, the future shape of the Program was toward working with fewer NGOs and allowing them autonomy within per-capita limits to make their own decisions regarding expenditures.
Q: I would think that in our dealings over the Vietnamese refugees, there had to be an awful lot of sitting around the table, saying: "I'll take so many; how many will you take?" and an awful lot of pushing and shoving.

BUCHE: There certainly was. Once the refugees were approved for resettlement in the U.S., there was a constant process of allocations and re-allocations with all the players having a say. The Department had only a minor role in the domestic allocation process. The big players were HHS, the NGOs, especially the larger organizations (Church World Services, the U.S. Catholic Conference, HIAS, and IRC), and representatives of the State governors. There was considerable give and take over the numbers of refugees to be admitted. Before the Refugee Act of 1980, this was an on-going, piecemeal exercise. With the passage of the Act, there was a formal procedure put into place which involved the Congress and the Executive Branch.

Q: Were you involved personally in any of the refugee crises? I'm thinking particularly of the Sudan, maybe Burundi and Rwanda, or any of those areas?

BUCHE: We were trying to do as much as we could through the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross and through NGOs and not have to become involved on the ground. There was one exception. After the passage of the Refugee Act, there was a decision in Washington to begin processing of Ethiopian refugees who were in the Sudan and Djibouti. In June 1980, I was sent to Djibouti to set up a processing office. My orders were to select and process several hundred refugees for interviews by officers from the Immigration and Naturalization Service in early September so that they could arrive in the U.S. before the end of our fiscal year on September 30.

I certainly counted on the American Embassy and the UNHCR to assist me in this undertaking. At first, they were really helpful in finding office space and locally available persons to work with me. The UNHCR sent over its files on refugees who had petitioned for overseas resettlement. Then as numerous minor problems and bottlenecks arose, they became less willing to assist. The Charge was unhappy with the crowds of refugees who gathered outside the processing office. It was in the Motor Pool, but on the Embassy compound, so I was forced to relocate my office.

When several Djibouti Government officials asked me for refugee status and resettlement in the United States for their Djibouti-citizen relatives and I turned them down immediately, they complained to the Charge. I explained that I was managing a refugee program, not a migration or educational program. Only refugees were eligible. By definition, a Djibouti citizen in his or her own country could not be considered a refugee. The Djibouti Government was already taking a "cut" of some 10-15% on food delivered to refugees by the UNHCR/WFP. (The number of refugees in the two camps was pegged at a higher number than were actually there. The "undistributed" food was taken by the Government and used for its own purposes.) The Djibouti Government began to complain of the "burden" of the refugees and how our program of resettlement would attract even larger numbers of Ethiopians.

Although Djibouti and Ethiopia adjoined, there was a desert of some 80-100 miles to cross from the populated areas of Ethiopia before reaching the border. Crossing the desert was extremely
dangerous for the Ethiopian refugees. There were Ethiopian military patrols as well as hostile natives looking for asylum seekers on the way to Djibouti. Some refugees lost their lives from attacks; some perished from exhaustion. Of those who reached Djibouti, almost all had been robbed. Most of the women also suffered rapes. Life as a refugee in Djibouti was extremely difficult. The weather was horrid, and there were constant shake-downs and harassment by the police. The refugees were generally aware of the dangers awaiting them in the desert and the daily tribulations of life in Djibouti, but they fled to that country because they feared for their very lives in Ethiopia. To say that Ethiopians would flee to Djibouti because a few of them might have the chance to resettle in the U.S. was irrational. Instead of trying to dissuade the Djibouti Government officials from this point of view, the Charge seemed to agree. He became quite uncomfortable with the program and did the minimum to help.

There were three UNHCR officials posted to Djibouti when I arrived. Two of them departed for annual leave in Europe shortly thereafter. The Chief of Mission, a Kenyan, remained behind. He was unwilling to do much of anything to help. The files turned over to me by the UNHCR were mostly out of date. In addition, there had been few new files created in the year or so before my arrival for potential resettlement cases. That meant I had to interview many refugees with nothing more to go on than name, date of birth, and date of arrival in Djibouti.

Since I was getting little cooperation from the American Charge, I asked him repeatedly to speak to the Djibouti Government (and the French Embassy, since the French controlled many aspects of the Government) for help in obtaining some necessary papers for the refugees (birth and marriage certificates if those events happened in Djibouti, plus exit permits from the country) as well as medical exams. I could not understand why he was so unwilling to act, until I went to the French DCM directly for help. I learned from the French DCM that the UNHCR head and the Ethiopian Ambassador were “very close”. The DCM said he suspected that the UNHCR head was passing on information about the refugees in Djibouti to the Ethiopian Embassy. The French DCM turned out to be supportive, and I was able to make some progress in obtaining papers from the Djibouti Government offices. As far as the medical exams were concerned, all the French physicians left the country in August for vacations in France, so I had to appeal to Geneva. The Mission asked the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for help. IOM sent down two doctors and a nurse, so the medical exams were completed.

The two locally-hired assistants proved to be gems. Both were wives of officials; one from the American AID Mission and the other from the French Military Assistance Group. I was reluctant for obvious reasons to use refugees to perform any processing work. The temptations and pressures on refugees to “assist” their friends and family would be too great to assure objectivity. I interviewed without interpreters to prevent shading and coaching. By the time the Immigration and Naturalization Service officer arrived in the first week of September, we had 228 persons ready for interview. We had their medical clearances, their security checks, and if applicable, the verification from the American Red Cross of their stated relationships with persons/companies/institutions in the USA. The latter step was not a pre-requisite for being included in the U.S. resettlement program at the time, but we were encouraged to obtain the data in order to facilitate integration in the USA. All but one person was approved by the INS officer. The one exception seemed to have very close ties in Djibouti and France, and could likely find resettlement opportunities in either. I returned to Geneva after welcoming my replacement and
handed over the responsibility for starting the processing for the next group. Eventually about a thousand Ethiopian refugees were resettled out of Djibouti to the USA before the Djibouti Government closed the program in 1983. Sometimes we would become involved in individual cases, but through letters, telegrams, or rarely, a phone call. It was the exception. I was probably guilty more than anyone else because I knew many Ethiopians from my tour in that country and they remembered, if not personally, at least my name through some other people. You will recall that a revolution began in Ethiopia in 1973 and that Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed and murdered a year later. There were tens of thousands of Ethiopian refugees in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Once in a while I would receive a letter from Djibouti, the Sudan, or Somalia asking for assistance since their file seemed to be lost in the bureaucracy. My normal reaction was to alert someone at the UNHCR headquarters to the problem and then follow-up later to make sure the case was back on track. Even before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the USG could process and admit Ethiopian refugees to the U.S. They were potential beneficiaries of the old Refugee Act of 1952, which included a section designed to offer the Jews in North Africa and the Middle East resettlement opportunities in the U.S. The geographic limits for such assistance included Ethiopia, although the main purpose at the time was for North African Jews.

Q: *Morocco?*

BUCHE: Particularly, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

Q: *And Egypt, yes?*

BUCHE: Yes, Egypt had the largest Jewish community in the area. Including Ethiopia in the 1952 Act was one of those quirks of drafting, where the intent was to help one particular ethnic or religious group under extreme pressure and persecution, and for some reason, another group was also included. The Refugee Act of 1980 did not include any geographic limitations, but defined a refugee in accordance with the Refugee Convention of 1951.

Q: *In 1982 you went where?*

BUCHE: I came to an end of my tour in Geneva in July 1982. I had received an assignment several months earlier to be the DCM in Mogadishu. As Anike and I were beginning to focus on Mogadishu, I got a call from a friend of mine, Nick Platt, who said that he had been nominated as Ambassador to Zambia and would like me to be his DCM. He was a Chinese specialist and had not served in Africa before. I said I would be delighted to go to Lusaka as his DCM, but I had already been assigned to Mogadishu. Nick knew about that and said he would work it out with Ambassador Oakley for me to come to Lusaka and for Ambassador Oakley to choose another DCM. Nick later reported that Bob Oakley had wanted another officer for his DCM, but at the strong recommendation of the Executive Director of the African Bureau, Len Shurtleff, he accepted me after checking out my background and references. When Nick offered Oakley a chance to obtain his preferred choice for DCM, he was delighted. So were Nick, Anike, and I. Looking back, I am so pleased that I did not go to Mogadishu. From a professional point of view, it probably would have been great assignment, but daily living was awful.
GERALD B. HELMAN
Representative, European Office of the United Nations

Ambassador Gerald B. Helman was born in Michigan in 1932. He received a B.A. and an L.L.B from the University of Michigan and was a member of the Michigan Bar. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he was posted in Milan, Vienna, Barbados, Brussels and Geneva. Ambassador Helman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 8, 2001.

Q: We’ll pick this up the next time in 1979, which was a rather exciting year as far as Afghanistan and Iran and all that, blew up. You were out of IO by that time, weren’t you?

HELMAN: By mid-year I was designated for Geneva.

Q: As what?

HELMAN: As ambassador.

Q: To do what?

HELMAN: Permanent representative to United Nations offices in Europe, which is headquartered in Geneva and carried the rank of ambassador.

Q: So we’ll pick this up ’79 to when?

HELMAN: ’79 to late ’81.

Q: Gerry, how did you get your job going to Geneva?

HELMAN: With great difficulty. (laughs) In fact I was really quite surprised and pleased I had been offered the job because up until then I think without exception Geneva went only to political appointees. My predecessor, Bill Vanden Heuval was really quite qualified and had a lot of domestic political experience through the Kennedy family. I attribute the fact that I got the job to three people - one is Cyrus Vance and the others Don McHenry and Bill Maynes. Don McHenry at that time had succeeded Andy Young as our perm. rep. in New York and Don and I for years had been very close and dear friends and professional colleagues. He and Bill pushed for my designation as permanent representative in Geneva because they felt that the U.S. could gain a great deal through professional management of that post. They supported it; it was not uncontested because the political types in the White House, of course, asked why should this guy, Helman, get this kind of job which has always been considered a plum? What did he do to be that deserving? But fortunately I had sufficient backing and the president agreed and I was designated. Passed my confirmation hearings and so on and went on to Geneva.
Q: At that time, because these things always change, how was the job described and how did you see your job and what you were going to be doing when you went out there?

HELMAN: Well, I must confess I was a bit surprised that I was asked to take the job because while I was quite experienced in United Nations affairs, that experience had been almost exclusively in the area of political Affairs, the activities that went on in New York principally, rather than in Geneva. Geneva was the home of the economic and social and humanitarian activities of the United Nations and I had precious little experience with organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and so on and so on. These and others turned out to be fascinating organizations, including the office of the High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Human Rights Commission. Because of these various specialized agencies. The UN has a significantly larger staff in Geneva than New York. But I knew very little about those organizations so I was a bit surprised and I honestly did not know quite what to expect.

My strengths lay at that time in a knowledge of political affairs, which as it turned out did intrude on those organizations; a good sense of how the State Department worked, a good feel for multilateral and conference diplomacy and how the U.S. could best obtain its objectives in a multilateral forum. But that being said, and puzzled as I was, I was also quite happy because it turned out to be a great experience.

Q: Did you go out with any sort of preconceived agenda in your briefcase?

HELMAN: Yes I did. And it was a strategic one or a conceptual one rather than an issue-specific one. Up until I think I went there, the Geneva Mission was generally considered to be a facilitator, a hotel management entity for various U.S. delegations coming to Geneva. It was heavy on the administrative side and it was not expected to participate much at all in the actual substantive work of these organizations. I was supported by Bill Maynes and Don McHenry in particular, and I figured it’s time to change this, that there are too many important things that go on in Geneva, including - while this wasn’t part of my direct responsibility - trade negotiations in the context of the GATT. Various arms control activities were also conducted in Geneva.

Different parts of our government were responsible for our participation in various of the Geneva-based organizations and activities, for example the Trade Rep for GATT, the Department of Labor for the ILO, Department of Health for the WHO, the FCC and Commerce for the ITU, ACDA for arms control, and so it went. The Geneva Mission could never provide the necessary technical expertise. What it could do was to monitor these organizations between major conferences, establish close ties with their leadership, who often controlled large budgets, and provide the political and multilateral expertise needed to achieve our objectives in conferences and meetings. In addition, I decided that I was going to train myself in the programs and activities of these various specialized agencies, as they were called, and try and figure out how the U.S. could best reach its goals. By the way, each of those organizations had its own culture, structure, method of operation and decision-making. Most were established by treaties separate from the UN Charter. I also had the opportunity of selecting my DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) and I chose Don Eller, whom I had gotten to know in IO and who I considered the best
admin fficer I had ever run across. He certainly validated my opinion of him through his performance in Geneva. Don unfortunately is since deceased, but we went together to Geneva. His job was to take care of the complex administration, not only of the mission, which was fairly sizeable and moving into a brand new building of its own.

Q: I don’t mean this to be facetious at all, quite seriously, part of that hotel management thing you were talking about which can get extremely complex having delegation after delegation coming in, needing to be housed, fed, and served for whatever their purpose is.

HELMAN: That’s right. Don knows that I would make the decisions that had to be made but I relied on him heavily to just manage all of that so that I could free myself to work with the various delegations, with the heads of all these agencies and so on. And I thought it turned out to be - well certainly my relationship with Don was very close and I hope it achieved what I sought to achieve.

Q: When you got out there did you find there was a distinct culture, either for the whole mission, or did each separate entity, which are quite different from each other, have its own culture and sort difficult to understand it, to break into it and all that?

HELMAN: Not in quite that way. There was a cultural issue there. I worked hard in my first couple of months at the mission, which was complicated by the fact that we moved from the old mission which was a couple of floors in an office building in Geneva to a spectacular building - one of the nicest structures I’ve seen the U.S. government put up - on the outskirts of Geneva near the UN complex. So that move was really time consuming and distracting. But I tried very hard to develop a core team with which I worked from the mission. I wanted them to buy into my concept of how we should function, which was that for each delegation - and the delegations were numerous and large - we would, I would, serve not only on that delegation together with some of the people in the mission who were expert in the work of that particular specialized agency, but that we would let the people coming from Washington know that we could deal with the complicated political and multilateral problems that came up. We didn’t put ourselves out as experts on technical telecommunications issues, or the details of labor law, or the details of health problems and so on, but when it came to our working with these specialized agencies directly or working as part of the U.S. delegation in the annual conferences that these agencies sponsored, we knew how to get things done.

Q: How did you find this concept dealt with the delegations that came?

HELMAN: Really quite good. Not to make invidious comparisons but they were habitually looking at the U.S. mission as basically a hotel management operation and I think they were willing to acknowledge that my background, and with the expertise that I had worked to develop within the mission, we could contribute significantly to the work of a particular delegation and we could tend their special interests in these agencies in between the various conferences. It worked out well. I and my people had the experience and contacts in the UN bureaucracy and with other Missions necessary to devise and implement the tactics to achieve our substantive objectives.
The other element of it that reinforced what I was trying to do is the deference that a Presidential ambassadressorial appointee commands. Even though some of the people who came with our delegations were quite senior and often Cabinet members, they were respectful, they saw what I could do for them. The Residence was a great help here - we had a marvelous residence - and we would hold cocktail parties, dinners, and whatnot, in order to further the work of each particular delegation. My wife had put together an outstanding staff and figured out how to do marvelous entertainments at short notice and on budget. She should have gotten paid.

There were structural and even cultural differences between various of the specialized agencies. For example, the International Labor Organization, created at the close of World War 1 by the Treaty of Versailles, had an elaborate constitutional structure and, uniquely, tripartite participation, representing labor, business and government - and they voted independently. I used to get Lane Kirkland and Irving Brown and other senior members of our labor movement over plus senior corporate executives representing business voting business interests. Delightful. I mean it was a great deal of fun working with these people. By the way, these labor relationships persisted even after I left Geneva, when I worked for the Under Secretary. For annual meetings of the World Health Organization, I’d get the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare coming over to head the delegation. Most of the issues, of course were a lot different than those in the ILO. Procedures, conference structure and overall ambiance varied considerably by organization. But the usual Arab-Israeli questions bedeviled everybody and our delegates from Washington were really quite happy to have me take it off their shoulders. They were content to have me speak as ambassador and who seemed to know what he was doing in dealing with extraneous political issues such the Arab-Israeli dispute.

One time I stepped in to take responsibility for implementing the U.S. position on a controversial technical issue. The U.S. position was controversial and embarrassing to our health professionals. It involved the use of infant formula instead of breast milk in poor countries. The U.S. position under Carter was to favor breast feeding. It switched under Reagan. I announced and justified the U.S. position, which happily was very much in the minority. I guess that’s what professionals are for. I several times took the pain and strain off the hands of our experts, delivered the harsh message on behalf of the U.S. government and let the experts take it from there.

There were more political questions involved in my work in Geneva than I had anticipated before coming out there. The Human Rights Commission, for example, met there annually and it still meets there and it’s still highly contentious, highly political. The U.S. government would send very capable delegations but they suffered from the fact that each time it was generally a new bunch of people, so all needed orientation and education and help and so on. An amusing sideline: the head of my household staff told me that the human rights types ate and drank more, and stayed longer at my cocktail parties than any other group.

I should add that another surprise to me was the range, commitment and energy of the various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) that followed the work of various of the specialized agencies. They mainly were active in the field of human rights and humanitarian affairs, but also had a point of view on what was going on in other of the Agencies, such as the WHO. And they let me know their views. They are, by and large, remarkable outfits and a powerful lobbying
force in many countries. They are more widely appreciated and reported on today; I learned about them and their quite significant role when I was in Geneva.

**Q:** Within your core mission, if you want to keep up with political things you must’ve had some people who were reading the cables and were…

**HELMAN:** Oh, yes. Including me. *(laughs)* I read the cables.

**Q:** But you must’ve had the equivalent of a political advisory section to understand what the issues were. Did you have that type of thing?

**HELMAN:** Yes, I had a small political section, a somewhat larger economic section because it had the several economic entities, specialized agencies including the UN Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was sometimes a bloody pain in the neck.

**Q:** This was doing what?

**HELMAN:** UNCTAD was set up by the United Nations back I think in the early ‘50s. Its principal purpose was to try and promote economic development, particularly of developing countries, and they used to develop lengthy studies and resolutions and to describe and recommend various measures and methodologies to assist developing countries. It was a fairly sizeable specialized agency by the time I got there that produced a lot of paper, sponsored endless meetings but never seemed to do anything useful. There probably were more than a dozen specialized agencies; each one required separate handling because each one was unique and operated on unique charters. Some of them were remarkably effective and often were not well known. As I mentioned earlier, I was much taken by the ILO, which I found a fascinating organization in its structure and performance. For example, a wide variety of human rights conventions were developed under its auspices. They dealt with a variety of labor issues, including child and slave labor. It sought thereby to establish global, uniform standards. Back in the ‘30s, the ILO helped the US to develop its Social Security System. More recently, the ILO helped Poland write new labor legislation in the aftermath of Solidarity’s success. By the way, most UN specialized agencies, with some exceptions, were set up post World War II. But the International Labor Organization goes back to the Treaty of Versailles; the International Telecommunication Union goes back to Alexander Graham Bell. Along time ago. So these have their own particular histories.

I found the Human Rights Commission quite challenging and quite difficult, quite discouraging sometimes. Then, as now, the countries with serious human rights problems lobbied to be elected to the Commission so that they could prevent any action against them. I found the UN High Commission for Refugees a fascinating organization - had a great deal to do with them. During my stay there the work multiplied immensely, in part because global developments beyond anybody’s expectation resulted in a huge growth in refugee populations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) I also found a remarkable organization. Of course, the ICRC was a private Swiss foundation, not a multinational organization, but the U.S. was a major contributor and welcomed its participation in dealing with man-made disasters worldwide. The ICRC’s leadership was always available to me to discuss issues and operations. Quite an
extraordinary organization. I should here distinguish between the ICRC and the League of Red Cross Societies, also with its headquarters in Geneva. The American Red Cross is an affiliate of the League, not the ICRC, and is concerned largely with providing aid in natural disasters.

Q: What about the other major powers - the Soviets, the British, the French, Japan? Did they have comparable organizations such as yours?

HELMAN: Yes, they were really quite well represented. The French had a smaller mission but then again they always have a small embassy and small missions. But they sent really top-notch people, the British, as well. And their ambassadors were guys with whom I closely cooperated. Japan was a bit more remote but still an important participant. The Japanese normally are reticent. When I was there the Chinese first came on in a significant fashion; they had by then joined the Security Council and they were gradually learning how to participate and learning - I use the term advisedly - to participate in international organizations more broadly, because they were terribly inexperienced, terribly fumbling.

Q: You were saying you got to know the…

HELMAN: I had a good working relationship with the Chinese ambassador because he sought, obviously for his own reasons, some help in how to participate. He literally sought my guidance. My instructions were to go ahead and help him as long as I was not giving away the store. That proved to be a valuable way of getting Chinese support when I needed it.

Another relationship which developed quite encouragingly as a consequence of outside events was with the Egyptian ambassador; Rauf el Reedy, who subsequently became Egypt’s ambassador to the United States. This was in the wake of the Camp David accords and so our relationship with Egypt was certainly on a new level. Having recognized and established diplomatic relations with Israel, they couldn’t contribute to the kind of political harassment of Israel that had become standard fare for Arab countries in the UN system. I was able to work with el Reedy closely to discourage and circumvent or defeat such harassment.

Basically my purpose was to save the UN institutions from the distractions of having to deal with political issues that really didn’t belong there, and certainly my ability to work closely with a very talented Egyptian ambassador and his staff made my job in that respect quite a bit easier. I also established what continues to be a good friendship with el Reedy. I should add, while giving a general account of Geneva, that it was the scene of many ad hoc diplomatic activities.

Q: A neutral, nice environment.

HELMAN: An absolutely nice environment. Geneva always offers a very desirable alternative. And the Genevois certainly encouraged that. So there were a variety of off-the-record diplomatic activities that went on there. To illustrate that about all I can say is that there is a plaque in the lobby of a mission, which I think was awarded to two or three embassies around the world, commending us for our assistance in the Iran hostage crisis. And that was of course extremely gratifying to our entire Mission staff.
Q: How did that play? We had two things going on at the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis. I imagine the hostage crisis particularly engaged us, didn’t it?

HELMAN: Yes, the hostage crisis was preeminent; there were some off-the-record activities that involved Afghanistan, but diplomacy with respect to Afghanistan had not really taken hold. This was something that developed several years afterwards. But the activities on a variety of other issues were certainly parts of my portfolio.

Q: On the Iran hostage thing I imagine there were all sorts of... I mean this was sort of a meeting informal sub rosa a meeting place for various negotiations or discussions.

HELMAN: I’ll pass on that, but needless to say we were pleased to receive a commendation.

Q: Were some of the age-old diplomatic games played out on these delegations? I think of the perpetual one between the French and the Americans, particularly from our perspective of the French trying to stick their thumb in our eyes and all.

HELMAN: Sometimes on the economic side, but the French had quite a remarkable Ambassador, Stefan Hessel, who had no patience for that kind of activity. He was quite senior in the French diplomatic service and thus not easily challengeable from home. You always expected the French to give you a hard time of it, but it didn’t happen very much in Geneva. The French, certainly on refugee matters and human rights matters were team players; we were pretty much working off the same page. My French counterpart could call me and I would give him a hand if I could possibly do that and I was pretty confident that if I gave him a ring he would similarly respond. My British counterpart certainly was of the same mind. It was a really pleasant experience. We all cooperated on substantive but also budgetary issues. When we called as a team on Agency heads to discuss money, for example, we were quite formidable. How much was a product of my skills, or lack of them, is not very relevant. But I know that they were very pleased to have, for the first time, an American colleague who was a pro, who knew the policy, who knew the business, and with whom they could work and who would understand what they were driving at. By the way, and also whom they couldn’t take for a ride. (laughs) And they knew that.

Q: How did you find being separated from the UN headquarters? Sometimes this is quite a joy to be away. You know, it’s a large bureaucracy.

HELMAN: Geneva, by the way, has more UN employees than New York. Our contributions to the Geneva based agencies, was larger than our contributions to the New York agencies, so I had plenty of bureaucracy. And one of the things that I undertook was to try my damnedest to place U.S. nationals on the staffs of the various UN agencies. Other countries generally do a much better job, I think even today, than the U.S. has done in making sure that we get our fair share of jobs. Not that the U.S. nationals who were employed there, in the bureaucracies there, were at my beck and call, but there was a matter of fairness, of confidence in the competence of the U.S. nationals, and insistence on my part that we get our fair share.
I also tried to pay closer attention to them - there were hundreds of U.S. employees in the UN agencies in Geneva. None of them had ever seen the inside of the mission, certainly few had seen the inside of the Residence; only a few had ever met the U.S. ambassador there, or staff and stuff like that, and I thought that that was wrong so I tried hard to at least make them feel a part of the larger community so that they would know that we’re there, we’re on their side, we want to meet them, talk to them, work with them, and even deal with their grievances. I thought that worked out well.

Q: How did you find the Swiss as hosts?

HELMAN: Oh, pretty good. (laughs) The Swiss are remarkable. Better, the “Genevois” because the Swiss canton system is real and they have every bit as much pride in their identity as “Genevois,” or coming from one of the other cantons, as a Texan has of being from Texas and so on. Genevois recall that Geneva was once an independent entity that predated the Swiss Confederation and had very much a history all of its own. And indeed Geneva has a fascinating history. So when you dealt with the Swiss, you were really dealing with the Genevois, and they attach a great deal of importance, both politically and economically, to the presence of the UN entities in Geneva and in Switzerland despite the fact that up until recently Switzerland was not a member of the United Nations, or at least of its political organs. It was a member of many of the specialized agencies and contributed a good bit of money to their operations.

I learned about at least one attraction that the Genevois and the Swiss employed to maintain their attraction to UN agencies; if, let’s say, the International Labor Organization decides it’s outgrown its old building, doesn’t have enough land, wants to build something and is sort of looking around generally, even outside of Switzerland, the Swiss will make them an offer they can’t refuse. (laughs) It might involve loaning them money to build a new building, charging almost 0% interest. And so the ILO stays there and others stay there as well.

Q: While you were there were there any issues that you can talk about that you found particularly difficult, engaging, and contentious?

HELMAN: Yes, I think the area that engaged me more than any other single one was refugee affairs - humanitarian affairs generally, but specifically refugee affairs. At the time I was there, Saddruden Aga Khan, who did an outstanding job as High Commissioner for Refugees, had left post. He was a Prince of the Islamic Ismaeli sect and lived in a gorgeous villa right on the shore of Lake Geneva. Paol Hartling, who at various times had been foreign minister and premier of Denmark, was elected as his replacement. Saddruden’s job when he was High Commissioner involved a world-wide effort to help with scattered refugee populations. It involved persons who had been involuntarily and forcefully displaced from their country - essentially “true” refugees, instead of persons internally displaced because of drought, famine and civil war. While the organization had a large budget, its operations were generally predictable and manageable.

That changed rapidly when Hartling came on board, not because he invited the change but because of events around the world. Civil conflict, drought and famine created huge populations of refugees and internally displaced persons in Africa. And then you had the whole Cambodia refugee problem - that was when Pol Pot came on the scene and a real holocaust began there -
and the Vietnamese invasion and the terrible, terrible suffering and decimation of the Cambodian populations and the wandering, almost uncountable number of Cambodians and the desperate efforts to provide somehow for these refugee populations in a very dangerous environment. All told we were talking about many millions of helpless people. And the difficulty of it was intensified by the terrain, the politics, and the sheer physical danger - the Pol Pot people did not welcome visitors (laughs) and the Vietnamese could also be difficult. It’s strange to think that the Vietnamese could be at that time viewed as almost rescuers.

Q: This was really not that long after the war. Were we making contacts with the Vietnamese? They were really coming in to stop this. The fact that they were coming in was…

HELMAN: Since I was not involved directly in the bilateral aspect of it, I think the answer was, not really. In part because it was not really clear what the Vietnamese objectives were, although certainly anybody that took on Pol Pot was more than welcome in my mind. And you had the boat people issue and so on. It was just a horrible, horrible situation. Between Cambodia and Africa, the UNHCR’s resources were almost overwhelmed. The UNHCR was trying to develop some sort of plan with a Thailand that wasn’t always terribly cooperative and with Washington which was intent on assuring in that the proper procedures were maintained in delivering refugee assistance - financial assistance, food, anything.

In working with Harting and a number of other quite remarkable people, and I think in many respects the most remarkable of all was Mort Abramowitz - who I knew before this as a colleague. He was, fortunately, our ambassador in Thailand and was quite willing to go to the mat on the refugee issue with Washington. Mort came up with the, at that time, radical and extraordinary idea, saying, “So what if the food gets in the hands of black marketeers? Dump the food at the frontier if necessary and even if it gets in the black market, all the black marketeers can do is sell to people who are willing to pay for it and so you feed people.” He bullied State and the Thais, until they did the right thing. (laughs) Certainly I bought into it and Mort came over once or twice to Geneva. We helped put together an international emergency conference to raise money, consolidate political support, and help organize the UNHCR, the ICRC and other humanitarian agencies to tackle the crisis in a coherent, organized fashion. We also worked together to organize the UNHCR operation in Thailand. Mort was the inspiration and the engine that drove the process. Help was given and gotten. Another remarkable person who played a key role was Sir Robert Jackson, “Jacko” was Australian, with a military background and served as Hartling’s Coordinator for Cambodia. Jacko was experienced in UN and military operations. He was unorthodox, profane and totally dedicated. His wife, by the way, was Barbara Ward Jackson, the very formidable author, journalist and, as I recall, editor of the “Economist.”

The other principal effort in the refugee field involved Africa, which was being overwhelmed by war and draught induced-famine. Organizing a special contributors’ conference to wheedle large amounts of money out of donating governments for the High Commissioner to use in providing assistance to the African refugees, was a major effort. It was major in terms of timing because there was present disaster that one was trying to confront. The bureaucracies in Geneva and Washington had great difficulty in addressing the really quite extraordinary events and numbers of people involved. I did a lot of pushing on that and so did the State Department. For the
conference, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher came over and Dick Holbrook came over as well.

Q: He was secretary for Far Eastern Affairs which is where a significant number of refugees…

HELMAN: You are right, but I’m sure Dick was on that trip. He probably took on some Cambodian and Asian issues on the side. The event was successful in raising money but, as importantly, in helping the UNHCR to organize itself to cope with its quite huge problem. Subsequent to that I was at lunch at the Thai ambassador’s residence and Paol Hartling was there, the High Commissioner for Refugees, and a bunch of other ambassadors, and it was then that Paol was called to the phone. It was the Nobel Committee calling to inform him that the UNHCR had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. That was terrific.

Q: Oh, yes. Did you find that the Scandinavians were playing a particular role in this, because although they were both in and out of NATO - Sweden being out of NATO and all - but they took a particular interest in places like Africa and humanitarian affairs. Did you find that they had a positive thrust?

HELMAN: Oh, yes. UN affairs, in particular. When I was in Geneva, three heads of agencies were Danish nationals. One was Paol Hartling, High Commissioner for Refugees, another was Hafdan Mahler, who was head of the World Health Organization. He was superb. He was a tough bureaucrat; he managed that place far better than some of the people who succeeded him. And then the head of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which is a very large organization, was also Danish. I don’t recall his name. But one thing I learned, though I didn’t deal much with the WMO, they are the largest consumer of computer capacity in the world. Apparently, following and predicting the weather requires huge, huge time on very heavy duty systems.

Q: They still haven’t found the philosopher’s stone. I mean at least they keep saying when there’s going to be rain in Annandale and they’ve been off almost every time.

HELMAN: Well, they haven’t gotten it down to that fine a grain. (laughs) I’ll tell you though, the WMO provides immense amounts of data to its U.S. counterparts, and around the world. Farmers can be very happy with what these guys do.

Q: Satellites, by the time you were there in 1980 or so, were beginning to kick in with all of their data that they could have - crops and...

HELMAN: That’s taking pictures and observation satellites. Yes, that’s true. That provided a great deal of assistance in predicting weather. But the heavy duty computer demand was based upon just raw data, not pictures, temperatures, events, amount of rain and cloud patterns, and sea patterns, and wind patterns. It was huge.

Q: What about the role of the Soviets at this time? The Soviets were quite a bit in the international doghouse after their invasion of Afghanistan. Did that have any impact on operations in Geneva?
HELMAN: Only in particular areas. The Soviets certainly had a large staff there, probably for a number of reasons most spelled KGB. And they were most troublesome because they used their Geneva mission as a recruiting headquarters; they tried very hard both to place their own nationals and suborn other nationals who were on the staffs of the various UN agencies. I think just as in New York these multilateral institutions represented for the Soviets sort of a happy hunting ground for informants and more - both from the staffs of the UN entities there and from the various delegations to the United Nations, because Geneva and New York were two of the very few places where basically the whole world was represented and so you’ve got a large smorgasbord from which to dine. So that was troublesome and part of my work was to try and assist these specialized agencies in coming up with more efficient structures and to try and resist the politicization of their activities and the suborning of their staffs. Certainly I had good support from the heads of the various agencies, who knew what was going on, but that was always a significant part of my portfolio. Others at my mission who were more expert at these matters than I dealt with them daily.

The Russians were active in arms control obviously. I didn’t get into that very much. They were hardly active at all on the economic side of the picture. They were active in a variety of specialized agencies. Sometimes they were cooperative, sometimes they weren’t. This was on the overt side. By and large, even though they had a large delegation, I don’t think that they were very effective in pursuing their interests on the overt issues that arose in the various agencies. Since they contributed little money, few were inclined to pay attention to the Soviet view on questions of programs and agendas of the Agencies. They were increasingly on the defensive - not only because of Afghanistan, and that really wasn’t terribly significant while I was there, except some of the Soviet nationals found it a little embarrassing, but because of events in Eastern Europe. That was the time of very significant political developments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These countries were looking for a freer hand. These countries used the United Nations, both in New York and Geneva, as fora in which they could seek wider scope for pursuing what they considered to be their national interests. And certainly it’s something that I saw, perhaps not in terribly dramatic fashion, but sufficiently clearly so that I looked for ways to give them a hand to weaken the Soviet position if possible, and to seek support on particular issues of interest to us. But I never expected it to go terribly far.

There were, however, some very dramatic events. Geneva was almost a wonderland in some of the things that happened there, for example, at the 1981 International Labor Conference, which was the ILO’s annual global conference. President Reagan had by then taken office and I forget the name of the secretary of labor who came. Anyway Lane Kirkland came over with a strong union team. Senator Hatch was there as ranking member of the Senate’s Labor Committee.

But the big attraction at the Conference was the presence of Lech Walesa as the Polish worker representative. I believe it was the first time he had ever departed Poland. The Polish government allowed him to leave to represent Polish workers at the ILO. I can’t begin to describe the electricity in that huge conference hall when Walesa rose to speak. It was great. (laughs) I recall standing at the side of the conference hall so that I could watch the reactions of the Eastern Europeans. Almost all, including some Cubans, applauded Walesa.
Q: When you were there were you seeing a growing importance where both - I’m not sure if it was the European Union or European community, probably at that point?

HELMAN: It was a little more complex than that because you still had EFTA.

Q: And that was when the OSCE was getting… Were you seeing sort of a coalescence within Europe of being a power unto itself or not?

HELMAN: I think there was still a lot of stumbling and feeling for direction. As I said, the Europeans, unlike today, were split between two trading groups. One was the Common Market, then called, and the European Free Trade Association with Switzerland and the Scans generally and the Brits. I think the Irish and a bunch of others were members. It was a complicating factor because on anything of real significance, each entity went off by themselves and they tried to bargain amongst themselves on a position and finally they’d come around to tell you what their position was. This introduced a lot of rigidity in the negotiating process because none of them wanted to go back into their own groups for approval of changes. It was a complicating matter but not overwhelmingly so because on anything with any significance, you know the Germans or the British or the French or some of the others were quite willing to get together.

Q: How was the advent of the Reagan administration seen from Geneva at the time?

HELMAN: Great trepidation. Reagan came with a highly critical foreign and even US press. Whatever the press printed was mistaken as gospel, as true; and what the American press printed about Reagan and some of the people who came in with him - General Haig and Jeane Kirkpatrick was accepted and even devoured. It was seen most immediately in Geneva in the Human Rights Commission because the Human Rights Commission took up its usual array of high voltage issues in March, 1981. The Commission meeting goes on for six to eight bloody weeks and the U.S. government then would send over a couple of guys that I got to know - Dick Schifter and - who was the co-head of delegation? I forget. He’s over at the American Enterprise Institute now.

But they came with rather a hard nose and idealistic approach to human rights. They both were neo-conservatives; they were part of the neo-con crowd in the Reagan administration. They were a lot tougher and a lot less willing to compromise and this made the task of getting general agreement very difficult on almost anything. I thought that in some cases they were unnecessarily rigid. So the first direct taste of the Reagan administration that the people in Geneva noticed was in the Human Rights Commission; it was a rather harder edged, less compromising approach, quite willing to take on issues that others felt uncomfortable with and so on. Not bad, but it was a change of pace into which people read all kinds of implications. Where it went badly awry was in the justification for supporting some pretty dreadful regimes, such as those in Argentina and Chile. You may recall Jeane Kirkpatrick’s article in, as I recall, Foreign Affairs - the one that supposedly brought her to the attention of the Reagan people. Her argument was roughly that in the battle against communism, it is better to put up with somewhat less than perfect regimes in Chile and Argentina. What a dreadful, morally perverse doctrine.
The event that I think was most difficult, and most embarrassing at the annual conference of the World Health Organization. And that is because one of the prominent issues at the World Health Assembly that year - the one that stuck out in my mind very much - was the question of breastfeeding. At that time a real controversy had arisen as to whether some of the large pharmaceutical companies, both Swiss and American, were being unethical in how they pushed artificial milk products, in Africa in particular, but also in South America, on populations that simply were incapable of employing them as directed or too poor really to afford them. It was felt by many that the pharmaceutical companies were trying to displace a far better and safer means of feeding infants, which is mother’s milk, breastfeeding.

And what was happening, and quite purposefully on the part of the pharmaceutical companies, was that the pharmaceutical companies would go into the maternity wards in hospitals and hand out free samples of the stuff as the modern and easy alternative. You’re not saddled with a child constantly at your breast and so on. It was attractive and it was free, at least initially and so it became the practice and was increasingly popular. What would happen is that when the free samples stopped and they had to go out to the store, they found they had to pay and so they started diluting the product with water out of the tap or out of the stream - and so they’re feeding their infants a polluted product. Had that also in South America.

So there was a drive in the World Health Organization to admonish the pharmaceutical companies, and some of them took the point and behaved themselves, but unfortunately not the American pharmaceutical companies - at that time anyway - and to start a drive to encourage breastfeeding rather than substituting artificial products. Under the Carter administration the U.S. was supportive of this. The Reagan folks came in and they said no, this isn’t the business of the World Health Organization and there’s nothing wrong with artificial products; it’s modern, it’s healthy, and so on. And we don’t want to get in the way of pharmaceutical companies pursuing quite legitimate business. So the U.S. official position changed and we went on aggressively to discourage mothers from feeding their infants. (laughs) You know, I recount that now and it was so ludicrous.

Q: They’ve come up with studies that show women really should breastfeed their children for at least a year. There are all sorts of benefits, not just…

HELMAN: There are all sorts of benefits. It’s a cultural thing, it’s an economic thing, and it’s a health thing because in these countries diluting the product introduces a terrible danger.

Q: And also there are so many other things that are much more nutritious anyway.

How about the Swiss, did they get involved? Because I think of Nestle.

HELMAN: Nestle I think eventually backed off and behaved themselves. Nestle is very big and they’re an industry leader.

Q: They had been involved then in this, too, weren’t they?
HELMAN: Oh, yes, they were. They were certainly selling the substitute formula and pushing it but they began backing off and looking for a compromise. I assumed that they didn’t want the political fallout that was resulting from their marketing practices. This was one of the times when I decided to take the burden off of our professionals who came from HEW and the National Science Foundation and who were deeply chagrined by the change in the U.S. position. These guys knew better and couldn’t bring themselves to speak the U.S. position, so I said, “Okay, that’s fine. I’ll do the dirty work.” (laughs) That’s what ambassadors I guess are for. But it was these kinds of things that confirmed the worst expectations of some of the people in Geneva. Otherwise it was way overdrawn. I mean some of the fear of the Reagan people.

Q: Did tobacco or the use of tobacco come up at all while you were there?

HELMAN: Not while I was there. The other health issue that came up that was quite inspiring is that at that time the World Health Organization determined that smallpox had been eradicated worldwide - unfortunately it turned out that it really hadn’t. But the WHO at that time had taken on an immense global program of vaccination to get rid of smallpox, and largely succeeded. They now have almost reached the point of polio eradication. WHO has had long-standing global programs on malaria and tuberculosis and is now the global coordinator in the battle against AIDS.

The WHO is a remarkable organization and, together with other of the Geneva-based agencies provide an unanswerable rebuttal to critics of the UN and multilateralism in general.

Q: Did abortion come up while you were there?

HELMAN: Not while I was there, no.

Q: Thank God. (laughs)

HELMAN: I had enough on my platter. But it was an extraordinary experience. I worked with some remarkable people, as well.

Q: You didn’t have the feeling that the UN staff was overstuffed with remittance men from various countries - time servers and that sort of thing?

HELMAN: There was some of that but generally in specialized agencies you had to be technically qualified in some way. They may have had too many technicians but I wasn’t really competent to make that judgment or evaluate the quality of their contributions. A lot of doctors, medical researchers, a lot of engineers, radio engineers, computer specialists and meteorologists and so on. Scrolling forward, in 1988, while I was with the Under Secretary, I was asked to be the U.S. “expert” on a so-called “High Level Committee” of twenty experts to examine the structure and function of the International Telecommunication Union - an organization of genuine importance to the commercial and national security uses of the radio spectrum. The Committee was supplied with a generous budget for outside consultants. The eventual report several years later was extensive, with over a hundred recommendations, all of them adopted by the ITU. While many of the recommendations dealt with management of personnel of the budget,
the Committee found little evidence of overstaffing. To the contrary, the increasing demands being placed on the ITU, particularly by the US and its private sector could well justify staff increases.

I must confess I’ve always been very skeptical about the screaming and yelling about the size of UN bureaucracies and their sloth and duplication. There is that but in my experience in Geneva I didn’t think that they were much worse than a lot of public bureaucracies I had seen, including that of the United States. My subsequent experience in the private sector tells me that the UN is no better or worse than some of the private bureaucracies you see in dealing with some large U.S. corporations. It’s always difficult to say no, you shouldn’t be more efficient. My view, and it certainly is the minority view, is that there are more important things for the U.S. to focus on and more that these organizations can do of interest to us if we showed more leadership and more confidence in them. We’d probably serve our own interests better if we concentrated more on that rather than whether nine people can do the job of ten.

Q: It’s a good political ploy, but it’s not…

HELMAN: It doesn’t deserve the hullabaloo it has caused and the fallout in these organizations. Well, my comments a week or ten days ago gave you my view of what I thought of the UN budget as a domestic political football.

Q: Did Jeane Kirkpatrick come out at all?

HELMAN: Yes, Jeane came out two or three times. We got along really quite well and I think she was certainly interested in what I had to say and took - to say it bluntly - took guidance pretty well, or instruction pretty well, because I knew a hell of a lot more about what was going on than she did. She was good and smart.

Q: So she wasn’t coming out like Jesus claiming at the temple or something like that?

HELMAN: (laughs) It wouldn’t work on me anyway. It was a good relationship and she came out there for the Fourth of July once. We had a big Fourth of July reception with some Congressmen there. She was a dynamo. It’s just that she was sometimes wrong.

Q: (laughs) Did you feel that with a new administration that your days were numbered?

HELMAN: Oh, I knew my days were numbered. I was originally supposed to be replaced by Senator Javits, who unfortunately at that time was very ill - he had to retire from the Senate. He was suffering from a debilitating muscular disease. I’m not sure if it was Lou Gehrig’s Disease or something similar to it. I came back for consultation - I think it was in the spring of ’81 – called on the Senator in New York and said, “Let me know what I can do for you. Any help I can give you, advice I can give you.” It was a very cordial meeting. But I could see from meeting with him that there was no way he was going to get to Geneva to handle that job.

I could tell from my visit then that his illness had progressed. Intellectually he was all there, he was terrific. It would’ve been a huge honor to be replaced by a person of such distinction, but it
was something, I concluded having met him, that wasn’t going to happen even though it was a month or two more before the information was made available that in fact he wouldn’t be going. It was a while after that, towards the end of the summer, that the decision was made to send Geoff Swaebe. Geoff was a reputed member of President Reagan’s old kitchen cabinet from California, along with Judge Clark, Charlie Wick and others. He subsequently was our ambassador to Belgium. He replaced me, I think it was sometime in October or November of ’81. His background was as a department store executive, and he was successful at that and quite wealthy. Certainly an interesting, likeable and well-meaning fellow, but I don’t think he brought anything special to the job. But, as I understand it, if he ever wanted to call Ronald Reagan, for whatever reason, Ronald Reagan would answer. But Geneva wasn’t that kind of a job. It didn’t require that kind of clout. But Geoff was a most responsible person. Years later I visited with him in Brussels and we got along very well.

Q: When you went back - you know you’d go back from time to time to New York - did you find that our mission to the United Nations with the advent of Jeane Kirkpatrick and all and there was talk about if the United Nations wants to leave New York, I’ll be on the dock and waving goodbye?

HELMAN: Well, that was one of Jeane’s people. That was just childish.

Q: Okay, that’s ’79 to ’81. So we'll come back to that. Then you moved off for a while to Geneva?

PALMER: Yes. NEA had nothing for me after I did those country reports. An ambassadorship had fallen through that NEA had laid on for me. Coincidentally, the job of Chief of the Humanitarian Affairs Section in Geneva had become open due to the illness, and shortly after the death of the incumbent, Derian asked me if I would like to do that. They wanted to upgrade the position to Minister-Counselor rank, and I’d be the third ranking person in the mission. I was delighted to accept, and we went over there in very short order. It turned out I was there a little less than a year but it was a year really packed with a lot of interesting work and developments. The job entailed maintaining high level contacts with the UNHCR, the Refugee Commission, and with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with -- its changed its name twice since then -- the organization that helps UNHCR move the refugees.

Q: The National Committee for European Migration.

STEPHEN E. PALMER, JR.
Chief of Humanitarian Affairs

Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. was born in Superior, Wisconsin on July 31, 1923. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University and served in the U.S. Marine Corps. His Foreign Service career included positions in Nicosia, Belgrade, Sarajevo, Tel Aviv, London, Islamabad, Madras, Geneva, and Washington, DC. Mr. Palmer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.
PALMER: Then, largely my staff which consisted of two officers and a secretary, and about ten Swiss nationals, spent most of its time managing a multi-million dollar program, the European part of the refugee program, and managing in a very real way, that is, making payments to ICEM and various voluntary organizations, and investigating programs. This was centered in the European theater, the movement of Soviet Jews out and into Italy and then to the States and elsewhere. That was the main element of the program, the Soviet Jews at that time. During the time I was there, an international conference on the Southeast Asia refugee problem which was at a critical point with thousands of boat people leaving, and the receiving countries in Southeast Asia, Thailand and others, not wanting to keep them. So there was a high level conference with Vice President Mondale leading our delegation, and it was successful. The governments pledged an awful lot of money, and there was a useful public focus on that issue.

There was another conference that I attended and I led our delegation; it was an observer delegation, and that was in Tanzania, Arusha, on African refugee problems. Anyway, I was very busy and usefully engaged. I particularly enjoyed and was stimulated by my contacts in the ICRC and the UNHCR senior staff. ICRC was particularly impressive, and I say this because at that time it was not so generally known in Washington, in their program for visiting political prisoners. We gave a modest donation every year to this program, and I related it to my human rights experience, gee; this is important. If they could get into places like China, or places they're not in, what a difference it could make. So we were helpful in enhancing the U.S. donations to that program, which is still going strong, and is still a very useful endeavor. UNHCR, being a UN organization, wasn't the most efficient organization, but had a lot of very dedicated people. I enjoyed very close relations with the commission.

Q: Who was the commissioner?

PALMER: Mr. Poul Hartling, he was a Dane. He had been a Foreign Minister of Denmark. And the key person and my direct contact with the ICRC was John Pierre Hocke, who was the operations director, number two under the president. In both cases the relationships was of honesty and openness and respect for each other's institutional limitations. So I was happily perking along in Geneva, in the meantime we had ambassadorial changes, and DCM changes, and I guess I was acting DCM for two of the months I was there, and I was Chargé for a while. So that was an interesting experience.

Then out of the blue, when I was back on consultations in Washington, Derian asked me to replace Mark Schneider as her senior deputy. I said, "Pat, I appreciate that trust a great deal, but I've only been eleven plus months in Geneva, its been very expensive settling in, it would be a financial disaster to leave at this point. And I just love the work and I think its important." She said, "Well, I hope you'll reconsider." And the next thing I knew, Christopher wanted to see me, and he put the arm on me and said in effect, "Pat is doing a great job, and Mark has been doing a fine job, and everything is going better than one could have expected, but what we need to do is professionalize the bureau more, and get it more accepted, get it in the mainstream." I said, "I'll consider it, and I gave him the same demurrals. Then before I left town, I've forgotten whether it was Derian or Schneider or Christopher, told me, "Would you like to be invited by the Secretary
himself to come back from Geneva to take this job?" And I said, "I'll come." So I pulled up
stakes very abruptly in Geneva and came back. It was a rocky experience.

First of all, I'd been back a few days when I was catapulted off to Bucharest for the first annual
round table on human rights with the Romanians.

GERALD J. MONROE
Economic-Political Counselor
Bern (1979-1983)

Gerald J. Monroe was born on October 13, 1933 in New York State. He attended
City College in New York where he received his BA in 1955. Mr. Monroe served
in the US Army as a 2nd lieutenant from 1955-1956. His career has included
positions in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Germany, China, Switzerland,
and Italy. Mr. Monroe was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1999.

Q: And where did you go from there?

MONROE: Well, I was slated to stay an extra year on the Canadian desk when I did get a call
from Bern. My minister counselor in Bonn called me and asked if I would like to do the same
sort of thing in Bern but except it would include political, one would be economic-political
counselor.

Q: Now who was your minister counselor in Bonn?

MONROE: Ed Crown.

Q: Who was then in Bern.

MONROE: Who was DCM in Bern. It turned out I discovered through the grapevine that Dick
Vine who was then the PDAS, or the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the EUR was going
to be ambassador. Since we had been working together now for, you know, we had first met
many years ago in Germany, and then I was working with him on the Canadian desk. He had
been in charge of Canada initially; that was his deputate. That is what it was called. So, he had a
special interest in Canada, and never really let go of it. He [was succeeded by] one other DAS in
the department but he did follow that very closely, and he was a stern man, a demanding man.
He also had a wry sense of humor which somehow or other Canadian affairs brought out in both
of us. We had some good times as well as some late nights.

Q: He had served previously in Switzerland, I think, hadn't he?

MONROE: He had. He was DCM in Switzerland, yes.

Q: So you thought you could work with him.
MONROE: Yes, and most importantly, he thought he could work with me, because it was his choice ultimately as it turned out. I don't think anyone else in Bern knew this at the time because it was very rare that career people became ambassadors to Switzerland. I think just Mac Davis was the only one I am aware of. Back in the days of legation, you know, monthly legation, we had a lot of professionals.

Q: Including a woman. One of the earliest woman career officer ambassadors, I think, was there whose name escapes me at the moment. Willis?

MONROE: Yes, Willis. I had forgotten her.

Q: So you went to Switzerland.

MONROE: We went to Switzerland. It was also Angie's first overseas post. She had become a Foreign Service officer by then.

Q: While you were in Washington.

MONROE: While we were in Washington.

Q: What was her assignment in Bern?

MONROE: She was a rotational, it was really two. Rotational officer in Bern is pretty limited. As one would imagine, it was a relatively small embassy. Hers was between administrative and consular, so she started off as the GSO.

Q: You were the counselor for economic and commercial affairs?

MONROE: And political, all three. Although I lost the commercial brief almost on arrival because there was new legislation passed and the FCS was created.

Q: Foreign Commercial Service.

MONROE: Foreign Commercial Service. The commercial attaché remained as the FCS person.

Q: He had been there before.

MONROE: Yes he had been there, he already had a year there. I had known him from Bonn, and so it was very agreeable working relationship.

Q: And was it also a Treasury Department financial attaché who came under you?

MONROE: There was indeed. Yes, very closely financial. We worked together very well indeed. There were two during my sojourn in Switzerland. I worked well with both of them; they worked
well. One was actually new to treasury, so in one respect I broke him in based on many of the
tricks I learned from the first one, on computing monetary aggregates and so forth.

Q: Did you have others in your section, or was that pretty much it?

MONROE: A political officer, a financial officer. I guess that was pretty much it as I recall.

Q: So you had a political officer who worked for you as well as you, yourself.

MONROE: That's right. Upon arrival Bern became an immediate action post. You might recall
we were frightfully busy because of the Iranian issue and Switzerland's role as the protecting
power. I think that dominated the first six months there. We had time to settle in before we were
going 24 hours a day.

Q: You got there in the summer, and the hostages were taken in November, or the embassy was
taken hostage.

MONROE: That's right.

Q: Was the embassy in Bern kind of a main channel conduit to the Swiss government about
things related to what was happening in Iran?

MONROE: It was one of two major conduits. The other major conduit was, of course, the Swiss
embassy in Washington, but of course, that was a very small embassy, even smaller than ours.
For certain things the Swiss foreign office preferred to use our facilities, particularly if they were
passing tangible property or things that were actually written by our people.

Q: Our people? You mean Bruce Laingen.

MONROE: Bruce Laingen who was at the foreign office and the two other political officers. No
one was a political officer. I don't remember what the other was. All of them wrote on foolscap,
long dispatches as we called them. Bruce was a man of the old school.

Q: They would be given to the Swiss embassy in Tehran and put in the diplomatic pouch and you
would transmit them to Washington.

MONROE: Both we would transcribe them and we would send the actual copy. There were
many other aspects of that whole issue.

Q: Were those other aspects primarily handled by the Ambassador and DCM or were you quite
involved as well?

MONROE: I was probably more involved than the DCM, possibly because for personality
reasons Dick Vine was used to working for me as a subordinate than having me do things.

Q: Dick Vine was used to you working for him as a subordinate.
MONROE: That is correct. That is what I meant. He was used to sending me places to talk to people and that sort of thing, odd people that weren't spoke to, had to speak to them in the situation. Dick Queen and those who were brought out, were brought out through Zurich.

Q: Richard Queen.

MONROE: Yes, and others came through. So all in all, one became very close emotionally and every other way. When I think of Vine's period there, it seems totally associated with that issue. Now, Switzerland became less important as it dragged on, and other mediators entered the picture and we became less engaged. Although we maintained administrative relationship.

Q: Because the Swiss continued to represent out interests in Iran.

MONROE: That's right. There were many financial issues to be resolved. As a matter of fact, the Swiss foreign interest section was bigger than the foreign office itself. I mean they had a huge building, by Swiss standards that was off in another part of town. It wasn't downtown; it was.

Q: They said they were part of the ministry, a separate entity.

MONROE: Part of the ministry but a separate entity and a separate unit. A separate ambassador heading them.

Q: Because they were representing not only the United States' interests in Iran but the United States' interests in Cuba.

MONROE: That's correct. Curiously we didn't deal with that. I don't remember dealing with that at all. I do remember dealing with administrative matters that became so complex that we finally decided to ask an administrative officer to come out on TDY, a series of administrative officers to deal with the Swiss administrative component of the interest section.

Q: Relating to Iran.

MONROE: Relating to Iran, yes. Because there were many questions, some of which we couldn't answer because they related to Iranian property in Washington. That's just what the Department did. They sent a series of very senior administrative people out.

Q: Who would specialize in handling property issues.

MONROE: Beyond that, we had a whole range of issues that involved trade. They were small issues, but they were in agriculture in a major way, because the Swiss were even more protective than the common agricultural policy was then protective of the then European community. These were problems I was used to of course, having dealt with trade agreements and that sort of thing.

Q: There was, of course, an agricultural attaché in the embassy.
MONROE: There was an agricultural attaché in the embassy who would then cast some interest. You may remember...

Q: On whether it was essentially a trade policy issue having to do with access to the Swiss market, government policy. You probably had to deal with it as much as the agricultural attaché did.

MONROE: Well, That's right. There were a number of... There were issues that who was to handle them was dependent on the preferences of the agency representative. I will say that this particular agricultural attaché didn't want to become involved in dealing with the government as much as he did want to become involved with cooperatives and the agricultural community as such.

Q: Promotion.

MONROE: That is exactly right. I found myself dealing with agriculture much more than I had ever had before which proved helpful in my later career. I did learn things that I really didn't know. And of course, we had aviation issues which I did, but again, this was relatively routine work.

Q: Why don't you talk a little bit about the economic, financial reporting. Swiss bankers have lots of information. Not necessarily willing to give it, but...

MONROE: We had two areas of concern that the treasury attaché and myself had to cover. One was the banking community. We met with them on a regular basis. We were honorary members of the banking association or something, whatever. It was a once a month luncheon group.

Q: Usually the two of you would go?

MONROE: The two of us would go which surprised me. He asked me to go, and I was delighted to do so. We also had the BIS.


MONROE: The Bank for International Settlements in Fasl. At that point, the president of the Swiss bank that is to say the national bank.

Q: The Swiss National Bank.

MONROE: The Swiss National Bank was to become director general of the BIS. It was a move of transition, so that was extremely interesting. We had the one man, because he had an intimate familiarity with the BIS, having been the Swiss representative for many years. Of course I didn't know then; I was trying to do this sort of research in the historian's office, but that is another story. The treasury was very concerned about Swiss markets which in terms of equity markets were not all that developed, as you probably know. They were surprisingly small. We began to believe that Switzerland's attraction as a banking center to the world was primarily a function of
the skill of its bankers more than the secrecy. Secrecy had started to erode in terms of a treaty we had signed with Switzerland and many others involving drug money just a year or two before I arrived. I think it is important to note for future reference that that treaty was wholly dependent on the act, the presumed act committed by the depositor. It had to be a crime in both jurisdictions. It had to be a Swiss crime as well. I will put that aside for a moment. Well, before I knew it, Vine had left. The 1980 election, I got there in '79, the 1980 election.

Q: So you were with him for roughly a year and a half.

MONROE: And a good half of that was taken up with Iranian matters and trading matters that arose.

Q: And then in January, '81 Ronald Reagan came into office as President and the hostages were released and transported home to the United States.

MONROE: That's right.

Q: That changed that issue.

MONROE: That changed that issue; but then it became purely administrative. We settled on a more senior administrative officer than Bern would normally warrant attached to us to help handle that issue. So, we did away with the TDY [temporary duty] people and so forth.

Q: Ambassador Vine left pretty soon after the change in administration?

MONROE: Oh, about a month. Faith Ryan Whittlesey arrived almost the day he left. I am sure she was there very swiftly. She had been a Reagan supporter for many years. She was extremely conservative.

Q: She was from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

MONROE: Well, she was actually from Buffalo, New York. She was an American tale you might say. She was brought up, she was the daughter of a railroad man who won a scholarship to Wells College, I believe it was. A good college for the young women in New York.

Q: State.

MONROE: New York State, upstate New York.

Q: Aurora New York. I know Wells College.

MONROE: Good. I don't except I have met some Alumna now from Wells College. She then went to law school and I don't remember what law school. I think the University of Pennsylvania law school where she met her husband. She clerked for a judge, a very conservative judge. Her husband was very conservative. Her husband was very interested in conservative politics. His dream was to capture Delaware county which was a large county on the outside of Philadelphia,
both the main line and many working class districts. It was a challenge. He had problems with his business and ultimately, tragically committed suicide. His wife was left with two children and a law degree. She followed his footsteps into conservative politics and became county supervisor for Delaware County where she was during the Reagan 1980 year campaign. She delivered Delaware County as she would say to the Reagan supporters, and was rewarded with this embassy. The first speech she made when she arrived was the new dimensions of the Reagan administration. I tried to write it for her, but it was so domestically oriented, and she changed a good deal of what I had written. It was kind of interesting, I had written Vine's farewell address you might say. This was a totally different thing. It had very little to do with Swiss American relations. The DCM who had changed by then was a fellow by the name of Charles Stout. I don't know if you know him. Charles was a fine fellow, I mean he was a good deal of fun to work with, a superb draftsman. So we tried out materials, briefing materials for her, Charles and I. She ignored all of it, particularly the people we asked her to call upon. In fact she never called on the head of the, the number two, essentially the operating head of the economic department, a very powerful department of government in Switzerland as we all know. Monsieur Loless, a very big man, very influential man, probably as influential as any other political figure. She never called on him which left a bad taste. She didn't call on other people who felt it strange. She was not comfortable with the career service. Nothing else one can say. She simply didn't believe that we were giving her the kinds of materials which she needed and what she said she needed was to convince the Swiss to support President Reagan. I felt that there was nothing I could say that could change that view of the world. Unfortunately, Charles Stout decided he would try and change that view. He was summarily let go from one day to the next. Curiously she let him stay in country for about two months afterwards. Because he did have no where to go. In some respects she was not an unkind person, although she had felt that he just didn't understand what had happened in the election and what was necessary. But, while she let her public affairs person go almost immediately and brought in her own USIS person. I don't know where he came from. He didn't speak to us very much actually.

Q: He was from the USIS?

MONROE: He was a USIS career person, right. He had never been to Europe before. It was someone she knew from earlier. An issue arose, and that had to do with banking secrecy, and it had to do with discovery. Somehow or other, people with insider information were making a killing on the U.S. stock exchange. The SEC discovered that the agent was a Swiss bank, as a matter of fact, several Swiss Banks were operating for these people. These people were indicted, but it was evidence from these banks that was required. The remedy again of discovery was very severe, something like the [Swiss banking consortium] was being charged $50,000 a day in New York because all of these banks, these were major banks, they had major operations in the United States, Credit Suisse in Boston, Banque Suisse, Switz-Italiana in New York actually. This led to a kind of crisis. The banks were furious. The Swiss government was beside itself, conflict of laws. The problem was that there was no crime called insider trading in Switzerland. Insider trading was a perk as far as the Swiss were concerned.

Q: Everybody did it.

MONROE: Yes, everybody did it and you tried to get into a position where they could do it.
Q: That was the name of the game.

MONROE: We pointed out that your market is small; our market is large, you make more money on our market. That is to say, you can mislead American traders in far greater numbers on our market than on yours. Since so few Swiss actually deal in Swiss securities, anti market behavior doesn't seem to you to be the crime that it does to us. We began a long drawn out negotiation which I was very shortly deeply enmeshed in dealing with people at the foreign office who I knew extremely well. For the Swiss, this was a critical issue, a basic national interest issue. For us it was a pain in the neck. Whittelsey discovered that this and selling the M-1 tank was really where it was at.

Q: The M-1 tank to the Swiss army.

MONROE: To the Swiss army, which I refused to work on in the hopes that she would relieve me, but she didn't. She said, OK, I understand. I mean the Swiss needed the M-1 like they needed a moon shot. It wasn't suited to their topography at all. That said, this other issue was fascinating, time consuming and absolutely critical to the Swiss, and I was fascinated with it. Again, the very good relations I had with a number of people at the foreign office helped go on. These were people I meet with for a late dinner after an all day session. The SEC was over almost continually. This fellow, Fedders, was the, he later became embroiled in a wife beating episode. You may remember. Something I always looked at askance. The man was 6' 10" and had been a basketball star in Texas or something. In any case, he was a good lawyer, a good negotiator, and we did work together quite a bit. Whittlesey saw it almost immediately, in that she recognized that this was a critically important issue for her. She also recognized that she couldn't do it herself. She didn't know how to do it. So, she asked me to do it for her. There was an arrangement. It was unspoken, but basically, you do this for me, and you will get a good launching on your career, and you can go when you have to etc. In the meantime, she named a fellow who was working for me as DCM, the political officer.

Q: Who was that?

MONROE: His name was Jim Shin. There are several Jim Shins in the service. This was one of them. I think she let me know as she did that, that he wouldn't bother me, that I would be on my own business on the issue. Well, she didn't know about figuring monetary aggregates every two weeks, and I report to the Treasury Department, so I doing almost totally financial reporting because the financial attaché with whom I had worked left, and a new Treasury man came along. Very well-trained, academically, a lot of experience, but he was fundamentally a trade person. He had worked at STR most of his career. While he was a fast learner and a very good officer, someone you would really want to have in the Foreign Service.

Q: You needed to give him a lot of support.

MONROE: I needed to give him a lot of support at the beginning. That is exactly right. We calculated things like monetary aggregates in a very peculiar way using newspaper reports and what not. But we did it. We got a bi-week out.
Q: That had a consistent data series.

MONROE: Data series, that is exactly right. I remember it because it was all seat of the pants sort of thing. Of course, the currency markets were of extreme interest, and getting some handle on what were called fiduciary accounts, I don't know if they had them in your day there, but these fiduciary accounts were exceptionally important. For obvious reasons these were moneys that the Swiss were dealing with. And during the Credit Suisse problem, shall we say, someone was found stealing money at [a certain] branch, which led them to pay back the money, so as a matter of course for the Swiss banking community, moneys that were given to them to invest became part of their deposit base in effect. They felt responsible for these moneys and would pay back for malfeasance. It was not as if there were a lawsuit, but if there were malfeasance.

Q: Let's go back to the insider trading issue. How was that resolved, or was it resolved?

MONROE: It was resolved. I got together with a fellow by the name of Sloan. I don't know if you knew him, John Sloan. Well, we must have stayed at the [hotel] until about three in the morning. They just left us alone. We came up with the notion of a private MOU which was among banks, that is the Swiss government would have nothing to do with this, the Swiss and American governments would sign another MOU taking cognizance of this, stating that we, the governments of Switzerland and the United States recognize that our banking systems have agreed on this sort of self imposed discipline. The Swiss would yield information on people trading in American markets in a matter of 90 days. During that 90 days there would be no discovery, that they had seen as an action taken against Swiss interests.

Q: But there in effect would be a waiver of bank secrecy to prevent disclosure.

MONROE: If the banks chose to do so.

Q: On a voluntary basis.

MONROE: It was on a voluntary basis. I told her this is the best you are going to do. It lasted for another month and a half. People from the SEC ran back and forth. The Swiss also promised in a side letter to study the effects of insider trading with a view to perhaps tightening Swiss law, which I thought was a significant concession. The only problem was while the Swiss banks will probably live up to it, and probably did live up to it, it was hard for us to control American courts. As soon as I left the post there was a case which tested the MOU. I think it survived, but only just, because some judge was into discovery and huge remedies and so forth. She was very grateful for this, she really was and she wrote a magnificent efficiency report. She could draft. She knew how to write these things almost instinctively. She was not a bad attorney in my judgment, and rewards and all that sort of stuff. Much to her surprise, I don't think she realized that there was any connection between promotion and the things she was writing, but I was promoted to, let's see, this was just as the wall was turning. I was promoted to OC making me two grades higher than the DCM. At this point she stopped talking to me, and I dealt solely with the DCM to the extent I had to speak to, I had to deal with him at all. I went on with my financial reporting and training this fellow. When he felt that he was comfortable doing what he did, and
my wife had recovered. She had been the victim of, she went in for a minor operation and it turned very seriously because of the... Well, let me put it this way. If that happened in the United States, we'd be very rich people. She had to be evacuated on an emergency basis and we solved this up in Yale Medical Center. The issue was whether we really were ready to move, and we needed a few more months for her to recover and so forth.

Q: She came back from the States.

MONROE: She came back to Switzerland within five weeks. Then another woman from Wells, the ambassador, always kind even though we didn't talk very much, introduced me to a classmate telephonically, of hers who said, "You can have my house in Old Lyme Connecticut. I am going off to, " She called it P time, "on the cape to be with my children who are studying somewhere or the other, and you can use our house for a month." Which we did. It was a delightful month once Evangeline's problem was straightened out. I left shortly thereafter. In other words, when Evangie regained full strength and my colleague felt that he was now able to go ahead and do his own thing,, I left. By that time, Whittelsey had rotated back to the White House and John Davis Lodge came out to be Ambassador.

Q: You were there with him or no?

MONROE: Just briefly. Just a few months when he first arrived. So that was the story of my eventful period in Bern which turned out to be far more stressful, more Sturm and Drang than I ever expected in Bern.

Q: Four years you were there.

MONROE: As it turned out it was four years for the combination of reasons I was talking about.

Q: Whatever happened to the M-1 tank?

MONROE: The M-1 tank was not sold to the Swiss.

Q: And the defense attaché cooperated with the Ambassador?

MONROE: Others tried. With the ambassador and with the DCM. The DCM was given that mission. Of course even the defense attaché was very skeptical about it. I mean this was not a tank for mountain roads. This was a main battle tank across the plains or something like that. In any case, that didn't happen. They did buy a much smaller German tank that was better suited to rough terrain.

Q: You certainly had a challenge in terms of your relationship with the DCM, but I guess you coped with that on the whole.

MONROE: I coped with it but it bothered me a lot initially. Then I realized it was a reflection on no one in particular. I think it would have worked more easily had he been one of the superb officers who was getting promoted every year anyway and who could do the job. He had great
difficulties in maintaining morale and keeping the place run. I helped him where I could actually. I felt that since she had given me a very key issue, an issue that I really delighted in, and an issue where I could use all that I had in terms of professional awareness and the tools I had gathered over the years. I was quite pleased with that. It is not to say I wasn't bothered sometimes early in the morning with the notion of this fellow being DCM, but we did get on. And this was noticed incidentally in the diplomatic community. She lost a lot of purchase in the diplomatic community. I suspect people with her perspective and I am not putting any value on it, but people in her perspective think that breaking up the hierarchical system that most institutions develop for themselves over the years, in our case, it would have been centuries, helps to put the bureaucracy off its guard or...

Q: Helps to establish their authority.

MONROE: It establishes, that is exactly what I was going to say, they are in command of that little piece of the bureaucracy. It didn't work to her advantage apparently because he had grave difficulty doing the job, although she was unaware of this. She had him travel with her, and she didn't realize what that did effectively was make me acting DCM the good part of the time which rather annoyed me more than pleased me. The Department was well aware of that. She had been advised not to do it, even by the deputy secretary whoever it was at the time.

Q: Even though Switzerland was a small country, and even if she stayed within the confines of its borders, that effectively took her away from the embassy a good part of the time because you have to go to Zurich and Geneva and all over.

MONROE: Well, those were places you could get to easily in one day. She liked places like Davos

Q: Where you go for several days.

MONROE: St. Moritz where you could get snowed in easily, and they frequently got snowed in. Odd that you should think of that because I had forgotten I used to think, why on earth were they going there. Well Davos was the center of a think tank, and I can see why she went there for a lot of events. St. Moritz was a little harder to pull there but that was over the hill, over the mountains as it were, and if you get stuck there, [you’re isolated] but it never occurred to her that the DCM's job is to stay on post as it were and run it while she was doing her thing with the sub staff of officers that- (end of tape)

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Q: Today is May 17, 1999. Gerry, we pretty much covered most of the matters you took up when you were economic counselor at the embassy in Bern. Maybe we kind of ought to finish off at least by just refreshing my memory of Ambassador Whittlesey. She was still there when you left or she left before you did?
MONROE: No, Ambassador Whittlesey left some three or four months before we did. She was offered a job at the White House as I think it was public liaison of some sort. I don't quite recall what the specific job was.

Q: *This was about 1983.*

MONROE: This would have been in the winter of '82-'83, probably '83, late winter or early spring of '83. She was replaced by John Davis Lodge who at that point was in his very late '70s, and to a degree was showing it. I recall his daughter traveled with him and stayed with them. Mrs. Lodge was there as well. If anything she was probably, she had been more vulnerable to the ravages of age.

DAVID MICHAEL WILSON  
**Public Affairs Counselor, USIS**  
**Geneva (1979-1984)**

*Mr. Wilson was born and raised in Pittsfield, Massachusetts and educated at Columbia University and New York University Law. Joining the USIA in 1963, he served variously as Press Officer, Information Officer and Public Affairs Counselor in a variety of posts including Abidjan, Cape Town, Ottawa, Geneva and Brussels. He also served in senior level positions with USIA in Washington, DC. Mr. Wilson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.*


WILSON: Correct.

Q: *How long were you there?*

WILSON: Five and a half years.

Q: *So we are talking almost '86?*

WILSON: No, '84. Because I was there for almost all of '79, '80, '81, '82, '83, through August of '84.

Q: *What were you doing there then?*

WILSON: I started out as the deputy public affairs counselor. I ended up as the public affairs counselor. I could have stayed longer had I wanted to. We will get into that. I was in Ottawa, and I had been trying to get a transfer out. They said, "No there is no way possible." So I had just renewed my housing lease in Ottawa in November. I got a call from Washington in December saying we need you to go to Geneva immediately. I was a little put out, because it was "no, you can't leave, you certainly can't leave mid-cycle." But they had an emergency opening. The person
who had the job I was to go into had just quit, and they needed somebody because they had the arms control talks going on, and the PAO needed help. I had worked in the arms control agency, so they thought that was pretty significant, and they wanted me over there. So I pulled my family out in mid-January, and we came by New York and went to Geneva directly.

**Q:** Well what was the status of talks when you got there in January of 1979?

**WILSON:** Well the arms talks hadn't done much. They were just sort of kicking around. But there were a lot of other side talks that were going on at the UN in Geneva, particularly one dealing with UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to help the developing countries. They had a major UNCTAD meeting, and I being very enthusiastic plunged right into it the day after I got there. I was very excited; we were going to achieve something. We had the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* there. The *New York Times* gentleman said, "Relax, nothing is going to happen." I said, "We are on the verge of something great." We stayed up, a couple of all-nighters. It was very exciting. I started to talk to some of the colleagues around me, and one was a lady from the State Department legal office. I said, "Oh what are you doing here?" She said, "Well, we have to be around in case they reach an agreement." "Can't they just send it back to you?" "No, not really, we need to be here." So the talks went on for three or four days, crisis marathon state. Nothing happened. By the time I left, every other year these same talks went on and nothing happened. Nothing still happens, but it was exciting the first time.

**Q:** Well tell me, did you find, you are talking about there is a whole series of talks that were going on, people who were living or sent there by the Soviets or Americans, whoever. I mean there must have grown up sort of a Geneva culture.

**WILSON:** Absolutely.

**Q:** Could you talk a bit about it?

**WILSON:** Sure. The Geneva culture was if you were attending a conference, and I am going to exclude arms control for a moment. We will get back to that. If you are attending a conference, the sessions usually begin three or four o'clock in the afternoon. They break for supper, and then they go into the evening. Now there was one point a couple of years into my tour where they were doing again another one of these UNCTAD conferences to help the developing nations. The developing nations always said, if you will just take half of the budget you developed countries are spending on arms and give to us as developing nations, the world will be a safer place for democracy. These talks always went on to three or four o'clock in the morning. One day the UN interpreters, these are the ones who do the simultaneous interpretation, went to the head of the conference, the president of the conference and said, "Look, we are tired. We are not going to stay up and do interpreting past midnight." The head of the conference took great umbrage at this and said, "We don't need you." Midnight came. The interpreters went. The conference went on for about 20 minutes and it fell into total disarray like a Tower of Babel. Nobody could understand anybody else. It was humorous, it was great. Interpreters are a very important part of UN procedure, any international procedure, and they are well paid.
Q: Well what was the reason for this going on past midnight?

WILSON: It became part of the culture. They start late in the afternoon because they had been working late the preceding night so they sleep in. They get up and sort of have a late breakfast or lunch, and they begin their talks about three or four in the afternoon. That's the way it works. Not all meetings obviously, but certainly the UNCTAD meeting was that way. Some of the CCD, the Committee on Disarmament was that way. From a working perspective it was very exciting because we always had a lot of political appointees come in to head up these various delegations from the United States perspective. It was fun to deal with them and talk with them. They would come in, the congress would begin on a Monday, they would come in on Saturday night or more likely a Sunday afternoon or Sunday morning, and they would have a big meeting on Sunday afternoon, Sunday evening and state what the U.S. position was. We all would nod and say yes, yes, yes. Then they would begin their round of meetings, and not much usually resulted from them, but they had a good time. We had a good time at least at first. There was one conference dealing with hunger. Our ambassador who was a good democratic political appointee at the time, was a guy named Bill Vanden Heuvel, who claimed he had worked with the old predecessor of the CIA. He was a good guy. A liberal Democrat, he had been a Congressman from the silk stocking district of New York. His claim to fame was to sit between Jimmy Carter and Ted Kennedy to keep them apart from each other, keep them from talking to each other. Anyway, there were two things I learned from him. I learned several things from him. One when he was talking about Mrs. Carter coming over, I think. We were discussing her coming over. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, what does it matter what these other countries think or do?" Then he gave me a lecture on the importance of multilateral diplomacy. It was a good lesson on how it works. But when we had the food conference, he implored the delegation that came in from Washington, I forget who headed it up, he said, "Please may I ask you all delegates stand up. Please, you are Americans. While you are at this conference, don't go to all these good restaurants in Geneva and eat yourselves sick. It doesn't look good if you are discussing food and hunger, and going to and eating at all these good restaurants." It was a good point. It was a very good point. Not that anyone would listen to him, but it was a good point.

Q: Well, what was our setup there? Were you sort of assistant and then finally PAO for all the various...

WILSON: Yes, any of the delegations that came in. The PAO could take his choice of any of the delegations that he wanted to service, and I serviced others. Sometimes we would trade off, and we would try to put out statements for the people. For the leaders of the delegations, we would try to get them interviews with the various media, not only American media but international media as well. That is what it consisted of. It was a major media operation.

Q: Well during the five years you were there, I mean did the Swiss play much of a role or were they just the hosts?

WILSON: They were the hosts, but in order to achieve our objectives with people coming in and out at airports, etc., we found it very useful to be good to the Swiss, very nice to the Swiss. The Swiss often resented foreigners, but they enjoy living off the proceeds of foreigners. So we got
along with the chief of protocol and with his assistants. We made sure we worked things out with them, very important. One of the problems that we faced, of course, was the relationship between the U.S. mission to the UN in Geneva and the bilateral embassy in Bern, and the relationships between ambassadors, particularly when important figures came in. Who was to greet them? Which ambassador went out to the airplane, walked at the end of the tarmac. It was a very touchy subject, and we learned to deal with that. The underlings kind of laughed about it, but the ambassadors took it very seriously.

Q: Well did you get together with the PAO in Bern and sort of, you know, sit there and figure out how are you going to deal with these egos?

WILSON: Yes. for example, one of the things we did was once a year, we would invite the ambassador form Bern to come and address the American club, at one of the big hotels in Geneva. That always made her feel good. But the real thrust of the problem reached a boiling point when somebody like the Secretary of State came or the Vice President came or the President came in. If the President did go through Geneva, who is the first guy to greet him, or in this case, guy or woman? Then we ran into another problem. One of the ambassadors, a democratic appointee ambassador, a guy named Marvin Warner from Ohio, I think Cincinnati, was a bachelor, as was at the time our ambassador Vanden Heuvel. They used to compete for various things, but right in the middle of all this, Ambassador Warner was stopped by the Swiss police from bringing a young woman to an official Swiss government dinner in Bern. The Swiss police told us quietly this is a known prostitute. We cannot have her coming in to sit with the President of Switzerland, etc. Warner was very indignant. He was going to make a diplomatic incident of it. I counseled our ambassador to go and talk to him. Tell Marvin Warner to call it off. He didn't, but the State Department ultimately told him to cool it, so ultimately he cooled it. When he went back, when his ambassadorship ended or he was recalled, he ended up going to jail in the United States for some fraud or some of these doings. He was not the most pleasant character to deal with, but those things happen in any situation.

Q: Of course Switzerland is considered a cozy spot to send somebody who gives money, but you don't want to put an awful lot of trust in their ability.

WILSON: Yes, in the bilateral relationship. The problem though for the ambassador in Geneva, our ambassador, is if you got an activist in there, and we had one career guy who was very activist.

Q: Who was that?

WILSON: Jerry Hellman. He wanted to follow the issues, and he knew the issues. He wanted to get involved with the delegations on all the issues. Of course the delegations coming out of Washington, you know, what the hell does this guy know? He doesn't know anything; keep him out. But he did know something. It was a major problem because our ambassador felt he had nothing to do unless he dealt with these delegations. He was just a housekeeper. Hellman really got involved. Now one of our other ambassadors, a political ambassador, a guy named Jeff Swaebe, who then went on to become ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium in Brussels, happened to have been a good friend of the President. At one point, this is a true story, the
director of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency came out for some talks. In an obligatory way, he had to "brief" the sitting U.S. ambassador. He sort of went in and did it with a lick and a promise, as if to say you dumb bastard, you don't know what the hell I am talking about do you? He didn't say that obviously but that was his attitude. Well, this got back to the President, and the director of the Arms Control Agency was not long for this world as director of the Arms Control Agency. I mean, he didn't take this ambassador seriously. That was a major mistake. He belittled him; he downgraded him, and paid the price. This guy had a lot of influence with the White House, and the reason he had influence with the White House was his property in California was contiguous with the Reagan property in California, and it was contiguous with the property of a guy named Charlie Wick. The wives used to carpool, so the wives were very close. Jeff Swaeb who had been with Florsheim shoes and then with the major department stores, he had been head of the major department stores, put together a consortium of retailers to refurbish the White House when Ronald Reagan came in. This was for the White House. This wasn't for Ronald Reagan to take home afterwards as Clinton seems to have done. So he had a certain amount of influence with President Reagan, and certainly with Charlie Wick who had a lot of influence with President Reagan. So if you came out, you had to learn very quickly that you could not just slough off the ambassador to the commission in Geneva. You couldn't just ignore him, or at least you shouldn't just ignore him.

Q: How did you find your role because with the exception of Hellman, most of your ambassadors and others were political appointees, and sort of caretaking things? I would have thought that, I mean, when you are acting as a spokesperson for the various delegations that come out, at the same time you are working for the ambassador. I would think this would get kind of tricky.

WILSON: There was another political appointee, a guy named Gerald Carmen who now runs Carmen Associates. He had a tremendously lousy personality. He had been a used car parts dealer in New Hampshire. He had helped Reagan overcome a deficit. They brought him down to Washington and made him head of the General Services Administration (GSA). After about a year and a half, I don't know how this came to his attention, but he suddenly learned that several of the wives, particularly Wayne French Smith's the attorney general and a couple of the other wives, were using government cars to go shopping and do things like this. He started to crack down on that. Apparently some people got to the White House and said, get him out of there. Get him out of the GSA. So they did, and they sent him to Geneva. He was a decent guy, he really was, but he had no personality. At one point, my offices were right down on the ground floor and he had to take the elevator, or anybody did, to get upstairs where his office is and the executive offices were. One day I was standing at the elevator when he came in and he said, "What are you doing right now? Tell me what you are working on." I told him. He said, "You know, you are damn lucky." I said, "What do you mean, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "I don't know what I am doing. I haven't got anything to do. You are lucky to have something to do." We got off to a good relationship. He tried to get me to stay on. He wanted me to stay on past the time I was there. I had already stayed on. He said, "In your Foreign Service culture, is it true you can't leave unless I give you permission to leave?" I said, "Yes, Mr. Ambassador that is correct." He said, "Is it also true that no successor can come in unless I approve of this successor." I said, "Yes, that is correct, Mr. Ambassador." He said, "Well you tell Washington that I don't approve of your successor no matter who it is. You can't leave." So we sat back for a little while. Meanwhile, this is true. This shows you how the bureaucracy works. Charlie Wick who was then director of USIA, had then
come out to Geneva. He had known me, and he wanted me to come back and break my tour six or eight months early to head up, become the first program director, for something called Worldnet, which was USIA's new innovative television service. I was a little hesitant, but he wanted me to do that. I said, "Well I have got two kids in school. I really can't pull them out." He said, "Well, they can stay in Geneva until the cycle is over." "Yes, but the housing allowance stops and the school allowance stops. I really can't do it." They said, "Well, we will see about that." The USIA person said, "Well if Charlie Wick wants you back here, you have got to come back." Well I also discovered, there was a certain regulation at USIA that said I could not come back and get per diem on a temporary assignment in Washington if I were going to be assigned to Washington afterwards. So we went back and forth on this for awhile. Wick said he wanted me back in May to deal with a NATO 25th anniversary meeting or whatever it was, to help do that one, because I had dealt with arms control stuff, and he wanted me to deal with NATO. That's fine. I talked to the personnel people, and they said, "You know you really can't get per diem, and we really can't continue your housing in Geneva once you leave." So I remembered what the ambassador said to me, and I said, "Well you know," and by that time my successor had been named. I said, "Well you know the ambassador doesn't want to accept Chris as my replacement. Moreover he doesn't want me to leave, and he won't approve my leaving." There was dead silence on the other end. They said, "Well do you think you can convince him?" I said, "I don't know; I'll talk to him, but do you think you could find a way to keep my wife and kids here while I go back and on TDY and to pay me my full per diem while I am in Washington." Within an hour, the director of personnel called me herself and said, "We have found a way to meet all of your requests. Do you think you can get the ambassador to let you go?" Well I knew I could because he told me if I wanted to go I could. I said, "Well I will get back to you in a week." Which I did. I told them yes, I found a way to do this. The ambassador will let me go. But it is a good example of how you can deal with the bureaucracy. You need to deal with it, you need to know where you want to go, and you need to be strong in your own interpretation of regulations, and you need to have something to, not hold over their heads, but something that they want that you can provide. That worked extraordinarily well.

Q: Well tell me, while you were there, what were the hot-bellied things that were going on?

WILSON: I became PAO when the USIA director fired the former PAO because he spent a lot of time on a boat, and the ambassador noticed this, that he would come in from lunch after a two or three hour lunch. The ambassador would notice this. So I presume, and I don't know for a fact, that the ambassador just called his friend, the director of USIA and said, "Just get his guy out of here." When this happened, I happened to be in Paris for a conference. I got back and the ambassador called me up and said, "Well, now that your old boss is gone," because I had not been happy with the fact that they had a USIA car. They really didn't need one, and the guy was using it to go to and from his boat. He said, "Well now that Hank is gone, what are you going to do about the car?" I said, "Well we have got the car. I can't get rid of it, Mr. Ambassador, but I will use it to go to and from work. I will not use it as my predecessor did." He said, "You know, now that you are the head honcho, you have got to learn to step back, take your hands off the operation and direct it rather than run it personally." It was a good lesson. How to learn to run an operation. Once I became head, the two things which I was most intimately and directly involved were the arms control talks, the START talks, the INF talks, and the Tokyo round of the trade talks. Those were extraordinarily significant, and it required personnel developing a good
relationship with several members of each delegation, and importantly, getting the heads of the delegations to trust me. Very critical, and particularly on the arms talks, there was a lot of media around. We had maybe 15 or 20 people around each week coming in from out of town to try to deal with these issues. And it was up to me to judge the people. If I recommended that an ambassador do an interview, they would do it. If not, they wouldn't. But I had to be very careful, because if any of the people whom I recommended broke our agreement, I would have had my head handed to me.

Q: When you say broke the agreement, what was this?

WILSON: Well, the conditions of our interview, by naming the person with whom they were speaking or by not writing the thing up properly. So this became very sensitive. I had to be involved in the negotiations, where things are going. this is when we were going to station INF missiles in Germany. This is when Willy Brandt took a toy airplane and threw it at one of his opponents in the Bundestag. We were using our Worldnet operation to reach other countries in Europe and convince them to allow the stationing of U.S. missiles on their territory. A very sensitive area. Then the START talks, which were much wider ranged and were headed by a guy named Rowny.

Q: Yes, General Ed Rowny.

WILSON: The missile talks were headed by Paul Nitze. The START talks were less imminent so they were less emphasis on this, but Rowny became jealous of Nitze. He was getting all the press attention. So Rowny wanted some press attention. But then the relationship between Rowny and Nitze deteriorated markedly. For example, and this is fact, both arms control ambassadors periodically went to Brussels to brief the NATO allies. They would fly in a military plane. Nitze was always very precise and very on time. Rowny knew that being late was anathema to Nitze. Nitze hated that. So most of the time when they flew up together, Rowny either deliberately or because of his nature would always end up at the airport late, and the plane had to wait for him. This would drive Nitze crazy. It would drive him absolutely up the walls. One of the more interesting times I had with them, and I was much closer to Nitze and the intermediate nuclear force, the INF delegation than I was to the START talks. Our ambassador to the INF talks, Paul Nitze, and the Soviet ambassador, Kvitsinsky, decided to talk a walk in the woods because I think each of them felt they really couldn't trust their own people, who may be bugging their conversations, so they decided to go for a walk in the woods, literally. When they came back from that walk in the woods, they had reached an agreement as to how we could conclude the INF talks. They really had. This was then sent back to Washington by Ambassador Nitze. I don't know how the Soviet side worked, but you have to remember on the U.S. side, it was a conglomeration of interests. You had the Arms Control Agency, in which Nitze worked. You had the White House; you had the NSC; you had the joint chiefs, and they all had their own lines of communication. Everything went back with their own spin on it. This is, of course, what Nitze wanted to avoid. He wanted to get his stuff back first. The initial reaction by a guy named Allen who was National Security Advisor to President Reagan was extremely positive. Hey, this is really a good basis for concluding agreements. What no one realized, this was in August, was that a little man over in the Pentagon, a political appointee named Richard Perle, was on vacation. He had been on vacation in France. When he came back the position in Washington changed.
Q: He was known as the prince of darkness. He hated the Soviet Union.

WILSON: Correct. So Richard Perle is on vacation in France. He likes to cook and eat. He came back and he saw this agreement. Then some of the defense contractors got to him, and after about six or seven weeks, the agreement was scuttled. We wanted to say the Soviets scuttled it, but in fact we really did. But this really opened up a whole area for responsible journalists, what the hell is going on. This is where I earned my money, because I was able to give a few journalists, these were with one exception, someone form the BBC, I took them out and showed them where the walk took place. I got them deep background briefings with Ambassador Nitze. They helped get our position our, at least the position Nitze had negotiated. Now ultimately that particular walk in the woods agreement was rejected, and in talking to Ambassador Nitze a year or so later, he said that he had made a big mistake. I said, "What was that, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "Well I should have realized that the agreement eliminated an entire class of weapons." Which is ultimately what happened. He said, "What I did not realize is that by eliminating an entire class of weapons, instead of saying reducing this to about 100 or so, I got all the defense contractors and the sub-contractors against the agreement. If I had left in 100 or so weapons, they would have been happy. It probably would have gone through." This is speculation after the fact, but it was a very interesting point because ultimately about four years later, the agreement was put into place almost as it was negotiated five years earlier.

Q: David, you were...

WILSON: We were talking about getting briefings, reporters briefings on this walk in the woods. We had to be very careful on whom we got the briefing for, because we recommended it. If I recommended it, Ambassador Nitze would do it. And fortunately, just by good luck, no one ever crossed us up. I was very pleased about that. You always put your neck on the line when you do those things. This worked very well. Now the other thing that developed during all the arms talks, was that I would often bring both to Ambassador Nitze and Ambassador Ryan, bring in the BBC correspondent in Geneva. Again it would be on background. But the BBC correspondent was always very well informed as to what was going on, and I got to know him. I said to him, "How do you keep up on all this?" He said, "Well, to be very frank, I get a weekly briefing from the foreign office when I am back in London." I said, "Oh that is very interesting." Then in my own mind I related this back to VOA, Voice of America being very pristine, wanting to have nothing to do with the State Department, with USIA saying we are an independent news gathering organization. Now the BBC reputation worldwide is still very sterling. VOA is much less so in spite of VOA's insistence they wanted no special briefings, no special contact, just like everyone else. The BBC on the other hand got weekly briefings from the foreign ministry on whatever subjects they needed. They didn't violate the confidence, and they still were respected as an objective international news source. A rather interesting little sidelight.

Q: I'd like to go back to the walk in the woods thing. In a way, I would think that you would be playing a very complicated game of chess in this briefing. Your knees had been cut from under you by Richard Perle. By the conservatives, the contractors.

WILSON: Yes, we didn't know precisely who. We could suspect.
Q: In a way, if you are telling the press on deep background that you really came up with what appeared to be a viable thing, and it had been shot down by forces in the United States.

WILSON: Well, we didn't say that last part.

Q: Was this left unsaid?

WILSON: It was left unsaid. We presented what the U.S. position was, and we tried to frame it in such a way that the responsibility for the breakdown of these negotiations lay with the Soviets.

Q: I mean, I assume the Soviets were doing the same thing.

WILSON: Probably, but much less effectively obviously.

Q: Yes. Did you have much chance after these meetings of getting together with the Soviet spokesperson?

WILSON: Never got together with the Soviet spokesperson. One of the people who we were very close to in all of these talks was a reporter named Strobe Talbott who was a good friend of Nitze's, extremely reliable. A couple of times when we arranged for our delegation and the Soviet delegation to take a little trip down Lake Geneva, I had to contact the Soviets, and we brought Strobe along. Strobe never broke a confidence. He was very good about that. He knew the subject. He covered the Soviet Union, covered Russia. He was very good, a very reliable person. I think he did some writing well after the fact.

Q: What about the press? Can you kind of give your feeling earned after almost five years there, not just the American press, but the other press, about how things came out, or how you dealt with them or their knowledge or whatever.

WILSON: The people who were based in Geneva for various news gathering organizations around the world were very knowledgeable in the details of whatever is going on. They would normally report back on a regular basis. The stuff they would report back on would not garner headlines. It was just stuff that would fill the back pages. Whenever a major conference was taking place, these same organizations would send in "their big guns form home base." That was always a slight problem for the locals who felt ignored or shut out. It was a problem.

Q: Would they get the stories wrong too, the big guns?

WILSON: No, not if they checked with their local guys as to what the background was. They didn't care about the details. They cared about the global impression, the big picture. They wouldn't get the stories wrong. They wouldn't necessarily have all the subtle details and the nuances. The local guys did.

Q: I would have thought particularly in some of these disarmament conferences, it would be very difficult to deal. You know, I mean we are talking about almost points of theology practically.
How much throw weight, how much this, that, and things moved at a glacial pace anyway. Wasn't it hard not to say, well you heard my briefing last week, and it is the same this week or something like that?

WILSON: No, because they wouldn't report on a daily basis. They would report when something was happening. You know, the big thing with the arms talks, the arms control talks. Then you had the Committee on the Conference on Disarmament, CCD or the CD. There was the question about maneuvering. What do you do about the Chinese? How do you deal with this little issue or that little issue? That would be for a period of maybe six or eight weeks once a year. Then they would go away and they would come back and take up where they left off on the arms control side. The other side of the real interesting press work or media work was the trade talks. Most of the reporters did not want to get involved in the trade issue. Obviously the guy from the Wall Street Journal did. There were people from the New York Times that did, but the New York Times when they really got going would send in, they had a permanent person, but when they really got interested in something they would send in someone who really knew the subject to give a little more global perspective. The trade talks were very important, the Tokyo round trade talks. I learned more than I ever, I didn't know much about it to begin with, but I learned very quickly. It is my background in these trade talks for about three years that ultimately got me the PAO job at the U.S. mission to the European Community in Brussels, because I knew the players, and I knew the issues. So the trade talks were very significant, though people didn't pay much attention to them because a lot of special interests were involved, cocoa interests, lumber interests. Our delegation was always filled with people from the various special interest groups. The trade talks became more over a period of time, much more significant to what we were doing than even the nuclear talks, except the nuclear talks could save us from being killed, and trade talks save us from going broke.

Q: What about the other delegations? Particularly, I think of the French, and maybe the Germans, particularly, when you get into trade talks. The French pursue their interest much more than anyone else.

WILSON: Sure, but you mention two countries that happened to be members of the European Community at the time, and the European Community had a delegation in Geneva. Whenever they dealt with trade issues, it was the European Community spokesman, or the European Community position that was critical. Now the French and the Germans obviously made their issues known within the European Community, and they helped shape the European Community position, but their role in the actual negotiation was less significant as individual countries because of the European Community and the European Union then.

Q: Well, I would have thought particularly at that period, France was sort of the major driving force in the European Union, Germany happily letting France take the lead, but basically was fine but basically a protectionist thrust, correct me if I am wrong, in agriculture and culture.

WILSON: Agriculture was very significant for the French. Culture was not really an issue in the talks as such, except when it came in to motion pictures, and then it became...

Q: I was going to say motion pictures.
WILSON: Television became a significant issue. Agriculture is still a major issue. Nothing has been solved in that. The U.S. position in all this is not always that clear. Fortunately the U.S. delegation was always headed by someone from the U.S. Trade Representative's office. While that is a bureaucracy, it is a very small bureaucracy, less than 200 people. You could deal with them very well. It was in this sense that you could see how over the years the State Department's position on economic affairs had become eroded. State had absolutely no, I mean they had a member as part of the delegation, but they weren't significant in any way. Commerce was even more significant than State. Agriculture was more significant than State. But USTR kept the whole thing going and the whole thing together and they did an extraordinarily good job.

Q: Well did you find, say when USTR came out, a deputy?

WILSON: They have someone there permanently, a permanent ambassador.

Q: Well you acted as spokesman for this group too?

WILSON: Yes.

Q: How did you find these various delegations and I imagine each one had again its own way of doing things and all this? I would think that as you were running around you would be switching hats and outlooks, methods of working all the time.

WILSON: Well, it required learning a new culture, a new set of terms because I really had not been steeped in trade. I did that. But, it is interesting that you should mention that because that solved sort of a State Department personnel dilemma. We had been asking, when I became PAO, to get a new deputy out. He was kind of lazy, he is kind of lazy still. He is retired. I really wanted an information officer, and I put in a request to handle some of these other talks. The deputy wasn't doing diddly. I had forgotten about it, because I was told no, there is no position available. Okay. Suddenly, I don't know the date exactly, I got a call from Washington saying, you know, your request for an information officer, we are going to fill it. I said, "No, kidding! That's great. Who is coming out?" They said, I think she was an 0-1 at the time, maybe an 0-2. They said, "Ruth van Heuven." I said, "Who? Who is she?" They said, "Well, she is a State officer, and she is in the consular section." I said, "Oh, why is she coming out to be my information officer?" They said, "Well, her husband is going to be named DCM at the mission, and we need a place for Ruth to go. She can't work for her husband in any way in the mission, so we thought she could work for you and fill that slot." I said, "Oh." I had actually known Ruth on a personal basis. Our kids had gone to the same nursery school, so I had known Ruth, and she was a very fine officer, very opinionated, but all right. In any case, I knew that the consular officer was leaving. "Why don't you assign her to the consular section?" Because the consular section in Geneva was attached not to Geneva but to the embassy in Bern. The embassy in Bern was responsible for the consular activities in the whole country. I knew that the slot was vacant. They were hemming and hawing, and they said, "Well, we have already paneled a young woman named Kay Dailey," Kate Dailey, Kay Dailey, whatever her first name was, "so she is getting that job." I said, "Well why can't you unpanel her and give the job to Ruth?" They said, "She is a very feisty young Irish girl, and she said she will take us to court if we try that. We are going to leave that one alone."
Since there is this opening that you have requested, and USIA has not given us a slot, we are going to fill in with Ruth." Ruth came. She knew a lot of the people on the arms control side because her husband had been dealing with a lot of them in the State Department. She didn't like the trade talks so I let her do some of the arms control. She loved it. She was very efficient, and she got along very well with the ambassador who at that point a guy named Jeff Swaebe. So it worked out very well until, and Ruth and I always got along well, until it came time for the efficiency rating period, the old ER period. Ruth came to me and she said, "I don't want your deputy to write the efficiency rating on me. I want you to write it on me, and I want the ambassador to review it." I could understand why she didn't want my deputy to write it because, I mean they just did not get along, understandably from her perspective. So I said, "Sure, Ruth, I'll be glad to do it." I did it and it was within her prerogative as a State officer to have the ambassador do the review, fine. So I took it up to him, and he also wanted me to write his review. I did that for him and sent them both up to him in draft. He called me up, I remember it was a Friday afternoon. He said, "This is ridiculous." I said, "What do you mean, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "What you have written for Ruth, for your rating and what you have written for my rating is absolutely wrong. It is ridiculous. No one is that good. You cannot write stuff like this. This is the problem with the State Department. You guys are always patting each other on the back and never saying the bad things. This is crazy. I come from business. I know how things are done." He said, "I want you to take this back, and I want you to think about it over the weekend. I want to talk to you on Monday. I want you to remember I write a review of your performance too. Just remember that." Well I took it back, and I thought about it. On Monday afternoon I went up and talked to the ambassador. He said, "Well did you think it over?" I said, "Yes, I did." He said, "What is your response?" I said, "Mr. Ambassador, do you think Ruth van Heuven is doing a good job?" He said, "She is doing an excellent job." I said, "Mr. Ambassador, do you want Ruth van Heuven to get promoted?" He said, "Yes, I do." I said, "Mr. Ambassador, the rating and your review stands as I have written it. If your answer to those questions are yes, that's the way it has got to go." I left. In the end he took my rating, my writing, he took his review that I had written, and made it even more glowing, because he liked Ruth, and indeed she got promoted. It was a harrowing 48 or 72 hours, because obviously I knew she wasn't as good as you are writing, but if you want to get someone promoted, you have to.

Q: Yes. So, was there any particular incident or occasion that caused great crisis or trouble while you were there that sticks in your mind?

WILSON: No, not in the outside work, nothing that would have shaken the world. There were obviously inside things. When Ambassador Swaebe left and Ambassador Carmen came in, Ambassador Carmen did not get along with van Heuven. Ambassador Carmen did not like the way Martin van Heuven parted his hair. I am serious. He didn't like Martin walking around with a superior attitude. The Ambassador had decreed that none of his staff should do representation unless they checked with him first. This is all right; it is getting into a little everybody's knickers, but you don't usually do that. In any case, Martin van Heuven was a big Yale person. It happened that the Yale Whiffenpoofs were coming out. Martin had arranged to do a reception for them. They were coming through Europe. He failed to check this with the ambassador. There were problems.

Q: Did you find yourself playing the role...
WILSON: Oh sure in the middle of this, absolutely. Particularly since Martin's wife worked for me, I mean it was a very interesting party. I learned to be an internal diplomat very quickly.

Q: I often said in the Foreign Service that real diplomacy is done in the Department or inter-departments within the U.S. government. The outside diplomacy you know where people stand, and you really don't have that much maneuvering room, but...

WILSON: That's right. But I had known Martin from back here, and I had known Ruth, and the ambassador liked me. I was literally in the middle. I think I helped out, although Martin didn't get the representation money for his Whiffenpoofs. At least he wasn't kicked out immediately. But the other thing was when they were, Ambassador Swaebe when he picked Martin van Heuven, the DCM slot was open, he was sent five files from the Department for potential DCM's. We sat up in the bubble and we discussed them. The senior State Department guy was there and was telling the ambassador about this one or that one. The ambassador finally with a big smile on his face, this was in the bubble said, "Now come on Jack, I have read all this. You can't distinguish between them. Everyone is great. You cannot tell me that one is better than the other. The only way you could really make a distinction here is from corridor reputation. I don't want your goddamn fake pile of bullshit. I want to know who is good and who is not good from corridor reputation." He was right; he was absolutely correct. Jack hemmed and hawed and he ended up with Martin.

Q: Well then, you left in '84, and you went to where?

WILSON: I came back to Washington.

John J. Harter was born in Texas in 1926. Harter served in the US Air Force during WWII before graduating from the University of Southern California and joining the Foreign Service. Overseas, Harter served in South Africa, Chile, Thailand and Switzerland. He also worked in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for USIA and after retirement on Oral Histories. Harter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You were in Geneva until?


Q: Had anything changed since you were in Geneva in the late 1960s?
HARTER: The most conspicuous change was a dramatic hike in the Swiss franc/U.S. dollar exchange rate - from four to one in the late 1960s to about two to one by the early 1980s. There had been virtually no inflation in Switzerland, and U.S. dollars therefore stretched about half as far in the Swiss market as they did earlier. We received a slight cost-of-living allowance, but not enough to compensate for the huge difference in the exchange rate. Otherwise, I saw relatively little change in Geneva or in Switzerland.

Q: How about UNCTAD?

HARTER: It was almost the same as before.

Q: It was still the United States against the G-77?

HARTER: Yes, but again, as in my earlier assignments to Chile, IO, and Geneva, it was almost as though I held two different positions in sequence. The first year was challenging and rewarding, but the second year was not a happy experience, largely because of several personnel changes. Gerald Helman was our Ambassador in Geneva when I arrived. That was his first and only tour as an Ambassador, but he was a first-rate career diplomat. Having been the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in IO just before he came to Geneva, he was thoroughly familiar with the United Nations. He had little interest in administrative detail, so he chose Don Eller as his DCM. Don had been the IO Executive Director, and his entire background was in administration. Gerry Helman and Don Eller had a wholesome and mutually supportive relationship that nourished a comfortable milieu for the Mission.

Q: How did you find Helman as an Ambassador?

HARTER: I was impressed with his comprehensive grasp of the Mission's entire output, complex and technical as it was. He read every cable into and out of that Mission. He was in his office by 7:00 o'clock every morning and he usually left about 7:30 in the evening unless he had an evening engagement, in which case he sometimes returned to his office after the event. Early every morning he began telephoning Mission Officers to clarify something or other. I was usually there early in the morning, and I received a number of those calls. Some people thought he was too preoccupied with detail, but I personally welcomed his interest. Also during that first year, our UNCTAD duties were imaginatively backstopped from Washington. The Deputy Assistant Secretary in IO with overall responsibility for UN economic and social matters was Marion Creekmore, who has been the senior international affairs advisor at the Jimmy Carter Center in Atlanta since he retired from the Foreign Service. Marion had a sophisticated perspective on UNCTAD, as did Gordon Brown, his officer-in-charge of the unit that backstopped our UNCTAD programs.

Q: I've interviewed Gordon Brown.

HARTER: Marion and Gordon approved my assignment to Geneva, by the way, and they briefed me thoroughly before I left Washington.

Q: Who were the principal State Department officers directly responsible for UNCTAD affairs?
HARTER: During that first year it was Chuck Meissner, representing the Economic Bureau, and Vickie Huddleston in IO. Chuck headed U.S. delegations to the principal UNCTAD meetings that first year. I met him at UNCTAD-V in Manila in 1979. He was fully attuned to the technical and political intricacies of North-South economic relations, and he was a skilled negotiator. Tragically, Chuck died at an early age in the plane that crashed in the Balkan Peninsula with Ron Brown in 1995. Vickie Huddleston was, in effect, the UNCTAD desk officer in Washington.

Q: I know her husband, Bob Huddleston.

HARTER: Vickie was wonderful! She was patient, bright, endlessly energetic, and she always sent us timely and realistic instructions. Unfortunately, all that changed during my second year in Geneva. Less experienced and less perceptive individuals replaced all of the key players. Geoffrey Swaebe succeeded Gerry Helman. He was conscientious, but his background was utterly irrelevant to our responsibilities in Geneva. He had no previous association with the State Department or foreign affairs or the United Nations. He was in his 70s, but he seemed older. He had been a salesman for Florsheim shoes and a senior executive for the May Company. He received his Ambassadorial appointment solely because he supported Reagan’s gubernatorial campaigns and 1980 presidential campaign as a fundraiser. Swaebe chose Marten Van Heuven as his DCM to replace Don Eller. I knew Marten when I was in IO and he was in the Legal Advisor’s Office. He was originally Dutch, and he spoke several languages fluently.

Q: There were other personnel changes?

HARTER: Yes. Chuck Meissner’s position in the Economic Bureau was abolished, and its UNCTAD-related functions were absorbed by Gordon Streeb, who replaced Marion Creekmore in IO. Gordon took a very hard line in UNCTAD. About the same time Vickie Huddleston and Gordon Brown were succeeded by individuals who shared Gordon’s aggressive approach to UNCTAD.

Q: That was just as the Reagan Administration came in.

HARTER: That’s right. And in 1981 Paul Volcker at the Fed pushed interest rates up sharply. That brought inflation in the United States under control, but it also accentuated a global recession, which significantly dampened U.S. imports from developing countries, contributing to a severe downturn in their economies. And they blamed the United States for that! Chuck Meissner understood those interrelationships, but most Americans who attended UNCTAD meetings in the early 1980s did not appreciate the implications for our UNCTAD agenda.

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[Begin September 8, 1997 session]

Q: Just what did your job involve?
HARTER: It was a non-stop operation from January through December, from early morning until evening, almost every day, including many weekends. Other Mission officers enjoyed occasional free days, uncluttered weekends, and all American and Swiss holidays. I didn’t, because UNCTAD scheduled back-to-back meetings throughout the year, except for August, when most Europeans take their vacations. The ongoing program centered on UNCTAD committees - shipping, commodities, financial flows, trade in manufactured goods, transfer of technology, economic cooperation among developing countries, insurance, and a few others. Each committee functioned independently of the others, and there was little coordination among them, either within the Secretariat or within governments. The UNCTAD Trade and Development Board met once or twice a year, ostensibly to review, coordinate, and approve the programs of the committees, but in practice its overall guidance was minimal.

Q: What happened when those committees met?

HARTER: In each committee the G-77 sought to devise some means of accelerating the flow of real resources from industrial countries to developing countries. Take the commodity agreements for coffee, cocoa, tin, and rubber, for example: Group B was generally willing to accept them when they were structured to stabilize prices around world trends, but the G-77 wanted to peg commodity prices at artificially high levels that would effectively require importers to subsidize commodity exports. One problem with that was that high commodity prices encouraged consumer shifts to substitutes. In practice, it was hard to find a compromise formula acceptable to both sides, and the meetings often ended in impasse.

Q: Who represented Washington at those UNCTAD meetings?

HARTER: During that first year, Chuck Meissner and Vickie Huddleston headed our delegations to the Trade and Development Board. Gordon Streeb inherited that chore the second year. A different inter-agency group came out for each committee meeting.

Q: How long did those meetings last?

HARTER: Each committee was normally scheduled to meet for two weeks, but invariably, around midnight of the second Friday, the Committee would decide - as we expected - to "stop the clock" and meet again on Saturday. More often than not, the proceedings spilled over into Sunday. After our delegations left Geneva, I usually wrote the reporting cables and our Mission transmitted them to Washington Monday morning.

Q: What has been the long-term impact of UNCTAD?

HARTER: That's a good question! UNCTAD history has not been positive overall, but one should see this in historical context. Prebisch envisaged UNCTAD as filling a vacuum left when the International Trade Organization failed in 1947. GATT was the phoenix that rose from those ashes, but GATT was only a partial substitute for the ITO, which would have had a more universal membership and a more ambitious agenda. The new WTO is more than GATT, but not quite what the ITO would have been. UNCTAD has dealt with bits and pieces of the world economy, but UNCTAD discussions lack balance. Like an adversary legal system, they tend to
argue in terms of black versus white, with a view to identifying the "guilty" party, rather than seeking compromise in shades of gray.

Remember, before World War I, several European empires dominated their colonies in Asia and Africa, and by the 1960s those formerly dependent territories were politically sovereign, even though they lacked the institutions, traditions, and resources of modern states. This posed enormous challenges to the international community, but its responses were distorted by the Cold War. Neither Group B nor the G-77 took into account the causes and consequences of decolonization during the Cold War.

Q: Wasn't the United Nations established to solve those problems?

HARTER: That's debatable! Its overriding mandate was to maintain the peace, a mission that was derailed by the Cold War. The Second Committee of the General Assembly more or less reviews international economic developments, but it isn't a viable forum for analyzing interconnections between trade policies, foreign exchange rate fluctuations, and foreign aid flows, for example. Delegates to the San Francisco Conference intended for ECOSOC to oversee and coordinate the programs and activities of international agencies concerned with economic and social developments, but ECOSOC hasn't proved to be a potent instrument. In fact, it has no authority over trade, money, and aid. The World Bank finances major development projects, the IMF more or less monitors exchange rates and balance of payments shortfalls of individual governments, and GATT/WTO facilitates international trade negotiations. Those agencies are beyond the reach of the ECOSOC and other organs of the UN.

Q: Did Prebisch think UNCTAD could fill that vacuum?

HARTER: More or less. Prebisch and the G-77 attempted to secure a very broad mandate for UNCTAD from the beginning. During the months following its initial conference in 1964, a major bureaucratic battle ensued in the U.S. Department of State between the Economic Bureau headed by Phil Trezise, and IO, represented by Dick Gardner, regarding the precise role UNCTAD would play. As I understand it, Gardner thought UNCTAD should be a decision-making body, while Trezise insisted that it could only make recommendations - which the United States and Group B could block in the other organs of the UN system. In the end, Trezise prevailed. UNCTAD's power has been limited, and UNCTAD debates have been polarized and shrill. The stereotypical image in the minds of many was that the G-77 was a tribe of whiners making unreasonable demands, while the U.S. obsession with containing communism limited our strategies for coping with the Third World. UNCTAD fora have therefore been the scene of endless wars of words in which neither side really heard the other. Nevertheless, UNCTAD may have helped, over time, to raise public awareness on both sides that global economic development is a complex and necessary phenomenon that warrants much more attention from governments than it received during the Cold War.

FAITH RYAN WHITTLESLEY
Ambassador
Ambassador
Switzerland (1985-1988)

Ambassador Faith Ryan Whittlesley was born in 1939 in New Jersey. She went to Wells College, and was interviewed by Ann Miller Morin in 1988.

WHITTLESEY: The other thing I did before I left was to make the rounds on my own. I tried to figure out what the problems were between the United States and Switzerland. I had to read between the lines. I also got a call from a friend of mine, my former law school classmate, who was legal counsel to the Swiss Bank Corporation in New York. He still holds that position. He's in the office of legal counsel. His name is Albert Shultheise. I hadn't talked to him in years although I had introduced him to his wife, who was my college classmate. He called me because he had read that I was going out as ambassador to Switzerland. He knew that there were serious problems brewing between the United States and Switzerland on the matter of law enforcement and insider trading. He called to alert me to a problem he thought was quite serious.

I went to the State Department. They really didn't give me what I considered to be a clear-cut analysis of these law enforcement problems. I later learned the reason. Structurally, the State Department is constructed in such a way that Switzerland is very far down on the totem pole. The State Department is structured on an east-west basis. The UN plays a role. Switzerland is not part of the UN and it's not part of NATO or the EC. Because it's structured on an east-west basis, Switzerland is an adjunct of the German desk. They have a central Europe department. There is one junior officer who is responsible for Austria, Switzerland and Lichtenstein. Most of the action in central Europe relates to Germany, of course. West Germany.

I also found out that economic questions are not given very high priority. That was my experience. Commercial responsibilities were taken away from State by the Congress and given to the Commerce Department some years before. American foreign service officers are simply not very interested in promoting trade. They're not very good at it and they don't do it. I found that they weren't particularly sympathetic. I can give an example of that attitude in my experience. There was an airline trying to come in to Switzerland, run by an American trying to compete with Swissair, Panam and TWA; he was an American entrepreneur. As ambassador, I wanted to try and help this person. He was from the south and he came in wearing a string tie, dressed in polyester. His wife had blonde hair piled way up on her head, wearing white plastic boots and short skirt. The attitude of our economic counselor was that he was not interested in doing very much to help this individual. There was a culture clash between these two men. The company came into Switzerland. They didn't succeed. But these are the kind of Americans that I believe we have to help abroad. In that particular case it didn't work. I was struck by the attitude of the then economic counselor. I believed it was because of the cultural differences between the economic officer and the American entrepreneur from Tennessee or Kentucky or some such place. He hadn't gone to the right New England schools.

Economic issues were not played front and center in the State Department. Political issues in the State Department are the ones that seem to attract everyone's attention. Switzerland is a country
whose importance is primarily in the economic sphere. So Switzerland is quite far down on the list of State Department priorities.

The main problem that we had at the time was the problem of the insider trading and the clash between legal systems. I asked to have appointments set up at the SEC and at the Justice Department before I went out to Switzerland. I was quite surprised by the attitude of both the Justice Department and the SEC towards Switzerland. I realized the problem was much more serious than I had been led to believe by the State Department. State didn't have time to worry about this. They weren't interested. The attitude of the previous ambassador was that he thought it should be fought out in the U.S. court system. He did not interject himself in any way into this issue to try to resolve it in the diplomatic track. He thought it belonged in the American judicial system. I am a lawyer. I had worked for judges. I knew how unpredictable American courts are, and once anything goes into the judicial system, it's absolutely out of control. The relationship with Switzerland was very important in many ways. Not only in the law enforcement sense. There were a whole panoply of issues and levels of cooperation that might be jeopardized if we had a collision on this subject. I did not share the view of my immediate predecessor who was a career diplomat that the embassy should essentially stay out of it, just report and sit back passively and let it be fought out in the American court system. I realized the seriousness of it as a lawyer. As it turned out, I was the only lawyer in the embassy. The main problems between Switzerland and the U.S. at this point were legal ones.

I met John Fedders, chief enforcement officer, at the SEC, and the people at the Justice Department. They were angry at the Swiss. They were visibly upset, using very harsh language about the attitude of the Swiss toward law enforcement questions, and their compliance with the treaty that had been signed earlier. Their efforts, as they saw it, to circumvent that treaty were causing friction. I could see I had a big problem on my hands. But I didn’t learn that from the State Department; I figured that out on my own by asking questions and going around on my own to these U.S. federal agencies.

I did have lunch with my immediate predecessor, Richard Vine. He told me that he thought it was a mistake that I’d been appointed because I was a woman, that the Swiss would not accept me. I was surprised by the reaction I received from him. But he had a completely different approach to the job. I think I traveled six times as much as he did around the country in my first year. He believed in just staying in Bern, which is what he did. And yet, on paper his resumé would be very impressive to the New York Times editorial staff, they would see that he spoke several languages, that he, you know, had a long history of diplomatic service. However, I realized, when I got to Switzerland, that such a resumé was no guarantee that someone would be an effective spokesman for his country.

Q: Was he an older man, getting ready for retirement?

WHITTLESEY: Yes, yes.

Q: Did you have any brush-up on your language skills before you went over?
WHITTLESEY: I didn’t have time, no, I didn’t. I should have. That’s one thing I really regret. It always seemed to take last place, my languages. I wanted to learn French and I wanted to work on my German. I did have German lessons. I continued with my German my first tour. The second tour I don’t even think I was able to.

Q: You mean private tutoring?

WHITTLESEY: Private tutoring. I had a teacher that came. I have so many German friends there’s really no excuse, but we always speak English. I have many German friends to this day. I understand German, and I can read. I don’t understand any French, don’t speak a word - I call it my “emergency German” - I can manage in German if I have to. I found in Switzerland with people who didn’t speak English, we could speak German. They don’t like to speak high German; they prefer to speak Suisserdeutch which is a dialect. Most of the Swiss, the businessmen and politicians, speak English. The French speakers sometimes don’t speak English. They don’t like to admit they speak German, but I found that in certain cases, if we had to communicate, they would admit finally that they spoke German and we could speak German.

Q: I have a couple of questions here. I would like you to, if you can, remember your first day when you arrived, and the other question is: what were your goals? Did you have your goals set out when you went to Switzerland?

WHITTLESEY: I don’t remember my first day, except... I really don’t recall it specifically. Do you mean my first day in the embassy?

Q: I mean your first day, when you arrived in the country as ambassador.

WHITTLESEY: I was met, I believe, by the consul general in Zurich, whose name was David Schwartz. He was very nice. I liked him very much. He became very upset subsequently that I didn’t name him deputy chief of mission, but I had the highest regard for him. He was an outstanding officer. I had another officer that I wanted to make deputy chief of mission, whom I also admired and respected. The two of them were the two top officers in the embassy. David met me, the then-deputy met me, I recall, at the Zurich airport. I was exhausted, with the children, and all the packing.

Q: You didn’t stop over anywhere?

WHITTLESEY: No, no. They gave us guidelines about going in to the embassy - what you do on the first day. I remembered all that. Frankly, I think I was too tired, but in retrospect, I really don’t think it’s so important. I think there are certain things that an ambassador has to do to assert control in the embassy but whether it’s the first day or the second day or the fifth day, doesn’t really matter. Or the fiftieth day. Obviously you have to get a feel for the people and find out who gets along with whom and who works well together and who doesn’t. It’s like any other human institution. There are all kinds of subplots and little undercurrents that are not visible at the outset.
Q: Well, you had already been told that the Swiss would not accept you, which we’ll find out whether or not was true. Did you have any feeling that the officers at your embassy did not accept you? The career people?

WHITTLESEY: My then-deputy, an older man by the name of Charles Stout, made a great point of telling me that he was a Republican, although his wife was an active Democrat, and how open he was to the idea of women and minorities - that was a kind of a leitmotif in his conversation. Actually, I did feel that he resented very much the fact that he was reporting to me, number one, a political appointee, number two, a woman younger than he, and that it was emotionally very difficult for him to accept the fact that I was his boss.

Q: Do you think it was mostly because you were a woman, or because you were a political appointee?

WHITTLESEY: A combination, definitely a combination. And a younger woman... But this is not unusual. I have found in my life that men of his generation find it extremely difficult. Younger men seem to be less sensitive to it. They talk about it, and they’re conditioned to say they will accept it, but when they actually have to live with it themselves, and actually be deferential to a woman. He was openly insubordinate.

Q: Oh, he was?

WHITTLESEY: Oh, yes. Finally, after five months, I asked that he be removed. I had the choice. State told me when I went out as ambassador that I could choose a deputy. They said there was someone there. My attitude was that, even though they told me I could choose a deputy, I would see how it went with the person who was there. I would give it a try and see how we got along. Then I would make a decision. At that time, an ambassador could choose her own deputy within the system, without any restrictions. I could choose anybody within the system of appropriate rank. There were “stretches” so that officers could be below this rank. It was fairly common to give stretch appointments, in other words, appointments to the rank of the person who would normally serve in such a job. I did give Charles Stout a try, for five months. Then I decided that I wanted to make a change. He went into fits of apoplexy and did not accept my decision. His reaction unmasked his real attitude toward my authority as the representative of Ronald Reagan.

Q: Had he been there a long time, by the way? Was he relatively new there?

WHITTLESEY: I can’t remember exactly.

Q: But had he been chargé for a while?

WHITTLESEY: Yes, he had been chargé. There were a couple of things that put me off initially. First of all, I had been in government a long time. I had not been in the State Department, but I was very familiar with the phenomenon of bureaucratic sabotage. I knew how a bureaucracy worked. I knew the mentality; I knew the characteristic of civil servants because I had worked in state, local, federal governments, I had been both an appointed official myself, a bureaucrat myself and an elected official. Although I was new to the State Department, I was not new to
government service or the press. A couple of things made me wonder about him. Initially, he wanted me to establish my authority vis-à-vis the U.S. ambassador in Geneva. I was to throw down the gauntlet and make it clear that I was the ambassador to Switzerland and the ambassador in Geneva had a lesser role. I was disinclined to do that, because, first of all, I liked Jeff Swaebe, who was the ambassador, and I thought “I can get along with him and we can work this out. There’s no need to have a disagreement over turf.”

The mission in Geneva was always trying to expand its influence and deal with the Swiss authorities in Geneva, as though they were the representatives of the U.S. government in Geneva. They tended to overlook the authority of the embassy in Bern. That was a problem, but it wasn’t one that I thought was of such magnitude that I wanted to have an immediate conflict with the new ambassador. It didn’t make sense to me. He also wanted me to lay down the ground rules firmly with the Swiss-American Chamber in Zurich. The embassy in Bern had had a number of problems with the Swiss-American Chamber, clashes with the embassy. I certainly wasn’t inclined, at the outset, to go in and make a strong statement. I wanted to find out for myself the history of the disagreements, whatever they were, and the personality clashes that were a part of it. I wasn’t inclined to start out having a clash with the Swiss-American Chamber in Zurich based upon Charles Stout’s recommendation.

I guess my biggest disappointment was... There were three things that happened. The first one was that I was invited to make my first major speech in Zurich to the Swiss-American Chamber. This group was the largest group of the leading businessmen of Switzerland [who] would attend this function. Switzerland is a country in which the business community is dominant. These are the most important people in the country, Zurich being the financial capital of Switzerland. There was to be a speech and a luncheon In the evening there was a dinner. Charles Stout was invited to both of those. He gave me no help at all, in offering any advice as to how I should conduct myself or what I should do, how I should speak or what I should speak about. I think, in retrospect, looking back on it, I don’t think he knew any of these people. I don’t think he was familiar enough with these circles himself because I later learned that many of these diplomats in Switzerland were not invited by the top bankers and industrialists because they preferred to deal with the ambassador or not at all. They would deal with the treasury attaché, but frankly, didn’t have a high regard for our diplomats. They were simply not invited into the inner circles of Zurich. In fairness to him, he probably didn’t know what I should do, but he didn’t attempt to find out, either.

I had made many speeches in my life, but the day before the speech I attended a luncheon in Bern. I sat next to a prominent Swiss. I asked him about my presentation the next day. I said, “How would you suggest I approach this? This is my first speech; it’s a major speech,” and I said, “I had intended to speak extemporaneously the way I [do] in the United States.” He said, “Well, my advice is that that’s a mistake, because the Swiss won’t regard it as a serious speech unless you have a paper to deliver.” I learned later that this is true. They always have “a paper.” They don’t put as much stock in extemporaneous speechmaking as we Americans do and they believe, in order to show seriousness of purpose, you have to show prior preparation and a paper has to be presented. Even if a Swiss speaker speaks extemporaneously, he always has a paper that he has prepared for distribution later.
I had not done this, so I stayed up that night, writing a speech myself. I wrote it about what Reagan hoped to accomplish, about his belief in new federalism, trying to return governmental powers to local and state governments, to reduce regulation, and what this would do for the economy, basically about domestic policies, about court appointments, the fact that courts had usurped their constitutional prerogatives had become too activist. They were not elected officials and they should be carrying out laws, not making law. That was the responsibility of elected officials. These are the things I covered. I think it was quite well received. I stayed up the entire night doing it and I remember feeling, in the car driving down with Charles Stout to Zurich - I went down with him and his wife - that I was annoyed that I had to hear this good advice from another source in Bern, not from my senior deputy or anyone else in the embassy.

[December 7, 1989]

Another example: On a Senate courtesy call in Bern, asked, "Would you like to have a complete copy of the president's recent message? We have it in English." He said, "Oh, yes, very much." He would like it. I noted the Soviets had sent to every member of the Parliament a copy of their counter proposal. This deputy, Mr. Stout, had discouraged me from sending the president’s speech to Parliament. I had specifically urged it be sent to the Parliament. He discouraged me from doing so. I accepted his counsel at that time because I was new. I thought he knew what he was doing. Only to find this result.

Then I went to see the new Canadian ambassador to make a courtesy call. A few days later, or the next day, and the same thing happened. I said, "Have you seen our proposal on zero option?" Yes, I think it's very interesting. I said, 'Do you have a copy?' "No." I hadn't brought a copy with me. He said, “You know the Soviets have distributed their complete counter proposal to the diplomatic corps.” So the Canadian and the leader of the Swiss Senate both had the Soviet response and here is Charlie Stout telling me, "Oh, no, we don't do that sort of thing." Was this attitude reflectively of laziness, ignorance or incompetence? Or was it because he personally did not like President Reagan’s proposal.

I thought, "Something is seriously wrong here. I tried to persuade Charles Stout that I wanted him to reorder the time of the officers, the political officer, the economic officer and himself. I didn't want them to give to completely reorient their whole lives, but I wanted them to take ten percent of their time and use it in public diplomacy. Get out of the embassy, go and speak to opinion leaders and seek out speaking engagements. They would say, "Nobody asks us. We go if we're asked."

I've been in politics. I know you can generate invitations. He resisted that suggestion. They did not want to do that kind of work. They were very comfortable. They were very concerned about their perks, their houses, their servants, their nice lives and the diplomatic circuit in Bern. But that use of their time didn't result in increasing the number of America's friends. That little cocktail circuit in Bern, which was very comfortable - everybody knew one another - but it wasn't carrying out the mission that I wanted them to undertake.

Q: Was it all the diplomatic corps?
WHITTLESEY: All the diplomatic corps. They saw the same people every night. Back and forth, entertaining back and forth. Very little was accomplished for the United States. They also saw the Swiss government officials, but opinion was being formed and manipulated against us out in the country. They had virtually no contact with the political leaders, leaders of Parliament, with the major labor leaders, with the media. And Charles Stout adamantly resisted this effort. I understand because in the State Department they don't get any personnel department points for their promotions based upon public diplomacy. It's a very low priority. They get promoted based upon the number of reports they write to Washington and how well they write reports and the analyses. They can do that sitting in their offices, which they would prefer to do in most cases. Such was my experience.

He was also openly insubordinate. I had been a prosecutor - an assistant U.S. Attorney. I had therefore an established relationship with the FBI. We had two FBI agents, no, one FBI agent in Bern at that time. The FBI was asking for a second agent. The previous ambassador had turned them down. So the FBI agent came to me, the agent in charge. made a case and said, “I'd like you to reconsider this and make a decision on the merits.” I was inclined to be sympathetic because I had the highest regard for the FBI and I could see that our legal problems were mounting. Based upon my visits to the Justice Department and the SEC, that our problems with Switzerland were not at a crisis stage but they were headed for a collision.

I saw the FBI agent in charge, Larry Levine was his name, alone. I may have seen him several times. After Larry Levine got out of my office, Charles Stout confronted him in the hall and demanded to know what we had discussed. Mr. Stout didn’t come to me and ask me; he came to Larry Levine. That was really the limit as far as I was concerned.

There were a couple of other things. I was invited to events. One time I was invited to a party which was the seventy-fifth anniversary of a Swiss company. I didn't realize it was a most elaborate party. I thought it was an in home informal small dinner party. I was expected to make a speech. I had been in politics and was able to handle it but I felt I was inappropriately dressed for such an elaborate party. I had on a long skirt and a blouse, it was not a really a high fashion elegant dress that would have been appropriate for the occasion.

Also there were a number of other things. He gave me no guidance whatsoever about the people or the event.

Q: Do you think it's because he really didn't know, or was there an attempt to sabotage?

WHITTLESEY: I believed it was sabotage. There were things that he didn't know, but he also didn't make an effort to find out. At the New Year's Day greetings, I had no idea what it was: I knew we had to go to the Foreign Ministry but I didn't know that it was a formal ceremony and that there would be all the major Swiss television networks there. It was a very big event. I went to the New Year's greetings unprepared. These are major events for which one has to be prepared. He didn't do that or me. Clearly he knew what it was. I got the feeling after a while that he wanted me to stumble so that I would confirm the notion that I was an inappropriate choice. Then, later, I realized that there were other officers who had negative feelings about his leadership. As I developed an understanding of the embassy and got to know some of the people
better, I realized the people that I thought were doing a good job were not the people that he favored. My judgement about performance was clearly not the same as his. I tended to seek out the advice of people in the embassy who I believed were serious and were more than just time servers. You see, some people would come to Switzerland with the idea that it was a quiet post, a reward of sorts. We can relax, enjoy the good life, enjoy the Alps or the country, enjoy our nice houses, our maids and have a relatively easy time. Frankly, that's not my idea of any job I've ever undertaken. There are always things to do. There were things to do in Switzerland—a tremendous amount of work to be done. Switzerland may be small, but it is a global economic player and a major international center.

Q: So the embassy divided into two camps?

WHITTLESEY: Well, yes. I wouldn't say two camps. There was a strong feeling against the State Department on the part of certain other agencies like the CIA, treasury, especially the CIA, and defense and the FBI. And the State Department group, were dependent on the DCM. I became very disillusioned with all the infighting and pettiness. I wanted someone who displayed initiative and energy and who shared my interest in public diplomacy, in active trade promotion, in solving the problem of insider trading that we were having, by going out and dealing with the banks directly and trying to persuade them of our point of view. I didn't believe Mr. Stout could or would do it. He took great offense that I wanted to change. He has continued to attack me ever since - within the system - even after he left.

Q: Has he?

WHITTLESEY: Oh, yes. How dare I criticize him, senior foreign service officer, was his attitude.

Q: Is he still in the service?

WHITTLESEY: He may have retired by now. I don't really know. But I wrote a personnel report that was critical of him. I believe it was buried and never went into his file. I don't think it was ever in the system. Somehow they managed to deep-six it.

I gradually asserted myself within the embassy. I saw things that I liked and didn't like. I didn't respect the USIA officer very much. He was a great buddy of Charles Stout. He was absent frequently. He came in very late. His office was a mess. He liked parties. He was generally a bright man, but not exactly the sort that I thought should be representing us.

I remember once I went to lunch with him with a journalist. During the lunch I kept asking him jokingly, “Whose side are you on?” He was quite critical of the United States at the lunch. Apparently, he believed there would be no repercussions if he advocated his own opinions instead of those of the duly elected government.

Q: Really, to a foreigner?

WHITTLESEY: Yes. He was a very liberal Democrat and liked to talk about all our social problems, and was totally unsympathetic with Reagan's approach to those problems.
Q: That's pretty tactless, isn't it? On his part?

WHITTLESEY: I was a younger woman. He didn't take me seriously. They thought they didn't have to. He was convinced the system would protect him. He moved out finally. I think he was recalled. He had a problem with alcoholism. In fact, I know he did. I think he went back for treatment. He was a great buddy of Charlie Stout. I had an excellent relationship with the treasury attaché and with the political officer, who was harassed by Charlie Stout. And with the FBI and the defense attaché. We had one good defense attaché, Col. Justin La Porte, and one who preferred not to work so hard. But with Col. La Porte I had an excellent relationship. One of our jobs was to try to sell the M1 tank to the Swiss, so we geared up to do just that. Reagan had changed previous defense department policy and urged us to make a major effort to sell the Swiss on the M-1.

Ultimately I made the political officer my deputy. He was the one with whom I had a good relationship. I had enormous respect for his intellect, his writing ability, his willingness to work and to find ways to help the United States, to be creative and innovative to help his country.

Q: You didn’t consider bringing in somebody from...

WHITTLESEY: I was very cautious because I knew once I was out on the post I would have to choose a deputy from a resumé. I didn't want to do that. I had someone in the post with whom I could work easily, [whom] I liked. I liked his wife. She was a lovely polished lady who was a tremendous asset. That was particularly important because I didn't have a spouse. She liked to entertain and she was very helpful at any social event. She would go around and introduce people, not just stand in the corner like a lump, or spend her time talking to other Americans. She was very skilled in social events, in representational events. She was also well-read and could speak well. She spoke French. I saw no reason why, if I had someone with whom I had worked successfully and who was a career foreign service officer in good standing, why he couldn't be made my deputy. Ultimately he was. It was a stretch. I’ll say! Joan Clark who was then the director general... it was a stretch appointment for Jim. It may even have been a double stretch, but I think it was just a stretch. She tried to persuade me that I should think about this. But I insisted, and she finally agreed. It was interesting. I got help from another career foreign service officer in Geneva, Mike Smith, who later became an ambassador. He had some strong feelings about the system. He gave me very good counsel to make it happen.

Q: Was he in the system?

WHITTLESEY: Yes. He had known Charlie Stout. I would see him in Geneva and he would come to see me in Bern. You see, some of these career officers were sympathetic to the Reagan approach to the world. Some were not, like Charlie Stout. But Mike Smith was; Jim Shinn was. They wanted to help me, because they knew that I was there to carry out the Reagan agenda. I couldn't have gotten Jim Shinn named my DCM without his guidance. Every step of the way he advised me how to deal with Joan Clark and how to deal with the State Department. He was in the room with me when I made the calls to Washington.
Q: I gather Joan Clark was director general at the time?

WHITTLESEY: Yes. I sought approval in the normal course and I got it with the advice of Mike Smith. I don't think she realized that I had someone from the system advising me. Mike had had clashes with Charlie Stout and fully supported my decision. He was then the U.S. trade representative in Geneva.

Q: He was the trade representative then?

WHITTLESEY: He later became... let's see... he later became an ambassador. I really liked him. I kind of lost track later. He got a divorce. I haven't seen him in a couple of years. We had wonderful times together. I made Jim Shinn my deputy. The treasury attaché, Jim Fall, for whom I had the highest regard, and [who] also was a career civil servant, fully endorsed my decision as far as Charles Stout was concerned, and, of course, the FBI rep, Larry Levine also. I worked very closely with them, you see, because our biggest problem was the insider trading crisis. The treasury was very important to me, the FBI was very important, and Jim Shinn was invaluable. He stayed with me throughout my tour. When I went back to the White House, he stayed and was DCM through the John Lodge administration. Then when I came back he stayed with me for a while. I wanted to keep him on. I asked permission, State said no he couldn't stay, because he had been there four years at that point and it would have been a fifth year. I acquiesced reluctantly. I tried to persuade Ron Lauder to take Jim Shinn because I knew Felix Bloch [Felix S. Bloch - DCM at U.S. Embassy, Vienna, Austria in the mid-eighties under Ambassadors Helene Von Damm and Ronald Lauder. Accused of spying for and delivering sensitive U.S. government documents to the Soviet Union. Dismissed from the service and denied his pension rights.] had been there with Helene von Damm, and I knew Felix Bloch was personally disloyal to Helene von Damm. I had visited Helene there; I didn't know that Bloch was also disloyal to his country. But I believed, because he had been personally disloyal to Helene, he would probably be also personally disloyal to Ron Lauder. I tried to persuade Ron Lauder to take Jim Shinn. He told me that he would. Then, without telling me or explaining, he decided to keep Felix Bloch, to his everlasting sorrow.

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Q: Because what I wanted to know was, was there any delay in presenting your credentials? I know this is going back to the very beginning, but did you feel that the Swiss were hostile to you?

WHITTLESEY: No, I didn't. I never felt that being a woman was a disadvantage in Switzerland. I felt, from the very beginning, that the Swiss welcomed me warmly. I was immediately deluged - as soon as they got to know me - with invitations. I don't mean the standard diplomatic invitations to the diplomatic corps events, but into the homes of the most prominent Swiss. I would say they were more forthcoming early on in Zurich than in Geneva. The Genevois are more restrained and reserved. Only at the end of my tour was I invited into the homes of the most influential citizens of people in Geneva. But I was invited. They don't even invite UN diplomats into their homes. I would go to parties in Geneva that they would have, and I would be - sometimes the French ambassador would be there - but usually I was the only diplomatic presence at all, in Geneva. And in Zurich the same. I started to be included. These were the top
bankers, the top industrialists. They knew I liked the country. I went skiing; they would invite me into their chalets. In fact, I had so many invitations my son, my youngest child, didn't want to go because he liked to sleep in his own bed. Visiting private chalets involved traveling and staying overnight in strange places. He was young. That was hard for me. I ended up mostly turning them down in the end, in the second tour, especially, because William just didn't want to be on display in the homes of strangers.

Q: And he was approaching that difficult age, too, whereas before, he was a child.

WHITTLESEY: He was a child, but he wanted the security of his own bed. He didn't want to always be sleeping in a strange bed. Even today, he's traveled so much with me, I ask him what he wants to do on his vacations and he says, “I want to go home.” He has traveled in his young life so much that for him the greatest treat was to be at home. That was always a problem but completely understandable.

Q: Of course. You're always pulled, aren't you?

WHITTLESEY: I always wanted him to be with me, and my daughter too. She was different. From the very earliest time, she liked to be standing in receiving lines with a thousand people. Neither one of the boys liked it. My daughter just loved it. It was like a fish to water for her. She thrived and now, I guess, in this new life she'll continue. There were differences among my children.

I was invited to make speeches. I tried to visit many places. I went out into the country. I visited opinion leaders, parliamentarians. Because I had been involved in politics, I could talk to them fairly easily. One of the reasons they invited me, I think, was because they knew that I brought a certain perspective, that I was a conservative, that I had been involved in politics, that I had a certain political view. They wanted to hear that view and they knew that I had information that they wouldn't read in the newspapers. I brought an understanding to them of what was really happening in the United States that they didn't get from other people.

Q: Do you think it was a help, too, that you obviously had political clout?

WHITTLESEY: No, I would say no.

Q: So they could send a message through you?

WHITTLESEY: No, no, I don't think that was [it.]. They knew that I had influence with the Reagan administration, but no, I would say it was more really that they liked to find out what was going on from an insider.

Q: And you were knowledgeable.

WHITTLESEY: I was knowledgeable about the things they were interested in. Charlie Stout used to bring these huge piles of cables in every day. I had to race to catch up and read them. That's one of the reasons why I didn't pursue my language, because I had to catch up with all of
this reading material. In the beginning I didn't know what I had to read and what I didn't have to read, so I was struggling through it all. Had I read everything that he had brought to me, I would be sitting at my desk the entire day doing nothing else, which is what some people in embassies do, I guess. I learned fairly quickly, and one of the reasons I had Jim Shinn was that I learned that much of this material was not of critical value to me. I didn't need it. Much too much gets printed in the State Department anyway. I needed to defend and advocate the policies of the United States. I had to have these governmental presented policies in advocacy form, which the cables don't provide in most cases. I had to read the newspapers. I had to read American newspapers. I had to read the literature, not of the Washington Post and the Herald Tribune, but I read the material that I got from my conservative magazines, the National Review, Human Events, the American Spectator, the publications from the Heritage Foundation. This was the Reagan administration. The State Department, because it didn't really share the view of the Reagan administration, was not presenting the Reagan case at its strongest in the material I received.

Q: I see.

WHITTLESEY: I wanted materials that would allow me to make the case at its strongest, and also to have some analysis of what the opposition was, what the arguments were, how to deal with the various arguments. That's how I spent my time. I think that's what made me interesting to the Swiss. I, unfortunately, didn't speak French or good High German. They preferred to speak English anyway, but I did have something to say about what Ronald Reagan's goals were. You can speak the language and not have anything to say.

Q: Very true.

WHITTLESEY: Speaking the language is not necessarily the highest priority. I was a lawyer. I became very knowledgeable about insider trading and about the legal problems we were having with the Swiss and with the court system in the U.S.

Q: Did you find your very great experience in politics was a big help to you?

WHITTLESEY: Yes.

Q: It seems to translate very well.

WHITTLESEY: Yes, it translates. Also my experience in the theater was helpful, because being an ambassador is... in a way, there's a ceremonial aspect to it. I felt that I was on stage in these public performances. I sought out friends of the United States in Switzerland. I tried to identify people within the country who were friends. I wanted to give them encouragement to continue supporting the United States, to continue speaking out on behalf of the United States, to give them information so that they could defend the United States more effectively.

Q: I see.
WHITTLESEY: I wanted the officers to go out and speak. Some of them were better at it than others. Jim Shinn did a lot of public speaking at my request. He used to bring me big thick books about his previous service in Italy. When he was posted in Italy, he would go out and speak all over Italy. He spoke fluent Italian. He would speak on American foreign policy and would get his picture in the local papers. He told me the State Department paid no attention to his efforts. He never got any credit for that. Mostly they were interested in cables, analysis and writing. With some of the others in the embassy, I wouldn't send out making speeches because they would lose friends for the U.S. They were not able to speak in public. They were very happy to stay reading and writing cables. I don't think we can afford those type of officers much longer. I think we should select our diplomats and select foreign service officers on the basis of their ability to go out to be multifaceted. Yes, they have to write cables, but they also have to be able to make a public presentation. There were far too many of them that I simply could not send out to make a speech in Switzerland.

Q: Do you think Switzerland gets the pick of the crop, or do they get sort of...

WHITTLESEY: I think we get a mix. I think sometimes we get some of the pick of the crop because it is such a beautiful place.

Q: It's sort of self-selecting, isn't it? I mean, the people who go there want to go there?

WHITTLESEY: Yes. They want to go there. They want to go there, definitely. I met a lot of foreign service officers in my five years. A lot of them came through Bern to say we got people in Switzerland that weren't the best. No, I think the system does not reward those qualities. If I were to do anything in the State Department, if I were ever secretary of state, I would make sure, and I would say this to people, that the only kind of people who could be admitted as foreign service officers into the American diplomatic corps were people [who], assuming they had language ability and good analytical skills, good writing skills, but could also sell a carton of pink toilet paper to a corner grocer who was already ten cartons overstocked. If he or she could do that, then he could sell American foreign policy to the most difficult adversaries. He could be on the cutting edge and could go out and make friends for the United States and diminish the number of her enemies. That was my mission as I saw it. That should be the mission, in my mind, of every American diplomat abroad.

Q: When you got there and found you had all of these difficulties facing you, did your goals change, or were you able to carry out what you expected to carry out?

WHITTLESEY: One of the major problems I had the first time I was there was the insider trading crisis. In that effort our biggest problem was, again, the U.S. government. The attitudes of the U.S. agencies, who were not inclined to try to find a diplomatic solution. The previous ambassador didn't want the issue in the diplomatic track. He wanted it to be resolved in the courts. What I did was pull it out of the courts, essentially put the court action on hold, and bring it back into the diplomatic track to resolve it diplomatically and amicably. That's what my mission was the first time, and also to try to sell the M1 tank. We were successful regarding the insider trading. That required a major selling effort. Not only with the U.S. agencies, the SEC. I spent a lot of time with John Shad, John Fedders, Bevis Longstreath, the members of the SEC,
who had to be persuaded that this was a reasonable solution. Also with the Justice Department, to a lesser degree with the State Department. State was merely the go-between. The major players were basically the U.S. Justice Department and the SEC.

Finding a solution to this problem was my primary mission, and I became very much involved in it. As a lawyer I was interested. It caught my imagination. It was a major problem between the two countries. The Swiss cooperate with us in a variety of ways, I'm afraid there would have been some repercussions elsewhere in our relationship had we not been able to resolve this amicably. I thought it was very short-sighted to say, “Let it run its course in the courts.” I had to persuade the U.S. officials that we were able to do it this way. They sent a mission to Bern. I organized this mission of the SEC and the Justice Department. They were there only one day and said they wanted to go home because they didn't think the Swiss were serious and were trying to circumvent. The team wanted to leave after just one day. That first day of the negotiations, they were not getting anywhere.” They said they were the same, they haven't changed their attitude, and we're going home and we're bringing the Swiss suit.”

“No, no, you can't do this,” I implored. In addition, I had to persuade the Swiss banks who were getting advice from American lawyers that they should stonewall the U.S. government, in short, not cooperate at all. I persuaded them to rethink their position, readjust and try to reach a diplomatic solution. If they didn't come to an agreement, the end result was they were going to end up in court. They didn't like that. They were going to risk treble damage fines, contempt of court citations, headlines in all the financial press in New York, which would not be attractive to them. I believed there was a middle ground somewhere that we could find over a period of time. For me to go as a woman to the big Swiss banks... I remember going to the leadership of the Union Bank of Switzerland, the biggest bank, and trying to explain this to them in diplomatic, tactful language. I was there by myself, thinking, in their society there are no women in business. Hardly any at all. I assumed they were thinking, “Who does she think she is?” I tried to be the most diplomatic, the most tactful, it worked ultimately. I went around to all the banks and explained that we had to reach an agreement, and we did. That was my greatest accomplishment.

That agreement which was reached has become the model for use in other jurisdictions by the U.S. Justice Department.

Q: Is that so?

WHITTLESEY: Yes.

Q: What was it called?

WHITTLESEY: It was the “Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading.” It was the opening up of Swiss banking secrecy, which was really, considering the stakes, quite an achievement. (End of tape)

And Jim Fall.

Q: So that has become a model.
WHITTLESEY: Yes, and it still is. It went on. There were further refinements in my second tour. Now the relationship on banking matters, which was so acrimonious when I first arrived on the scene, is virtually trouble-free.

Q: That's wonderful. That's terrific.

WHITTLESEY: It took a long time. The Swiss take a long time for these things.

Q: Indeed.

WHITTLESEY: Political clout is generally given as a reason for appointment of a political appointee. The reason why a political appointee, in my mind, is better is not that the person has political clout, that your phone calls will be taken in the White House. The real reason is that you're a salesman who agrees with the product, that is, the politics of the duly elected government. You are willing, first of all, to understand the product, you understand the policies of the president, and are willing to advocate those policies enthusiastically. A political appointee needs those skills. I think if we live up to our trust, we must appoint people as political appointees who have interest in the president’s policies - are not just socialites or big givers. I believe in a system of citizen ambassadors. We don't believe in an elite corps of diplomats, a self-selecting elite. In our country, historically, we've had a system of non-career ambassadors who represent the highest traditions of America. These people should be skilled in discussing the most controversial aspects of a president's foreign policy and be prepared to advocate for him. That's the difference with career diplomats. That's why I think there should be more political appointees rather than fewer.

Q: Do you think there should be any from the corps?

WHITTLESEY: I think it's very hard to get political appointees to go to places like Lagos, Nigeria, but I would try to get the best political appointees to go if I were secretary of state. Unfortunately, as a result of the situation in government today, I think George Bush is finding that it's hard to get people to serve, period. With all the disclosure rules and the climate. It's unfortunate, but those rules mean that the establishment in Washington has more power because there are fewer and fewer people from the outside. Any president needs to rely upon the existing bureaucracy, but the direction should be set by the political appointees. So that the national election has real meaning.

Ideally every ambassador should be a personal representative of the president, appointed to carry out the president's agenda. Career appointees usually don't want to expose themselves to the criticism that they think they would get in another administration if they were too enthusiastic about supporting the policies of one president. Therefore they tend, for reasons of survival, to be passive and more neutral. I think a president is entitled to more than neutrality from his ambassadors. A career ambassador generally can't provide that enthusiasm because he is, understandably, concerned about what's going to happen to him in the next administration.
Q: Sure. I'd like your views on this. If the foreign service corps, the officer corps in general, only gets to a certain level, aren't you going to get awfully mediocre people into the service?

WHITTLESEY: No.

Q: You don't think so?

WHITTLESEY: No, because I don't think they should be encouraged to think they can be ambassadors, you see.

Q: I see. Change the premise?

WHITTLESEY: Yes, we should change the premise. We invite them to come into the diplomatic corps. We have people now... how many do they have, a hundred applicants for every person they select? I don't think there's any danger of not having good people. People will always want to go and serve in foreign posts. Now, as it becomes more dangerous for the United States abroad, there may be some reasons why we won't get the best people, but I think there are other ways of making the job attractive. These people should be, ideally, neutral. They're not neutral now. The lower level people, they come in, they don't really know how they should behave. But the people at the top set the political agenda and they carry it out through the State Department personnel system. These newcomers learn very quickly that if you don't conform to this top tier political agenda, you will be penalized. This was made very clear to a fine young officer for example who worked for me. He was a Ph.D. He was the best foreign service officer I ever encountered. His Ph.D. was from Penn State. He left the system because he was so disillusioned. He is now the top aide to John Silber, the president of Boston University. His name is Douglas Sears. He could be a political candidate in his own right. He's so attractive, well-spoken, talented.

Q: What do you think of the idea of career people coming in and serving five, ten years, then getting out and doing something else, and then perhaps coming back? A lot of them have done that. Gotten themselves high-powered jobs on committees on the Hill.

WHITTLESEY: I think that would be a good solution, because some of them are away from the United States for so long, some of them don't even like the United States. I think that was Felix Bloch's problem. But then, going to another government agency is not really going out into the real world of the private sector.

I think Bloch was typical of a number of foreign service officers I met who consider themselves an elite. They are intellectually superior to the average American in their own mind.

Q: I know what you mean.

WHITTLESEY: I don't think they like middle America very much. The American people are ill-served by types such as this. Felix Bloch, to me was the epitome of that person, of which I saw a fair number. They scorn middle-class values. They believe ordinary Americans are cultural barbarians; their religious faith, their traditional values, their more conservative approach to family matters...
Q: Within the State Department itself, because that is a good deal of the thrust of what I'm working on, do you feel that there is a difference of the mindset and the philosophy, depending on the cone? I mean, are the consular people less "elite," for example?

WHITTLESEY: The consular people aren't very much interested in policies, regrettably. I'll give you an example. I find that most of the women seem to gravitate to this cone or that's where they put them. I guess that's been one of the criticisms that they're not given higher-ranked political officer positions.

Q: Right.

WHITTLESEY: And economic officer positions. For example, a young consular officer said to me, "I was at a dinner party in Zurich, and there were some young people there and they were asking me questions. They knew I was an American diplomat, and they were asking me questions about this IMF treaty - the zero option, it became the IMF treaty - and I told them that I didn't know anything about that aspect of U.S. policy. I'm a consular officer. I didn't know anything about that. So we went on to another subject." I was horrified.

Q: Yes.

WHITTLESEY: I found that the consular people were not interested in policy questions because it didn't matter in their promotions. It all has to do with how they get promoted. This prompted me - this experience with this young diplomat in Zurich - to start a program in the embassy in which, in our staff meetings, the various sections had to make a presentation every week on some aspect of American policy for the benefit of the others. So that they could all be informed as to what American policy was generally. I believed they needed more general information.

Q: Were they assigned certain things or did they pick it?

WHITTLESEY: No, they were assigned, according to their areas. This served two purposes for me within the embassy. First of all, young people like this officer in Zurich would learn about the zero option so if he again were at a dinner party, he would be informed and able to discuss it intelligently. And secondly, it gave me an idea as to which officers had any skills in public presentation.

Q: Oh, sure.

WHITTLESEY: Also, I could tell what their own views of these policies were. I had been around for a long time in public life and could tell in the manner of the presentation how enthusiastic someone was or was not about a particular administration policy. So what I asked them to do with these policies was to present the administration policy, the reasons for it, present the opponent's position and how to deal with that objection. It was important that we know what was going on in Switzerland and we would report to Washington. They would read the papers to prepare this report in most cases. Our job was to advocate current American policies to all of our contacts. The meetings were very revealing to me but entirely new in an embassy, apparently.
Q: I'll bet it was.

WHITTLESEY: It was very useful because I could see that some people were better than others in speaking. Those people I would then encourage to go out and make speeches. Those that were totally lacking in skills I would keep inside. I also was able to figure out who was generally supportive of the Reagan administration policies and who was not. They always claim they can advocate the policy of any administration, but it is really not true.

Q: No, I've never heard of that being done.

WHITTLESEY: We're light years behind in dealing with public diplomacy in terms of what the Soviets do in Europe. We have learned to wage war with tanks and high tech, but we have not begun to scratch the surface of the manipulation of opinions of populations against us. Of course we have a real opposition press and an opposition political party in our democracy, which they don't have. Now there is more attention being paid to active measures in disinformation. Even the State Department has a section on disinformation now. They didn't have one then. At that time nobody even believed that it existed. It was obvious to me, because I was so much interested in it. So I did a number of other things. I became concerned that at various social functions the Americans would talk to themselves. I'd see them in the corner clustered and talking among themselves and the poor Swiss would be standing around. Throughout my time as an ambassador I said in staff meetings, "These are not social events to which you are invited as guests. You are invited there to work. And you are expected to work the room and to socialize with guests" I said it over and over again.

Q: Aren't they told this in the A100 course?

WHITTLESEY: You mean the diplomats?

Q: Yes.

WHITTLESEY: No, they don't do it. It was a continuing problem.

Q: Really?

WHITTLESEY: They got angry. I would look around standing at the door in the receiving line on the Fourth of July and see those Americans talking together and my blood pressure would go up. I had gone over this in the staff meetings. Some poor Swiss or some Nigerian was standing off by himself and here the American diplomats were clustered. I couldn't tell the wives what to do, but the husbands, the diplomats, were expected make guests of the American embassy feel welcome. It was so basic.

Q: That's true.
WHITTLESEY: They resented any advice at all. This is another small thing. When they would come in to the embassy residence, I would always ask the Americans to come early for any function.

Q: Yes.

WHITTLESEY: I would spend two hours upstairs memorizing the list, going over my speeches, learning the names of all the people. I did that every time.

Q: Sure.

WHITTLESEY: I would ask the Americans to come early. I would talk to them about the list, the people who were there.

Q: And they would have the list.

WHITTLESEY: Yes, we were spending the taxpayers' money. They would have the list and the goal was to make the most of the contacts. The women would come, and I would say, "I consider you a co-hostess with me. You are co-hosts and hostesses." It's a small thing, but they would come with big pocketbooks. "Will you please put your pocketbook in the office, because a hostess doesn't carry a large pocketbook." That was like asking them to fly to Lagos, I guess. Small things. Some of them obviously were very quick and knew immediately, and others, the wives, would go around with these great big clunky pocketbooks carrying their life savings at a social event in the residence. That was just one small thing.

Q: And some of them became angry?

WHITTLESEY: Some of the women, I would even say the secretaries, one in particular, June Foster, who's still there, was wonderful. She was such a gracious hostess and would come to any function and was so well-mannered and knew how to deal with people. Our consular officer, Annette Feeler, was wonderful. She was very good. Always properly dressed and dignified. Others couldn't make table conversation, even had poor table manners.

Q: Really?


Q: You shock me.

What about press relationships the first time? Did you have good relations with the press?

WHITTLESEY: The first time, excellent, yes, I would say.

Q: They pretty much followed your activities and gave you good coverage?

WHITTLESEY: Good coverage, I would say.
Q: Did American press people come through?


Q: Oh, great.

MAYNARD WAYNE GLITMAN

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations (INF)
Ambassador and Deputy Negotiator

INF Delegate

Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Illinois and his MA from Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy MA, and served in the U.S. Army in 1957. His postings abroad include Nassau, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Vienna, and served as the ambassador to Belgium. James S. Pacy interviewed the ambassador on April 24, 2001

Q: Okay, we’ll now move into late 1981-1984. You’d been appointed Deputy Negotiator with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations with the rank of Ambassador in Geneva. How did this job come about?

GLITMAN: As you’ve seen, I was very deeply involved with the whole INF issue and had been for some time. It was almost natural that I would continue to see this thing through, hopefully to its successful conclusion. Not being a military man I could not be a part of the deployment aspect of the development, which was the agreement reached in ’79 to deploy weapons. But I did feel that I could make a contribution to the arms control negotiation side. And I made my interest known. I was at one point the State Department’s candidate for the position of Chief Negotiator, but the decision was made to appoint someone who had far greater experience and certainly was better known, to the job of the Chief Negotiator, and I would be the Deputy Negotiator with the rank of ambassador. That person was Paul Nitze.

Nitze was the first Washington official I had ever laid eyes on. It was at a conference on national security issues, with senior students selected by their university, in my case the University of Illinois. I don’t recall what he said, but I remember the positive reaction I had to it and to him. When I returned to Washington, after the arrangements had been made that he would be the chief negotiator and I would be his deputy, I joined in the U.S. delegation’s preparation for the opening round of the INF negotiations.

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I soon found that Nitze and I approached problems in a similar manner. In our delegation meetings, all ideas, regardless of who proposed them were considered and subject to a rigorous logic check. If they passed the check, they were adopted. If one part of an argument was questionable, it had to be dropped. If the proposition could not stand without that argument, the proposition would be discarded. When Nitze’s contributions were subjected to the process, he was, to his credit, quite prepared to rethink his position if he or the group concluded that someone else had a better idea or formulation. He was and still is a remarkable human being in every sense. Not only is he remarkable intellectually, but also physically. He was in his ‘70s and we used to ski with him, and he kept on being active. Just a remarkable human being. I very much enjoyed working with him. I learned a lot from him. This rigorous examination really was the key to the delegations ability to put forward logical, well constructed papers.

I should also note that the one other thing we shared, Nitze and I, and that was appreciating the value of constructive ambiguity and bifurcated clarity in situations where it might be necessary to temporarily put aside a difference during the negotiating process. But we also both saw no room for this device in the formulation of the treaty which would legally bind the U.S. Again, that rigor which he had and I felt very much akin to and tried to continue when I took over as the chief negotiator. It was a very positive element in our ability to work closely together.

In preparing to go to Geneva, Nitze asked our legal advisor, Tom Graham, who was from ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to begin the process of drafting the treaty; the final version of which would mark the culmination of the negotiating efforts. Getting an early start on this task helped us ensure that we would be able to prepare a draft of the treaty early on and thus improve the prospects that negotiations would in effect be, but without anyone making a point of it, worked from our draft. Again, this was a process that we continued to try to stay ahead of. The legal writing was ahead, our views would be available in legal form early on, so that when the discussion begins to turn on a specific issue, whatever section of the treaty you are looking at, we have a text down and the other side does not. Our text essentially becomes a working document. The Soviets could say, “Take this paragraph out, put this paragraph in,” but they would work from our document. And again, Nitze showed great foresight and acumen in getting that process started early on. I can assure you, I followed that same pattern as well afterwards.

In addition to the legal aspects of the treaty and the tactical aspects of the negotiation, there was one point that I worked very hard to get across within our delegation. Noting the political nature of the INF issue, I urged that the substance of our position, as reflected in the draft treaty, be rooted in the ’79 decision. This was not SALT, this was not a bilateral strategic negotiation involving only U.S. and Soviet interests. In the INF issue we were acting as agents for NATO allies, as well as for the U.S. We would have failed, if we would have ended up with an agreement which was technically sound from the US standpoint but which left the allies with an impression that their interests had not been adequately taken into account. To ensure that this did not happen, the negotiator would need to remain in close contact with the SCG process, at the North Atlantic Council, at NATO headquarters, and directly with NATO capitals. One of the reasons I was given the rank of ambassador was to permit me to carry out those duties, in an effective way with the Europeans.
Q: After all these preparations, we get to Geneva?

GLITMAN: Yes. Before Geneva, Nitze and I went to call on Helmut Schmidt and German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. Days before the actual beginning of the negotiations we were in Bonn and in Hamburg to meet with Schmidt. Underscoring the effort we made to keep the allies fully informed of what we were doing and obviously the Germans were, because the Pershing missiles were going to be deployed only in Germany and the cruise missiles would be deployed in Germany plus four other basing countries, the U.K., Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Indeed it was symbolic of the underlying nature of this negotiation, that our first task on the opening day of the negotiations was to meet with the group of European parliamentarians. We reviewed and compared the negotiating positions of both sides, noted the importance of allied solidarity (including continuing with the deployments to achieving an agreement). Even as we prepared to meet with Soviets, you could see how important keeping the allies on board was. Not on board, but working closely with them, and I particularly took seriously this concept of being an agent for them as well as for ourselves. The building we moved into is called the Botanique, it’s in Geneva of course and it’s across from the botanical gardens. Not too far from the League of Nations, on a nice day you could walk to it. The American mission in Geneva was in a separate building, up the hill from us and the League of Nations, so it was a little climb to get there. But we were not housed there, we were housed in this Botanique building. It had been originally put up by a financier, Bernard Cornfeld, I believe the name was. I think he went bankrupt. I hoped that wasn’t going to happen to us. I had been in that building earlier because the US delegation to the GATT was also housed in that building, so I was familiar with it. It had a certain number of drawbacks from the security standpoint. The building was also home to the Hungarian delegation to the UN. Obviously, that wasn’t too comfortable. The West Germans were also located in the building and in fact shared a wall with us. That wall was in our main room where we met with the Soviets for plenary sessions.

Let me say a little bit now about how we did actually work. Twice a week, we would have plenary meetings. These would be formal sessions, full delegations would be present, and we would have prepared a paper, without any idea what Soviets were going to prepare. And they would have prepared a paper without any idea of what we were going to prepare. These were formal documents that we exchanged. And on both sides they were stamped secret. So we were giving over secret papers to the Soviets, and receiving secret papers from the Soviets. In fact at one point we had a security investigation and somebody asked one of our people, “Did you have secret papers?” “Oh, yes.” “And what about the Soviets?” “Well, we gave some secret papers to them.” And the security man was quite upset. I had to explain to him that this was a normal exchange. But, the fact that we did exchange these papers meant that we had to be extremely careful in how we wrote them. Anything we put in those papers could be used against us. We took great care, I think I mentioned that earlier, we took great care in preparing these papers, almost as if they were the treaty itself. Because we realize that you are giving over a hostage to fortune when you turn over one of those papers to the Soviets.

After the formal meetings, we would break down into subgroups. The ambassador and the committees would meet. I would be there with Ambassador Nitze. On the Soviet side it was Ambassador Kuitzinsky and General [Nikolai] Detinov. It would be the four of us who would meet. Then the senior people from the foreign ministries on the delegations would meet in a
somewhat larger group, maybe instead of just four maybe six, maybe eight people, three or four on each side. The military people had a table of their own. There would be coffee, soft drinks, and snacks on these tables. The intelligence people would have their own table, even though they were all supposed to be unknown to anyone else, they quite quickly figured out who was who and that’s where they would sit together.

A few more points that I wanted to add. One was that in addition to all the other tenants that I mentioned, there were several commercial firms in this building, in Botanique, including a lighting company which never seemed to have any customers and which closed its doors when the U.S. arms control delegations moved out of the building in the late 1990s. That was the Zonea Electric Company, and we always kind of wondered about it but never could say anything definitive. It was clearly not ideal from the security stand-point and it would become less so when terrorism also became a major concern.

We also uncovered another fault, or rather my wife did. When I described the office situation to Chris, I also noted that there were problems with the stairwells, should we need rapidly to evacuate the building. However, I said, there were fire escape stairs. “How do you know they are open at the street level,” she asked. “I don’t,” I said. “Maybe you should walk down those stairs,” she replied. I did. They were locked tight. Neither the crash button, which should have opened the doors with a push, nor the regular door lock would budge.

Corrections were made. On the positive side, the Botanique offices were bright and cheerful. And the main conference room which doubled as a reception room offered a fine view of the Alps. A fair amount of our time at the office was spent in a secure conference room which was lacking most of these characteristics and amenities.

Let me describe a typical day for us; a plenary day in particular. Members and advisors would read the overnight cable traffic and the newspapers. They would individually consider what developments and reactions might flow from the take and perhaps discuss this with one or two others. The delegation would meet around 10 o’clock and our first task was to go over the formal U.S. plenary statement, due to be presented on that day and ensure that it was factually correct and accurately got across our points. An advisor would have been assigned to draft a statement which would have been developed in outline form in an earlier delegation meeting, and already subject to at least one or two reviews. The entire delegation would once again go over the draft, fine-tuning it if necessary. It would then be put into final form and translated into Russian. The English version was considered authoritative, the Russian version was a courtesy to allow non-English speakers on the Soviet side to refer to the U.S. statement during the discussions. Both would be handed, as I said, to the Russians.

Having approved the statement (we are still in our delegation meeting, internal meeting), we would then rehearse the arguments in its favor. Finally, we would discuss what we thought the Soviets might introduce at the meeting, how they might react to our statement, and how we should react to their remarks. This is something that I introduced, that is, what are they likely to come up with. We would use the precision of a rifle in laying out our position, and the wide coverage of the shotgun when considering what the Soviets might have in store for us. I had, as I said, introduced this approach, to help reduce the chances of being caught unaware and thus to
improve the chances of acting appropriately and confidently and not having to improvise on the spot. By and large, the system worked.

The Plenary session would normally begin around 11 o’clock, with the exchange of the formal statements. And then, as I pointed out, we would break into these smaller groups. Normally, this would go on until past the normal noon hour. But, in any case, once the meeting did formally break up, if it were held in our place I would normally escort Ambassador Kuitzinsky and General Detinov out of the building, which afforded another opportunity to gauge the Soviet reactions to the meeting or reinforce one of our points as we went down the elevator and out the door.

As I said, the meetings would break up about one or two in the afternoon. We’d go back to our secure conference room and exchange views and reports on the formal and informal meeting. “What did you think this meant?” “How did you feel about that comment?” We would analyze the Soviet remarks for any hints of movement or signs of retrenchment, and offer our estimates of Soviet reaction to our presentation. Then we would consider what suggestions we might make to Washington for tactical or strategic moves. Summary reports, including analysis and action recommendations, would be prepared on each of the meetings and sent out at the end of the day; which often meant well after normal closing time. Interpreters prepared verbatim reports of the meetings and all of this was put together in a package. Norm Clyne, who was a very able delegation executive, was responsible for doing that. After he finished, Nitze and I would review and approve each of the reports before they were sent. It all made for a very long day. After leaving the office many of the U.S. team, including the support staff would go out together for dinner and then to their respective hotel rooms for calls back home and bed.

The negotiations were broken down into rounds which would last approximately two months. Rounds would then be followed by two months back in capital. The chief, the deputy chief and immediate staff and the members were expected to stay the course of the negotiation, the advisors and most of the support staff might skip every other round. Most of the members were accompanied by their spouses, the advisors usually came alone.

Recognizing the importance of continued close consultation with the European allies, I opted to be based in Geneva after the first round, and to use the inter-round period to attend SCG meeting or HLG meetings, visit NATO capitals and meet with government and opposition leaders, attend conferences where INF was main topic of discussion and generally get our points across to opinion leaders, to the media and the public. I would usually return with the delegation to Washington for the debriefings and the determination of work assignments in the inter-round period. And then return to Washington again in time to participate in the final preparation of our instructions for the next round, and return to Geneva with the delegation. I should add that there was some opposition to my staying in Geneva. As opposed to being home-based in Washington. But given the task that I had before me, it seemed to me that I ought to live and work on the same continent. And in the end Washington approved of this and it would mean that I was able to make the rounds as I pointed out, to the European capitals. Once again, reinforcing the sense and reality of consultation with the allies.
Regardless of where one was home-based, whether or not spouses were along, the continuing back and forth movement, plus being away from home for extended periods of time was not conducive to a normal family life. Nitze’s Secretary, Nancy Jenkins, had at one point been the social director at an officer’s club. She (and the military assigned at the negotiations) understood the importance of maintaining morale in such circumstances. She organized weekly events, movies on some occasions, square dances and others. An end-of-round party provided an opportunity to let off steam by skits and application of topical lyrics to well known tunes. Despite efforts such as these, by the time the negotiation had ended there were some divorces, balanced by some weddings. Most, however, adapted to the unusual rhythm of life as best as one could.

Let’s get to the very first meeting. It was held at the Soviet delegation. They lived in a compound area. They had a large wall around it. There was one old mansion which was used for some events, I think we held our first meeting in what must have been a dining room in that building. Then they had some newer buildings. Many of the Soviet delegates lived in those buildings. I gather they had a communal kitchen and a restaurant. Some of them lived in hotels as most of our people did, but the majority of them lived within the compound. The first meeting began there. Of course the press was busy, we sort of waved to the media and walked in.

As we expected, both sides at the first meeting laid out in broad terms their basic positions and the reasoning behind them. We underlined the concerns of the U.S. and its allies, as laid out in the December 1979 NATO decision, and to the principles that were embodied in that decision. We highlighted the principle of an equal outcome, explaining why it was essential to a balanced agreement. We reviewed the arguments for concentrating on long range INF missiles and placing global limits on them. And noted the importance of incorporating an effective verification regime within the treaty.

The Soviets had been proposing a moratorium on any new line of missiles in Europe, via the media, before the negotiations had began. Not surprisingly, they put forward a proposal for a moratorium on the deployment or preparation for deployment, of new or additional INF systems in Europe at the first plenary meeting. As you can easily see, this was a patently one-sided position which would have left the Soviet Union with over 1,000 war heads on its INF missiles while the U.S. would be frozen at zero. While it was patently one sided, and as we will see, it was not unusual. Very often they seemed to like moratoriums when we didn’t have anything and they had something. They became less fond of them when we began to deploy ourselves.

While the Soviet plenary statement contained no surprises, the informal session was surprisingly revealing of the Soviet position, and Kuitzinsky’s view of the relations between states. Kuitzinsky, General Detinov, Ambassador Nitze, and myself, and two interpreters, one Soviet and one American, were at the first post plenary meeting. Kuitzinsky began by saying he wanted to tell us a joke about a rabbit and a bear. The two were traveling in the same train compartment. Some time after the train had left the station, the rabbit began feverishly searching his pockets, and then let out a gasp. “Ah!” “What’s wrong.” asked the bear. “I seem to have lost my ticket,” replied the rabbit. “So what,” said the bear. “So what,” exclaimed the rabbit. “When the conductor comes around he will find that I have no ticket and have me locked up!” “Don’t worry,” said the bear, “I can take care of it.” Kuitzinsky had a great bass voice. “How,” asked the
rabbit. “Well,” the bear said, “when the conductor knocks on the door, I’ll pick you up by the ears and hold you out the window. I will give him my ticket and he won’t know you are here.” Assured that the powerful bear would protect him, the rabbit calmly awaited the conductor’s arrival. Then, as promised, when the conductor knocked on the door, the bear picked up the rabbit by his ears, and held him out the window of the speeding train. “Where is your ticket,” the conductor asked. “Right here,” the bear said, showing his ticket with his right hand. “And what to you have in your other hand,” the conductor asked. “Nothing,” the bear replied, pulling his now empty left hand out of the window.

I should add that our plenary statement had made several references to the importance we placed on serving the interests of our NATO allies. Nitze and I concluded that Kuitzinsky’s joke was meant as an object lesson for how a great power should deal with their allies. We were astonished by Kuitzinsky’s near recklessness in a situation where anything you say can and will be used against you, in suggesting so openly to us that this is how the Soviets would act if they were in our place. And it was his failure to understand that we neither would or could play the role of the bear. I did not fail to repeat the joke in future meetings with NATO allies.

The bear story clearly reveals one of the more serious issues we had with the Soviets, basically how you deal with allies. But there were also many other fundamental differences. And the first among these was a basic disagreement over whether the U.S. and its NATO allies had the legitimate right to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. The U.S. and its European allies base their position on inherent right to individual and collective self-defense accorded by Article 51 of the UN charter. This inherent right underlies the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. The Soviet position in denying that the U.S. and its allies had the right to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe in defense of NATO presented in effect a challenge to the legitimacy of NATO itself. In devising proposals which in all of their variations had a common theme, that is no deployment of U.S. INF in Europe, the maintenance by the Soviets of all their new SS-20s and modern medium range aircraft as well, the Soviets were seeking to give practical and juridical legitimacy to their claim that the U.S. had no role to play in Europe, that the issue of INF missiles was one for Europeans to handle alone.

Kuitzinsky understood this. At one of our early meetings when I noted the Soviet unwillingness to move in our direction, he replied that their very participation in these negotiations with the U.S. was in itself a major concession. And given the Soviet point of departure he was right. But in making his comment, he also acknowledged that the Soviet Union knowingly accepted the premise of our position by agreeing to the talks. It remained to be seen whether the practical outcome of the negotiations would further support the underlying U.S. and NATO position.

Another underlying philosophical and political force was a question of principle. Should the outcome be based on equal reductions, as the Soviets argued, or on an equal outcome as the U.S. proposed. And connected to this issue was the Soviet insistence that U.K. and French nuclear forces be taken into account, in determining the existing and future balance of INF missiles and aircraft among the U.S., NATO and the Soviet Union. No other issue in the negotiating process took up more time than this fundamental nexus of linked questions of legitimacy, the nature of equality and the bilateral nature of the negotiations.
One of the other issues we dealt with was whether or not to include aircraft. Our basic point was that aircraft were not as threatening, I am not saying that they were unthreatening, but not as threatening as the missiles, and that we really needed to concentrate on the missiles. In addition to this the Soviets continued to argue that we had more aircraft than they did. We’d been rather defensive about the aircraft position, and as the debate wore on I suggested that we might go over to the offensive. By our account, the Soviets had far more INF range aircraft than the U.S. and NATO. We might suggest to the Soviets, that while we continue to consider missiles more worthy of priority attention, we were quite prepared to consider reductions in aircraft and then confront them with the quantitative asymmetry. The U.S. Air Force had some qualms about this, but when they ran the numbers and saw how we could argue in good conscience that the Soviet INF range aircraft outnumber ours, they took up the challenge.

Among the aircraft that the Soviets sought to exclude was their new Fencer. They argued this aircraft could not fly a 1000 kilometer round trip mission. At the same time they insisted that older U.S. aircraft could undertake such a mission. When we probed the Soviets how they could have come to such conclusion, the discussion turned into a question of flight profiles. Aircraft use less fuel when flying at high altitudes and at lower altitudes, where the air is denser and offers more resistance, they use more fuel. It was generally understood that most aircraft would take off low, fly high towards the target, drop down under the radar to deliver their weapons, exit the target area and then fly back to base at higher altitudes. The Soviets claimed that their flight profile called for flying low to and from the target. As a result their range was limited. When we asked them why their aircraft had to fly such a flight profile while our aircraft could fly a more efficient and effective flight pattern, they replied that our airplanes had technical advantages over theirs.

For the Soviets to make such an argument was most unusual. The fact that they used it is an indication of the importance they placed on being able to protect their claim that NATO had an advantage in aircraft, even if it meant acknowledging the superiority of U.S. equipment. We continued to hammer away at this chink in their armor. In any event, the seeds were planted which would eventually lead both sides to agree to drop aircraft all together from the INF treaty regime.

Despite or maybe because of the inability of both sides so early in the negotiations to move off their opening position, the verbal jousting during the post-plenary sessions continued at a pace. In preparing for my job, as deputy chief U.S. negotiator, I read a number of articles about Soviet and Russian negotiating tactics. Some of these were provided by my European NATO colleagues, thus giving me more than one slant on this topic. In addition, my previous work in the international trade arena had exposed me to a wide variety of national and individual negotiating approaches. Among the frequently mentioned ploys, the desire to get the last word, and the device of putting your words into an interlocutor’s mouth, and vice versa, seemed to have been particularly well learned by our Soviet counterparts.

I pointed out to Nitze, after our first two post-plenary meetings, that Kuitzinsky seemed to especially favor these two old standards. As our next meeting drew to a close, he was at it again. Nitze, however, got the best of him by saying, “Well, Mike, he really has to have the last word so let’s give it to him and get out of here.” Which we proceeded to do. At the next post-plenary
meeting, Kuitzinsky, indirectly referring to the tale of the rabbit and the bear, suggested that in approaching the negotiation we should go beyond good and evil. I said, “That judgment comes from Nietzsche and you know what had that lead to.” “Yes, I do,” said Kuitzinsky. “Nietzsche lead to Wagner. Wagner, I said, “gave us the Gotterdammerung.” Soon thereafter, as the meeting seemed about to enter into the last word jockeying phase, Kuitzinsky turned to General Detinov and said, “Well, Nikolai, Glitman always has to have the last word, so let’s give it to him and leave.” Later in the negotiations, the Soviet ploys took on a counterproductive and perhaps sinister aspect adversely impacting on efforts to find a common ground.

In addition to the major issues involving the longer range INF systems, there were a couple of other issues which were of special importance as well. We were beginning to see them and recognizing that we would have to resolve them. One was the treatment of shorter range systems. These would be systems with ranges below 1000 kilometers. NATO had originally proposed that these be dealt with under some form of “collateral constraints,” but it wasn’t spelled out. But somehow or other, they would not be allowed to run totally free when we would put a ban on the production and holdings of the longer range INF missiles which went from 1000 to 5500 kilometers in range. We proposed to limit certain of these shorter range systems. The Soviets argued that short of eliminating all non-strategic nuclear force from Europe, systems with ranges under 1000 kilometer should not be constrained. Needless to say, they had quite a large numerical advantages in those as well. That was one question, we referred to that as SRINF, short range INF, and that was one issue we knew we would have to deal with as the negotiations proceeded.

Another one involved the method of reduction. We favored destruction, the Soviets had a combination of destruction and some withdrawal. And then the duration of an agreement. It was clear we were going to have some differences of view on this issue. We saw the treaty lasting with unlimited duration, and the initial Soviet approach had the treaty lasting till 1990. Which was obviously a very short term.

While we had not gotten into verification very far, it also became obvious pretty early on that we were going to have difficulties in reaching agreement on verification. The Soviets were leery of too much on-site close inspection, and we were moving in the direction of wanting to have as rigorous and stringent an inspection process as possible, compatible with our own need for a certain amount of secrecy as well. That too was clearly on the agenda, as we would move into later stages of the negotiation.

We should also bear in mind that during this period, at the beginning of the negotiations, the public interest had grown considerably and this began to take form in larger and larger demonstrations against nuclear weapon policies. Something like a 100,000 in Hamburg, Schmidt’s hometown, against nuclear weapon policies, on June 20, 1981. The coming months would see more such demonstrations. There were four days of peace rallies in East Germany, attended by 480,000 in April of ’82. In June, something like 15,000 in Paris, 300,000 in Rome and 115,000 in London. This is all in ’82. Over 300,000 demonstrating in Bonn in April of ’82. Even in New York, something like 800,000 demonstrating in support of the nuclear freeze movement. And I might note that while primarily aimed at the U.S. strategic nuclear force, the nuclear freeze movement approach to the new deployments fit perfectly with the one-sided
Soviet INF moratorium proposal and would have undercut NATO’s dual track decision. And there was a freeze movement in the U.S. as well as abroad. On August 5th, the U.S. House of Representatives failed by two votes to pass a resolution in support of an immediate freeze on production, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons. In October, over 20,000 demonstrated in Ottawa against Canadian agreement to approve testing of U.S. cruise missiles in Alberta. Again, a lot of this was supported and aided by the Soviets. And it was a clear-cut effort to influence publics, and through them, governments to, in effect, accept the Soviet position in the INF negotiations to essentially not deploy anything on NATO side and to leave the Soviet Union with an enormous superiority in these type of systems. We had our work cut out for us. We know now that Soviets were actively working with these groups. Essentially, as we’ll see later on, the Soviets put too much faith in those groups’ ability to swing governments and publics. It was becoming obvious that the outcome of the negotiations would depend on the ability of the European NATO governments and the U.S. government to maintain public support for the dual track decision.

The negotiations themselves were about to settle down into a campaign of maneuver with each party introducing variations on their basic theme and working to show that they are being flexible. But there would be no give on the fundamental differences. The Soviet proposals, no matter how they were dressed up, all lead to the same conclusion, that there would be no deployments of U.S. INF in Europe while the Soviets would retain a substantial portion of their new SS-20 force. During the second round, which went from May to July of ’82, the Soviets tabled a draft treaty based on their proposal that both NATO and the USSR would reduce their medium range systems to 300. NATO’s 300 would consist of U.K. and French forces, with only a small number of U.S. aircraft in the mix and no new type on INF missiles would be allowed. Restrictions would not apply to the Soviet forces in the Far East, although SS-20s east of the Urals were quite capable of reaching targets in NATO Europe. Ground and sea launched cruise missiles would be banned regardless of location. Of course we were producing new systems of that sort as well and Soviets were behind in that field. The Soviets did agree that the treaty could be of unlimited duration, specified a zone of withdrawal and agreed that Soviet INF systems west of 80 degrees of longitude would be subject to limitations. They also suggested that systems with ranges below 1000 kilometers could be covered in side protocols. There they begin to make some move towards capturing SRINF.

While these proposals made minor adjustments in the Soviet positions, they didn’t change the fundamentals. It would lead to an unequal outcome, exclude any U.S. INF missile deployments, and allow the Soviets to deploy an INF force which would equal the number of all U.K. and French INF systems, but would not limit Soviet strategic forces would could also target the U.K. and France. For its part, the U.S. worked on the basis of making progress were it could be made, while continuing to explain its position and to explain the weaknesses of the Soviet proposals. The U.S. tried to get the Soviets to agree to set up some working groups on technical issues, and one of them was a data experts group which would consider and try to reduce the differences of the sides, data, on such issues as the number of existing systems and their capabilities. Another was a treaty text working group, which would begin to blend together language of the two draft treaties in those non-controversial areas, based on boiler-plate language, where they were already quite close.
It was against a background of not much progress at all in the negotiations; where the progress that was made was a secondary issue; it was against that background that the political situation in West Germany began to grow increasingly tense with the demonstrations both reflecting and helping create a climate of angst. Nitze and I had visited Minister Genscher and his arms control and security staff in Bonn, and Chancellor Schmidt in Hamburg in mid-April, between the first and second rounds. And a few days after a major peace rally which attracted 480,000. We came away from our meetings feeling that the German leadership would stand by the 1979 decision and carry out the deployments. Both of us were concerned, however, that the end result might well resemble a pyrrhic victory, with considerable damage inflicted upon the alliance as a result of disaffection of a large portion of the public of several alliance member states. As the end of the second negotiating round came into view, Nitze became increasingly concerned over the situation in Germany. With these concerns in mind, and with word from Kuitzinsky that Moscow would be holding a major review of the negotiations during the summer break, he discussed with me and others his belief that the U.S. would need to cut through the morass of issues and try to find the basis for a deal. That the U.S. was unlikely to achieve an agreement involving substantial movement on the Soviet side unless we were prepared for a substantial movement on our side. These are taken, in part from my memories of the time, and from Nitze’s book From Hiroshima to Glasnost.

I shared his concern and his belief that the U.S. would need to make some changes to its position. The zero-zero proposal remained an excellent bedrock upon which to base our position, but the Soviets by putting forth variant after variant of their basic unequal outcome proposal had created the appearance but not the reality of flexibility. In my view, what the U.S. needed was to offer an equal outcome at some number other than zero. While retaining zero as our preferred outcome. In other words, an interim proposal which would show movement on our part without abandoning our principled approach.

More fundamentally, although I was very much in favor of trying out variations of our own in order to demonstrate flexibility, I was persuaded that the Soviets would not agree to any outcome other than their unequal no-U.S. deployment proposals before the U.S. had deployed its new INF missiles in Europe. To do otherwise would be to give up on their possibilities of overturning the 1979 NATO decision and splitting the alliance wide open. There would be no serious movement on the core question of an equal outcome from the Soviet side until after NATO had demonstrated the will and the ability to deploy. In the meantime, the Soviets would rely on their negotiating and public relations skills and on the political impact of the anti-nuclear demonstrations on NATO governments to help fashion a favorable outcome. We now know that the Soviet negotiators’ instructions were indeed “mainly to prevent American INF deployments.” And this quote is taken from the book called The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union, and the authors were Alexander G. Savelyev and General Nikolai N. Detinov, my counterpart during these negotiations. In any case, we would need to use our skills to prevent either an outcome which would prevent our deployment or one which would yield a pyrrhic victory.

Without revealing that he was considering going soon to Kuitzinsky with his concept, Nitze outlined parts of what would become his Walk-in-the-Woods-Formula to me. Its main feature was an equal outcome at a number above zero with the U.S. deploying only cruise missiles.
While we would drop Pershing-2, obtaining Soviet agreement to the deployment of the cruise missiles to NATO Europe, would meet our political and military requirements. Moreover, I believed that even if Soviets would not accept any of the U.S. deployment, that the U.S. proposal was imaginative. Its eventual move into the public arena would help us and allied governments in what would become a very important struggle for public support in NATO Europe.

Two days before Nitze and Kuitzinsky took their walk in the woods, Chris and I attended a dinner hosted by Norm Clyne and his wife Alice. Nitze, Kuitzinsky and their wives were among the other invitees. After dinner, Kuitzinsky and I had a serious and for his part gloomy conversation. After going over our respective views of the state of the talks, Kuitzinsky said that he thought the negotiations were heading towards an impasse and that he could see no way out. When I commented that we needed to recognize that the talks were likely to go on for some time, and that what seemed impossible today might be possible tomorrow, Kuitzinsky said he thought hopeful circumstance was unlikely. “In the end, you will deploy and we will walk out in indignation.” Thirty-six hours later, he would walk with Nitze down a path in the Jura.

The round ended soon after the walk in the woods. Nitze had arranged that he and Kuitzinsky would keep in touch while both were back in their respective capitals via a special point of contact in the Soviet Embassy at Washington. As the summer went by without a word from Kuitzinsky, opposition to the concept began to grow within the U.S. administration. The stated concern was that the Soviets would reject the overall approach but then pocket those aspects of it which they liked as concessions that U.S.G., the U.S. Government, had made to U.S.S.R. The opponents to Nitze’s approach considered that allowing the Soviets to retain ballistic missiles while limiting the U.S. to less capable cruise missiles was in effect an unequal qualitative outcome, regardless of the numerical equality. However, it was agreed that if the subject came up when Nitze met with Kuitzinsky in Geneva, or Secretary of State Shultz with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Nitze and Schultz would say that the U.S. had examined the package and considered it to be unequal, because the U.S. was not permitted to have in Europe any missile comparable to the SS-20, it was allowed only slow flying cruise missiles. Nitze and Schultz would note that the U.S. also took exception to that part of the walk-in-the-woods formula which allowed the Soviets to retain 90 SS-20s in the eastern U.S.S.R., which could reach, or be moved into range of targets in NATO Europe. The U.S. was however, prepared to continue to exchanges in the Nitze – Kuitzinsky channel.

Nitze carried out his instructions during his meeting with Kuitzinsky on September 29, 1982. The eve of the formal opening of the round three. Kuitzinsky in turn gave Nitze a short paper which reiterated the main lines of the Soviet position. Full compensation for U.K. and French nuclear forces, no U.S. deployments, no constraints on Soviet INF systems east of the Urals, major reductions in dual capable aircraft, including those on U.S. aircraft carriers, and full adherence to the concept of equality and equal security; a Soviet formulation which sought to provide a philosophical foundation for inequality. Finally, Kuitzinsky told Nitze he would not continue discussions with Nitze in his channel. Moscow had turned down both the substance of what Kuitzinsky and Nitze had agreed to, present to their capitals, as well as the informal channel that gave birth to the proposal. Unfortunately, when inevitably the episode leaked, the media portrayed the issue largely in personal terms, placing emphasis on internecine bureaucratic warfare in Washington. The result was to give the public the impression that it was
Washington’s reaction, not Moscow’s that was mainly responsible for the failure of the walk in the woods. We asked our selves why did Kuitzinsky continue the discussion during the walk with Nitze, even after Nitze said there would be no point in continuing the conversation if Kuitzinsky had no flexibility on third country systems, Nitze did make that point. Why did he take the first step down that path, despite his having forecast, correctly as it turned out, that this phase of the negotiations would end with the U.S. deploying and the Soviets walking out? Neither Nitze nor I asked him. The whole episode left a bad taste in everyone’s mouth, and there was little interest in pursuing motivations in a failed attempt.

The round itself would continue and we would try to make progress towards convergence in some of the secondary areas where both sides had similar positions. But the Soviets held back, arguing essentially that no progress could be made unless the U.S. accepted their basic approach to an agreement. And they began to introduce obstacles to progress, refusing to enter technical discussions to support their assertions on missile and aircraft ranges. They put in some basic new proposals, which were in effect additional variants of their unequal outcome approach. They would have allowed no U.S. deployments to match Soviet missiles, once again ignoring Soviet strategic missiles and virtually eliminating U.S. nuclear capable aircraft. The Soviets also stepped up their threats of countermeasure should NATO proceed with the deployment of U.S. INF missiles. And again, they hinted new deployments of their own, and of walking out of the negotiations.

It’s obvious that Soviets were both seeking to give the impression of a stalemate and creating the reality of one. It’s also obvious, as I had believed from the outset that their real target audience was not their negotiating partners, but rather the European and to some extent the U.S. public. The number and size of anti-deployment demonstrations was attracting wide media attention. The impression was being given of an unstoppable movement. The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance and the course of the Cold War would be determined by how well NATO would respond to this challenge.

While I had had some indirect contact with the peace movement in Europe, my first real contact with the U.S. peace movement occurred in Vermont. We were on home leave from assignment at NATO, it was ’81, when Chris pointed out an article in the Burlington Free Press, that a group of local peace activists were going to hold an anti-nuclear rally which featured a walk from Washington to Moscow, both in this instance being small towns in Vermont. They invited speakers from both the U.S. Department of State and from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The Embassy agreed to send someone but the State Department, short of funds as ever, had declined. Chris said the U.S. government ought not appear afraid to take on a challenge. I agreed and after checking with the department called the organizers and offered to speak. I had of course been working on both the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and the proposal to negotiate limitations on those weapons. I believed that the U.S. and its allies had a logical and sound position. I had put this position to Europeans and was prepared to propound it before an American audience. Chris and some of our children accompanied me to the outdoor rally in Washington, Vermont. There was a fairly large crowd by Vermont standards. It appeared from the banners and placards and comments of the speakers that all were of one mind, opposition to the very idea of nuclear deterrence, support for a nuclear freeze, and unwillingness to see the U.S. and the Soviet Union as equivalent states.
My talk was designed to lay out an alternative proposition, based on the premise that the Reagan administration was serious about providing a strong defense and achieving negotiated reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. It was among the first of many such efforts to persuade the peace movement that the U.S. was determined to enhance its and NATO security by deploying new weapons or negotiating sound and durable arms control agreement or a combination of the two. Arguing, that “Better red than dead” slogan was based on a faulty juxtaposition of alternative. The talk emphasized that with the proper blend of defense and arms control policies we could continue to enjoy both our freedoms and avoid nuclear war. To underscore that there was no equivalency between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, I pointed out that one need not be believer in international conspiracy theory to recognize that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state. To look at its historical record or at least a map, to see a pattern for concern. To recall Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. To be aware of its use of military power to intimidate, and to question the policies of a regime which forces distinguished intellectual and artistic leaders into exile or worse, or refusing to let others leave.

Then to underscore our willingness to negotiate, the talk continued by stressing that this litany does not lead to the conclusion that we should have no contact with the Soviets. Instead I concluded, we must and should seek agreements with them. The only way to achieve successful arms control and reduction agreements was through a long slog of complex, extensive and intensive negotiations backed by the will to be armed. In order to demonstrate that the U.S. administration was far from being isolated in this approach, I cited statements by left-of-center European leaders and others recognizing that a freeze would leave the U.S. at a dangerous disadvantage, especially given the continuing Soviet buildup and understanding that the Soviets would never negotiate with us unless we had missiles of our own. “When the seriousness of our intent becomes clear to the Soviets,” I said, “they will tire of proposals such as those which seek to freeze NATO’s modernization program, before it has begun, while reserving for themselves the advantages of hundreds of deployed SS-20s. They will recognize that what is required in our mutual interest is a serious negotiation, not efforts to achieve one-sided advantage.” I was to return to many of these themes throughout the next several years.

However, while I was still only partly through my speech, some in the audience began shaking their placards and shouting “We’ve heard enough, let’s start marching!” I particularly noted the proverbial energized gray haired woman in sneakers. One of the event organizers whispered to me, “Wrap it up.” I quickly reminded them that they had asked me to speak for 20 minutes and I had prepared my remarks accordingly. At that point a voice called out to “Let the man finish.” And the crowd quieted down until I had finished. The voice it turned out was that of my son Erik, and without prompting from his mother. Afterwards, a few of the audience paid me a backhanded compliment, congratulating me on doing an excellent job defending a bad policy. I would see the placard shaking woman again, several years later, under very different circumstances.

The Burlington Free Press, in reporting on the event, stressed that both I and the Soviet speaker, who gave his talk in Moscow, Vermont, were cut from the same mold, wearing similar clothing and arguing their cases in a similar manner. It was a phenomenon I would encounter again. Unfortunately, an effort to bend over backwards to appear even handed, sometimes ended with
the appearance of establishing moral equivalency between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There was no chance that the Soviet media, or peace organizations, would reciprocate. The event was my first encounter with the American peace movement. The fervor and the evident unwillingness of some of the group to hear or even allow some others to hear differing opinion made a deep impression. It appeared the struggle for public opinion would take place on three fronts: countering the Soviet propaganda directly, seeking the support of the European public, NATO publics, and maintaining the support of the American public. I passed my observations on to colleagues in Washington, many of whom had not been aware of the extent to which the home-grown version of the European peace movement had developed.

Q: We are going to continue with Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations in Geneva, during the time frame 1981-1984. We will take up after the failed walk in the woods.

GLITMAN: The nature of the failure of the walk in the woods, particularly the clear sign that the Soviets would not agree to any approach which would have permitted U.S. deployments, or one which would result in an equal outcome between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., really reinforced my view that no agreement could be reached until we had U.S. INF missiles on the ground in Europe. At the same time, we were determined to negotiate seriously and to be seen doing so. When the third round began, on September 30, 1982, the U.S. delegation continued with the effort to persuade the Soviets to at least acknowledge that NATO had legitimate security concerns as a result of the Soviet INF deployments, and to recognize that the U.S. was prepared to work out an agreement that met both sides’ concerns. We also continued to seek to make progress in those areas where the positions of the sides that had begun to converge, where common language had been agreed in earlier negotiations, or where the sides could move ahead even if they remained deadlocked on key issues. The Soviets, unfortunately, were not really ready for this type of negotiation or to move in that direction.

During this period, the Soviets came up with quite a few seemingly new approaches, new proposals, but it was blatantly apparent to those of us engaged in the negotiations that these were not new, but all variations on a theme. And that theme was essentially that the U.K. and French forces balanced the Soviet forces, and therefore there was no room for the U.S. to have any forces in Europe. It’s again the unequal outcome, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And doubly unequal because the Soviet Union not only had SS-20s to counter British and French forces, it had its entire strategic force in addition which could play that role. But, the Soviets were quite clever in the way they managed to portray these proposals as new positions. We were in a way frustrated. I remember going to several of the SCG meetings during this period and on one occasion I pointed out that it seemed that all of the Soviet proposals could fit on a t-shirt. They were easily turned into a slogan. “Freeze now.” Our reactions, our proposals and our criticisms of their proposals were correct, but they were also much longer. Much more thorough perhaps, but the net result was that the Soviets had a clear propaganda advantage over us.

This lead me to begin considering also whether we needed to move towards a more flexible position, putting out some new concepts. The problem here was somewhat political. President Reagan had formally proposed a zero result, that is no INF missiles for either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. And that was our established position. But it seemed to me that we ought to be able to say, “We will take a lower number, although zero remains our preference.” In other
words, if we don’t get zero, it would be because the Soviets were not prepared to go that far, but that was our preferred outcome. We were prepared to consider an equal number, somewhere below the total of 572 missiles which we planned to deploy. It took a little while to persuade everyone in Washington we needed to do that. But eventually, that did become our position and at that point we were also able, therefore, to show some flexibility. Not a rigid demand for zero, preference for zero but willingness to consider other equal numbers, as long as they were below the 572 number which was the number of our planned deployments. Again, the stress was on equality between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

While we were not able to make as much progress as we wanted to during this period, there were some other areas where we seemed to get a little closer to the Soviets. One of these was on short range INF missiles. Again, during this period in late 1982, fall of ’82, they proposed constraints that would be quantitative in nature and apply only to the missiles between ranges between 500 and 1000 kilometers. That was within our concept as well. We did want collateral constraints. The Soviets also began to move in a familiar direction, when we got into their proposals, they frequently ended up with a freeze proposal. Of course, a freeze in the SRINF would leave us with zero and the Soviets with hundreds. And so we made the point would be a totally unequal outcome and not acceptable.

As a result of our responding to their really unequal outcomes, we began imperceptively to move away from a general concept of some kind of collateral constraints to a conclusion that we had to have an equal outcome in SRINF as we had insisted on in INF. That happened virtually imperceptively to us. Only when I went back and looked at it years later did I see what had happened. I might say, to the best of my recollection, the Soviets never called us on that, that we had sort of shifted our position from collateral constraints not otherwise defined to equality not only in long range INF, but also in SRINF. At the same time, they included in their 500-1000 kilometer range, the SS-12-22 missiles that they had and the Pershing Is which we had and some of which were in the hands of the Germans. We will come to that later on, it would become a major issue. But they continued to deny the very existence of the SS-23, and that missile we will hear about as well in the future as we go through this.

There were also other proposals that the Soviets came up with during this period. One was a sub-ceiling for missiles, we had a ceiling for aircraft and a ceiling for missiles. While it appeared that the sub-ceiling would be set at the level of the U.K. and French forces, it did represent an acknowledgment that the aircraft and missiles should not be treated as equally potent weapons, but the overall result of this proposal was to leave in tact the basic Soviet unequal outcome approach. In addition to these sort of carrots and efforts to appear flexible, the Soviets often had other proposals, and some of them looked rather enticing on the surface. Brezhnev announced a unilateral freeze on SS-20 deployments but that proved short-lived and they moved off of that. When we examined these proposals, they all remained rooted in the fundamental Soviet unequal outcome. No U.S. deployments, equation of Soviet INF with U.K. and French forces, that was the basic aspect of their position and it didn’t change. As I said, I referred to these as variations on a theme. For some reason Kuzitsinsky didn’t like that phrase. I guess the word in Russian is “variant” and it seems to have a pejorative sense, which it doesn’t carry in English. But nonetheless, those were variations on a theme and not anything really new. As I said, these continued adjustments gave the impression of Soviet movement and flexibility. But I did begin
an effort to try to move us to a different position, as I pointed out before, zero was our preferred outcome but we would be willing to consider others.

Finally, while the Soviets had been offering all these alternatives, they also began brandishing some sticks, as well as carrots. And there was a notable increase in the threat of countermeasures which would follow any U.S. deployment. These were clearly designed to frighten European publics. The SCG prepared a document called the “SCG Progress Report.” And this came out about the time of the deployments. And it summed up I felt very clearly, our own, the U.S. INF delegation view on the status of the negotiations at the end of this post walk-in-the-woods round in September of ‘82. It increasingly became apparent that the Soviet effort in Geneva was aimed to a significant extent, if not primarily, at public opinion. The Soviets tabled several variations of the same proposal, all of which would have the same essential outcomes, apparently to position themselves to claim that they have shown flexibility and had offered a range of solutions to the INF problem. At the same time, they increasingly stymied progress on the smallest of issues, in an effort to create the appearance of a negotiating dead lock, the blame for which they attempted to place on the U.S. Their calculation undoubtedly was that such a stalemated negotiation would generate pressure for U.S. concessions and against proceeding with deployments as scheduled. This was published, as I said, by NATO and this represented the view not just of the U.S. but all the allies on the status of the negotiations at this point.

This might be a good time to try to restate somewhat more clearly the basic point that I made earlier about my sense that we needed to move off of the zero approach, and to consider some alternatives which would maintain our fundamental principles, but give us the ability to show some flexibility. I wasn’t alone, most of us on the delegation were somewhat frustrated by the situation because we could see that the Soviets were scoring propaganda points by these variations on their themes. The reaction in Europe was that the Soviets were being flexible and we would shoot them down one by one, but that still didn’t detract from the view that we were somewhat on the defensive.

There are times in negotiation when one must stand firmly on a position. And there are elements of a position which one cannot abandon or compromise without undermining the fundamental premise of one’s approach to negotiation. There are times in negotiation when one can and must demonstrate flexibility by offering alternatives which would not breech the fundamental premises of ones approach to negotiations. To do that, in order to avoid creating a situation outside the negotiations which could prove more harmful to ones interest than a demonstration of flexibility might engender. There are times when one needs to make some changes in the fundamental position in order to come to closure on an outcome which despite the change of position is still basically favorable to one’s interest. I believed even before this round ended that we’d reached such a point.

We had held firmly to the equal-zero approach for a year. It was a strong position and served to underscore the desire of the U.S. and NATO to pursue the ultimate arms control outcome for these negotiations. But the Soviets were proving adapt at making frequent seemingly major shifts and concessions. We were equally adept at proving these moves were smoke and mirrors and represented no change in the basic Soviet position. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the exchange placed us on a defensive. I believed strongly that we needed to show that we too can propose a
change in our basic position. Moreover, Western European political leaders were beginning to suggest that it was becoming time for the U.S. to negotiate a new move of its own.

As I said, I’ve been considering the benefits of offering an interim alternative for some time. Nitze had in effect a proposed one in the walk-in-the-woods formula. While I did not believe that the Soviets would accept any outcome that we might accept, until NATO had demonstrated it could deploy, we would need to take an initiative if we were to hold our own in the public arena. But the initiative need not, indeed ought not, to compromise our basic position of an equal outcome, in this case formulated as equal in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The change could be rather simple. We would continue to express a strong preference for double zero. Now, because of the Soviet unwillingness to go that far, we would propose any number below 572. As I said, that’s the number of U.S. LRINF scheduled to be deployed in Europe. Delegation members collectively and individually carried this concept back to Washington after the end of this round on November 30, 1982.

We also had our traditional end-of-round party. As I said, there was a sense frustration of among the members of the delegation, feeling that the negotiations were treading water at best, and that the Soviets were scoring their propaganda points by their disingenuous policy. The skits and the parodies reflected this. Chris and I did one as well. Chris played Nitze, while I played Kuitzinsky. To the tune of “Let’s take an old fashioned walk” we sang:

I’ll say the idea came from you
You say the concept was mine
Maybe we’ll both end up in the stew
If you get burned, that’s just fine.

Let’s take an old fashioned walk
I’m just bursting with talk
What a tale could be told
If we both took an old fashioned walk.

Kuitzinsky got the last word in this exchange.

When we finally got back to Washington, there was, as expected, resistance to moving off an exclusive zero option approach. The opposition to a change was based in part on the grounds that it was not what the president wanted and this was accompanied by the implication that any deviation would be disloyal. Some argued that the situation was in fact well in hand and we did not need to make any moves. In the end, the agreement was reached that the U.S. position would remain based on the double zero outcome. However, we would be authorized to say that while it was our preferred solution, and surely the best for all concerned, we were prepared to consider alternate outcomes at numbers above zero but below 572. So from here on we were able to come back and show some flexibility on our part. And I am confident it helped us in our public relations as well as internal USG back and forth within the negotiations.

The next round began on January 26, 1983. That was round four. We actually put this proposal out. We also, in saying that we were ready to consider reasonable alternatives, set up five criteria
based, as was our position, essentially on 1979 NATO decision, by which we would judge any proposed outcome. First, an agreement must entail equal rights and limits between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Second, an agreement should address only the systems of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Third, an agreement should apply limits to INF systems, regardless of location and should not result in an exportation of a security problem in Europe to the Far East. This was a way of letting our Japanese and Korean allies know that we were not going to see this situation put them, the outcome of the negotiation, place them in a worse security situation, but preferably in a better one. Fourth, an agreement should not weaken the U.S. contribution to NATO’s conventional deterrence and defense. Side note on that: this was to make sure that we let the Soviets know that we were not going to countenance an agreement that impacted on our conventional aircraft, in their effort to get the nuclear warheads out of the way. And finally, an agreement must be verifiable. The five points covered the key issues for the U.S. and they all essentially harkened back to the ’79 NATO decision, so we kept in sync with our allies on these.

The Soviets chose not to take up our offer to explore the possibility of reaching an agreement at an equal number above zero. Rather, they continued to offer their variations on the principle theme of an outcome at which the Soviet INF systems would be set an a level that would match U.K. and French forces. They made clear that if U.K. and/or France should increase the quality or quantity of their forces, the Soviets would be authorized to increase their LRINF systems in Europe. We expressed a wonderment at how the Soviets could expect the U.S. to participate in such an agreement with them and why the U.K. and France would approve such a scheme. They repeated their positions, occasionally citing the Russian proverb that repetition is the mother of learning. If so, we proved to be unwilling students.

This unproductive round ground on, and perhaps buoyed by the continued anti-nuclear demonstrations, the Soviets in fact displayed even more intransigence and brought to a halt productive work on secondary issues. They also set out their own prerequisites for the main issues. First, an agreement could not entail deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe. In other words, we couldn’t deploy. Second, negotiations must address only the most urgent and acute problems of the situation in Europe. Third, negotiations should encompass all types of medium range systems, land and sea based, aircraft as well as missiles. Fourth, negotiations must take into account British and French forces.

The first one is of course the basic Soviet demand, it essentially claims that the U.S./NATO position is illegitimate and provides no grounds for negotiations. The second one seeks the leave SS-20s in the eastern portion of the Soviet Union free from any limitations and free to attack and intimidate NATO Europe because they had the range to do it. Point three seeks to use the INF negotiations to eviscerate U.S. conventional aviation in Europe. Point four seems to provide a rational for an unequal outcome in which there would be no U.S. deployments in Europe and the U.K. and France would find their entire nuclear force equated with only a small portion of the overall Soviet nuclear arsenal. That’s why we had to go back, just as I did now, point by point, with the Soviets. We were using the same points outside the negotiations, setting out the Soviet position and showing where the flaws were in it.

We were always somewhat on a defensive when we had to do this because we would be coming in this case at a “new” proposal on their part which turned out not to be so new in reality. We did,
as this round drew to a close on March 29, 1983, formally table our interim proposal. And in doing so, we established for all to see that the U.S. and its NATO allies were willing to modify a major element of our initial position; the zero outcome. While the Soviets and the western opponents of the deployment downplayed the move, they could not deny that the U.S. had shown flexibility. That did not however deflect the 500,000 marchers who turned out for an anti-deployment demonstration in West Germany a few days after the round had ended.

On the other hand, and this was a major development, the right-of-center pro-deployment Christian Democratic Union under Helmut Kohl, had defeated the increasingly anti-deployment left-of-center social democrats in elections held on March 30. With a prospect of the Bundestag majority in favor of deployments, the real political situation had in fact improved for NATO and the U.S.

We returned to Geneva on May 17, ’83, for round five. Our delegation had tabled a new draft treaty based on this interim approach, in other words we don’t go to zero immediately, we’ll have this other number with zero as a preferred outcome and hopefully down the line, final outcome. The Soviets, perhaps still pumped up by the continued demonstrations and clearly not mindful of the changed political situation in the Bundestag, refused to participate in the process effectively. We were determined to press ahead, to make progress wherever possible, even if the main issues remained deadlocked. Accordingly, we indicated we could accept collateral constraints on U.S. SRINF missiles and specifically the Pershing-I missile, on a reciprocal basis with similar constraints on Soviet SRINF and we even talked a little about a freeze. By making this proposal, the U.S. had chosen to consider an SRINF freeze in an unequal outcome. This would have been justified because the SRINF constraints were collateral to an agreement on LRINF, which would have been based on an equal outcome. But as I said earlier, we were beginning to move more and more in the direction of insisting on equal outcome in both SRINF and LRINF.

Nevertheless, the Soviets limited their response to their standard argument that no progress could be made on collateral or secondary issues unless the central issue had been resolved. The same response was made to our efforts to move on verification, data exchanges and even on work on the non-controversial elements of the treaty text. Some of these non-controversial elements were boiler-plate that you would find in almost any treaty. Standard language. To my recollection the Soviets did not attempt to use our mid-’80s SRINF proposal as an argument for seeking to obtain an unequal outcome in SRINF when that issue came under serious discussion, later in the negotiations.

The Soviets continued to offer variations on their basic themes. One of these proposals was worth looking at, and you will see why I think that when I get to it. This was a proposal put forward by May 3, ’82, by Soviet Communist Party Secretary General Yuri Andropov. He had succeeded Brezhnev upon the latter’s death in November of ’82. His proposal was to negotiate on the basis of warheads as well as missiles. The keystone of this proposal, which was introduced at the opening of the round, was an equal number for only the Soviet Union’s LRINF warheads and the combined total of all of the warheads of U.K. and French nuclear forces. The Soviets again, demanded the right to increase the size of their LRINF systems, should the U.K. and/or France increase the number of their warheads on their nuclear systems. There was no
room for US deployments and no equal outcome. The absurdity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union signing a treaty whose foundation rested upon the action of non-signatories, who had already stated that they would not be bound by such an agreement, remained as glaring as the fact that what was once again an offer of old wine in a new bottle.

The Soviets also introduced confidence building measures, such as the prior notification of missile launchings and the take offs of large number of aircraft. We did a few things like that, but they refused to participate in the confidence building working group, or to negotiate such measures until major issues were resolved. So they raised it as a possibility, but they didn’t want to talk about it yet. One could conclude that all of these new ideas were meant more for public consumption than for serious negotiation. From the Soviet standpoint, given the great stock they had placed in the peace demonstrators ability to block the deployments and grievously damage NATO, it was understandable that they didn’t wish to let it appear that an agreement might be possible after all. From their standpoint, the worse the situation looked, the better the climate for inducing demonstrations. And indeed, we now know from writings by Soviets who were involved either directly or indirectly in the negotiations, in fact they had the peace movement in mind and there were times when they failed to move ahead in negotiations for fear that they would undercut their friends in the peace movement. It was an important factor.

We also began to sense a change in the Soviets’ demeanor. It was almost as if an order had been given to particularly difficult and unpleasant and a bit imperious. Indeed we, and not just myself but all of us, had come back from a reception, from meetings with them, from post plenary discussions, with this sense that I had just described. They had sort of taken charge. Indeed we had on occasion noted that the Soviets not only follow the same policy line, that was to be expected, but they also seemed to coordinate the personal attitude they would adopt on a given day. These displays of what looked like deliberate efforts at psychological manipulation, did not contribute to developing that degree of trust which even cautious and sometimes cynical negotiators must have in order to work together. In any event, the moment of truth was not far off.

Round six would begin on September 6, 1983. It was quite likely that we would still be in session when the first of the U.S. INF missiles were deployed in Europe. Even before the round began, Andropov on August 26 tried to give an impression of Soviet flexibility by offering to destroy all SS-20 missiles over the number of French and British missiles, if the U.S. did not deploy new missiles in Europe. Most of this will sound familiar and ought not to require any further rebuttal. What appeared new at first blush was the offer to “destroy” SS-20s as part of an agreement. Once we began to prod the Soviets on this point, its newness began to evaporate as they were unable to give clear understanding of precisely what the U.S.S.R. had in mind. It particularly appeared that their proposal would allow them to build and stockpile new missiles without constraints.

A few days before the scheduled opening of the round, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 transport. The U.S. took some steps to underscore abhorrence of this action, nevertheless, while Ambassador Nitze, under instructions, raised the issue with Kuitzinsky during the first meeting of the round, the U.S. did not break off the negotiations. The Soviets did not reciprocate. They emphasized that there could be no agreement if the U.S.
deployed, that any agreement had to take British and French forces into account. And they began to point out that it would be fruitless to negotiate if there were any deployments. To underscore that point, they began to refuse to schedule meetings past October 12 and eventually only on a one by one basis. As the negotiations were clearly moving toward a climatic moment, the U.S. increased the frequency of its consultations with the allies. Thanks to the support of the U.S. Air Force, I was able to attend SCG meetings and visit allied leaders in capitals in Europe and return back to Geneva on the same day. As a consequence we could give the allies timely briefings of the state of the negotiations and receive first hand their reactions and those of Washington officials at the meetings. These close and frequent consultations helped further cement the solidarity among the U.S. and its NATO allies, as we prepared for the arrival of the U.S. missiles in Europe.

One of the consequences of the consultations was the tabling of three new U.S. proposal which we did on the 22nd of September ’83. Within the context of an agreement providing the right to equal levels of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads globally, the U.S. would consider not offsetting the entire worldwide Soviet LRINF deployment by U.S. LRINF. In other words, we had a right to deploy other LRINF elsewhere up to the global level of SS-20 deployments, thus maintaining the principle of an equal global outcome. But we wouldn’t put them all in Europe, so we would be prepared to offset some of the numbers by having them elsewhere. In the context of an agreement involving significant reductions from current Soviet and planned U.S. deployment levels, we said we were prepared for the proportionate reductions between the Pershing-II and the Ground-launched cruise missile in an appropriate manner. This proposal could have met specific Soviet concerns regarding the P-II and while awaiting an appropriate definition, it did indicate U.S. willingness to take those concerns into account. And we finally said that the U.S. would be prepared to explore equal, verifiable limits on specific types of U.S. land based aircraft consistent with the allied criteria for an INF agreement, and that was of course not to have any diminution in equality of our aircraft, both numbers and abilities. We didn’t want to see our conventional forces hurt by this. The U.S. had been less enthusiastic about including aircraft in the negotiations and this was therefore a major move on our part. However, as we noted before, given the size of Soviet airplane inventory, compared with that of the U.S., they were quite likely to face greater reductions down to an equal level than we would. Nevertheless, this offer did move toward their position.

The Soviet reaction to these proposals was swift and negative. They would not discuss any proposals which were based on the deployment of the new U.S. INF systems in Europe. To do so would legitimatize deployments. The U.S. in response to the Soviet reaction noted that we had negotiated while the Soviets were deploying SS-20s, and we pointed out that our positions envisage limiting all LRINF missiles in the context of an equal agreement. But time was getting short and the Soviets must have been aware that we were moving towards the actual physical deployment of these missiles. They remained adamant. There was nothing to discuss as long as the U.S. continued to pursue deployments.

On October 22, well over 1,000,000 people participated in ant-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany, Britain and Italy. Once again, as we now know, the Soviet position was shaped at least in part by their consideration of the role of the peace demonstrators. And once again, the Soviets failed to consider that governing parties at most NATO countries and particularly in basing
countries were supporting deployments. On October 24, the effort to intimidate NATO into abandoning the 1979 decision took an additional step. The Soviets announced that they had begun to deploy nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe and would complete the process if new U.S. missiles were deployed in Western Europe.

October 26, I saw General Secretary Andropov, proposing in a T.V. interview that the U.S.S.R. would reduce SS-20s in Europe to about 120 missiles, each of which carries three warheads. This would bring the SS-20 warhead count to 420, which equates to the number of warheads the Soviets attributed to the U.K. and France. Andropov also offered to freeze SS-20 deployments in the eastern U.S.S.R. and to be flexible as regards aircraft. The package was dependent, however, on no U.S. LRINF deployments in Europe. The following day in Geneva, the Soviets tabled the full TASS article. The details did not make the package any more attractive. The freeze in the east was contingent on a vague “no change in the strategic situation” and would not go into effect until the treaty had entered into force. Until then, they would have time to increase the number of missiles in that region. The offer to reduce SS-20 warheads to combined British and French levels was based on an inflated estimate of the size of those forces. Indeed, the Soviets acknowledged that given their projections, the future growth in British and French growth in warhead numbers, they would not have to reduce any or only few of their SS-20s and could even increase that number as the U.K. and France modernize their forces. The airplane offer was also deeply flawed. Based on their aggregating U.S., U.K., and French aircraft, the Soviets acknowledged that only one type of the non-U.S. aircraft would be affected by the proposed reductions. Meaning that the full rate of the cuts would apply to the U.S. forces. Finally, none of this would be possible if U.S. LRINF missiles were deployed.

With the deployments of GLCMS, Ground-Launched cruise missiles and Pershing-II missiles scheduled to begin in Europe within weeks, the room to maneuver within the negotiation was rather limited, and the number of options had shrunk. But there was still some time left for carrying out the struggle in the public arena, before the Bundestag took its final vote on deployment and the first Pershing-II arrived in West Germany. This took the form of a Soviet ploy to derail the decision. In essence it was another unacceptable equal reductions to an unequal outcome scheme, but with a strange twist. In parallel with the formal negotiations which the sides continued, to exchange views and proposals, an informal channel was opened by Kuitzinsky on Sunday, November 13th, during a meeting with Nitze. The conversation took place in the Geneva Botanical Garden and the resulting episode would be known as the walk-in-the-park.

The Soviet approach involved the U.S. reducing its proposed INF deployments by 572, that is to zero. The Soviets would reduce their INF deployments by an equal amount, that is to a 120 triple warhead SS-20s. The Soviets would not demand any compensation for British and French forces, which would be the subject of future negotiations. However Kuitzinsky added the Soviets wanted the proposal to be made formally by the U.S. Nitze’s reaction was non committal but not promising. He did not believe Washington would accept it and he insisted Kuitzinsky made it clear to Moscow that idea was Kuitzinsky’s and not Nitze’s.

On the next day, November 14, the U.S. announced a proposal that each side limits its LRINF to 420 warheads world-wide, a level which corresponds to the number of warheads which Soviet
Secretary General Andropov had suggested the Soviets would limit themselves in Europe. Also, and this is significant, that day, November 14th, the first cruise missiles arrived at Greenham Commons air base in the United Kingdom, under the angry eyes of the woman peace demonstrators who had been camping out at the sight for some time. The deployments had begun.

The evening of the 14th, the Soviets, without any explanation, sent to us the traditional end-of-round farewell gifts for the U.S. counterparts. But the Soviets continued to participate in the negotiations. At a scheduled plenary on November 15, the U.S. formally tabled its 420 warhead proposal. The Soviet reaction was negative. Our proposal while meeting the oft repeated Soviet call for equal reductions, allowed U.S. deployments. The Soviets equal reductions argument was thus exposed as bogus. What was left was unbending opposition to either eliminating their own INF weapons or to permitting the U.S., on behalf of NATO, to match Soviet warheads at any number from zero on up.

Chris and I had offered to host a reception for Soviet delegation on November 15. The date had been chosen with the GLCM deployments in mind. I had mentioned to Chris that we would, of course, be wondering how the Soviets would react when the first U.S. INF missiles arrived in Europe. She suggested we invite them to a reception timed for the anticipated arrival. If they came, it would suggest that both formal and informal talks could continue at least for a while. If they turned down the invitation or did not show up, we could hold the traditional end-of-round party. The Soviets came. In so doing, and in continuing to negotiate after the GCLMs had arrived in the U.K. they once again demonstrated that their real target was not deployments per se, but rather where the deployments took place and perhaps also the particular missile being deployed. Our conversations with the Soviets reinforced this analysis. It was Germany and the Pershing-II which coincidentally had only been deployed in Germany as replacements for Pershing-I, Germany and Pershing-II, those were at the sensitive core of the Soviet political and military position. The final vote of approval by the Bundestag was yet to take place. Until then the Soviets would stay in Geneva. But I believed that once the Bundestag had given its approval, they would, as Kuitzinsky had predicted at that dinner shortly before the walk-in-the-woods, walk out of the negotiations in indignation.

We kept Washington informed, we have been keeping Washington and through Washington our allies I should say, fully abreast of the Soviet moves, both in the negotiations and in the informal walk-in-the-park channel. Kuitzinsky’s continued effort to suggest that while he had put forth a proposal, Nitze should be seen as the originator had put us on our guard. Thus, when on November 17 the Soviet Ambassador at Bonn, Vladimir Seminov, delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry, claiming that Nitze had put forward an equal reduction scheme, that Moscow had accepted it, but that Washington had turned it down, the Germans and the other allies already had the real story. The Soviets also leaked their story to the press, but here as well, allied spokespersons were ready to refute the false tale. The effort to entrap us failed. Indeed, once exposed their deception backfired.

This lead to another memorable moment in these negotiations. On Saturday, November 19, Nitze asked Kuitzinsky to meet him in our delegation’s offices. There he delivered to Kuitzinsky the official U.S. rejection of the very unequal Soviet proposal to maintain the force of 120 SS-20, with the U.S. INFs set at zero. He also confronted Kuitzinsky with the evidence of Soviet duplicity during the walk-in-the-park episode. At that point, Kuitzinsky got up and walked out of
Nitze’s office. I looked up from my desk, and I saw Kuitzinsky leaving Nitze’s office in a somewhat disoriented daze. I was aware of the message he would receive, but assumed that while he would not like it, he could hardly have expected otherwise. I was surprised therefore by his pale and downcast mien. He seemed to be taking the outcome very personally.

I wondered whether Kuitzinsky felt that the failure of the walk-in-the-park following the failure of the walk-in-the-woods, in which I believed he must have gone well beyond the basic Soviet position of not accepting any U.S. deployments, and even further beyond his prediction to me that the negotiations would ultimately fail, could have deep and negative personal repercussions for him. I escorted him out of the Botanique building. He remained crest-fallen and unusually quiet on the way out except to say, “Everything is finished.” When we reached the front door, the fog was as thick as Kuitzinsky’s gloom. The forecast had called for the clear skies in the mountains. “The sun is probably shining in the Jura,” I said, “perhaps you can take some time off after you file your report and take your wife up there with you.” I never found out if he did.

The time was coming when we would see whether the Soviets really were going to walk out, but there was some activity to take place before that. One of those was a meeting on November 19th of the German Social Democrats holding an internal vote on the INF question. The party voted overwhelmingly to condemn deployment of U.S. LRINF in West Germany. One of the consequences was that the Soviets could really look upon this as a major accomplishment because it demonstrated the extent to which the NATO defense consensus had been broken. Obviously, this was unfortunate, particularly for Helmut Schmidt, who I thought had done a splendid job as Chancellor. But the SPD had clearly taken a move to the left as a result of this. Everyone involved with the INF issue realized that the outcome of the Bundestag debate which would begin on November 21st, would be decisive for the future of the deployments, the negotiations and frankly the alliance. It was a very important moment.

On 22nd of November, I flew to Brussels, to meet with NATO SCG members who had come from their capitals, to gather at this obviously momentous occasion. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare for whatever was going to happen, however it would work out. I was able to give them a first hand status report including our estimate of what would happen next. I pointed out that it had been over a week since GLCMs had arrived in the U.K. and the Soviets had nevertheless continued to meet with us. Again, I emphasized that Germany was the key for the Soviets. I said that NATO members should be ready, by the end of the day, with an agreed allied public position, predicated on the Soviet walk-out, following a positive Bundestag vote for deployment. By the time I got back to Geneva from Brussels that night, the Bundestag had made a decision. The vote was 286 to 226, in favor of deploying Pershing-II and GLCMs on German soil. The next day, the first Pershing-II missile parts arrived in West Germany.

According to our standard negotiating procedures, a plenary was scheduled for that day, the 23rd and in keeping with protocol, Kuitzinsky as a guest would speak first. At Nitze’s suggestion and we put together possible responses based on what the Soviets might say. And we really had sort of three contingencies. One is clear-cut walk-out. Another was a somewhat ambiguous position. And the third basic one, what do we say if to our surprise, they continue to negotiate?
The plenary didn’t take very long when it actually happened. The statement appeared clear although I did sense that there might be a little something there, but nothing sufficient to really change opinions. So basically, Nitze went with the statement we had prepared, which was based on the Soviet walk-out and clearly no prospect for beginning the negotiations again. The Soviet language, as I have said, may have had some possible give-in, but in the end that was it. As usual, I went down the elevator with Kuitzinsky and Detinov, I expressed hope that they would eventually return to the table. Kuitzinsky was not at all hopeful. We got to the front door of the Botanique and were immediately engulfed by a sea of journalists and cameras. I stayed around long enough to hear Kuitzinsky’s comments to the media, which tracked the plenary statement and sought to place the blame for the breakdown on the U.S. I went back upstairs to our delegation meeting room, where the team was already preparing our own statement for the media and our report to Washington.

The next day Andropov made a statement which really closed off any prospect for further talk. He basically said that there was no hope of discussion, talks could only resume when the U.S. missiles withdrew from Europe. And of course, that was an unrealistic demand. The Soviets were in a bit of a quandary at this point. If they continued to negotiate despite the threats they had made and the warnings of negative consequences, they would have been seen as having fully legitimized those deployments and that would have cut the rug out from under the peace movement. Even worse, it would have appeared NATO had successfully called its bluff. The same logic applied to the Soviet statement ending the talks. If they had a softer statement, which held open the prospect of further negotiations without placing an unrealistic demand for withdrawal on us, that would have encouraged strong competition from Soviet hardliners and from those who could argue that a more nuanced Soviet approach would undercut the anti-deployment peace movement. Let me say here, as I may have mentioned earlier, that we now know that in fact these concerns about undercutting the peace movement played a role in Soviet considerations and usually lead to the Soviets taking a harder line, rather then appearing to make concessions to the U.S. which would in their view undercut the peace movement.

The day after the negotiations ended was also Thanksgiving. I spent part of the holiday preparing for a series of briefings which were going to begin on Friday at NATO headquarters and then continuing with allied leaders and media in Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Norway. I should note that at this point that neither Belgium nor the Netherlands had voted yet on deployments. Eventually they would, and they would vote in favor, but there were still two countries that hadn’t taken that final vote. In my view, what this meant was that the negotiations had broken down but the INF battle would continue. We have already seen that the main lines were clear and we understood where the differences lay.

Despite all the problems, I was rather confident that Soviets would eventually return to the negotiating table. If they stayed away, they would be seen as the uncooperative party, while in the meantime the deployments would continue. If they returned to the negotiations, their political flank could be covered while they pursued their efforts to weaken the resolve of those NATO governments who had not yet formally accepted deployments. Although the peace movement had failed to prevent the deployment in Germany, there was still a possibility the Soviets might succeed somewhere else. But there would be no chance of this if the Soviets continued to boycott
the Geneva negotiations. So I was quite persuaded that they would return. And when the moment came, they did. But it did take a little while.

Obviously, eventually we left Geneva. We stayed on a little while, a bit more than a little while; Essentially to demonstrate that the U.S. was prepared to continue negotiating. I traveled from Geneva again on “the circuit,” to lots of conferences, I’d visit different NATO capitals, as the issue continued to bubble. It didn’t go away, to demonstrate and reinforce our determination to continue the negotiations and to get an arms control settlement to this issue. I also realized that we were now going to face another house move. We had, actually, lived in two different places in Geneva during this time that I was discussing. First, Servacerie House, which was under a lease to the U.S. government when we arrived and we stayed in it till the lease ran out. The government was going to have to pay for it anyway. We concluded in the end that the house was probably too far gone to purchase. The grounds were magnificent but the building itself was not in a good state of repair. The rent was probably going to be more then we should pay. So, we felt that the government should not continue the lease. In fact the owners eventually were going to sell. We found another place, not too far away from this area, a smaller house, fairly new and also very pleasant. We would have receptions there for the Soviets, dinners and so on. There was a fair amount of socializing, not nearly as much as you would find in a normal diplomatic situation, or at NATO, but a fair amount with the Soviets. We didn’t do much spreading out beyond that. I think it was a full time job just dealing with the negotiations. I should also point out that we worked very hard within the delegation, as I think I mentioned earlier, to maintain good morale so that certainly was one of the things that sticks with me from that period; And the subsequent time in Geneva. The building of the team was very important to that work.

We knew we would face another house move after Geneva. Sure enough, it was going to come. That would be to MBFR in Vienna. Mort Abramowitz was the Ambassador at MBFR, head of the delegation, and I guess he wanted a change of venue. He was going to leave, eventually found another position. I think at that point became Assistant Secretary of State for I&R, Intelligence and Research. The left the MBFR job open. That as you know was dealing with conventional weapons and forces in Europe. I think it had been going on for about 13 years when I arrived there. That would be where the next move would come in.

Before I leave Geneva entirely, I guess I should mention a couple of incidents that were kind of amusing, I know because other people have enjoyed them. We had a dog, Hercules was his name, whom we acquired in Brussels. His mother we knew was a malamute, husky, very big dog, and the father was clearly a black lab and there was a large black lab in the area. Chris announced that she was going to take the children over to see this dog, would I want to come along, we knew it was a pup. I realized that there would be no returning from this place without a dog. He was a cute little guy at the time. He grew up to about 100 pounds. And quite a character. One of the amusing things that happened with him was when we had the Soviets, General Detinov, I think, and General Medvedev, and their wives over for dinner. We were living at that house by the lake, and Herkie was underneath the table. The discussion turned to food and somehow or other, Chinese food, and then one of the participants said, “They actually eat dogs in China.” And from underneath the table came “Oughgoughgough.” He understood it! He had a way of being around at receptions and on one occasion one of the Soviet ladies was at a buffet table and she had picked up some kind of a meat dish and was eating it. She would take a bite and put her
hand down, take a bite, put her hand down, but she was putting her hand down in front of his nose. Eventually, he couldn’t resist, she put her hand down and he snatched it away from her. He was a real character and we had him till he died at age 13. He came back to Vermont after traveling around Europe with us, and didn’t live much longer after that. We had a good time with him there.

Q: In your social life in Geneva was there any cause for your folks to be involved with the U.S. mission to the UN European office there? Did you deal with them in any way?

GLITMAN: Only on administrative matters. They really were handling administration for our ACDA activities. ACDA had its own people there, nominally we were working for ACDA, so ACDA had a support staff and they were very good people. They were really very helpful. But the mission also played a role in supporting us, with cars and drivers and that sort of thing. At that point, we were still in Botanique, but when we came back to Geneva, ACDA and the delegations decided that the building was really simply not secure enough, so, like a group of pirates that had left one ship and boarded another, we took over seven floors of the U.S. mission to Geneva, again because of the security issue.

The phone calls that I received from the Secretary Schultz and subsequently from President Reagan telling me that I would be coming back to head the INF delegation were made on the 18th on January and by the 21st of January I had already flown back to Washington and began series of meetings with senior officials, including the president.

Q: This is in 1985?

GLITMAN: 1985. I had a whole weeks worth of those meetings, in which I was preparing for the job and getting ready for hearings as well, which were obviously a part of the process. What I found when I got back was that the negotiations were going to be set up in a somewhat different way than we had carried on during the first set of INF negotiations. For the first set, we had our own INF delegation, our own negotiation. At the same time as we were meeting, the strategic arms reduction talks, START people, that was headed by former General Rowny and the deputy negotiator was Jim Goodby. They were also meeting, but these were two separate negotiations, two separate communication channels. We kept a very similar time-table, maybe we’d start a week earlier than them and end a week earlier, and vice-versa. But essentially, while we were occupying the same office building, essentially they were separate talks.

In the work-up to come back to the negotiating table, the Soviets, Gromyko and others working with Secretary Schultz, ultimately came together with the Soviets on a different approach for this set of new negotiations. The fundamental reason for the difference was the arrival of the Space Defense Initiative, popularly and incorrectly known as Star Wars. The Soviets very leery of that and they made a very strong case that given the relationship between the strategic offense and strategic defense, you really ought to conduct a single negotiation. But they would be prepared to see the talks broken up in three segments, all of which would at the same time try to come together into a final package. And there would therefore be the strategic arms reduction talks, the defense and space talk, dealing with the space defense initiative, and INF. The formula that they agreed upon made it possible to have a grand package but it did not exclude the possibility that there might be separate agreements. I personally believed that in fact, the best way to deal with
the space defense question and the strategic question is to put the two together in some fashion. Because in the end you can have trade offs between, “Alright, if you want so many offensive missiles, that would allow me to have some many defensive missiles,” and vice-versa. So one could get it down to numbers and talk about the balance that each side would have and allow the other side to have between the offensive and defensive systems.

The problem for INF, however, was that it really didn’t fit neatly into this package. There was obviously some relationship because of the overlaying ranges between INF systems and strategic systems, but essentially they did serve different purposes. It was particularly true of the Soviet SS-20. What made it such a politically charged weapon was the fact that from its normal bases, where Soviets were placing them, it really could not strike the U.S. proper. I had mentioned earlier that if they put them in a base way up north they could, but from where they were putting them, they couldn’t strike the U.S., maybe just the corner of Alaska, but essentially not reach too deeply into the U.S. But they could strike Europe and much of Asia. If you look at some of the charts we had prepared to show the range arcs from the SS-20s, a fairly high percentage of human beings were in the range of those weapons. The fact therefore it was the system which the Soviets could tell the Europeans, “We’ve got these weapons, they are for you. The Americans, they can’t protect you in the same way as they could before.” That, we tried, I think as I mentioned before, to persuade the Europeans earlier on that our strategic systems that we had in the region was sufficient to provide deterrence, they were not so sure. We had agreed with them and began the process that lead to the ’79 decision on the deployment and negotiations. But there was still this factor about the 20s that made them particularly politically dangerous, the ability to say that these systems are the ones which the Soviets have and which are capable of striking Europe but are not really a threat to the U.S. That was really an effort to try to break up the linkage that we had between our systems in Europe, our defense of NATO and our strategic forces. It had that effect, the Soviet effort, to split the alliance in a very sensitive way.

That being said, I felt that U.S. SDI deployments were not a particular threat to the Soviet INF missiles, so the link between SDI and INF was not as salient as that between SDI and Strategic Offensive Forces. It would therefore be difficult for us to explain to our NATO allies why an INF agreement was being held up for lack of an agreement on SDI. Particularly when the allies were somewhat skeptical of the concept and the utility of SDI. You see, my concern here was, you could argue that the more issues you had to deal with in the grand package, the more room you had for reaching an agreement. Trading this off against that. The problem here was that we could not and certainly could not be seen as trading off something which was of interest to our allies in the INF area, in order to get something in the strategic side. This would be seen as our leaving them in the lurch, so to speak, and would have enormous political repercussions. So it seemed to me that we really needed to try our best to see if we could not work out a separate arrangement for INF; without having INF held up because of this back and forth on the SDI and strategic side.

In any case, the way that the U.S. delegation was set up reflected the fact that there were these three separate negotiations under one sort of umbrella organization. The responsibility for the conduct of the negotiations in each group appeared clear. It would rest with the chief negotiator for that group, Max Kampelman for the strategic defense group, former Senator John Tower for START and myself for INF. It soon became apparent, that answering the question of how, when
or if to consider and resolve the three subject areas and their relationship was less clear. That
interrelationship came out of the communiqué following Secretary Schultz’s meeting with
Foreign Minister Gromyko which opened the way to resume the negotiations.

Kampelman was designated as head of delegation for the Nuclear and Space Talks, which was
the title given to the umbrella organization. And he carried the additional title of chief of mission.
Tower and I both received ambassadorial rank, as well as Kampelman, but he received the
additional title of chief of mission. This was very beneficial to us in administrative terms,
because it meant that the NST delegation would be afforded the same type of administrative
arrangements as an Embassy. There was a press conference following the announcement of the
U.S. negotiators. Secretary Schultz was asked about the duties of the head of the delegation and
the relationship of the head of the delegation to the specific negotiation. And the question was,
“Would you say then that Senator Tower and Mr. Glatman would report to Mr. Kampelman who
in turn would report to you? Who will report to the president? Is that the chain of command?”
And the Secretary replied that the chain of command is that each of these heads of delegations,
or heads of these groups, would get their instructions directly from the president. Now, process
of developing the instructions for each session is obviously something that we all participate in.
But in the end there will be separate instructions for each one of these talks. And then he said, “I
think it has been very clear to us for quite some time,” and the Soviets had put a lot of emphasis
on this too, “That there are very clear relationships among these different sets of issues. We
expect that it will be important in their conduct that there will be a lot of comparing notes across
different groups. And Ambassador Kampelman on the spot would be the person who’s
responsibility it is to coordinate that and be sort of a convener.” That was how he reacted to
those sorts of questions about how this is going to work. He made clear in that statement that all
of the negotiators would bear responsibility for their negotiations, have their own channel of
communications with Washington, but what would be coordinated and the role of the head of
delegation as a convener was less clear, especially if it turned out there was no grand package to
coordinate. In fact, you could not put together a single arrangement.

As you saw, the head of delegation, in Secretary Schultz’s words, “would convene meetings of
all three groups when and if these were considered desirable.” In practice, while there were two
or three joint plenary sessions per round involving all three groups, we’d all sit at the table, there
was never any real overlap between INF and the other groups, except for the Soviets on-again,
off-again, linking of the INF agreement with a satisfactory conclusion of START and SDI
agreement. The joint plenaries did not have a remarkably positive impact on resolving INF issues
or the START-SDI relationship. Neither John Tower, Ron Lehman, who succeeded Tower as
neither the START negotiator, nor I, considered joint plenaries very useful. We recognized they
were in essence mandated by the Schultz-Gromkyyo agreement, but we did seek to minimize their
content and frequency. Each of the three negotiations were complex and detailed, INF and later
START even more so as the talks drew closer towards a resolution. Putting an agreement
together in even one of the areas would be difficult enough. Trying to trade off concessions
between them, I felt as did Tower and later Lehman, would greatly delay or even block our final
agreement. The Soviets on the other hand were rather anxious to have these joint plenary
meetings. In part because they improved the prospect of embroiling the U.S. and NATO in an
effort to roll up the three negotiations in a grand package, at least, that is my view of it.
One of the reasons that I preferred serving abroad rather than in Washington, was the near constant battles over turf at the seat of the national government. It is not my intention to belabor bureaucratic intricacies, as I have done in a way now, but in this instance the forum had a potential for becoming substance. And I felt very strongly that the manner in which the INF agreement was sought, including its relationship with the strategic and defense and space issues, would have a major impact on many of its elements, and on how it and the process of negotiation was perceived by our allies and the Soviets. As I said, my basic concern was that we not find ourselves in a position where we would be seen at least to have made some sort of trade-off which was not favorable to the allies, in order to obtain something that would be favorable to us. I was conscious, given the way that the negotiations had gone up to this point, that the Soviets would do their best, and they certainly wouldn’t pass up an opportunity to do this, and I believed that they would try to figure out some way to achieve this result. As I’ve tried to make clear before, INF was probably more of a political issue than an arms control issue. The basic issue at stake was the future of the alliance, and solidarity of the alliance. And up until this point we had been doing rather well. I think on the very day that the talks had reopened in Geneva, that the Belgian parliament accepted the deployments. Only the Dutch Parliament had yet to act.

I had differences with Kampelman, and they were real, in this whole question of a separate INF negotiation or a grand package. They were purely substantive and by no means personal. I liked him very much and had great respect for his abilities. I saw him at work and particularly I remember one occasion when a group of Senators were visiting us and they got into a discussion about some problem they were having on defense and space issues in the Congress, in the Senate. And Max, brilliantly, listened to both sides and then came together with a way they could compromise their differences. He was an excellent mediator. But on this issue, we just had different views. He told me and General William Burns, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member of the INF group, that he didn’t think we would ever get a separate INF agreement; that the grand package was the only way to resolve this. I felt differently. But I had to work within the arrangements that were made. He was the head of the delegation, it was set up the way it was set up. But at the same time, I would do my best to see whether we could move ahead separately if possible. Because there was no bar to that. So that was just a difference of opinion on how best to move ahead on this area. In the end, I know he came around to the view that a separate INF agreement was possible and the way to go. But at this juncture, as we began the talks, there were these differences. Again I want to emphasize, they were not personal. The personal side was good.

In any case, we had to work with these sort of differences. There was a hope of continuing the negotiations by the three individual groups and those who thought that we could arrive at a grand package, continued working in that direction. I certainly did my best and emphasized the separate nature of INF. I preferred to hold the whole so-called social events, which were a continuation of negotiations in a different format, with the Soviet INF members, rather than encourage large group meetings. I felt, it didn’t seem very practical for all three groups to meet socially, because I certainly would not expect someone from the INF team to go ahead and try to informally begin negotiating with someone from the Soviet START team, and vice-versa. So we tried to work on social events with the Soviet INF team, so we could carry-on our negotiations in a somewhat more informal way. Hopefully finding some way to open possibilities to reach an
agreement. During the first week of negotiations, I met alone for lunch with my Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Alexi Obukhov.

I might say a word now about Obukhov. He had a reputation as a younger officer, when he was dealing with the SALT negotiations, for being a very forthcoming, open-minded, flexible fellow, but subsequently, those who dealt with him during the first set of negotiations, the START negotiations that ended up in ’83, Soviets walked out of START just as they walked out of INF, so Obukhov was dealing with START during that period. His reputation after that time was quite different. He was extremely cautious, very careful, he didn’t seem to want to engage in any what-if type things. He had tendency to be rather long-winded as well. In any case, he was the man that I sat across from throughout most of this period. There were periods when someone else would come in and take his place, but he was there most of the time.

Q: Did you get to know his family, have any kind of relationship with him socially?

GLITMAN: No. His wife was there, and we did meet her. He did not have any youngsters with him. I know that he had some. Perhaps an anecdote or two will sort of capsulate my difficulty I had dealing with him, as I saw them.

One was during one of our early meetings. I suggested to him that it might be interesting Ambassador to see how the world would look from another capital. I said, for example, if you were sitting in an Eastern European capital, and looked out and saw the Soviet Union, you might very well see a huge, powerful country, one with which you had had difficulties in history. On the other hand, I could see, if you were sitting in Moscow, looking out over the world, you would see on all sides countries who at one time or another invaded you. He got very angry. I said, “Can you not put yourself in someone else’s shoes that way? Try to put yourself in our shoes, or our European ally shoes. I just put my self in your shoes, I can see how you look at the world.” And he said. “That’s very unprofessional. I would have expected that from a political appointee, but not from a career officer.” I was dumbfounded. Anyway, that was one example.

The other was a little more humorous. Ambassador John Woodworth, my deputy and also the Defense Department representative on our delegation and I, would have once a week, or every so often, a lunch with Ambassador Obukhov and General Medvedev, who had been in the earlier negotiation, as had John. At one of those lunches I thought, “why don’t we go to a Chinese restaurant?” I must admit there was a little mischievousness in selecting the Chinese restaurant, because the Soviets and the Chinese were having some difficulties at the time. So okay, I plead guilty to that. But I thought it would be interesting change anyway. We went to this Chinese restaurant. As we sat down, I think neither he nor General Medvedev seemed to have much knowledge of Chinese food, I am certainly no expert, but anyway, we ordered the meal. Then I said, “Well, what to drink? I hear beer goes very well with Chinese food. And they have Tsing Tao beer here,” which is Chinese beer, and it’s quite good. Why don’t you try some of that?” He said, “No, no, I don’t want that. I’ll have a Cardinal,” which was a Swiss beer. I tried once more and I said, “This Tsing Tao brewery was built by the Germans, who also know a lot about beer making. It is Chinese owned now. I’ve had it and it’s good.” And he said, “No. I never try anything I haven’t had before.”
We did actually have some very serious discussions, obviously. Most of them were serious. I wish we could have had a little more humor in them. During one of those early luncheons with him, I tried something out. I said, “Look. I could see the logic (in linkage), I think I may see the link between the strategic and the defense questions, but it wasn’t as compelling in INF.” And he came back in a rather didactic manner, which I had been told to expect, and said that logic had some merits but there were other ways of considering what was logical. Then I asked him “Would the Soviet Union agree to a separate INF treaty in a situation where the U.S. had accepted the Soviet position in INF?” In other words, “We accept your INF position, would you then agree on a separate treaty?” And he thought about it and allowed that in such an unlikely event, it probably would. His reply carried with it the implication that the same conclusion would logically apply in the case where the two sides had reached a mutually acceptable agreement. With that point made, I did not belabor it further. But that conversation and his response left me with a distinct impression that the Soviets could, and ultimately would, accept a separate INF agreement. Part of my sense that this would be necessary, again on the political side, was that we could find ourselves at a point in the negotiations where their unwillingness to accept what our allies and allied populations agreed, was a very generous offer, very fair offer from us, and for them to turn it down because of a link to SDI or START would then be held against them. So that sort of strengthened my sense that we could probably achieve this.

Again, as the talks proceeded, there were some indications that there might be a possible shift in the Soviet policy on this. Some of it, I admit it, is grasping at straws in a way, but this was from a Pravda editorial, I won’t go into all the details, but I could see that in the editorial there were rather sharp distinctions drawn between the linkage between the SDI and START and the linkage with INF. There was a phrase, for example, “INF could be self-contained” and related INF to the situation in the European continent and outside of it. But they didn’t mention linkage to SDI in the editorial. But Pravda editorials are one thing. Statements by the leader of the country is another. During Gorbachev’s October ‘85 visit to Paris, he spoke of the possibility of a separate INF agreement. He said something like, “Concerning medium range nuclear weapons in Europe, with the aim of making easier agreement, we consider it possible to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, outside of direct connection with the problem of space and strategic arms.” This road, as it appears, turned out to be practical. That was a breakthrough in a sense. The Soviets would, after that speech, sometimes reinforce the idea of a separate INF agreement and we have Gorbachev doing that, and in other times they may pull it back. As the negotiations develop, we are going to see, on more than one occasion, where Gorbachev says something which would have moved the talks forward, and then suddenly later on it gets pulled back again. This was beginning of that. As I said, we’ll see later on as I go through this I will be able to show you other examples.

Indeed, in this instance, January 16, ’86, Gorbachev made a very major speech on the whole broad arms control approach. I would say it was one of the best pieces of work the Soviets did in this era. It was very comprehensive, very compelling, you really needed to know the intricacies of the negotiation to find the flaws in it. But, they were there. It was a well done job by them.

In this speech, Gorbachev seemed to put linkage back into effect. In other words, he referred to the settlement of the SDI question as a precondition for moving ahead on his proposal on eliminating all offensive nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It was a major thing then. All
offensive weapons out by 2000. The specific linkage with SDI was contained in a sweeping proposal dealing with nuclear arms, which can reach each other’s territories, that is strategic arms. A separate portion of the speech called for the complete liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium range missiles in the European zone. Again, this is a zero coming out from their side, but limited to the European zone, and as we’ve seen, the Soviet SS-20s outside of Europe were still capable of hitting targets in most of NATO Europe.

And then, after January 16, there was a press conference and one of the Soviet deputy Foreign Ministers, Korniyenko, made clear that the fate of SDI would apply to INF. Korniyenko had a reputation as a very hard liner and again, sensed that Gorbachev talks a bit about linkage, but it’s someone else who comes in and really makes a strong case that there will be linkage. My feeling at that point was that the linkage issue was a non-winner for them. And that they would ultimately drop it, so it was merely a matter of time before they would come back to what Gorbachev had said in Paris.

Let me see if I can run through linking and de-linking that had occurred during this period of certain years. I noted they started out linking, then in the ’85 visit to Paris we had Gorbachev’s de-linking, then on January of ’86 a re-linking, and then again on February of ’86 Gorbachev used the media-worthy event of a visit by Senator Ted Kennedy to suggest once again that a separate INF treaty was possible. Then on February 25th Gorbachev announced that the Star Wars program must not be allowed to be used both as a stimulus for a further arms race and as an obstruction on a road to radical disarmament. There he seemed to be de-linking it again. That de-linking would last until the Reykjavik summit, and at the Reykjavik summit, the Soviets once again re-linked. I was confident that in the end they were going to have to de-link. The political negatives of their trying to tie up INF with SDI and START were going to be so strong that they would back off in the end. And in fact they did.

That was on February 28th of 1987. On that date, Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union “proposes taking the problem of medium range missiles in Europe out of the block of issues and concluding a separate agreement on this subject.” Gorbachev also notes that de-linkage would remove, and this is a very important point to make, de-linkage would remove much of the nuclear burden from our common home, which is Europe. This became a major theme for Gorbachev at this point. “Our common European home.” And guess who doesn’t live in that home? That’s right, the U.S. is outside of this picture. In his memoirs, Gorbachev later says, “Well, I didn’t mean to exclude the U.S.” But I think it is clear from the way this began that this was his move in that direction. And this has broad strategic significance as well, in the sense of political policy. He is backing off of the hard-nosed line. He is seeing, rightly, that he can be more effective by taking a warm approach, than by a cold one. You could see once he took over, even before maturing in this common European home theme, that he was, all these initiatives that he took after January 16 and so on, this was part of a war of maneuver. This was a war of movement on his side. He hadn’t given up the objective, but he was pursuing it by showing in a sense a very real flexibility. Again, we can find flaws in what he was saying, from our standpoint, but he was very good at portraying this willingness to move forward. Perestroika, democratization, openness, etc. All of these slogans were designed not only to have an impact internally but also to send a message out to the Europeans and particularly the NATO Europeans. So, this “common home” theme fits, and this is an example why in my view there would be no
further re-linking. This fact was happily recognized and supported by all on the SDI delegations. President Reagan welcomed this announcement. He made reference to the European political aspect of this event by stressing the importance of close cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies. And I’ll quote this because I got this in my notes here. “As we proceed, it is well to remember that nothing is more important to the cause of peace then the credibility of our commitment to NATO and our other allies and the vitality of these alliances of free nations.” The President’s statement was well attuned to the “common European home” theme and presented our side. But this was a qualitative change in the discussion at this junction. We were going to get a treaty and this was the beginning of a sign that we may get that treaty, but the contest is not over. The contest is seen, basically as the Soviets trying to split the alliance or to move the allies closer to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had not given up on that.

With the agreement on a separate INF treaty, we also had to turn to some other issues and I want to work our way through some of those. But before I do that, I should have mentioned earlier, one of the things that set the INF group apart from how the U.S. has put forward negotiating teams in the past. That was the continuity we had. The people who were involved in the first set of negotiations, obviously Ambassador Nitze, myself, John Woodworth, the Department of Defense Representative General William Burns, the JSC representative, three key players, and people from ACDA, various people, Fisher and others at different times. Our lawyers were also from ACDA, Tom Graham and Karen Lawson at the time, now Karen Lock. These same people came back to the INF negotiations where we reopened. Nitze left and I took over as a head of the group, but General Burns was there and John Woodworth was there, Tom Graham, like so many others, Lucas Fisher, Stan Riveles, I’d better stop because I will leave somebody out, and I already have, but it made a difference. Usually the Soviets kept the continuity and we changed the teams, but in this instance we had the same folks. So there was no breaking-in period, we all knew each other, we all worked together, we all had the same memories of what had happened in the past, and we could build on those. It really made a tremendous difference. I should add that not only did this team have continuity, but these were very, very able people. All of them. We had put together a wonderful group. Good back-stopping in Washington as well, and also a degree of continuity there.

The other point that I think I should make is, I mentioned and I will probably mention again, the numbers of trips that I made to NATO capitals during this period. I have already commented that the Air Force made much of this possible. But I also want to emphasize the importance of the assistance I received from the American Embassies on these visits. They were the ones who would select the journalists that I ought to meet, they were the ones who set up the lunches or the dinners or the cocktails or whatever, the venue of the place, and the ones who would indicate, these are the officials that you really ought to meet and the senior people, and here are some of the more junior ones who are more active on this issue, etc. They made those trips very fruitful for all of us and I appreciated that effort on their part.

I want to talk next about, we are sort of skipping, not necessarily chronological order, I am going to work on this by issues. We dealt with the separate INF treaty now. The next issue that we need to turn to is something we refer to as “Asia and how we got to a global zero.” INF was, as you’ve seen, principally about our relations with our NATO allies. But, it also had an impact on our Asian allies and we did take that into account. It didn’t start out quite like that. There was a
tendency to look at it as essentially a European issue. Fortunately, we had John Woodworth to remind us about Asia. Frequently, when we would start talking about problems we were focusing on how it was going to impact on NATO Europe, for example, the way we would treat SS-20s located east of the Urals and so on, John would be there to remind us that we did in fact have Asian allies, principally Japan and South Korea and that there was also a Chinese impact here, and as a consequence, we were always able to factor Asian considerations into these issues. Because, John would be there to say, “Hey, don’t forget this.” After a while he didn’t have to say that any longer, we all were tuned to that as an issue.

As the negotiations went on, our policy line also began to broaden to make Asian concerns an important part of the argument that INF treaty needed a global basis, that it would be better to deal with limitations on these weapons not just as they apply to Europe, but indeed globally. No matter where they were deployed, they really ought to be eliminated. That was a major step, because I don’t think there had been many instances before in arms control history where, for example, you looked at chemical and biological weapons, but no real program to actually carry out this elimination. They were to be banned, but this was basically going to eliminate them, and no more production, no more testing, no more missiles. Our feeling, belief was that it would be easier to make the agreement durable and sound if the ban, the elimination took place on global basis. And it had a side effect of making clear to the Asian allies and friends the benefit from this treaty as well as our European allies and friends.

In any case, the Soviets began most of their deployment in the European side, but as the negotiations went on, we saw more and more new deployments, new bases being set up in the east. I think someone had estimated that the SS-20 could target 62% of the world’s population, including all of Europe, China, the Middle East, the Near East, most of India, much of South-East Asia and a large portion of northern Africa. And yet, they were not, strictly speaking, strategic weapons, they could not reach 5500 kilometers, which is the beginning range for strategic weapons. They were a different category, but as you can see, they needed control. Because of the impact they had on security and stability across a large part of the world.

We began fairly early on in the process to explore a little bit with the Soviets, what might be done, explicitly in behalf of Asia, as opposed to eliminating them as a consequence of eliminating weapons, 20s that were capable of striking Europe, that would obviously have some impact on the 20s not being there, therefore they would not be able to strike some of these other targets in say North Africa or Middle East. So we began to think about how to bring Soviet-Asian INF missiles into an agreement. I would probe my Soviet counterparts on their views of the political aspects of INF in Asia and particularly China’s role in this equation. They were very leery of even discussing the subject. Only General Nikolai Detinov, who was my counterpart in the first set of negotiations, was prepared to engage on this topic, and his comments, while elliptical, left me with an impression that a deeply ingrained Soviet concern rooted on fear over China would be a factor in their decision, on whether and to what extent, they would be prepared to reduce their Asian INF missiles in the context of a bilateral negotiation with us. And, interestingly enough, one of the Soviet interpreters, Pavel Pavlishenko, wrote some memoirs, after the INF treaty. He ended up being an interpreter for Shevardnadze and then Gorbachev, very able man. He noted in his book that fear of China was widely spread in Soviet Union, and this is a quote from his book “including the country’s leaders” and “it often reached the point of
hysteria.” That was very telling. As I said, I sensed that from my discussion, it was interesting to have it confirmed. But you can see how that impacted on their seeing what we were doing, trying to reduce the SS-20s in Asia, and from there, while NATO concerns remained in the forefront, but increasingly Japan and South Korea came into the picture, we had our eyes open to the fact. Now from a Soviet stand-point, it would have been China that they would have been most concerned about. So, trying to get them to go to zero globally was not going to be easy.

There was one other great advantage in going to zero globally. And that was, verification would be far easier to carry out. If you allow 100 large missile systems, you have to make sure that the next one you see is not the 101st. And we had come up with all kinds of technical ways of trying to deal with this. One was tags. These would be sort of like a license plate that you couldn’t fiddle with, that you couldn’t remove. And these would be placed on Soviet launchers. On ours too. And then when the inspectors came, they would run some kind of electric beam over it, and they would say, “This is the right tag for this vehicle, fine.” Or if they didn’t they’d say, “Something is wrong here.” We were looking at things like that. Actually we even produced a couple of models, I was given one of those tags as a sort of a memento after this was all over. But we wouldn’t need those if there was zero. Because if you see one, it’s a violation. There is no question this is 104th, it is a missile launcher. That would make it much easier to do and that would reduce the amount of control, the number of inspections we would need, and so forth. That was a big plus from going to zero. We did anticipate that verification would be a major issue during the Senate hearings on the treaty, as indeed it turned out to be.

The Soviets eventually began to get the sense that the political nature of this issue for them was as well, with countries in Asia and Europe, and one sign of that was a proposal in October of ’83 by Soviet General Secretary Andropov, which added to one of the many proposals to reduce SS-20s, to match the Soviet count with British and French war heads, we’ve seen that constant theme. But he added to that and offered to freeze a number of SS-20s in Asia, as long as the U.S. deploys no similar weapons in the region. But it really wouldn’t be until Gorbachev took over the reigns, that the Soviets began a more serious effort to improve relations with the Asians; and to recognize how their INF deployments in Asia impacted on that effort. They walked out of the negotiations before we had any real exploration of INF in Asia, let alone any practice, but when they came back to Geneva, that issue came back with them. And here we were looking at their deployment pattern and we could see that the Asian element took on growing importance after the negotiations resumed.

One of the things we did in the INF negotiations, it’s been done before, but we set up a Senate and House Observer Group. Senate Observer Group was headed up by Senator Ted Stephens of Alaska. He was a co-chair I think along with Senator Nunn. The fact that he was from Alaska, also played a role in focusing our attention on Soviet Asian SS-20 deployments. He lost no time in reminding us that the SS-20s could reach portions of his state. Keeping him abreast of our efforts to obtain reductions and eventually the elimination of SS-20s in Asia, I encouraged him to take his concerns to the Soviets during his frequent visits to Geneva. And let me say a moment here about the Observer Group. We had visitors frequently during the first set of negotiations which ended with Soviet walk-out. But when we came back in ’85 the Senate and then the House, set up sort of formal observer group. And Senator Stephens was a co-chair, as I said, with Senator Nunn on the Senate side. I am pretty sure it was Senator Nunn, I am positive about
Senator Stephens. They would come over, at least once during every round and join us. I had an earlier experience with congressional staff, that made me really very leery of this operation at first. That experience, just briefly, involved Senate and House staffers, joining us in our negotiation, I think it was with Argentina. It was a bizarre sort of situation, where the administration was negotiating with the Argentineans, and the Senate staffers were in the room and as the discussion began the staffers joined in, effectively becoming a part of the negotiation. It wasn’t clear who they were speaking for. In fact, they began to argue amongst themselves, whether this or that might be the result and it occurred to me at that point that this is why you have an administration, an executive branch to do the negotiating, because the House and the Senate are too large and too unwieldy bodies to conduct negotiation. As I said, they were arguing amongst themselves about what they should be doing, in front of the Argentineans. As I say, it lead me to a realization that this is a dangerous thing. This Senate and House group never did that. There was only one example, and I am not going to say who it was, when they sort of said something, and I felt in was injurious to the position that we were taking. Otherwise, I thought that they were very helpful, they were not in Geneva on vacation, they worked, we did not invite them to the plenary meetings, but they had ample opportunities at receptions and at dinners to sit down with the Soviet negotiators and discuss issues with them. Obviously, we would brief them before every event, so that they would have an idea of where we were coming from, where we were at in negotiations, what our goals were, how we would try practically to move things. In this instance, I don’t think there was ever, except for that one exception early on, any problem. On the contrary, Stephens’ was very helpful. And I in fact encouraged him to make his concerns known. He saw were we were coming from; where we were working together towards the same goal. I think they played a useful role.

Another item had occurred, which made dealing with the situation all the more urgent. In August of 1986, we had a series of meetings with the Soviets outside of the Geneva negotiations, and this involved people from capitals, Washington and Moscow, and chief negotiators on both the U.S. and Soviet side. The first meeting was held in Moscow and it was supposed to go through all three negotiations. And let me just concentrate on the INF portion of it. The most important part of the Moscow meeting was a question that General Chernov, who was the Soviet Defense Ministry’s lead individual for arms control, asked of me. It sort of came out of a blue, it didn’t follow any sequence. He said, “Would you be willing to accept an outcome in which there were 100 missiles left in Europe?” I had to think about it for a moment, everyone looked at me because the question was addressed to me and they expected me to answer. Fortunately I had a pretty good idea at what point we still had a viable military force, so I went ahead and said, “Yes.” Then I asked him a couple other question. First one was, “We are talking about U.S. and Soviet systems, but nobody else’s, no British, no French?” And he said, “That’s correct.” Then I said, “Secondly, this is not going to impact British or French in any way what so ever?” And they said, “Yes, that’s correct.” And I said, “Well then probably, we could work something out.”

And when we came back, the Reykjavik summit had been set up. We came back from Moscow. We had preparation meetings and I was able to say for INF I anticipated that we would hear from the Soviets something along these lines, 100 in Europe, and we’d have to determine what the right number would be for Asia, and my thinking was that it would have to be a proportional cut. So whatever proportional cuts we took in Europe, that same proportion would be cut, if it was 50% cut in Europe, it would be 50% cut in Asia, and we would have to look at our own numbers.
to adjust accordingly. What happened in Reykjavik was a variation on this. I won’t go through the negotiation itself, between the president and Gorbachev, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. But what came out of it was an agreement to have zero in Europe and 100 elsewhere in the world. That was where they were at. The problem at that junction is, we don’t have anything in Asia. So that would have allowed the Soviets to have that hundred, but for our part, we didn’t have any deployments planned, so we might find ourselves in a situation, and there were possibilities where it might be placed in Alaska, but that was also an issue that hadn’t been broached. We were certainly prepared when we got to Reykjavik to deal with 100 in Europe number and leave open the question in Asia, but this came as quite a surprise I have to say, the way it worked out. We were ready for something, but this twist was unusual. Not anticipated by us. I am not sure it was anticipated by the Soviets either. This was Gorbachev just moving in that direction. That left us with the question as to how we get down to zero. I began to look around for ways for some kind of leverage, that could keep open the prospects of deployment somewhere in Asia, but that was not very likely, and there was the possibility of Alaska, but that was sort of lost in several ways. Some of the positions that we had taken, and others had taken on the fringes of the negotiation, concerning the possibility of our deployment in Alaska suggested that there was not any support. I think the Soviets were probably aware of that. So we needed to find some other way.

But the basic arrangement, especially the willingness to drop the British and French that we heard from Chervov, struck me as really significant. This was one of the toughest issues that we had faced in the negotiation, and at this point it looked as if this issue was now going to be resolved and in a way which would not in fact put the British and French missiles on our side of the ledger. So the issue now was could we get to global zero at this point. I have already pointed out the advantages to us, verification simplification, etc. that would flow if we could get a double, global zero.

There were some other caveats that came in at this point. The Soviets continued to try to affect the mix between the GLCMS and Pershings and so on. We said that we were prepared to discuss the mix, but Pershing was going to be part of the force one way or the other. I also went back to this, as I mentioned earlier we tried this equal percentage reductions approach when this was done with Chervov, but again when the President, Gorbachev, Shultz, and Shevardnadze were together at Reykjavik, all that sort of got pushed aside and we were left with how to get the remaining 100 out, what that would take. It occurred to me that there were some pretty good arguments to deal with this. Around this time, Gorbachev began a campaign to show that the Soviet Union wanted friendlier relations with Asian countries, in particular with China. I, in effect, said to Obukhov, during some of the negotiating sessions, “You know, you are taking a position that you want to improve relations with Asia, then you really need to take a good hard look at your position to keep 100 missiles in Asia and zero in Europe. You know, it looks as in fact you are favoring Europe over Asia.” I wasn’t too subtle about the way I phrased this. I wanted them to recognize that there was an incompatibility there between seeking better relations and keeping the 100 missiles.

Let’s pick up on getting rid of the remaining 100 missiles which would have been in Soviet Asia, and we would theoretically have been able to put some in Alaska. There was a place in Alaska where cruise missiles could have reached Soviet targets. Out aim was to try to get it down to zero.
I kept pressing the case for zero, noting that the world and especially the Asian nations would know that it was the Soviet Union alone that was preventing the removal of the INF threat from the region. And that everyone knew that we were ready to go to zero. But the Soviets, I think, really had an abiding concern for the security situation in Asia. That concern remained an impediment to an agreement to reach global zero. So we began thinking if there was some kind of additional sweetener which might provide an impetus to move to zero. And fortuitously, one appeared. A little complicated, but here is the essence of it.

While we had agreed to zero level for LRINF in Europe, established patterns of cooperation, sometimes called “patterns of cooperation,” POC, involving nuclear weapons provided to our allies were not effected. The argument we made there was that we have effectively signed contracts with our allies, to support their nuclear programs, that we did provide them with nuclear weapons which they would place on their airplanes or in case of Germany on their Pershing missiles, and that would bind us together in this nuclear world. It was a way of sharing the responsibilities of being a nuclear power. And those responsibilities included, obviously, being a target. That linked the U.S. strategic force directly to the allies’ nuclear forces. That was called the linkage issue. And that was another way of assuring them that we were in it together with them. That if there was going to be a war we would all be in it, it wouldn’t necessarily be fought only in Europe and it would not only be fought over the heads of Europeans. We would be in it together and that was how we would deter it from happening because the Soviets would recognize that they would have to take on the whole alliance. In any case, that was really what these patterns of cooperation were involved in.

The Federal Republic of Germany had purchased and deployed U.S. manufactured Pershing IA missiles, for which the U.S. provided nuclear warheads. It was technically possible to upgrade a Pershing IA by converting the first stage of the Pershing II missile into what would be called a Pershing IB. Pershing II had two stages. Basically, you drop off the second stage and what you are left with is another missile. A new missile which we would call Pershing IB. It would be much longer in range than the IA which was roughly I think 700, less than 1000 kilometers. It’s improvement wouldn’t be so much in range, however, in all the electronics which would be new, the guidance would also be new. It would be qualitatively an improved missile. And since under the INF agreement we were going to have to destroy a lot of our Pershing IIs, all of them would have to be destroyed if we went to zero globally, we had these Pershing IIs there, you can eliminate the missile, it ceases to exist by removing that second stage and converting it to IB. We argued, this was elimination. There was no more Pershing II.

The Soviets didn’t like that argument. They were quite concerned about the Pershing IB. They let us know that. Time and again they would raise this. Our concern was that we were not going to upset the contract that we had with the Germans, the POC, in a context of a bilateral negotiation. That contract had been in effect for decades so we had a very delicate problem here. But the Soviets were quite concerned about the PIB. So what I was looking at was some way to put these things together. Their concern was the potential conversion; ours was the desire to get zero LRINF missiles.

In time we began to hear from the Germans that prospects for this conversion were dim at best. And they were concerned for a number of reasons. First, they didn’t want to be singularized. In
other words, they didn’t want to be the only country holding significant INF systems in Europe following an INF treaty. And second, they didn’t want to give the Soviet elements in their domestic body politic a high profile focal point for attacking the government of the Federal Republic. In other words, everyone else has gotten rid of their INF missiles in such a world, why are we still keeping ours in Germany? So you can see the political pressures were there, not to go ahead and accept this PIB. Nevertheless the Germans were going to be our good allies, and certainly not damage either the alliance negotiating position or NATO’s military posture, should the INF negotiations fail. We didn’t want this issue to be a treaty breaker, nor I believe did the Germans want to open another debate over the deployment of nuclear weapon system. If they were to remain a nuclear weapon power, their missile force would, without conversion, be obsolete. The Pershing IA was clearly obsolescent at this point. I don’t want to say that it was useless or ineffective, but it was not state of the art.

The near certainty that conversion would not take place seemed to me to provide an opportunity to trade off our agreement to forgo conversion of the German Pershing in return for a Soviet willingness to join us in a global zero. I contacted Washington and laid out the basic proposition and suggested that I float it past the Soviets as a personal idea, which at that point it was. If it elicited interest we could follow up by making it more concrete, and if the Soviets treated it as a non-starter we could drop it. And in any case, I could be disowned. I got a general green light. I met with Obukhov around this time, June 1st, to be precise, of ’87. We had a conversation. He began to hint about this and I began to hint about it. It was clear to me that there were some possibilities here. I asked him if he’d be prepared to go a little deeper on some of the points he raised. He was interested to know whether we would also agree not to convert the ground launched cruise missiles, the GLCM, to the sea launched cruise missiles, the SLCM. At that point I said, “Are you ready to talk informally now?” And he said, “Not yet.” So we couldn’t go any further on that discussion. He said he would make a sign when he was ready to go further. I took this as being possible therefore.

Shortly afterwards the Soviets told us that Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, I think I mentioned him before, was the man who asked those questions about 100 missiles in Europe at the meeting in Moscow. They told us he’d be visiting Geneva. This really provided an exceptional opportunity to put this concept directly to a Moscow player. The first meeting I had with Chervov took place on June 17. It was a luncheon meeting. General Medvedev was there, Ambassador Obukhov was there, and John Woodworth on our side with me. I think that was the main group that we had there. And the interpreters. The luncheon danced around this issue. He was clearly interested in it. And in fact kind of raised it himself, brought it up almost as I was going to. So we kind of came together on this. The sticking point was the German Pershings and POC. The Soviets were quite opposed to allowing that program to continue; even if it had been in existence for years. They felt that it was going to be unjust for everyone to stop having these weapons except for the West Germans, who would be able to have PIB if we insisted on the POC. Otherwise, it looked as if we would be in a pretty good shape. But that was a big stumbling block. But the atmosphere was good. My broad hints that we needed to find trade-offs were well received, as were his. He said he would be leaving on Saturday, the 20th of June in the morning, and would be prepared to talk again with me. I informed Washington about that planned meeting and set up the talking points I intended to use for it. I was given an informal go-ahead on a
secure line, but told to expect a more definitive and detailed response after the U.S. officials had an opportunity to review the talking points more carefully.

There was one comment that Chervov made during that discussion that amused me. He said that the U.S. approach contains logic and he said “I’m in favor of the U.S. side.” I am not sure how to take that. Again, this was not an angry meeting, this was one of the better ones we had. He did sum up his understanding of our position as follows: zero globally on short range INF, I have not discussed that here but that was also coming along. The U.S. would abandon conversion for the U.S. of Pershing II to Pershing IB, but would maintain its program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany. I hope that distinction is clear. We couldn’t do it for ourselves, but we argued that we had this existing contract and we would fulfill it if we were asked to do so by the Germans. And he said our position as he saw it was if the Germans should ask for it, the U.S. could convert PIIs to PIBs.

After we went over the PII to PIB conversion, we went through it again, he summed up the Soviet position this way: If the Soviet side were to accept the double global zero, SRINF, LRINF, in other words, no missiles between 500 and 5500 kilometers would exist, they would all be gone. If the Soviet side were to accept the double global zero, U.S. must in turn physically destroy all PIIs, no conversions and physically destroy all GLCM’s, the ground launching cruise missiles, with no conversion. He hinted the Soviets might be willing to accept retention of the existing German PI missiles. As I said, at this point he told me, “I am leaving for Moscow on June 20, and let me know what you think.” But you can see, we had a very general agreement. The sticking point was again about the conversion of the German Pershing.

I’ll say a brief bit now about GLCM’s and their no conversion issue. I was aware of the fact that ground launch cruise missiles, which are covered by the INF treaty, and the sea launched cruise missiles, which are not, were almost identical. I won’t go through how I knew this, but I had a visual proof of it on one occasion, let’s put it that way. What seemed to me to be a possible solution to this problem, if we couldn’t convert the whole missile, because we really didn’t want the Soviets going through a lot of conversions either, we might have been suspicious of how those might have worked out, even with good verification, monitoring, on-site inspection, etc., one thing we could do, and in the end we did, was to set up the elimination in such way that the exterior, the airframe, would be crushed and destroyed, but everything inside, electronics, the guidance system, obviously the warhead, the engine and the little rocket motor at the back for missile which propelled it off the launcher in the first place, all of those would be kept. And in the end we did that. We agreed that we would destroy the airframe but we would keep all the innards. I was told by someone that it saved about 250 million dollars, this arrangement, for us. It would have been cheaper if we could convert whole thing, but that ran the risk of having them do something of the sort themselves. That is how that eventually worked its way out. I noted at the end of this luncheon meeting that the farewell handshakes were heartier than usual.

Anyway, I informed Washington of the other meeting, the planned meeting on Saturday, and set out the talking points for me to use. Basically they outlined how the thing should work. Which included the Soviets Union understands the U.S. retains the right to continue this established pattern of cooperation with Germans regarding the Pershing missiles. And that if they would agree to that we would agree to basically get global double zero and we wouldn’t transfer any
existing U.S. INF missiles to any third parties. Those that were actually in our force, and PIIs, we wouldn’t transfer but that did not happen, and of course we kept open the idea of conversion. That was crucial in this issue. I was very forceful, privately forceful I think too, that simply we were not going to break a contract. We just could not accept an outcome in which that contract would be broken unilaterally by us. That of course left it open if the Germans were to say no. And that would be the end of it. Ultimately, a month or so later, in August, I have the exact date somewhere here, Chancellor Kohl did say Germany was not going to continue with this program. But that was further on.

When I got to the U.S. mission on Saturday morning, I was told that there were no messages for me. Chervov, accompanied by Lieutenant General Medvedev, the official Soviet INF negotiator at that point, was at the door, and I decided to proceed along the line that I had sent to Washington. I had gotten verbal clearance over the phone. I would just proceed without a cable. It turned out in fact that the message was in Geneva, but it was serving no practical purpose at this point. We were still saddled with this combined delegation super-structure we were talking about. The message had been given to the combined delegation duty officer, who worked on the defense space group and had no knowledge of the INF issues. It had been put aside for the combined delegation executive officer, who would be in on Saturday, but who came in later in the morning. The message gave me a green light to go ahead and called for only one relatively minor change in the talking points.

The discussion with Chervov was obviously very intense. Both in terms of the time constraints and the need to get our figures worked out. I reiterated our arguments for double global zero. And made the point once more that we were aware of Soviet concern over the modernization of German Pershing IA force, and he saw where I was heading and that it might be possible to reach a solution to both of the problems, that we have a trade-off. I also took the occasion to put forward the concept of destroying the airframes and keeping the innards, so to speak, of the missiles. He didn’t have any specific reaction to that, but as I said, eventually they did accept it. At the same time I suggested the both sides would make it clear that neither would transfer to third countries any existing U.S. or Soviet LRINF or SRINF missiles, and that meant those in the force now. And this would include the Federal Republic. However, I made it equally clear that it was a matter of principle for the U.S. that the German Pershings are not part of this agreement. We would retain the right to continue the established pattern of cooperation for the Pershing systems. However, I did say I did not envisage that support for that program would go beyond the framework of the existing pattern. In other words the numbers would not change and the types wouldn’t change.

Chervov again expressed concern over the possibility that under what I had proposed, the U.S. had the right to convert the PII to PIB for the West Germans. He believed that his authorities would find this difficult to accept since it would be seen as an inequity.

Having laid out our respective positions, we both came to an informal agreement, stressing that we were speaking informally and unofficially. There would be Soviet commitment to eliminate the remaining INF systems in Asia, in essence a double global zero and the U.S. would not convert any of its PIIs into PIBs. The Soviets could accept the retention of the existing German PIA force. The one part of which we had to agree to disagree concerns the continued application
of the U.S. pattern of cooperation with the Germans. I made it clear that we would not abandon that arrangement without German agreement. Chervov commented that this would pose a major difficulty for the Soviet side. Nevertheless I think we both understood that each of us would present the informal agreement to our respective capitals. As I bid farewell to Chervov I was more confident than ever that we would get a sound and durable INF agreement, incorporating the principles we had worked out with our NATO allies back in 1979. As it was that confidence would soon be tested.

What happened there was that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Yuri Vorontsov and Ambassador Max Kampelman came to Geneva about the time Chernov had left. On June 23rd, John Woodworth and I met with Vorontsov, Obukhov and Medvedev. Vorontsov had been rather pessimistic and negative, and in response I noted that we made progress during Chervov’s visit and expressed a hope that we could move further with Vorontsov. When I outlined the discussion with Chervov, Vorontsov exploded. “Decisions on such issues are made by us in the Foreign Ministry and not in the Defense Ministry,” he said. “Chervov’s views and suggestions are not our policy and have no standing.” Neither Medvedev, who had been present during my conversation with Chervov, nor Obukhov, who had been present at the luncheon meeting with Chervov, made any comment. Both carefully controlled their body language. Well, despite, or perhaps even more, because of Vorontsov’s reaction I concluded that of the two, Chervov’s was the more authentic voice. In any event, we continued our efforts to move the Soviets to accept our global zero approach and patiently awaited developments. Again, I have to underscore how strongly we made a point that we had these agreements with the Germans and while we wouldn’t be unilaterally remove it. And that was obviously a very serious sticking point for them. It eventually got resolved.

On July 22nd, we got our answer. One of my staff came into my office and said, “There is an article here that you need to see right away. It’s an Indonesian newspaper, Merdeka.” I thought to myself, “I know what this is.” It was Gorbachev’s acceptance of double global zero. He sought to present it as his own and as a Soviet contribution to improving security in Asia. His choice of an Asian newspaper I believe was also meant to send an obvious message. Nevertheless the incompatibility between his call for closer Soviet-Asian ties, and Soviet insistence of keeping SS-20s targeted on most of Asia, had forced the change in Soviet policy. He simply couldn’t argue in favor of closer relations and then maintain the SS-20s. That had forced the change. As well as, I hope, some of our efforts to give him some further reasons to move forward in this area; including, bringing this incompatibility to their attention.

The next day in Geneva, the Soviets formally tabled the proposal outlined in the Merdeka interview. The Soviets, however, made agreement contingent on the inclusion not of the new Pershings, but of the old Pershings IA in an INF agreement. Now, suddenly this arises. Our argument was that these were German Pershings and not ours, we had basically sold them to them. We did have the warheads. But they then began to argue that the existing German Pershings should go under any U.S.-Soviet INF treaty.

After the formal session Obukhov took me aside and expressed the Soviet expectation that we would now follow through on the accord reached with Chervov. I knew that we had been in close
contact with the Germans on the issue of conversion, conversion was not in the cards and I said it will work out. On the other hand, I said the existing German PIA would have to remain outside any U.S.-Soviet agreement. I had trouble trying, well not trouble, but I began to question why Vorontsov had reacted the way he did. And it makes me wonder whether there was simply not full coordination within the Soviet bureaucracy. It’s also possible that Vorontsov may have been aware that something like the Merdeka’s article was underway within the Soviet government and he felt that getting into the issue the way that Chervov would make it look as if the U.S. had some role in this.

In any case, I would put down my conversations with Chervov as win-win on both sides. The Soviets would avoid the risk of a modern NATO - FRG nuclear missile force. We’d get the global zero that we sought to benefit of ourselves, our Asian and NATO allies and both parties would gain from the improved prospect for effective verification which the zero outcome would create. I went through why the verification would be easier.

If you look back at this juncture in the negotiations, we had obtained the zero outcome which President Reagan had made his primary goal six years earlier. We had secured Soviet agreement to the NATO principles, which had guided us from ’79 on. We had obtained Soviet recognition of the legitimacy of U.S. deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe. And by extension their acceptance of our military presence in Europe as a counter to Soviet deployments threatening our NATO allies. And we had defended the interests of our Asian allies, by obtaining the elimination of the Soviet INF threat against them.

We have talked a little bit before about the short range INF system and I think it would now be a good time to discuss the evolution of that aspect of the negotiations. I think as I pointed out, we had started out asking for collateral constraints, not otherwise specified on those systems, both Soviet and U.S., their ranges were 500-1000 kilometers and I think there we and the Soviets reached agreement pretty quickly. We listed some systems, specifically the SS-23 which they at first claimed did not exist. They eventually agreed it did exist but then claimed it could not go 500 kilometers and should therefore be kept out of the treaty. Those were sort of the main parameters of it. We had very few of these types of missile systems, although there was always a possibility of building some. We did have shorter range missiles with ranges below 500 kilometers in Europe. Artillery. Again, we had a large number of nuclear weapons there. Some of which, frankly, I questioned the value of, when I was in the Army early on. But, in any case, these were all being removed from the inventory. And by now are all out of the inventory.

From the beginning, we realized we would have to constrain Soviet missiles with ranges below 1000 kilometers because from bases in East Germany they could strike well into West Germany, possibly some of the other neighboring countries. Therefore they were as effective for the Soviets as their INF missiles in certain situations. As you see we didn’t have anything quite like it. The Soviet rationale for the 1000 kilometers was that this was how much it would take to reach from West German bases, to Soviet territory (a round trip in case of aircraft), that is where that number came from. It made sense just in general terms as a good place where to break off short range INF and move into longer range INF systems.
Throughout most of these early days the SRINF was not a major consideration, but as we got closer to the end of negotiations, as we began to make progress on other areas, of course then SRINF moved up to be a more important factor in it. This issue really sort of got moving during a meeting, a luncheon in Geneva with Viktor Karpov. This would have been in spring of ’87. I have the exact date somewhere, but in any case. Karpov, a senior Foreign Ministry arms control official, joined us for a working lunch and during that lunch I think Ambassador Kampelman and at that point probably Ambassador Lehman also were present along with our Soviet counterparts. During that lunch I took the opportunity to raise SRINF. Essentially to put down a marker that we remained determined to constrain SRINF as part of any agreement. Karpov responded (and this in presence of Vorontsov and other Soviet negotiators) that if SRINF issue represents an obstacle to an early INF accord, the Soviet side would be prepared to eliminate SRINF at the same time as LRINF missiles are reduced to 100 warheads globally and eliminated in Europe. When I asked what Soviet systems he was referring to, Karpov indicated the scale board also known as the SS-12/22, and the SS-23, which, as I said, up until fairly recently at that point the Soviets had argued that the 23 did not exist. They now recognized that it existed, and not only that it existed but he was saying they would be included in the elimination.

While noting that a global outcome, rather than retaining the 100 warheads, would be the most appropriate result, I urged Karpov to come to Geneva more often with proposals of this sort. It was noteworthy here that neither Karpov, or the other Soviets made reference to the statement Gorbachev had made on February 28, in which Gorbachev had suggested zero SRINF outcome. Around this time, and after Reykjavik, we began to wonder what was happening back in Moscow. We began to have a sense that there was some lack of communication. You can’t help but wonder. Look at what happened here!

The Soviet leader puts forward a proposal, Gorbachev on February 28th, zero SRINF. His senior Foreign Ministry officials are unable to discuss it in any detail with us when we asked them about it. And yet one of them floats a trial balloon, a proposal similar to that their president had made in public only days before but about which they seemed rather uninformed. Nonetheless, there was something about Karpov’s presentation that lead me to conclude that it was serious. In fact, while I didn’t state that for obvious reasons, I had misgivings about the effect of Karpov’s trial balloon on NATO’s inter-relations. The prospect of removing all U.S. SRINF from Europe could be seen as a major Soviet interest insofar as it could be a major step towards a Soviet goal of eliminating, undermining rather, the linkage or the strategic interest of the U.S. and the European NATO members. U.S. nuclear capable aircraft would remain in Europe, the Soviets had dropped their effort to include aircraft back in the fall of ’85, but they would not provide the same amount of determent value as the missiles. Unlike the missiles, the aircraft had conventional roles, and would encounter Soviet aircraft. Considering the leaders in Europe had been in the forefront of supporting the U.S. INF approach, and who had considered the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe crucial to their countries’ security, they were likely to raise concerns over a double zero outcome. Karpov’s hint carried with it, therefore, the potential for a serious NATO debate on how to respond. In addition to the potential of stirring up disagreement in NATO, Karpov might have had another motivation for trotting out a possible zero level SRINF outcome. Soviets saw both political and military advantage in stopping the conversion of PII to PIB, and therefore this was another way of getting at that. As I pointed out, there were some values, economic and military, attractions I should say, for conversion. We’ve been
through this so I won’t go any further in that. But it was a factor I thought in their mind. We did our best to make sure the Soviets understood that there would be no agreement without constraints on SRINF and at this point, back in March of ’87, I went on the David Brinkley show, This Week with David Brinkley, and was asked about SRINF and said it was a sine qua non for a solid agreement. We would not have an agreement which did not include this. I made similar remarks during a press briefing held at the White House on March 6 and carried by USIA to European diplomatic posts.

Over the next two or three weeks, Karpov’s hot air balloon seemed to float away. Soviet negotiators didn’t broach the subject or respond to our careful probing. Bonn, however, was growing restive over SRINF. German officials were increasingly concerned both over the prospect of Germany’s deploying modernized PIA missiles and conversely concerned about the possibility of zero level for U.S. SRINF in Europe. The reaction of German officials at NATO meetings I attended to brief them on Karpov’s trial balloon lead me to suggest a visit to Bonn to explain the situation directly at cabinet level meetings.

On March 30, accompanied by John Woodworth, I met separately with Foreign Minister Genscher, Defense Minister Wörner, German Socialist Party Bundestag Group Deputy Chairman Horst Emka. Wörner was in solid support of the alliance, of the deployment of Pershing-II and GLCM in Germany and of our negotiating position. I explained to him that I believed Karpov’s zero level SRINF trial balloon could well be serious and that while it was not being pressed by the Soviets, we needed to prepare for a formal introduction. The problem, I acknowledged, was that accepting zero SRINF could be construed as a step towards ultimate elimination of all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, with the clear implication that the linkage between NATO European defense and U.S. nuclear forces could be seriously weakened, if not broken. The potential fracture could, however, be mitigated if NATO moved ahead to modernize its remaining short range nuclear forces, that is weapons with ranges below 500 kilometers. I pointed out that this could be accomplished by deploying a follow-on to the surface to surface LANCE missile, which was called FOTL. And a new air to surface missile, TASM, that is Tactical Air to Surface Missile. On the other hand, if we did not accept the zero level for the SRINF we would certainly incur criticism for having turned down the Soviet offer to go to zero and at the same time we would need to modernize NATO’s SRINF. Not to modernize would place us at a military and political/psychological disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviets. And here is a problem. We would have turned down an offer for an equal zero, outcome at zero, and willingly accepted an unequal outcome, providing the Soviets with a distinct advantage. If we didn’t do anything there would be an unequal outcome. The alternative there would be to start building up. We would have been left holding obsolete systems, solely in German hands, if we turned this down. And the ability of the alliance to deter Soviet political intimidation and aggression would be greatly weakened. Wörner responded that by arguing the negative sides of moving to zero SRINF we would certainly incur criticism for having turned down the Soviet offer to go to zero and at the same time we would need to modernize NATO’s SRINF. Not to modernize would place us at a military and political/psychological disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviets. And here is a problem. We would have turned down an offer for an equal zero, outcome at zero, and willingly accepted an unequal outcome, providing the Soviets with a distinct advantage. If we didn’t do anything there would be an unequal outcome. The alternative there would be to start building up. We would have been left holding obsolete systems, solely in German hands, if we turned this down. And the ability of the alliance to deter Soviet political intimidation and aggression would be greatly weakened. Wörner responded that by arguing the negative sides of moving to zero SRINF we would have more serious consequences than turning down any Soviet offer. Since zero SRINF on top of the zero already agreed on LRINF would negatively affect the linkage with U.S. strategic systems, and hence between the U.S. and other member of the alliance. I am going over this again, so you can see the nature of this issue. It was a situation where we did not have a perfect answer. If we relied on SRINF alone, Wörner argued, to provide the linkage that would have the major disadvantage of leaving Germany particularly exposed and singled out as a potential nuclear battlefield. At the same time he questioned any possibility of modernizing NATO’s SRINF if we
turned down the zero offer. I told him that we understood and shared the German concerns. The logic of the situation made it very difficult to defend refusing a Soviet offer to move to zero SRINF but not to take steps to update U.S. and NATO SRINF systems in an environment where SRINF would remain present. We parted amicably, but it was clear that there had not been a complete meeting of the minds and that further discussion would be required.

Genscher for his part stressed the importance of completing an INF treaty along the lines agreed in Reykjavik, or calling for immediate follow-on negotiations on SRINF, which he called a paramount interest of the German government.

At the end of the day it seemed increasingly likely to me that if the Soviets adopted a zero SRINF position and we turned it down, we would find ourselves both unable to deploy SRINF to match the Soviets and in an indefensible position back home. Under the circumstances, zero SRINF outcome, with some prospect of upgrading remaining shorter range nuclear forces, was probably the best outcome. While this outcome would leave the U.S. and its NATO allies with the least desirable nuclear systems in Europe, missiles and artillery with ranges below 500 kilometers and air-delivered weapons, it would still pack a punch and provoke a visible evidence of the linkage between NATO and the U.S. nuclear deterrent. But we first had to persuade Wörner and his cabinet colleagues of this judgment.

Well, it turned out we were not going to have much time to do this. A day after visiting Bonn I went back to Washington and began to help preparations for meetings in Moscow between Secretary Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It was obvious that INF was certainly going to be on the agenda. I emphasized that we might be confronted at that meeting with the Soviet zero SRINF proposal and that we would have to move very carefully, given the German concerns. I reinforced these points during the pre-ministerial meetings, which were held in Helsinki prior to going to Moscow.

In fact, as we anticipated, SRINF was a prominent element at the April 14th, 1987 Moscow ministerial meeting. I think Secretary Schultz raised the topic during the meeting with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader first suggested that Soviets would withdraw nuclear systems in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and that both sides would then freeze SRINF levels. Secretary Schultz responded by citing our cardinal principle: any agreement must be based on an equal outcome and a freeze at current levels would not be equal. Gorbachev then suggested the SRINF be treated in the same manner as was agreed at Reykjavik for LRINF. Zero in Europe and 100 in Soviet Asia and the U.S. The Secretary rejected this approach, and he pointed out that these missiles can be moved rather easily. And he added that the only sensible outcome is equality on a global basis. Finally, Gorbachev proposed a global zero. Secretary Schultz was well aware of the sensitivities with our allies and made it clear he would have to consult with the allies before responding to Gorbachev’s offer.

Well, we were scheduled to meet with our NATO allies in Brussels directly after the meeting in Moscow. I had been working on other issues, obviously during the ministerial I had been busy, but I wrote up talking points for the secretary on the airplane as we flew to Brussels. I basically used the arguments that I had used with Defense Minister Wörner, that formed the basis of the talking points. We could accept global zero for SRINF or an equal finite number for both sides,
but to accept an outcome in which we turn down a Soviet offer for a global zero for SRINF while not deploying modern SRINF on our side, would create a military imbalance, a politically indefensible result. If NATO does not accept zero then it must deploy SRINF to match the Soviets.

I had some interesting times with this paper. As we flew to Moscow I had cleared it with the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Roz Ridgway, several other members of the party, and Richard Pearl. Pearl was busy working on a message of his own, but once we got to Brussels I showed him this and he gave a quick green light. We were in a hotel at this point. I went ahead and took it to the secretaries that would come along with Secretary Schultz and went ahead and asked them to type up the paper and have it ready for the Secretary to read the next morning. I thought I’d go to bed. In Moscow we had gone around the clock a couple of days so I was ready to sleep. But in not too long a time, I got a call from Charley Thomas, who was at that point the Director of State Department’s NATO office. A good friend. Unfortunately gone. Charley said, “You’d better get back downstairs to the delegation’s office. A group of officials who had just joined the party had taken the talking points paper from the Secretariat Staff and were arguing that its entire premise was wrong and that it had to be entirely rewritten.” So I went down there. There was a sort of intellectual turmoil. These new arrivals were insisting that the zero offer must be turned down because it would undermine nuclear linkage and the overall deterrent. As for the considerable likelihood that Germany and other allies would not support deployment of new U.S. SRINF, they argued it would be sufficient to leave open the possibility of deployment at some future time. In other words, our unexercised right to deploy would balance the existing Soviet force. I went over the argument with the folks there. But before any conclusion could be reached, it was announced that a press backgrounder, which Ridgway was asked to give would be held in a few minutes. I guess the lure of seeing or being seen by the media proved more powerful than dealing with the SRINF issue. The crowd, Richard Pearl aside, surged towards the doors. I looked at a way to bar the exit and said something like “Look we need to wrap up the paper for the secretary now.” Ridgway said, “I’ve already cleared the draft.” Others in effect said they would leave their proxy with Richard Pearl and they made for the media. Once they left the room, Richard and I sat down and went over the paper. As I’ve said, we had already gone over it once before. He made a couple more suggestions, which didn’t affect the substance, which I readily accepted. By the time the others had returned, the paper was retyped and back with the Secretary’s staff, awaiting delivery. And Secretary Schultz used the paper to good affect. The Germans, as expected and understandably, agonized at length over the decision. In the end, they and the other allies recognized that the global zero SRINF outcome was in NATO’s overall interest, it presaged global zero for INF and it would make verification easier and relatively more certain in verifying the final number. On the other hand, going to zero did, as I pointed out in my Brinkley Show interview, carry with it, or require that, “to ensure that the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe are high-tech.” This reflected my concern that we needed to lay the groundwork for such action in order to meet concerns of those Europeans who believed an INF agreement would undermine linkage and deterrence and my uneasiness over the prospects for obtaining broad enough European support for the deployment of such systems. The uneasiness was intensified by growing signs that a there would be a follow-on SNF negotiation, with the possibility of pressure for another third zero outcome could be in the offing if we succeeded in INF. Genscher’s call for follow-on negotiation certainly strengthened the prospect of another round if not this outcome. Remember, the Cold War is still
a factor at this time. Therefore the prospect of the removal of all U.S. nuclear forces from Europe while the Soviet Union would continue to hold European cities hostage to its remaining strategic nuclear force, that was not going away. And the effect that outcome would have on our ability to deter Soviet attack on the alliance was not particularly agreeable to contemplate. But there would still be some more obstacles on SRINF before we would reach that point. And all of these obstacles would be interrelated and Germany figured prominently in all of them.

On June 1, ’87, the Germans informed the U.S. that they were prepared to accept a global zero level SRINF outcome. The NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik on June 12 put the alliances on that decision, and we tabled it in Geneva on June 16 as a formal U.S. proposal for SRINF. Thus at this point, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement on an INF treaty which would eliminate all INF missiles except the 100 Soviet LRINF in the Asian part of Russia and 100 U.S. LRINF missiles on U.S. territory. We appeared close to reaching an agreement on eliminating SRINF on a global basis.

That same NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik on June 12, in its communiqué called for “adequate and effective” U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. This was meant to be a clear signal that modern U.S. SNF systems should remain in Europe even if a double global zero INF treaty was successfully negotiated. As Prime Minister Thatcher put it, “A firebreak was thus in place to ensure that zero would not be extended to cover all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.” However, while conservative Germans supported this approach as essential for maintaining deterrence, other Germans believed that, as they would put it, “the shorter the missile, the deader the German.” In this climate support was growing stronger in favor of a new negotiation to cover SNF. No doubt Mrs. Thatcher would not be happy with that. But at this juncture, the Soviets began turning the spot-light of their primed public attention to those German Pershing-IAs, these are the old, obsolescent missiles. Chervov in effect had said, “Let them keep them if they want. You just can’t convert them or improve them.” What led the Soviets to do this was I suspect a treaty outcome more to their liking and the prospect of exacerbating divisiveness within, among the allies nations. What was the situation?

At the time of the ’79 INF decision, the Germans had 72 PIA missiles. Like their 108 U.S. PIA counterparts, they had been first deployed in 1962. We saw the ’79 decision call for the modernization on a one-for-one basis of 108 U.S. Pershing IA to Pershing II. These, of course, were going to disappear with the signing of the INF treaty. But the modernization involved more than this, and this gets us back to the value of conversion and the modernization included other important improvements. But we have already seen that it was not going to be possible to convert. That still left these old PIAs. And there were 72 of them at this point. Their range was substantively within the definition of a SRINF missile. But they weren’t U.S. owned and controlled, they were outside the scope of a bilateral U.S. - Soviet INF agreement.

The Soviets however, had other ideas. They began increasingly to bring up what they considered the anomaly in maintaining any missiles with INF ranges in Germany. They tabled a draft treaty on April 23 of ’87, which contained a proposal to include American war heads on the German Pershings as part of the agreement. Obukhov, during private meetings with me in early June, because we were getting into this conversion issue, made a specific point of arguing that the retention of the German Pershings would put the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies at a
distinct disadvantage, because none of them would have a comparable system. This is going to lead to an issue later in the future; the point that neither the Soviet Union nor its Warsaw Pact allies had a comparable system.

Our side objected to this position noting that we had made clear that these patterns of cooperation would not be affected by any agreement. We couldn’t accept an agreement with them that had that sort of an effect. I also pointed out that the Soviet negotiators told us they had no existing programs of cooperation with their Warsaw Pact allies, and Obukhov continued to argue that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact would be at a disadvantage because they didn’t have anything similar to the German Pershings. I noted that the Soviets were not restricted to their SRINF or LRINF missiles when it came to targeting NATO Europe, I was of course referring to the strategic systems. On one occasion, Obukhov cited the Soviet agreement to eliminate its SS-23 missiles as a factor in their view that the retention of German Pershings would put the Warsaw Pact at a disadvantage. As we know, the Soviets had fought hard to keep the SS-23 out of the INF agreement. And the arguing was over range. In the end, it was Gorbachev personally, who made the decision to include the SS-23 and as we shall see, that may have had historic consequences.

Following the April ministerial meeting in Moscow, Gorbachev included the SS-23. We’d seen that Karpov had earlier included it. At this April meeting with Secretary Schultz, Gorbachev specified that SS-23 will be a part of the agreement. Nevertheless, although he had done that, Soviet officials that we dealt with were rather unhappy that their leadership had agreed to the inclusion of the SS-23. And they would raise it from time to time as a concession. We know now that in fact it was not very popular with Soviet officials. We have found that from the Soviet sources, that it was seen as a great mistake by Gorbachev. It might account for some of what we saw were inconsistencies at least in timing if not in content between things we would hear from Gorbachev and then, only after a time, was picked up by the Soviet negotiators.

On August 6 of 87, Shevardnadze raised the issue of the German Pershings at length, in a sometimes impassioned speech he gave to the UN in Geneva. He called the German Pershings “the main snag” preventing the conclusion of an INF agreement. He argued that the agreement to global double zero must include all U.S. and Soviet INF, including those on the old IA Pershing missiles that the Germans had. But if the U.S. does not want the zero option, as it’s clear from its present 72-0 formula, that would be a different ball game. He was really upset by this. And Shevardnadze also, sort of similar to what Obukhov was saying, “we too have allies, we are concerned over the fact that the Germans are going to maintain the shorter range missiles which would pose a threat to their security.” He was quite concerned about the Germans being able to keep these. With this argument Shevardnadze neatly twisted the facts to make it appear that Germany and the U.S. were colluding to turn Germany into a nuclear power. They were putting maximum pressure on the German government and Shevardnadze placed the full burden on reaching an INF agreement on Germany’s giving up its Pershing IA missiles. Once again, you can see the intense Soviet desire to use those negotiations to create dissension within Germany, and between Germany and the other allies. It had been a hallmark of the Soviet approach to the INF from the outset. This issue continued to fester for about 20 more days and then on August 26 of 87 Chancellor Kohl put it to rest by announcing Germany would eliminate its PIA missiles.
after the INF treaty was signed. With PIA missiles gone, it was only logical for the U.S. to state it would withdraw their nuclear warheads.

You’d think the Soviets would leave it at that. But they were not content to do so. I mean, they had gotten what they wanted. They argued that the disposition of the German Pershings and their warheads, must be made an integral part of any INF treaty. I objected that the treaty was strictly bilateral in nature, no other country was a party to it and no other country’s missile system could be made a part of it. Nevertheless, the Soviets continued to press their demands in Geneva and raised it in Washington on September 17, during a ministerial level meeting chaired by Schultz and Shevardnadze. The Soviet foreign minister pushed exceptionally hard on this point. Frank Carlucci, who had become President’s Reagan National Security Advisor, came out of the meeting with Shevardnadze, and told me that the issue has become a major obstacle to reaching an agreement. The Soviets felt that without some formal mention in the agreement with us that the warheads on the German Pershings would be removed from Europe, they would have no legal basis for a complaint that the U.S. was not in compliance with the treaty if we did not withdraw the warheads from the German Pershings. Carlucci asked if it would be possible to meet the Soviets’ concerns by including some mention of the warheads on the German Pershings in the treaty. The effort to keep third party systems out of the INF issue had been a critical component of our position, and we had not budged on it, recognizing that to do so would open the way for the Soviets to argue that British and French nuclear forces should be included on the U.S. side of the ledger. It would undercut our key philosophical point. An INF treaty must lead to an equal outcome for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While it bothered me to have to move even a millimeter towards the Soviets on this issue, I recognized that neither Schultz nor Carlucci would raise the possibility if they had not judged the solution was essential to the conclusion of a treaty, which would meet all the basic goals of the U.S. and its NATO allies that we set out to achieve in December ‘79. I told Carlucci we should not make any reference to the Germans Pershings and the U.S. warheads in the treaty, but I did think I could find a place to indirectly refer to them in one of the treaty annexes.

Shortly thereafter, Karpov and I were called to join the ministers. We went down there, they instructed us to find some place in the formal documents, which we were preparing in Geneva, in which to refer to the problem posed by the German Pershings and their U.S. warheads. Having known what to expect, I had already located the place and prepared the words to accomplish this task. When Karpov and I convened I suggested that the protocol on elimination would be appropriate place to refer to the elimination of the U.S. or Soviet re-entry vehicles on INF missiles owned by other countries, which had by unilateral decision of those countries, been released from an existing protocol of cooperation. There was no specific reference to German Pershings. This section was drafted in a manner which made it applicable to both sides. It also accommodated the treaty requirement that the U.S. and the Soviet Union eliminate all of their INF missile systems 15 days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. This was a rather convoluted procedure, but it was required so that the U.S. could withdraw the re-entry vehicles which had been placed on the German Pershings to the U.S. for elimination before the elimination period called for in the treaty. Karpov and I reported back to the ministers and they agreed with our proposal. The wording was subsequently included in the appropriate part of the treaty, Section 2, Paragraph 9 of the Protocol on Elimination, and implemented accordingly.
Now we come to another incident. Three years before the elimination period had run its course, an eliminated SRINF system, the SS-23 returned to prominence. As foretold by the June 27 NATO ministerial meeting the U.S. and its allies began the process of modernizing the remaining SNF in Europe. These systems had been reduced in numbers over the course of the INF negotiations in Europe: in part because of obsolescence and in part in order to underscore our bona fides in arms control. The modernization plans called for an improved artillery warhead, a follow on to the LANCE missile, FOTL, and a new surface to air missile, TASM. As anticipated, these plans were seen as essential by some of our European allies, and contrary to the INF spirit by others.

As this modernization process became controversial, the Soviets once again geared up their propaganda machine, seeing in this issue yet a new opportunity to split the alliance. Gorbachev’s popularity was high, his call for “common European home” seemed to resonate with many Germans. Soviet spokesmen began to attack NATO modernization plans. Ambassador Kuitzinsky, who was then Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, likened the proposed FOTL missile as going beyond modernization, because the Soviets under the INF treaty sacrificed their comparable SS-23, so that weapons of this kind would disappear completely from Europe. He said, “If NATO now builds a missile that has a range of perhaps 20 or 50 less than our SS-23, this is a fraud.” More impressive was a comment by Marshall of the Soviet Union, Akromayev, which aired in Pravda on April 19th. He said, “NATO leaders are claiming that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, while opposing the so-called modernization of NATO’s tactical nuclear missiles,” that is SNF, “have themselves already carried out such a modernization of their own missiles and are misleading the public in an effort to align it against the NATO block. The reality is that the Warsaw Pact armies are equipped with missiles created between 15 and 27 years ago. It is true that the Soviet Army has a modern missile with a range of up to 500 kilometers. It is the SS-23 missile, being eliminated in accordance with the INF treaty. The Soviet Union deliberately took this step so there would be no more nuclear missiles of this range in any country. Now, however, completely unembarrassed by the fact that the U.S. representatives at the talks sought the elimination of the SS-23 missile, the U.S. intends to deploy in Europe a modernized LANCE nuclear missile with a range up to 450 kilometers, virtually identical to the range of the Soviet SS-23 missile being eliminated.”

Well, what happened? On March 6, 1990, a news report from Germany revealed that the Soviet Union had provided SS-23 missiles to East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. With the GDR collapsing, the secret was out of the bag. My immediate reaction was one of anger at Soviet duplicity and concern that the U.S. had not unearthed these developments during the course of the negotiations. Upon reflection, I recalled the several conversations I had with Obukhov, which I had just gone through, in which he argued that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be at a disadvantage if the Germans kept their PIA force since they had no comparable missile. I called Washington and passed on my recollections. I promised to provide some specific citations.

That night I awoke with a startle and I called out “Akromayev and Shevardnadze!” I woke Chris up in the process. I said, “I think I kept some of their statements about LANCE modernization and the SS-23 and German Pershings.” The next morning, I did indeed find the articles noted above as well as the dates of the conversations with Obukhov. The articles which I read from
were of particular value obviously, because they were on the public record. No one reading them, then or now, can come to any conclusion other than that the Soviet foreign minister, the leading Soviet military officer and a former Soviet chief INF negotiator and well plugged-in ambassador were either unaware of the transfer of the SS-23s to GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, or were knowingly falsifying, or to put it bluntly lying, by claiming that their Warsaw Pact allies would be at disadvantage if the Germans kept their PIA missiles or modernized its LANCE missiles because the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had no comparable missile. The Soviets also argued that the SS-23 missiles provided to the three Warsaw Pact states were not subject to the INF treaty because they were non-nuclear. But as they well knew, the treaty applies to all INF missiles, whether conventional or nuclear armed. Moreover, with the East German SS-23 available for inspection, it became clear that these missiles were configured to accept nuclear warheads. Yet, the Soviets continued to argue that the transferred SS-23s were conventional weapons and thus not subject to the treaty.

I did have some further discussions, well afterwards, with some Soviets about how this could happen. Some speculated that there was bad blood between Akromayev and some of the Soviet field commanders, but clearly orders from Gorbachev were not followed out. I think that Shevardnadze basically said, “I believe that comrade Gorbachev was not aware of this and I can assure you personally that I was not aware of it.” Again, it reflects the situation inside the Kremlin; that this sort of thing would happen and the leadership would be unaware of it, and placed in the position of making the sort of statements that they did make. I think there was more, I could go on and about this issue, but we have taken long enough. I clearly was quite angry about it, and I suggested to Washington that we ought to refer to this as deliberate deception, but I guessed people back there had a better feel of the overall situation and opted for “bad faith,” as a way to describe it. It was an interesting affair I think. There was no doubt that Gorbachev’s decision to include SS-23 had ramifications. Clearly things happened as a result of that which undermined him and were a sign of the growing weakness of his power within the Soviet Union.

Q: Let me ask this question. Our intelligence did not know that these had been placed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria?

GLITMAN: No. And in my view, regardless of how you look at the rest of it, this was a failure of intelligence. We did not know. From what I understand now, I think this was all in the press, we knew once our German allies had the missiles. The Soviets were able to place these missiles with other missiles that were not covered by the agreement and were very careful about when they would take them out and so on. All that being said, it was a failure of intelligence. And worrisome in that regard. We had as good an inspection regime as we could have. But they had found places to put these things. Whether they were in a position to use them as a force, as opposed to having them there but not being coordinated, I don’t have the answer to that. But, yes, it was a failure of the intelligence, we have to face up to that and bear that in mind as we go forward in these sorts of things.

I guess the other thing we have to recognize is that as time went by, very soon after the fall of Berlin Wall and all that followed from that, and the end of the Soviet Union, that Margaret Thatcher’s effort to set up a “firebreak,” against total denuclearization of NATO, that began to crumble within 24 months. We did not go ahead with the follow-on of LANCE, we did not go
ahead with TASM and what’s left now are essentially gravity bombs on aircraft. Same situation. We own the bombs and some of the aircraft, and the allies provide the rest of the aircraft. The strategic link back to the U.S. strategic system is thus still there.

But at this juncture at least, NATO is now looking at this whole question of what’s left, and what to do with these residual systems. I think there are committees set up to look at it. The Russians are being brought into the discussion on how to handle that. It would be interesting to see how it plays out. To some extent the allies may still welcome having these systems around, as providing a visual proof of a linkage to our nuclear strategic forces and that they in turn are prepared to share with us the responsibility of nuclear weapons. I don’t know how it will all turn out.

The whole issue was an interesting one. Beyond that, I think there is probably a lot more for researchers and historians to uncover just what happened inside the Soviet government at this juncture, because as we’ve seen, there were some problems there. Gorbachev himself comments about what his delegation was doing in Geneva at this point. He sort of complained about the Soviet military and diplomats not really working. And that began after Reykjavik. There was that sort of sense that there was a coming apart. He himself notes that he was having trouble getting our counterparts to move. That’s in his memoirs. At one point he makes a comment along the lines of, “These guys were finding life too cushy in Geneva and they didn’t want to leave. They were enjoying being paid in hard currency,” etc. They were just dragging their feet. Obviously, he sounds very bitter. Again, this is in his memoirs. He had gone through a difficult time himself. As I say, I think historians should have an interesting time going further into this to determine exactly what happened.

Let’s go back a little bit now and take a look at how the negotiations itself ended up. We’ve already seen some of the consequences later years.

The last group of issues we had to work on were verification questions. We had for years been trying to get the Soviets to move ahead seriously. Eventually, and slowly they came along. What they began to do after a while, however, was to take positions which were seemingly more open than ours. And I don’t believe that they were really prepared to carry some of these out, but it was a way of trying to score propaganda points off of us; To suggest that they would be more open than we were. We got kind of caught up in this in a way. Verification is a difficult enough subject, extremely technical, we’ve already seen the consequences of the 23s and the verification regime not working as it should. What I found as we got into this was that, the people working on it and including myself when I got into it, got caught up in what I refer to as “nightmare, dream, nightmare, dream, nightmare, dream” syndrome. What do I mean by that? You start looking at an issue. How do we verify that these missiles are actually being destroyed. Then you begin to have nightmares. “My God, what we are proposing isn’t good enough.” So you try to think about how to improve it. And that’s the dream. The dream comes along and now you dream how you are going to verify it. And the next day it’s another nightmare. As a result of this “nightmare, dream, nightmare, dream” syndrome we couldn’t get anywhere. Because it never ended. Every time you thought you were closing a loophole, our team, we ourselves would find ways around that, closing one loophole, and then opening another one. The result is no action is taken. You are paralyzed. Because you cannot come to closure on the issue; Recognizing that
“this is as good as we can get.” This got to the point where we were beginning to look at the prospect of going to inspect anywhere at any time.

Colonel Bob Linhard, who was the NSC point man on the INF treaty, wonderful man, and real easy guy to work with, dubbed this the “fruit-loops problem.” Fruit Loops cereal. Because, as he pointed out, we had reached the point in our proposal in which the Soviets could demand access to a Kellogg’s Fruit Loops factory in case something was being built there and we would have to grant it to them, and of course that was nonsense. We reached the point where the more stringent we made the verification and inspections on the Soviets, the more stringent they would be on us. So beyond Fruit Loops, we can get serious and talk about plants that we would let them into, in order to get into their plants. The Soviets saw that we were getting caught up in this and they tried to up the ante, so that they would show that they were more interested in verification than we were. In the end, we were able to say to them, “We know you are not serious, let’s both get serious about this and stop playing games.” It was very difficult for the folks back in Washington who were working on this problem, to come to closure with the issue, because of that “dream, nightmare” syndrome.

But eventually we did so. The program that we do have is the most stringent verification program ever. Again, obviously not perfect. It did involve site inspection, it involved continuous monitoring of the Soviet factory in Votkinsk, where the SS-20s were being made and where some missiles are still being made, although there are no more 20s coming out. We still have people there. This will all come to an end this year. The treaty permitted 13 years of inspection. That was based on the experts’ view that was about the time it would take for the missiles to become obsolescent and therefore their value would be reduced even if they were producing them. We had gotten rights to come on site to all their INF bases. There was an exchange of data, of photographs and diagrams and charts, and by and large the verification system worked quite well in terms of the way they were seeing problems and working them out. I attended the destruction of the last Pershing missile. General Medvedev was also there.

Q: Where was that?

GLITMAN: That was in Texas, in Marshall, Texas, we had a factory there. Where they were being destroyed. They just destroyed it by running the engine. It sort of died down, if you will, the flames come out at the back, and the rocket engine is gone, and than machines come and crush the airframe. That’s how those were destroyed. Others were destroyed in different ways. We had at the end of the negotiation a number of highly trained technical people, because we had to discuss such technical things as, “If we are going to allow the Soviets to keep this particular piece of equipment, how can we cut it apart so that the launcher can no longer raise the missile?” And we had folks who were engineers and were obviously familiar with the Soviet systems. They would guide the negotiators; this is what you can accept, this is what you can’t accept.

The treaty sets up a body to discuss questions and problems. The Special Consultative Group, sort of a committee. It continues to meet regularly. They had a lot of work to do. We got down into details about what you could and couldn’t bring in on an inspection. We put things in there, in verification, which didn’t exist. For example, we wanted to look inside the Soviet canisters, missiles come out in canisters from the factory. How can we be sure what is in there? And how
do we assure that they were bringing out an SS-25 which is very similar to SS-20, and not SS-20. There are ways that we could measure. We got them to agree that we could pop open, I think it was three of four times a year, and look inside a canister and determine that this had to be a 25 and not a 20. In addition to that, whatever the number of times was, the people who did sampling theory said that we had a very good sample number. It was enough to be fairly confident that we would be able to catch one if it was ever to come out. In addition, the question was what about the canisters that can’t be open? I, half-jokingly, half-seriously had said, “What about an x-ray machine?” One of the scientists said, “Anything big enough to see through that skin would have to cook everything between Votkinsk and the Urals.” And I said “Better yet!” It turned out that we put that in the treaty, the machine, but it didn’t exist. And the scientist and the engineers did create such a machine. Another thing that was foreseen was related to the SS-20 having three warheads, while it’s near relative, the SS-25 had only one. So in addition to various things that we could do and look at, we felt we needed some permission, agreement in the treaty, to take radioactive detectors of some sort with us, into those bases and pass the detector over the warhead, over the nosecone and say, “This has got a single one and this has got one, and oops! this one here has three.” It shouldn’t have three. We got that in there. Again, this is part of where that “dream, nightmare” syndrome can lead you to. It is not all bad, the syndrome, if it comes up with some things that we would be able to put in. But Fruit Loops, just to get back to them, that marked the extreme and I think after that we began to calm down.

A couple of other things that we need to talk about. We did find out, as we got near the end, that there were systems which we had not heard of before. We had them and the Soviets had similar systems. These are systems which launch satellites, and things like that, but they could look a lot like eliminated system. So we had to find ways to incorporate that. This was really sort of lack of communication within the U.S. government, and it was the same on their side. The people who were running these systems seemed to be unaware that we were dealing with missiles that had their range, and we were certainly unaware of their systems. Their stuff is probably fairly highly classified and I am sure they didn’t want everyone to know that they have test vehicles of these sorts. But, the Soviets had the same and we exchanged diagrams of what they look like and so on, and they finally did get included.

A few interesting things at the end. The final ending of the negotiation, when we were really heading towards the 8th of December when the treaty was to be signed. As late as Thanksgiving, Secretary Schultz and some of his people had to come over to Geneva to deal with detail questions. I really felt badly about his having to come but in fact what was left suddenly became the most important thing on Earth. Three weeks earlier, three months earlier, it wouldn’t have been given the same prominence, but now it’s what’s left. So we had all kinds of problems. Let me give you one quick example. And it’s instructive in other ways.

We wanted to be able to drive away, the cabs, the front ends of a semi-trailer, as all of our stuff was set up as a semi-trailer arrangement with the back of the semi-trailer, was where the missiles were. And you could drive away the front part. So our view for how to destroy the front part was to just drive it away. There was no sense in tearing it up, it’s the same kind of tractor that we use for tank transporters. The Soviets did not use semi-trailers. They all had one long body. So when we said that we wanted to drive away the front, they said, “That is good for you but we can’t, so you’ve got to figure out some way to let us keep the whole thing together.” That’s where the
experts had to come in. But we got hung up here. One of the issues in which Secretary Schultz and Akromayev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze got into this discussion was on how they were going to do it. It turned out that in some instances, we found that for us it was cheaper to destroy some of the back-ends, the trailers, rather than try to convert them to put tanks on. It was cheaper to buy the new ones than to convert the old ones. And Akromayev said, “You must be a very rich country to be able to blow these things away.” And of course, the point was that we are a very wealthy country, but it also demonstrated that we can come up with another system, one which made it possible to drive away the front and keep the back or not keep the back. These were some of the things that the senior officials were forced to deal with.

As it was, near the end we began to look at what was left in brackets. We’d go through the treaty and we’d put the brackets around the words of phrases that were not agreed upon. That’s how we proceeded. There were a fair number of brackets. I remember cabling back that we had 120 brackets. Many of them were interrelated. If you solved problem A, you’d solve B, C, D, E, F and G. So you might get rid of 10 brackets by solving one problem. But the people were quite concerned in Washington when we sent that cable. I just asked them to calm down, but wanted them to know that we had it all tracked. We knew that if we got A solved, here is what our B, C, D, and E are, and we will take the brackets off of that.

Near the very end, we had a terrible confrontation with the Soviets. It involved who gets to look inside what. The treaty is set up so that each side can look at the other side’s smallest object. And the Soviets wanted to see inside a container which could include the smallest part. And of course they wanted to get into the smallest stage of a Pershing missile. And we wanted therefore to see inside a canister which could hold the smallest stage of the SS-20. And they said, “No, you can’t do that, that is not correct, etc., etc.” They just wouldn’t give on it. At this point, I had been going day and night, and the Soviets had began double-teaming me. As we were getting into this issue. One time I’d have Medvedev opposite me, then I’d have Obukhov, and I was there alone. Finally after we caught on to what was going on, we’d look out the window if they came to our place, and if Medvedev got out of the car, I’d go back to the office and work on other stuff. John Woodworth would take over that meeting. But I got very tired. Not quite ill, but what really happened was that I began to get angry. Obukhov, on one occasion, went on and on without translation, and I said to him, “How about stopping and letting us have a translation?” And he just wouldn’t listen. He just kept going on and on in Russian. I got up and left the table. I went back and got a glass of orange juice. He suddenly went into English, I brought the orange juice back and he stayed in English. But I could feel myself really getting at the point where I was going to lose my temper. He had a tendency to go on at great length. He was covering every flank. He couldn’t just discuss this chair. He was afraid that you might conclude that by not discussing the location of the chair in the room you were leaving open the fact that maybe the chair could be somewhere else. You see what I am getting at? It’s probably a technique that you need to survive in a society like that, it could back you up in a corner if you didn’t. Make sure that every flank in your argument was covered. But, this went on and on.

On one occasion, this again in the last couple of days of going through this stuff I said to him, “Look, can’t you stop this dance of the seven veils and get to your position?” He turned to the Soviet interpreter and said, “What is this ‘dance of the seven veils’?” The interpreter said, “It’s an oriental dance.” I looked at Woodworth and said, “Now we are going to hear an explosion.”
And he did explode. “What do you mean, oriental?” And I said, “Look, it’s a dance, that’s all, veils are removed,” anyway, he was quite unhappy about that word.

Another episode, all this coming near the end. We had a couple of days, Saturday, Sunday, or whatever it was, and we were supposed to go over there, then they would call us up and say, “No don’t come now we are not ready yet. Don’t come now, but in another two or three hours.” It went on like that the whole day and on into the next day. It was obvious they didn’t have their instructions, they were missing their guidance. But they didn’t tell us that, they just kept putting us off. Finally, we went over there, and I forget what the issues were. Could have been some of this stuff we were just mentioning, verification stuff, which was mostly all that was left. Finally we go over there, as we were leaving the place, Obukhov said to me, “I am really sorry about yesterday and earlier today.” Let me back up here, what happened in fact, was I just said “Let’s go over there, ready or not.” So we did. And there they were. As we left, he said, “I am sorry that we had to carry on the way we did today, but in fact we simply didn’t have our guidance.” I said, “I assumed you didn’t have your guidance, why didn’t you just tell us that and tell us that you would let us know when you are ready?” But then he let drop that they had gone up to the Jura to ski on that day. He couldn’t have chosen a subject that was more likely to make me really furious. That they had kept us in the office waiting for them, while they had gone off and skied. So I grew angrier. This began to take a toll on me physically. My blood pressure is normally low, it must have been going through the roof at this point. Anyway. Years later when I began to think about it, I said to myself, “Wait a minute. They may not have gone skiing at all.” He may have just known or been told that one way to get my goat was to do something like that. I don’t know what the truth to that is, but in any case, I felt that I was getting angrier and began to question my judgment frankly. In addition to that, I got a phone call, four a.m., our time, from Jim Timbie, who was one of the people in the State Department who was sort of behind the scenes, deeply involved in all arms control issues, very able fellow, physicist by background. He called me up and said, “What are you guys doing there? You are changing some of the time arrangements, you are making it possible for the inspections regime to end before 13 years.” And so on. Normally, he is a very calm person, but he wasn’t calm on this occasion. The Secretary has told everyone that it was going to go 13 years and now you’ve made it possible that it might not be 13 years,” and I could feel myself getting upset. I explained to him that what we did essentially was to set it up in such a way that we couldn’t, would not find ourselves in the position where the Soviets would have us no longer inspecting their place, while they could still inspect at ours. This was designed to protect us from getting into that kind of spot. He said, “Okay” at the end of it. That night I had gone home, Leo Reddy drove me back, I remember, it was cold, and I was really feeling badly, didn’t really sleep well that day, came back the next day and at that point I realized that if they continued with their tactics I was ready to jump across the table and slug them. It was really getting to me. Therefore, I took myself out. I said, “John take over. I will be back tomorrow, I’ve got to leave or I am going to do something stupid if I stay here. It might be gratifying to do it, but it would be stupid.” John Woodworth took over and he worked again, late night. Next day I did come back. I had calmed down enough.

John Woodward was furious at the Soviets. He thought that he made a deal with them in which we could look into a container which could hold the smallest stage of a SS-20 and they could look at a container which could hold the smallest stage of a P-11. Obukhov suddenly said, “No, that’s not at all possible.” That’s when I came back in, he was backing away from it. So I went
through it again with Obukhov, I said, “Look, we can’t have the situation where you get to open a box which can hold the smallest stage of our missile but we don’t get to look into a box which can hold your equivalent. That is just not going to wash. Especially with SS-20 involved.” I knew that we could look at the box size of their smallest missile, which was their cruise missile, a box that could hold that. But I did not think Congress would appreciate coming back and saying, “They get to look at the smallest stage of the Pershing and we can’t look at a box that will hold the smallest stage of SS-20.” They tried to argue “Well, we don’t have stages.” I said, “Oh, yeah? Look here in the Memorandum of Understanding, the MOU,” which had all the data exchange in there. “It shows you have stages, here is what size it is, it says so right here.” “Well, we don’t take them apart.” “It doesn’t matter whether you take them apart or not,” I said. “You just list that.” He was being very obstinate.

At that point, it was getting late. We were scheduled to leave the next day for Washington. We had an Air Force plane. They were going to have to fly commercial. We had time, an Air Force plane would wait for us, but a commercial flight would not wait for them. We were doing the U.S. copy of the treaty, typing it in Geneva. Helen Moses from ACDA did the typing, did the wonderful job. We were ready to go, we had a way to get back, they didn’t. I said at that point, “Look, we are all tired. Why don’t we take a break, come back at four a.m or five a.m. and conclude with that?” And I walked out. Picked up my books and walked out. And the delegation followed me. He came running afterwards. “What’s wrong? What’s wrong?” I said, “I told you what’s wrong. If you get to look at the box that could hold the smallest stages of our missile, we are going to be able to look inside a box which would be small enough to hold the smallest stage of the SS-20.” I felt it just wouldn’t be fair. He thought about it for a moment and said, “Look, if that’s all there is to it, we can work it out. You want to be able to say that you can open a box that would hold no more than the smallest stage of our missile.” “That’s right,” I said, “we want to be able look in something that small.” Both sides were trying to get into the smaller box, not to be looking into a bigger box. He agreed to that. We went back to the room together and the delegation reassembled and we put that together very quickly and it was over with.

That still left a couple of problems. One was that we had to initial the treaty. I received authorization earlier from Washington to initial for the U.S., and we had one outstanding issue. That was which Russian word we would use to interpret the English word “undertakings.” That was the very last thing we resolved. Let me set out a little background on that. It is very interesting in light of the recent question how do you say “I apologize” in Chinese. At one point, I’ll try to stay away from names in this, near the end of the negotiating sessions, it would have been in November, we had a visit from one person from Washington, and a similar visit from someone from Moscow. Both wanting to help us reach a conclusion of the treaty. The visitors sat down and began going over various parts of the treaty, which we had been working on. The Soviet visitor focused on a section of the treaty, sort of normal boiler plate, it has to do with what we call non- circumvention arrangements, if I have my copy of the treaty here I can find it. Well, I don’t have my copy of the treaty so I will have to wing it a bit. Basically we were dealing with the part of the treaty which we had picked up from the old SALT agreement. It was boiler plate, it was not controversial. The purpose of this section was to in effect say, you think it will be common sense if you sign a treaty and you intend to carry it out, that you wouldn’t do anything to contravene it, circumvent it. Those were the kind of concepts.
The Soviet visitor wanted to change that. Wanted to make it a little more open, looser. What was the issue here? The issue gets back to those programs of cooperation. We wanted that part of the treaty to read in a way which would make it possible for us to continue our programs of cooperation. Not place us in a situation where the Soviets could argue that an American and a Brit sat down and began to discuss the possibility of setting up some new program, under the pattern of cooperation, maybe a new missile or a new part for an old missile, and the Soviets would wind up saying this is contrary to the INF agreement. In addition to that, as I said, that language had been approved. Congress was used to it, they had seen the language before. The Soviet began to probe. Maybe we could add something else that could meet these concerns of ours. The American visitor said, “Well, what about adding the word ‘undertakings’ to this?” That we would not engage in any activities or undertakings which would not be consistent with the treaty. Something like that. I said to the visitor, quietly, “That’s an awful word. We can’t use that.” And the visitor said, “I know what I am doing.” So it stayed in there. I went back to the office, I saw our lawyer, again, Karen Lawson at the time, now Karen Look. I told her about this and she said, “Oh my Gosh.” I said, “Look, we are going to have to find a way around this.” She said, “Go back in the afternoon and try to get Obukhov to back off of this.” I said, “I’ll try.” I did but I didn’t have much hope for that.

The next thing I did, however, before I went back down to the afternoon meeting, was to get a hold of a thesaurus, and look up the word ‘undertakings.’ As I suspected, it had five different meanings. And it’s not all bad. It went from a discussion or undertaking as something you arrive at over a cup of coffee, to something very formal, like an act. Like the Helsinki Final Act. I called in our interpreter, our head translator, Dimitri Erensburger. I said, “Dimitri, see this word? Here is the thesaurus. See this English version of it? Please find a Russian word that equates to this very formal activity. I don’t want it to be loose, it has got to be a very formal activity, something like the Formal Act of Helsinki.” He said, “I will try.” He came back and he said, “I found a Russian word. Which equates to something like an undertaking, something like the Final Act of Helsinki.” I said, “Good.” He said, “It’s an archaic word.” I said, “It’s in the dictionary?” “Yes, it’s in the great Bolshoi Dictionary.” I said, “Fine. When the time comes to translate from English into Russian, we must have that word in Russian.” I said, “Don’t give in on that point.” And he didn’t. And at the end, the very last thing Obukhov said to me, of substance, was “You have your Russian word.” This issue came up frequently enough during the hearings, I was asked about it. “Why did you get something new here? What is this new word?” I was just able to say, “yes it’s a new word, it was placed there, but here is how I dealt with it. I found a Russian word that equates to a formal act, and therefore it cannot apply just to some general conversation. And subsequently, one of the Senators came up to me and said, because we had to turn over all of our transcripts to them, that’s another story linked up to SDI actually, in any case, he looked it up and he said, “I understand what you did. I see what happened. And why you did what you did.” So that’s how we, that was the last thing we settled.

The next morning we arranged to take the Soviets, Obukhov, General Medvedev, and one of their secretaries, along with their computer on the Air Force plane with us. It was cleared, we could do that. As we left Geneva at least officially for the last time, the whole delegation piled in the buses and we left for the airport. Before leaving, I went up to the office that I occupied and the floor that we were on, it was filled with plastic bags of left-over pizzas and so on. I got to the point I ate so many pizzas during that period that I couldn’t eat pizza for months afterwards. And
all of us, I mentioned I got to a point where I wasn’t feeling well, every one of us had sleep deprivation. I called a doctor over at one point, and he said, “It’s nothing, you are just exhausted.” That’s when I pulled myself out of it for a bit. He said, “You are just exhausted.” But I noticed I wasn’t eating. The guys all said after, the reason there were all these empty pizzas and stuff, most of the folks figured those of us who were over 40 or 50, the younger ones were fine, just stopped eating. We were working 24-hours a day, day after day, and it was a strange phenomena. Couldn’t look at food. It’s quickly ended, that phenomena. But in any case, there were all these mounds of stuff that we threw out. The shredding machine was working over time. It was a bit like a disaster zone that we had left behind us.

We had sent over to us the treaty paper. Beautiful, fine, meant to last, paper. The Department of State, I guess, hadn’t really prepared for this negotiation, so they didn’t have a lot of paper available, but they sent us all they had. Helen Moses couldn’t make a mistake. Thank goodness Helen Moses didn’t make any mistakes, or only very few. A few things that turned up, it may not have been her doing, it may have been the people who plugged in some geographic coordinates for location 73W 21S or something like that, and it was 22S, whatever. A few of those things, we corrected when we got back to Washington. But we made it through with the paper on hand. We did start initialing the treaties that night instead of going to bed and getting up at four, we went ahead and initialed the treaty. I don’t have any photos, some of the guys were taking, people were taking pictures at the time, never got a picture of that. Jeff Ankley went ahead and bought a bunch of pens, INF treaty pens, which he handed out. I was using them. I would sign with the pen and then hand it back to the folks. Good move on his part. Ankley had been in Vietnam. He was our exec, doing a fine job at keeping morale up during this. He said this was closest, in terms of stress, the closest he’d ever seen to combat. He’s a big fellow, but could fall asleep in the strangest places. He was surviving on Cokes and cigarettes and his own energy.

We had had that “ceremony” and then on the airplane as we flew back, we initialed some of the annexes. One of them we began over Chartres and the pilot sent back to say here is where you are as you initial this. We flew back with the Soviets, after a bit everybody went to sleep, including the Soviets. They were hoping to arrive before Gorbachev, but we didn’t. We just missed, his plane landed just before ours at Andrews. I guess the Soviets wanted to be there to meet him when he arrived. At the end of the flight, we get near Andrews, and I mentioned the Soviets brought along the secretary. It was the first time any of us had laid any eyes on the Soviet staff. We always would invite everybody to functions, but they only invited the officers, not the staff. Anyway, this was a nice young lady. They also brought with them their computer. It was in a box, tied up with the most magnificent knots. Everyone commented on what a beautiful way they tied it together with these knots. I guess, we had already moved to floppy disks and they had not gotten to that stage. They basically had to bring their computer, it was the hard drive, and a good size box. Anyway, as we approached Andrews, a little before landing, the Soviets were awake and suddenly a pillow fight broke out among the Americans. And the Soviets were wondering, “What the heck are these guys and gals up to?” But anyway, the plane came down and that leaves us with a very long ratification process and then we are finished with this.

The treaty was set to come up for hearings very soon after we arrived there, after Christmas. It wasn’t until May, I forget the exact date, when the treaty was finally accepted by the Senate. I spent full time on that. Chris and Herkie the dog came over. They flew at our own expense, and
we found sort of a temporary one-bedroom apartment to stay in with the dog. We just settled down to live there until the treaty got done. We just left everything behind in Geneva, and that’s all we could do at that point, there was no time to go mess with it. We both got a chance to go back to Washington, and I got a chance to see to some extent how the Congress works. We were very well received and treated. There were lots of events that we went to. The president had me over for the signing of the treaty, and other things like that. I felt good about it. I was given an office up on the Hill. Dave Jones and others came and helped, Ron Bartek, another guy who was active in the agreement, in the treaty. I should back up and make a point about Ron and some of the others.

Each one of these annexes required someone to work on it. And people like Ron Bartek and others, I should have all their names, I will try to eventually get them all into the transcript and not leave them out. I assigned each one of them. Someone else looked at this part of the acts, on verification, the annex on elimination. Leo Reddy already had a really tough job. He had to get the treaties that we wrote with all of the five baseing countries. What we did there, we in effect were allowing the Soviets to come onto let’s say Germany, or Netherlands, or Belgium or Italy, or the U.K., to come into our base and inspect to see what is in our base, but it was on their sovereign territory and the Soviets had to come through their customs and all. So Leo had to work on these arrangements between each of the countries and with the Soviets who were going in there. And that took quite a task. Obviously, we had full cooperation from allies and we worked it out completely, but it was a painstaking job. He did an excellent job on that. I don’t think there was ever any negative repercussion from that. So we had that done. And the same thing with the annexes, as I said. Individuals were put in charge of them. John Woodworth and I didn’t go to all of those, we just couldn’t we were working with Obukhov on the treaty itself. As events occurred, one or the other of us would find out about it, if we had to make a decision we would. And we were always in constant contact. John was really a good friend and he and his family, we became really close. We had lot of good times together. He was a good, calm fellow in a tough situation. And quite smart, able to deal with the Soviets. Between us we managed to keep abreast of what was going on. At that point five or six were in the circles, as we were coming to a conclusion.

The hearings usually begin with the secretary of state, secretary of defense and other principle speakers on the U.S. side, and then the negotiators go next. We had to meet with both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. I felt pretty much in command of the subject, frankly. So I was reasonably comfortable going through this. There were a couple of times when it got a little difficult early on, but most of the questions we had anticipated. The most difficult period, one which continues to have ramifications today, involved the Armed Services Committee. We had some questions from Senator Nunn over the legal language, I remember there was a clause in the treaty, it is still there, that begins with “Not withstanding” and he said that his professor at law school told him never to use that phrase and he didn’t want to see it there. It was a complex grammatical sentence, trying to deal with issues that were not easy to state simply. I think he eventually agreed with it. Some of the other senators. I remember Senator Levin seemed to agree with us, that it made sense, but to Senator Nunn it did not. I know eventually, he signed it, he agreed to the treaty and I am sure it satisfied him in the end.
The toughest group of questions were from Senator Quayle. Here again, I mention to you things like these test missiles that sort of popped up late in the day, we were not even aware of them. During the hearings Senator Quayle began to talk about systems that could be considered INF systems, and he made reference to some of them, and they sounded like what are called “black systems,” systems that are not covered under the normal course of business. They are not in the budget, they are like the U2. It was a black system before it came out and the people learned about it. I had no idea what he was talking about. He began to describe some of these things, and he kept pushing me to say is this covered or isn’t it. I kept trying to tell him, I finally said, “I feel very uncomfortable answering the question. Talking about systems that you know about and I don’t. And you are asking me to say whether or not they’d be covered and I frankly can not be considered authoritative on this subject.” That word “authoritative” came up frequently in the context of the ABM treaty, who was authoritative and who wasn’t, and then they said in INF that they were going to make us all say that we were authoritative, which I was prepared to do, but not on this one. Because I had no idea what he was talking about. But I do now. Years later I finally found out what it was all about. It was a difficult moment.

At one point, I kind of saw what he was getting at. He seemed to be wanting to leave open a loop-hole for us, basically. We had a break at one point, and I remember saying to him, “Look, I think I know what you are after, but please don’t keep pushing me for a more and more precise response, because it’s going to make it harder to achieve what you would like to achieve.” Which was as I said, try to leave it more open. But he kept going after it and eventually got into a long argument about what is a weapon. Of course, the other senators joined in. I finally said to Senator Quayle, “there is a simple definition.” He then asked, “Why didn’t you define a weapon?” I said, “Look, we can’t define it. It’s a commonly understood word, international law permits that, commonly understood words. If you start getting into that, you’ll end up having to attach what is Roget’s unabridged Thesaurus and the Great Soviet encyclopedia, as annex to the treaty so you can define every word.” He kept pushing and I told him, as I said, “If you keep pushing you are going to get an answer you don’t want. I think I know what you want, and I am somewhat sympathetic to trying to keep it open for a new system, but don’t push me.” He did and consequently I gave a simple definition of a weapon as something that damages or destroys. We talked about, well is it a weapon if it does this and it does that, finally I said, “I can’t be authoritative on this.”

It was a tough time. Of course the transcript is available and I have it, books have come out afterwards, but even when I read it today, I get upset, I realize that it wasn’t helpful to this cause as I saw it. I think most of the senators, I could tell from their comments, they understood what I was up against. But, everyone has the right, they ought to ask questions, senatorial courtesy as there should be. I did my best to give him the answers and the Department of State Washington lawyers backed me up. They came back with a definition which pretty much tracked what I just gave you now. That would be it. It was in some ways quite frustrating, not knowing what he was talking about. It was one of those things that could have been done better. We negotiators didn’t know about what these guys were doing, this black system, because we didn’t have access to it, but they should have known what we were doing. And they should have been aware that we could be impinging on them. But that connection was not made. It’s okay. As far as I can tell, it worked out all right. We passed it, but it was a difficult moment.
The treaty was ratified, there were only five who voted against. I think I can still name them, but I won’t. We had a very good outcome in terms of support for which we were appreciative. To wrap it up, I would give Gorbachev the last word. In his memoirs, he says it was the INF treaty that made it all possible afterwards. That’s what ended the Cold War. It was the last battle, and we ended it. If we had not succeeded, God knows what we would be facing today. It might not be NATO any longer, it might have turned out very badly. But we did it. It took both diplomacy and the potential of force. You couldn’t do without it. And that’s again where the peace movement, I felt, had missed the point. The Soviets were not going to give us something for nothing. We had to prove, to demonstrate on the ground that we could get the missiles in, that NATO was going to do this. That made the difference. All of the logic in the world won’t help you if you can’t, in fact, carry this thing out. As I said, the question about the continuation of basing some of these systems in Europe is another issue. There were some problems with 23s as we discussed earlier. In the end none of that really mattered. We wouldn’t be where we are now if it hadn’t been for the treaty coming out, the whole activity, not just the treaty coming out where it did.

The next little bit is what happens when we go back to Brussels.

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**MARTIN VAN HEUVEN**
Deputy Chief of Mission

*Marten Van Heuven was born in the Netherlands in 1932. He received his BA and LLB from Yale University and his MIA from Columbia University. His positions abroad included Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn and Geneva. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on January 31, 2003.*

**Q: In ’82, whither?**

VAN HEUVEN: By the late spring, I had been paneled to go to Geneva as DCM. I regarded this as a dream post, having been to Geneva as a student, having served there for long periods at conferences - the Law of the Sea, Human Rights - speaking good French, knowing people there, liking Switzerland, loving Geneva, and having basically walked every street on foot in Geneva during my eight months of TDY, and returning to the UN environment that I had cut my teeth on in the beginning when I was in L in New York and in Geneva.

The ambassador was Geoffrey Swaebe, a senior businessman from California. He had been head of the May Company. He was a personal friend of Nancy Reagan’s. He and Mrs. Swaebe were self-assured, approachable people. Geoff had a very good sense for people and situations. He could not have reached that stage in business life without those qualities. I had one interview with him in Washington, at the end of which I was informed that he had chosen me as his DCM. So I was looking forward to an ambassador I didn’t know but whom I thought I could work with. So, in fact, in my last month of the Seminar, I clocked out for about a week and went to Geneva.
and got briefed there and returned, finished the Seminar, took my summer vacation, and went to post.


Q: What mission was this?

VAN HEUVEN: This was the United States Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations. I have never had a visiting card with such a long title before or after. I was the DCM. Our offices were located in a spanking new building overlooking the lake and the United Nations, on the west side of the lake. I was parked for a couple of weeks in the apartment that had been occupied by my predecessor, Don Eller. But the mission had located a residence across the lake in Chene Bourg, north of Old Town. It was a brand new villa surrounded by a wall which I’m sure our security officer liked for that reason. It was a spacious and elegant house with a nice garden. By the time Ruth joined me, I was already installed. Like the residence that we enjoyed in Bonn, this one was spanking new. We put it to good use. I had to, because the entertainment responsibilities of the job were enormous. But I can come back to that later.

What was the post like? It is a post that handles the U.S. relations with a large number of organizations. These included the UN proper (with the Office of Human Rights), plus UNCTAD [UN Committee on Trade and Development], the International Telecommunications Union, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the UN High Commission for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, the International Wildlife Association and others. We were also doing business with the International Committee on Migration [ICM]. There are a lot of other UN-associated organizations in Geneva. There were also many NGOs. We dealt with them all. When I got there, the U.S. Mission was in a heavy operational relationship with ICM and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is a Swiss organization that implements the Geneva Conventions. There had been incidents and many deaths in the refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra, and Shatila. There was an immediate need for moving refugees. I found myself involved in the logistics of those operations. Typically, when things like that happen in the world, NGOs get involved. You don’t see much about this operational side in the press, but things have to be done and paid for, and the systems management is often in U.S. hands. That is where the U.S. Mission in Geneva came in.

There were other negotiations in Geneva that involved the U.S. but that were not part of the U.S. Mission. The START negotiation was independent of the U.S. Mission. It had its own ambassadors. The CCD, where I had served in my earlier days, was operating independently with its own ambassador. The GATT and everything that later became the World Trade Organization was handled by yet another American ambassador. They were all independent and we had no direct policy relationship with them, except that the Mission did provide the logistics for all of these operations in terms of the housing, offices, and transportation.

Q: It seems like you should have gone through the Conrad Hilton School of Hotelerie.
VAN HEUVEN: We had a lot of visitors. All these organizations attracted many delegations throughout the year, some of them quite large. The WHO would draw the presence of an Assistant Secretary of Health and Education, but also of the Surgeon General, Dr. “Chick” Koop. The annual meeting and the meeting of the board of the International Labor Organization would also bring in large delegations. The officers in the political session in the Mission followed the WHO, the IPU, the ILO, the WMO, and WIPO. I deliberately mention these acronyms because Geneva is a town of acronyms. We had to keep track of what was going on in the bureaucracies of these organizations because, typically, up to one-third of the funding was American. We had major equities in many of the programs of these organizations. So we were heavily involved in watching and influencing the operations and the policies of these organizations. This meant that the ambassador and I had direct dealings with the directors general of the WHO and the ILO, Dr. Mahler and Monsieur Blanchard, and their colleagues in other organizations. We also entertained them and other senior staffs, and they entertained us. I already mentioned that the entertainment level at Geneva was intense. It wasn’t just all a matter of eating and drinking. It was affording opportunities all day long to work with contacts and to get our job done.

The role of Ambassador Swaebe was unusual. He had no questions about the fact that he was the boss. But he had his own notion of how a DCM ought to operate. An example of that approach was that we had a daily staff meeting which he attended, but which I chaired. At some point in the proceedings, I would of course call on the ambassador, as I did on the others. But he never interfered. The other element of his approach to dealing with me was that he wanted to spend a lot of time with me. Typically, I would be in early to read the cable traffic. A little later, we would have our staff meeting. Then I was ready to get to my desk. But after staff meeting, Geoff Swaebe wanted to sit down for a nice long chat. It made me uneasy because I could just visualize the in-box growing by the minute. In retrospect, however, Geoff Swaebe’s approach was a fine way of operating. It served him, because he heard a lot from me. And it served me, because I had his support. His approach was to give me full authority. He backed me up in public even though he might tell me later in private that I might have done something differently. So I knew that I did not have to worry about the ambassador. As a result, I had a lot of authority in the Mission, since everybody knew that the relationship was solid. Ruth and I got along well with the Swaebes. We shared some very amusing and funny incidents. Swaebe did not like to go to bed late, so by the time it was 10:30 at dinner parties at the residence, he would tell me, “I’m going up stairs now. You say ‘Goodbye’ to my guests.” At another time, we got instructions to make the residence available for a dinner for four people. The ambassador was not to attend the dinner. It was a mystery to us what was going on. We proceeded as ordered, and the staff set the table for four. The ambassador arranged to be out of the house. Four men showed up, had dinner and left. Geoff had told me earlier, “I want you to come to the house when they’re gone and we’ll just chew the fat for a bit.” So around 10:30 in the evening I turned up at the residence and then, just by chance, as I was leaving, we looked at the guest book. Like perfect gentlemen, all four guests had signed their name in the guest book. So we knew what was going on.

Q: What was it?

VAN HEUVEN: The visitors were there to discuss the Israel/Palestine issue. It was arranged out of Washington. It was on U.S. ground.
Geoff also had an original approach to efficiency reports. He explained to me that in the May Company, when they hired somebody, he would have that person tell the board what he proposed to do for the company. That was then committed to writing. Then, at the end of the year, that same person had to take that checklist back to the board with a notation as to what he had accomplished. So the board could see the difference, if any. Operating on that principle, he said, “You write your efficiency report and I will cut out all the cr-p.” In the Foreign Service at that time, it was already customary to ask officers to provide at least raw input for efficiency reports. It was then the rater’s job to put it all together. But Geoff took the process one step further. He said the only person who can really know what he’s doing is the person himself, and the only person who is the best judge of saying whether the job he has done is the person himself. It made sense to me and I found it helpful. It cut through the mythical notion that efficiency reports are somehow magically written by raters who spend an entire year thinking about their subordinate’s performance. Swaebe’s introduction of real world practices seemed to make sense to me. I did of course run into the fact that my predecessor, Don Eller, being a nice guy, had been giving top ratings to everybody he rated for several years. It fell to me to ratchet that down a little bit. The practice of overinflated reports was widely known to be common in the Foreign Service, but the situation in Geneva was out of bounds. My new approach, of course, was not all that welcome. But with the ambassador’s authority, I did make it stick.

The issues. One issue that I dealt with directly was as cochairman - with the British DCM - of the Geneva Group. This was the group of countries that contributed the most money to the United Nations system. So, Switzerland was on this group even though it was not a member of the UN. Our job was to keep UN budgets in check. These were the Reagan years and there was administration and congressional pressure to keep the exponential expansion of the expenditures of these organizations in check. We had an Assistant Secretary of State by the name of Newell, a young man. He had come in as a worker bee with the Reagan election and had been rewarded with the job. He tried to carry out this zero growth budget idea, which caused all sorts of difficulties, given the fact that even inflation would cause a certain increase every year in these already large budgets. Nonetheless, the two officers who were working with me on this, and my cochairman, the British deputy chief of mission, David Moss, spent a lot of time not only jawboning the Directors Generals of the organizations, but also going into detailed budgetary review of the budgets of these organizations. That was a complex and difficult undertaking, because these financial directors held high UN rank and did not take kindly to having outsiders come in and look over their shoulders, because they had been used to doing business for many years without that sort of supervision. So we found ourselves in an uphill fight all the way. While we claimed some success, it was never enough to satisfy our masters in Washington.

Q: I would have thought that Geneva would have been a hotbed or a softbed of time servers, bureaucrats, of other nations, a good place to put people who were the relatives of the powers that be in their country and that this would have meant a heavily padded bureaucracy there.

VAN HEUVEN: It really wasn’t. At my level I was dealing with top-level people, who were bright, motivated, turf conscious, and mission conscious. The Director General of the World Health Organization had programs that any reasonable person would say were good, to eradicate disease, tackle HIV, and go after all sorts of smaller diseases that could be handled effectively by the WHO, and were. He had around him a group of lieutenants who were excellent in their field,
good doctors, good administrators, and a lot of loyal others who spent many days and months in unattractive countries trying to implement those programs. As to the work of the UNHCR, most of the staff was in the worst parts of the world trying to deal with immense refugee problems in camps. If you wanted to have a soft life, you would not want to be engaged in these activities. You wouldn’t want to work for UNHCR. The International Committee of the Red Cross was always active, in dangerous places where there was conflict. At every level, people were risking their lives to do their job implementing the Geneva Conventions. Sure, there was always the odd loafer, the odd obviously misassigned person. But in my time I found more chaff and misplaced patronage at the Secretariat in New York than I did in Geneva.

Now, Geneva is, of course, a pleasant place to be. Some of the sinecures, like the staff of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which droned on year after year after year, got bored and became a bit of a bore. But to a large degree, Geneva was doing the things that the world wanted, like delivering the mail, forecasting the weather, and protecting patents. The international staffs were smart folk who knew what they wanted and who were willing to fight for their budgets and argue for their programs.

Q: What other points should we cover in this period?

VAN HEUVEN: I was often confronted by questions from my colleagues who were posted in Geneva for the first time. They would call on me and ask: “Well, what do I do?” because this is not a bilateral post. There is not a government to talk to. There is not a country to observe and report on. And my answer was that all they needed to do was get involved in the operation of the international organizations that the diplomatic missions had relationships with. Most of my colleagues took that advice, and had happy assignments, though I was surprised to see how ill-prepared many diplomats, including some of our own, were for this multilateral work. It was not something that they were used to. Certainly, a lot of Europeans were not, although many Europeans, once they got used to it, were very good at it. It involved giving direction to large bureaucracies, focusing on the politics and policy issues in the Executive Committee or the Board or the General Conference of a certain organization, exercising advisory roles of some sensitivity to visiting delegations on all sorts of issues, whether they had to deal with the Israeli-Palestine conflict or the China issue or the Cuba issue. I should mention another realm of activity, namely human rights. The human rights part of the UN Secretariat was located in Geneva. In the old days, I had been a member of our delegation to the Human Rights Commission, working for Mary Lord and then Marietta Tree. So I knew how that operated. This time, I was watching Dick Schifter, who arrived as the new representative to the Human Rights Commission. Dick sought me out because it was clear that I needed his help and he needed mine. He needed mine to do his business, to meet people, to lobby, to have access to people, and to entertain. Ruth and I frequently did so at our house. We would have a large number of people for dinner - Dick and his human rights crowd. Dick also needed advice on how to operate within the Human Rights Commission. That was a sensitive thing because Dick, who became a very good friend and has remained a good friend ever since, came from a school of thought - lawyer that he was - that held that if somebody said “I will do this,” then that would happen. But, as he assiduously lobbied over dinners, drinks, and otherwise, with beautiful argumentation for a particular position or a particular vote, he discovered that, when the vote occurred, those colleagues whom he thought had told him they would vote one way, did not. And he would come to me and say, “Well,
wasn’t he supposed to vote with us? They told me they would.” I had to say, “That’s the way the world works. This is not a legal setting that you’re in. You’re in a political setting, where you have to realize that maybe they accepted your dinner invitation because they felt no way out, but their reaction to the dinner may have been to get as far away from the U.S. as they could as soon as they went home. You’re just seeing the effect of that.” Anyhow, something like that was always going on and Dick soon learned the ropes, and he became a superb head of delegation. I was not a member of the delegation myself, although I think there were times when my name was on the list. At any given time, there might be 20-50 delegations in town for all sorts of meetings. Some of them were one-man shows; they didn’t need our care or input or help. Others needed it all the time. One issue which always drew the Mission staff and us in was that of Israeli representation. We had to be ever watchful for efforts to throw Israel out of meetings. That’s where the political section and I did get involved a lot. We would pull the strings of the resident network in Geneva in order to keep that from occurring.

But how do you control all these loose horses? Ambassador Swaebe made it very clear that he wanted every U.S. head of delegation, no matter how small the delegation or insignificant the meeting, to call on him on his first day in town. With his authority he could pretty well make this requirement stick. When he wasn’t there, they called on me. When they called on him, I sat in. So at least he and I had an idea as to why the people were there, who sent them, what they were supposed to achieve. Then we would tell them about any problems that we saw for them. Some of them were very happy to get advice. Others felt that this was just an intrusion on their prerogatives to operate on their own. So an awful lot of diplomacy was required in dealing with our countrymen, who all felt that they had been chosen by God to come to Geneva to do the Lord’s work and who were miffed if they felt we were trying to keep them from doing so.

I should also mention the fact that we were backstopping the logistics of all the other permanent delegations. This took quite an amount of my time. The afternoon of my arrival, on my first day at post, I went to a reception. Kitty Fields, the wife of Ambassador Lou Fields, then ambassador to the CCD, came up to me and said, pointing her finger at my tie and grabbing it, “You have my garden furniture.” From that point on I knew that I was going to have to deal with a lot of goods - furniture, china, official cars - and that I better be tough. We had a lot of ambassadors in town. Ed Rowney was doing START, with his deputy, Jim Goodby. Both had the rank of ambassador. Paul Nitze was doing the intermediate range missile negotiations. He and his deputy, Mike Glitman, both ranked ambassador. Ambassador Lou Fields was at CCD. There was an ambassador of GATT. So there were just six resident ambassadors right there, not to mention the one that was dealing with UNCTAD. At one time, I counted 13 persons in town with the rank of ambassador, not all of whom were resident, but seven of whom were. They all needed housing, official cars, drivers, and something to show like china and garden furniture. Guess on whose door they came knocking? They didn’t want to bother Ambassador Swaebe with those things but they sure as hell wanted them from me. So I had to be judicious, polite, nice, and tough. I had only so much to give out. The problem was that each of them was funded in different ways, not always by the State Department. So, in some cases, we controlled the funds and sometimes they came with their own funds, and they handled these funds themselves. So there was lots of material on which to exercise diplomacy right in-house.

Q: Do you have any stories about prima donnas?
John Davis Lodge comes to mind. Though quite old, he was alive, almost miraculously, in those days and he was the ambassador in Bern. When he tried to stand, he had on occasion to be literally supported by his staff. Despite all of this, John Lodge added a certain cachet to that position and gave it a class that only a Lodge could. I had worked on the UN delegation headed by his younger brother, so I was familiar with the Lodge style. Lodge saw himself as the prime American in Switzerland. Since he was the bilateral ambassador, he was right. But when people came to Geneva they came not to Switzerland; they came for UN business. In many cases, Lodge couldn’t have cared less. But when he thought about the personage who was coming was within his realm, he did get interested and he would come down. Once, George Bush, who was then Vice President, came to introduce a new American position at the CCD. That made Lou Fields the ambassador he was dealing with. Geoff was not in town. I was Charge. Lodge was coming down. So I had Fields and Lodge, and myself. Every other ambassador in town also wanted a piece of the Vice President. Bush came alone without Mrs. Bush. So we agreed that there would be no spouses at the airport. But as I arrived at the airport, there was Mrs. Kitty Fields. And there was John Lodge, who was almost literally steaming because, as he put it, “The Vice President will come off this plane and he will see you and he will immediately say, “Where is Francesca (Mrs. Lodge)?’” He was hot under the collar about the fact that Lou had broken ranks. But what Lou had done was what you would expect Lou to do. He had broken the rules. “I’m going to get Kitty in there.” Well, what then happened was that Bush came off the plane. Lodge was the first to greet him. Then the rest of us greeted him. Then Lodge, who suspected the worst, thought that Fields would play another dirty trick on him, and usurp his place in the motorcade. So he quickly moved away and got into the Vice President’s car, just to be sure that he would be riding with the Vice President, which he was supposed to do anyway, but he just wanted to be sure. At that point, my wife, who was handling the press, released the press and they came with all their photo apparatus. The next day, on the front page of the “International Herald Tribune,” there was a picture of Kitty Fields with her arms open as if to embrace Mr. Bush, and Lou Fields standing behind her, and me right in the middle of the picture, but no Lodge. I called the DCM in Bern at once and said, “Brace yourself when the ambassador reads the press tomorrow.” He handled it as best he could.

Some of the ambassadors were hard to handle. Ed Rowney was modest. With Paul Nitze I never had any problems. Others were more difficult sometimes.

The entertainment part of the job was huge. The count for one year in our house was 4,000 guests for food and drink. One reception was for the executive board of the World Health Organization - all the surgeons general of the world. They all came. I don’t think they had any idea who I was. To them, the reception was just the Americans giving the party in somebody’s house. But I noticed one thing. Nobody smoked. But they drank like fish.

Q: Maybe this is a good time to quit. Let’s pick this up next time in ’84.

There is a story of my departure from Geneva because I was kicked out by the next ambassador, a political appointee who had been head of GSA. He was uncomfortable in Geneva and had difficulty adjusting to a life that he didn’t know and a role he had trouble grasping. He treated the Mission officers and me roughly, though in the end he gave me a
courteous send-off. For a while he tried to do without a DCM. Eventually, the system reasserted itself.

MELVILLE BLAKE  
Delegate, US Delegation to International Telecommunications  
Geneva (1983)

Melville Blake was born in Lexington, Mississippi in 1924. He attended Mississippi State College. He joined the army and served for four years and then attended Georgetown University where he studied in the school of Foreign Service. Following his graduation he worked as an editor in the CIA for a year and then went to Germany. Mr. Blake was interview by Thomas Dunnigan in 1999.

BLAKE: I did that for about four or five months. Then, I was asked to be foreign policy adviser on the U.S. delegation to Geneva on an International Telecommunications Union negotiation, or rather, the western hemisphere region thereof. This was a satellite communications negotiation, which markedly expanded the number of channels that are available for all of the western hemisphere countries. The negotiations lasted some six weeks and were successful. The communications adviser to the Under Secretary reckoned the financial benefit to the United States at $20 billion.

Q: At that time, you were working out of Washington.

BLAKE: Yes. At that time, I was working for Diana Lady Dugan, who was a special assistant to the Under Secretary for Technology handling international telecommunications affairs.

RONALD D. FLACK  
Political Counselor, European Office of the United Nations  

Ronald D. Flack was born in Minnesota in 1934. After receiving his bachelor’s degree from the University of Minnesota he served in the US Army from 1957-1960. His career has included positions in Athens, Manila, Abidjan, Paris, Algiers, Geneva, and Copenhagen. Mr. Flack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 7, 1998.

Q: Fascinating. You left the management in 1983 and where did you go then?

FLACK: I was assigned as political counselor to the U.S. Mission to the UN and International Organizations in Geneva.
**Q:** You did that from when to when?

FLACK: I did that for one year actually, 1983-84. I was political counselor there and we had an ambassador, a very nice gentleman, Geoffrey Swaebe, who was later ambassador to Belgium, a political appointee, a friend of President Reagan’s. He was there for about a year, as I recall, and left and the deputy permanent representative was Marten van Heuven. A new ambassador came in, a political appointee, who was an extraordinarily difficult man. He fired Marten a month or so after he arrived. It was one of these situations where Marten, who is an extraordinarily talented, highly professional officer, was basically trying to run the mission when this totally inexperienced and very unprofessional political appointee came in. The ambassador did not like the fact that there was somebody working under him who knew what he was doing when he didn’t know what he was doing. So, he said he wanted Marten out of there and didn’t want a DCM. I was political counselor so basically I became the DCM in terms of work. The Department kept on pressing the ambassador to select a deputy. After several months and talking to a number of people he finally told them he wanted Ron Flack to be his deputy. So they assigned me to the job and brought in another political counselor. So, for two years, 1984-86, I was the deputy permanent representative in Geneva and then the ambassador resigned and I was the permanent representative in charge of the mission for a year before another ambassador came in.

**Q:** So, you were really there from 1983 to 1987.

FLACK: Yes, I was there for four years in three different positions, political counselor, deputy permanent representative and then acting permanent representative. That was the time when there was an awful lot going on in both the international organization and UN area and in the negotiations with the Soviets which was going on in Geneva, they were reestablished there. We had the first Reagan/Gorbachev summit there in 1985 and I was the Geneva coordinator for it. It was an extraordinarily busy time and a very important time. It was probably one of the most interesting assignments that I had in the Foreign Service in terms of getting a feeling that I was really participating in and contributing to a major world event.

**Q:** The office was called what and when you arrived in 1983 what was its program?

FLACK: The United Nations has its headquarters in New York but its European headquarters are in Geneva. Also in Geneva are many of international organizations, like the ILO, WHO, etc., 22 of them, that are part of the international organization system of the United Nations. So, the main UN headquarters is in New York, but also of great importance is the U.S. mission to the European headquarters of the UN in Geneva and to the international organizations that are there. We were dealing not only with the UN activities that were in Geneva, such as ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) meeting in the summer and the Human Rights Commission meeting in the winter, but with the activities of international organizations. We had in the mission attachés for the various international organizations. There was the telecommunications attaché, a health attaché, a labor attaché, working with the ILO, ITU, etc. on a daily basis. The U.S. government has contact on a daily basis with all of these organizations. They had their meetings and conferences so delegations from Washington were constantly coming through. One of the offices in the mission was simply a conference office. We had an officer, two secretaries
and a staff of national employees who were doing nothing but handling the visiting delegations to conferences. There was another office with two officers and a couple of national employees who were doing nothing but following the applications of U.S. citizens for work in the UN system and helping them. These offices, which were very, very useful, are now all gone because of the downsizing of the Department.

So, there was the UN side, the international organization side, then we had attached to the mission the U.S. negotiations team (with the Soviets), Ambassador Kampelman and his staff. At one point I remember I had 13 ambassadors living in Geneva. A lot of them, like Kampelman, would come and have a round of talks with the Soviets and would be there for perhaps two months, return to Washington for two months and then back to Geneva, etc. Back then there was the GATT, which now is the World Trade Organization, and we had the ambassador to the GATT and his staff, which was located in part of the mission properties, and also the U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). So, all in all, it was a very big operation.

Q: What were you dealing with the first year you were in Geneva as political counselor?

FLACK: The political counselor at that point was supervising the specialized attachés, for example, the labor attaché, the health attaché, the telecommunications attaché. We had a number of officers there, like the human rights officer, who was reporting to the political counselor. So, the political counselor was kind of a general purpose officer who was a supervising officer and was not responsible for any bilateral or multilateral political activity, because the bilateral activity was handled in Bern. But the Swiss government does have a mission in Geneva dealing with its relations with the UN, even though they are not a member of the UN, so the political counselor was responsible for the relationships with the Swiss office there as well as the Geneva authorities.

Q: You had all these people working for other outfits and they had masters back in Washington, how did you handle these relations?

FLACK: This was one of the most difficult things about this mission. Many of these officers were Foreign Service officers. The labor and telecommunications officers were Foreign Service. We had a Foreign Service officer as counselor for refugee affairs, the UNHCR, the UN refugee organization, was in Geneva, and he had a rather large office and an enormous amount of money went through his office. So, the problem was trying to keep it all together, I discovered this when I was deputy permanent representative, because you had these offices who were off doing their own thing and reporting back to their own agencies back in Washington and the ambassador and I were trying to make sense of it all together, I discovered this when I was deputy permanent representative, because you had these offices who were off doing their own thing and reporting back to their own agencies back in Washington and the ambassador and I were trying to make sense of it all and keep it at least coordinated so everyone knew what the other guy was doing so that we weren’t going off into totally different directions. But, it was very, very difficult to do because they did have their own agendas, they did have their people to report to back in Washington. If the counselor for refugee affairs had an issue with the assistant secretary for refugee affairs back in Washington it was an issue often that had very little to do with Geneva and the mission. It might have to do with some refugee camp in Thailand. It was hard to keep this group together. The weekly staff meetings were very difficult to handle because no one was really very interested in what the other guy was doing because it was so totally removed from what they were doing. It was no common thread of a bilateral relationship.
Q: Was anybody back in Washington trying to coordinate these things?

FLACK: IO, the Office for International Organizations, of course, is the home base for the mission and if anyone was doing this it would be the assistant secretary. While I was in Geneva we had two unusual assistant secretaries. The second one was Alan Keyes who is now running for president, and he came to Geneva many times and I got into a rather nasty fight with him over administrative issues after the ambassador left and I was in charge. The assistant secretary before Keyes was a very young man, a political appointee right out of the White House, who had no experience whatsoever. The White House just really wanted to find him a job and didn’t think IO was an important one. It was said that the Reagan administration was purposely downgrading IO by putting a young, inexperienced political appointee there.

Q: He was the one, I think, who was renown for calling staff meetings and giving long expositions to which everybody would kind of look up at the ceiling and wait until it was over because he didn’t have very much to say. There wasn’t much respect for him.

FLACK: That is true. He was what you would call a real light weight. But, that was done on purpose by the White House because at that time they didn’t think multilateral affairs were something of great priority.

JOAN M. PLAISTED
US Trade Representative
Geneva (1983-1985)

Ambassador Joan M. Plaisted was born in 1958 in Minnesota. She attended America University and received both her Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree. Her postings abroad include Paris, Hong Kong, Geneva, Rabat and Marshall Island as Ambassador. Ambassador Plaisted was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Well then in '83 you finally had to move on. Whither?

PLAISTED: Yes, in ‘83 I was offered a position with USTR because I had gotten to know Ambassador Mike Smith quite well through 48 hours straight of negotiating textile agreements. He offered me a job in Geneva. In fact he used to call me up from Washington at two or three o'clock in the morning in Hong Kong and give me instructions on what I was going to negotiate with Hong Kong. I said, "Mike, it is two A.M. I am not working." He said, "When you work for USTR, you work for USTR 24 hours a day." I said, "Mike, I work for the State Department. I don't work for USTR." He said, "You will." He was very persuasive, so he convinced me to work for USTR in Geneva as a trade negotiator from ‘83-’85. USTR stands for the Office of the United States Trade Representative. It is a White House office with a very small but important office in Geneva. Here the main function is to handle all the negotiations in what today is the World Trade Organization, the WTO. In my day it was called the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the GATT. We had some responsibilities in the United Nations Office - in the UNCTAD - the UN Conference on Trade and Development. I was the UNCTAD negotiator. I don't know if that was a blessing or not, but I handled this portfolio when I was with USTR. I did the developing countries’ portfolios in the GATT and UNCTAD. I did all the commodity negotiations in UNCTAD. I may not always have been the main negotiator, but I was the one in USTR who oversaw and was involved in all the commodity negotiations in UNCTAD.

Q: What is commodity?

PLAISTED: Commodities, these are talks on just a whole host of products from jute to tropical timber. There is a lead and zinc study group, a coffee agreement, work on nickel. I was also in charge of the meetings in the GATT for the MTN codes on import licensing and civil aircraft. Probably the most important thing I did, the legacy I left, was to help launch the work on services in the GATT so we could move forward and have trade negotiations on services. This became a more important area for the U.S. It is insurance, banking, shipping, an increasingly important segment of our trade in addition to the traditional export goods. I came up with a plan on how we could get service talks launched in the GATT which eventually led to a successful agreement in the WTO on services that took many years to negotiate.

Q: How were things constituted in Geneva? How did you operate? Would there be different subjects that would come up or was it an ongoing move from one thing to another?

PLAISTED: It was a very heavy demanding meeting schedule in the GATT. There were constant meetings of these different committees on civil aircraft and import licensing. There would be meetings or negotiations on commodities in the UNCTAD. I think I handled more meetings than most of my counterparts. I had a more diverse group of subjects to cover. Sometimes I would have overlapping meetings and be jumping in my car going from one meeting to another in the GATT and the UNCTAD. Sometimes I had to call for the help of a colleague since I couldn't physically be in two places at once. It was a very hectic meeting schedule. Of course you had to get your instructions from Washington for each meeting. The issues were often very technical, and I had to become an overnight expert on some of these topics. I made a big mistake when I first arrived in Geneva. I went directly to the office. The phone rang and I picked it up. Someone asked, “Who is going to represent the U.S. tomorrow on tropical timber?” I sure didn't know, I said, but let me find out. I will get back to you. I went and asked my boss. He said, "Oh I forgot about that. You better represent us." I said, "What's tropical timber?” He replied, "I don't know much about it. Go look in the files." I stayed up most of the night and became an overnight expert to the extent one can to prepare for the meetings the next day. To give you a little idea of the atmospherics, there was often a problem of obtaining cleared inter-agency instructions from Washington for these meetings. I have the highest respect for my colleagues at USTR. Of all the government agencies I have worked with, USTR is the most efficient little organization. But there often would be problems in getting cleared instructions. They would call me at home from Washington the night before the negotiations and start trying to give me instructions over the phone which isn't exactly what you want when you are speaking over the microphone the next day for the U.S. government. So that could be a problem. I have seen our ambassador, Peter Murphy, at one point receive his written instructions about five minutes before the meeting started. I was walking across the street to the GATT with him as he was reading his instructions.
He read them, folded them up, and put them in the trash can on the street and walked into the meeting. Now I never went quite that far in treating my last minute instructions that way, but that is often when we got our instructions because of the interagency coordination problems back in Washington. Colleges offer courses on “How to Negotiate.” I always chuckle wondering if they only knew how it sometimes really happens.

Q: Well, the other delegations since it was such a varied thing must be having somewhat the same problem. In other words you didn’t find a tropical timber group of experts arriving and sitting there and negotiating for Singaporeans or did you?

PLAISTED: It could be an issue for other delegations too. Do you or do you not bring in the experts from capitals? It depended on how important the meeting was. It depended on our budget limitations. Sometimes these commodities were the absolute lifeblood to these countries, so their delegates knew all the arguments quite well. I was often learning just as much as I possibly could in a very quick period of time. There were delegates who knew these subjects cold, and who had been in their positions for years and years. In the U.S. we shift our people, so by the time I became an expert two years later, I was off to my next assignment.

Q: Well I would imagine there would be a time when you would be finding yourself in a group talking about left handed widgets or something when somebody would say does anybody here know what we are talking about?

PLAISTED: If we didn't know, I would quickly figure out what it was or find somebody to explain it to me because you had to know these commodities. I also, this is a little more on the atmospherics, noticed an incredible difference in U.S. administrations. It was so much easier to represent the U.S. in some of these meetings when Reagan became president as opposed to the Carter administration. I think back to why it should have made such a difference in these meetings in the UNCTAD. It was just very clear to me and probably to the other countries what our position was under President Reagan in many of these commodity negotiations. It became more of a negative position, more of a no, we are not about to agree to anything like a compensatory financing facility for commodities. If I didn't receive instructions from Washington, I still had a pretty good idea of what the U.S. position was. Almost overnight under Reagan, it became much clearer to me just what our U.S. government position would be.

Q: I would think under Carter with Andy Young in the U.S., somebody could say, poor little us and big you, can’t you give us a chance, so our positions were a little bit loose.

PLAISTED: A little more nuanced, for example, on the compensatory financing facility.

Q: Which means what?

PLAISTED: Explaining it very simply, if developing countries had a down year in coffee or jute, the countries aren’t able to produce that much, or the world market price had fallen for these commodities, developing countries would be able to make it up through dipping into this fund to subsidize their economies that year. I was quoted in the Financial Times as being very tough, with the U.S. taking a very critical attitude on these commodity pacts.
Q: You know looking at our trade, we often take a stand we are opposed to subsidies, and yet we in one way or another subsidize a lot of our products, don't we?

PLAISTED: Yes, particularly in agriculture. We could argue that the EC does this to a larger extent. It always made it quite a challenge. How can you liberalize trade dealing in a world of subsidies? One of the issues I was working on, it was one of the few trade liberalization agreements in those days, was to reach agreement on expanding the duty free treatment of aircraft parts under the MTN code on civil aircraft. It was one of the few concrete trade liberalization actions the U.S. was able to take at that time. This was an area where countries were certainly subsidizing their aircraft exports.

Q: What role was the EC playing? What was it called? It keeps changing names. It is the European Union, but was it the EC at that time?

PLAISTED: The European Economic Community, the EEC.

Q: Were they acting as one or did they sort of split off?

PLAISTED: It’s a good question how they negotiated in those days. In the GATT there was an EEC spokesperson. It was based on a six month rotation among EEC countries. Whoever was in the chair for the EEC for that period of time would be the spokesperson. Then if other countries wanted to say something individually after the EEC spokesperson spoke, they could. Britain would speak as Britain if they wanted to, or the French ambassador would pipe up if he had something to add after the EEC spokesperson had made the opening remarks.

Q: Did the Soviets play any role at this time?

PLAISTED: They weren't in the GATT. They were very much in the UNCTAD. They would play quite a negative role at times. They would really take me on. Most of the time we would just ignore the Soviets because they were ranting and raving over something polemic and I wouldn't take them on. I remember one day, the Russian ambassador took on the U.S. in a most outrageous manner and I was representing the U.S. in a most outrageous manner and I was representing the U.S. I absolutely had to go charging back at the Russian ambassador. It became well-known within the Geneva community. Everyone came up to me and said great. We are pleased to see the U.S. challenge the Russians who were getting a little out of hand every once in awhile in the UNCTAD. The Russians are still looking at how to join the WTO today. Talking about the different delegations in the GATT, it was always something of a gentlemen's club. The draft minutes of the meetings that were held would be sent to you, so you could double check your remarks. The minutes were usually quite accurate, but were not perhaps what you should have said based on the instructions you had received from your capital. You could adjust what you said for the recorded record.

Q: Just like an oral history when they get back.

PLAISTED: The GATT secretariat would send the draft minutes to me for correction. As I said, they were always quite accurate with the exception of one thing I would object to, I would call
them back and say, "Excuse me, you may not have noticed, but I am a she. You always have me
down as he said, and he, he, he. Please note I am a she." "Oh, we can't. We know you are a she,
but we can't. You have to be a he in our minutes." I said, "Why do I have to be a he in your
minutes?" He said, "Because we have a policy of non-identification of countries, and if we said
she, everyone would know it was the U.S. because you are the only female." So I literally went
into the minutes as having had a sex change operation. It was a problem to be a female
representing the U.S. in terms of the GATT minutes and their non-identification of countries
policy.

Q: What was the social life there? I am talking about among the delegates. I mean was this the
sort of thing where you were fighting hammer and nails and then go out to a restaurant and chat,
or did you go your own way? Were you too busy to socialize?

PLAISTED: At that time we would socialize informally. I remember doing a lot of work around
the coffee bar at the UNCTAD. They had a great coffee bar. It was probably the best coffee in
Geneva. On a clear day, which wasn't very often, you had a spectacular view of Mont Blanc. I
would usually go a little before the meeting and pick up what I could hanging around the coffee
bar. I would talk to my friends and colleagues to see what they were picking up. Again I would
pick up some information on the dinner circuit. It was always very useful to speak French. The
French would sometimes note that French was an official language of the UN and insist on
working off French texts. It was very useful to have French and be able to negotiate in French,
using the “tu” form with the French speaking delegates.

Q: How did you find the role of the French in these negotiations?

PLAISTED: I think in general they were playing a fairly positive role in the negotiations
although they weren't the most active country. In some of the commodity negotiations the French
would get very actively involved, defending the interests of some of the African countries where
these were the major exports of their former colonies. Of course the French were very interested
in what went on in aircraft. They were quite active as you can imagine in the aircraft area. It
depended to some extent on the meetings we were in.

Q: Well, did you have delegates coming, essentially industry spokespeople coming over to act as
delegates on some of these issues from the States?

PLAISTED: Yes, depending on the meeting. We would definitely have U.S. experts come if it
was a major commodity negotiation. Some of the commodity negotiations were based in London,
but most of the work would take place in Geneva. It was always a question if it was something I
could handle, or if we should bring in the real experts from Washington. When we would bring
in the real experts, I was often still be the head of delegation, so I was keeping a close eye on
what was happening in all the negotiations.

Q: I think it would always be a problem if you brought in somebody who was an expert in
something. They are fine, but they really don't understand the dynamics of the conference and
how to get things done. It is not just speaking your piece, but how to work it. I imagine you
would have to be the watchdog or something to keep them in line and be effective.
PLAISTED: Depending on who it was. I found that most of the delegates I worked with were real professionals. Many of them had been working on say tin for the last ten years and knew this better than I was ever going to know it. They knew their counterparts in all the delegations because they had been in negotiations for the last ten years together, and they had been together in the meeting in Malaysia, and they had been out to dinner together quite often. They were often informing me of what was going on behind the scenes because they had developed the personal relationships with these people for many years and were giving me some of the inner dynamics of what was happening in the other delegations and where the conference may eventually come out. I was always looking at it from the U.S. policy perspective.

Q: I assume the Canadians are part of this structure.

PLAISTED: Yes.

Q: Because often I have been told by people who have dealt with Canada they are very difficult, not difficult but hard negotiators. Did you find this to be true or in this particular milieu perhaps it didn’t many any difference?

PLAISTED: I didn't find them particularly hard negotiators. Particularly in the GATT, their position was almost always very similar to the U.S. position. The Japanese when they would become engaged could sometimes be more difficult in negotiations. I have worked at the U.S. mission to the UN in New York three times now. I have represented the U.S. at the OECD and the UNCTAD. The Japanese had the most difficulty in dealing with me as a woman. I remember once we were very engaged in tropical timber negotiations. The Japanese wanted the headquarters to be in Japan. Eventually they got their wish, but at one point the U.S. instructions were that we not agree to this. As a courtesy, before I took the microphone to announce the U.S.’ formal position, I went over to tell the Japanese delegation informally about our negative position. It was a fairly high level delegation, and I explained to their all male representatives the position the U.S. planned to take and why we were taking it at that time. They all sort of looked at me, and they all started bowing in unison.

Q: Putting their heads together.

PLAISTED: ...and said, "It is too bad your position is not as beautiful as you are." One of my great moments in diplomacy, the Japanese bowing and saying it is too bad your position isn't as beautiful as you are. They later succeeded in getting the U.S. position reversed.

Q: As if you could go back and say I would like to change our position as a personal favor.

PLAISTED: One of the things that was very important in the future negotiations that we were trying to line up on the new round, what became today the World Trade Organization, was to try and move forward with work on services in the GATT. The developing countries were having none of it. They were blocking the U.S. and the Europeans, the developed countries, from moving forward. Services were very important to us. Our exports of services were increasing. The developing countries were doing very little in services, they were very suspicious of the
developed countries, and they just wouldn't agree to move forward. Part of the problem was one of our top U.S. negotiators, for whom I have the highest respect, did not want any work to go forward on services in UNCTAD. The developing countries considered UNCTAD as their organization, and it was. They really trusted that organization. I became convinced that if we were ever going to move forward on services in a new round of negotiations in the GATT, we had to let the developing countries do some preparatory work in the UNCTAD. It probably wasn't going to hurt us too much. It was going to hurt us a lot if they would never agree to allowing work on services to move forward in the GATT/WTO. We were never going to get what we ultimately wanted. So I came up with a strategy of how to turn Washington around to get Washington to stop blocking work in the UNCTAD so we could move forward with the negotiations. During a well-timed business trip back to Washington, I got some of my colleagues on board, and then we all took on the main opponent in the U.S. government. Plus, I sent in a cable outlining a strategy on how we could move forward on services in the GATT/WTO by approving work in UNCTAD, and eventually got the top negotiator to change his position. Once the developing countries were able to start studying the issue, I think they started to realize that this really is an area of the future not just for the developed countries but for the developing countries, too. We were able to move forward with what today has become one of the major agreements in the World Trade Organization.

Q: Was third world debt at all an issue while you were there? Was this becoming a concern?

PLAISTED: All the third world issues were discussed in general, particularly in UNCTAD and to some degree in the developing country forum in the GATT, but we really didn't get into debt negotiations per se. Those were taking place in Paris, where the Paris Club was the real forum for developing country debt issues. Any rescheduling of the debt was taking place in the Paris Club.

Q: Did you ever get out and sort of have a busman's holiday and go off and see tropical timber and anything like that? I mean were these things all sort of paper things that you were learning about.

PLAISTED: Unfortunately the U.S. government never sent me to a coffee plantation; they never sent me on a tropical vacation to go look at tropical timber. They never sent me to some Club Med that had jute growing outside of it. No. So it was more theoretical. But I think our real experts on these commodities actually set foot on plantations at some point.

Q: Well, I think this probably is a good place to stop. Is there anything else on the UNCTAD that you would like to cover.

PLAISTED: I would just add in general I had a reputation at UNCTAD of being the iron lady of UNCTAD - always fighting so vociferously for the U.S. positions in UNCTAD. One of our meetings was going on endlessly. I raised the U.S. position and tried to get some support. Nobody was on board, particularly not the Scandinavian countries. They pounced all over the U.S. position. The dialogue went on for another two hours without any conclusion. I slightly rephrased the U.S. position, slipped it in again, and made it a proposal. It was essentially the same proposal of two hours earlier, with a slightly different nuance to it. This time I got
everyone to support it. They had been sleeping for those two hours. Perhaps I deserved being known as the iron lady of UNCTAD.

Q: I was thinking, the level of threshold of patience or boredom or something like that must really come into play. You must have people where you know exactly what they are going to say and when they are going to say it ad nauseam. I mean, this must be quite something to keep you going.

PLAISTED: Yes, these were the days before UNCTAD was reformed which it has supposedly been now. Our meetings would literally last around the clock. I spent many a Friday night at UNCTAD until 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. There was something of a slogan at that time about what UNCTAD stood for, “under no circumstances take any decision.” Another slogan was “A day in UNCTAD lost is a day in UNCTAD gained.” You had to pay attention to what other delegations were saying even if you knew what they were going to say. You would get just awfully bored. I remember sitting there and just wishing that some day I would see a punk diplomat, not just everyone dressed in three piece suits. I wanted to see a diplomat with a mohawk with a green stripe in his hair and a ring in his nose. Now I do sometimes see in the British foreign office someone with a facial ornament, but I would pass my nights in Geneva just dreaming of my becoming the first punk diplomat.

Q: Why don’t we stop here, and we’ll pick this up in ’85? Where did you go?

PLAISTED: All right. I go to China. I was on the China desk in Washington from ’85-’87. Then I attended the National War College.

GILBERT H. SHEINBAUM
Political Counselor

Gilbert H. Sheinbaum was born in New York on April 20, 1929. He received a bachelor’s degree in political science from New York University in 1950 and served in the U.S. military from 1951-1953. Mr. Sheinbaum entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included positions in Laos, Vietnam, Denmark, Madagascar, Malawi, the Philippines, and Switzerland. This interview was conducted by Tom Dunnigan in 1995.

Q: Well, you mentioned Geneva and that was your next post. Did you go directly from Cebu or did you get leave in the States first.

SHEINBAUM: No, we went directly from Cebu and that was good because the guy that I was replacing had left and the new political counselor came in at the same time. It was good that the two of us started together.

Q: Were you the political counselor?
SHEINBAUM: I was not for the first year; I was the deputy political counselor and also the telecommunications officer -- telecommunications meaning the relations with the UN agency, the ITU, the International Telecommunication Union which was a very active thing. I had to learn a whole new environment, especially because two months after I arrived, there was a big telecommunications exposition in Geneva and two months after that there was a big ITU conference. The chairman of our delegation -- we must have had fifty people on the delegation -- was Leonard Marks who was the ex-Director of USIA.

Q: So those were busy days for you after your arrival. Tell me, did the U.S. Mission in Geneva get its instructions from IO or EUR or both?

SHEINBAUM: IO.

Q: Did the Embassy in Bern or the Ambassador there ever get involved in what was going on the Mission or not?

SHEINBAUM: No, except when there was a VIP visit -- whether it was George Shultz or Ronnie Reagan or George Bush, who was then Vice-President. There was not any problem there but there was a conflict at the time of Reagan's visit in November 1985, his first meeting with Gorbachev, for which I was the control officer. Gerry Carmen, who was our Ambassador in Geneva, thought he should be the first one in the receiving line and Faith Whittlesey, the Ambassador in Bern, thought she should be the first one in line. She should have been and in the end she was. It took quite a bit of business on my part to convince Gerry Carmen that he should not be at the head of the line.

Q: Because he was going to write your efficiency report among other things.

SHEINBAUM: No, no, he didn't write it. I don't even know if he wrote a review.

Q: Yes. Tell me something about that Gorbachev visit. That must have been exciting days.

SHEINBAUM: It was. It was five months in preparation, during part of which I was Chargé because Gerry Carmen and the DCM were both gone. By that time I'd been political counselor for a year. A couple of people on the White House pre-advance team were difficult to deal with and the Swiss were difficult to deal with, but the Soviets were easy to deal with. I think it was at our first meeting with the Soviets that the head of the White House team politely said to the head of the Soviet delegation, a KGB general, "Well, uh, this is what I suggest." He was very discreet about it, but the head of the Soviet delegation said, "Oh, you just decide everything. If there is anything that I don't like, I'll let you know. But as far as I'm concerned, everything will be all right." It was the Swiss that were more difficult.

Q: During the talks themselves, did you get nearby, or were you informed?

SHEINBAUM: No. I set up the meeting places but I was not part of the meetings themselves.
Q: What was your mode of operation with the UN? Did the various agencies have representatives there?

SHEINBAUM: That's right. We had one guy who was handling our relations with the ILO, the International Labor Organization; we had one fellow who was half-time working with the UN Human Rights Commission; we had one officer who dealt primarily with WHO; we had one officer who dealt with the WMO, the World Meteorological Organization, as well as a couple of environmental organizations that were based in Switzerland.

Q: How many other countries had missions similar to ours there?

SHEINBAUM: I think we had more over a hundred missions.

Q: A hundred missions. It was like being in a capital?

SHEINBAUM: Yes, right. And there were more missions there than there were embassies in Bern.

Q: Presumably Bern is covered from Paris and Bonn by some countries who wouldn't maintain resident missions.

SHEINBAUM: Correct.

Q: Were there difficulties coordinating among the U.S. agency representatives in Geneva?

SHEINBAUM: Well, we had such a flock of official visitors. There was some difficulty coordinating but mainly because we had so many people coming in and out, we could barely keep track of them. We have a conference officer who was doing all the arrangements. And often there were people that were coming in and out that he never knew about. The staffs of all the agencies, including ACDA, numbered, as I recall, about three hundred, but then you had hundreds and hundreds of official visitors. When there was a big conference, you had a big flurry; when there were smaller meetings, you have a small flurry. Inger met them all because somehow so many of them would come into the nurse's station for something or other. She had more contact with them than I did. But there was a lot.

Q: I assume you're rather glad you weren't the disbursing officer there as you'd been in Vientiane -- to handle all that?

SHEINBAUM: Yes, I would say so.

Q: Did you have any direct dealings with Swiss authorities?

SHEINBAUM: Yes.

Q: Of the Canton there or of the federal government?
SHEINBAUM: When we had a VIP visit like George Shultz or George Bush or Reagan-Gorbachev, I dealt with the Chief of Police of Geneva, Jacques Kunzi, and with the city’s Chief of Protocol, Robert Vieux, who really ran the city of Geneva as far as we were concerned. We had very nice relationships with them, social as well as official, and they made everything move.

Q: And our relations with the Soviets? Can you characterize them?

SHEINBAUM: Well, from the time of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in January of ’85, things were looking up because Shultz and Gromyko got along very well. Shultz named the room in the U.S. Mission where they met The Gromyko Room. Of course, in March took over in the USSR. Then, in November we had the first Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, and the relationship got off to a very good start. I was the Mission’s Control Officer for the Reagan-Gorbachev event. It took five months of preparation with White House teams in and out, and it came off beautifully. I located terrific venues and a villa for the Reagans, all of which they liked. It was easy working with the Soviets - not so easy with the Swiss. The Soviets told us right off to make all the decisions in planning and if there was anything they didn’t like, they would let us know - and that occurred only rarely.

On the other hand, the Swiss went all out regarding security - little, peaceful Switzerland. The day before the party was arriving the head of the Secret Service and I almost had heart failure when we went to the villa to find barbed wire all around, a machine gun at the front gate, dozens of soldiers and 2 antiaircraft guns in the rear. The Swiss colonel in charge said it was his duty to provide maximum security and he had full rein to do what he thought necessary. He was a reserve colonel, a bank vice-president by occupation, and he was stubborn. Meanwhile the media got photos of the machine gun, which resulted in Nancy Reagan saying emphatically she wouldn’t stay there. The colonel would not budge, even when we told him we would give up the villa and move the Reagans to the Intercon - a great inconvenience for us and what we thought would be an embarrassment for the Swiss. I even went a bit out of bounds by going to the Army commander who was in town, and by calling the President of the Swiss Confederation (I was really desperate to take such a bold step), both of whom said that the colonel had full power and there was nothing they could do. The Secret Service chief and I were about to give up when the colonel casually mentioned that he would be taking his family to Washington the following spring and could they get a tour of the White House. Whereupon the Secret Service chief lit up and said he would give them the BEST tour possible - after which the colonel relented and everything went forward as planned.

I would so like to mention that Inger, who was Mission Nurse during our three years in Geneva, escorted Nancy Reagan during those meetings, of which the highlights - if you can call it that - were visits to drug rehabilitation centers. Nancy was in fact very interested in drug programs - and not just for show as there was no media coverage. I should also note that it took Inger some time to get the Swiss to own up to their drug problems, that a well-known meeting ground for pushers was under the Pont de Mont-Blanc in Geneva, and that they actually had rehabilitation places.

Nancy Reagan figured in another way with our family as she took a boat ride with a bunch of Swiss and American children, as a result of which she appeared on the cover of USA Today and
the German magazine Bunte holding our daughter Britt (then 9 years old) by the hand. Quite a thrill.

Q: Any relations with other bloc representatives or not?

SHEINBAUM: Not so much. I mean the Soviets were the primary . . .

Q: What were some of the substantive issues with which you had to deal during your period there?

SHEINBAUM: Well, the Human Rights Commission met regularly in New York, but then the subcommission met in Geneva for six weeks in February-March. That was always a critical time because there were so many delicate issues that had to be covered then. Dick Schifter was the head of our delegation both before and while he served as Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs; he was really very good as he knew how to handle so many different delicate issues at any one time. You know, the Department's Human Rights Report was annually in the forefront of everybody's mind in that season, and we had to tread very lightly on some things and yet make our points clear, unambiguous - which, I think, was very well done. With WHO we had major issues. Surgeon General Chip Koop was on each major delegation to the WHO during the time I was there, and he was very good, but he was at odds with the State Department's IO Bureau on different issues. They treated him very shabbily, you know, feeling that they knew more about international affairs than he did, yet he made the best of it and was very effective. He is really a very sterling character -- with some tragic background in his family. It was very interesting for us to talk with him; Inger got to meet him also several times. ILO was a question of U.S. membership in the ILO that we had resumed and we were restoring a productive relationship. Critical issues, I think that's about it. There was nothing that was earth-shaking.

Q: Afghanistan didn't. . .?

SHEINBAUM: It didn't really come up so much at that time.

Q: And the refugee problem?

SHEINBAUM: Refugees, we had a lot but that was a different section. We had a fellow by the name of Karl Beck who handled our refugee section. We had very good relationships with both the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and then with the ICRC, the Swiss Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross, which did a lot of work with refugees and gave us great insight. It was very important to us. There was a lot of activity there but that's something I didn't usually get into.

Q: Did you get involved in things such as arms control -- with chemical and biological negotiations?

SHEINBAUM: No. That was a separate entity under a separate administration. We had three ambassadors over there dealing with various aspects of that. Warren Zimmermann was there for a while; John Tower was there for a while; Max Kampelman and Paul Nitze-- all who did well.
Q: And how about the Middle East -- talks in the Middle East? Did they take place?

SHEINBAUM: No.

Q: They didn't impinge on any of your duties?

SHEINBAUM: No. The only significant political talks that took place were occasional ones of Chet Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, who would meet quietly with Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister. I had to set up a dinner or whatever it was at a discrete, out-of-the-way location. But Vice President George Bush came through Geneva frequently, and I was usually his control officer.

Q: Did the reduction of our funding for the UN have any effect on you?

SHEINBAUM: Not that I can recall.

Q: Because it was during those years that Congress began to whittle away at our contribution.

SHEINBAUM: No, I don't recall it having an impact of any serious proportion on the funding for any of our specialized agencies that were based in Geneva.

Q: And I gather from what you say, that there was a good deal to be done in the matter of care and feeding of visitors including Congressmen?

SHEINBAUM: Yes. They didn't provide any problems - except in numbers. I had one group of congressmen, I think they were about twenty, and a few wives, but I don’t recall for what purpose. Jim Wright headed the group, he was Speaker or about to become Speaker, I don't remember which. At any rate, the rest of the Mission, including our conference officer, were all shocked when I said (I was Chargé at the time) "We're going to put them on a nice bus and take them around." "You're going to put them on a bus instead of limos?" "Yes, put them on a bus." This isn't what is usually done. I said, "Well, we'll try it." And they loved it. They liked all being together. We had a little refreshment in the back. I handled the microphone and gave them a tour of Geneva, described what we were doing, where we were going, what we were eating and all of that and it was great. It was one of several coups I can remember in the Foreign Service.

Q: Congratulations. And I take it from what you say, there is enough work to justify a permanent office in Geneva.

SHEINBAUM: Oh yes, with the UN agencies absolutely. They were cutting out one position as I was leaving - the human rights affairs job which devolved to somebody else part-time. Probably with good reason but there was enough work for the human rights guy who did other things as well.

Q: Do we still maintain a consular office separate in Geneva or not?
SHEINBAUM: I don't know. We did at the time I was there but I don't know if we still do.

Q: Whether it's been closed. I haven't heard myself. Well, when your tour there ended in '86, Gil, you went into retirement?

BEAUVEAU B. NALLE
Counselor for Refugee and Migration Affairs

Beauveau B. Nalle was born in Pennsylvania in 1927. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956, serving in Washington, DC, Turkey, Uganda, Liberia, and Belize. Mr. Nalle was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on April 19, 1994.

Q: Yes, now you're in Europe.

NALLE: Now I'm in Europe, after 30 years in the Foreign Service, in a developed country, and bored to death.

Q: What was your job there?

NALLE: Counselor for Refugee and Migration Affairs at the US Mission in Geneva. Which was a very anomalous kind of job, I was in the Mission but not of it. The Mission is run by IO. However, my office is not run by IO. I did not report to IO, I had my own budget, I reported to RP, the Office of Refugee Programs. My own budget, my own administrative staff, everything, except that the Ambassador was my boss and that I went to staff meetings. I participated in all the embassy goings-on. But I had a 500 million dollar budget for refugee programs, and I forget what my administrative budget was.

Q: Did you have any staff?

NALLE: I had 3 FSOs, 7 locals. It was a very busy job. I was primarily dealing with the UNHCR but I also dealt with, do you remember Jim Carlin?

Q: Yes.

NALLE: Jim Carlin was there in what we call ICM, the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration, a very well run organization that Jim worked with for so many years. I dealt with both the ICRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross. I dealt with LiCross, the League of the Red Cross. I developed an unbelievable admiration for the ICRC. It's all Swiss, there are no non-Swiss in it. And the things they could do are incredible. They are the operating arm, you might say, of the Red Cross. Particularly in as far as the treaties regarding prisoners-of-war and all that kind of stuff and refugees are concerned.
I was sitting in an office there at Geneva, they had a little headquarters in Geneva, talking to one of the fellows who was the Director of East African Affairs. I asked him a question and he said, "I'm not sure of that, wait a minute." Then he held what I thought was a telephone on his desk, he picked it up and said something in French. Then he continued, "I have Mr. Nalle of the American mission here and he asked me about this problem in Kenya. What can you tell me?" They talked on the phone back and forth for a minute. Then he hung up. Yes, he said, that was my agent, my representative in Nairobi.

Q: **Very good communication system.**

NALLE: Then I remembered there was an antennae field a couple of miles out of town out of Geneva, along the lake. That was always said to be, theoretically it was classified but everybody always said the ICRC antenna farm for all their communications. A very well run and efficient organization.

I might dwell, if I could, on the political ambassador there. He is the 4th political ambassador I have worked for and he epitomizes everything that is wrong with political appointees. The others I worked for--Ferguson was an intelligent, thoughtful, hardworking, receptive man. Strausz-Hupé I did not get along with him at all, I did not agree with his political opinions, I didn't agree with the way he was handling Turkey, I'd have disagreed with him if he had said it's black, I'd have said it's white. But he was an able, intelligent, ill-tempered mean little man. I watched him at an archeological ruin translating the Greek and Roman inscriptions on the stones which not many career ambassadors could do today. So Strausz-Hupé was there.

Well this one was Gerry Carmen and his claim to fame was that he had been Chairman of the Republican State Committee of New Hampshire and had delivered New Hampshire to Ronald Reagan. He was a used tire salesman. Everything that was wrong could be wrong. He hated the Foreign Service, he hated Foreign Service people. I have watched him twist and torture his Admin Officer till the guy had tears running down his cheeks. The Admin Officer was no genius but he was perfectly competent. He had the mission running and running well. He was saving money, he was doing a good job, he just wasn't very dynamic.

Q: **Who was this man's DCM?**

NALLE: Ron Flack when I was there.

Q: **I know Ron.**

NALLE: Poor Ron was suffering, you can't imagine how Ron suffered under this guy.

Q: **This is our ambassador in Bern?**

NALLE: In Geneva, the US Mission in Geneva.

He could speak no French. I suppose that's all right, I don't speak that much myself, I can get along. He held the UN in contempt. He was an anti-UN guy. As I say, he hated FSOs, FSO
people, he hated the diplomatic life, he was the laughing stock of the diplomatic community in Geneva. My colleagues would come up to me and make jokes about him and I had to defend him, much as the thought filled me with horror.

He got after me one time. My predecessor had quit because of him. They're on a round-the-world tour inspecting refugee camps and my predecessor, Carl Beck, sent a cable from Bangkok where they were, saying that he wanted an immediate transfer, that he could no longer get along with him (Ambassador Carmen). That relations were such that he had to leave. And the Department sent back a soothing message saying, yes, of course, as soon as you get back to Geneva we'll arrange for your transfer. Carl cabled them back and said, "You guys don't understand, I want a transfer, now, from Thailand." And they gave it to him.

I got into a fight with him one time. He wanted to do some inspecting of refugee camps in Africa, which we all thought was probably a good idea to get him out of Geneva for a couple of days, if nothing else. But he wanted to go to Washington first and he wanted me to pay for his ticket out of my RP budget. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I really can't do that. We can get down to Africa from Geneva very quickly and easily, Swissair flies down there everyday." But no, he wanted to go into Washington first. Well, I said, I really can't do it. I'll tell you what I said, "I'll write a first person cable, I'll put your case to them in the strongest words I can, you can sign it, read it, do whatever you want. But I cannot pay for the ticket until I have written orders." He said, "Oh Beau, you fancy pants State Department guys." Those are his very words. "You fancy pants State Department guys, call somebody, your hotshot friends back in Washington, they'll cut a deal." I said, "I'm sorry Mr. Ambassador, I need written orders from the Department." And he said, "Come on, call one of your friends, they'll take care of it for you. Nobody has to know about this." I lost my temper. I stood up and said, "Make your own fucking phone calls Mr. Ambassador," and I walked out of his office.

From then on he practically never bothered me. He'd kid me at staff meetings, "You all watch out for Beau, he has a quick temper." And I looked down at him one time and I said, "Yes sir, I do," and I smiled at him. But I mean, what he did for the United States was disaster piled up on chaos.

Q: By the way, did he go to Africa?

NALLE: No. He couldn't stick it to Washington. And then he forgot.

RONALD D. FLACK
Deputy Chief of Mission

Ronald D. Flack was born in Minnesota in 1934. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Minnesota he served in the US Army from 1957-1960. His career has included positions in Athens, Manila, Abidjan, Paris, Algiers, Geneva, and Copenhagen. Mr. Flack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 7, 1998.
Q: This was the time when the Reagan administration was turning inward. They were going to do everything themselves.

FLACK: The most remarkable and exciting thing that happened while I was in Geneva was the Reagan/Gorbachev summit, the first one, in 1985. I came in 1983 and in 1984 my second ambassador came, the one that I was the deputy to. Shultz came to Geneva many, many times for meetings with the Soviets getting things back on track to restart the negotiations. At that point I realized that this was going to happen and I remember having a meeting with the ambassador telling him, “You know, as soon as these talks get started, when we talk seriously with the Soviets, we can expect that there will be talk of a Reagan/Gorbachev summit and my guess would be that it will be here in Geneva. We had better start thinking about that because we will be responsible for it.” Well, he didn’t pay much attention to that. He thought I was kind of dreaming wildly, or something. But, indeed that is exactly what happened. They came in November, 1985 and had their meeting. The decision was made in the summer, I think it was July, to hold the meeting in Geneva, and the first White House contingent of 15 people arrived on August 1 and we began our work with the Soviet mission and the Swiss. I was not involved much in the substance of what was going to be discussed between Reagan and Gorbachev, but very much involved in all of the details and arrangements. Where the President and Mrs. Reagan were going to stay, the agenda, what the Swiss would be doing, what activities they would have, Mrs. Reagan’s program, etc. All of these things were organized by the mission in coordination with the White House. In the end, it turned out very well.

Q: How did you find the White House staff when it came out to start working?

FLACK: I have had a lot of experience over the years, not only in Geneva, with the people from the White House and they are always extraordinarily difficult to work with. They have a very narrow view of the work they are doing and they tend to focus on just the particular job at hand and they don’t see the wider implications of what they are doing. So, it is very difficult when they are telling you they want to do something and you say, “Be careful because you have to think of this implication or that implication.” They don’t like that. They think you are just causing problems. In meetings with foreign officials they are always aggressive and offensive, especially the secret service. They always are, it kind of goes with the territory for them. They have a job to do and have a certain mentality and attitude and creates a lot of bad will for the United States abroad.

Q: Were you both preparing your counterparts of the Swiss and others for this beforehand and then cleaning up afterwards?

FLACK: Absolutely. I have often said that when you have a presidential visit, and I have had them elsewhere, I hope relations between the U.S. and the other country involved will survive the visit. In this case, it was U.S. and Swiss relations because they were basically the host country. I also, of course, was working closely with our ambassador in Bern.

Q: Who was that?
FLACK: It was John Cabot Lodge, who was a very old man, in his eighties. I don’t know if you know his story, he was a movie actor in the twenties and thirties and was a political appointee.

Q: He was in the “Scarlet Empress” with Marlene Dietrich.

FLACK: That’s right. He also did a film with Shirley Temple when she was a little girl.

There was a great deal of friction between my ambassador at the mission and Ambassador Lodge, as to who was going to be the most important of the two ambassadors involved with this visit. Obviously we were the ones who were doing the work and Bern wasn’t, but Bern felt they were the representatives to Switzerland. In terms of protocol they were absolutely right, the president was coming to Switzerland. For example, who was going to meet the president at the bottom of the steps? Should it be Ambassador Lodge or should it be my ambassador in Geneva? They had a very bitter time over this. Strangely enough I found this really laughable, that two grown men would be doing this, but in fact they were.

Q: At one point people used to fight duels over points of protocol. A presidential visit, particularly one of this magnitude, will tax the most organized of people and here is somebody who has almost dismissed the professionals from his view. How did this political appointee ambassador, whom we will leave unnamed, respond to the visit?

FLACK: Basically, he didn’t deal with it. I was in charge of the arrangements for the meeting. He attended a few of the meetings and was involved in it in a certain way, but he was not involved in any really serious way of actually making decisions, etc. About half of his day was spent on the phone to Washington. I don’t know who all he was talking to but he had been involved with a consulting firm back in Washington and I think a lot of his calls were back to that firm and the White House. He knew Mike Deaver very well, for example. I remember once he said, “Well, call Mike Deaver” and I didn’t know Mike Deaver and said, “Give me his number.” He gave me his number and I dialed the number thinking I would get Mike Deaver’s secretary, but he answered. That was his personal number so I know that they did indeed have a close relationship. So, he was on the phone to Washington a lot but I think he was much more concerned about the domestic politics of the visit. Who will get something out of this type of thing. That is what he basically was interested in.

Q: How did you find the Swiss to deal with, particularly on this occasion?

FLACK: The Swiss can be very strict, very difficult and very serious and in fact they are also very efficient, very good at this. I remember someone in Washington saying after having dealt for a couple of months on these arrangements describing Switzerland as the nicest police state in the world. That is what it is. They are really in control of what is going on in their country. They were good to deal with and even survived the secret service. I remember one particular meeting when we were making arrangements for things at the airport and the director of the airport was present. The secret service, as they always do, handed the director of the airport a lapel pin for him to wear so they could know who was who in the crowd, etc. He took it and said, “I’m not going to wear this. Why should I wear this?” They very patiently explained to him that it helped them know who was a member of the party and he said, “Look. I am the director of this airport,
everybody knows me. I don’t have to wear anything like this in my airport. I am not going to wear this.” The secret service was getting more and more put out and anxious to have him do this. He finally shouted at them, “Give me one good reason why I should wear something like this?” The secret service agent looked at him and said, “We don’t shoot people that are wearing these.” The director turned red and shut up. It caused a diplomatic incident. He went to his government and complained that he had been threatened by the secret service. This kind of thing is always difficult but to be expected.

The Swiss are just very well organized for things like this. Their police are very effective. The local Swiss official who I dealt with, his title was chief of protocol but he was really the political officer of the region, of Geneva, not the Swiss government. You know Geneva is almost independent. I remember during the conference there was going to be a press conference, Shultz and Gromyko were going to be there, and we were waiting for them. I remember talking to Andre, the Swiss official, and saying, “I understand Gromyko is going to be about half an hour late.” He said, “No, he’s not.” He then said, “Well, I was just told he was going to be half an hour late.” He said, “No he’s not.” He then said, “Ron, it is impossible that you are better informed than I am.” He was very sure of himself and he was right, Gromyko came in on time.

It was a very tense time. Security, as you can imagine, was incredibly tight. My wife, who is French born, was Nancy Reagan’s interpreter. She visited a drug rehabilitation center, a school, laid the cornerstone of the new International Red Cross museum, and things like that.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Soviets?

FLACK: It went well. The Soviets were secretive but we got what we needed. There certainly was no openness about it. Things basically went well and in the end I can’t think of any major problem that involved the Soviets. We gave the reception at the beginning and the Soviet ambassador gave the reception the next night. When I went to his reception he was decked out in all his ribbons and I said to him, “Mr. Ambassador, You look great in your uniform with all your medals. You will get another one after this visit.” He said, “I just hope I will be able to keep the ones I have!”

Q: Were there any last minute problems or any stories about this meeting?

FLACK: The stories that I have, and I have lots of them, are administrative type anecdotes about where Reagan stayed or about the chairs that Reagan and Gorbachev sat in, etc. I was not involved, of course, in the substantive discussions, except only on a peripheral basis. Not many people were. The mission in Geneva is a very big mission. One of the wonderful facilities it has is a very large international style conference room. For a press conference we put bleachers around the insides of the room because we had an enormous amount of press, as you can imagine. Shultz and Gromyko were having a meeting with just a couple of people around them in one of the offices of the mission and there were dozens of hanger-ons at the assistant secretary and under secretary level from the Department and the White House that were just milling around in the hall waiting for them to come out. The room was ready for the press conference half a hallway away and I said, “Let’s go into the conference room and wait there. There is no point hanging out in the hall here.” No one would move to the reception room where the press
conference was going to be. I soon realized what the reason was when Shultz and Gromyko came out and then proceeded to come into the press room, where all of the cameras were on them, this group wanted to be following as closely behind as possible to make it look as if they were part of the negotiations. If they were already in the room, everyone would have seen that they, of course, were not with the Secretary in the meeting and, of course, that would ruin their credibility. There was a lot of that going on.

There were far too many people from Washington, from the Department and all the other agencies. We had a thousand people from the White House. We had 35 servants from the White House.

Q: Of course, from the historical point of view this was a very important meeting because this is the beginning of a real change. Reagan had talked about the evil empire, the Soviet Union, from the far right of the political spectrum and Gorbachev was a new man. And, these two hit it off starting at this point and things flowed from that. So, it was not just one of these humdrum summits with a lot of people.

FLACK: I do think it had a tremendous impact on Gorbachev, particularly. I think he came to realize the importance of the Reagan administration here and the president and of the weight of the responsibility that he had in this negotiation. That was the beginning of perestroika and glasnost. That was when they began to realize that they weren’t doing things right, that there were better ways of doing things. Someone told me that when Gorbachev was on one of his visits to the States, he and the president were on a helicopter going up to Camp David or something, and they were flying over the northern part of Washington into Maryland and Gorbachev was looking at all these subdivisions which from the air looked beautifully laid out. He looked at Reagan and said, “How do you do that?” Reagan apparently told his aides afterwards that it is mind-boggling to even think about how you would answer a question like that. It goes back to the very basics of economics. The question of “How do you do that” showed the intellectual limits Gorbachev had and the need he felt to really do things differently and learn.

Q: What was the feeling you were getting after the summit from the people who had been involved in this?

FLACK: It was very, very up. It was a highly successful meeting. You may recall that some of the meetings following it in Iceland, etc. were less successful. This was the first one and the one where they really got together for the first time and got to know each other. It was beautifully orchestrated, if I do say so myself. I certainly had a lot to do with it, but a lot of people in the White House were good at this as well. We were able to provide the type of environment that was really conducive, I think, to very, very good talks. When everybody left, we had a lot of work to do to clean up, so to speak, but we felt that we had been a part of an historic occasion and that it made a difference.

Q: Did you get any feelings both dealing with the Soviets and others before and after, that there was a change in atmosphere?
FLACK: No. Again, the Soviet mission in Geneva is a very large modern mission, but it is also very closed and we didn’t have a lot of contact with them. Relations with them were certainly cool. Where we did have a relationship with them which was developing very rapidly was with Ambassador Kampelman’s team who were negotiating with them on the nuclear question. There the Soviets had teams of negotiators and we had our teams and they met on a regular basis. This was a much more open and almost social thing. They obviously had their serious meetings, but there was a lot of receptions where you got to talk to the Soviets. Over a period of time you saw the attitude of the Soviets become more and more open and constructive.

I remember a luncheon that I gave for UN Ambassador Dick Walters with the Soviet minister of justice. We had the Soviet ambassador and I was acting permanent representative at that point, and Walters’ deputy was with him. During this lunch Walters was really pushing the Soviets on human rights and criticizing them in a very severe and aggressive way. I kept on thinking to myself that the Soviets were going to get up and walk out. Instead, these people were almost apologetic saying, “Your are right and we need to change and we are working on it. But, give us time.” It was just a totally different attitude at a very high level than I had ever seen before. Before they would have been defensive and accused us of who knows what and maybe even walked out. Here they were apologetic and saying they were going to try to do better. It was a really big change.

Q: What was your impression of dealing with the cadre of United Nations personnel?

FLACK: For the most part they were really highly effective international civil servants. These people are highly professional, highly experienced and, I must say, highly paid. During my time there I was very critical, as were a lot of Americans, of the generosity of the UN system to their people not only in pay but in terms of benefits. I think that has changed to a certain degree since then, but back then they were certainly very generous. But, they were very good people.

Also, I must say, I was very impressed by the level of representation that other countries send to Geneva. For most countries, Geneva is a very important diplomatic posting. For the United States it is not. It is a secondary one, a political give away. This is sad because other countries do have their finest people there and they know our system and they know we don’t have our best people in Geneva. For example, I found when I was deputy, the other ambassadors dealt with me, they didn’t deal with the ambassador because they knew he was a political hack that landed there because he knew the president and was not a very effective ambassador. They discounted him. When anything of a serious nature came up, they called me, which was frankly the right thing to do because very often the ambassador simply wouldn’t know what to do with it.

Q: It must have been a very difficult position to be in when acting as the deputy people bypassed the ambassador and he becomes aware of it. How did you deal with this?

FLACK: I don’t think he cared that much, actually. He cared much more about things like how the furniture was arranged in the mission. I remember the first thing he did when he arrived was to ask the GSO to come up to his office and asked him about the maintenance of the automobiles. He wanted to know, for example, when you changed the tires, do you break the beads on the old ones. These were the kind of questions he was asking. It wasn’t who is the French ambassador
and what are the issues with the human rights commission and things like this. He was only interested in administrative details.

Q: Well, he was an auto parts dealer.

FLACK: Exactly, he was. One of the horrible situations I got to and one of the reasons that I had this very nasty argument with Alan Keyes after the ambassador left, was while he was there he changed the configuration of the mission several times. For example, I as DCM changed my office four times while he was there. The building was brand new having been opened in 1980. The FBO had done a wonderful construction job. The ambassador’s and DCM’s offices were on the top floor next to each other, perfectly done. The first thing he did was to kick me out of the DCM’s office. He didn’t want me there. He put the conference room in the DCM’s office. Then he moved me to another floor, etc. He cut into his own office and put a partition down it so that he could put his secretary, another secretary that he had brought in, in the other half of it. This really screwed things up because it was an office made with a restroom along the side and the partition cut him off from that. It just made a mess of it. It was like this all through the mission. He would walk through the mission and move desks and tell people to sit there instead of here, etc.

Well, after he left, the first thing I did was to put things back in order. I took down the partition in his office because I knew a new ambassador would eventually be coming in and I put my office back to where it was supposed to be. I put everything back the way FBO had designed it. Before I did this I talked to the assistant secretary for Administration and the FBO people and asked if it was okay with them. They said that it was fine. Well, the ambassador had left in place one of his executive assistants, a political type, and was trying to get him a job in Geneva, so he was hanging around. Of course he saw what I was doing and called up the ambassador, who at this point had resigned and no longer had any affiliation with the Department of State, and told him what I was doing. The ambassador then called Alan Keyes and told him that Flack was ruining everything he had done in Geneva to make things better and he should stop it. I got these phone calls from Alan Keyes asking what was going on. I explained it to him and he said, “Look, you may be right but this is kind of risky. Don’t screw around with it, just leave it the way it is.” I said, “No, the mission is a mess and needs to be put right. It is not operating effectively because it is physically disrupted.”

So, when he tried to stop me from putting things straight, I said, “This is a minor issue. This is an issue of local management. You shouldn’t be involved in this at all. The ambassador is gone and resigned and has nothing to do with this and I am going to put it right. I have the blessing of the appropriate people in the Department to do it and I’m sorry Alan, I am going to do this.” He, of course, was furious with me for making the departed ambassador angry and this cost me a couple of years on my career path because he obviously took it out on me at evaluation time.

Q: What was your impression of Keyes?

FLACK: Brilliant. Keyes has got an incredible mind. He is one of the brightest men I have ever known. In multilateral meetings he is on top of every issue. His mind is usually three steps ahead of everybody else around the table. At the same time he is thinking about issues, he loves to
think up analogies or little things that he can relate to and make a story. At one meeting we were going through a number of things with seventeen countries and he was drawing a little diagram trying to relate this to some little story that he could tell about men going down a river rowing the boat and somebody is rowing the other way. He said, “Isn’t that kind of like this meeting?” I had no idea what he was trying to get to but sort of nodded. When he spoke he described the meeting in terms of this analogy of men rowing the wrong way or something like that.

He was and is still very, very bright. Unfortunately, I think he is a reactionary in terms of politics but he has a right to that. I don’t think he was very effective as assistant secretary in this respect because he was so outspoken and brusk. He had very strong opinions and his way of presenting them often was not very diplomatic. He was not liked by his UN counterparts.

**Q:** You were there during the beginning of the Reagan period. Did you feel the sort of disdain that the White House had for the international organizations at all at your level at the beginning and did you see any change?

**FLACK:** I felt it in the beginning in a very abrupt way. I was arriving just as the Reagan policies were falling into place. I remember one of the unpleasant policy dilemmas that I had was with the World Health Organization. The Carter administration had come up with a plan that was put forward to WHO to come to an international agreement that international pharmaceutical companies would agree to limit the way they market in developing countries. There was this problem of too much competition and too many developing countries spending unnecessarily large amounts of their scarce foreign exchange for pharmaceuticals when it was actually a duplication of what they were buying elsewhere, too many companies selling similar products. The WHO and the Carter administration were trying to address this problem by having the drug companies agree to cooperate and coordinate in their distribution and marketing in developing countries. This was a Carter administration initiative that was going forth nicely in WHO and was going to be supported by many countries. It was going very well. Then we a cable as we were going into one of these meetings, reversing the policy 180 degrees, saying we withdraw our support of our own proposal, it is not a good idea. Obviously this was major politics going on back here in Washington, but the result was I had to go in and reverse our stand on our own initiative. That is not the only time I have had to do that in my career.

**Q:** What was the impression of Jeane Kirkpatrick when she was our chief representative to the UN?

**FLACK:** She came to Geneva several times while I was there and she was always received very well with a great deal of respect and I think was very highly regarded. She is an absolutely brilliant person, an excellent speaker and really knew her subject inside and out and was learning on the job in an exceptional way. For example, I remember something she told a group of us once in terms of human rights. She said that before she came into the job at the UN, she never really considered the Human Rights Commission to be a terribly effective group, that it was really a lot of talking and didn’t amount to much. But, she said that she found out on a very personal level that she personally could make a difference by working on these things. She said that during one of the Human Rights Commission meetings, a dissident got to her and said, “Would you call the minister in this particular country and complain about this particular
dissident and see what you can do about getting him out?” She said that she was reluctant to do it but the case looked good, she had researched it, and she said that she would do it. She called and got the guy out. She said that she suddenly realized that you could make a difference, that things could be done in cases where you studied it and saw that there was an injustice and that even on an individual level, but certainly on a collective level, you can make a difference and something good can come of it. So, she changed her opinion and became more favorable to human rights activities.

Q: Did you have much contact with the other delegations?

FLACK: Oh, yes. Regularly. We met on a regular basis in various groupings. I was the co-chair of what was called the Geneva Group. One of the functions of the American mission and the British Mission, the other co-chair was the British DCM, was to chair a small group of donors, the most important donors to the UN system. We had a group of six or seven major donors to the UN system that met regularly as kind of an oversight group. We were kind of an informal OMB. We would meet and discuss, for example, the budget of the ILO and look at it from a very critical point of view, because we were all interested in trying to save money, and made suggestions to the management of the organization about how we thought it could be trimmed, changed or improved. These organizations listened very carefully to what we had to say because they knew they were talking to their major donors. So, this was a very important group and we worked on a regular basis with these other countries, the French, the British, the Japanese, etc.

In other forums we would work regularly with many other missions, perhaps with the members of Human Rights Commission, which would change, or others. It would depend on the forum. From time to time you would have the full Geneva representation. As I mentioned before, other countries send their top people to Geneva, so you have very high level and very competent representation from other countries.

Q: Did you have a problem with them from time to time over the Reagan administration? The Reagan administration was a real change and like most administrations when you have almost a total change in the American political thrust overseas, there is a learning curve. It takes a while for the shake down to learn the territory and responsibilities and find that you are not going to make an earthly difference just because you think it is right in international affairs.

FLACK: Yes. Due to the type of representation that we have abroad, especially in Europe, and especially in Geneva, at that time at least, we didn’t have an ambassador who could make a big difference in terms of really explaining the Reagan agenda. So, the local ambassadors and UN people basically looked to Washington. They read the “Tribune.” They read the “New York Times.” They listened to CNN to find out what was going on in Washington. In the first part of the Reagan administration, I think there was a great deal of almost amusement. They thought that Reagan was the movie actor, the cowboy, etc. As time went on I think they began to see that this was a serious administration that had a real agenda. But, I don’t think in Geneva that we did a very good job of conveying that. We tried to do things, for example, the State of the Union speech by inviting the diplomatic corps to see the speech, either direct or on tape. Such occasions were mildly attended. But, we didn’t have a major voice in Geneva, as we should have had, to put our story forward.
Q: Did any events intrude on your work in Geneva like the problems in Central America with Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Grenada invasion, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, etc.?

FLACK: All of these things one way or another involved us in Geneva because there are so many organizations that were involved in them or through the embassy in Bern. You mention Nicaragua. Faith Whittlesey was ambassador after Lodge and her major issue was Nicaragua and the Contras. She made a real campaign out of it at the embassy with the Swiss, much to their annoyance. We felt it down in Geneva. It became an issue almost everywhere.

The invasion of Grenada occurred while I was there. I remember that very well because one of the groups that we dealt with very closely was the ICRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross, which was just about a block away from us in Geneva. I had a very close relationship with the operations head and the president of the ICRC. I had been following what was happening in Grenada but I didn’t know exactly when things were going to happen. I remember getting to my office one morning and there was a call waiting for me from the president of the ICRC. I got him on the line right away and he said, “I am calling you to remind you of the United States responsibility under the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war and we have a plane standing by at Cointrin Airport ready to go with our people to Grenada to start working on the prisoner of war problem. I need your authorization and clearance to let that plane take off and land in Grenada.” Well, I put the phone down and called the operations center and within two hours we had the authorization for them to go. But, the U.S. military was totally unaware of the ICRC responsibility to do that and had not factored in any kind of arrangement for something like that. This was one of the ways these international events impacted on us in Geneva.

Another element that I remember with the ICRC was one of the terrorist hijackings of TWA in Lebanon. The ICRC was the intermediary on that and were negotiating with the terrorists. I remember at one point I kept getting calls from the operations center asking me to tell the ICRC this and that and find out if they had met with these people, etc. and I was going back and forth. At the same time I was watching CNN. This was the time CNN was coming into its own as a very important conveyor of information internationally. I remember watching CNN and being on the phone to the operations center and they were saying, “Get over to ICRC and find out if they have arrived at the intersection where they are suppose to be meeting with these people to negotiate. Has that meeting taken place yet? What is going on? Get back to us right away?” I told the guy at the operations center to turn on CNN, that they had cameras at that intersection waiting for something to happen. “I can tell you right now nothing has happened yet, but turn CNN on and you can watch it.” Another one of those changes in the way that we do things.

Q: How about the hijacking of the “Achille Lauro,” did that impact at all in Geneva?

FLACK: No, I don’t remember that having an effect. I do remember the bombing in Beirut and the loss of all the Marines. That was a major blow to all of our missions around the world.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the United States as far as Geneva was concerned was the mover and the shaker of events at the international organizations we were dealing with?
FLACK: Yes, very definitely. In spite of the fact that we didn’t play our hand very well, in the sense we didn’t have an effective ambassador there, the other missions and organizations recognized (1) the fact that we paid so much of the budget of the UN and the budget of these other organizations, and (2) the importance in Geneva of what we were doing because all of these negotiations with the Soviets were going on there and it was a very public event. Every night on television, locally, you would see the Soviets and Americans arriving for meetings, so people knew that big and important things were going on in our mission, even things that were not related to the UN. In addition to all of this, we had a very imposing mission on top of the hill overlooking the lake. So, yes, it was an important mission and everybody knew it.

Q: On a personal note, how was it like living in Geneva as far as the cost of living, etc.?

FLACK: Well, as DCM, deputy permanent representative, you don’t feel that as much. You have servants, a residence, a car and things are pretty much taken care of. But, generally I would say that was at a time when the dollar was very high, at the beginning of the Reagan administration. I remember the dollar being at close to four Swiss francs. I think it is now close to two. The French franc was at 11 and now is 6. So, it was a time when people on our staff were buying Mercedes because they were cheap. The cost of living was not a problem for us then because of the strength of the dollar. It is a lovely city. Most people don’t realize that Geneva is really a small town, population of 150,000. If you take the whole metropolitan area it comes up maybe to 300,000. So, it is not a very big place. Big name, but not a very big place. However, it is close to France, close to Italy. You have the Alps and the skiing. Our Monday morning staff meeting in the winter usually began with the casualty report, to see who was in a cast, and there were a lot of them. We had to be very careful at our mission about people in wheelchairs because there were several people in wheelchairs who had broken legs skiing. Fortunately, the building was built at the time that you had to have wheelchair access and all that, so it took care of these people pretty well.

WARREN ZIMMERMAN
Deputy Chief – Arms Negotiations
Geneva (1985-1986)

Mr. Warren Zimmermann entered the Foreign Service in 1961. His career postings included Venezuela, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, France, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria. Mr. Zimmermann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: Today is October 23, 1998. You were saying the time you were with Max Kampelman was actually ’85-’86.

ZIMMERMAN: That's right. Of course the negotiation went on a lot longer. I stayed with it for about a year.

Q: What were the negotiations doing at that time?
ZIMMERMANN: Well, there were three of them. It was a very complex situation. There was the space negotiations of which the major component of it, of course, was Reagan's strategic defense initiative, Star Wars. Then there were the strategic negotiations, a pick up from the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. And then there were the intermediate range force negotiations which was a negotiation pegged to the SS-20s the Soviet Union targeted on Europe and the NATO missiles, Pershings and Cruise missiles, targeted on the Soviet Union. So each of those for the American delegation, each of those negotiations had a leader. Max Kampelman was the overall leader for the whole negotiation, and he was also in charge of the space negotiations.

Q: What was your role?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, my role turned out to be much less than either he or I had contemplated. I was his deputy in his function as head of the overall thing. It turned out that for a variety of reasons, on of them very strong turf consciousness of the American leaders of the strategic and the IMF, intermediate range negotiations, there wasn't a great deal for me to do other than managing the administrative structure of an enormous delegation. I didn't have nearly as great a substantive role as I had anticipated.

Q: Well, what was sort of the spirit you were seeing. I mean in a way you weren't in a day to day role and working on sort of the overall, was there a spirit of optimism or frustration or how were things going?

ZIMMERMANN: That was very interesting because we had an enormous delegation. I think over a hundred people who had come out. Most of them designated to one of these three negotiations. All the major national security elements of the U.S. government were represented. The dynamic of the negotiation was that there were a number of people who had been sent out from the Pentagon to insure that no progress was made. This is of course not what they would admit except after a few drinks, but that was indeed what they were sent to do. They would report back to their defacto leader Richard Perle in the Pentagon every night or every two nights about the progress of the negotiations or in their eyes the lack of progress in the negotiation. There were others who took the more professional point of view that if American interests could be satisfied, they would go along. So, it was with those kinds of ingredients, you can imagine this was not a negotiation that moved very fast. The Russians, I think, had their own restraints on doing very much. What they wanted to do more than anything else in the world was to block the progress of the SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, because it was clear they couldn't compete with it. If it actually was built, and if it worked, it would give the United States and their allies a first strike capability, and we would have effectively won the strategic competition. So, at all costs they wanted to block.

Q: Well, what was the feeling of our delegation because the strategic defense initiative which was designed to essentially shoot down enemy missiles is still floating around, but it hasn't gone anywhere, and many people in the United States at the time including military people said this isn't going to work.
ZIMMERMANN: Again it was fascinating. You recall how this all started. It was an idea that Ronald Reagan got from Edward Teller, the old vintage Hungarian physicist and cold warrior, and it appealed to Reagan's idea that you didn't have to depend on a balance of terror or mutually assured destruction or deterrence. You could actually shoot down anything the Soviets sent over. During one of the breaks during the negotiation we were taken to the two great nuclear laboratories, Los Alamos and Livermore where the main work was being done on the SDI. I remember asking something as a devil's advocate at both of the laboratories how long it would take before we would have an operational strategic defense. The answer at both places as I recall, I may be off by some years, this is 1985 remember. The answer was somewhere in the first decade of the 21st century. In other words this was way out, several decades out. It turned out later, we didn't know it at the time, that some of the tests for this missile system were being faked. We were told, and it became public knowledge, it was in the press, that these tests had worked, and effectively we had gotten the capability at least in the testing mode of shooting a bullet with a bullet, which is what it would be like if you were shooting down a strategic missile with a defense ballistic missile. Of course, this made an enormous impression on the Soviets, that we had the technology to do that. They always tended to give us credit for much greater technological skill than we had. In this case they gave us too much credit, because it turned out and it was admitted later I think by Teller, that these tests were faked, that we hadn't actually shot a bullet with a bullet.

Q: Well, what was the motivation for Richard Perle and his cohorts to try to stop this?

ZIMMERMANN: They didn't believe in arms control. They were opposed to arms control. They felt it would weaken the United States' defense capability. The Soviets were taking advantage of it. They simply didn't believe in it. In a way there was another interesting paradox here along the lines of you should never ask for something because someday you may get it. The American position on the IMF negotiation, which was on intermediate range missiles, was a so called zero option. Missile systems on both sides, the Soviet side, the western side had to be completely destroyed. That was our position. As it turned out that was exactly what was achieved. It turned out to be a brilliant denouement to a missile rivalry which was enormously dangerous and enormously important not only in our relations with the Soviets but our relations with the allies. I am quite sure that Perle and company devised the zero option because they were convinced that it was totally non negotiable. Of course it was for many years, but ultimately it produced a result, and these missile systems have now been totally dismantled.

Q: Did you get any feel that say our representatives from the American military establishment were people on both sides of the question, or was it pretty much they were there to stop it?

ZIMMERMANN: No, it wasn't actually so much the American military that were going to stop it. Of course they had negotiated SALT I, they had negotiated SALT II. I think they had a very keen sense of the U.S. national interest. It was the more ideological people surrounding Perle, many of them coming from - again a paradox - the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which was founded as a result of legislation by Hubert Humphrey to promote the cause of arms control. Afterwards it was almost totally taken over by people who didn't want any arms control at all and people out of Perle's office were of the same frame of mind. There were also people on the delegation who came from the Air Force who wanted to build the SDI. This would be an Air
Force thing, and they were very strongly committed to that. So they didn't want a result either. Now the ones who would have been prepared to have a result, nobody was saying we should have a result at any cost of course. But those who were prepared to negotiate in good faith were some people from ACDA. The most outstanding of these was the ACDA counsel general Tom Graham who later became the head of our delegation to the non proliferation treaty renewal. He had been a veteran of earlier strategic arms control talks, and he genuinely wanted to negotiate on the basis of American interests. The military in general other than the ones I mentioned were prepared to do that. Kampelman himself had a very difficult job because he was known as a hardliner. At the same time he was an is a brilliant negotiator. He had to play his cards very close to his chest. He had to win the confidence of those who really didn't want any result at all, while at the same time he had to carry out the instructions which he was getting which were to negotiate in good faith. In the end, I think the result at least in the INF negotiations was a testament to his ability to take the opportunity to get a result when it is in the American interest.

Q: Were you feeling at this time, '85-'86 that a change was coming around in the Soviet Union?

ZIMMERMANN: You know, when were in Geneva, I think I am right on this, both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze became the leaders of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev became head of the party; Shevardnadze became the foreign minister. I actually had known Shevardnadze from my days in Moscow in the ‘70s. I had met him once. I had been traveling with Senator Kennedy in Georgia and he was the Georgia party boss. We had met him, and he was already an outstanding individual and looked like somebody who would go very far. Nobody, I think, understood then and I think he didn't either, how flexible he would turn out to be. Nobody had a sense of Gorbachev being a liberal. We had of course, all the CIA information and all the intelligence information that was amassed on Gorbachev. Not a lot was known about him, but he had visited Canada, so there was one long visit to the west. But in that year it seems to me, I went to a think tank meeting of the Columbia and Harvard schools of Russian studies which they have every year in Harriman New York. I recall that the one in 1985 was devoted to Gorbachev who had recently taken over. The consensus of all the great Russian experts from these two great universities was he was a totally traditional Soviet leader, that you could not expect any serious reforms. He would be just a younger version of what had gone on before. So, I think we in the delegation could have been pardoned for not knowing that some fairly big things were in the offing. Of course they didn't have them in arms control at least for several years more.

Q: But there is no sense that the Soviets were beginning to get concerned, say about things as simple as computers and things where information is getting out. The technical world is changing such that it is very hard to keep the Soviet system going.

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I think there were certainly no Soviets we were negotiating with would ever speculate about that sort of thing. They were totally rigid in terms of what they were prepared to tell you outside the negotiating framework. You got very little from them on things like that. I think there was a general view, and I go back to my own experience of five years in the Soviet Union that yes the technological revolution was going to leave them farther behind, was going to make their ability to keep their dictatorship working much more difficult because of duplicating machines because of computers, all the rest. But, certainly there was no sense '85 or
'86 that there was going to be the collapse that there ended up being five or six years later. No sense of that at all.

Q: Well, how did you leave this position you were there, you found yourself with not as much to do as you liked.

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I talked it over with Kampelman and he was very sensitive to it. In 1986 the European Bureau of the State Department, Charlie Thomas, who was the principal deputy assistant secretary for the European Bureau, went to Kampelman, had been in charge of the last CSCE review meeting and asked him if he could recommend somebody from the outside world who could be the head of the next review meeting that was coming along in the fall of 1986. Kampelman with whom I worked earlier in the Madrid CSCE meeting, knew my work and he also knew that I was a bit frustrated in this job in Geneva, he gave Charlie Thomas my name. Kampelman told me the story that Thomas said, "No, Max, you don't understand. We are not looking for a professional foreign service officer. We are looking for somebody in the tradition of Arthur Goldberg who was the first one, and yourself who was second. someone who has a national standing and could deal with all of the pressures that come with a major human rights meeting." Max said, "No, I have thought about that and I really think Warren would be the best person." So very reluctantly my organization accepted me on the strong recommendation of somebody who was not a part of my organization. Roz Ridgway who was an extremely able assistant secretary for Europe at the time, said she had opposed my being named because she thought that no foreign service officer should have to deal with the Congress on such volatile issues as human rights performance of the Soviet Union. I said, "Look, I have dealt with the Congress before. I have been in the Soviet Union." I didn't really worry about that. I thought it would be all right and it was all right.

Q: So just to get the time frame you were working with CSCE from when to when?

ZIMMERMANN: I started in the summer of 1986 with CSCE. I left the Geneva talks, I guess the spring round of '86 was the last time I was there. I spent some of the time learning some German because the talks were going to be in Vienna. We went to Vienna in September of '86 for what was called a preparatory meeting. These meetings don't have an ending date because they all work on consensus which means that any one of the 35 countries has a veto power. The meeting can't end until all 35 are prepared to have it end. So the best guess was the entire meeting would last about a year. Some optimists thought it would last six months. As it turned out it lasted over two years. We finally did get a result, but it took us nearly two years and a half to get it. So it ended actually on the day on the last day of the Reagan administration in January '89.

Q: In the first place was there a sort of hearings before going before Congress or not? Was this an appointment?

ZIMMERMANN: I had to be confirmed, and I was with no difficulties at all. Claiborne Pell was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and there were no questions about it at all. I don't even think I had to appear. At least I don't remember appearing so if it happened it was very pro forma. The commission on security and cooperation in Europe was created to be a
kind of a watchdog group of the Helsinki process. It was created by Dante Fascell a Democrat of Florida who later became the head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It was created over the strong objections of then Secretary of State Kissinger. There was a lot of bad blood between the State Department and the commission. The commission had members who were both Senators and Congressmen from both parties, and a large staff which participated in all of the CSCE meetings including the one for which I was the head of the American delegation. Without that commission staff we would not have been able to find enough good people from the State Department who were available to go to these long and very complex negotiations, so they did a very good job. The commission in its Washington embodiment in Congress was always there. It was always pushing us very hard for general and specific human rights progress and sometimes actually criticizing us, the delegation, if that progress wasn't apparent. This, I think, was what Roz Ridgway was talking about primarily when she said that no professional foreign service officer should have to deal with that because it is such a political thing. Fortunately, the heads of the commission were both reasonable people. Steny Hoyer from the House and Dennis DeConcini from the senate. They were people you could talk to; they would listen. They might disagree, but they both had a good deal of understanding of the process and understanding of what is possible and what is not possible. I think we were very fortunate that they were there.

Q: What was the status when you arrived in the fall of ’86 of the CSCE negotiations?

ZIMMERMANN: Well, it was in a kind of shambles because there had been an earlier meeting in Bern on human contacts which was a human rights related subject. This is one of these satellite meetings.

HARRY JOSEPH GILMORE
Director, Office of Central European Affairs

Ambassador Harry Joseph Gilmore was born and raised in Clairton, Pennsylvania in 1937. He attended the Carnegie Institute of Technology (Carnegie Mellon University) for a year before transferring to Pittsburgh University, where he graduated in 1960. From there he went onto graduate school at Indiana University’s school of Russian and Eastern European studies. While applying to a National Defense fellowship, Gilmore took and passed the Foreign Service exam and was accepted into the Foreign Service soon after in 1962. He served in the United States and at posts abroad including Ankara, Turkey; Budapest, Hungary; Moscow, Soviet Union; Munich, Germany; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Berlin, Germany; and Armenia, where he served as Ambassador. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2003.

Q: How about Switzerland? Let’s turn to Switzerland.

GILMORE: This is very delicate. The Swiss embassy in Washington was extremely capable. The ambassador, whose name was Klaus Jacobi, had been a very senior member of the Swiss foreign ministry. He had been number two, the Deputy Foreign Secretary, before he came to the
U.S. And his deputy at the embassy, David de Pury, was one of the most capable diplomats I’ve met anywhere. They by and large fended for themselves very well in Washington and didn’t want to go through the desk for the things they could do directly with other parts of the government. We had no problem with them on that.

There was a very sensitive issue in U.S.-Switzerland relations. I learned about this issue firsthand when as Director of the Office of Central European Affairs when I visited our embassy in Bern for consultations. In accordance with normal diplomatic practice, the embassy arranged for me to visit the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss foreign ministry. In the course of my consultations at the ministry, I was asked to meet with the Deputy Foreign Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the second ranking person in the ministry. He asked me to meet with him alone.

The Deputy Foreign Secretary asked me to please convey a message to my government. He asked me to convey the message that Switzerland would dearly like to have a career American ambassador the next time around. He observed that we had sent a number of competent and very well intentioned political appointee ambassadors in the recent past. It was the considered judgment of the Swiss government that they would like to have a career ambassador. They believed that U.S.-Switzerland relations would benefit from it. The Deputy Foreign Secretary indicated he would not convey this message in writing.

I carried this message back to the State Department and gave it personally and orally to senior officials. As I remember it, I gave the message to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway [Ed: Ambassador Ridgway has a series of oral history interviews under ADST auspice] and Director General of the Foreign Service George Vest [Ed: Ambassador Vest also has recorded an ADST interview].

It was a very touchy time. Our ambassador to Switzerland, Faith Ryan Whittlesey was being investigated – that may be too strong a word – she was under scrutiny from Congress, particularly from Representative Dan Mica (D. FL) and Representative Olympia Snowe (R. ME), now Senator Snowe. She had allegedly misused the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Switzerland to host a number of senior Reagan administration officials. I don’t want to get into that because I have no --

**Q:** *It’s in the papers. It was certainly something that was in the papers. And Faith Whittlesey drew a lot of publicly.*

**GILMORE:** Right. I have considerable empathy for her. She was a fellow Pennsylvanian. Her husband had died a tragic death. She raised their children and raised them well. One of them, as I remember, had a learning problem. I believe he was dyslexic. In Bern she was doing what she thought best for the U.S. I mention this matter because I think it needs to be on the historical record. I don’t mention it with any malice toward Ambassador Whittlesey.

**Q:** *This does, of course, raise the subject of assigning political appointees to places where you could get by on English, nice places and all. Such assignments, especially during the Reagan Administration, were currency in kind for the political supporters who got a president elected.*
GILMORE: And many of these political appointees have done wonderful work. I have come to the conclusion, after many years in the Foreign Service, that a well-chosen political appointee can bring some great strengths to the U.S. bilateral relationship with a given country, particularly if the appointee has access high in the administration. But I just mention this because I think it deserves to be on the historical record.

Q: I’m looking at a list which suggests from 1957 to 1990, we’ve had two career ambassadors and twelve non-career ambassadors in Bern, which gives you a feel for the Swiss concerns.

GILMORE: It was interesting. And there were important issues to be dealt with. They may not sound so important to some people, but they were important. Money laundering was one issue we had with the Swiss. Also, some important bilateral relationships were run out of Bern. For example, the U.S. dialogue with Iran to this day is conducted through our embassy in Bern. So, the Swiss capital is also an important diplomatic post for some non-bilateral issues.

Q: Was the issue of Jewish assets much of an issue when you were there?

GILMORE: With Switzerland, no, it wasn’t at that point. That came later. The issues of money laundering and banking secrecy, and the question of how the U.S. would operate with the Swiss to deal with them were on the agenda. The Swiss were very discreet and determined that any business with us be done on a strictly bilateral basis and as equals.

CHARLES E. RUSHING
Executive Assistant to the Ambassador, European Office of the United Nations

Charles E. Rushing was born in Illinois in 1929. He received his bachelor’s degree from Augustana College in 1951 and his law degree from Duke University in 1954. He served in the US Army from 1954-1955. His career included positions in Italy, Eritrea, Southern Rhodesia, Congo, Laos, Liberia, Denmark, and Ireland. From 1985-1991 he served as an ambassador to the UN in Geneva. Mr. Rushing was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in July 1996.

Q: I’m not surprised. After your three years on the Management Planning Staff, you were transferred to our mission in Geneva in 1985. Tell me about that position. What were you and to whom were you to report?

RUSHING: After the exciting and challenging years as Director of the Management Planning Staff, I learned of a new position that was being established in Geneva. That was as Executive Assistant to our ambassador to the UN’s offices in Geneva. One of the reasons for establishing this new position was that the Department wanted to be sure the U.S. was taking consistent positions in the many different fora in Geneva.
As you know, Geneva not only is the European headquarters of the United Nations, but it hosts a multitude of different international agencies and activities: GATT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs], WHO [World Health Organization], ILO [International Labor Organization], Multilateral Commission on Disarmament, bilateral arms reduction talks with the Soviets, etc. We could at any one time have as many as eight different U.S. ambassadors in Geneva.

Another thing that was wanted was for someone to maintain close contact with our discussions with the Russians, with the Soviets, on disarmament. In doing this, I initially spent considerable time with the head of that activity there, at the time, Max Kampelman. My job was not to put myself ahead of the mission’s ambassadors or DCM, but to make sure that the management activities of the mission and that of the other elements of the United States Government represented in Geneva were fully compatible.

I expected to be transferred after the initial four-year assignment but two successive ambassadors asked the Department to extend me. In fact, as we were preparing to leave in 1991, the ambassador (my third) would have wanted me to stay even longer, but I thought that six years were enough.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you arrived?

RUSHING: When we arrived there, the mission ambassador was Gerry Carmen. He had been the head of the General Services Administration in Washington and was a Republican activist in New England.

Q: You say he was effective in his role there?

RUSHING: He was very concerned with promoting American business interests and put together a seminar on capitalism and private industry that was quite successful.

Q: How long was he there?

RUSHING: He was only there for about a year after I arrived. I don't remember when he came. He was succeeded by Joseph Petrone, who had retired from the Army some years earlier as a colonel. He and his wife were very active in Republican Party affairs. She was very able and engaging. They entertained graciously. He was liked by everyone who knew him. Finally, there was Morris Abram, a New York lawyer who came in '89. He had a remarkable ability to get along with people while at the same time, he was very tough-minded, effective, and intelligent. Perhaps he was one of our best ambassadors ever sent to Geneva.

Q: What was our relation, the mission in Geneva, with our embassy in Bern?

RUSHING: Well, there wasn't all that much, aside from protocol and social events. The mission had little to do with the U.S. bilateral relationship with the Swiss, which was handled by the embassy in Bern. There were some complications concerning the operation of the Geneva office of Embassy Bern's Consular Section.
Q: *Did we have relations with other missions in Geneva, too?*

RUSHING: Yes. I forget how many missions were there but there were a lot, maybe 50 or 60. We saw their diplomatic personnel on a continuing basis, particularly when we were trying to make some point, get something done that we wanted.

Q: *Did our various groupings there, or entities, get their instructions through the Department of State or through their own agencies?*

RUSHING: It was complex and difficult to explain briefly. Most UN activities came under the aegis of the U.S. ambassador in Geneva. I should say the "U.S. chief of mission." For, although there could be any number of U.S. ambassadors in Geneva at one time, depending on what was going on (meetings, conferences), there was only one U.S. chief of mission.

This was not always well-understood and misunderstandings resulted. The U.S.-Soviet bilateral disarmament negotiations were basically in a separate capsule. The U.S. team had its own communicators, procedures, etc. Most of the people in the mission saw little of their work. In the view of what happened later with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Petrone deserves praise for being able to halt planning for the construction of a new, separate, high-tech building solely dedicated to the bilateral arms negotiations at a price of somewhere between $50 and $100 million.

There were two (maybe I'm forgetting some others), U.S. Government residential delegations which carried on their affairs--although UN-connected - separately from the mission: the UN Conference on Disarmament and the GATT.

Q: *Did USUN [U.S. Mission to the United Nations] play any role in this? Were they interested in what you were doing?*

RUSHING: Yes. USUN was the mission's sister post back in New York and there were some joint interests and activities. In many cases, however, the mission was separate from what was going on in New York and visa versa. Our parent bureau in the Department for most matters was IO [International Organizations].

Q: *How about instructions concerning labor or the health matters? Would they be sent to Geneva directly from these bureaus in State?*

RUSHING: Theoretically, everything should have come out with IO's concurrence.

Q: *Were you inundated with visitors, VIPs [very important persons], Congressmen?*

RUSHING: We had a lot. There was a branch of Geneva's Administrative Section that did nothing except handle visitors and set up conferences. It had one officer and, I think, three national employees.

Q: *So your role was more than just housekeeping.*
RUSHING: The role was more than just housekeeping.

Q: So, six years of that and you were transferred back to this side of the Atlantic to Norfolk, where you became Political Advisor. Was this to CINCLANT [Commander in Chief, Atlantic] or SACLANT [Senior Allied Commander, Atlantic] or both?

RUSHING: To both. The U.S. admiral in Norfolk wears two hats. SACLANT is the NATO command. CINCLANT is the American command. Both are focused on the Atlantic although the CINCLANT territory is larger than the jurisdiction of SACLANT.

Q: When you got to Norfolk, what did you find your duties to be?

RUSHING: The Norfolk experience was not totally satisfactory. I was treated well, both socially and professionally. But I was never clear what I should be doing.

Q: By the Department or by the Navy?

RUSHING: Neither.

Q: Fairly broad.

RUSHING: I picked up and embroidered on what my predecessors had been doing. I was told, "Everything's just fine." Certainly the POLADs [political advisors] coming out of World War II were stellar FSOs. Think of Bob Murphy. I think that reflected that the military may not have known how to deal with the State Department; they had limited experience in the areas of diplomacy and foreign affairs. I have reflected on this and contrasted the year's training military officers receive before taking up an Attaché job at an embassy with the few days of briefings I received in Washington on my way to Norfolk. Over the years, the military has become so sophisticated and so knowledgeable about how the foreign affairs apparatus works that, in many cases, I don't think that they need a political advisor anymore, except as an ornament, although I had had close contacts with the U.S. military throughout my career, e.g. the sale of the F-16, the Norfolk experience was discouraging.

Q: To whom did you report?

RUSHING: Theoretically, only to the Commander in Chief, a four-star admiral.

Q: But practically?

RUSHING: I didn't report to anyone.

Q: In Washington, State's Bureau of Political/Military Affairs could have cared less?

RUSHING: Could have cared less.
Q: They wanted to see the back of your head?

RUSHING: Yes.

Q: But you got your instructions from them?

RUSHING: I didn't get any instructions and only an occasional query.

Q: A rather interesting way to run an organization. When you sat in the staff meetings with the Admiral and the other top Naval people, did you get the impression that your views were listened to? Did they find you useful?

RUSHING: I don't know. Yes and no. One of the things that concerned me was that, in these staff meetings, let's say, a Marine General, who was no friend of the State Department, would say, "The State Department's position on this issue is so and so." I'd say, "Not so."

Q: You were making friends all over the place.

RUSHING: That was the problem. Then I would call up someone in the State Department--almost never to PM. I'd call one of the geographic Desks and say, "Hey, what's our position on this? Today in this meeting, this guy said it was so-and-so." The State guy would say, "No, it's not that way. It's this way." Which coincided with my prior understanding. My discussing this with State - to rebut what I knew was not the case - was not appreciated by my colleagues at Norfolk.

Q: Did you have access to the top at Norfolk when you needed it?

RUSHING: Yes.

Q: Was being near to Washington, DC a help or a hindrance? Would you have been better off if you'd been in Honolulu or not?

RUSHING: I'm not sure but I think so, based on stories from other POLADs. One of the things that worked was that I'd go to Washington about once every three or four weeks and make the rounds (on a face to face basis) of all the people I had business with. That was helpful in keeping up-to-date, but aside from correcting Norfolk military misperceptions I'm not sure it added much to what was already known. The most useful people were outside PM. I must say, however, that there were not infrequent occasions when I could make a meaningful contribution that could shorten Norfolk's reaction time.

Q: You had no role in Desert Storm, and yet you could probably see the messages coming back?

RUSHING: I think Desert Storm was over by the time I got to Norfolk in August '91.
Richard McKee was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He attended Cornell University for a BA, the University of Virginia for a MA and then joined the Foreign Service in 1965. McKee served overseas in Bolivia, India, Pakistan, Tunis, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. McKee also served as the Office Director for the Arab Peninsula and on the Board of Examiners. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: We are not sure what happened, but we’re not sure where we left off. So we’re going to start with Geneva. Today is the 23rd of September, 2002. When did you go to Geneva?

MCKEE: I went to Geneva in the summer of ’86…

Q: And you were there from ’86 to when?

MCKEE: ’86 to ’88. Originally scheduled for three years, curtailed to two, because money was tight and I realized it was probably impossible for me to get promoted into the Senior Service with a political counselor / human rights officer job in Geneva.

Q: So what was your job?

MCKEE: It’s an interesting story, it’s a good Foreign Service story. The then Permanent Representative was a political guy, a friend of President Reagan’s. He thought, in true businessman fashion maybe, that he could run the place without a DCM, a political counselor, or a human rights officer. He was prevailed upon eventually to accept a DCM; he had fired the previous one, and to combine the political counselor and human rights job into one. And I got that position. So I supervised three people, one of whom did only WHO, a civil servant, one of whom did only ILO, Foreign Service Officer, and one of whom did several things, economic commission for Europe and IPU groups of that nature. And then I did the human rights stuff myself. I also was the Mission liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Q: Well now, there are a number of organizations in Geneva, what was the title of yours?

MCKEE: Well it was political counselor.

Q: But was this, of the titles, what was it?

MCKEE: Oh, it was a whole range of them, World Health Organization was there, International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunications Union.

Q: Well was it the American mission to…
MCKEE: Oh, I’m sorry, yes, it’s the United States Mission to the United Nations Organizations Headquartered in Geneva or some such thing. U.S. Mission.

Q: Who was your political appointee... I mean, your Ambassador?

MCKEE: I was just trying to think of his name… Gerry Carmen was his name.

Q: What was his background?

MCKEE: He was a used car or used tire dealer, I was never sure, from New Hampshire. In the 1980 Republican primary, there was a famous scene in which Ronald Reagan commandeered the microphone in a panel discussion with other candidates for the Republican nomination, saying, ‘I paid for that microphone’. Well the story was, was in fact, Gerry Carmen had paid for that microphone.

Q: So, I mean, what was the Mission’s mission? What were you doing?

MCKEE: Well it’s sort of a diverse mission, in the sense that most of the organizations in Geneva were technical organizations. ILO, ITU, what have you. But various groups wanted to politicize them, and State did not want to seem them politicized, and so, in a way I suppose you could say I was the anti-political counselor, I was the one who was trying to get them to focus on what the U.S. Government thought was the business at hand and not an extraneous agenda that involved political grievances and various human rights things.

Q: How did you find operating in that particular environment?

MCKEE: Well, I was very lucky, because Gerry Carmen quit about six weeks after I got there, and his successor was a very nice guy, Joe Petrone, whose wife Augusta was also a very nice person. Two very good DCMs, Ron Flack my first year and Bill Marsh my second year, so the Mission itself ran fairly smoothly after Gerry left. I’ve gotta confess, I was not particularly attracted to UN work, it’s heavily, heavily influenced by precedent, every resolution and every meeting, practically every resolution builds on the preceding resolution. And every adverb and every semi-colon is argued about. Also, the UN organizations ran on the same regional basis on which the UN political side in New York ran - the African group, the Western European and Others Group, in those days, essentially the Soviet Group, the Latino group and all of that. This left Israel out in the cold. More to the point, in that setting there were an awful lot of awfully boring planning meetings of the group before you sat in on a very boring plenary of ITU or ILO or whatever it was.

Q: Well it was sort of, the same battles fought again and again and again?

MCKEE: Absolutely, absolutely. The same resolutions would be brought up year after year and debated year after year, and slightly modified to reflect changing political alliances and conditions, and then voted on. It was, frankly, very hard to see the relevance of all of it. Now having said that, I did enjoy the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Committee, which is an experts group. I did come to see that they couldn’t function without the NGOs.
NGOs are very important in the international human rights arena, as they are for example in the international environmental arena.

*Q:* Particularly when the Reagan administration came in, it was, if it didn’t run on an anti-UN platform, it certainly, the United Nations was not its favorite organization. Was this reflected in what you all were doing?

MCKEE: Well, I think so, I think so. And that’s actually one of the reasons I curtailed, because I just couldn’t see that the Reagan administration had any real use for the UN. The great example of it is, for my money, the appointment of Armando Valadares as our representative to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1988. He was Cuban, who after twenty-odd years in Castro’s jails was freed and went to live in Spain. He was a bit of a hero for right-wing Cubans in Florida and elsewhere. He came out in ’87 as an advisor to the U. S. delegation. Then, as I think is often the case, he was named to lead it. The fact is that he got his citizenship through some special legislation, only weeks, or at the most, months before the Commission convened in the spring of 1988. He spoke rapid-fire Cuban Spanish, and actually pretty good French, but almost no English. The point here was that the only use that the Reagan administration had for the UN system was to try to politicize it, and make it serve these objectives. In this case, the goal was to get a human rights resolution targeting Cuba, which we did. That’s the reason I have that Superior Honor Award on the wall. The Reagan administration was not interested in the programmatic aspects of the Human Rights Commission, the special rapporteurs on torture, on non-judicial killing, that kind of thing. And they were not interested very much in the ILO, for example. So it was in a lot of ways not a very happy environment.

*Q:* Well how did you find dealing with your counterparts on these various commissions? Were they more or less creatures in the UN, had they acclimated themselves or it, or did you find otherwise?

MCKEE: Well I think in the Western European and Others Group, there were thoughtful people with a lot of experience in multilateral diplomacy who did really feel that the organization had something to contribute to making the world better. I would argue that their situation was a little bit easier, in that they almost all represented parliamentary democracies, whereas of course in our system, you have to keep track of what the Executive wants, you have to keep an eye on what Congress wants, and it’s a much more diffuse kind of government. The representatives of the other countries in most cases were either political appointees or sort of careerists run rampant, not a very inspiring crowd.

*Q:* Well you mentioned you got a Superior Honor Award, what did you do to sort of merit this?

MCKEE: Mollify the members of the Western European and Others Group by, first of all, persuading the Department and then Mr. Valadares to come two weeks earlier, earlier than usually had been the case. I took him around to call on heads of missions there, key missions there, so that they could see that he wasn’t a Johnny one-note. He actually was, and this was true, he was also interested in other human rights issues such as Chile and South Africa, which were hot at that time. But also just basically I made an effort to develop a rapport between him and these other missions so that we could achieve our objective, which was this resolution about
Cuba. To that end, I mean the White House moved mountains, President Reagan would call presidents of other countries to get them to vote in favor of our resolution, or at least to abstain.

Q: Did the Soviets play any particular role in what you were seeing there at the time?

MCKEE: They were not active in retrospect in the human rights commission or in the ILO or the other organizations, WHO, ITU. The country was actually beginning to fall apart a little bit. The most significant, I think, conversation I ever had in the Foreign Service was that my Russian opposite number. One of my duties was also to keep an eye on regional political issues. For example, while I was there, there were proximity talks between the Afghanistan resistance and the Soviets about the Soviets’ leaving Afghanistan. And Cambodia was another regional issue, I got to know, my Soviet opposite number a bit. He called me once and asked me to come by for coffee in the Delegates’ Lounge. It turned out that he was really quite distraught. He had come from a family of old Bolsheviks. His father had been a railroad engineer, what more Stalinoid occupation could there have been? He was brought up believing all this stuff. Of course the revelations of the ‘50s had some adverse impact. But what really hit him was his brother is coming back from serving the military in Afghanistan as a drug addict. He was just really concerned that the Soviet Union was falling apart. He made the point that, what are now the Turkic Republics in Central Asia, were all run by these family rival mafias that the USSR authorities were afraid to confront. But anyway, overall the answer to your question, I don’t remember the Soviets being particularly active in these fora.

Q: How about the Arab bloc? Particularly vis a vis Israel. I mean I imagine this, did this take up quite a bit of your time?

MCKEE: Oh, absolutely, this was one of the biggest thing that the political counselor did. A whole bunch of pro-Arab resolutions would be introduced into every forum, including when the ICRC had one of its once-every-five-year meetings.

Q: The Red Cross.

MCKEE: Yes, the Red Cross, yes. While I was there, in every forum the Arab group would introduce resolutions. If it was in the ILO, it would be the Israeli suppression of Palestinian trade unions; in the WHO, it would be Israeli health practices that threaten the health of Palestinian children. And, mind you, there was a lot of sentiment among the representatives of the developing countries and also among the Europeans that this was true, that the Israelis did deserve to be censured and criticized. Of course this was not the view in Washington.

Q: What did you have, sort of an anti-Israeli sniffer that you put on everything that came out, or was it...

MCKEE: Well, that’s not too far from the mark, although, we’re not talking rocket science. These resolutions are published and you know who’s sponsoring them and you know what they say.

Q: Were you able to beat them down?
MCKEE: Sometimes, but quite often the resolution would come out and we would either abstain or ours would be the only negative vote.

Q: Did you have any contact with the Israeli embassy?

MCKEE: The Israeli Mission, yes, I talked to them from time to time. But you know the Israelis’ contempt for the UN matches the UN’s contempt for Israel.

Q: I take it, for both professional reasons and sort of personal things, I mean you didn’t care for this multilateral, multinational, what is it, multi...

MCKEE: Multilateral.

Q: Multilateral diplomacy. Which is a creature of its own.

MCKEE: Well it’s very different from bilateral diplomacy. It combines the worse aspects of a grade school classroom and an insane asylum. Others find it challenging and rewarding, but I didn’t. So an opportunity came up to go back to Pakistan, to the Consulate General in Lahore, and so I put in for it. Thanks to a couple patrons, Arnie Raphel, may he rest in peace, and Ed Abington, particularly, Bob Peck, may he rest in peace. I was assigned as Consul General in Lahore in 1988.

DAVID T. JONES
INF Negotiations Member

David T. Jones was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania and served as a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army overseas from 1964-1966. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1968, his postings abroad included Paris, Brussels, Geneva, and Ottawa. Mr. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: Today is March 3, 2000. ’87-’89 in Geneva. What were you doing?

JONES: It’s a little less than ’87-’89, but what I’ll try to talk about today is my experience with the INF negotiation at the end of the year, 1987, and the work that was done with the treaty ratification until the end of May 1988 and perhaps if we still have time I’ll talk a bit about what I did in the following year, which was to have an Una Chapman Cox fellowship, a sabbatical. What I had been doing in the late summer of ’87 was trying to find out what I was going to do next in the Foreign Service. I had been unable to work out an assignment. The assignment that I had to Pakistan was canceled because of family medial reasons. As a result, I stayed on in the Department. At that point, the most obvious suggestion was that I continued to work with Ambassador Mike Glitman on INF, which had been the major topic which I had worked on as
the deputy in the Theater Military Policy Office in PM. In any event, for a couple of months as a result of that, I was Glitman’s man coordinator in Washington on INF issues. Then, starting in late September, I moved to the U.S. delegation for the INF in Geneva. We were now at this point very much under the gun. The President had announced on September 18 that INF as a treaty had been agreed upon in principle. On September 20th, Glitman was supposedly told by the Secretary that they wanted the treaty done by October 20th, which made it potentially a very exciting month. It didn’t turn out that way, but that was the initial impetus that we were given in late September. I arrived in Geneva on September 21st. Glitman had been coming from a different part of Europe. We met in Paris and went into Geneva together. I settled in in a curious role of being the major reporting and drafting officer for the delegation for the next two and a half months. This put me working also with the State Department representative at INF, a senior Foreign Service named Leo Reddy.

The exercise in Geneva was a very complicated, multifaceted, interagency exercise on the U.S. side and then dealing with the Russians on the other side. Within the delegation, we had representatives from each of the agencies – ACDA, OSD, JSC, and the State Department. At the same time at the head of the delegation there were actually two ambassadors, Mike Glitman and John Woodworth, a representative from OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) who was also tied personally to senior people in OSD or at least ostensibly he was to be responsible to them. Woodworth had been a longtime career DOD civilian with a great deal of experience at NATO, where I first met him in the late ‘70s, and then in various arms control capacities within the Department of Defense. He was indeed and still is a very knowledgeable individual on arms control and he remains a personal friend as well. But you can see what a dual-hatted, two ambassador situation and a multi-agency operation can bring in complexity. There was also a CIA representative initially. Each of them was also responsible to their home agencies and communicated by Official-Informal telegrams and “secure voice” as well as arguing their cases in Washington and in Geneva. Each side that thought themselves a loser in one set of arguments would then carry their argument either to their special representatives in Geneva or send their arguments back to their agencies in Washington so the arguments could be reviewed and renewed again. To handle our discussions, we worked many hours and almost every day in the “bubble,” the secure facility within almost every embassy. These discussions would last hours and hours on many points. Then you would deal with the Russians. People dealt with the Russians on multiple levels. You had a substantial number of two-on-two negotiations in which Glitman and Woodworth would meet with their Soviet counterparts, Obukoff and Mekvedeff. You would have those meetings. Then you would have more complete groups of the INF delegations on steering groups. These often met twice a day. We would meet alternately in the U.S. delegation or we would go “down the hill” to where the Russians were centered. It was always amusing as to how we would meet one another. It was as ritualized and formalistic as a May Day parade as we would walk in and the Russians would be standing in rank order line, and we would get out of our vehicles and walk through their rank order line shaking hands as we went through this exercise. When they came up the hill to see us, we would do exactly the same thing and there would be a yell throughout the delegation just before the time of their arrival that, “The Russians are coming!” mocking the movie title. We would rush into line knowing that holes would be left in the line for the people that were still rushing to make their spot. There were times when the Russians were virtually coming through the door and our people were hustling into position in order to shake hands and say, “Good morning” or “Good afternoon” or
“Isn’t it a beautiful rainy day today?” Then you would go into the conferences and discuss. The discussions were almost without exception led only by the senior people.

Later, as the negotiations became even more intense and the work became more focused on specific items, we broke down into groups handling each of the specific treaty protocols, one for verification and inspection, another for “elimination” or the destruction of the INF system. There were other people that were working on the exchanges of data which were highly statistical and highly intelligence related. Overall, there were people that were working on the format and the legal language associated with the treaty.

Q: Hanging over this whole thing, was there the feeling that the Soviet Prime Minister, Gorbachev, and the American President, Reagan, had been getting together… They wanted this and you guys had better come up with something?

JONES: Well, clearly, we had this impetus when the president had announced that the treaty was finished. It had to be worked out. But at the same time, there was an almost curious willingness by the delegation that we would sink the ship rather than have a bad treaty. There was not a single dove in this delegation. That didn’t just mean that there was only a question of how fully plumed the hawks were. Any dove would have been eaten alive at the first bubble meeting. It simply wasn’t that way. We perhaps by being willing to sink the whole treaty at the end regardless of how much we desired to get it, to complete it, we were absolutely convinced that we were still better off to have no agreement than to have a bad agreement or to have an agreement that was a good agreement in technical terms but couldn’t be ratified.

Q: Were you getting any feel for your counterparts in the Soviet delegation, what they were working under?

JONES: In retrospect, my feeling is that they had an impetus to complete the treaty, but by no means did that entail being particularly cooperative. It was much more “Here is a problem, Americans. How are you going to solve it?” Certainly this was true on the technical end, “Here is a problem, Americans. You think this is so important. We’re willing to take it another way. You find a way to solve it that won’t bother us.”

Q: In other words, the onus kept being thrown into the American lap?

JONES: Certainly that is the way we felt. You get yourself into a curious hothouse environment of enormous intensity and great pressure from all directions in this effort to complete it. At the same time, there were certainly people in Washington within the office of the Secretary of Defense who did not care if it ever were completed. There were at least one or two people within the NSC who didn’t care if it was ever completed. Toward the very end of this session, a representative in OSC, Frank Gaffney, who is still prominent in conservative circles and writes a column in the “Washington Times” about once a week, resigned because he was informed that he was not going to be promoted to Richard Perle’s former position as the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs but, in effect, the primary person within the Office of the Secretary of Defense dealing with arms control issues. He resigned and said that we should slow down the INF process rather than push it forward. There was a representative within his office dealing with
inspection, who was so ritualistically difficult that the difficulty could only be considered in my view obstructionism rather than principled concern that the very last conceivable possibility for verification had not been explored. So, yes, you did have a great impetus to get the job done, but you had some very serious conservative objections. They turned out to be objections that could be overcome, but they were overcome by a combination of great care during the negotiating process and the political impetus to move forward. There was also a degree of cooperation by the Russians that previously would not have been anticipated, a required degree of openness on their part which I think they found almost personally disconcerting, such as the degree to which information on intelligence holdings and specific holdings of different missiles and locations for them had to be provided to the Americans. There was one Russian military officer who said, “We don’t even give this to our foreign ministry officials.” Now they were forced to publish it in a data exchange. Each portion of these exchanges was clearly very painful for them. It was indeed as if they were making sacrifices, which in a more open society such as ours was information that wasn’t being hidden. We had very little to hide, and they had, in the past, a great deal to hide. That is what made some of our problems particularly intense.

Our intelligence judgments and projections as to how many missiles of this nature they had were based on projections as to how many could be pushed out of a factory given certain production type runs. As a result, we had a high range and a low range. The Russian data figures came in much closer to our low end projection, which generated a conservative storm of criticism of saying, “Where are all these missing missiles? There is a hidden SS-20 force somewhere. We have to be able to find it.” Then they would hypothesize a kind of anywhere, anytime, everywhere, all-the-time inspections in the Soviet Union, which were impossible and deliberately presented not to find the ostensibly missing SS-20 missiles but to make sure that the treaty couldn’t be completed because their level of trust in the Soviet Union was so little under any circumstances that their position was that any agreement was worse than no agreement.

Q: Also, looking at production figures played to… We always assumed that the Soviets were more efficient than common sense would have told us they were from observing how they built other things, that factories were doing an extremely efficient job of producing missiles when they probably were not.

JONES: I’m not sure how the production projections were made, but if you think that they’re going to run three shifts a day and push out missiles 365 days a year, and that this is their major focus to produce this missile rather than another one; then, at each level, you push the theoretical figures up. If you take other projections, you put the numbers further down. However, in the end, we would have been happier if they had come in a little closer to the midpoint in our estimates. What it did was to make it harder for us to say where those missiles that we didn’t find might have been and we had to find additional mechanisms to prevent the possibility that these theoretical missiles existed. We had to tie down and prevent any flight testing. We had to tie down and prevent any training in these systems. We had to tie down the movement of systems in and out of their major SS-20 production facility, which was also producing other missiles. So, we had to find devices and mechanisms that would allow us to inspect for SS-20s while not catching technical/intelligence information on their other missiles that were being produced at the same time. This required a lot of creative thinking and creative drafting. Then we had to find a facility on our part that would allow the Soviets an equal facility to inspect. We weren’t producing that
system anymore, but they still had to have something to inspect. We found a facility. We were able to find a method to inspect their facility that proved acceptable.

The work that I was doing there turned out to be an incredibly intensive drafting experience. Since I went to almost every steering group meeting and was debriefed by Mike on almost every one of his two-on-two sessions, plus doing the basic drafting requests for guidance from Washington on outstanding issues, plus doing end-of-week roundups on where things stood in the negotiations each week, plus writing Official-Informal telegrams to the PM Bureau and other people at State to keep them up to speed on what was happening. I never worked harder in my life for a more extended period of time than those months in Geneva. At the end, we counted up that I had worked 33 consecutive days. Our normal workday at the beginning of this process in September was 12 hours. At the end, it was at least 14. I by no means will say that I worked harder than most. The amount of work that I was doing was on the high end of the group, but there were many people that were working even longer hours and harder and, of course, with much more responsibility than I had specifically. I tried to be creative in the manner in which I did my drafting for guidance.

Q: Your piece of the action was to go around and draft for the different components? The technicians were working and then you would draft?

JONES: We would have the meetings and exchanges. I became very close to the person that would give the immediate record of what was most prominent that was happening in a special steering group meeting or what were the most immediate responses that were happening in the two on two meetings or what fresh guidance needed to be done, what was the status of old guidance or existing material, and what we were going to have to accomplish during this period. So, that was the kind of work that I did by and large.

Q: Was your feeling at the time that while you were all willing to go down with the ship if you had to, were the military members and the State Department members, were you a team or were you going in different directions?

JONES: The delegation in Geneva was a team. That’s a reflection of the guidance and energy that Mike Glitman put into it. In the end, he managed to persuade and co-opt the agency representatives who were there, persuade them that what we were trying to do and the manner in which we were trying to do it was correct, and that there was nobody who had the slightest intention of selling us short by a millimeter. As a consequence over a longer period of time, the OSD ambassador, John Woodward, suffered professionally by not being more obstructive or more difficult or more of a mouthpiece directly for his OSD principals. Instead, he stood on his principles and continued to push for the obtainable treaty. So, the group in Geneva was a very substantial “team” in that manner and worked on it very effectively. At the same time, my illustration of our willingness to accept a failure was the delegation photograph that was taken late in November. This was a ritualistic exercise in that the Russians would come over – perhaps in other years we had gone to the Russian delegation – and we would take joint delegation photographs of everyone who was there on this round of the negotiations. This time, we were in an absolute panic day. We were struggling to try to complete this exercise. We had just sat down and taken our formal photograph, and we were about to leap up and go away and back to our
work when the executive secretary of the delegation, an Army Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Ankley, said, “Stop. Wait a minute.” He went to the side and opened a box and out of the box he pulled a series of bags that had eyeholes on them labeled “INF delegation.” Every single one of us was given a bag to put over our heads. This was to be the photograph of the “delegation in exile” if we failed. So, a number of us still have these bags – and I have mine framed and mounted as part of an INF memorabilia package. It is a juxtaposition of the delegation that succeeded and the delegation that failed. We were in hysterics as a result of this photograph session, but it reflected a reality that within days before the agreement was supposed to have been completed we were willing to take the ship down if it didn’t meet our needs and satisfaction. Throughout the process, we also had people coming to Geneva to solve problems or to buck us up in one way or another. We had senior people from the Department and from Washington come at a couple of different junctures during these final days and final month to put additional impetus behind some of the specific issues. While I didn’t mention that the entire structure for negotiating these nuclear arms control agreements was really quite complicated. INF was only one of three elements being negotiated. The other two elements with separate negotiations ongoing in Geneva were on strategic arms or START and on Star Wars, space armament, SDI. Over this entire structure there was a senior negotiator, subsequently the Counselor in the Department, Max Kampelman, a very senior and very longtime expert professional in various arms control general negotiating frameworks. He had a vested interest in how this entire process was running. Although it became clear over the months and over a couple of years that the only one that was going to be completed in the near term was an INF agreement, at the beginning of the process, there was at least some thought that each of the three would move forward in tandem and there would be one magnificent, overall, incredibly large agreement covering all aspects of nuclear armament. With considerable adroitness, the INF negotiators moved into a separate track policy in which each was able to move ahead at the speed that was appropriate for it and what the negotiating traffic could bear. But that still meant that there was this overall ostensible framework, one portion of which has never been completed. But this framework theoretically existed for many years and they still operate within the framework of how we were going about the negotiations. But what it did was lead Kampelman to come back about November 16th to deal with his senior counterpart on the Soviets side, Vorontsov, in effect waiting for him to turn up delayed progress on core issues in the treaty for somewhere between 10 days and two weeks, although people continued to struggle forward with more specific elements of it. Then finally on the 23rd and 24th of November, Secretary of State Shultz came to Geneva along with some senior people within the Department both in the European Bureau (Charlie Thomas came) and the Assistant Secretary from the Political-Military Bureau (Allen Holmes was there). Again they attempted to push forward some of the more specific problem issues and to generate more attention on the individual protocols that were being negotiated to try to solve problems of “elimination” and areas of that nature. Probably by the end of November when the Soviets had provided technical information, official exchange of data, on the 24th of November, that indicated that they really were committed to completing the agreement also.

This final willingness of the Soviets on November 24th to provide this kind of information would have made it very difficult for them then to have walked away from a treaty. The amount of information that they provided, which had not previously been provided, assuming that it was accurate information, would have been a level of commitment on their part that would have been very difficult to walk away from and would have been considered a serious loss, a serious breach.
of Soviet security, if nothing had resulted from the exchange of information. Without us realizing that as clearly as we should have at the time, in retrospect, it would have been very difficult for them not to have completed the agreement having made this data exchange. This is why the data exchange was delayed as long as it was. They had information that we didn’t have. We had information that was virtually public knowledge, almost down to the last millimeter of length of our systems. So, what they knew about us was perhaps 95% or more of the information. What we knew about them was maybe 50%. In the end, until they provided the information, we really didn’t know how many systems they had. Then, of course, we got into the extended fight to prove the number of systems that they had provided but was accurate.

Q: When you say a “system,” what do you mean?

JONES: What I meant was a missile that fell into the requirements of the INF treaty, the 500-5,000 kilometer range, that it was ground launched, either a ballistic missile or a ground launched cruise missile (a GLCM) and that it was a weapons carrying vehicle.

So, the last week of November and the first week of December ’87 became an even more intense effort to get the Treaty language right and to complete the legal elements of it, and to have a legally acceptable treaty that would be signed. By then it had been announced that this treaty was going to be signed between Gorbachev and Reagan on December 7th. It didn’t turn out to be December 7th because there were other people that said, “Do you know what December 7th is?” But there were, indeed, people whose sense of history was so minimal that signing the first significant arms control agreement with the Russians on Pearl Harbor Day was something that had slipped by them. You wonder still if there are people with a sense of history that feeble, but there are people that just missed that point. In any event, the treaty objective signing time was then to be on December 8th. But this didn’t make it any easier. There is always a benefit to a forcing event, but all it does is ratchet up the pain rather than make it easier. People work longer hours and become more and more tired. Some years later, I saw a psychological study that said that when you’re sleep deprived, it doesn’t mean that you can’t continue to work. You can indeed continue to work based on various stimulants whether they’re simply coffee or whether they’re anything more powerful than that. But what you lose is flexibility. You lose intellectual adroitness, a suppleness, a facility, a way to find an answer around a problem other than just continuing to hammer your head directly at the problem. Unfortunately, the brute force exercise of trying to complete the problems that way was what we often were forced to resort to. “Do you want this agreement or not?” “Alright, then this language, or this comma, or this word would have to be the ones that were agreed.” Some of these exercises ended in very arcane studies of the Russian language versus the English language and the translation of each. One of these words resulted in the exchange between one of our senior negotiators and the senior Russian negotiator. The senior Russian negotiator seized upon what was considered an infelicitous U.S. term, but, because it was delivered at such a senior level, it could not really be gainsayed. So, it then became our effort to find a Russian phrase and translation that would not damage us or harm the manner in which the treaty could be interpreted either by the Russians or by the U.S. Senate. As a consequence, our very adroit Russian translator spent a good deal of time with dictionaries and ultimately did locate a word that was sterile, old, but accurate Russian, and it was the term for our English word that we insisted upon. The Russians, of course, didn’t like it because it deprived them of the flexibility that they had seen and seized upon. But in the end, it was the
very last word in the treaty that was agreed. We left it at that. But the process itself had generated a level of exhaustion that left some of the people on our side virtually prostrate. At the end, we had one of these significantly memorable exercises where at midnight on December 6th, entering December 7th, we had a treaty signing, initialing essentially, ceremony between the head of the Russian delegation and Mike Glitman. We all gathered around this. We had glasses of champagne. We had tears from pure exhaustion. It was the first time that I had seen people cry from happiness. The combination of it was striking. We were just standing there, and all of a sudden there were just a whole group of people, including myself, with tears streaming down our face. It had taken so long and it had been such an incredible effort to get it to this point, which was as close to being the last minute as you conceivably could have.

We went from there to a very different type of exercise. You would think people who were going to fly to the United States would fly by civilian airlines, the Americans on our airlines, the Russians on their airlines. But instead, because we could see that we were going to need every minute and we just simply were not going to be able to depend on commercial air, we got a military aircraft to fly us to Washington. We took the senior Russians along with us, which was even more unique. We not only took the senior Russians along, we took their word processor, which was about the size of a small refrigerator. In the “refrigerator,” buried in the core, was their copy of the text. Along with it came a little Russian secretary who had apparently typed every single word of every single aspect of their draft. We, at the same time, had it on what is now an absolutely archaic and totally antiquated disk. We took one disk with us which had our copy of the treaty in electronic form along with paper copies. On the off chance that the plane didn’t make it, we FedExed copies of the disk to Washington at the same time. During the process of this exercise, we had a C-141, which I’ve you’ve never flown in a 141, it’s like flying inside a vacuum cleaner. It is just incredibly noisy. It is designed to bring cargo and paratroopers. It’s not designed to bring little old ladies politely from Los Angeles to Hawaii. But some of us fell asleep and we would wake up and eat a second bad lunch from the military rations that we had had. But during this process also, we had additional levels of initialing ceremony. Although the exercise was one in which two of the protocols had not been completed or not been officially initialed by the negotiators – and while we had initialed the main text and the elimination protocol in Geneva at midnight, we had not initialed the exchange of data memo of understanding or the inspection protocol. So, these were initialed with the Russians sitting on one side of a table in the front of the plane and Mike sitting on the other end of it. They would pass the papers from one to the next and we initialed it. To show you the creative aspect of the executive secretary, LTC Jeff Ankley, he sometime early on in the fall had gone out and purchased 50-75 ballpoint pens and made sure that each and every one of them worked by starting them. So, during the course of the original initialing at midnight, Mike sat with a pen and he would initial it and then put the pen into a box, pick up another pen, initial it, and put that pen into the box. These pens were then that evening distributed to the individual members of the delegation. As the initialing went forward on the plane, we went up and handed Mike the pens that we had been given and he would use them to once again initial one of the protocols and give the pen back to us. So, that was that kind of creative exercise. It was very exhilarating; very exhausting. We arrived on the 7th. The treaty was initialed on the 8th. The people that went to the treaty signing were almost all in total those in Washington. The people that had done the work in Geneva got to see it on television at a party that we held separately at a Marriott hotel that was actually put on for us by a corporation that had contributed to it. We saw this happen and we saw
Ronald Reagan say, “Trust but verify,” which was the core of the agreement itself. From there, we started on the exercise to ratify the treaty.

We had to believe that the easy part of the entire experience was ahead of us, that we, having done all this work for so many years and having put so much effort into the completion of the treaty and with the President and Gorbachev having signed it in such a high level and highly visible operation, would have a relatively smooth and straightforward path to getting it ratified by the Senate. It turned out to be wrong. It was not as hard to get it ratified as it had been to get it negotiated, but it proved to be far more difficult than anybody had expected.

Q: Ever since the League of Nations treaty was rejected by the Senate, it’s been an article of faith that you want to get some Senate representation on major treaties in at the beginning, at the takeoff as well as the landing. Had there been any such effort to keep informed or to keep the Senate knowing what was going on?

JONES: Yes. There are people that ignore history such as on the 7th versus the 8th of December. But these were not the people that were in the overall review of how the treaty was being negotiated. What you had for many years was a Senate oversight group, which was invited to come regularly to Geneva and look in on, discuss, and meet with the negotiators on both sides. For quite a number of years, we had this process and this group was supposed to be a relatively small group of people that were going to be there in the Senate likely a long time and had an interest in arms control, were not going to be constantly rotating because it did require a degree of expertise, and, as a consequence, also their staff people. So, the structure was there. Unfortunately, it didn’t work as well as the structure should have in theory. What happened was, over a period of time, the entire negotiating process on arms control at large had gone very slowly. It was not really obvious until close to the end that we were likely to get an INF treaty. A certain number of people in the Senate, if the vote isn’t on an issue that is going to take place tomorrow or that’s not a constituency sensitive problem, don’t pay a great deal of attention to it. The material associated with the treaty was complex, arcane, detailed, lengthy, and as a result not something that an individual normally sat down and cuddled up with. At one point, to illustrate to you that there were also slippages on the Senate side, we had a batch of questions directed to us from Senator Byrd’s staff and office reflecting a treaty text that didn’t exist anymore. It was old. But somehow they had never gotten him the updated, complete, final treaty text. But, no, we were aware of the need to get this through the Senate. We were particularly aware also of the need for Republican administration to get it through a Democratic Senate in an election year. Yes, this was a very popular treaty. It was endorsed by everyone from the VFW to the League of Peace. It was widely popular throughout the country. It was wildly popular within our European allies, all of whom wanted it. It got to the point where Kissinger, who wasn’t enthusiastic about the treaty, said that it should be approved because not approving it would be more damaging to NATO than approving it would be, which is the damming with faint praise that Kissinger is often able to do. But nevertheless, there was this definite inherent tension between the Executive and the Legislative Branch. The Senate had just returned to Democratic hands after six years in which they had not had controlled it. They had just resumed control of the Senate in ’86. This circumstance meant that they were not going to be taken lightly. It became one of those instances where how do you endorse something that you know the Republicans want to use to run on in the next election without saying, “Gee whiz, the Republicans did such a great job. Isn’t this
wonderful? President Reagan’s enormous expenditures of defense money have paid off with an INF treaty.” At the same time, how do you turn down something that is very, very popular and essentially something that the Democrats had always wanted: more arms control. The people that wanted it least were the conservative Republicans. Why do we as liberal Democrats give something to this handful of conservative Republicans by being so obstructive that we then look as if we are just being deliberately destructive and political? The administration, after a very heavy initial dose of publicity associated with the signing itself did not go out as it had in SALT I, SALT II, and attempt with a group of people that we used to call the “SALT sellers,” to beat up on any opposition and to sell the merits of the treaty throughout the country. Essentially, they felt that the treaty was selling itself. Indeed, it was and remained extremely popular throughout the entire process. The question became how to get it through all of the various hoops and over all of the hurdles that were being put in front of it. It became the view of the people that had negotiated it and were trying to get it through the Senate that the Democrats couldn’t really oppose it, but they wanted to give it enough nicks and scars and damage to show that “we Democrats are smarter than you Republicans were,” and this is not fatally flawed, but it’s definitely not anywhere near as good as you’d like it to be. We’re going to have to fix it up. So, the process was getting it through the process without having to accept reservations or amendments that would have been damaging, made it impossible for the Russians to ratify it, or force us back into negotiations with the Russians in a way that would protract the exercise even further. These were the problems. They became in the end at times almost as intensive and extensive to deal with as the original negotiations in Geneva.

Q: What was your role in this work?

JONES: My role was defined in the overall structure in which the operation was put together. Ostensibly, there was overall leadership out of the White House and an effort through the NSC to orchestrate extremely carefully all of the testimony and all of the responses to questions that were posed so that no one would be saying anything that would be contradicted by anybody else. Under that regime, each of the individual agencies, particularly DOD and JSC, and to a degree also the CIA and particularly the Department of State and the Arms Control Agency, had individual working groups that were set up for INF ratification. The State Department had an INF ratification task force that was headed by the previous State Department representative in Geneva, Leo Reddy, and I was the deputy for that task force. Ambassador Glitman, Mike, was set separately as a general resource for the community. He ended by testifying to more committees on more issues than anybody else. Although we were devoted obviously primarily to the Senate, we also did briefings for the House. This structure then within the Department of State had me as the deputy for this task force. There were other people from within the Department of State, the European Bureau, the Political-Military Bureau, and in particularly the Intelligence and Research Bureau, who were designated as representatives on the task force. We were to do everything that we could to provide testimony, to provide speeches, to provide backup information, analysis, and among other things what turned out to be the longest, most complicated, most difficult process: to answer the questions that were posed by individual senators and official staff members. We had package after package of questions that were brought to us. Ultimately, we had more than 1,000 questions that came to us in packages, which were designed not just to ask questions about the treaty but to ask questions about virtually everything else that had the slightest connection with arms control and administration foreign
policy. Because the administration was under the gun to answer these questions, we had to devise appropriate responses in one manner, shape, or form. As the questions came in packages, we also had made a decision that we would not return the questions as they were answered but return them as packages. Unfortunately, in almost every package, there was at least one problem question, a question perhaps on which the administration would be divided and which complicated answers – or ways to avoid an answer – had to be created. So, we had and were faced with this ongoing problem.

I was the orchestrator of these questions. Going back through my diary, all I can say is that for weeks and months we pushed this package forward, were answering questions on that package, or we handled another. The most complicated, labyrinthian, and extensive questions were asked by Senator Helms.

Q: Jesse Helms of North Carolina, an archconservative.

JONES: Whether “arch” or not, he was definitely a strong, direct, and committed conservative who believed that the treaty was wrong. He had some able staff members who created sometimes puerile but oftentimes difficult and intensely complicated questions which needed to be answered one-by-one-by-one. Then, having answered the questions, they had to be cleared legally. Then they had to be cleared with every other agency that had an input on this. As were the questions that were directed to their senior testifiers. You started with testimony. After the testimony, sometimes coincidental with it, and sometimes before it, you had questions. The questions had to be answered in one way or another.

We had another problem though. This is the problem of what was called the Abraham Sofaer Doctrine. Sofaer was the legal advisor to the Department of State at the time. He devised this doctrine in association with the Anti-Ballistic Missile or ABM Treaty. What he said was that the administration could make judgments or adjustments to what the text of the treaty said based on the classified record that we had held, whether or not that classified record had been shared with the Senate and whether or not that classified record perhaps was at variance with what the administration had said to the Senate officially in testimony. Well, as there was, as there is today, still an intensive ongoing debate as to what we should do in relationship to the ABM Treaty, Star Wars, the Strategic Defense Initiative, things of that nature, the Democratic Senate was certainly not going to let the Republican administration get away with a treaty, a brand spanking new shiny treaty, such as the INF treaty without making their points on the lack of validity, in their view, of the Sofaer Doctrine. So, they demanded was that the official record be presented to them. The official record then became a subject for intense negotiation as to what exactly composed the official record. Finally, it was recognized that it would have been all of the formal presentations that we made and all of the specific direct accounts of the meetings themselves, not, however, our request for guidance or our backchannel Official-Informals. But reconstructing the official record itself became a major exercise on our part for an extended period. What I had done was the quick, extended summaries of these individual meetings and these steering group meetings that were being held in Geneva. There were also, however, semi-verbatim records of these negotiations and discussions that had not been completed simply because they were very long, and the people that were doing them in some instances were very much engaged in doing other things. For example, the translator-interpreters who were present at the two-on-two
meetings between Glitman and his counterparts were to be done by the interpreters who had been taking notes as they accompanied the principals. But they for many other reasons had not produced the full text. So, this full text had to be produced, and it had to be negotiated as to what exactly was being given to the Senate, who would have access to the documents and under what circumstances they could be read. No copies of them were to be made. Things of this nature. Eventually, we set up something like five cubic feet of documentation to be held in a room in which senators or very specifically designated Senate staff were to be permitted to go and read. In the end, virtually nobody looked at them. Certainly, nobody spent any extended period of time on them. It was simply another exercise in political accountability rather than technical accountability of the negotiations themselves. But we did have a very extended set of discussions. The Intelligence Committee testimony was almost all classified. We had testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee and then before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While the Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator Pell, was willing and indeed eager to get the treaty through, the Armed Services Committee was less enthusiastic or more skeptical and more focused on generating questions and creating a more intense analysis of the treaty. This was headed by Senator Nunn. While Senator Nunn has and retains a well deserved reputation for intelligence and concern for defense issues, he can also get himself and has gotten himself into situations where one wonders why he is taking the position that he is. Aside from that, I'll never quite understand why Senator Nunn decided to oppose U.S. participation in the Gulf War to the degree that he did. But he did. I think politically and historically, we suffered for it. Likewise, I am profoundly skeptical of his technical reasons for finding ostensibly fault with the INF treaty, but he came up with two objections. One was what was called the “Double Negative Problem.” This related to a relatively obscure portion of the treaty, which stemmed from the fact that the Russians used the first “stage” of their SS-20 in their SS-25 as well. So, while they were banned from producing this particular stage of the SS-20, they did not want to be caught in a situation where we would prohibit them from producing the SS-25 as well. But at the same time, neither could we permit an unlimited exception that they could simply produce endless “stages” for a missile that really could be the SS-20 as well. So, what we did was to devise a relatively complicated exception which said that a missile stage section which was outwardly similar but not interchangeable with another missile was permitted on a one time circumstance. We could do it as well. We could produce one stage of the Pershing II if we wished to for another missile so long as it was not directly interchangeable with a Pershing II. Senator Nunn chose to see that as a “double negative” in which he argued that that would allow them to produce a stage that was outwardly in effect interchangeable with the SS-20. Our answer as the negotiators was that, no, it wouldn’t; something that was identical and interchangeable with an SS-20 stage would be an SS-20 stage and, therefore, banned. That was one portion of the Senator’s argument.

Then there was another one which we got involved in arguing. It was called the “Futuristic Debate.” This was an exercise in what conceivably could be done with future systems that might fall into the range that the INF systems included. We got ourselves wrapped terribly around the axles in whether there were “black,” compartmented systems that people were conceiving of, whether you had some sort of Star Wars phaser type of weapon that conceivably could be mounted on a ground launched cruise missile. We then began arguing over what was a weapon and what wasn’t a weapon. A problem for us became there, if you managed to create some sort of an exception for a ground launched cruise missile that wasn’t carrying a warhead but theoretically might at some future time carry something that might be regarded as a weapon, you
left yourself totally open for the Soviets to do the same thing. The problem was that there was simply no way to distinguish between a ground launched cruise missile carrying a conventional warhead or some future system and a ground launched cruise missile that was carrying a nuclear warhead. So, we had had to ban them all. But in this argument over what future weapons would be, we got ourselves into a situation where we exchanged letters between Shultz and Shevardnadze but the exchange didn’t satisfy the Senate. It satisfied the people that weren’t looking for invidious misunderstanding, but it didn’t satisfy the most lawyerly of lawyers. So, the team including Shultz went back to Geneva on the 13th of May. I wasn’t with this group. Shultz left and announced that agreement had been reached and everything was fine; then the negotiators, Glitman and his Soviet counterpart, spent 10 hours negotiating on a paragraph that lasted all night long, the contents of which I have not the slightest idea, except that, in some way, it was an effort to nail down finally, completely, and absolutely that ground launched cruise missiles would not be involved in any future weapons. Of course, what we have done is to use ALCMs [air launched cruise missiles] and SLCMs [sea launched cruise missiles] to handle any of these futuristic type weapons or to handle the navigational type radar, the observation type systems that will surveil the battlefield. The fact that we set them aside for ground launched cruise missiles and prohibited them really hasn’t restricted us in the slightest. But the process, from something that people had blithely imagined was going to be finished sometime in March after a Christmas break allowed people to relax a bit and organize themselves for a quick run through the entire treaty and a rapid ratification, just started to drag. The more it started to drag, the more people got worried, that something was going to go wrong, somehow that would foul it up, somehow the obstacles that were being put forward, in our view created artificially, were going to lead people to a sense of exhaustion. We feared a conclusion of “well, no, we weren’t going to be able to get it done; maybe we had better defer it until after the election.” The President and the executive branch created another force in that regard. That was that they were going to go to Moscow, have a summit. At the summit, they were going to sign the treaty officially and formally, and exchange ratification instruments. This created what was an artificial deadline but which became the forcing event to push people out of the committees, out of the committee discussion, end the endless rainstorm of questions, and actually move us to official debate within the Senate. We knew that if we could get the treaty to the floor, there wasn’t any question that it would be able to be done. In a test vote earlier, there had been something like a 91 to six vote on it. That had made it clear that it wasn’t going to be a problem – if we could get it there to have it voted upon. So, for essentially the last week in May, we moved our operation from the State Department to the Senate. Again, we over-prepared. We created huge briefing books for both individual senators and for the leaders in this debate. We wrote floor speeches for people that we assumed would be sympathetic. Most of them were never used. We created answers to every question. We created responses for every amendment that we believed might be presented, trying to beat back even the most ostensible motherhood-type of amendments such as “You will adhere to all previous treaties as well as to this treaty” or “We think that this treaty should be done in conjunction with conventional forces reductions,” all of the things that sounded good that would either make it almost impossible to get the Russians to agree to it or would tie the hands of the administration in further negotiations. Well, this was possible finally. We sat in the Senate and listened to a lot of people make sometimes a little better educated presentations than others did, but for the most part, “speak for the record.” In the end, we did indeed finish it with a situation that was predicted: the vote was 93 to six. That obviously reflected overwhelming satisfaction by everybody. But we had, of course, Jesse Helms able to
vote against it. Among others, one of the more puzzling people that voted against it was Fritz Hollings. He is supposed to be so ostensibly noble, and one of the people that pursued Nixon throughout his career. I have never quite understood why Hollings elected to vote against the treaty. Helms I could understand. He just simply opposed the treaty and opposed anything to do with the Russians.

Q: What was the feeling? Was it postpartum blues?

JONES: I think there is always a degree of that. I remember noting the fact that there was a sadness in a way that this incredibly long effort had finally come to an end even though it had been the successful end that we had all sought. We did do a little bit of “after action” work to the extent of going around to people in the Senate, to staffers, and to people within the Department to try to determine what lessons we should learn from this – lessons that we thought were going to be applied perhaps fairly quickly to a START treaty, which again people thought was much closer to being completed than it turned out to be and much more complicated.

START almost had to start over again. But we did a series of what I think were useful, even thoughtful, analyses of what it meant to deal with the Senate under these circumstances, why we had had problems associated with this exercise, and what might be done to do it better.

Q: While you were having these questions, were you doing any checking with your Soviet colleagues to make sure you weren’t getting out of bounds?

JONES: I would tend to say no, except on a couple of very specific areas. There were some extremely technical points that we did have to make almost tiny wording changes. Although we had all read the treaty itself, the text of the treaty, literally 100 times, we found there were tiny little grammatical difficulties. In some cases, they were periods or a word or things that were missing that we had to send a corrigendum (correction document) on these. We did have exchanges with the Russians to try to fix some of these points on “futures” and on the “double negative” to resolve these issues that had been generated by the Senate Armed Services Committee. But the thousand questions plus themselves, no, we didn’t go back to the Russians.

Q: Did you have any feeling that proponents of missiles – cruise missiles and land based intermediate range missiles – within the military, within the Pentagon, were there any people that you had the feeling were going around, behind, whispering to people in particularly the Senate staff trying to sabotage this? There is always a camp of people. Maybe they build the missiles or they’ve been trained in the missiles and want to keep these things.

JONES: I would say less so than might be imagined, particularly not within the uniformed and military services. There were certain people – Richard Perle and Frank Gaffney in particular within the Office of the Secretary of Defense – who believed that (and this was certainly true with the concept of a conventionally armed cruise missile) that this particular type of system on a ground launched basis had a great potential. What has happened is, they have been proved right in the potential of accuracy from this type of missile. But we have used it from air platforms and sea platforms instead – and not nuclear. But we have now the incredible, precision guided munitions that are able to land within a square meter. If those had been retained on a ground
launched missile basis, presumably they would be just as effective as the air and sea launched systems. It just turned out that it was impossible to make any distinction between the nuclear armed and the conventionally armed cruise missile. They simply were identical. You could not tell the difference. You could stand there and verify that “this was a conventional cruise missile and have your hand on it.” You left the base and people would pull out a nuclear warhead from a bunker and it would be a nuclear armed cruise missile instantly. It was simply that easy to make an exchange. But within the uniformed services, they believed what in the end many of us believed: that the entire INF treaty was a very important but very limited first step in an arms control regime with the Soviet Union. The INF systems were very important for the Europeans, far more than they were for us. It was at best a secondary system so far as what the U.S. was using for its military and political security. For the Europeans, it was on a far higher basis. What we managed to do was to eliminate not just for the Europeans but for a variety of our Asian allies what was perceived as a specifically threatening system designed against them. Nobody bothered to argue or discuss the fact that strategic systems can always “shoot short.” People elected to view this reality with a degree of psychological blindness that can be amusing but is, nevertheless, real that “if these systems aren’t designed specifically to hit us, we won’t be hit.” Therefore, the Europeans saw the INF systems and designed to specifically threaten them. As a result, we first created the counter with our deployments and then finally the effort to eliminate them all, which was very satisfying to the Europeans.

Q: In many ways… The deployment of an SS-20 and our counter, these were really political moves anyway.

JONES: Yes, they were. They were not militarily useless. They had very specific military rationales for their deployments. But the stimulus for them was certainly political. As a result, in the end, they were argued for and against on a political basis in many instances, seen as a major political counter, and played in a very political way within Europe and then also by the Soviets in saying, “Well, look, this is part of our overall European homeland. Look at what we have done with you Europeans to demonstrate genuinely our desire for peace.” So, there were political, psychological “propaganda” advantages to the elimination thereof just as there had been political advantages to their initial deployment.

But, no, to step back, I will once again emphasize that I don’t think the uniformed military services were objecting, certainly not in any significant way that I ever encountered, to the treaty. They did buy onto it. Perhaps some of them bought onto it in the same way that senior military figures will indeed accept civilian control and resign if they object. If the most senior people in your civilian establishment say, “This is what we should be doing, Admiral So and So,” they will say, “Yes, Sir.” We can believe when we disagree personally with what our major political leadership is doing that it wasn’t a smart idea and we would appreciate a little more military objection to our political leadership decisions, but in the end, no. You really have to have military services that support the executive’s decision or resign.

Q: This takes us up to when?

JONES: Essentially to the end of May 1988.
WILLIAM HARRISON MARSH  
Deputy Chief of Mission  


Q: Okay, okay. So here you are now in Geneva. I guess this is one of your first experiences with multilateral diplomacy?

MARSH: Not exactly because while serving in the Paris quadrilateral talks on Vietnam, I had been in Geneva in 1974 in a Vietnam effort, a humanitarian law conference, and I handled the credentials fight concerning which South Vietnamese party to admit to the conference, the government of Vietnam or the Vietcong. I won that by what became known as Marsh’s landslide, 38 to 37, in favor of the Government of Vietnam. There was general rejoicing over this outcome.

Just before going to Geneva, in 1987, however, I got somewhat involved in the crossfire between the then ambassador to Switzerland and the then Assistant Secretary for European Affairs together with the then Director General of the Foreign Service. The then Ambassador to Switzerland was looking for a deputy chief of mission, and wanted a certain person who had worked for the ambassador before. The Department would not allow it. There was a feud between the Department and the ambassador on certain other matters. I went to Bern and received very, very cold treatment from the ambassador who told me that the recommendation of me by the Assistant Secretary and the Director General was hardly something in my favor. So I wasn’t quite sure what to make of that.

But the previous January, again serendipity plays a great role in things, I was awhile in Washington briefly due to a family emergency, I had stopped in and talked with Ambassador Joseph Carlton Petrone, the newly appointed permanent representative in Geneva, and his wife. I was the first person out of 24 that Petrone interviewed.

Q: That Petrone had seen?

MARSH: That’s correct. Let me digress here, I am informed that a score or two dozen applicants for a DCM-ship is not an unusual thing. What one can do, of course, is waste an awful lot of one’s time in races in which you really have no horse and that there should be a much better arrangement for the selection process.

I would like to bring this up to the present, by the way, because in 1994, early 1994, to my astonishment I saw that in Rome, where I was permanent representative at that time, there were
over 50 officers who had bid for the job as my deputy. Now obviously my incredible personality and great reputation would make every Foreign Service officer want to work for me, but I think Rome may have had something to do with it, too.

Q: I think so, too.

MARSH: But when you’ve got an army of people applying for something of that sort, this is really just not very fair. It is not very efficient. I think the Department needs to establish more criteria, marked guidelines and so forth and I don’t just mean language proficiency but certain kinds of experience and this and that and the other thing for these jobs. It would cut down on the waste of time for the individuals and the system for all these applicants, nine-tenths of whom have no chance whatever of getting the job.

I noticed that there were perhaps a dozen or two dozen people who just wanted to get a European tour. Had no service in Europe and multilateral organizations, what have you, anything to do with it. So, to return to 1987, I go to Geneva and had two very fine years with Ambassador and Mrs. Petrone. She was very active, shared fully with her husband. My wife and I worked very, very hard.

Q: Active in what way?

MARSH: Well, in the first place the ambassador wanted to improve relations between the diplomatic corps at Geneva and the leadership of the international organizations in Geneva and the U.S. mission. The ambassador’s predecessor had been a person who had had an extremely unsuccessful stay there and matters had deteriorated greatly. So he wanted to work to repair things. And in particular the ambassador wanted to use the function of representation at his residence. My wife and I attended every function that he gave.

Q: That’s quite a load.

MARSH: It was quite a load. But it was nothing compared with the Rabat experience where I think I mentioned we had 203 engagements at the residence in 180 days. It wasn’t mere quantity and mere volume but it was qualitative and in the service of the many, many delegations we had come through. We did have, I think, four visits by Secretary Shultz.

Then I had a second ambassador who wanted to deal with substance and representation was nothing he found particularly friendly. In particular he wanted to deal with the human rights questions.

Q: Who was that?

MARSH: That was Ambassador Morris Abram who was a noted New York Attorney. He had been President of the Council of Presidents of Major Jewish organizations in the States. So two very different approaches these people had. But my wife and I worked extremely hard. It is fair to say that ninety plus percent of the time we were out every night Monday through Thursday, or we were hosts ourselves. We had thousands, literally thousands, of people to our house.
MARSH: I have to give you one little anecdote because it tells you something of the approach that we had. Through various complications and shenanigans, the DCM residence had been lost and it was necessary to find a place for us to reside in Geneva. Now my predecessor had had an interesting apartment, not terribly far from the mission, but hopelessly small. To such an extent that General Services had to come over every time he gave a reception to move the furniture from his living room and dining room and put it in the back and so forth. And there was no way to let anybody in at the door below on the street because there was no buzzer system or something of that sort. So there had to be somebody stationed there. We found this terribly inconvenient.

We came in advance, in April, for a look-see. We stayed with my predecessor and his wife in the apartment and they were very kind. They had a wonderful outdoor terrace that faced the lake and the Alps. It was just out of this world. But in the wintertime you wouldn’t get a great deal of use out of the outdoor terrace, I don’t think. So we had General Services look around and find us a place.

They found us this glorious apartment. This apartment was on the other side of the lake and therefore was facing West, facing the mountains, but it was overlooking the lake and the little sailboat basin that was there in Geneva. It was marvelous so we were thrilled to death. Well, Washington turned it down and the reason was that it was too big. We didn’t know what too big meant, but some guidelines had just come in very recently which would allow a certain amount of square feet. Now I told you we had thousands, literally thousands, of people in over the three years at our place on official business. Well, they found us a very nice place and it was considerably smaller and considerably more expensive, and six miles out of town, not on the West Side, not overlooking the lake. So this was approved.

Q: Even though it was more expensive? Doesn’t make sense.

MARSH: Of course it doesn’t make sense but these sorts of people…wait, I’m not through. ACDA had given a sum of money, $50,000 to be exact. They had not looked properly after the furniture that had been in the DCM’s residence. ACDA had taken over that DCM’s residence, and its furniture and they had all but frittered it away and couldn’t account for it and so forth. So they paid an indemnity to the embassy of $50,000 to buy furniture for the new DCM’s place.

I had wind of this when I came back to go to the DCM course in June of 1987. It is held in West Virginia and at FSI. At that time I went in to see the interior decorators of FBO. I arranged to talk with this lovely lady and we went out for coffee or something of that sort and we talked. I said my wife was very interested in helping and had done a wonderful job with the GSO in Rabat when they completely redecorated and refurbished the political counselor’s residence there. They had done it very economically and beautifully and it was stunning. At any rate we come to Geneva and find out that the dear lady, the interior decorator, has already come and has gone to the most expensive antiquarian on the lake there in Geneva and has bought Louis Philippe
originals and Napoleonic originals, all of that kind of thing. The one I particularly liked very much was the $3,000 chandelier for the dining room.

Q: This is in a rented apartment?

MARSH: A rented house. That’s right. So she has bought all these lovely, nifty things for us and there is no money left. So we had no beds, no dressers; we have nothing for the family quarters. And we have a room on the ground floor, just off the living room, a library, with no furniture for it. So we have to send for our stuff, which has been put in storage in Antwerp and they send that to us. We pick out of it the things that we need for our house, we put it back in, and it is shipped back to Antwerp. Considerably later we find how much breakage has been involved in our things due to this packing, shipping, unpacking, re-packing, shipping and then ultimately shipping back to Washington and so on.

I’m suggesting that there are procedures and policies and people who need a lot of careful scrutiny because screwy things happen. Now my administrative counselor in Geneva who had been privy to all of this I fired, by persuading him that I was going to make him an offer that he could not resist, namely early retirement. And he took it, sensibly enough.

At any rate it was very difficult getting established. One thing that a DCM believes is that he is going to move into a fully furnished place.

Q: Sure...a DCM in Western Europe.

MARSH: And you know about two days after arriving he is going to give his first dinner party and that sort of thing and so forth. Well, we arrived in July and our house was completely set up in November, by November. So we did do some entertaining in the meantime because we did have that little tiny apartment that I told you about.

I want to say that one of the strange things to me about the way we structure things in the Foreign Service and the Department is this. Whereas we make a specialty of trade negotiations or labor relations or scientific affairs and so forth we have no specialization whatsoever for multilateral diplomacy. So very few people have had any experience with it at all. You really need it because first of all it is physically exhausting...the representation, the demarches to be made, just keeping tabs on things, just programming your people appropriately, and so forth. For example, we had a major conference every month, except December. We had eleven major conferences going on, minimum, and sometimes we had even more than one a month. We would have delegations sent and each such delegation thought that it was unique, that its requirements superseded all other matters, and so forth. It was really and truly extraordinary.

I want to say that I arrive in July, about the 7th, in 1987, and about three weeks later Ambassador Petrone and his wife went to England for a month. And so I was chargé after having been there only three weeks. The first thing to deal with was an Air Afrique airliner that was hijacked to Geneva, and we had our hands full. The next thing I know is that I’m told by Washington that I am to follow the Iraq-Iran Peace Talks that are being held under the aegis of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The Bureau of International Organizations called me up and said
I should give this top priority. I said to wait a minute, I was chargé d’affaires and was running the place. All of these instructions that came in said to go see the head of the World Health Organization, go see to this, go see to that, what am I supposed to do about all these? They mumbled in effect don’t bother us.

So I sent in a daily cable that was based on seeing Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and seeing the British, because the British could see the Iranians, whom they recognized and we didn’t. So the British DCM and I would compare notes and I would learn what they’d find out from the Iranians, pass on what I had found out from Tariq Aziz and so forth and also deal with the Secretary General’s special representative for the negotiations.

Q: It wasn’t Suk Moon by any chance?

MARSH: No, it was an Italian, Giandomenico Pico. He got an award from the U.S. government, a northern Italian of about 6’ 5” tall, a very slim guy who ran about six miles a day and worked about twenty hours a day, amazing.

At any rate, there was all this work, an enormous amount of work. Plus I got new people arriving who have to be oriented, I’m trying to make all my introductory calls and so forth. What I want to say is that, given a workload like that, it is amazing to me that we don’t make more of an effort to develop people with multilateral proficiency who know how to work an entire hall full of delegations. I’m talking about keeping in touch with, rather close touch, with between thirty and fifty delegations at a time.

Q: You mean sort of an occupational cone?

MARSH: Something of that sort. They give a very short course over at FSI, about a week long, on multilateral diplomacy and really you need people to be studying UN affairs and other matters at a university for a year, is what I’m saying.

Q: I was just at a luncheon where the new director general of the Foreign Service, Gnehm, this is one of the things he talked about. Of course now we have a Secretary of State and a director general of the Foreign Service, both whose immediate previous experiences have been at the UN. Gnehm was Secretary Albright’s deputy. So hopefully we may see more emphasis now on these sort of multilateral needs.

MARSH: I would submit something else as well, and that is that people in the field of multilateral diplomacy also need very strong grounding and practice in congressional relations. Because if you don’t have the money for the dues, you are not going to be effective in the club! It is as simple as that and everybody knows it.

Q: Okay.

MARSH: Now, what did we spend a lot of our time doing? We frustrated the PLO because we kept them from full membership in a number of organizations of the UN. I think that helped to
frustrate a diversionary effort by the PLO, kidding itself it could pretend to statehood, develop it by degrees as it were rather than through negotiation with Israel. So I think this was useful.

Q: They were what...an NGO?

MARSH: No, they actually had certain observer status in Geneva.

Q: Then what were you out to defeat or to frustrate?

MARSH: Their accession to full membership as a state.

We had many visits from the Secretary of State, that is, from Mr. Shultz, who was a wonderful man. I was very deeply impressed by him. He had so much decency and humanity in spite of the crushing burdens of his office. It was really extraordinary.

Then we had the job of interagency relations.

Q: Now that is another whole can of worms!

MARSH: That’s right.

Q: How many agencies had people in Geneva?

MARSH: Well, we had a problem every year because we had a rather large delegation come in for the UN Human Rights Commission. The name of the game was to obtain a Resolution condemning Cuba for its violations of human rights. We had a Cuban poet who had been a prisoner for many years and who had been freed at the behest of President Mitterrand of France.

Q: Do you remember his name?

MARSH: His name was Ramon Valadares. He spoke no English, but we are something of a bilingual country, I guess, at any rate it wasn’t a particular problem, as you know, and the draft resolution had been given very high, very, very high importance by the White House.

Well, we had a number of delegations reporting to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA, coming through. At the time ACDA had two thirds of the space in the U.S. mission and used it episodically, not continuously. So I conferred with Ambassador Abram and said we had a problem because we needed a certain number of offices.

We always had problems getting space for human rights delegations, which meant for six to seven weeks, including preparatory time. I recommended to the ambassador that we advise ACDA well in advance that we needed ‘X’ number of offices for the Human Rights Delegation between such and such a dates. So he said that that made sense. I warned him, however, that this would not be a cost-free exercise, for there would be a great deal of opposition because of the very proprietary attitude of ACDA, having been handed over two thirds of the mission...that is not a guess, two thirds, we measured. They had been given two thirds of the total mission
building there in Geneva. They felt they had a right forever and a day to such terms. The ambassador, good for him, bless his heart, said to go ahead.

So we sent word to please schedule their delegations so that they would not need ‘X’ number of offices on the fifth floor at such and such a time, between the dates of such and such, and we did this, as I recall in August. We were talking about the following January. Next thing I know I have the director of ACDA on the phone asking me why I am trying to sabotage the President’s arms control policy! I said I was not trying to do any such thing.

I said I knew that one particular delegation of ACDA that had been occasionally using these offices scheduled them to be used by agreement with its Soviet counterparts. I asked if they could just arrange to have this done before or done after the human rights session because that particular arms control delegation only came three or four times a year, maybe for a couple of weeks each time. These offices normally stood empty.

Well, next thing we know, Under Secretary Eagleburger is sending a group of inspectors out to find out what this is all about! Talk about an El Nino in a teacup! But it just tells you how difficult it is for State to assume even a very reasonable management of foreign relations, in such a fragmented and balkanized policy context. I think it was ridiculous and it ended up costing a lot of money. You send three people out for five days or so.

Q: So ACDA wanted its space whenever it wanted it.

MARSH: That’s right, and nobody else was to touch that space even though it lay unused for something like three quarters of the time. They lost on that one, incidentally, Valadares and company did come out, and we did get the Resolution on Cuba. So that was very fine. That worked out very well.

Of course, Cuba was a matter that had much more domestic political resonance in 1990 than did arms control because the Soviet Union was in full disintegration by then.

Q: So you found that a lot of your tour in Geneva as deputy permrep [permanent representative] really was dealing with either administrative or sort of representational duties?

MARSH: I would just say that it was a very big point and there were very ample servings of all sorts of things on that very big plate. I did mention the numerous consultations. For one thing, the American deputy permrep [permanent representative] is co-chairman of the Geneva Group, which is the 13 principal Western members, the industrial members or OECD Group it is called in some places, of the United Nations. Russia later became a member. This work of consultation was very demanding.

Q: Did you feel you had adequate staff?

MARSH: No, certainly not.

Q: Again you were sort of filling in behind people?
MARSH: Yes. For one thing I was astonished to find out that yet one more time that proficiency in French is a great rarity in the Foreign Service. Even if people could speak it, they clam up completely when it comes to writing it. And if you have to write something, you had to deal with that sort of thing. Certainly there was not anyone who could take a distinguished visitor and interpret for that person with a French speaker in Geneva. There are still plenty of people who don’t speak English in Geneva.

I had a political counselor who came, the Department’s choice, not mine. This person did not meet the language requirement, but pledged to learn French and never took lesson one. That’s not all of it. I handled all the representation funds from the beginning, because I had a very active first ambassador who was spending money at a good clip and I wanted to know how much we had left on a current basis. So everything was channeled through me, with his agreement, and then we just kept that arrangement when this second ambassador arrived. To my astonishment I realized one day that this new political counselor had not spent cent one on representation. I called the person in and at that point the counselor said that no, there had been no representation done.

Q: Why not?

MARSH: As a matter of fact in the whole course of the year there was no representation performed by that political counselor.

Q: He just didn’t feel like it?

MARSH: The person just really offered no explanation whatsoever.

Q: Well, you are the deputy permrep [permanent representative], what did you tell him?

MARSH: I told the person what you would expect. I always had periodic reviews with my officers, usually quarterly. I would give them a written piece of paper with the key things that I found concerning their performance and so forth and so on. In this way it helped me prepare for writing efficiency reports.

Q: Anything else, Bill, that you’d like to add about Geneva?

MARSH: It was a fascinating assignment, but again, exhausting. I did take the minimum home leave and no other leave in three years, no annual leave.

Q: Good grief! Your ambassador is going off to New England for a month? No climbing, no hiking in the Bernese Oberland?

MARSH: My friend, let me tell you something. My ambassador goes off for a month, comes back, and is in every single day thereafter! He needed me. Not Sundays. He didn’t come in Sundays. But he was in there every day of the week and he needed me. I wanted to be available to him.
Q: That was hard on your family, hard on your wife and children.

MARSH: Yes.

Q: That’s really too bad in a place like Geneva where you would think so much of the work, petty as it is, is sort of programmable and recognizable so that you could sort of organize and staff for it.

MARSH: There is a problem here in that people are often reluctant to take assignments in multilateral diplomacy because they do not want to leave the jurisdiction of a geographic bureau. They want, in other words, to maintain their ties and connections with a given geographic bureau with the hopes of getting assignments within that bureau’s competence later on.

Q: Despite Henry Kissinger, who wanted everybody to go somewhere else than they had been before!

MARSH: Oh, yes. Well, of course, that was probably in an effort to create the maximum chaos for which he alone could create...

Q: ...his own Kissingeresque orders! Okay so now you are reassigned back to Washington to be Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of IO...different pew but same church?

MARSH: Yes, something like that. Also, I am waiting out the time until I can succeed Jerry Monroe as Permanent Representative in Rome.

Q: That was what you wanted?

MARSH: It was understood.

Q: Let’s go back, I pushed you much too fast. You had an idea, an interest while you were still in Geneva in going over to Rome?

MARSH: Yes, I did. Partly because it was Rome and partly because of the subject matter and partly because the Food and Agricultural Organization had the worst reputation of any specialized agency in the United Nations. Because I had helped the reform movement in the Geneva Group I mentioned there in Geneva, in which we tried to achieve budgetary sanity and transparency and accountability in all of the UN agencies there and elsewhere I returned and was assisting the Assistant Secretary. It was John Bolton, who was a remarkable fellow. Many considered him very acerbic. I considered him as very purposeful and very effective. He was always very decent to me so I had no complaints at all.

I was thrown immediately into work at Rome on a TDY basis to work a divorce between the World Food Program and the Food and Agricultural Organization. So I went to Rome I think seven times in two years. I went to London twice, because I went to the International Maritime Organization to try to work the way out of some thickets there that had developed. Then in
addition I was given the job of obtaining success for the candidacy of Catherine Bertini to head the World Food Program, to become its Executive Director.

The World Food Program has been something of a sleeper in the UN system. It hasn’t had very high visibility, but there have been years in which we’ve given it more than a billion dollars altogether for its emergency feeding, for its developmental programs, for its refugee assistance programs and all that sort of thing. So it is very important to the United States both in terms of humanitarian affairs and its high political objectives.

I was told that I was to work single-handedly to get endorsements from UN member countries, particularly those associated with the World Food Program, so that Catherine Bertini would be named to head it. She had had no international experience but had been Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Food and Nutrition, and in particular for food stamps in the United States, where she had run, incidentally, something like a 26 billion-dollar program. So it was a great deal of work. I sent out 175 telegrams, made innumerable phone calls and finally ended up getting 75, 76 endorsements which prevailed therefore on a very reluctant Director General of the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], and a sometimes ambivalent Secretary General of the UN, to name her. There is not an election. The head of the World Food Organization is named by the UN and the FAO acting together.

Q: So there is a lot of sort of behind the scenes diplomacy?

MARSH: Oh, yes. I went to conferences at Copenhagen, Nairobi, and a number of other places. It was very exciting. I did a lot of traveling that time and then in 1992 went to Rome, this time as Permanent Rep.
Geneva to come to take his place as the political counselor and I was identified to go to Geneva to take his place. We sort of did this little round robin. I was debating over my options for my next post, but Geneva was my number one choice, so I was very fortunate.

Q: Today is November 5, 2003. You were in Geneva from 1988 to when?


Q: What was the exact title of what you were up to?

LEADER: The first two years that I was there, I was the number three person as a refugee and migration officer. There was a section in the U.S. Mission in Geneva that was called the Refugee and Migration Assistance Section (RMA). I had gone to Geneva thinking that I would have the same portfolio as the person I replaced, which was Asia, but it was decided when I got there that since I had so much Africa experience, it was bad management if I wasn’t assigned to Africa. So I ended up doing all of Africa and most of Asia as well. Our main interlocutors were the people who worked on those issues in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. There were also a few other international organizations that had some representation there. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Of course, the International Labor organization (ILO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) were also involved to the extent that they were relevant. There were some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a couple of consortiums of NGOs with which we related. So, it was very exciting work and the people who were working on these humanitarian issues, because that’s basically what we were doing was the humanitarian issues, were just wonderful people from all over the world who were attracted to UNHCR. ICRC at that time was wholly Swiss. Now that’s not the case. It was a wonderful group of people to work with and we had a great time.

Q: You were a part of the U.S. Mission to…

LEADER: It was the U.S. Mission to the UN organizations.

Q: All UN organizations?

LEADER: Just those based in Geneva.

Q: To whom did your organization answer to back in Washington?

LEADER: We answered to what at that time was called the Refugee Office.

Q: You were not part of the Bureau of International Organizations (IO)?

LEADER: No, we were not. But of course, the people that we reported to in Geneva above our office were IO people. Our office related directly to the Refugee Bureau. It had a director of refugee affairs at that time.
Q: Who was the head of your organization in Geneva?

LEADER: The head of the Mission?

Q: First the Mission and then your office.

LEADER: I can’t remember the first guy, but the second ambassador was Morris Abrams, who was there most of the time that I was there. There was another political appointee before that. My initial supervisor was Mike Carpenter. I worked with Dick Mann, who unfortunately died not too long after we finished up in Geneva. After two years, I became the number two person in the office as the deputy. At that time, my direct supervisor was Allen Drury.

Q: As you arrived and they looked you over and said, “You’ve got the African area and other things,” what was on your plate?

LEADER: One of the biggest programs that we worked with was in Asia. It became the Comprehensive Plan of Action to resolve the longstanding Vietnamese boatpeople issue. This was a plan that was worked out among UNHCR, the donor countries, and the countries of asylum where refugees were temporarily settled. Under the plan, the refugees would resettle in other countries or to go back to Vietnam. It was called Comprehensive because it was intended to resolve the situation in Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. There were people in all of these areas that needed to have resettlement options. The plan was worked out through a number of conferences. There were always groups of delegations coming from Washington to Geneva to work on these issues. Robert Funseth was the principal DAS of the refugee office at that time. He led a number of these delegations and was very instrumental in getting the whole plan put together.

Q: Who would accept Vietnamese refugees? This was the crux of the matter. The whole idea was to clean out the camps and get them set up with a new life.

LEADER: Right.

Q: What were our instructions? Were we reluctant to take more in?

LEADER: We wanted to see a burden sharing situation where other countries would also respond. We would not be the only ones shouldering the burden. Burden sharing was definitely the principle on which the whole process was grounded.

Q: How were the other countries responding to it?

LEADER: There was a very good response throughout the world in the resettlement countries. There are only about 15 countries worldwide that do resettle refugees – principally in Europe of course, but Australia as well. It was a fairly robust response from throughout the resettlement community.
Q: Were there any particular problems that you had to face, such as those that were not overly eager to take more in?

LEADER: I don’t remember being particularly involved in looking at that aspect of it. There were a lot of issues and concerns around what would happen to those who were not taken, who did not qualify for resettlement in another country. Just because UNHCR declares somebody a refugee according to its criteria doesn’t necessarily mean that the person will qualify for resettlement in the United States. There is always the problem of what happens to the residual caseload? That was more a sticking point than getting other countries to step up to the plate.

Q: There must have been quite a bit of pressure from the countries who initially accepted: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia…

LEADER: Yes. They were always threatening to close the camps and send people back against their will, trying to clean them out. This was particularly true in Hong Kong, but Malaysia was very much in that mode. Of course, there were a lot of very difficult situations in some of the camps. The camps on the Thailand border were very much involved in trafficking in timber and things like this. There were a lot of difficult situations in the camps and it was time that they be closed but it had to be done in an orderly way. At the same time, we were starting up the Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam for persons who had not escaped through the boat route and who may have been in reeducation camps, but who also may have been connected with the Americans at some point. So, this was a program where, on an exceptional basis, refugees were being taken directly from wherever they were located to the United States. Interestingly enough, a similar kind of program is about to start up again. There are some in our government who believe that there are still Vietnamese who did not make it into that program before it closed.

Q: Was the Vietnamese government a participant in these negotiations?

LEADER: Yes, they were a very integral player in all of this. That was one of the things Bob Funseth worked on so very hard to bring them along and to get their cooperation in this Comprehensive Plan so that they didn’t feel that things were being done to their people against the wishes of the Vietnamese government itself. It was during that time that Bob Funseth would come to Geneva and meet with delegations from Vietnam on the issue of the missing in action, the MIAs, and he made a big breakthrough in that area as well. I was always the notetaker at the luncheons he hosted. Everybody else got to eat except me and Bob Funseth. That was really my role in many of these meetings: to be the notetaker whenever more senior officials were in Geneva and to report on what transpired. My reporting would then lead policy decisions in Washington about follow-on actions.

Q: How did you see the role of the French in this?

LEADER: I don’t honestly recall anything too exceptional. I can’t remember the substance of it, but at one point we had the interesting experience of having dinner with Bernard Kuchner, the French Minister for their Humanitarian Affairs. He was the founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, Doctors Without Borders. He had a falling-out with them at some point and then he founded a second organization called Doctors of the World or something, Médecins du Monde. As the
leader of Médecins Sans Frontières Kuchner had done some rather flamboyant, spectacular things with the Vietnamese – sending boats out to rescue people at sea and all kinds of things like this. I can’t remember exactly the conversation, but there were a lot of very strong statements on both sides. Our refugee director at the time and Kuchner were going at it. But there was a willingness to try to come to an agreement that would be acceptable to both sides.

So that was basically the Asia portfolio.

Q: Did East Timor come into this at all?

LEADER: It wasn’t very big on my radar screen. There were groups of Timorese, liberation groups, but what was going on in Indonesia wasn’t really on my radar screen at that point. A lot of things should have been but you just couldn’t do everything.

Africa was also a big issue. There were lots of different issues in Africa. At that time, we were spending a lot of time on what was going on in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia was in a civil war with Eritreans who wanted independence. In Sudan the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) of John Garang was fighting government troops in the southern part to try to keep these troops out of the south. At that time, there was a big push on the part of officers in our emergency section of AID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), to launch a humanitarian operation in the southern part of the country. This was very controversial because of course the central government didn’t want aid going to people in the south. So, aid workers began flying in from Kenya and going from Lokichokio into various places in the southern part of Sudan. We worked on getting UNHCR to support this work and to harmonize with ICRC. I always was impressed with ICRC because it had such innovative approaches to problems. Instead of just bringing in food, it had a veterinary program to help keep the cattle healthy. People’s lives were so intertwined with cattle. There was drought and war. So they had mobile veterinary stations that would go around and keep the cattle healthy, which would then keep the people healthy.

Q: Were they mostly for milk?

LEADER: The way the people kept their wealth was in cattle, so they were not eating them so much as just having them for the milk and for other things that they could get from the cattle. But eventually the UN operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan, was launched. A lot of food was going in and helping the people. There were UNHCR officers stationed in various areas southern Sudan. Their presence had to be with the concurrence of the central government. It became very dangerous. The government would hold some of the towns. Outside the towns there was war and drought and it was very hard to get access to the rural areas where there were so many millions of people who needed assistance. People were trekking long distances from drought areas of the Sudan into Ethiopia. Refugee camps in Ethiopia were working with UNHCR to ensure that these camps were being run properly and that they had adequate resources to take care of the people.

And then there was Somalia, which had a number of large camps – this time refugees from Ethiopia. So you had refugees from Sudan in Ethiopia, refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia. The refugees from Ethiopia were also in Sudan. This was a very big area full of refugee problems.
Q: What was your role in this?

LEADER: My number one role was to keep on top of what was happening, what the UNHCR was doing in these areas, what their policies were, and what their financial needs were, and then to report this back to Washington. I recommended funding options and where we should put our emphasis in using our resources. I also made recommendations about how we might discuss with UNHCR our thoughts on what would be a good way for them to go. We had some additional ideas about their programs and so forth. I had long discussions with the head of their Africa office about what they were doing and how they were doing it and whether they were putting enough resources in – into northern Somalia in particular, where there were a lot of difficulties. In Ethiopia, there were some rebels from northern Somalia whom Ethiopian officials said had to leave the country. So, they left the country. Where did they go? They went into the hills in northern Somalia and started waging their rebel war there against Hargeisa and other towns in northern Somalia, creating more displaced people. I recall that this was before the government of Somalia totally collapsed. It seemed to me that a lot of the food we were providing there became a resource that government authorities were using to keep people on their side. They were using the food to buy loyalty. There was considerable debate about whether or not UNHCR was going to cut off its food assistance to people in various parts of Somalia, particularly in the north. We didn’t want them to cut it off just point blank, but eventually they did. That coincided with the beginning of the collapse of the government. When they didn’t have the food anymore, it was a problem. They didn’t have any commodity to buy loyalty with and it disintegrated, the whole network.

Q: Did you find that much of the refugee effort was driven by where TV camera people were?

LEADER: I’m sure that may have prompted some of the urgency we felt, but at that time there were no other areas competing for our attention where the problems were as large as they were in the Horn of Africa. Of course, the people from Somalia were going into Kenya. I went to see some refugees in Kenya who were Somalis as fighting picked up inside Somalia. But West Africa was fairly calm. It hadn’t really exploded yet. My respect for ICRC was reinforced when I talked to them about what they were doing in West Africa. They said they had identified West Africa at that time as being the next real trouble spot in Africa and they were very worried about political stability. Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast was getting old. What sort of succession was there in that area? They were very worried about it. It was 1989 while I was there that Charles Taylor started his rebel war to oust the government in Liberia and that became a very big focus of ours. There was a lot of attention in the humanitarian community as people started to be displaced in Liberia and across borders. I remember trying to figure out if we could put food on the railway line and send it up into those areas. Was the railway still functioning? It was run by a mining company. Had the mining company left? I kept trying to figure out how we could get resources into the country. I also recall having a discussion with ICRC about what it was doing and its representative in Geneva said that he was in frequent contact with his people who were actually already inside northern Liberia. They were coming in from Cote d’Ivoire to the east and he was using some sort of a satellite radio. I asked, “Aren’t you worried about having other people pick up information about what your plans are and what your strategies are?” He said, “Oh, no, I have no problem at all. We talk in Swiss German and nobody in the world understands it.” They were in very close contact. They had a lot of people working out of northern Cote
d’Ivoire. ICRC was also very good at building contacts with key people. Taylor’s brother was in Cote d’Ivoire. There were rumors that he actually had a vehicle painted white like an ambulance with a red cross on it. So ICRC sent out the word that they had to find this vehicle. Apparently they did find it and they had a little chat with Taylor’s brother and told him he’d better stop using this ambulance-like vehicle with the red cross. ICRC would try to maintain its neutrality and talk with people on both sides of any conflict. They always had to cross lines to get to the people in need of their assistance. So that was another big focus and it became a much larger issue as time went on. Charles Taylor spread the word to Sierra Leone to try to get access to the diamonds in that country. Guinea got drawn in and took a lot of the refugees. It became a much bigger regional problem. When I was there 13 years ago we were focused on Taylor and Liberia. We were aware that he was getting assistance from Burkina Faso and at that time Cote d’Ivoire, which had to be complicit and knowledgeable about him.

Q: Were we constrained about whom we helped? From the American side, did it make any difference where the refugees were or whom they were fleeing from?

LEADER: The short answer is, of course, no. U.S. funding goes not to governments but to the international organizations and the NGOs that are helping in humanitarian crisis situations. So, basically, our money went where UNHCR went and UNHCR goes anywhere. Of course, it is helping in countries of asylum and if it’s an internal conflict, the Red Cross will actually be inside the country helping the victims of the conflict. So we were not constrained by looking at who was right or wrong or trying to make any judgment about the conflict. We were looking at the victims of the conflict. It wasn’t really the role of the Refugee Bureau to get involved in conflict resolution or conflict prevention. In fact, that has been an issue for some time that UNHCR has wrestled with, and that is, to what extent should they be involved in the countries of origin? They usually are working in the countries of asylum. What should they be doing in terms of conflict prevention to keep people from crossing borders? What involvement should they have in human rights, with people who are displaced who haven’t crossed borders? That became a big issue when we got into another situation that happened when I was there: the Gulf War. There were so many people who fled to northern Iraq and when fighting followed, they tried to cross borders and fled into Iran by the hundreds of thousands. Turkey stopped them at the border so they were blocked inside Iraq, displaced people in desperate need of help. What was UNHCR’s role? That was one of the first times that UNHCR got involved in a big way with people who are called “internally displaced.” They did go in and helped in that situation. Of course, the U.S. military was there first.

Q: This was Operation Provide Comfort.

LEADER: One of the women in our office was working very closely in liaison between Provide Comfort and UNHCR and ICRC and so forth.

Q: How did your operation and other agencies of various governments work with the NGOs, including Doctors Without Borders? These all have their own dynamics. Was this like trying to herd kittens?
LEADER: In the humanitarian arena, the NGOs need to get their funding from somewhere. Some have independent sources. Oxfam tries to avoid using government funding to the extent that it can. CARE often tries to, depending on the situation. It sometimes makes judgments about the government’s role in a specific situation and then decides whether to take government money or not. They often work in concert with UNHCR so that they’re implementers. UNHCR has staff in the field but not enough to do all of the things that need to be done. The NGOs become the implementing agencies for UNHCR, working with the World Food Programme (WFP). They become implementing agencies in many of these situations. U.S. funding goes to UNHCR which then subcontracts with the NGOs. As money became tighter and tighter, UNHCR often had gaps in what it could provide. More recently, we’ve been providing a lot of funding directly to NGOs to operate in parallel with what UNHCR is doing in the refugee areas. For example, an NGO might be funded to set up a health clinic or school in a particular refugee camp. It would do so in conjunction with UNHCR because UNHCR said it needed to be done but UNHCR itself didn’t have the resources to do it. There’s still debate as to whether the resources should go through UNHCR so it can supervise and manage all of the NGO activities or whether the NGOs should be funded separately. If so, this raises the coordination question because they shouldn’t be out there operating as independent entities.

Q: Did Rwanda-Burundi cause any problems while you were there?

LEADER: You asked before, were there other concerns that we should have had on our radar screen? Quite honestly, it was a surprise to me on October 1, 1990, when the Tutsi rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), came across the border militarily into Rwanda. At that time I was virtually ignorant of the situation and the fact that there were refugees in southern Uganda, in Burundi, and some in Zaire, who had been there for 30 years. This is not to say that I was totally ignorant of the situation in these countries. I had followed Africa and I did know that there were the Hutus and the Tutsis and that this was a problem. There had been some massacres in Burundi which sent refugees into Rwanda. That was in 1989. I was sent from Geneva to help our embassies there to improve their reporting and assessing of the situation. I worked with one of the junior officers on the refugee portfolio. We went out to look at the situation on the Rwandan side of the border and then I went to Burundi and looked from the Burundi side of the border. Then I made a report to Washington with recommendations about how to deal with gaps and what kinds of things UNHCR was or wasn’t doing, what ICRC was or wasn’t doing, what the WFP was or wasn’t doing. I tried to build some capacity in both the embassies to continue reporting on the ground.

I also knew in 1988 there had been a conference in Washington with Rwandan refugees and at that conference the refugees had declared they wanted to come back to Rwanda. The response of the president was, “You can’t come back. There’s not enough land.” I was partly aware of this because one of my colleagues in UNHCR was a Ugandan born Rwandan descendent. He had come from the refugee community in Uganda and was keeping me informed about these things. But it was still a surprise to me to discover the extent to which the Rwandan refugees had organized militarily with weapons and military prowess. They had military expertise, and they were motivated to take this very momentous and risky step of crossing over into another country and trying to wage a military fight. That was one that did get away from us.
Very quickly, UNHCR got involved in trying to build on the experience that they had in Asia with the Comprehensive Plan of Action and sought to bring all of the countries together where there were refugees. There was a conference about four months after the invasion in January/February 1991 that was held in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. UNHCR brought representatives from all of the countries in conflict together as well as the donor countries. One of the people they sent down there was Sergio Vera de Melo, whose name is now linked with Iraq and the fact that he was killed in August in a bomb attack. At the time of the conference I was encouraging him to try a Comprehensive Plan of Action approach.

Q: He was one of the top UN diplomats. He was involved in many things.

LEADER: He got his start in UNHCR. When I started in the Mission in Geneva, he was the head of the Asia Bureau in UNHCR, so we dealt with him on the Comprehensive Plan of Action. He was the key UNHCR diplomat who put that thing together tirelessly dealing with all of the various governments. He didn’t have much Africa experience as far as I know, but they pulled him in when there was this need to bring all of the people together. He was so good at that.

Q: Was there a concern during this time of how much are you supporting refugees and how much are you supporting rebel forces? Food is a weapon.

LEADER: There was always some effort to provide accountability and be sure that the food was reaching the intended beneficiaries. There were controls through WFP, through UNHCR. Most of the time, we were fairly satisfied that it was reaching the intended beneficiaries. Southern Sudan was a problem since the rebels were the authorities and so they were in a position to exploit the people. I think there was a big effort to keep the exploitation to an absolute minimum and try to wipe it out altogether. But in certain situations, this did become a problem – where the rebels would have access to the food resources that the victims of the conflict were supposed to receive.

Q: At one point some time later, you had these MREs [meals ready to eat].

LEADER: Or as they said in Ethiopia, “Meals refused by Ethiopians.” I was responsible for getting a million MREs after the Gulf War into Ethiopia for people who were trekking back from the war against Eritrea after the cease-fire there had been declared. The Ethiopians were trekking back from the north down to Addis Ababa and we gave a million MREs to the ICRC to put at some feeding stations along the way and they were then called “meals refused by Ethiopians.” They ate them, but that was just sort of a nomenclature that we came up with.

Q: I’m told in some places that the experience was, you’ve got to be a bit careful with this type of food in that it’s a military commodity, where it’s better to have large feeding stations which keep people somewhat static so it won’t be used by guerilla forces.

LEADER: I don’t recall any discussions along those lines. Having MREs is fairly unusual. They were stockpiled and ready to be used in Iraq before we went into Iraq because they were portable. If there were big displacements of people the military would be in a position to distribute them
without getting involved in food preparation and all of that kind of thing. But oftentimes, they’re not the food of first choice.

**Q:** How did you find that your work in humanitarian affairs fit in with all the other UN and American agencies? Were there any problems?

**LEADER:** I think that the humanitarian approach of the Refugee Bureau has always been accepted by the other parts of the government as being something that we do. The challenge has been to make it more of an integrated approach where the fact of refugees in a country becomes a critical policy issue for the rest of our government. Sometimes this is not a foregone conclusion. It’s not necessarily a number one priority on the list of bilateral issues. That’s been one of the things that the Refugee Bureau does try to do, to move this issue higher on the bilateral agenda so that we’re looking more at conflict resolution and conflict prevention so that there won’t be the need for the humanitarian response. But as far as the humanitarian response, once there is a need, it’s been pretty free of politics.

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**JOSEPH B. GILDENHORN**  
**Ambassador**  
**Switzerland (1989-1993)**

*Ambassador Gildenhorn was born and raised in Washington, D.C. and was educated at the University of Maryland and the Yale University Law School. After service in the US Army, he practiced law and became involved in real estate development in the Washington, D.C. area. Becoming engaged in Republican Party politics and an active supporter of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), he made several visits to the Middle East with President Bush. In 1989 he was appointed US Ambassador to Switzerland, where he served until 1993. Ambassador Gildenhorn was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.*

**Q:** How did the appointment to Switzerland come about?

**GILDENHORN:** After George Bush became President, he asked whether I was interested in becoming an Ambassador. It wasn’t something I had really thought about or planned for. I did indicate that I would be interested if the occasion arose. It was a propitious time in my life to do something for my country and to go overseas. Switzerland was thereafter designated by the President. I thought it was a great opportunity and my wife and I went.

**Q:** Talk a bit about your preparation for this. Did you go through the Ambassadorial Seminar and how did that work?

**GILDENHORN:** First of all, let me say that my background is in business and banking. This turned out to be a very good fit in Switzerland where the banking industry and business leaders have a very strong role in government and policy. I felt very much at home when I arrived in Switzerland since I had business and banking experience and could relate.
The Ambassadorial Seminar was interesting and quite helpful. My only problem was that because of inexperience, the substantive discussions were difficult to absorb being novices. Being a new political appointee ambassador is a whole new concept and work experience. So many new concepts are thrown at you in a two-week grouping of seminars that it is almost overwhelming. I don't know how it could be arranged, but it would be much more productive if the seminars could be given about three to four months after being at post -- after you had on-the-job experience, and the opportunity to learn about the procedures and some of the issues at post. The discussions would have had considerably more meaning.

Q: *Exactly.*

GILDENHORN: Perhaps the seminars could be scheduled at a Chief of Mission-conference, timed six to nine months after assuming post. Sessions could be scheduled to discuss administrative issues and questions, with the right people from State being present to answer them.

Q: *It makes good sense.*

GILDENHORN: It's just a thought. When I was cleaning out my desk before I came home, I glanced at my notes from the Ambassadorial Seminar, and it was quite interesting. I noticed that I wrote down on several occasions: 'What does this mean?' This proves that it would have been much more helpful if the discussions were held at a time when you had a clearer understanding about the duties of an ambassador after having been at post for a period of time.

Q: *Did you have any particular goals in mind before you went to Switzerland? Were people here in Washington saying, Now here are our problems with Switzerland and here's what we’d like to get -- that sort of thing?*

GILDENHORN: In preparation for my confirmation hearing, the desk officer who prepared me described certain issues pertinent to Switzerland. For example, some of the agenda items involved money laundering -- drug enforcement, military procurement, as well as other issues relevant at that time. It was only a cursory discussion of issues. I found that until you were actually at post facing substantive policy matters, the previous discussions in Washington really didn't mean too much. They took on a different context after you assumed post and had to deal with real issues. When I got to Switzerland, I think that the first thing on my desk was a matter involving the PLO who wanted to accede to the Geneva Accords as the State Palestine. This was an important issue to me, because of my background in Jewish affairs. Our government was very much opposed to the PLO position. But what was very interesting was that I was getting calls from Jewish leaders from all over the world suggesting that both I and they lobby the Swiss strenuously, to make sure that they turned down the PLO request. After getting a great deal of advice from my staff in Switzerland, and based on my own thinking, I felt that strenuous lobbying was a bad idea. This was because the Swiss really do not take well to hard active lobbying. So I made the position of the U.S. clear to the Swiss government officers and fortunately, they agreed with the U.S. The Swiss merely sent out an information copy to the members of the Geneva Accords and did not decide whether the PLO had any rights to accede to
the Geneva Accords. It turned out to be a good solution at that time for the Swiss. As a depository nation, the Swiss were required to send out a message to the members of the Geneva Accords, but they stopped short of deciding whether the PLO as Palestine qualified for accession.

Q: *Here is a case where, you knowing the territory or having a feel for the situation, sometimes overly aggressive lobbying does not help.*

GILDENHORN: I found out in Switzerland that it really is not a great idea to lobby hard. I think you have to make your views known clearly, but it's important, that you not aggressively tell the Swiss what they should be doing. That's a "no-no", as I found out.

Q: *What was the situation on Swiss-American relations -- you mentioned the F-18?*

GILDENHORN: Yes, the cost of the fighter plane was very expensive and Switzerland has been running a budget deficit for the past two years. Accordingly, there was strong opposition expressed against the purchase of the plane, especially among the Socialists who were definitely opposed. To make a long story short, the Parliament did eventually approve the plane. The plane issue will become the subject of a referendum to be decided by the people. The issue to be voted on is whether they will purchase any fighter plane between now and the year 2000. The referendum will be voted on June 6 of this year [1933]. If they turn down this referendum, the Swiss will buy the plane. There is money set aside for the purchase and they are all set to go. If the referendum passes which prohibits the purchase of any fighter plane till the year 2000, then, of course, there will be no airplane purchase. Right now, in fact, my former Defense Attaché is in town and he has indicated that there are strong lobbying efforts on both sides. Fortunately, almost all of the government ministers are strongly in favor of the purchase and are speaking about the issue almost every night. There are a lot of military people, a lot of industrialists also advocating the purchase of the plane, especially since there is a 100% offset. The 2 billion dollars of offsets will be put into the purchase of various Swiss goods. In addition, factories within Switzerland will be created to manufacture various parts of the plane as well as other items. So the Swiss really get the advantage of receiving 2 billion dollars from McDonnell-Douglas in the form of new business. So we'll find out June 6 how the referendum vote goes.

Q: *What role were you playing in this? You just left there -- you were there from 1989-1993.*

GILDENHORN: I believe that I was helpful in many ways. To give you an example, while I was there, there was a new missile produced called the AMRAM. It is really high-tech -- the last word in air-to-air missiles. The Swiss heard about it and basically said: Look, unless we get rights to the AMRAM, we probably do not want the plane. So I immediately got back to the Department of Defense and I was instrumental in persuading Secretary Garrett who was at that time Secretary of the Navy, to allow the Swiss to have the missile. It is interesting that the Swiss got rights to use the AMRAM before any of our NATO allies. This was the type of thing that we did. I was in constant contact with McDonnell Douglas. As long as we only had one American company pursuing the program, I could work closely with them. We met frequently to map out a strategy to get this plane purchase through.
Q: This brings up an interesting point: what happens when you find a couple of companies pushing and here you are, the American Ambassador?

GILDENHORN: When you have two American companies competing, you back off. You really cannot play a role, because you cannot side with one against the other. But once an American company is selected, you are able to assist that company to achieve it's goals. Let me give you an example. Right before I left to come home, there was a Swiss program out for bid for a civilian air traffic control system. The U.S. company Hughes was in competition with Thompson, the French company. Raytheon was also one of the bidders, but had been told their bid was not acceptable. I got very much involved because the French were using a lot of leverage and unfair influence on the Swiss to buy the Thompson product because of their sensitive position in Europe. Because there are a lot of bilateral deals between France and Switzerland which could be jeopardized, it was my feeling that the French were trying to unfairly influence the Swiss. I made a very strong demarche on the Swiss Minister of Transportation. I won't get into some of the information I had -- but we felt that the French were acting improperly and we really wanted open, fair bidding. I made it very clear that this was what we expected from the Swiss. So this was the type of thing I did. Again, what eventually happened, was that Raytheon entered the picture again and alleged that they were unfairly cut out of the competition and threatened to file suit against the Swiss. The Swiss reacted in their inimitable way by deciding not to make any decision and starting the competition from scratch. Accordingly, nothing will probably happen for a year or so. I learned that the French are very difficult businessmen and require constant monitoring.

Q: Could you talk a bit about how you have observed the French operate at times?

GILDENHORN: With respect to the F-18 airplane, right before the critical vote of Parliament, which they needed the concurrence of both the upper house and the lower house, we got word that the French Minister of Defense had come to Switzerland to visit with the Swiss Minister of Defense. We also got word that President Mitterrand was also planning to visit. We didn't know for sure what they planned to talk about, but the timing of the visit happened to be very close to the Parliamentary vote on the F-18. Again, we felt that there was the possibility of undue influence being used, undue leverage -- fortunately it turned out that the Swiss chose the F-18 and withstood any type of pressure. I am sure that the plane was talked about by the French at that time but to no avail and to the Swiss' credit. The French really have the habit of doing whatever they have to do to get a sale regardless of ethics.

Q: This has often been one of the criticisms of how the United States operates -- I've watched this myself. If two or more American companies are bidding on something, we will, as you say, back off as far as the Embassy goes because we can't get involved in this, but the French -- sometimes the British -- will more or less come to an agreement one way or the other and say, We'll go with this system or this company, and push all out, whereas maybe our two or three companies cancel each other out.

GILDENHORN: I think it's probably right that we do not choose one company over another company. I did bring in the people from Hughes and asked them whether they used any French suppliers in producing part of their traffic control system. They said that they did include a small
French company to produce certain parts. I suggested that they get this small company to go to their government and complain about the tactics being used. They did and I think it was fairly effective in holding off the French. I mention this to give you examples of some of the things I got involved with.

I came to the conclusion when I got there that if I were to make a contribution, it would have to be primarily in the business and trade area. Politically, I found that there were certain areas in which I had a certain amount of input, but generally speaking, most of the major decisions came from Washington. But as far as really making a personal contribution, I felt that I could do so by expanding our bilateral trade between countries, which was pretty substantial at the time. When I got to Switzerland, bilateral trade amounted to 8 billion dollars, split 50-50 between the Swiss and the Americans. I really spent time on trade enhancement. I went to every trade show -- probably 10 or 15 trade shows per year. I also tried to create new trade shows, which would bring over more American goods to Switzerland. By the time I left the bilateral trade was in excess of 11 billion dollars, and I think I had some role in increasing those figures. Trade matters was an area that I found very interesting, and where I felt I could make a contribution. I even had my wife become involved in a trade show promotion where she got a group of Swiss dress end users, i.e., department stores and jobbers, -- to come to the US to the couturier shows in New York. This was a good way to get more American dresses introduced and sold in Switzerland. These are some of the types of programs we were trying to create.

Q: What were the products Switzerland was trying to sell to the United States?

GILDENHORN: Other than chocolate and watches? The watch industry is very strong. Actually, there is one man who did a great deal to revitalize the watch industry, a gentleman by the name of Nicholas Hyack. Mr. Hyack is the creator of the internationally famous Swatch watch. The Swatch is a reasonably priced watch -- costs about $40-50 -- with a very popular, contemporary design. Indeed, the Swatch watch is the marketing sensation in Europe. It has also become popular in the United States. The watch industry in Switzerland is much stronger now and this is all due to Mr. Hyack's creativity. But basically, pharmaceuticals, machine tools -- indeed anything produced where labor is not a big factor -- can be manufactured competitively in Switzerland. This is because labor costs are extremely high in Switzerland. Because of this, machine tools are a big export item. Also, the major pharmaceutical companies, such as Ciba Geigy, Hoffman LaRoche and Sandoz export a large quantity of products to the U.S.

Q: How did you find some of the other competitors? We've talked about the French. What about the Germans and the British and Italians as far as competitors? Did you find yourself going head to head with their ambassadors on trade items?

GILDENHORN: I can't recall specifics. I believe that the Germans are the biggest trading partner with Switzerland, but I don't recall any specific problems. The Swiss are very restrictive with respect to their market access policies. For example, only a small quantity of our US beef is allowed in the country and we in the Embassy always tried to get more of our beef allocated for import into Switzerland. We made some inroads over the years since the Swiss really like American beef. It's interesting that we can export all our red wines to Switzerland but not our white wines. This is because the Swiss white wines are high quality and they are very protective
when it come to the white wine industry. But their red wines aren't particularly good so the Swiss are very happy to have our Cabernet-Sauvignons and other California wines, come in. Again let me say that Switzerland has a very controlled economic society with a legalized cartel system and strict price controls. Access into the Swiss markets was hard to achieve, but we spent a lot of time trying to open up access of our products. We didn't have a large Agricultural Department at the Embassy. We had one principal American officer and two FSNs who spent a great deal of time interfacing with the Swiss government trying to get better access for our products.

Q: In dealing with the Swiss government, any time an Ambassador goes to a country, you talk in Washington and you talk to your country team, and you try to figure out where the power is, who are the movers and shakers. I would think that Switzerland would be one of the most difficult ones, because, as you say, the business community seems to be very strong and the government seems to be somewhat amorphous. Maybe I'm wrong but how did you figure out what buttons to push.

GILDENHORN: Well, it's a small enough country to get around and you can get to see almost anyone in both government and business. Actually, on my way home back to Washington, I asked my driver how many miles we had on the official car and he said, 150,000 miles. In Switzerland, that's a great deal of traveling within a small country. I tried to cover every part of the country. I was on a first-name basis with every Minister. In this regard, there are seven Ministers who run the country, and I became good friends with each of them. My wife and I entertained them, and they entertained us. We also spent a significant amount of time in the business community with prominent bankers -- I personally knew all of the presidents of the major banks -- Credit Suisse, Union Bank, Swiss Bank Corporation. I spent substantial time going to Swiss-American business groups. The Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce is one of the strongest chambers in Europe with over eleven hundred members and a very aggressive program. They have interesting speakers every month and they attract all of the top business people in Switzerland. Through that group, I really got to know most of the important business people. In addition, I visited over a hundred companies, including both Swiss and American, doing business in Switzerland. I was shown around the respective company and had the opportunity to meet the CEO and executives of the company. That was one of my primary agenda items. What I did not want to do was sit behind my desk and read cables all day. So I really tried to get out of Bern and around the country. I visited about fifty educational institutions -- high schools, gymnasiums, universities -- and really enjoyed doing that. I went to at least thirty or forty newspapers throughout the country during my tenure.

Q: What was your impression of the Swiss impression of the United States? It's very easy to look at our TV and other peoples' TV and talk about a society in disarray. What were they getting?

GILDENHORN: First of all, I think that the Swiss really admire and like the United States. They really think highly of us. In fact, during the Gulf War, there were some toasts by government and military officials which were really quite emotional and almost embarrassing. I remember one Swiss General saying: Thank God, the US has saved us again -- the US saved us in two major wars, and now they have confronted aggression once again. These were incredibly warm toasts applauding the United States. With respect to the other part of the question -- the Swiss know a great deal about our country. First of all, thirty percent of the Swiss population has been to the
United States. I'm sure it is a greater percentage than any country in the world. At least 300,000 Swiss tourists come every year.

Q: Basically tourists?

GILDENHORN: Yes. Out of a population of 6.8 million, 300,000 each year is a large number. So the people in Switzerland know the United States first hand. I had a very interesting experience in the city of Bellinzona, the capital of Ticino, which is in the Italian section of Switzerland. I went up into the mountains to visit a local high school. I had a session with their English-speaking students, and after I gave my remarks, we had a question-and-answer period. And the first question asked was about Marion Barry, the Mayor of Washington, who had just been picked up for drug use. I said to myself, My Lord, how do they know! But the youngsters avidly read newspapers and learn a great deal about America. CNN is broadcast throughout the country, and The Economist is extensively read at least by the government officials, with a whole section devoted each week to American affairs. So the average Swiss is quite worldly and knows a lot about what we Americans are doing. What is unfortunate is that American movies shown in Switzerland usually portray violence and pornography. Most films point up our social ills and never portray what is right about America. My job was to portray a better, more pleasant America to the Swiss -- an America in which our citizens live well and a country which is disciplined and moral.

Q: How did you find the Swiss reacted to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and all the changes?

GILDENHORN: I think that the Swiss were as shocked as everyone that Communism really fell, so quickly and peacefully. They joined with other nations in giving aid to Central and Eastern European countries. Even though Switzerland is not a member of the UN, they are still very active in UN affairs and remain involved in every ancillary organization of the UN, but not the General Assembly. They obviously felt that the demise of Communism was a very important historic event.

Switzerland changed a great deal while I was there. When I first arrived in August of 1989, they were an isolated country, very much into themselves. I think the most important change in attitude occurred during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. We were asked by the State Department to ask Switzerland to impose sanctions on Iraq. This was a big undertaking since the imposition of sanctions had never been done by Switzerland in their history, because it violated its neutrality. Neutrality is almost sacrosanct in Switzerland and is an important doctrine which is highly supported by the people. I went to see the State Secretary Klaus Jacobi who was formerly the Swiss Ambassador to the US for four years. We had really become good friends. Secretary Jacobi said, We'll work it out -- come back tomorrow. I went back the next day and he said, Joe, we've worked it out. Every minister was on vacation being it was August and each was in different parts of the world. Secretary Jacobi had arranged a telephonic conference and was pleased to report to me that the Ministers voted seven-to-nothing to impose sanctions on Iraq. I recall a funny story that day: When I went to see Secretary Jacobi, I went to the Bundeshaus and saw the Iraqi Ambassador in the lobby. I had known him, and I said sarcastically that, You're making me work hard these days. When I got upstairs to see
Secretary Jacobi, he said, Did you see your colleague downstairs? He said, He's mad at me. I said, Why. Secretary Jacobi said, the Iraqi Ambassador tried to cash a check today and we bounced it -- we froze all of the country's funds. I said, how much was the check? He said, A million and a half dollars. Switzerland was very proud of the action they had taken against Iraq. The reason I bring this up, is that from that time on, they have modified their neutrality to become more expansive, more accommodating to Europe and the world. It was a big step for them.

Q: I'm sure it was. You mentioned that they don't belong to the United Nations. In a way, this must have been a God-send as Ambassador, because all of our ambassadors have to run messages and say, Vote to protect whales...

GILDENHORN: We still do that.

Q: Did you get involved in anything of that nature, through the various agencies?

GILDENHORN: As an example, when the US was urging the abrogation of the Zionism-racism resolution in the U.N., we were asked to go to our various host governments and ask support, which we did. We knew that the Swiss did not have a vote but we knew that they have influence throughout Europe. My demarche alluded to the fact that they were not members but still requested any help that they could give us. Those were the types of actions and involvement. The Swiss also turned down membership in the European Economic Area Agreement last December. I thought that was a bad decision because membership would have given them the benefits of membership in the EC but very few of the responsibilities. But the people in a referendum voted against it. I think eventually they will join Europe. It is just a matter of time. I have a bet that they will join sometime before the year 2000.

Q: Did you have any instructions -- should we push for it, or just relax and let them figure it out?

GILDENHORN: Frankly, it was my feeling that maybe with them not joining, they could be the liaison between the United States and Europe. By not being a member of the EC, they could be helpful to us in certain areas, especially when we needed a friend who was not a member of Europe. In fact, the Swiss suggested this possibility and even some of the Ministers suggested it. I honestly never believed it. The Swiss are so connected to Europe, so tied in with all of the community members that they're not going to jeopardize their position in any way.

Q: Particularly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there's no longer that...

GILDENHORN: Now the Swiss are even thinking about sending troops for peace-keeping -- blue helmets. They have sent observers to Namibia. But they would never commit troops for combat. That would be a "no-no". I think that they are far from sending peace-keeping troops and will not do it for some time. But at least they are thinking about it, and you're seeing a more accommodating approach to the world. I think that is good. I think of Switzerland, really, as a positive model -- with three diverse cultures, three different languages and two religions -- they live together pretty well. It should have been the model for the former Yugoslavia, but obviously that situation is beyond control.
Q: Switzerland has been renowned for a long time for being where the spies met -- during the Cold War and even World War II and before. Did you find with the demise of the Soviet Union -- did spying as an industry go downhill?

GILDENHORN: Well, I think it has changed. I think the focus has centered on more economic spying than political-military spying. Most of the intelligence-gathering in the country was located in Geneva where you had the UN and where every country had representatives present. That is where most intelligence could be gathered.

Q: Did you have any problems with having other American Ambassadors at various United Nations' things in Geneva?

GILDENHORN: I was told before I went over that that was always a problem and beware of turf battles. But I knew Morris Abram before I went over -- I didn't know him well but I had met him and got along well with him. He was our Ambassador to the UN and International Organizations, an excellent representative of the US. His background has always been in human rights and civil rights, and it was a marvelous appointment for Morris. We became very good friends and we deferred to each other on matters of protocol and jurisdiction. We never had a cross word. He realized that I was the bilateral Ambassador and he was Ambassador to the UN, and it did not become a problem.

Q: How does one work in Switzerland? You have essentially a small town, Bern, which is the capital, and then Geneva which is an international capital, and then Zurich -- where did you work?

GILDENHORN: As I mentioned earlier, I traveled over 150,000 miles throughout Switzerland. Our Embassy is in Bern because that is where the capital is, where the government is located, and where the Parliament meets. We conducted a great deal of business with the Swiss government in Bern on a daily, weekly basis. But I always felt very strongly that it was important that I travel outside the city and meet the Swiss. That was one of my missions -- to bring, hopefully, the best of America to the Swiss. I visited every segment of Swiss society. For example, I spent two days speaking to farmers in the farm belt. Farming is a very sensitive matter since the industry is highly subsidized and a very protected type of business. I believe that the Swiss have the highest subsidies in Europe and they are not about to give up on their subsidies too readily. Many of the farms have been in the families for over three to four hundred years. When the government has attempted to reduce subsidies, which has to be done because of the high cost, the farmers mobilize to oppose any decrease in subsidies. But I thought that it was important to get these views first-hand by visiting the farmers on a personal basis. It's really interesting -- a dozen eggs cost six dollars -- it's extremely expensive. There's really nothing in Switzerland that can be grown or produced efficiently, or economically. Perhaps cheese and milk -- because there is a great number of cows grazing throughout the country. But if you get into wheat production or other grains, they just can't do it because of the scarcity of land.

Q: Were you under any instructions -- these were major American exports?
GILDENHORN: I found that you really refrained from criticizing their agricultural industry. Apparently my predecessor, Phil Winn criticized the Swiss agricultural program when he first arrived. Apparently the press became very critical and wrote some unkind words about Phil in their respective newspapers. I tried to learn from that. If you talk about agriculture, you talk about the subject very subtly, and maybe just allude to the fact that changes have to be made in the future. But it's a difficult topic, not so much from the American point of view, but from the Swiss government standpoint. They need to make dramatic changes in their subsidy program because it's so expensive subsidizing farmers. But it's a political football, a hot potato. Most countries in Europe are making a real effort to cut down on subsidies, because of the high cost.

Q: Was our balance of payments fairly equal?

GILDENHORN: Almost even -- we had eleven billion dollars and each country exported about five and one-half billion in goods to each other.

Q: Somebody wasn't breathing down your neck on that?

GILDENHORN: If anything, we were ahead because the Swiss ordered 12 MG-11s, civilian airplanes. They replaced all of their Swissair older planes with new McDonnell-Douglas planes. This was a big item -- almost two billion dollars. So when they started delivering these planes in 1991, it helped our balance -- we were ahead. Eleven billion dollars in total trade is considerable.

I think that one of the big problems in the country is drugs. The Swiss passed a money-laundering statute before any other country in Europe. The new law basically puts the banks to the task of reporting large money transactions. If anyone on the Bank's staff thinks that there is something suspicious, they must report it. It is a good bill, good legislation, and many of the other countries in Europe are starting to adopt the Swiss bill as a model. The Swiss are more open in providing information about their bank accounts than most countries, even though they are unfairly criticized for the secretiveness. Through our mutual legal assistance treaties, the Swiss are pretty open with information and very cooperative with our government. The only thing they don't do is disclose information with respect to U.S. tax evaders. Tax evasion in Switzerland is not criminal, it's civil; so therefore they will not extradite tax evaders which is a problem. But generally speaking, the Swiss have probably done more to enact laws against certain crimes than most countries -- whether it be money-laundering, drugs or whatever.

Their drug situation is a serious problem. It is interesting that on the French side of the country, especially in the cities of Geneva and Lausanne, the officials are very tough on drug use. If somebody uses drugs, he's arrested. On the German side, they're very liberal. Many feel that drug addicts are people who are sick and need help. What has happened is that many of the drug users from places throughout Europe congregate in the cities of Zurich, Basel and Bern, to mingle with other users and to receive clean needles. Many congregate on a sidewalk near the Bahnhof in Zurich. They shoot-up openly which I can tell you is not a pleasant sight. They get free, new needles, because the incidence of AIDS is very high. There is a great deal of discussion about the possibility of legalizing drugs. I remember, I gave two speeches opposing the legalization of drugs, and this caused a great furor in the newspapers. One newspaper commented that the U.S. Ambassador doesn't know what he is talking about, while another would be supportive of my
position! It's a very difficult problem. Because of increased drug use, crime has increased rather dramatically. Not too many crimes against people, but property crimes, i.e., burglary, etc. It is an unfortunate situation. A lot of drugs come in because there is so much illegal immigration. Immigration is the other big problem in the country. Many illegal immigrants come in from Eastern Europe, from the South, including Sri Lanka, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia. Unfortunately a lot of drugs come in with these people.

Q: Was this something you took an active interest in -- you said you made speeches?

GILDENHORN: I was careful not to tell the Swiss what they should do. That would be a "no-no". But I would give speeches stating U.S. policy -- what we do in this country. I did give a speech reflecting the United States' position opposing the legalization of drugs. I think it was an effective speech reciting the many reasons why we oppose legalization. This was the position of the administration and one I personally subscribe to. I was careful not to tell the Swiss what they should do, but I thought it very relevant to tell them what we in the U.S. are doing.

Q: How about women having a vote? The women's lobby in the United States is very strong, and here is a country that at least has a spotty record. I would think there would be pressure on you as the Ambassador.

GILDENHORN: There are twenty-six cantons in Switzerland, which would be comparable to our states. In fact, their Constitution is identical in wording in many respects to ours. The canton of Appenzell finally gave women the right to vote about two years ago. Actually, they were required to do so as a result of a lawsuit filed by a women's group. I think Appenzell enjoyed the publicity and held out until the last moment. What is interesting is that just three months ago, the Swiss elected a woman as one of their Ministers, in what turned out to be a very controversial election. Seven Ministers run the country with all parts of the country being represented. They call this the 'magic formula'. You need one Minister from the German part, one from the French part, and one from the Italian section. You need a Protestant and a Catholic, and all four political parties have to be represented. As you can see, everybody in the country has to be represented on this Ministerial Council. In the last election, it was required that they have a woman Minister. It had to be a Socialist from Geneva to comply with the 'magic formula' doctrine. And it turned out that there was only one woman in all of Geneva who had those particular qualifications. Unfortunately the woman was criticized about her life style and she eventually did not receive support in Parliament. Finally, they found another woman candidate who was born in Geneva but spent most of her time in Zurich. She was recently elected and has become the Minister of the Interior. Her name is Mrs. Dreyfus, and I understand she is doing an excellent job.

Q: Did you find -- were you able to stay out of this one?

GILDENHORN: You observe but stay out of any controversial matters. Womens' rights groups are becoming much more vocal about their rights. They're very sexist in Switzerland. A woman is paid less than a man for a comparable job. That's part of their culture but it is changing quite fast. But as an American Ambassador, I would not get involved in that issue -- that's too controversial.
Q: How did you find your staff at the Embassy?

GILDENHORN: I thought all of my staff were outstanding, excluding maybe one or two. All of the members of the staff, American and Swiss, were highly educated, dedicated, and displayed a lot of enthusiasm -- really good people. My former DCM served with me for almost three years. He was excellent -- his name is John Hall. He will be coming back here this summer to Washington to be head of Recruitment for the State Department in the Director General's office. He is a superb professional, a really a nice guy, and knows how to handle people. He has a great deal of experience and I was really very fortunate to be associated with him.

Q: Had you any caveats among the non-career people when you went out -- You'd better watch it, these Foreign Service people are going to get you, or something like that?

GILDENHORN: You realize that there is a built-in conflict between career officers and political appointees. I found that I could utilize the management skills that I employed in the private sector to my duties in Switzerland. I felt that it was important to include the staff in all activities of the Embassy. This was easy in Switzerland because you had only 120 people on staff. You don't have a thousand such as you have in England or Italy. The first day that I was there, I had a reception at my house and invited all of my staff including all of the FSNs. I always tried to have staff at my residence for events. I also got along very well with members of staff who were Swiss. Many of these people had been working for the Embassy for 25-30 years.

Q: Oh, yes. It's the real strength of the Foreign Service, what we call our Foreign Service Nationals.

GILDENHORN: Absolutely. It was sort of interesting that three FSNs had been with the Embassy for 25 years and would have earned a higher salary than me based on comparable Swiss wage scales. However because of the law, they were restricted to making $100 less than the Ambassador. Somewhere along the line, I got a raise, and they cheered that raise -- because they got an increase in their pay. I got along with everyone and really tried to include the staff in all functions and activities of the Embassy. We had many receptions at the residence and all were included. On the Fourth of July, I always had a separate party for the staff and their kids. I sincerely liked members of the staff, both Americans and Swiss, so it was not a problem but a labor of love. I found to my surprise that some of the FSNs had been there years and years and had never been to the residence. I changed that situation immediately.

Q: Maybe I've got it wrong, but was it our former Ambassador to Switzerland who got into a certain amount of trouble because of getting extra funds...

GILDENHORN: Yes, I believe that it was Faith Whittlesey.

Q: Were you under either personal or representational things to watch your expenses?

GILDENHORN: First of all, I contributed money to the State Department so I could properly decorate the residence, which was really needed. With respect to representational funds, I allocated it between myself, my DCM and Political Officer, and so on. I was out-of-pocket very
little. We entertained a great deal but I was able to pay for the affairs with the funds the Department gave me. Near the end of the fiscal year, we would ask for a supplement if needed and the Department was very accommodating by allocating additional funds. If we were short at the end of the year, I would pay it myself and not expect the staff to contribute. I did feel that some of the officers should have entertained more.

Q: It's a new Foreign Service -- it's new Foreign Service for me. Did you find that the fact -- we really need both husband and wife to be working -- did you find this to be a problem?

GILDENHORN: I found that many of the wives of career Foreign Service would not get involved and really made it a point that they had no obligation to be involved. Sometimes we had jobs at post and some of the spouses would take positions for pay. I know that my wife enjoyed running the residence and going around the country making speeches. She was a good representative of the U.S. She is a Trustee of the Kennedy Center and she gave speeches about the Kennedy Center. She worked hard and enjoyed being a part of the scene. She certainly made a good impression among the Swiss. But among the career officers, I found in many cases that the wives were reluctant to participate.

Q: It's sad -- It's a generational thing -- I came in in 1955.

GILDENHORN: They made a point of it, overtly indicating that they had no obligation or duty to participate in the Embassy's programs.

Q: I know. There's a militancy. I was principal officer in Naples and had some of the same problems.

GILDENHORN: I do not understand or agree, because part of the joy of being overseas is to be able to participate.

Q: So often they're missing something...

GILDENHORN: I think so, yes. My wife and I became friendly with wives of our officers. But as far as really doing things, and especially entertaining, they really have a problem with that and virtually did very little.

Q: Here you've been an advisor to the Vice President, now the President, so unlike many Ambassadors, career or non-career, you did have an In with the President. Did you ever call on that?

GILDENHORN: Not really. I never had any unusual problems which required that type of influence. There was one matter when I felt compelled to call Larry Eagleburger directly -- the problem involved the plans to close the Geneva Consulate. It caused great controversy in the Geneva community, with so many local Americans living there and with Geneva being the headquarters of American Citizens Abroad -- a very vocal group which represents Americans living in Europe.
Q: It's a political group -- they have votes at the Convention.

GILDENHORN: Andrew Sundberg, the President of ACA, and ran for President of the U.S. I warned the Department about the strong feelings on closing the consulate. They accused me in the newspapers as the one trying to close the consulate, indicating that it was in violation of the law. I told the Department that since you are the ones who want to close Geneva, and not me, then they should come out with a statement explaining the action. Eventually I called Larry Eagleburger, and he worked it out by issuing a statement. I called occasionally to officials in the Department to assist some of my employees who were trying to remain in the foreign service. I never called the President directly. I met the President in Geneva one time and I met Secretary Baker a couple of times. I also met with Secretary Christopher who came to Geneva and I spent half an hour with him. I never had an important enough issue which required me to call the President directly.

Q: Did you ever find yourself having problems with the Swiss over our issue during the Reagan-Bush Administrations, over abortion, opposition to drugs, this type of thing? Did the Swiss ever get into this?

GILDENHORN: The Swiss never commented on our sensitive issues. I will say that the Swiss followed our election campaign quite thoroughly. To this day, they still do not understand why we didn't re-elect President Bush. They really felt that he had the qualifications, and had done so well in foreign affairs, with special reference to Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They were quite surprised when President Bush lost.

JOHN E. HALL
Deputy Chief of Mission
Bern (1990-1993)

John E. Hall was born in Niagara Falls and was educated at Kenyon College. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and has served in a variety of posts in Switzerland, New Zealand, Liberia, and Canada. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

Q: They in 1990 you went back to Switzerland as deputy chief of mission. First, how did that come about?

HALL: Well, when I was bidding as I left Toronto I certainly put it very high on my wish list. I felt that with prior service at the post, two of the languages, being a senior officer with some managerial experience, I had a fairly broad array of experiences overall… I thought I was probably a pretty darn good candidate. I later discovered that Ambassador Gildenhorn ran across my name on the third list of possibilities that he was given, that he had rejected everyone happily on the first two lists, after meeting each of them. One day I got a call from the desk officer here, calling Toronto, saying get down here for an interview in the morning. So I came down, interviewed, and got the job. I think it worked out marvelously. Mr. Gildenhorn was a political
appointee, a very prominent local businessman in the Washington area in property development. An absolutely marvelous gentleman with an absolutely marvelous wife. George Bush told me when I met him, after he’d vacated the White House and came through Switzerland and I was showing him around, he said that in hiring Mr. Gildenhorn he got two for the price of one, and he really did. Mrs. Gildenhorn was as much the ambassador and as good an ambassador as Mr. Gildenhorn was a very fine gentleman, a gentleman of unimpeachable integrity. And I think we worked extremely well as a team.

Q: The Swiss have, on occasion, not been so blessed with American ambassadors, and have been critical, in many cases, reasonably so. Did they appreciate how good he was?

HALL: I think that was quite evident. He was much admired, much sought after, very much welcome… I think particularly when he left in February of 1993, the farewells just didn’t stop. He had a horrible schedule of people wanting to do nice things for them. They were a superb couple for the role, very much appreciated both by the private and the public sectors, and by Swiss society at large. He was very highly regarded. He was interested in the broad issues but he did not involve himself in the details, which I think was the correct posture. But he was certainly interested in the broad issues and knowledgeable about them. He used his contacts here in Washington well, and of course he had contacts that neither I nor others of us on the professional staff could possibly know, or assume, ourselves. He was an honest broker in both directions, and everyone knew that.

Q: He was regarded well, obviously by you, but also by the staff at the embassy?

HALL: Yes. Universally. An extremely effective - again, I must emphasize - an extremely effective ambassadorial couple. And effective in all spheres, including back here. He did not overuse his access to the top levels, but when he needed it, there was no hesitation.

Q: You were there from 1990 to 1993. That was obviously the period of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the end of the Cold War...

HALL: The invasion occurred while we were airborne flying, in fact, to Bern. So we were there right from the outset. It was a very interesting time to be there, because the Swiss do not always rush to engage themselves in contentious international issues. Yet this was an issue that was not altogether far from home, either physically or psychologically, and it was an issue that certainly captured the attention of the whole world for an extended period of time. It was obviously a very dangerous issue, especially for them being as close to the scene of the action as they are. And I think they were acutely worried about it in ways that maybe they don’t worry much about a lot of other international occurrences.

What I thought made it particularly interesting was that, at the very moment when what we came to call Desert Shield and then Desert Storm were playing themselves out, CNN was arriving in Switzerland. At first you heard that there was some American television news channel that was available in the major hotels. Then eventually you learned that a few big banks somehow had this coming into their offices on the television. And then you heard that the Swiss press had found a way to tap into this thing. And then various ministries that you might visit around town
obviously were watching this. It was almost week by week that you heard that it had encroached itself on some other part of Switzerland. The whole country was agog. This was a real major fad, and the Swiss are not much for fads. But this phenomenon appeared on the scene at the time the whole Kuwait-Iraq thing was unfolding. And I was profoundly struck by its power. I was not seeing the equivalent here, I was seeing it there, by its ability to dominate people’s thoughts.

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Q: It’s the ninth of January, 1998. John, we were talking about your assignment as deputy chief of mission in Bern, and we were particularly talking about the “CNN Effect,” if I may call it that, at the time of Desert Storm. Do you have anything more to say about that?

HALL: Well, it became amusing because courtesy of CNN, we not infrequently found ourselves carrying messages to the Swiss government which were already overtaken by events on the ground in Kuwait. We would go in with what we thought was the very hottest news and of course they could one-up us because they had CNN at the time and we didn’t. In fact it took us until well after Desert Storm was launched to get a direct connection ourselves. So we were operating at a real disadvantage at a period when we were having a lot of interactions with some elements of the Swiss government. And I think Peter Arnett really was the U.S. ambassador for a long period.

Q: What were we trying to get the neutral Swiss to do, and to what extent did we have success in doing it?

HALL: During the period of Desert Shield, of course, we were simply trying to convince them that we were the more pure and the other side was the more tainted. We didn’t ask for anything at all.

The minute that Desert Storm broke, we went in with really the only request that we made of them during the whole conflict, and that was simply an acknowledgment of geography. To get personnel and equipment from our bases in Germany to Italy or directly to the scene of the action, we needed access to Swiss airspace and we needed access to the Swiss rail network simply to transit Switzerland. And so the only request we made of Switzerland we made on the day of Desert Storm, and that was that we be granted a blanket clearance for military flights in both directions and the use the Swiss network to convey cargoes by rail from north to south and back again. We knew that there would be a time when we would want to move wounded and other equipment and supplies northward just as much as we now wanted to move it southward. Our request was for that. In the case of the trains, we wanted to send our uniformed personnel on the trains and we were prepared to have our wagons attached to Swiss engines, and we were prepared to have Swiss customs or military or any other personnel ride on the trains, that didn’t bother us. But these were the two things we asked them for.

I was chargé at the instant that the instruction came in – we knew what was coming, we knew what we’d sent – and when I went up to the Foreign Ministry to convey my request, which was one under other circumstances that the Swiss would have thought long and hard about and very likely not granted – it was instant yes. And I am absolutely convinced that the reason that it was
instant yes was Peter Arnett. That the fascination with CNN had led them to focus on that as their essentially sole source of credible information. We were handing them all sorts of commentary officially, which was not credible. What they got from CNN I think they thought to be credible, and I think probably 99 percent because it was a new toy and one percent because it was “on the ground.” In any case, I think Peter Arnett had laid the groundwork. The Swiss government, the Swiss press, the Swiss public at large at that moment had already decided that Saddam Hussein was evil, that what he had done was wrong, that it was so wrong that it was absolutely right that the rest of the world should beat up on him. And the groundwork for the demarche that was carried that day was not done by me or any of my staff in the months preceding, though heaven knows we were active, it was done by Peter Arnett. And as a result we got everything we asked for. The only thing we didn’t get was concurrence in writing. But it worked. It worked beautifully. And we never had a problem.

Q: Did we present our request in writing?

HALL: Yes. It was never answered in writing, and we were told that it wouldn’t be, we didn’t expect it to be.

Q: And that was sufficient. It allowed us to do what we needed to do.

HALL: It worked. We had the armed personnel on trains. They did put customs officials on there, it was strictly pro forma. They put one in the cab of each engine; they never looked at what was following behind. At their request, we did those transits only at nighttime. But other than that we got everything we’d asked for, and had it not been for Peter Arnett and CNN we would have had a much more difficult time. But the groundwork was laid, the moral rights and wrongs were very clearly established by the time we came in. It was a very powerful lesson in how a nonofficial entity can impact on foreign policy. Not when it chooses to, but when the circumstances are favorable. In this particular instance, CNN and Peter Arnett were determining Swiss public opinion every bit as much as I suspect they were determining American public opinion during that brief interval. And I think there are lessons in that experience as I saw it play out in one little place at one little moment that we as a profession are still pondering.

Q: Still, the role of Ambassador Gildenhorn or your role... there was still a role. The role was not simply to convey information or analysis...

HALL: I think so, but in this particular instance, one of the rare cases where we went to the Swiss and asked for something concrete and something to put them on the line… something that could publicly force them to take a stance on an issue, I think the heavy lifting had been done by others.

Q: What were the other issues you were seized with in the time that you were in Switzerland?

HALL: Well, it’s a happy relationship, as you yourself will recall, or by and large a happy relationship. One of the major issues was international criminal activity, money laundering. Switzerland had come under some criticism prior to my arrival, and it was very much a lively
issue during my time, both for Congress and the Treasury, in terms of their attitude, how they handled alleged instances of money laundering, their internal controls, and so on.

We had a delegation at one point where a senior U.S. Treasury official came over and read them the riot act. There were various other public and private efforts to convince them to exercise more control, more surveillance over large money movements. We, of course, wanted clear-cut, positive, decisive action, quickly. The Swiss moved, in the end, at their own rhythm. And I think on my watch they moved a long way toward where we wanted them to be, but they had to do it their way, which is legitimate. They had to do it in such a way that they could carry their publics with them. I don’t think that there was any question but that they understood that abuses were occurring, that they needed to tighten up. The question was how to get from here to there. We wanted instant action, we got results, but it took some time.

Q: Did our desire for instant action, immediate solutions to problems sometimes make it delay the process that they were going through?

HALL: I’m not sure that it delayed it from their point of view. What we were trying to do was to speed them up, and they were not about to be speeded. They had domestic concerns that they had to placate. We often felt frustrated. But I was pretty convinced throughout that they understood the gravity and the extent of the problem both in a material and in a public relations sense. They did not like the image that they had been given publicly in this country. I think they realized that they had to do something, they knew roughly what it had to be, and it was our role, really, to push them.

This occurred at two levels. It occurred at the diplomatic level, with government trying to influence government, but it also occurred at the micro level, in terms of individual instances, of individual actions. And there our legal attaché, our DEA representation, the Customs representation in Vienna, which was responsible for Switzerland, they were extremely active on individual cases, sharing a good deal of information on individual cases, of things that they thought had happened, that they alleged had happened. So we were working with them at two levels. But one of the consequences of that issue, which is a permanent issue in the relationship, whereas I think Desert Shield and Desert Storm came and eventually went, is that probably the most active single part of the entire embassy in terms of outside activity -- raising dust, doing things with a capital “T” -- was the collection of what I think of as police agencies. The work of the political and economic sections, the work of the Defense Attaché Office, the work of the agriculture office, the commerce office, and so on, those tended to be somewhat more tranquil, more steady, more predictable. It was in the legal attaché and the DEA and the Customs area where I felt particularly that there was an enormous amount of pressure coming out of Washington, there were staff increases on the ground from very small to a little bit larger than very small, but still any increase is noteworthy. There was a lot of interactions with the Swiss Federal Police, the Swiss customs, and other Swiss officialdom, a lot of information passing largely in one direction. A lot of very informal pleading and cajoling and urging and requesting, all of which the ambassador and I monitored very closely but did not require our personal attention. And was handled, I think, well. There were good people. In my view, I saw in Bern more concentrated activity in this, for lack of a better term, array of police entities than I was
accustomed to seeing in other assignments. I gather that that phenomenon has in fact played out in some other locations.

_Q: The problem sometimes with law enforcement agencies is a lack of information. Post management - the ambassador, the DCM - don’t always know what’s happening until pretty late when there’s a problem, when it’s pretty hard to deal with. But you felt that you generally were able to monitor, that you generally were aware of what was going on?_

HALL: I think we were, and I think it was because of the esteem in which the ambassador was held by his own staff. I think another person in the ambassadorial role might have had a great deal of difficulty being informed by his subordinates, what they were about. This ambassador didn’t. The agencies had very good people assigned, but they had both an affection for and a respect for the ambassador. I think they understood that they were dealing in a dangerous area, they didn’t want to get caught out, and I think they genuinely wanted to keep him informed. It was a tribute to the man and had we had the other kind of ambassador there, which you alluded to earlier, it may not have worked so well.

_Q: A lot of these issues that we’re talking about in the police or law enforcement areas involve Swiss bank accounts, bank secrecy, alleged money laundering. The other area that has certainly come to the fore in recent times, and I’m curious whether it was a subject at all while you were there, is the question of Holocaust accounts at the time of the Second World War, which has become a very prominent public and intergovernmental subject in the last couple of years. Did that come up at the time you were there?_

HALL: It was not there as an issue at the time, Ray. You will recall when you and I were there, and certainly when I was there later as DCM, this was one of those things that when you got to know someone very well, they might make a comment about. But it was not discussed publicly. Openly, it was something that everyone understood but simply didn’t enunciate. It was not an issue with a capital “I.” That’s all come up since that time. And indeed, Mr. Gildenhorn is Jewish himself; he is very well linked in to the American Jewish community and others who are active in this, and in discussions he and I have had since we’ve returned to the States, he is obviously very much involved with at least staying aware of the inner workings of that issue. He, of course, had excellent contacts with Swiss officialdom, with the Swiss banking community, and so on, he had also contacts with the American Jewish community. I’m privileged to have conversations with him from time to time, and he has some interesting insights into it, but when I was there it was not a policy issue. We had other things that were issues, but this was not.

_Q: Certainly the way I recalled the situation in the early ‘70s when I was there with you was very much along those lines. To the extent that we thought about the Swiss role during the Second World War, I think we were aware that they benefited from accounts placed there in other ways, but they also contributed in allowing us to do some things in Switzerland... and somehow the balance was not necessarily positive, but was sort of neutral, at least, as they sought the role. That’s the way I recall it from that period._
HALL: I think that’s exactly right. And obviously at that moment they were caught in a very awkward geopolitical situation and I would not pretend to judge the factors. I can understand that they had to play a very careful game. How they played it was up to them.

Q: I guess the next thing to talk about is the structure of the embassy itself. You mention the police representatives, the law enforcement agency representatives, were the ones who were really involved in the important day-to-day matters...

HALL: Very difficult ones in some cases.

Q: Let’s talk about the reporting. What did the other people in the embassy do?

HALL: The other members of staff were certainly busy, but I think the police agencies had a whole array of individual difficult issues and circumstances to deal with and it almost seems that one was put to bed and two others would come along. The other activities of the embassy - its consular activities, its reporting activities, and public relations activities and so on - simply percolated along, there were certainly always things to do.

Particularly on the public affairs side, the Gildenhorns were very active. Mrs. Gildenhorn was on the board of the Kennedy Center at the time. They used their connections into the artistic communities in America very well in a society which could respond very well to those overtures. She used her Kennedy Center connections very well, there were Kennedy Center honors nights in Bern. She had the president of the Center over at one time for public appearances and to talk about the facilities and so on. A lot of things in the artistic area – shows for burgeoning American artists in the area and so on, but they were very active in cultural public affairs in a sense. He did a certain amount of public speaking, but a great deal of public appearances in support of whatever objective and sometimes just for the fun of it. And the Swiss reacted very well to him and to her.

During my time there Treasury closed down its one-man operation, which surprised me, but they had higher priorities elsewhere: Eastern Europe was opening and they needed to deploy their resources there. Agriculture pulled out its attaché although they left a FSN behind; I don’t know if that FSN is still there. Again, the function of the Agricultural attaché office, I think both while you and I were there and certainly when I went back, was not absolutely vital to U.S. interests – it was a cut that we could absorb easily enough. In Geneva the U.S. has its major mission to the U.N., but we also have a small consular office, which once was an actual consulate. That was closed on my watch, that was one officer and two FSNs.

Q: Which at the time was attached to the embassy, and not to the mission to the U.N.?

HALL: That’s correct. It was an appendage to our consular section, so a consular agency was opened in its stead, which I happen to think was the right way to go. There were obviously not significant resource savings when you’re talking about a staff that small, but on the other hand it’s a small country and communications are absolutely superb.

Q: Who headed up the consular agency?
HALL: We engaged a local resident American, a retired gentleman who I believe has since passed away. A man well-known among the American community in Geneva. I think that worked out very well in the end. Of course the American community there obviously was distressed, they thought that we were abandoning them, they didn’t believe that a consular agency could provide the services they wanted, materials, documentation. It turns out that the agency could. So it was a modest dollar savings, but I think it was an unnecessary office and the consular agency performs the function very well. Since then, of course Zurich has closed as well, and likewise become a consular agency.

Q: Zurich was still open when you were there? The decision had not been made to close it?

HALL: The story as I saw it was that at a moment when we were being asked to open up umpteen posts in countries that hadn’t been countries, places which we felt were priority locations, there was obviously a hunt for resources - it had to be. Again, with Zurich communications were very good, the embassy was a full-service operation, staffed in such a way that I think it was widely accepted that we could absorb the workload. Indeed you will recall that many times personnel from the embassy went to Zurich city to do business without ever involving the Zurich consulate. And that’s true in all sections. There was an inspection of the posts in Switzerland in 1991. And the inspectors, of course, came in with the understanding that resources had to be found somewhere for these new countries. So they came in very suspicious. They essentially decreed the closure of the Geneva consular office and we managed to get the consular agency in its place. They took a look at the Zurich consulate and concluded that it was contributing nothing worthwhile, that it had the potential to do so if the post would do reporting. It was not then doing it. So the inspection reported that if the Zurich consulate proves in some reasonable period of time that it can report then perhaps it should not be closed, but if doesn’t, it should.

Q: What sort of reporting were the inspectors particularly interested in?

HALL: This was all based on the presence of the banking community, and the idea was to work them more assiduously than they were being worked at the time. The principal officer caught fire, and I think really made some very serious efforts to establish those kinds of contacts, and to do reporting. That was a function that was alien to the person’s background up to that point. That officer departed fairly shortly thereafter for reassignment, and for a full year there was no principal officer assigned. The deputy was acting and only very late in the game was given the actual title, and then was pulled for reassignment. The sum total of which, over a year or two, despite some serious efforts on the part of both the outgoing and then the acting principal officer, not a whole lot of reporting came out of post. The reporting on the Zurich banking community was being done by the Economic Section in Bern, and that didn’t change. So it certainly didn’t surprise me when the pressure to close the Zurich consulate became very intense. They’d been given no chance, if any, to pass the test. And actually I think the closure of the Zurich consulate engendered less public relations uproar than the closure of the Geneva consular office because in Geneva you had a much larger American citizen community, and they had and used connections in Washington.
Q: I assume that not much political reporting was done by anybody.

HALL: I think there was not much to do. Our political officer at that time had very good contacts, especially among parliamentarians, and there were some vocal individuals there who made a lot of noise and not much difference. Covering Swiss politics was an interesting thing to do at that time but in fact it was sort of a forlorn, fruitless activity. It was amusing. The political officer really spent the vast part of his time conveying demarches on this U.N. issue, or that European issue, some science issues, and so on. He was walking back and forth to the foreign ministry all the time.

Q: On the economic side, you managed to touch on the role of the Treasury representative and obviously Swiss banks and private Swiss economic institutions have a lot of interests around the world and certainly in the United States. The government, back in my time quite a long time ago, was quite involved and engaged in international economic bodies - the OECD, GATT, whatever - in a way that it was not involved in the U.N. or NATO or any other international political institutions. The economic reporting, I thought at the time I was there, was of at least some interest to Washington agencies. Was that the case?

HALL: I think that continued to be true. I don’t think there was a Treasury representative when you were there. But for so long as there was on my second tour, there was tension between the economic staff and the Treasury representative as to who had what turf. There was concern at Treasury, when their office was closed, as to whether the economic staff could pick it up or not. We never had a complaint from Treasury afterwards that they were not given adequate services. But yes, I think there definitely was a market, and you’re right that is one area where the Swiss choose to be active internationally. They’re also active in refugee matters, things of that sort. Humanitarian issues attract their attention. Political issues as such they generally do shy away from.

Q: They have a very professional diplomatic service, and for a relatively small country they’re in rather a large number of capitals all around the world, and they have on occasion represented our interests. When you were there, where were they representing our interests? In Teheran, I suppose...

HALL: Teheran and Cuba, if I remember. Teheran was the only active one. And on my watch, if I remember, there was not much activity other than consular - individual American citizen services. There were established mechanisms for that. The head of our Consular Section would keep me informed, but there were no real problems. We were simply a transmission link in a chain. The issues were looking after people who got thrown in jail, or redoing the passports, what to do about a former FSN at our embassy who was being denied some sort of benefit that they were entitled to, things like that.

Q: And in Havana we have the U.S. Interests Section, which pretty much does everything itself, even though it nominally still comes under the Swiss.

HALL: I think that’s right, and for that reason we in the embassy really experienced no connections there at all. But the system that seemed to work was that communications from
Washington went to us first, then to the Swiss government, then to Teheran. Communications from Teheran went first to the Swiss in Bern, then to the Swiss embassy in Washington, then to the Department. So there were two separate avenues, but we were part of only one avenue.

Q: So you asked the questions...

HALL: But we didn’t necessarily hear the answer. We didn’t know that the answers had been given, so it was a little bit awkward in that sense.

Q: The Swiss didn’t get involved in representing us in either Kuwait or Baghdad.

HALL: No.

Q: The last period that you were there, I’m not sure how long it was, you were probably chargé. At the beginning of the Clinton administration...

HALL: It was about six months.

Q: You enjoyed that period? Anything significant about that, other than that you were the chief of mission?

HALL: I don’t think that there were any major problems or breakthroughs that occurred, it was a relatively quiet period.

Q: Had the new ambassador arrived before you left?

HALL: No. I turned the post over to the chief of the Consular Section as chargé. We had a number of grade one officers on staff and it was, I think, the conclusion of us all that he was best positioned to take on the task and he in turn was chargé for another six months – I contributed six, he contributed six. He turned the post over to the new DCM, who was chargé for a couple of months, who then turned it over to the late, lamented Mr. Lawrence. So there was a very long interval there. My suspicion is that when I had left the scene, when the interval had become so embarrassingly long, that the Swiss probably started to say snotty little things. They know us so well that they don’t need explanations, and they can figure out what is going on. I never had the feeling for the six months that I was chargé that the relationship suffered for the absence of an ambassador, with the exception that we had lost a particularly effective one. But our dealings with private and public entities did not suffer at all.

Q: Well, that, I think, was largely because you had been there a considerable period of time and they knew you well. They also recognized that the change from a Republican to a Democratic administration in Washington was going to take a while.

HALL: I think they probably know us well enough to know how to read the signals.

Q: But as it went closer to a year, and beyond a year, I bet that was a long time.
HALL: After I was gone I suspect there were some awkward moments, yes.

Q: They also knew that there was some controversy about Larry Lawrence before he took his post in Switzerland.

HALL: Of course.

Q: Later on, after his death, it was a different story. Anything else about your time in Switzerland?

HALL: I don’t know of any particular high points that we haven’t covered. A very comfortable assignment, obviously, a busy little post and a fascinating country. I think we left things there in very good condition.

G. CLAY NETTLES
Economic Counselor
Geneva (1990-1993)

G. Clay Nettles attended the University of Alabama and served in the U.S. Army from 1954-1956. In 1957 he entered the Foreign Service, having taken the exam during his final year of Law School. Mr. Nettles’s postings included Japan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Lebanon, Pakistan, Zaire, Italy, Turkey, and Switzerland. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1997.

Q: Where did you go from there, Clay?

NETTLES: I went to Geneva in 1990 as economic counselor at our mission there. Primarily, the mission is for the international organizations which are based in Geneva, mostly United Nations organizations, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Red Cross, and various environmental organizations.

It was a good retirement post. We had good people working in the section. There was enough to do, but it was basically a nine to five job except when there were meetings going on in your area of responsibility. Then you could be very busy and work all night on the weekends. But, I still had a lot of time to travel within Europe. This was my first real European assignment and I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Q: Even though Ankara was in the European bureau, Ankara is in Asia Minor. Let’s talk a little bit more about the organization of the mission on the economic side in Geneva. The Office of the Trade Representative had an office there too, I believe, that handled GATT and trade negotiations which was not under you or in your section?

NETTLES: Correct, we worked very closely with them. The principle UN agency for which we had responsibility was UNCTAD which is part of the UN General Assembly. It is based in Geneva and it was seen as the UN agency primarily devoted to the developing countries. There
would be meetings of all types which, of course, we attended. When the major meetings occurred, USTR would have a representative there, too, but we had primary responsibility. Unfortunately, UNCTAD had not fulfilled its early promise. It had a very low reputation.

Q: A very low reputation with whom?

NETTLES: With everyone. To give a good example of that, every four years there would be a meeting of UNCTAD almost always outside Geneva where major issues would be discussed. However, it was very difficult to find a developing country who would host such a meeting. It took five years instead of four until Colombia finally agreed to host a meeting.

When I arrived, the ambassador at our mission there, who was very capable, said, “UNCTAD is a very ineffective organization. We have withdrawn from ECOSOC because it was not effective and it was wasteful. Should we do the same for UNCTAD?” I said, “First of all, we can’t withdraw from it completely because it is a body of the UN General Assembly, so we would still have to pay our contribution for it. Secondly, tactics are very important. If UNCTAD collapses, it shouldn’t be seen as the fault of the Americans so since we have this major meeting coming up in a year, we should have a major campaign to persuade not just the developed countries, but the developing countries that if we don’t have fundamental reforms of UNCTAD, then UNCTAD will just be a travesty - a joke.” Washington supported this view. The U.S. government worked very hard and tried to persuade others, especially the developing countries that UNCTAD had to be reformed if it was going to be an effective organization. Our efforts paid off. We met for a month in Cartagena, Colombia and were able to accomplish significant reforms within UNCTAD, much more than I thought would be possible. It was an ideal way to end one’s service, feeling that one had accomplished something.

Q: And, you really had a game plan, a strategy that you had developed at the Mission in Geneva? It probably couldn’t have been developed say in Washington, because there probably wasn’t that much interest in UNCTAD, or nobody really had the time or energy to think it through. You were able to do that because you were on the scene and got the support of the ambassador. Who was the ambassador?

NETTLES: Maurice Abrams was the ambassador. I want to give full credit to IO, the International Organization bureau within the State Department. They took UNCTAD very seriously and they gave full support, particularly Melinda Kimball who was the DAS and who actually headed our delegation in Cartagena. I gave the initial idea, but Washington supported it fully. Much of the work, if you were going to get other countries involved, had to be done outside of Geneva by demarches in foreign capitals and, of course, IO had to be the one to draft those demarches. That went on for a full year.

Q: What was the position of the Secretary General of UNCTAD? Was he resisting changes and reforms to make it a more effective and efficient organization?

NETTLES: Not really, but he was a somewhat of a controversial figure which as you know he was a Ghanian. He was a likeable person, but he had a different constituency. He had the U.S. advocating reforms and many developing countries resisting - very similar to the situation in the
UN General Assembly. He was a capable individual, and once he had the developing countries themselves pushing for basic reforms, he could work with the different groups. He was very good in that sense, but he was not a natural leader. He was not an improvisor, but a capable individual and certainly likeable.

Q: When we talk about reform, not just of UNCTAD, but of the United Nations system as a whole, I think one of the proposals that we’ve made or perhaps the Secretary General of the United Nations has made or has been encouraged to make is to consolidate some of the economic functions of the UN system. I think some of those economic functions included UNCTAD - I’m not sure what else, ECOSOC, UNIDO, maybe, and to pull all those functions together. Is there a lot of duplication and overlap, would you say from your experience?

NETTLES: Not a great deal of overlap I don’t think, but, for example, ECOSOC used to meet every year in Geneva and, of course, we would have a great deal of responsibility for that. We changed it to every other year, but there is no reason why we should meet in Geneva or any place outside of New York. There was some duplication, but duplication is not the major problem with the UN in economic functions.

Q: What is the major problem, would you say?

NETTLES: Unrealistic expectations of developing countries. Too often, the developing countries want the UN to do things or draft some resolution which the developed counties, particularly the U.S., are not willing to do.

Q: Or, even if a resolution is adopted over, say the vote of the United States, or even with our abstention, does it change anything?

NETTLES: I think our goal that the OECD should be the role model for UNCTAD. The OECD is an organization which has no real power per se. It cannot force a country to do anything, but, because of its technical research and the respect it has, when they issue guidelines which are agreed upon by everybody, these are accepted. It is a meaningful organization. We felt that this should be the model for UNCTAD and for UN economic organizations in general.

Q: This was your only assignment in the area of multilateral diplomacy, although you had gone to many OECD meetings and maybe others when you were in the Economic Bureau? What kind of observation would you have about that dimension of our diplomacy? Is it something you enjoyed or would you have liked to do more or probably less or no more?

NETTLES: I did enjoy it, but I prefer bilateral work. I’m glad the bulk of my service was bilateral as opposed to multilateral work.

Q: Where you could deal with real people about real problems, but where, not only, you could report, but sometimes exercise influence?

NETTLES: Right.
Q: What else about Geneva - anything else or does that pretty well wrap it up?

NETTLES: I think that pretty well wraps it up.

Q: I think you retired in Geneva?

NETTLES: I should add one thing - we were also, the Economic Section, had the responsibility for the environmental organizations based in Geneva.

Q: The United Nations Environmental Program is based in Nairobi, I think. What sort of organizations or meetings are you talking about that took place in Geneva?

NETTLES: There were about 15 different environmental organizations based in Geneva.

Q: Did you have any presidential visits or other major visits while you were there?

NETTLES: Yes, but none that affected me directly, but the President came so often that I was told that it was the only mission to which the Department did not send an advance team.

We did have a visit from then Senator Gore who was very interested and came because of his environmental concerns. One of the people working for me was his “control officer” and spent three days with him and he came to a Country Team meeting. He was very persuasive in what he had to say about his environmental concerns.

Q: Did you get involved with the Swiss government or Swiss officials or things in Geneva other than the international organizations?

NETTLES: None with the Swiss government per se, but the Swiss, although not a member of the UN itself, are members of various UN organizations. They assign some of their top officers to these organizations and I worked very closely with some of them.

Q: Geneva is a very expensive city, but did you enjoy living there?

NETTLES: Yes I did, but, as you know, the State Department has a system of providing a cost of living allowance which supposedly equalizes it to the cost of living in Washington, DC. I thought that worked very well.

Q: Okay, and in 1993 you retired in Geneva, because you wanted to travel in Europe a little bit more?

NETTLES: Exactly, and I spent a month traveling and staying in Spain and Portugal. By car and a month traveling by train in Austria and Italy.

STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
US Representative, Conference on Disarmament
Geneva (1990-1997)

Ambassador Stephen Ledogar was born in New York in 1929, and received his BA from Fordham University. He served overseas in the US Navy from 1949-1952. Ledogar entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was posted in Montreal, Milan, Quang Tri Province, Saigon, Paris, Brussels and Geneva. He was Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

LEDOGAR: Very early ’90, yes.

Q: You were there for seven years?
LEDOGAR: Seven and a half years. I left Geneva and retired from the Foreign Service in May of 1997.

Q: We’ll start there. Your title when you went to Geneva was what?
LEDOGAR: Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament.

Q: In ’90, the Soviet Union was still in existence, but things were beginning to move rather rapidly. What was the situation when you got there vis a vis your work?
LEDOGAR: First of all, let me point out that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was a direct descendant of the old UN Disarmament Committee. In 1990 the CD included 40 nations. The CD was autonomous in many respects except it was dependent upon the United Nations for rations and quarters, for funding, including office spaces and interpreters. Our meetings took place at the UN headquarters in Geneva. But the Conference on Disarmament had a rotating chairman. (The original arrangement had been an alternating U.S.-Soviet chair). Importantly, it worked by consensus, not by voting, as the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and most UN Committees did.

Q: 40 nations by consensus?
LEDOGAR: 40 nations by consensus, which is not easy. That figure of 40 members initially diminished because when the two Germanies merged, we went to 39; when Yugoslavia fell apart, we went to 38. So the CD had 37-38 members for most of the time that I was U.S. Representative. At the same time there was increasing pressure over the course of the period I was there, which was seven and a half years, for CD expansion. Eventually in 1996, the Conference on Disarmament was expanded to 60 members, which it is today.

Q: Did it include Israel?
LEDOGAR: Yes. That was an expansion country.
Q: Why didn’t it include it at the beginning? Was it just that this was considered at a state of war all the time, so it would just be unworkable?

LEDOGAR: I don’t know. I wasn’t around at that time, but it was a controversial country. For the most part, the early members were admitted two or three at a time and were less controversial. That was pretty much what the case was. When we went to the expansion from the old format of 40, which by that time was 37-38, to 60, it was a conscious attempt to change from the Big-Five plus non-controversial nations to add nations which were essential to the disarmament process.

Q: Was China in the original group?

LEDOGAR: China was in the original group, yes.

Q: When you got there, how did you see the prospects? What were we trying to get to?

LEDOGAR: When I got there, there was a long-festering negotiation on chemical weapons, which was just then in the process of being revivified. The reason for that is that the United States and the Soviet Union had recently gotten together and agreed that they would really be serious about chemical weapons. The period immediately prior to my arrival in Geneva, the era of Gorbachev’s Glastnost and Perestroika, included a meeting at the U.S.-Soviet summit level in Wyoming which produced a memorandum of understanding on the whole subject of chemical weapons. Then there was another summit in Malta. That produced yet again some major moves on chemical weapons, so that by the time I got to the CD in Geneva, the chemical weapons issue was ripe for progress, whereas in prior years it had been just drifting along with everybody repeating their positions. Very importantly - and here I’m jumping ahead a little bit - we were soon into the Persian Gulf War. The United States CW (Chemical Weapons) position up to that point was that we would reduce chemical weapons but we would not agree to eliminate them. By the time I got into the issue, the combination of Wyoming and Malta had produced a basic change in the U.S. position to the extent that we would agree in negotiations to reduce our stockpile down by 98% to two percent, but that final two percent would be held until such time as we, the U.S., were convinced that it was safe to go to zero. We wouldn’t negotiate a firm commitment to go to zero. That two percent represented the modern weapons in the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile of the so-called binary sort. Binary chemical weapons are weapons where the precursors to the final lethal substance are side by side in the bomb or shell, but not yet mixed. When the weapon is launched, either through an artillery tube or from an airplane, the trajectory to the target causes a process of mixing in flight so that when the missile arrives, it contains a lethal nerve gas. But otherwise, as the name suggests, it is much safer to handle because there are two non-lethal components.

Recognizing that the whole U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons was in bad shape, beginning to deteriorate, and even becoming dangerous to us while in storage, the United States Congress ordered it destroyed. So the U.S. was in the process of gradually eliminating its own unitary chemical weapons. So, it wasn’t much of a concession for us to say that we would go towards this two percent goal. But since we were going to keep two percent, we could not join with others who made a call for an immediate prohibition on any use of chemical weapons. Such
weapons still factored into our national security arrangements and were in the hands of troops, including frontline troops stationed in Germany. That was a stumbling block when I arrived. The U.S. position opposed a blanket prohibition on use.

**Q:** What were you getting before you went out there? What was the military side of why we needed this?

**LEDOGAR:** The U.S. Chemical Corps had been in existence since World War I, and it was as natural to the organization of the United States Army as almost every other branch to a professional military man. But CW were always a pain in the rear end to military commanders because they had to have their troops trained and equipped for fighting in the chemical environment. That meant the big cumbersome, protective suits and the gas masks and our troops would have to carry antidotes to nerve gas and so on.

There had been a curious and fortunately substantial amount of time between when I left my previous job in Vienna and when I was able to show up in Geneva to take over in the CD. It had to do with personnel matters. My predecessor in Geneva wanted to stay on an extra month or two. I needed Senate confirmation in the new job. Thus, while waiting, I was able to go through fairly extensive training, including visiting chemical weapons facilities throughout the United States: the plant where we were making binary weapons, the places where all our unitary weapons were stored, the school where they teach U.S. troops and did the training for chemical weapons. I put on a hot suit and went into a live chemical weapons environment and actually handled a little bit of the bad stuff. It was a confidence building thing they gave to the soldiers. I developed a fairly good background in CW. I was also exposed to a little bit of the chemistry, the laboratories up in Aberdeen, Maryland where they did research on chemicals. So I was able to have a fairly good exposure to the subject matter. Then we were soon into the confrontation with Iraq in the Persian Gulf.

**Q:** It started in August of ’90 and ended in February or so.

**LEDOGAR:** “Desert Shield” was about a six month period during which the U.S. and coalition allies built up our in-theater military presence and then when the shooting started, “Desert Storm” was rather rapid. Now for our negotiation, that was very important because prior to the coalition assault our intelligence indicated that the Iraqis had chemical weapons deployed forward. They had used them not only in their war with Iran, which immediately preceded “Desert Storm,” but they had even used them against their own population, the Kurds in northern Iraq, who were not acting properly according to Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish Iraqis were subjected to nerve gas bombings by their own military. So Saddam was not the least bit shy about the use of CW and had a proven capability. The U.S. forces brought along our chemical defensive gear and we inoculated our soldiers against certain kinds of biological threats and the soldiers had the wherewithal to inoculate themselves. But to my knowledge, the U.S. did not bring into the theater our own offensive chemical weapons. Rather, we decided that we were going to employ just conventional weapons using our protective gear and standard tactics to blast through.
It’s a pretty interesting subject. When you get down to actual war fighting as opposed to psychological warfare and static defense, there is a limited military role to chemical weapons, especially in mobile warfare. You can deny a geographical zone with persistent chemical agent, but with the straightforward nerve gas that does not stick around, once you’ve launched it and the wind comes along and blows it away, that’s that. Or it can get back in your own face and so forth. But in our conventional arsenal, we had and still have a system which is a multiple launch rocket system [MLRS], essentially a track vehicle with dozens of tubes, each loaded with a small rocket. These things could be armed in various ways, but if you wanted to deny an area to the enemy, you could use proximity fuses and fragmentation warheads and thus obliterate anything that was above ground in the geographically attacked area, which is pretty much the same role as a persistent chemical agent has. So, the point of all of this is that the U.S. military proved to themselves that they were not only just as well off but were probably better off without hauling around our own chemical weapons with all the logistical and political baggage that goes with them. When that conflict was over, as it was in very short order, the Washington political powers were able to obtain an agreement from Pentagon military leaders that it would be okay for the U.S. CW negotiating position in Geneva to join the protocol that would call for total elimination (going to “zero”). Therefore the U.S. could live with a prohibition on “use.” So that helped to stimulate our negotiation.

Q: At the time, I think chemical weapons of one sort or another were considered the poor countries' response to the rich countries’ nuclear weapons.

LEDOGAR: That was always the belief. People had started talking in terms of “weapons of mass destruction” and that included nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Of those, the cheapest and probably the easiest to acquire technologically were the chemical weapons. So it was thought from the point of view of a number of less developed countries, that having a chemical capability would be kind of an offset against the nuclear capability of major powers.

On the other hand, it’s interesting that during “Desert Storm” the issue arose publicly, and the U.S. Administration was asked by the U.S. press whether we would rule out the use of chemical weapons. The answer was, “We won’t rule out anything. Conflict is under way. We will not rule out anything in the course of this conflict.” The follow-up question was, “Not even nuclear weapons?” The Vice President, Dan Quayle, said, “We don’t rule out anything,” making the threat that we would see possible linkage or an escalatory justification if the other side used chemical weapons.

Incidentally, if you ask whether the Iraqis did use chemical weapons in defense of their occupation of Kuwait, for the most part, the answer was “No.” It may be that in certain places some chemical agents were released because munitions stores were blown up or something like that. But it would have been accidental. According to the best that I was able to read about CW in that war, the Iraqis had the capability of manufacturing chemical weapons but they didn’t seem to have mastered the problem of shelf life. So what they were doing in the years before in the Iranian conflict was sort of pumping the stuff out of the factories, shipping it to the front, and firing. But over the long period leading up to the actual beginning of the shooting, i.e., during Desert Shield, we thought we had a pretty good line on where the Iraqi chemical capability would be. They did have good political control over it. To the best of our knowledge, there never
was an attempt to authorize its use and release it. But our troops took their injections, put on their suits, and rolled straight forward with a blitzkrieg that rolled up the Iraqi forces in a few days.

Q: What was the Soviet attitude towards chemical weapons? Was that changing?

LEDOGAR: Yes, it was. Under Gorbachev, to the consternation of a lot of hardliners in the Soviet military, the USSR was apparently serious about entering into a CW prohibition. Indeed, they were quite constructive during the course of the CW negotiations. For them, and this is true even today, the problem was becoming and indeed it became one of a lack of economic resources necessary to destroy the weapons. So almost from the get-go in the negotiations, the Soviets and later Russia started trying to work out some arrangement other than the obvious one that they would have to pay themselves for destruction. Everybody else figured, “You guys have got these things and this is a convention about the destruction of all chemical weapons, all chemical weapons manufacturing facilities, storage facilities, and so forth. So, you possessors have to pay.” The Soviets and then pretty soon the Russians recognized that this would present a terrible financial problem. They had by far the largest CW stockpile. We had a lot, but Russia’s CW arsenal relative to ours was on the order of 40:28, or so. It was an enormous amount.

We had started pilot plant CW destruction independent of the negotiation. The first facility was out in Tooele, Utah. This pilot plant was to improve the technology and hardware for what was to become eight U.S. destruction facilities around U.S. territory and possessions, one of which was on an island in the middle of the Pacific. But essentially, the U.S. decision was to destroy chemical weapons in place or as close as possible to the military installations on which they were stored. The political problems and the environmental uproar and everything else about moving these weapons around the country were daunting. Indeed, during my period before going to Geneva, I visited Tooele among other facilities. The pilot destruction plant there proved itself. The technology was high temperature incineration. There were other technologies being explored at the time. The Russians were fooling around with a bunch of other technologies, especially reverse synthesis, i.e., you start to subject the agent to chemical processes that would reverse the process by which it had been made. The trouble is that way you create an awful lot of by-product, that while perhaps not lethal, was very bad for you and for the environment. You get twice as much in bulk waste than when you started. They were also trying out a technology that had to do with taking the weapons and dropping them into pools of liquid nitrogen. That would just shatter the CW warhead. But then you still had to deal with the substances that came out of the nitrogen and they were hazardous. So the technology that’s used even today, the one that proved successful, was just high temperature incineration.

Q: You arrived there in 1990. What did your delegation consist of?

LEDOGAR: First of all, I’d like to make sure that people understand that the Conference on Disarmament is essentially a permanent forum. It deals with an agenda that is designed to change as disarmament problems are addressed and solved. So the Conference on Disarmament, in addition to work on CW, would have an agenda that included a wide variety of problems that were not yet ripe for negotiation, or that were being finished off, or that were still in a prediscussion phase. We had discussions but not negotiations on a half dozen different subjects. One of them when I got there was on nuclear testing. At the time of the chemical weapons
negotiation, a ban on underground nuclear testing was an agenda item that was put there by others, but the United States was sort of politely saying, “Yes, but not now.” We had other attempts to see if we could get the process of negotiations started on things like outer space, small arms, land mines, etc.

So the Delegation included representatives from all of the U.S. national security agencies. We therefore had people from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Department of Energy, from the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the CIA, and others.

One of the first things I noticed in Geneva was that there was a tendency on the part of the Washington agencies to send people out temporarily for specific times and not have folks assigned to my delegation who were resident in Geneva, who had their families with them, but rather, had desks, regular jobs, and inboxes back in Washington. That is a common problem with U.S. delegations to itinerant international negotiations. But the CD was permanent. I set out on a program to encourage each Agency to put at least one senior advisor in Geneva full-time and I was making considerable progress on that. It wasn’t completely achieved. The Joint Chiefs couldn’t assign somebody to Geneva because they didn’t have the military support structure, so our JCS representative was TDY from the U.S. Army headquarters in Heidelberg, but at least he was in Geneva full-time. We got a full-time person from ACDA (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). They were not a problem because they were the lead agency on the chemical weapons thing. But it was always hard to get the State Department to find a slot to keep someone on my delegation permanently. Then depending upon how the negotiations were proceeding and the particular technical phase, folks would come out from Washington agencies to reinforce and to work on particular tasks. So, it was a Delegation during the time I was there that ranged from about 10 permanent core members to as much as 40 total when things were very active.

Q: I would think you would have a problem of the people who would be sent out. Often, they would be task specific and would be sent by their agency saying, “Make sure these guys in Geneva don’t do this or that.”

LEDOGAR: I’m one of the leading experts on that subject - how to guard against commissars. I have given lectures on it. During my time in Geneva I earned a lot of enemies in Washington by insisting that the primary loyalty of the delegates was to me, not to their Washington bosses. In a sense, it is understandable, especially if you have someone TDY from Washington. His long term career, his evaluating supervisor, his instincts and his family are all in Washington. He feels he’s sent to my delegation to represent, for instance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and therefore should bring with him the point of view the OSD expressed in the interagency process that had resulted in recommendations to the President and decisions that became foreign policy. The trouble is that the Ambassador, in this case me, is not responsible to any Agency, even though he might be, as in my case, a Foreign Service officer, but rather is responsible for carrying out the President’s policy. If that’s against the original State Department recommendation, then so be it. What you have to guard against is people, who have lost in the interagency push-and-shove, trying to slant policy back towards the way their home office really wanted it in the first place and still thinks it should have been. One of the things that they tend to
do is to put their responsibility to their own office in first place and their responsibility to the
Delegation in second place.

I can’t tell you how many times I reminded, sometimes quite forcefully, young officers that their
primary responsibility while serving on the Delegation was to the President and to the
President’s representative and they were not there to continue the Washington struggle over
policy development. We were there to execute policy as handed to us in the front channel by
fully cleared guidance. I would say, “If you continue to talk over the telephone to the home
office or to report your version of events in backchannel messages, I’m going to rip your phone
out and disconnect your private communications; accept that, or you will be sent home.” I made
sure that each agency in Washington understood that if they put someone on a plane to report to
me in Geneva, I didn’t regard them as folks from Washington that I had to accept; they were
nominees to my team and if they couldn’t function on my team after counseling and reminders,
there were a certain number of things that I would do. One of them, the least brutal, after you
finish trying to get some sense into them and get them to understand the way things must be, was
to squeeze that officer out of the information loop.

An Ambassador who goes and hobnobs with all the other Ambassadors, heads of delegation, at
lunches and private meetings picks up an awful lot of information. The first thing you want to do
is to share that with your Delegation, but only under the circumstance that they’re going to hold
it as privileged information for our Delegation. If they start reporting things back to Washington
on their private channels there could be chaos. For example: the British Ambassador has got this
personal idea that maybe we ought to try to crack a problem this way and he comes in and talks
to the American Ambassador and says, “I haven’t even informed London yet. What do you
think?” Let’s say I report this feeler to my guys because I need technical perspective and
somebody goes back to Washington with it. With the local confidentiality lost, a Washington
agency that doesn’t like the idea might call in the British Embassy to explain, and there is hell to
pay. You try to have good relations with your British colleagues. If things like this happen, he’s
not going to confide in you ever again.

The trouble is that many of the people that we send out to interagency delegations in the field are
unwilling or incapable of sorting out their primary loyalty and their secondary loyalty. But in my
mind, it’s the only way you can operate. If one of these things gets very messy you have to be
very confident and be willing to say, “Either this guy goes home or you recall me. I’m not going
to be out here presiding over a bunch of Washington agency commissars, each with his own
independent foreign policy.” This aspect of dual loyalties should be taught in this building here,
the Foreign Service Institute. I’ve given a couple of lectures on it. For a while there was a course
on how to serve on an international arms control negotiation. It requires that you have
supervisors in Washington who are willing to support their ambassadors and heads of delegation.
Otherwise, it’s chaos. I know of a couple of negotiations which are chaotic from the U.S. point
of view. The OSD and the Joint Chiefs have folks on those delegations whose first loyalty is to
report back channel to the Pentagon on the U.S. Ambassador. The prejudice is to watch what that
clown is doing to sell out the United States.
Q: One of the issues was nuclear testing. I understand that on the United States’ side, this was always a big problem. One gets the feeling it’s because the nuclear establishment in the U.S. needs something to do, so they continue to do nuclear tests.

LEDOGAR: I don’t know, that’s a little harsh. But trying to stay a little bit on the chronological progression of things, during the first three years I was in Geneva, which were ’90-’92, the U.S. position on the question of whether we should try to negotiate a nuclear test ban was like this: “The United States, so long as it depends upon nuclear weapons for deterrence and extends our nuclear umbrella in favor of our allies, will not, indeed we think it would be immoral to, engage in a total cessation of underground nuclear testing. Some testing is essential for safety and reliability of our existing stockpile, if not for further development.” That was our policy. That line on nuclear test ban continued right on through the completion and signing of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, which was in January ’93. Then the Conference on Disarmament was flapping around looking for a follow-up task. What were we going to do next? Everybody in the CD who was not a nuclear weapon state wanted to have a crack at a nuclear test ban. At first, the U.S. was very reluctant, but with significant technological improvements in the test simulations, we gradually talked ourselves into agreeing to do so. We talked ourselves into joining in a total nuclear test ban negotiation with the encouragement of the U.S. Congress. But I think we’re getting ahead of ourselves; let me go back to the Chemical Weapons Treaty.

Right after Desert Storm, the U.S. made two major CW policy moves, which resulted in the chemical weapons negotiations going full speed ahead. That was when President Bush announced that we would no longer insist upon the retention of two percent of our CW stockpile, but would in the course of the negotiation agree to the total elimination of our stockpile. That having been said, we therefore would join with others in seeking the total prohibition on CW use. That was the second policy change. So the negotiation really got under way with full vigor. During ’92, there were several ministerial level meetings and one summit that helped encourage progress. In fact, there was a lot of East/West arms control and disarmament going on during the early years of Shevardnadze, with glasnost and perestroika and all kinds of things. In terms of East/West arms control, it was a new world. The Soviet Union was breaking up. You had the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) with full independence of many of the various states that had been part of the Soviet Union. We even had the Soviet Ambassador take over as chairman of the CD’s CW negotiating committee during 1991. When the USSR dissolved during the course of his chairmanship he became the Russian Ambassador.

Recall that the Conference on Disarmament had many agenda items. When an agenda item became ripe for negotiating, the CD would form a committee which would negotiate a mandate, and then it would elect someone as chairperson for a year to preside over the negotiation. The chair usually rotated annually among East, West, and non-aligned groups. The Russian was chairman during 1991. He was extremely good and straightforward and was clearly dedicated to the achievement of a CW agreement. It shows you how the negotiations were really moving forward. Everybody had their own positions and their own requirements. The negotiation was not free of problems by a long shot, but we brought the competing draft treaty contexts together and completed a final draft in late ’92, which was the last full year of the Bush administration.
A very interesting thing occurred during the U.S. election campaign in ’92. It’s part of the Nuclear Test Ban story. It has to do with Congress passing certain legislation that made the negotiation of a test ban treaty inevitable. But let’s just stick with chemical weapons for a while. One of the final problems was to select a city in which the international CW monitoring organization that the treaty created would be located. After a certain amount of political struggle, it was decided it would be in The Hague. Today we have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] in The Hague and it is functioning. It has certain problems, but they’re pretty much in the category of growing pains. That implementation regime is in pretty good shape.

**Q:** The group that was negotiating on our side, the Western side, was sort of the U.K., Germany, France, Italy?

LEDOGAR: Yes. In the Conference on Disarmament at that time, there were 10 participants, essentially Western-style democracies, in the Western caucus. It included Japan, Australia, and eight NATO members: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, U.K., and the U.S. The Eastern group was originally the Warsaw Treaty Organization, seven of them. All the rest of the original 40 CD participants were the so-called neutral and non-aligned. They called themselves the group of 21. Don’t try to do the arithmetic because the totals don’t add up. East Germany vanished, Yugoslavia self-destructed, and China stood as the “Group of One.” The G-21 was made up essentially of the neutral non-aligned - India, Pakistan, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, etc. Sweden was a big leader at that time, but was always having problems because the Swedes were viewed by other neutral non-aligned as rather pro-Western and the delineations weren’t too clear. But cohesion within the Western group was very good.

We also did work in smaller, informal groupings. The P3, the U.S., U.K., and France, met regularly. We had one grouping where it was the Berlin powers, which essentially were France, the U.K., the U.S., and Germany. That proved useful for certain issues. That’s another thing that a lot of people don’t understand. As long as you keep up a facade of every nation being treated equally, a lot of the work gets done in small ad hoc groupings. Frequently, they begin or continue around meals. Nobody can argue that a particular ambassador can’t have a few colleagues of his choice over to his house for lunch. These luncheons would be very much business meetings. The idea was to get a few very important people together to try out ideas and to be the board of directors on a particular new issue, to get things launched and set out strategy and so forth. Of course if the U.S. met to coordinate strategy with the P3, these had to be very discreet gatherings. You had to be very careful that you didn’t let the next level, the Italians and the Canadians, suspect that they were at the exclusion line, that they didn’t make the cut. We even had a couple of meetings of the non-European Union States within the Western group. The U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan were beginning to see political cooperation among the EU states in the Western group such that we felt that we were being confronted with pre-cooked EU positions that we hadn’t been able to influence. That goes on a lot in multilateral negotiations; special groups are formed for all sorts of processes.

**Q:** What was China’s role on the chemical side?
LEDOGAR: They tried to stay independent, but they fashioned themselves as morally and emotionally along the same line as the G21. So if the Chinese didn’t have a particular national interest, they would always side with the non-aligned. In the beginning, the discipline on the Warsaw Treaty Organization was very strong, but it didn’t take long in the period I’m talking about (early ‘90s) before you started to see the East Germans disappear. Then the Poles and the Hungarians were applying for membership in NATO, and former Eastern group solidarities began to show cracks and then to turn around. There was quite a bit of flux. But we completed the CW treaty by the end of ‘92. It was and still is today a very landmark treaty. It has a verification regime the like of which the world had never before even contemplated, with enormous intrusiveness. The watchword was “verification anywhere, anytime, no right of refusal.” At first, that jargon was put in by the U.S. side by Pentagon opponents of the very idea of a chemical weapons treaty. The Defense guys thought that calling for verification that strict would be a poison pill, that the Russians would never agree to it. Then within two years of that opening U.S. position, the Russians were able to accept it but we ourselves realized we were unable to accept it. So some of the final struggles dealt with exactly what circumstances, in terms of managed access, would obtain when there was a short-notice challenge inspection. The regime provided for routine inspections that went on all the time according to schedule. These required cooperation between the inspected states and the inspectors. But if any state party to the Treaty had any reason to suspect something illegal might be going on, it didn’t have to wait for a routine inspection. Any country could challenge and say, “I don’t like what I think is going on in this particular place.” If your challenge met minimum requirements for reasonableness, there would be an international inspection team launched on rather short notice to go to the challenged area and take a look to see what was going on.

Then the old problem in international verification regimes arises. Offense versus defense. Short notice intrusiveness sounds pretty good if you look at it from the point of view of what access you’re trying to get from potential violators. But if you look at those same levels of intrusiveness from the point of what a nation is trying to protect — secret weapons programs, intelligence facilities, nuclear weapon design labs, and the like — you want to be circumspect about how short the notice would be and what would be the permitted access of foreign inspectors when they came to take a look at someplace that someone chose, possibly on a whim. So challenge inspection was probably the toughest issue that we had. It was one on which the agencies in Washington were sharply divided. Those agencies in charge of sensitive areas that needed protection wanted to say, “No, you’re not going to get any of those foreign inspectors in here until I’ve had a couple of weeks to get ready and then they can only come to the fence and they can’t go through the buildings.” There was a big struggle over challenge inspection within the U.S. Government. But it is the eternal struggle in any international arms control agreement between on the one hand the offensive angle (what it is that we want to be able to get to inspect on short notice to be sure that others are living up to this agreement), and the defensive angle (how we can protect ourselves against the prospect of losing something confidential that has nothing to do with CW prohibitions, but which has everything to do with our national security from another point of view); for example, an intelligence facility or a place where we’re building some next-century weapons system. That’s one of the areas where the Commissar problem within the U.S. delegation was very threatening. That was one of the times in my experience as an American negotiator when I had as much or more problem with Washington collectively than with the foreign countries with which we were negotiating.
Q: I’ve remarked that real diplomacy is engaged among ourselves. Dealing with other countries is in a way cut and dry. Their persuasion is not quite... You have to reach agreements, but real persuasion and muscle is in one’s own Delegation, country.

LEDOGAR: Absolutely. There are old clichés that have a lot of truth to them. Kissinger said in one of his memoirs that the trouble with the United States foreign policy is that we spend 50% of our energy negotiating with ourselves, 25% negotiating with our allies, and have only 25% left for our adversaries. Let me give an example. In the early time of strategic nuclear negotiations, where I was following them from the Washington end, you could almost graph the development of a U.S. position in the SALT, START, or INF talks by the opening Joint Chiefs position and the opening Arms Control and Disarmament Agency position, and subsequently plot them as the two extreme possibilities, with the preferences of all other parties - the Congress, the allies, the adversaries - falling in between. The trick was to draw those two extremes together and when you had them very close together you had an agreement. Others could live with any of the territory between the two U.S. extremes. That has changed over time. The agencies started getting different policy azimuths on the positions at the beginning of the Reagan years.

In the period of the Cold War, the U.S. had developed - especially in the arms control and disarmament arena - an awful lot of experience, mostly in negotiating bilaterally with the Soviet Union. We had SALT I, SALT II, START, the INF treaty, the nuclear space defense negotiations, and a number of others. The establishments in the various agencies in Washington that were responsible for developing policy and for tracking what was going on were populated mostly by folks who had developed their expertise in bilateral negotiations. When we got into big multilateral negotiations, there was a significant lack of understanding. The way it showed itself in my first experience was in a Washington lack of understanding that once they developed a precise U.S. position, it was unlikely to survive in its word-for-word form very long, because it would be subjected to being shaped, twisted, and compromised, and so forth, not just in interface with one opponent, one negotiating partner, but rather with 40, or 60, or 180+. You might find that we favored something that the Australians just couldn’t abide. Yet here they are, close friends. It might be a little bit easier to understand and develop an adjustment, to take into account a friendly country’s position, than it would be if you ran into, say, a Chinese objection. China, Russia, and India have their own particular points of view and interests. So, it was not like a bilateral U.S./USSR negotiation where you take the U.S. position word-for-word and you bang it against the Soviet position and see what sparks fly. Oddly, there were certain Washington folks who didn’t understand multilateral dynamics. I formed the opinion that if we could have had a better interface between multilateral arms control operations and multilateral trade negotiations, we probably could have been better able to cross-fertilize Washington agency interactions. In trade, they’re used to working with these coalitions. The coalitions change as you go from frozen chicken to corn gluten, or whatever the subject might be. It depends upon where God or nature in his or her wisdom decided to make deposits of particular natural resources. That forms a natural coalition on that commodity; and trade-offs can be negotiated among different coalitions. In East/West or bilateral arms control negotiations, Washington though in terms of zero-sum security trade-offs, i.e., between rather fixed and permanent camps, East versus West. If we had more understanding of dynamic packages of issues and trade-offs among them, it
would have been easier for some people in the arms control business in Washington to understand how multilateral negotiations were different from bilateral.

Q: I would think that one of your most difficult countries in negotiation would be India. India tends to be a difficult country for Americans to deal with anyway.

LEDOGAR: India was difficult in both of my big negotiations.

Q: Also, in this case, they have some stake in it. Other countries didn’t have much of a stake. They were just there, but just to keep the big boys from having too many dangerous weapons to play with. Could you talk about India?

LEDOGAR: Yes, but if I may, I’d like to postpone that.

First of all, on the Chemical Weapons Convention, looking at it from an overall point of view, it really was a remarkable document in the history of international negotiations. It was so sweeping. The basic approach was that rather than try to pick out and isolate and prohibit certain activities in connection with chemistry, we prohibited all chemistry, if you will, and then just said, “Except that you can do this and that.” In other words, in order to make the scope of the treaty sweeping, the text was designed so that unless a specific activity with chemicals was specifically permitted, it was banned. Thus all chemical activities would be caught in the network of the treaty. So, it had a rather wide scope.

The American chemical industry and also worldwide chemical industry very wisely chose to join with the negotiators early on, and they were cooperative. They were the ones who were going to suffer the disruption and in certain cases the expense of the intrusiveness necessary to verify compliance with the treaty. So they recognized early on that they had an interest in seeing to it that the provisions were as benign, from their point of view, as they could be. I think that was far sighted and very helpful. Indeed during the crucial final weeks of the CW negotiation, a technical advisor from the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), was assigned pro-bono full-time to my Delegation. From my point of view he was just an extra resource, foot soldier, and a useful advisor. From the CMA point of view if the negotiators decided a thing had to be done, and there were two ways to do it, the CMA rep would point to the way that would be less objectionable to them. That was important and was true not only of the U.S. CMA, but also the Japanese association and a Western European association. They were all pretty much on the same wavelength. So this very complex treaty was completed in late ‘92. It was agreed that the treaty would be opened for signature in Paris in January of ‘93.

Q: Why Paris?

LEDOGAR: People grabbed at Paris because there were several alternative proposals that were not very attractive. The Belgians had threatened to propose that it be signed at Ypres in Flanders, the first place poison gas was used in World War I. Paris is a good town for treaties. A lot of treaties have been signed there.

Q: The French love to host those things.
LEDOGAR: Yes, and they’re very good at it. By this time, Lawrence Eagleburger was Secretary of State, and he headed the U.S. Delegation. He signed the Treaty for us in January of 1993. That was the very end of the Bush administration.

Q: I’m thinking of two countries where there were possible problems. One was Iran and the other was Libya. How did we deal with them?

LEDOGAR: Libya was not a participant in the negotiations, but they certainly were mentioned very frequently. They had a clandestine CW program disguised in various ways. We felt we had the goods on them. They had a chemical weapons facility in Rabda they claimed was a fertilizer plant, but it was very clearly used in nefarious activities. Rabda was very much at the forefront of our minds when we talked about what kind of an inspection regime would be necessary to catch a smoking gun at a place like Rabda.

Iran…? It’s hard to get into all of this in unclassified discussion. We had information about chemical weapons programs in a number of countries. It was at one time contemplated that we were going to draw up a list of chemical weapons capable countries, but we soon found out that it was extremely difficult to have a single list labeled “capable” that would capture all those that you wanted to capture. In some cases, people had chemical weapons programs that were ongoing and well known. In other cases, people had chemical weapons programs that were very clandestine and in some cases not even known to the central governing authority (it may have been known only by the military). In some cases, you had countries that had stores of chemical weapons that they didn’t want. Either they had made these CW’s themselves and had long since abandoned them or the CW’s had been left behind by previous invaders. In the 1940s, the Japanese left enormous amounts of chemical weapons behind in China. The biggest issue between those two countries was so-called “old stocks” and how those stocks would be dealt with, and who was going to be responsible to clean up and pay for destruction. You had countries like Belgium which had no chemical weapons capability of their own, but there were a number of cashes of chemical weapons left over from WWI, some individual shells and some stores collected by large farms and put somewhere. You had some countries that were not intending to have a chemical weapons program but were so sophisticated in chemistry (take for example Switzerland) that they could have a chemical weapon within a matter of days if they decided to. So an attempt at policy based on making sure that all the “chemical weapons capable countries,” were included fell flat. Agreement in open negotiations on such a category was not possible. We even had a private negotiation going on at one time between myself and my Soviet counterpart to try to see if the two of us, using our sensitive sources, could agree on a single list of nations that were the problem countries in terms of CW. We couldn’t agree. It was that kind of thing.

There were so many little nuances that often you had to go the route of broad sweeping prohibitions, making sure that they applied to everybody equally. I can remember at least two countries where CW programs were believed by U.S. intelligence to be unknown to the central authority of each country. So, that was taken care of in these prohibitions. If any weapons were found - and there was a special provision for old stocks - then the party who had left CW stocks
behind had to share responsibility with the country in whose territory the stocks had been left. Together they had to get rid of them. It was quite an elaborate affair.

I’m sorry to say that when the Clinton Administration took over in 1993 they did not move the CW treaty immediately toward ratification, although instinctively they were in favor of the treaty. They thought, “That’s the Bush Administration’s business. We didn’t negotiate it.” So they kind of let it languish and didn’t move forward with U.S. ratification all during 1993 and 1994. By this time, the Republicans had taken over the Senate and Senator Helms, who had never met an arms control treaty that he liked, took over the Foreign Relations Committee. That was a problem. The CW treaty was before his committee. That is a story in itself. In the end the U.S. was very late in ratifying, and almost missed by a matter of hours being an original party. If we had missed out the consequences would have been fairly serious, because we would not have had the right to have our people in the international CW organization. Fortunately, with an 11th hour bipartisan effort, we got the thing past Helms and approved by the full Senate. The treaty was actually debated in the Senate in the month or so preceding ratification. At that late date the debate, instead of being on the real implications, was being conducted in the U.S. Senate on all kinds of bogus issues. Somebody alleged that every mom and pop dry-cleaning establishment in Austin, Texas was going to be put out of business because of this treaty. The unfounded fear was that a certain chemical used in dry cleaning was proscribed. It was all nonsense and unworthy of the Senate. When you got around to it, there were some legitimate issues that should have been debated by the Senate and probably would have been if we had asked the Senate to take up the treaty promptly in early ’93 when it was first signed. The near disaster was the fault of the Clinton White House and its failure to give CW treaty ratification early priority.

Q: I had asked you about India. How did India work in this?

LEDÖGAR: I don’t remember them as terribly prominent in the chemical weapons negotiation except that they were one of the leaders in the neutral/non-aligned movement. But they were basically in favor of the CW endeavor. It was in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that India created havoc. The Conference on Disarmament in ’93, once the CW treaty was signed, was essentially out of major work. Incidentally, since the International CW Treaty Implementation Organization was to be established in the Hague, some Geneva delegations people moved their chemical experts to the Hague. Some countries just transferred the CW files and gave the responsibility to resident diplomats in the Hague. The United States decided that we would send a small team there, and otherwise man the periodic CW meetings with senior people out of Washington. So from the Geneva point of view we were finished with CW.

All during 1993 in the CD, we had a whole lot of conversations about what would be the next issue for negotiation. A majority of participants were interested in nuclear testing, but for a long time that was not the U.S. Administration’s choice. However, towards the end of the Bush Administration, there had been increasing feeling in the U.S. that something ought to be done about the continuation of underground nuclear tests. A piece of legislation was passed in late 1992 called the Mitchell, Hatfield, Exxon Amendment to the Water and Energy Appropriations Act of 1983. It dealt with nuclear testing and essentially said henceforth there would be in the United States a one-year moratorium on testing. After the moratorium, Congress would appropriate money only for a limited number of further tests, not to exceed 15. These had to be
applied for individually by the President. Those tests could only be for purposes of safety and reliability, not for development of new types of weapons, and those 15 tests had to include any British tests (the British tested in Nevada too). It also said that the U.S. should engage in Nuclear Test Ban negotiations and that by September 30, 1996, the Administration was in effect enjoined by the legislation to have completed a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After that, there would be no more U.S. testing, unless some other countries tested. It was a very odd piece of legislation, but it was in effect from ‘93 to ‘97.

In ‘93, the CD thrashed around, but kind of exhausted the year in trying to get ourselves sorted out. In ‘94, the Conference on Disarmament got serious and established a nuclear testing committee and gave that committee a negotiating mandate to begin trying to organize a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That’s when the serious nuclear test ban negotiation started, from my point of view, and that negotiation ended in a treaty two years later in September of ‘96. That treaty was signed by what is by now over 120 states. But it has not been ratified by the United States. It failed ratification in October 2000. It is not in force, and is not beloved by the current Administration of George W. Bush. But the treaty was big stuff in international affairs at the time.

Curiously, there was much more international pressure to get rid of nuclear testing at that time than there is today, the reason being that France was still testing, China was still testing, and until the Hatfield-Mitchell Amendment, the United States was still testing. During the course of the negotiation, the pressure was really on France and China to stop testing. By the time we began the negotiation, there was a U.S. mandatory moratorium in place. When the mandatory period expired, the issue for Clinton was whether to continue it, or to seek those 15 shots that were allowed. At one time, Clinton was on the verge of asking for nine of them, of which three would go to the Brits, who had a particular need to finish off their Trident warhead. But the U.S. Administration decided that it was not going to go for any at all; that it was going to take the high road of continuing the moratorium. Therefore the last U.S. test was back in ’92. The CTBT negotiation was begun in mid-'94, completed in September of ’96. It was very intense. That may not seem rapid, but that is rapid for an endeavor of that size.

During this time, there was enormous international pressure to expand the Conference on Disarmament by increasing its membership by at least 50%. A plan was developed by the Australian Ambassador who had been commissioned by the rest of us to come up with a recommendation. He was asked to take all the applicants and screen them out and come up with a list of new members that took in a sufficient number to take the pressure off, but obviously the CD couldn’t accommodate everyone who wanted to join. In the group that he recommended to be brought in, which was essentially 22 more, bringing membership up to 60, we wanted to have a balance of interests (geographical, geopolitical, and so forth). It is important to note that at that time, in the Conference on Disarmament we long since had a category of Non-Member Participants. Any UN member country that was interested in a particular subject being negotiated in the CD could participate in the negotiations. They had all the rights and privileges of members except that they just couldn’t vote on matters. You didn’t actually vote. What you did was when a matter was put up for approval, you either sat silently and let the gavel fall, or you spoke up and denied consensus. So, when we got into the nuclear test ban negotiation, we had Israel as a Non-Member Participant working full-time with the rest of us. India and Pakistan were already
members. The group that we would pick up under the recommended expansion included Austria, Finland, and Ireland. South Africa was also in the new group - very important because they immediately started playing a very important role.

The actual CD expansion was on the verge of being shouted through when suddenly, despite the fact that I had all kinds of Washington acquiescence to support the expansion, Washington finally woke up to the fact that Iraq was on the list. At 2 am Geneva time on the day expansion was to be gavied down, I got an irate call from a senior White House official. He said, “What is it you’re trying to do? Don’t you realize we just fought a war with those characters? You mean to say you’re going to reward them by letting them come into the Conference on Disarmament?” Now it’s not terrible to have your recommendation slapped down by Washington. But all along we kept Washington fully informed on how the CD expansion issue was going. Washington had gone along with the developments, and with their concurrence, we were sort of among those who were in the leadership role to get this membership problem solved. Maybe Washington support was only at the working level and not from the top level officials. That was their problem. In any event, within hours I got an instruction from Washington telling me to break consensus and oppose the whole expansion because key Washington officials had suddenly awakened to the fact that Iraq was on the expansion list. Our allies were flabbergasted, saying “This isn’t a reward to Iraq. Iraq is a rogue country and we need to have them involved in the beginning of disarmament negotiations.” So it was a very difficult period for the U.S., where for a long time we stood alone, blocking CD expansion. There wasn’t a single other country that had any understanding or sympathy for our position of blocking the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament.

Q: Was this Congress or was this somebody on the presidential staff?

LEDOGAR: Somebody on the presidential staff.

Q: Who was it?

LEDOGAR: I know who I got my instructions from, but he was only passing on the word from on high. Warren Christopher was probably the most responsible for this absolute prejudice against the idea of Iraq being in an international organization so long as they were flouting the agreements that had been achieved at the end of the Persian Gulf War. But he had help from William Perry, Secretary of Defense. There was no single person.

Q: What happens when you don’t get consensus? This stops everything?

LEDOGAR: Yes. We were vilified by everyone else, especially since we had gone from a leadership role to breaking consensus, and at the very last minute.

Q: How did you respond?

LEDOGAR: To Washington? I just said, “Yes, Sir.”

Q: I mean to the people who were blind-sided by this thing? “I have orders from Washington?”
LEDGOR: That’s right.

Q: Did the members of the Delegation of those other countries, including both in and out on the first list and the second list, go back to Washington to say, “What the hell are you doing?”

LEDGOR: Yes, indeed. And senior U.S. officials, no matter where they went in the world, were being confronted by whomever they talked to with the proposition that there was absolutely no justification for the United States reversal. Nobody bought our reasons even though they probably believed we were sincere. It was a very awkward situation. One of the first things I did was, in order to cover my rear end, I had my people pull out every single cable in which we had reported on CD expansion developments all along, and we listed all the cables and all the responses and the non-responses from Washington, so that nobody could try to make the case that we had acted without authority. It was really a disconnect. In fact, some Washington people who were quite senior said to me, “We understand that the fault is back here. It never came to a sufficiently high level that this was occurring.”

Q: Was Iran on the list?

LEDGOR: Iran had been in the CD all along. That was not a problem.

Q: North Korea?

LEDGOR: They were on the list.

Q: How was this resolved?

LEDGOR: Remember most nations of the world had delegations in Geneva accredited to all the U.N. activities there. Remember also that any nation that wished could participate in CD deliberations, though only formal members could block consensus. Once the recommended list of CD expansion countries was made known, all those countries attended CD meetings even though the expansion was not yet formalized. When South Africa joined, there was a very clever guy who was the head of the South African Delegation. This ambassador was very interesting. He was obviously one of President Mandela’s men. He was not an experienced diplomat himself because he had been outside the government for so long. But he was extremely intelligent and resourceful. He came up with a scheme that in essence allowed the 22 new folks to become full members without the United States having to say, “Yes.” I can’t remember the details, but it was a way of satisfying the U.S. fundamental refusal to give Iraq the right ever to stand alone and deny a consensus in the CD. Under the compromise, all 22 new members accepted not standing alone in a veto of progress, all the while reaffirming that everyone was exercising their sovereign rights in doing so. “I’m volunteering not to exercise my sovereign right in this case.” It was sort of finessed in that way. But it was a success and expansion took place right at the end of the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiation.

Q: How did the rest of the negotiations go once the new members were accepted?
LEDOGAR: As I indicated, most if not all of the new full time CD members were already participating in the CTBT negotiations as very active observers. So their now formal status had very little new impact on the course of the ongoing test ban negotiations. There was, however, a most important if very low profile side bar to the big CD negotiation. That was a private concurrent negotiation that the five declared Nuclear Weapons States (who also happened to be the permanent five on the UN Security Council and therefore were known as the P-5) conducted among ourselves. The P-5 realized early on that the broader negotiation looking to a test ban treaty was really about what we, the five, would stop doing. We were the known testers who would agree to do no more nuclear testing. Now let’s leave aside for now the so-called “threshold” states of India, Pakistan, and Israel. We’ll also leave aside the question of South Africa, which had been a clandestine nuclear state. They had built five or six nuclear weapons of a rather primitive sort, but they had never fired one off. Recently they swore them off and destroyed their stockpile. There was a question as to where North Korea was, and where was Iran regarding nuclear ambition. Let’s leave all these folks aside.

The five Declared Nuclear Weapons state and the declaration was made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - were the ones who really brought to the table the most negotiating chips. So, we five agreed early on that we would have to talk among ourselves frequently and profoundly. Therefore, we quickly established a private negotiation among the five right there in Geneva. The curious thing was that it soon became not so much a board of directors for the larger negotiation, because we found that we were content to let the larger negotiation proceed with its deliberations and delineations as to what would be prohibited. What the five were primarily interested in was understanding among ourselves and reaching agreement on what would not be prohibited by the big treaty. Obviously we were not giving up our nuclear weapons stockpile; our stockpile would remain. As the British Ambassador at the time said, “This CTBT negotiation was about banning the bang and not banning the bomb.” The subject of CTBT was explosive nuclear testing. We intended, for as far into the future as we could see, to keep our nuclear stockpiles; but we wanted to have an understanding among ourselves that there were certain things we could do to maintain our stockpiles in a safe and reliable fashion - to move them or to count them or to keep them clean and dry; just the whole business of activities not prohibited. They were activities that only the five, originally at least, were experienced enough to even debate.

Q: The five being the UK., France, Russia, the U.S., and China.

LEDOGAR: Right. We wanted to make sure that the treaty would not prohibit non-nuclear yield testing of these weapons; rather, that it would permit such testing of the hardware, the software, and even the chemicals, provided that in these simulations there was no explosion that produced nuclear yield.

There are ways that you can take a nuclear warhead and scoop out some or all of the fissile material and put in some other material that may be heavy so that it liquefies at roughly the same pressure and temperatures of a nuclear implosion. Recall that’s how the chemical explosive compresses the plutonium and creates criticality. The imploded fissile material becomes a critical mass and therefore a chain reaction is set off. We five wanted it understood that we would be able to continue simulations including those so-called “hydrodynamic experiments.” In other
words, leaving aside all the technical blather, we were maintaining the right to conduct certain experiments short of actual nuclear yield of any sort.

For a long time during the course of the negotiation, the five of us were all over the lot about what should be the threshold between what would be permitted and what would be banned. We, the U.S., wanted to say, “You can have a little bit of yield, a very tiny whisper, equivalent to no more than four or five pounds of TNT.” The Russians said, “No, we think you ought to be able to have a yield up to 10 tons of that equivalent. The French at one point were saying, “How about 200 tons?” We were all over the lot. Washington was convinced that we needed the flexibility of being allowed this little tiny whisper. During the nuclear testing moratorium in the Eisenhower years, we had perfected ways of conducting these hydronuclear experiments that would have the very tiniest bit of nuclear yield and we found we could learn a certain amount from them. The Russians and the Chinese started saying, “You guys can learn something at those very low yields, but we’re not that far along on that technical road, so we’re not going to authorize you to continue certain activities that benefit you and don’t mean anything to us because we don’t operate at that very low threshold.”

We had to provide for a lot of related activities in nuclear physics. We’re working, all of us, on laser fusion, inertial confinement fusion, and we wanted to be sure that nothing in the treaty would prohibit continued experiments along those lines. Inertial confinement fusion is an attempt to develop energy by creating fusion with the application of energy through very high powered lasers. Nobody has done it economically yet, but it’s a field that shows promise. There were all kinds of activities that were highly technical that the five wanted to be sure that we all understood each other and these activities were not going to be ruled out. In the meantime in the broader negotiations, we were talking about what was going to be ruled out. We five wanted to be sure that the language that ruled out nuclear explosions was not so inclusive that it would impact on our ability to simulate. Simulations were necessary to assure the safety and reliability of our stockpiles. They were done in all different ways, including sometimes just as a computer exercise. You could simulate a nuclear explosion on your computer by putting in certain well-calibrated variables from actual tests. Indeed you could experiment and test all the hundreds of parts and sub-systems of a real nuclear warhead without setting it off and in a way that resulted in nuclear yield.

It was not long before the other participants in the negotiation realized that the P-5 were meeting separately and that created a little friction, but we just stifled it out, and told the others: “Look, we’re the ones who are really bringing stuff to the table and we have got problems, many of which the rest of you wouldn’t even understand because you’re not into the physics of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we’re going to go ahead and work out these problems among ourselves.” It was on this issue of non-nuclear simulation that we began to have problems with certain neutral/non-aligned countries. India, which was a closet nuclear weapons state, started to become extremely difficult. As we got closer and closer to the end of the CTBT negotiations, they got worse and worse, and finally we finished the negotiation without India. Thus, the CTBT was not formally a product of the Conference on Disarmament, because there was no CD consensus on it. But it was a product developed there. The draft final CTBT treaty text was sort of bootlegged from Geneva to New York and reintroduced in New York as an individual initiative. Because the treaty text developed in Geneva was vetoed by India, the rest of us pulled it around to the back
door and put it into the UN General Assembly as an individual national paper that no one could veto. We got everybody but India and one or two others to embrace it in New York.

So, India indeed became a problem. They became a problem for a number of reasons and these were tied up with Indian politics, which I’ll admit I really didn’t fully understand. But essentially, India had reached a point where at least some of its major political elements wanted to resume Indian nuclear testing, and therefore did not want to sign onto prohibitions. At the same time they wanted to try to wrap into the Comprehensive Test Ban, either for altruistic reasons or for narrow national reasons - I’ve never been fully sure myself - commitments on the part of the five nuclear weapons states that would go beyond the cessation of any further nuclear testing, and begin the reductions of the P-5’s nuclear weapons stockpiles, essentially under the supervision of the neutral/non-aligned. This of course was not acceptable to any of the nuclear weapons states, certainly not to the United States. It was not acceptable to Russia or China either. The Indians tried consistently as the negotiation went on to insert killer language that would make it impossible for the five. They tried to include in the big treaty language that went in the direction of prohibiting those activities which we five were trying to make sure were not prohibited, such as simulations. India was trying to ban all nuclear weapons activities, even simulations.

In the field of verification once the treaty was in force, Pakistan and some others were at the forefront in trying to rule out any evidence that would be introduced by anyone to the international organization if that evidence had been acquired by so-called “national technical means.” In other words, if anybody’s satellites picked up information, photographs or energy emissions, suggesting that something was wrong somewhere, that evidence could not be considered. We and the majority said, “That certainly would be admissible as evidence - not proof, but as evidence, for the international examination of what really is going on.” The instinct behind this prejudice in a lot of the have-not nations is that somehow or other facts picked up by remote sensors advantage those who have satellites to the disadvantage of those who do not have satellites. So they conclude that it is necessary to ban all information that comes from satellites.

Q: This sounds more a tactical thing than...

LEDOGAR: It really was. India and Pakistan have all kinds of apparatus along their common border to look at each other and they’re pretending they don’t have national technical means. They have the most sophisticated ones that exist along the Kashmir border. So, we had a lot of problems from the Indians, but I think myself that most of them had to do with the fact that the pro-nuclear party in India was increasingly likely to come into power, which indeed it did. Then shortly after the treaty was signed, they popped off what they said were five nuclear test explosions. I don’t know what the truth was. But they announced that there were five, all done roughly at the same time. But that was after the treaty was signed, not by them, but by the rest of us. So, India really was a fly in the ointment, so much so that they tried to veto the entire thing - veto it or wreck it.

Q: Did you ever sit down and talk to the Indian Ambassador and say, “What’s going on?”

LEDOGAR: Absolutely, regularly. She and I got along very well personally. We had kind of a comic routine going. We were so frequently at odds in the broader forum. We’d get to a lunch
often after a big meeting and there we would continue to take light-hearted pot shots at each other and so forth, but as a matter of fact she was quite friendly. She gave a big going away party for me when I left Geneva. She had tough instructions. But we all got along well. It was a strange thing to be, in effect, conspiring with the Russians and the Chinese to the exclusion of the Australians, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders.

Q: You really had to. Common sense would say that you don’t drag a bunch of people who don’t have a stake in this and want to say something...

LEDOGAR: Absolutely. Originally, the other CD people didn’t have a clue as to what the P-5 issues were, what we were talking about. A lot of these people got technical educations as the negotiations dragged on and more and more was being written about technical issues. The terminology became less and less abtruse and more in the common jargon. But it was an extremely fascinating negotiation. You had these two negotiations going on - at five and at forty [countries] - sometimes interacting with each other. The two obviously affected each other because anything you agreed to in the one forum as being allowed - you had to be sure that it was not prohibited in the other forum. And yet you didn’t want to have gaps in between the scope of the two undertakings.

Q: How did you find the role of intelligence, not just from our side (I would assume that we would have our satellites and CIA and so on), but the other people, too? Everybody has their own intelligence apparatus, particularly the major nuclear powers. Did you share things?

LEDOGAR: I think U.S. intelligence served my Delegation’s needs extremely well. That was especially true in the broader area. We have certain arrangements with certain friendly countries, about which I don’t want to go into in much detail, but the cooperation inGeneva was particularly good because we shared intelligence with very close allies. We shared with them and vice versa. In many cases, close friends were in a better position than we to get local intelligence about what was going on. The CIA is one of those agencies which has vested interests on both sides of the subject coming under arms control negotiation. They have a responsibility on the one hand to collect intelligence about everything that’s going on in the world, and to make sure that those collection capabilities remain discreet and uncompromised by foreign inspectors coming to U.S. territory or bases. So, they’re very interested in not risking anything that will compromise their capabilities, their methods, their sources, and so forth. On the other hand, the CIA has a responsibility to inform U.S. leadership about what’s going on everywhere in the world. So, they want to be sure that our inspectors are able to get in to places of concern, and that they can intrude enough to get sufficiently early warning about what’s going on. So, CIA is an agency that must work both sides of the dynamic that is so interesting about multilateral arms control, defense and offense. There are other agencies where all they want to do is protect what they have. For example, it’s not the U.S. Army’s responsibility to find out what’s going on at Rabda in Libya. They’re not the first line of responsibility to see what the Indians and the Pakistanis are up to in their nuclear testing installations. They want to make sure that nobody finds out what is going on at the Army base at “such and such” a place, where we might be developing a new weapon. So, they are more concerned with the defensive side of U.S. negotiating policy. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency doesn’t tend to have very many assets it needs to protect, but they want to push forward the arms control and disarmament process, so they’re
more on the offensive side. All these folks are patriots and loyal to the President, but they have different responsibilities, and therefore tend to have different perspectives.

Q: Did you run across the nuclear testers... If you were a scientist and working in nuclear testing, you don’t have many other options to do. That’s what you do for a living and you had built up an expertise. It’s not just money. It’s also what you do. Did you find yourself up against an establishment, that you were breaking their rice bowl?

LEDOGAR: I guess to a certain extent there was that. They were very well behaved. All of the nuclear laboratories are under the Department of Energy and they are very cautious about making sure that the Department of Energy is between them and the government for a variety of reasons. They’re quite instinctively loyal. But there is another fascinating angle to this that a lot of people would overlook. The challenge to the nuclear weapons establishment to maintain and to be able to certify the safety and reliability of the stockpile with no explosive testing is in many ways greater than was the case when there was explosive testing. For many years we would design nuclear weapons, manufacture them, and deploy them, and then go on and try to develop a next generation which was lighter and more vigorous and could be delivered by even smaller launch vehicles, and yet was more powerful and dependable. That new generation would overtake the earlier ones, and we would move the first ones out of our stockpile. Nobody really got much into the business of how these weapons age and how long a weapon that’s designed and put together a certain way can last before you might begin to be concerned as to whether or not it’s being adversely affected by extended shelf life.

Nowadays, the nuclear labs are very busy trying to develop ways to assure that our stockpile of weapons is safe and reliable. The labs are actually taking apart existing weapons and examining in full detail what’s going on with the highly volatile chemicals inside, and then putting them back together and making some judgement as to how much longer they will continue to be reliable. Occasionally, you take one weapon and you test it, but you can’t test the actual yield, so you might take the basic weapon and subject it to a mock underground test except you have removed the fissile material and put something else in there. Or you take the materials and you bury them underground and have a chemical explosion nearby that subjects them to very high pressures short of criticality and you see what that does. All of this is going on now and there is a question as to whether it’s being properly funded. In the debate over CTBT ratification, a point that those of us who are in favor of the treaty being ratified try to make to the opponents of the treaty is that you’ve got to maintain the stockpile anyway, whether you have a treaty or not. And you’ve also got to verify because you’ve got to keep your eye on everybody else in the world and what they’re doing, whether you have a treaty or no treaty, except it would be easier if you had a treaty because you would have all the international apparatus to assist us. We’ve made all of these points. John Shaliskashvili put them together in a very useful report.

Q: He was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

LEDOGAR: Yes, and he was brought in during the last months of the Clinton Administration after the outrageously politicized, vindictive, and irresponsible defeat of CTBT ratification in October of 2000, to prepare a basis for a more focused, less emotional future Congressional look at the treaty. Shali points out in his report that the U.S. is not threatening the laboratories by
moving from active underground testing to science based stockpile stewardship. It may be that there are some individuals in the testing community who would like to continue working on new designs. The key is that what we’re doing now is maintaining the current stockpile and making sure that it is safe and reliable. We’re not developing new types. So, if you have any sour grapes on the part of individual members or organizations within the nuclear weapons community, their complaint would be that all they can do about new types is design them on the drawing boards. They can’t truly test to see whether or not the designs are right and that the new types will work. You do a whole lot of testing of this component and testing of that. So, I don’t know. There are folks on both sides of the issue, some who figure that the nuclear weapons labs are kind of unguided outfits that are strongly in need of adult supervision. It is said by some that the labs have been getting away with a whole lot and that their vested interest is in the continuation of testing: in a word, that the labs are a nefarious influence on policy. There are others who take the attitude that the labs are just doing what they’re told to do. I’m not sure what the truth is. I’ve met many bomb designers. I always had somebody from the nuclear weapons labs on my delegation because of the close technical expertise they provided. I have found them to be pretty straight shooters.

Q: What was the relation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to all of this?

LEDOGAR: Well, the problem with ACDA was that from the time of the mid-term elections of ’94 that put the Republicans in control of the Senate, ACDA’s very existence was under vigorous attack. It’s downfall really began even before that. Even the Democrats and the Think Tanks had convinced themselves that ACDA was an agency whose time had passed - that it was a Cold War agency and was redundant, in that it cut into the authority of the State Department. ACDA really should be folded into the State Department, they argued. In fact, in proof of this, I would point to the way the State Department was organized in the Bush Administration. There was a report called “State 2000" that was kind of a handbook adopted by the Baker State Department in 1994. They for the first time put the Under Secretaries of State directly in the chain of command, which I think was a good thing. Then they plugged the regional and functional bureaus into the 7th floor through the Under Secretaries, also okay in theory. By that time, the old Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance had become Security Assistance, Science and Technology and then pretty soon it became International Security Affairs. It had developed under the Republicans into quite a powerful Under Secretaryship. The study “State 2000" suggested that in the forthcoming century what was needed was to dismantle ACDA, take all of its assets, and plug them in, along with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, all under the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs. Trouble was that was not done right away. ACDA was resistant to being dismantled. So, you had the Under Secretary of Political-Affairs under whom were all the geographical bureaus, the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, who had all of the economic affairs bureaus; but when you got over to International Security you only had the bureau of Political-Military Affairs. ACDA was still separate, but it was under attack and crippled, especially when Jesse Helms took over as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1994. Not surprisingly, the best people began to leave ACDA. They couldn’t see a future. Not very many folks were anxious to try to take over the senior ACDA positions. There would be a real question as to whether or not they would get confirmed by the Senate anyway. So, ACDA began to disintegrate.
I had developed over the course of time a respect for the role of ACDA. It’s a close call whether arms control should have its own bureaucracy. On the one hand, you can appreciate the discipline that a straight line structure on the State Department foreign affairs side has in bringing forth coordinated positions. You don’t have to have the interagency battles at the lower level between ACDA and PM and EUR/RPM, which I was once the director of. On the other hand, arms control and disarmament probably should be looked at in isolation from U.S.-French relations and U.S.-China relations. Somebody ought to be a spokesperson for the pure arms control aspect. That was the statutory role of ACDA. It does bring about a kind of initiative to keep arms control moving. If you’re in the arms control business, you always have kind of a natural rabbi in Washington through ACDA. But there were two sides to the question. I came down in favor of an independent ACDA. I reached that conclusion just about the time that it was dissolved. Not very many people will admit this, but the administration bowing to Congress on those consolidations was part of the price that was paid by the Clinton administration to Jesse Helms in exchange for letting the Chemical Weapons Convention go through the Senate. The reorganization included eliminating all of USIS and very substantial portions of USAID. So, these so-called Cold War agencies were disintegrating. ACDA was the important one for me. All the time that I was in Geneva, my efficiency report was written by the director of ACDA. Most of the major support and all of my budget came through ACDA. They were very important and very attentive to maintaining our arms control delegations overseas in operation and well cared for. Other agencies had particular substantive aspects that they were interested in, but they weren’t interested in picking up the administration and financing.

I wanted to touch on the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. In a real sense, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the background against which the Nuclear Testing Treaty has to be seen. The Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 is the one that codified the fact that there were five nuclear weapons states, the ones which were in existence and recognized and overt at that time. It also said that all other states were invited to sign on as non-nuclear weapon states, and would not try to acquire in any way - manufacturing or purchasing or otherwise - any nuclear weapons capability. NPT set up the International Atomic Energy Agency. That was the verification branch of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I mention this because you have the nuclear weapon states which are the so-called “legitimate” ones, the five recognized by the NPT. By the time of the CTBT almost all of the other nations in the world had already undertaken in the NPT the pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. In exchange it was agreed that certain nuclear research advantages would be shared by the nuclear weapon states and all that stuff. I mention this to support the observation I made before that the P-5 were the ones who were really bringing the most chips to the table in the nuclear test ban endeavor. In theory if you were a non-nuclear weapon state and you were in compliance with your obligations under the NPT, you had nothing to test. So if you were now giving up testing when you had already given up any possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, it’s not a great leap forward. Mind you Israel, India, Pakistan and a couple of others never did sign onto NPT.

The second point is that many countries, have limited foreign services and international expertise in specific international security subjects. When it comes to the broad and complex field of disarmament, they don’t have sub-specialists. They’ve got disarmament guys who do everything. That’s why when you have a conference on one big disarmament issue in one place, you can’t have another one simultaneously elsewhere. Only countries like the U.S. and other large ones
have the resources to be able to get special experts in NPT and experts in chemical weapons, and other disarmament focal points. In May of 1995, everything in Geneva stopped because everybody who was literate in international security and disarmament matters went to New York for a big conference designed to address the fact that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was of 25 years duration, was running out. The undertaking and the conference was called the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Every five years, there was a review conference to see how NPT things were doing, to try to see whether or not the regime could be strengthened without rewriting the treaty. But here in May 1995 it was going to be the expiration of the treaty unless it was renewed. So, all of us were going to New York. For the U.S. NPT Delegation, the leadership was out of Washington. We had very senior people, including the deputy director of ACDA there. Madeleine Albright as U.S. Ambassador to the UN was the nominal head of Delegation. The Vice President came for part of the conference. So, it was a pretty high powered U.S. Delegation. The U.S. was a major force in bringing about the unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I was among those who came from Geneva. There was nobody else to talk to in Geneva, so I came and served on the U.S. Delegation in New York, and had quite a bit to do with the development of certain parts of what was the end product of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. I think that’s probably all I need to say about that.

Q: One question. In the renewal, were there any big issues or was everybody saying this was a pretty good thing?

LEDÖGAR: There were big issues. The biggest issue of all was an attempt by the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to gain a tighter, more immediate commitment by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to accelerate nuclear disarmament. There is a commitment in the NPT treaty itself, but it’s sort of general in that the NWS will engage in efforts to reduce their nuclear capability in the context of general and complete disarmament. That is kind of a panacea down the road. Gradually, the NNWS were getting more and more impatient and more belligerent about saying, “That’s not good enough. We want you, the P-5, to sign on the dotted line.” We would say, “Look at SALT and look at START and look at INF, and look at the unilateral efforts to dispose of fissile material.” They would say, “No, we don’t want just unilateral efforts. We want to have an international negotiation where you five bring your nuclear weapons, put them on the table, and we’ll tell you how to dispose of them and under what kind of timetable.” Well, that just wasn’t in the cards. So, that was the big issue. The NNWS were trying to increase and make more immediate the obligation that was vaguely set forth in the NPT treaty itself; they wanted it to be incumbent on the NWS to get rid of their nuclear weapons as the NNA would say “in a timebound framework.” We worked out some new words and they sounded a little better and a little more urgent, but we did not have the capability of rewriting the treaty which had been ratified by the Senate. So, there wasn’t too much to be done except express political commitment to press on with things.

There is another effort that started at that time that looked like it was going to take off and become a real side by side negotiation with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That was an engagement to henceforth ban the manufacture of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. This was known as “fizz cutoff,” which again would only affect certain countries, but importantly, it would affect India, Pakistan, and Israel if we could get them in and get this regime organized. If you could in essence freeze the current levels of fissile material where they were,
and ban any further production of military fissile material, then you would begin to pull India, Pakistan, and Israel, which still ignore the NPT treaty, into a kind of commitment through the back door that would say, “You may not have to give up your nuclear capability, but you can’t produce any more enriched uranium or plutonium.” That was on the verge of starting, but then things went awry and it was one of the negative fallouts from the aftermath of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in ’95, that and the fact that India was beginning to look to preserve its nuclear capability and flex its muscle. So, fizz cutoff keeps being on the verge of being ready for negotiation, but to my knowledge, it still hadn’t started seven years later.

But getting back to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we had indeed the usual problems with inspection and trying to detail and get right the balance between intrusiveness and protection of national interests. We had a certain amount of problem with the issue of whether or not national technical means could be used in trying to point the finger and ask for international inspections. We had a couple of other issues that we struggled with, but I can’t remember any other major ones that we could elaborate on here without excessive technical explanations. The treaty came together. Towards the end, there were a lot of problems with Washington from my perspective. There were two camps that kind of grew up there about this business of intrusiveness versus protection. It had to do with what the threshold was for getting a challenge inspection. There, the State Department and CIA were kind of lined up on one side. It was a very strange arrangement. But eventually, the thing got done. President Clinton had challenged everyone to finish by the end of 1996, and by George, we did.

Going back to the fact that some nations’ disarmament expertise had finite resource limitations, especially the smaller countries, in the autumn each year the UN General Assembly has a committee on disarmament called the First Committee. Literally, everybody from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva packs up and moves to New York for about six weeks, where we reconfigure ourselves as the UN First Committee on Disarmament. The CD year ends just before we leave for New York. So, we had a real scurry to finish the CTBT treaty. Then we ran into the problem of India saying that if she didn’t get the commitment to ban all tests, even simulations, and didn’t get a commitment of the five nuclear weapons states immediately to begin a negotiation with oversight from the non-nuclear weapon states about further reductions in their stockpile, and all sorts of other impossible things, India couldn’t see its way clear to sign the treaty, or even to allow it to go forward. So, we were in this standoff. The whole thing was ready.

Now, we had had problems of a similar sort, holdouts at the last minute, in the Chemical Weapons Convention four years before. Those of us who were around at that time realized that even in an organization that operates by consensus, you have a certain power which could be called the “tyranny of the majority.” It goes like this: “Okay, you’re going to veto this endeavor here? The friends of the endeavor are going to meet across the street and we’re going to agree on a course of action as to how we’re going to push our project forward. You by your veto can’t stop the treaty. You can only stop it from being done here.” That had worked in the case of the CW Treaty. So here we were in the early autumn of 1996 on the verge of going to New York. The whole draft treaty had been stuffed into a report to the UN General Assembly. Attached to the text of the treaty was a recommendation that it be opened by the Secretary General for national signatures with him as the depository. India vetoed it. So as a CD document it failed. We went to New York and got the Australians there to put the text in a resolution, saying, “Hey,
by the way, I have this national initiative and it’s got this nifty draft nuclear test ban treaty text attached to it. We think that it ought to be adopted by the General Assembly.” The General Assembly operates by vote, not by consensus. Anybody who has a proposition can put it in resolution form and run around and get cosponsors. So, we all ran around and got 150+ cosponsors for this Australian resolution - almost everybody but India. The resolution was adopted and there was the treaty text enshrined in it. The Secretary General declared that it was open for signature. Well, we had the P-5 leaders come to New York and the CTBT was signed by President Clinton representing the host country. He was immediately followed by China, France, Russia, and the UK in alphabetical order, then all the others. There were 70 signatures on the first day - but not India, not Pakistan, and not North Korea.

Q: How about Israel?

LEDOGAR: Israel signed. That’s where the CTBT resides today, signed but not in force. The big fight, one of the last fights that we had during the negotiation, was the provision in the treaty for entry into force. The result was not very satisfactory. In the Chemical Weapons Convention, we used the simple approach that upon deposit of the 65th country’s articles of accession, the clock would start ticking and 60 days later the treaty would enter into force. It was recognized that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would not operate quite so simply. It would be a farce if you didn’t have certain countries there. You had to have the five nuclear weapons states and you really had to have the threshold states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. But to draw an entry into force provision that said, “50 or 60 states, but it must include these eight” would deeply offend all those who could have gone the nuclear route 30 years ago but chose to take the high road.

It was politically unacceptable to many countries such as Canada, Australia, and others who felt very strongly about the need to get rid of nuclear testing to have India, Pakistan, and Israel specified as essential states. They would see it as kind of a reward to India, Pakistan, and Israel for having stayed out of the otherwise almost universal NPT regime, especially since all three had gone ahead and developed nuclear weapons programs. So, we had to find some sort of a euphemistic collective rather than just call for a number of any 60 or 65 states. Then we began to worry about, suppose if we specify a collective, one member of that collective might say, “Hey, wait a minute, I want to have my rights to the islands of So and So in the South China Sea recognized by everybody as a condition for me to sign.” In other words, somebody might try to hold entry into force of the CTBT as hostage for an unrelated concession. Taking the treaty hostage had to be avoided.

But a curious group that most distressingly included Russia, the UK, and a couple of others said, “If you allow for an entry into forces approach that will let you go forward despite missing one or two specified countries, then the pressure is going to be on everybody else to go ahead and let the thing enter into force and not on the countries that are trying to hold you up.” So, they said, “We’ve got to have a collective and it’s got to mean everybody in that collective.” So, the treaty as it exists today selected a collective which, in effect, was a list of all those countries that have nuclear reactors, whether for power or for research. That includes India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and a number of folks who are not going to be too easy to placate and get them to sign. Now, most of us believe that you can get India and Pakistan provided you get them together as part of a package where everybody moves at the same time. Neither will sign on before the other.
Indeed, China will not deposit its instruments unless India is going to put its down. Indian capability is a threat to China. It is a neighbor. China does not have all that much more in way of deterrence.

So ratification - selling CTBT to the U.S. Senate - is very important, but getting the U.S. to come on board may not be the last fight. You’ve still got to get India and Pakistan. It’s conceivable that North Korea would hold out, but I don’t think they would be the last one.

That was pretty much the end of it for me. As I said, the treaty was signed in New York in September of 1996. I came and did the usual springtime disarmament stuff in New York in 1997 and was preparing to retire. I had already passed the regular Foreign Service retirement age of 65 and was staying on only until the treaty was finished. I wanted to retire. During my last two years of Foreign Service the Clinton Administration wouldn’t let me retire until the treaty was put away, so I was two years overdue. I stayed and did the springtime New York business and then packed up my bags and said, “Goodbye” and left the Foreign Service on May 31, 1997.

Q: Great. I want to thank you very much. Fascinating.

PETER DAVID EICHER
Political Counselor

Mr. Eicher, son of an American oil geologist, was born in Saudi Arabia and raised in the US and abroad. He was educated at McGill University, the University of Pennsylvania and the University of California, Los Angeles. Entering the Foreign Service in 1973, Mr. Eicher became an Africa and Human Rights specialist, serving at posts in Fiji, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Switzerland as well as in Washington and at the United Nations in New York. Mr. Eicher was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.


Q: So then what?

EICHER: Then I moved on to what had been my dream job over very many years. I became political counselor in Geneva. That was the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. You may recall I had previously served a tour in the Department’s office of United Nations political affairs, so I had some experience on the UN.

Q: You did that from when to when?

EICHER: I was in Geneva from 1991 to 1995.
Q: All right. Could you explain what the job consisted of and then we’ll talk about what happened while you were there.

EICHER: The job was quite diverse and interesting. Geneva is the headquarters of many United Nations agencies and other international organizations. The political counselor’s title was actually “Counselor for Political and Specialized Agency Affairs.” I had a variety of different organizations and issues to deal with. The main issue by far was human rights. The UN Human Rights Commission was based in Geneva, which was a highly political and very active body. There were also several UN human rights treaty bodies based there and what was then the UN Center for Human Rights, which later became the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. But my section was also responsible for the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as helping out generally on any political negotiations which might be going on in Geneva. There were always some kind of international political talks going on in Geneva. While I was there, the principal one was the Yugoslavia peace negotiations, which started while I was in Geneva.

Q: Who was your ambassador or did you have several?

EICHER: I had two and they were both political appointees. The first was Morris Abrams, who was a very distinguished, quite well-known, elderly lawyer. He used to tell stories that he had been one of the young attorneys at the Nuremberg trials. He had also been a civil rights lawyer in the United States and was one of the people who helped break up the Ku Klux Klan. He was, therefore, well-known and well regarded. We changed administrations while I was in Geneva. Abrams, I think, had been a Democrat for Reagan, and he had been appointed to Geneva by Bush (that’s the first President Bush). He was replaced by Dan Spiegel when the Clinton administration came in. Spiegel was another attorney who was active in politics and had been one of the top people in Clinton’s transition team at State. Spiegel told us he had been heavily involved in the creation of the “G” position (Under Secretary for Global Affairs) because he believed that functional issues like human rights and environment and refugees were not getting enough attention at State. His interest in those issues is what made him interested in the Geneva assignment.

Q: I would imagine arriving there in 1991, which is really only two years after the breakup of the Soviet Union... in fact, the Soviet Union hadn’t even broken up at that point. But I mean, obviously, such a cataclysmic event in Europe must’ve had a big impact in Geneva. You must’ve felt that you were sort of in the center of re-creating Europe.

EICHER: We did. It was a very exciting time for the United Nations in many fields. Among other things, it helped transform the Human Rights Commission, which I was dealing with, which had been kind of a backwater. The Human Rights Commission was extremely political and had been extremely unpopular. It had not been able to do much during the Cold War because one side or the other would always block everything. The West didn’t like it because it didn’t seem to do much and the East and Third World didn’t like it because they were always potential targets of the Commission because of their bad human rights records. I got to Geneva just as things were beginning to change. In August 1991, just after I arrived, was the failed coup attempt
against Gorbachev by Marxist hardliners, which led to Yeltsin’s rise to power and the end of the Soviet Union. I remember being in a big UN meeting when the word of the coup attempt started to filter through, and speaking with my Russian colleagues – who I had only just met but would later get to be friends with – and how worried they were about developments at home.

As it turned out, the Russians became our friends, as did all the Eastern Europeans. Suddenly, the Cold War dynamics that had paralyzed the United Nations fell away. It suddenly seemed possible, for the first time, to forge a coalition of Western, Eastern, and other democracies within the Human Rights Commission that could make the organization effective and start making human rights a bigger and more integral part of the UN. That became our goal over the next several years, and I think we did it quite successfully.

We never really got explicit instructions from Washington about this, but we did find strong support for almost all our ideas so we charged ahead. There was no question back then – under George H. W. Bush and Clinton – that United States policy was to support international human rights. We had pretty much free reign to develop whatever ideas we could to highlight and advance human rights. I loved working on those issues, because it seemed that it could really affect people’s lives for the better and make the world a better place. I mean, we knew that things were not going to change immediately on the ground in far-off countries because of what we were doing in Geneva, but we were setting international rules and making judgments that would make a difference over time and, in some cases, could even lead to immediate changes. You could feel good working with human rights because you almost always had the moral high ground. There was a much clearer sense of right and wrong than you usually get on foreign policy issues and the United States was overwhelmingly on the “right” side back then. I get both angry and sad when I see how much that has changed under the current Bush administration. It’s just so hard to believe that the United States is on the wrong side of so many human rights issues and that senior American officials are even advocating torture. It really makes me cringe and makes me happy I’m no longer associated with U.S. positions on human rights.

In any event, in the Human Rights Commission – which was a big part of our effort to advance human rights in the UN system – we were able to put together a new, often shifting coalition for progress on human rights issues. In addition to the Western countries and our new Eastern friends, we were able to bring most of the Latin American democracies on board and, occasionally, a few of the Africans and Asians. For the first time, the Commission actually started passing resolutions and taking action on difficult issues. Previously, the only time that the United Nations had spoken out against human rights violations in particular countries tended to be a very few instances in Central America countries where the United States was willing to join the Soviets in condemning a particular Latin American dictatorship. Now, we found, we were able to get resolutions against African and Asian human rights violators for the first time. We were also able to develop new mechanisms to highlight human rights problems and recommend solutions. It wasn’t all so simple or straightforward, but often we felt like we were on a roll.

**Q:** You said that the commission had been very unpopular. Was that because it was sort of lousing up relations among different countries or creating other problems, or was it just that it was unpopular with people who were abusing human rights?
EICHER: It was mainly unpopular with the abusers, of course. It was not a very well known organization worldwide and certainly not in the United States. Interestingly, the abusers tended to know and care much more about the Commission than the “good guys,” if you will, because the abusers were afraid that they would get condemned. As a result, a lot of the abusers would work to get themselves elected to the Commission and this would sometimes lead to them being able to block progress. This, in turn, would make the Commission an easy target for critics of the UN, including in the United States. It was easy for the usual UN-bashers to say “look, you’ve got Cuba and China and Syria and Libya on the Human Rights Commission; that proves it’s a joke.” I thought that kind of argument was misguided. It just meant that the Commission was reflective of the UN members. It was still possible to beat those guys if you took a constructive approach and worked at it. We won much more than we lost at the Commission. I was deeply disappointed, therefore, that the U.S. helped lead the charge to do away with the Commission a couple of years ago and replace it with the new UN Human Rights Council. I thought that was very short-sighted and that we lost one of the most important international tools we had against human rights violators. It was another little-noticed instance of the Bush II administration undercutting long-standing U.S. policy on human rights.

One of the things that convinced me how important the Commission was and how useful and influential its words and actions really could be, was seeing how worried the “bad guys,” or abusers, were that the Commission might say something about them. The abusers really, really didn’t want to have the United Nations single them out. They considered it a huge stigma. A number of them would even take some positive steps on human rights to try to get out from under, so that in itself was positive. If you saw the effort that China, for example, would make every year to avoid being considered by the Human Rights Commission, it was just enormous. They would send delegations to every member of the Commission and increase aid programs to those countries. We used to joke that the China resolution in the Commission was the greatest thing for international sports, because the Chinese, in trying to line up votes, would visit many of the little African members of the Commission and offer to build stadiums in their countries. The Chinese head of state would get personally involved in appealing to different countries to support China in the Human Rights Commission. It was really important to them, and that gave us some significant leverage on human rights. The same was true for most other abusers.

Q: Yes. The bottom line is what they’re doing, I mean, not the PR spin but what were they doing vis-à-vis human rights.

EICHER: Yes, of course, that was our position. When anybody is seriously violating human rights, they should be called to account. In general, the UN is not going to send in troops to deal with a human rights problem but a UN condemnation is a very significant, important stigma. For the United Nations to tell a country, “you’re a human rights violator,” to put them on the short list of countries condemned by name, is something countries just don’t want to have happen to them.

And, in fact, as we pressed human rights issues more vigorously and they became increasing integral to broader UN issues, the UN actually did start sending in troops – in a few cases – to deal with human rights crises. The first, I think, was Haiti. But also, belatedly, in Rwanda and
other countries. Widespread human rights violations came to be regarded as a threat to international peace and security and became a standard issue for peace-keeping operations.

Q.: Well, let’s take China and then move on to other countries. During the time that you were there, was the Commission drawing attention to China or was China doing anything about the human rights situation?

EICHER: Well, China was the biggie. It was certainly the largest, most difficult, most time-consuming issue we dealt with. Every year the question that arose was whether there would be a resolution presented in the Human Rights Commission to criticize China’s human rights policies. China’s human rights situation was extremely grim in very many ways. These were the years not long after the Tiananmen massacre and there was still lots of “reeducation” going on, sentences of administrative detention, political prisoners, labor unions being suppressed, persecution of religious activities, the one-child policy being ruthlessly enforced. There were almost no civil and political rights in China. And, of course, there was Tibet, which was a huge problem in itself and a big aspect of U.S.-China policy within the Commission. I don’t think anybody would deny that there was a serious human rights problem in China and that it was one of the world’s big violators.

Q: Did you get the feeling in regard to China that there were those within the State Department and the body politic in the United States who were saying, you’re lousing up things here. We’ve got trade deals, you know, in other words, were you the burr under the saddle or something of that nature?

EICHER: Absolutely. There was no question about it. There was a very tough fight in the U.S. bureaucracy every year about whether to sponsor a China resolution. I got into that fight from the Washington end in my subsequent assignments. There were a lot of Americans who put other issues ahead of human rights and thought we should not sponsor a resolution. This included lots of official Americans, senior State Department people. In particular, our main opponent was always the China desk, which never liked the idea of a resolution at all and which was a powerful opponent. I used to get irked that much of the State Department, at the instigation of the China desk, even took up the Chinese nomenclature of calling it the “anti-China resolution.” We had to continually remind everyone that it was not an anti-China resolution, and it was not anti-Chinese per se; it was a resolution on the situation on human rights in China, and no one could really deny that there was a problem there.

From our human rights perspective, we seldom thought that there was a real chance to win a China vote because they were so big and had so much influence with many of the little members of the Commission. They not only sort of bribed countries to vote with them in exchange for aid packages, but they also engaged in a practice of taking reprisals against countries that voted against them in the Commission, by suspending trade deals, and so forth. It was serious stuff. But, sponsoring a China resolution was critical for our credibility with almost any of the other actions we were pushing on human rights. Things were so bad in China and it so dominated the international human rights scene, that for us to ignore it would just feed into the argument being used against us that we were selective and political. How could we press for action on say, Sudan or Burma or Iraq, if we were silent on China? Are human rights just to be imposed by the big
guys on the little guys? Why don’t you pick on somebody your own size? Are things really worse in Cuba than in China? And so forth. So, for us in Geneva, backing a China resolution was extremely important. If we were going to get anything else done in the Commission, we needed to take on China. It didn’t really matter so much if we won or lost the China vote, what we really needed was to show that we were willing to make the effort, that we didn’t have a double standard.

So the battle in Washington over the China resolution was critical to us in Geneva and we inevitably got involved. Sometimes it was high drama. I remember that at my first Human Rights Commission the Europeans put forward a resolution on human rights in Tibet. This almost turned into a disaster. Washington instructed us to vote against the resolution because they thought that it could be read to suggest we supported an independent Tibet. The Chinese were gleeful – actually chortling – at the prospect that the U.S. was going to vote with them and against the Europeans about human rights in Tibet, as if everything there were just fine! We couldn’t believe it and went back with reklama after reklama about the damage it would do to our human rights policy. This went on until the night before the vote, when we finally got agreement from Washington that we could vote for the resolution if the Europeans would change the title to the “the situation of human rights in Tibet/China.” They reluctantly made the change and we voted in favor, but the resolution was soundly defeated since we had spent so much time on internal bickering that there was no time left to build support among other countries.

After that, we did sponsor a resolution on China every year that I was working on the issue, both while I was in Geneva and later, while I worked on human rights in the Department, but there was always an internal battle. The final decision to sponsor often came so late that we couldn’t run an effective campaign, so the resolutions usually went down in flames. Still, as I said, just sponsoring was the key issue for us, not whether we won or lost.

There was one more year of very high drama on the China resolution; I can’t remember which year it was, I think it was probably 1993 or 1994, possibly ’95. Whatever year it was, we had actually made a decision reasonably far in advance. We had lobbied hard in capitals and in Geneva. The Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, John Shattuck, came out for the vote, together with a senior adviser from the National Security Council. We were all trying to count votes and it was very close. It was a real showdown. The usual Chinese procedure in the Commission was that when the resolution on China came up, they would make a parliamentary maneuver, introducing a motion to take no action on the resolution. There would be a vote on the “no action motion” and every year the Chinese won, so there was never even a vote taken on the actual resolution. Anyway, this particular year it was very close and we had convinced enough countries to vote against the Chinese procedural motion that we had a real chance of defeating it, and even getting the resolution adopted for the first time. The way the Commission’s schedule worked out, the China vote came very late in the evening, about 11:00. There was a roll-call vote on the Chinese motion to take no action and it was defeated, for the first time ever, by just one or two votes. Everyone was startled, amazed that we had finally beat the Chinese. Even the Chinese were amazed; they had counted their votes wrong; they had been sure they would win. At that point, however, the chairman suspended the session until the next morning, when the actual vote would take place. We spent much of the night trying to make contact with some of the capitals of Commission members. I think Benin and Ethiopia
might have been the key swing votes. We were trying to get to them directly and through the Department, to convey the word that we need you to stand by us on the actual vote. No doubt the Chinese were also making midnight demarches around the world. The next morning there was another roll call vote on the actual resolution. Everyone was biting their fingernails. When the count came in, we lost by one or two votes. I think it was the Russians and Ethiopians that changed their votes and voted against our resolution even though they had voted with us to defeat the procedural motion. So, it was high drama. The big news, however, was we had defeated the no-action motion; the Commission had finally, formally considered the situation of human rights in China for the first time, even though the resolution had been narrowly defeated. It was a symbolic victory. The Chinese took it very seriously. They replaced their ambassador and in following years they redoubled their efforts. It was one of the few times our actions in the Commission actually made the front page of the New York Times.

There were a few other times we also made the front page of the Times. One was when we passed the first resolution of the UN ever condemning anti-Semitism. That was seen as a real step forward for the UN and involved another complicated drama. Remember that not long before, the UN had been equating Zionism with racism, so the anti-Semitism resolution was seen as a big victory, even though it was quite a convoluted resolution.

We also created the position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which was probably one of the greatest human rights achievements of my time in Geneva. This wasn’t actually done in the Commission, but through a different mechanism I worked on a lot, the World Conference on Human Rights. The creation of the High Commissioner was a real breakthrough. Symbolically, it elevated human rights to a much higher status in the UN, and in practical terms it eventually meant that a lot more resources were devoted to human rights and that human rights became better integrated into all UN activities. Although it didn’t get off to a great start, it did create an institution that has been able to do some real good.

Q: What was the problem in getting it started?

EICHER: The problem was the selection, basically. There was not enough preparation on the part of the United States or the Europeans in terms of coming up with a good candidate who could really make the most of the new office. An Ecuadorian diplomat, José Ayala-Lasso, was named as the first High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ayala-Lasso was not a human rights expert or crusader. He was quite a gray, non-confrontational kind of diplomat. He had chaired the UN General Assembly subcommittee that drafted the resolution creating the office, so he had a leg up in being associated with the new institution. As a diplomat seeking consensus, he was the kind of person the human rights violators could be more comfortable with, even though his heart was basically in the right place on human rights issues. So, he was not ready to make waves or to try to make the most out of the office, but he did do some useful things to get the office established and get its work started. He actually launched its first field mission, with a lot of U.S. help and encouragement, which set a very good precedent for future activities. And he avoided getting into any trouble, so perhaps that was also helpful in getting the office established and accepted. So, it was a modest start. A stronger personality could have made more of the office and the powers we gave it, I think. Later, when Ayala-Lasso was replaced by Mary Robinson, you got more of the fire-breathing, human rights-backing kind of leadership that I had envisioned.
for the position, but I was gone by that time. I understand that Robinson’s style created its own kind of problems, not surprisingly, I guess, and that she was not necessarily a particularly good administrator and was a little bit of a loose cannon. But it was good to see a UN official speaking out forcefully on human rights issues.

**Q: How did information come in about abuses and that sort of thing?**

EICHER: We relied a great deal on nongovernmental organizations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and dozens of smaller organizations that focused on different countries. The UN also had its own human rights mechanisms that brought in information, including the human rights treaty bodies and the special rapporteurs on particular countries or issues. One of the most important things we did, in fact was to greatly expand and strengthen the system of UN special rapporteurs, who were investigating and reporting on human rights violations around the world. There was also a UN subcommission on human rights that developed information, and various working groups, for example on indigenous people, or on “disappearances.” There were other mechanisms, including ones that allowed individuals to complain to the UN about human rights violations. There was even a “confidential” procedure, the so-called “1503 procedure,” under which people or groups could bring violations to the attention of the UN; I was the Western member of that group one year. And then, of course, the U.S. was also doing its own human rights reports and we had very good, first hand information from our own embassies about abuses in various countries. So, there was no lack of information coming in. If anything, there was a risk of being overwhelmed by the amount of information coming in. Even in a big mission like ours, there was no way you could get through it all.

**Q: Congress mandated these human rights reports, which have gotten honed more and more over the years. There are screams and yells about them within the Foreign Service. I know in the ’70s I was in South Korea and we were not too happy with them but anyway, they have become quite a force in international relations. Were other countries doing the same thing?**

EICHER: Not really, no. Interestingly, China would produce a report on human rights in the U.S. every year, claiming that, you know, China is not the only country with human rights violations, which was true enough, of course. A lot of countries complained that we reported on human rights violations around the world but that we didn’t report on ourselves. But I’m not aware of any other country that was writing country reports on human rights as a matter of course, certainly not in the solid manner that the U.S. was doing it.

**Q: In Geneva was there a human rights alliance with, say, with the British, the French or the Scandinavians or something? I mean, were we really leading the charge or were we one of a number?**

EICHER: We were out in front on a number of issues, but there really was a good bunch of reliable countries in Geneva. There was a group in the UN in Geneva that was very strong and well coordinated on human rights issues, which was called the WEOG (the Western European and Others Group). The UN is formally broken down into five geographical groups, in particular for selecting which countries will be members of different UN bodies, which are required to have balanced geographical distribution. The WEOG includes Western Europeans and others,
including the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The WEOG, however, coordinated closely on issues well beyond who would be elected to which UN body. The WEOG would meet regularly during the six weeks of the Human Rights Commission, every morning without fail, to coordinate policies and resolutions and who was going to take the lead on what and generally to plan on what we were trying to achieve and how we would achieve it. It was a very effective group which drove most of the work of the Commission. Most of the Commission’s resolutions originated in the WEOG.

Q: Was WEOG pretty much of one mind?

EICHER: No, there were differences from time to time depending on the issues. At that time, the European Union didn’t exist yet as it does today. It was before the Maastricht Treaty. They had what they called “the common foreign and security policy,” which often was not a common policy at all. Sometimes you would get splits within the European countries on different issues, which occasionally worked to our advantage, but most often did not. In general, when the Western group was split, it just made us all weaker. The Europeans were generally pretty solid on human rights and we could normally count on them to do the right thing. Occasionally, they would want to take a weaker position on Iran or something than we would.

Q: What about the Helsinki Accords? The OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe? In many ways the Helsinki Accords were considered to be almost the key to the breakup of the Soviet Union and human rights were sort of at the core of that. How did the OSCE work in those days?

EICHER: It was just starting up in those days. In fact, I had virtually nothing to do with it at the time. Later in my life, I spent almost a decade with the OSCE, but at that point they were really just starting out. The Helsinki Accords dated from about 1976, I think it was. They grew out of the CSCE, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Only after the fall of communism was there enough constant activity going on, constructive activity going on, that they decided that the CSCE should become an organization, the OSCE, not just a Conference, the CSCE. They didn’t set up a full-time secretariat and become the OSCE until about 1993 or 1994. The secretariat was in Vienna, rather than in Geneva, so it wasn’t really in my bailiwick, and in any event it didn’t get going in a big way until later. The Yugoslavia settlement was what really brought the OSCE to the fore as an active organization.

Q: Going back, still sticking on the human rights side, going back to China, was there any discernible movement on the part of the Chinese to cut out some of the human rights violations or was it more trying to keep people from criticizing them?

EICHER: That’s an interesting issue. Every year as the Commission approached the Chinese would give signals that they would be ready to do a certain number of things if there was no China resolution. This would lead to discussions with them, sometimes by the United States. In fact, I got involved in some of these discussions myself, in a later job, when I went back to work on human rights in Washington. They would signal that okay, they were ready to release prisoner X, or maybe consider doing one or two of the other things we wanted them to do, like sign a new human rights treaty, or ratify one of the major human rights treaties, or move toward some other
reform. They were never willing to make an explicit *quid pro quo* that they would do something in return for dropping the resolution, but the timing always seemed to be centered around the resolution and it was perfectly clear that that’s what they were aiming at. Even with no agreement from us, they would almost always do something as resolution time approached, usually release a few prominent prisoners in the weeks or days before the Commission met, or sometimes take some other kind of action. Even if it wasn’t enough to stop us from sponsoring a resolution, it would help them get other countries on their side. So it was interesting to watch them. It made us feel like we were doing something right, something that forced the Chinese to take positive steps. Still, it never seemed like they would do enough or that they were sincere about it; they just wanted to do the minimum needed to avoid a resolution. You know, we used to use the term that they would “let a couple of prisoners fall off the back of the truck.” Well, that was nice. It was very positive to actually get people released. It certainly made a difference in those people’s lives, as well as making a political point. But, in general these were people who never should have been arrested in the first place and, meanwhile, they would be rounding up half a dozen more dissidents. So, while it was always nice to get people released, and you got a sense of accomplishment from doing it, I became a bit wary of the political prisoners game with the Chinese. They were masters at manipulation—picking up someone who never should have been picked up and then getting credit, or even concessions, for releasing them.

**Q: What about Burma?**

EICHER: Burma was always a big issue. We did certainly have Burma resolutions and there seemed to be a quite solid international support for condemning Burma’s actions. There was a lot of support for trying to get Aung San Suu Kyi released. But Burma was one of those pariah regimes that didn’t seem very concerned about international opinion. Most states, like the Chinese, would bend over backwards to avoid UN condemnation. A few, like Burma, were beyond the pale; they just didn’t seem to care.

Speaking of Burma makes me think of one of the biggest events of my tenure, which I haven’t really spoken about yet, the World Conference on Human Rights. This was a big UN world conference that was actually held in Vienna in 1993, but all the preparations for the conference were done in Geneva, because that’s where all the international human rights officers were based. So we worked very hard on that. There were lots of preparatory meetings that went on for weeks and involved some very difficult negotiations. Difficult, but fun. I enjoyed multilateral negotiations. You would sit around a table with Iranians and Cubans and others who we don’t usually talk with, and try to hammer out agreements. Or, you would sit with like-minded countries and look for ways to circumvent the “bad guys.” Lots of the most important work was done informally in the coffee lounges, rounding up support and cutting deals, not in the plenary sessions, which usually consisted of boring speeches. There was a lot of parliamentary maneuvering, which I got pretty good at. After a while you could get a good sense of what could be adopted and what would face problems, even before consulting anyone else. You could tell what kind of amendments to propose that could win majority support and that might change something really bad into something OK.

Anyway, I’m digressing. The World Conference, when we finally finished all the preparatory meetings and got to Vienna, produced a declaration that actually included a number of very good
things. It was far from a perfect declaration because we were laboring under the constraint that everyone wanted it to be adopted by consensus. In a way, this is a big advantage, because if it’s adopted by consensus it really reflects world opinion and no one can later say it doesn’t apply to them, since they voluntarily signed on. On the other hand, consensus required very hard negotiations and meant that we couldn’t get everything we wanted. Still, there was a lot of good stuff in the declaration and we even had a couple of breakthroughs. We were able to get agreement, worldwide acceptance, for the first time, that human rights is not a just a domestic issue but it is a legitimate concern of the international community. With that, we really should have put the last nail in the coffin of those who claimed that what they do domestically is none of anyone’s business and that criticism on human rights issues is interference in internal affairs. The declaration that came out of the World Conference made clear that human rights violations anywhere are everyone’s business. So that was a major, hard-fought, victory.

The other really big accomplishment of the World Conference was laying the basis for the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. With much difficulty, we got a paragraph in the declaration saying that the United Nations General Assembly should consider, as a matter of priority, creating a High Commissioner. This was the result of a lot of really hard work. NGO’s had begun floating the idea of a High Commissioner for Human Rights about the time the conference preparations began. I liked the idea, as did others at the U.S. mission in Geneva. We thought it could really make a difference in UN priorities and lead to good things around the world. Washington was much less enthusiastic. Under the Bush administration, they were worried about the “dreaded UN bureaucracy” and they didn’t really want to create new UN structures, even on issues that they basically supported, like human rights. We continued to advocate for it from Geneva and won some allies. Part of the problem was that no one really had a clear concept of what a High Commissioner would be or do, or what his or her powers would be. I actually sat down at one point and sketched out in a cable exactly what I thought the concept of High Commissioner should look like and how it should fit into the UN system and sent it to the Department in a cable. That was just about the time that the Clinton administration came into office. They seemed to like it, and it eventually became U.S. policy. After the World Conference, I went to New York in the fall of 1993 and joined the U.S. delegation in to the UN General Assembly, where we actually created the High Commissioner in quite difficult negotiations.

Q: Why were they difficult negotiations?

EICHER: Well, several reasons. I think there was reluctance among much of the Third World – and particularly among the big human rights violators – to create this new position that could end up highlighting some of the problems in their countries. I think that some of the countries that went along at the World Conference with the idea that the UN General Assembly would consider creating a High Commissioner felt that they could kill the idea in New York, or just let it die a quiet death in the General Assembly. These kinds of things usually are adopted by consensus and they felt that by withholding consensus, they could block it or stall it. Even among the countries supporting the idea, there was a lot of controversy over what the new position ought to be and what it ought to look like; not every country accepted all the ideas I had gotten the U.S. to buy on to.
The negotiations in New York went very slowly, very badly, and we could see that time was running out on the General Assembly session’s consideration of human rights. It was clear that we had large majority in favor, but there were a lot of countries that were not enthusiastic and that were willing to let the clock run out. At the same time, we judged that if it came to a vote instead of relying on consensus, there were probably no more than half a dozen countries – if that many – that would actually be willing to stand up publicly and vote against a High Commissioner. Nobody wanted to look like they were blocking a High Commissioner, so that was an advantage for us. The dilemma was that most people, even our closest allies, wanted a consensus, not a vote, and that a few states – I think Cuba, Syria, and for some reason Malaysia, and a couple others – were deliberately trying to drag things out so there would be no consensus by the end of the session. We got into a squabble with our European allies, who generally wanted consensus, even if it meant waiting until the next year or longer. There was even a sharp division within the U.S. delegation about what we should do under these circumstances. Should we call their bluff and take it to a vote if need be? Or should we negotiate longer in hopes that we could bring them around to a happy solution eventually, even recognizing that this would be next year or the year after that or whatever? I was among those advocating that if we didn’t seize the iron while it was hot, we would never succeed. You know, we had the momentum from the Vienna World Conference. If we couldn’t do it with that, it seemed to me that the chances of doing it in subsequent years would likely be even less. I also suspected that if it came to the crunch, none of the “bad guys” would want to be seen as voting against this issue. By forcing the issue, we might yet get a consensus, and even if we didn’t, we would get a High Commissioner.

The crunch point, from a procedural point of view, was the deadline for filing a resolution. If there was no resolution filed by the deadline, then there could be no vote or no adoption by the General Assembly and the issue would lapse until the next year. I argued that we should file a draft before the deadline. That would force consideration of something before the end of the UNGA session. If we achieved consensus on another text we could substitute that for ours; if not, we could still amend ours in any way we wanted and bring it to a vote. Or, we could even withdraw it later if we changed our minds for some reason. Others on the negotiating team – including especially the head of the team, who was one of our UN ambassadors – thought that it would just make people angry for us to file a draft and that it would be better to wait until next year.

By a happy circumstance, the head of our negotiating team was away somewhere on crunch day, the last day for resolutions to be filed, leaving me in charge of the team. I was able to convince Madeleine Albright, who was then the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, through her staff, that we really ought to go ahead and file this resolution, which would ensure that there would be a vote on a High Commissioner before the end of the session. With her approval, I gave instructions five minutes before the filing deadline for one of our team to run down and file our resolution. We waited until the last minute so that no one would have a chance to run down and file a competing resolution. We got a lot of flack from some of our own allies, who thought that filing a draft was confrontational. I remember the British representative, of all people, giving me a really hard time. And, of course, we got even more criticism from the half dozen states who were trying to drag things out. But, the bottom line was that it worked. Despite all the whining, the speed and seriousness of the negotiations improved tremendously. Once people knew that they were going have to vote on something, and that they couldn’t just delay it for a year, they
were far more inclined to work seriously toward an agreement. As a result, we actually did get a consensus resolution hammered out within a few days, to create a High Commissioner, which was quite a breakthrough. Even a lot of the people who had criticized me for tabling the resolution came to me later to apologize and to admit that the strategy worked well in the end, including, to his credit, my British colleague. The resolution that we finally adopted was not great, but it was adequate. The one clause I insisted on getting in there was a phrase that the High Commissioner’s job is to promote and protect all human rights. That’s sort of an “elastic clause;” a good High Commissioner could take that phrase and do almost anything. So, in the end, that was one of the big victories of my time in Geneva. Certainly I can’t take full credit for it, there were so many people involved. But at the risk of putting modesty aside, I can’t help thinking that if I weren’t there, it wouldn’t have happened.

Q: Did you get any feel for, were the geographical bureaus here in Washington sort of weighing in and saying you know, don’t upset our clients and all that?

EICHER: On this issue not so much, no, because this was not aimed at a particular country. In general, in Geneva we would usually get the State Department’s final position sent to us, rather than hearing from individual bureaus or desks. It was later, in my subsequent assignment to the human rights bureau, that I saw – and was involved in – more internal fighting on human rights issues.

Q: When you went with the delegation to New York, did you get the feeling that this was a different world than Geneva?

EICHER: To some extent, but not a lot. I mean, I had been a delegate at previous UN General Assemblies in New York so it was not all new to me. The UN parliamentary rules and procedures were the same in New York and Geneva. More importantly, for these negotiations, I was dealing with a lot of the same people who I had been working with in Geneva and at the World Conference in Vienna. A lot of countries (but not usually the U.S.) regularly send their Geneva officers to New York to follow human rights issues that come up at the General Assembly. So, there were a lot of familiar faces at that negotiation in New York in addition to the procedures also being much the same.

Q: Did you feel that there was a change with the advent of the Clinton administration? It was more liberal, or less real politque, than, say, Bush Sr., who had a lot of experience in the United Nations and had served in China and had been around block and was perhaps more sophisticated. I may be over characterizing, but the Clinton administration came in all bright eyed and bushy tailed, sort of, on human rights. Did you feel that there was almost a fresh impetus on human rights?

EICHER: You know, interestingly, not really. The human rights policy changed only in small ways. That’s one of the things I liked about it. I found it very reassuring that U.S. human rights policy changed very little, whether you had a right-wing Republican administration or a left wing Democratic administration. Everybody likes human rights. I liked working on human rights partly because you always had the moral high ground and, you know, you could feel good about what you were doing; you could believe in what you were doing. I was happy to let somebody
else worry about how this might affect our trade with China or our relations with Colombia or whatever. My job was to point out that China or Colombia or whoever, were human rights violators and that we ought to do something about it. That’s not to say that I didn’t understand the bigger picture, but I had the luxury of being in positions where I was supposed to be advocating for policies that would promote human rights, in whatever country.

When I started in Geneva, under Bush Sr., there was actually a lot of focus on human rights. There were probably more State Department personnel devoted to human rights in the UN under Bush than there were under Clinton, when he came in. Certainly in the Bureau of International Organizations there were more people dealing with human rights under Bush than under Clinton, including a couple of high-level envoys. There was one gentleman, Ken Blackwell – as a matter of fact, the same Ken Blackwell who is of more recent fame as the secretary of state of Ohio during the last election – who was the Bush administration’s, I can’t remember what his exact title was, but in effect he was a special ambassador for human rights and delegate to the Human Rights Commission. He would come out frequently to Geneva and would lead our delegation to the Commission. He did quite a nice job.

When Clinton came in, that position ceased to exist and some of the support staff which worked for that position ceased to exist. Clinton still did name ambassadors to the Human Rights Commission and very good ones. The first one was Dick Schifter, for the first year of the Clinton administration, and then it was Geraldine Ferraro. So I worked with Gerry as her deputy at the Commission for several years. She was a joy to work with and I think her appointment showed the level of interest of the Clinton administration in international human rights. But in terms of policy, it really didn’t change that much. One thing that did change was that the Clinton administration supported the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights, while the first Bush administration had still been waffling at the time it left office; it wasn’t opposed, but it hadn’t made a positive decision, either. But on almost everything else, the positions were very similar on the human rights issues we were dealing with. It’s only recently, under Bush Jr., that the U.S. has changed its policies so dramatically on human rights and undercut so much of what we did and lost the high ground that the U.S. always used to be able to claim on human rights.

Q: Was Israel sort of a wild card on human rights?

EICHER: Israel was a big problem for us on human rights and it was one of the instances where it was difficult to keep the high ground. Israel did have big human rights problems. It was violating human rights in a number of very nasty ways and yet the U.S. position was to support Israel and to vote against any resolutions that condemned Israeli practices. Our rationale was that Israel was being picked on unfairly, and to a large extent that was true. There were lots of resolutions condemning Israel’s human rights practices, way out of proportion to what was happening there, and the language of the resolutions was often over the top. And some of the resolutions were very political, having more to do with peace negotiation issues than with human rights. But still, some of the points in the resolutions were valid, in light of Israel’s violations, and I was sometimes uncomfortable in casting “no” votes in its defense. Overall, though, UN positions on Israel were often so outrageous that they deserved to be voted down. Often, the U.S. was the only “no” vote; anti-Israel resolutions tend to draw an automatic majority in the UN.
One of the accomplishments of the Commission during my tenure was that for the first time the Commission adopted a resolution supporting the Middle East peace process. This was fun for me, having come out of Middle Eastern affairs. The resolution was a U.S. initiative and I took charge of drafting it and of the negotiations. I was actually negotiating with the PLO delegate and the Israelis on language which probably didn’t belong in the Human Rights Commission at all, but we did put some human rights language in there to make it more plausible. But, basically the resolution welcomed the rapprochement between Israel and the PLO and all the good things this would mean for human rights. The resolution was adopted and it may have been the first positive words ever adopted about Israel in the Commission. So, that was another nice accomplishment.

The anti-Semitism resolution that I mentioned earlier was another plus, from the U.S. and Israeli points of view.

We also had other Middle East related problems, especially under the Bush Sr. administration, before the PLO became our friends. In particular, there was a quite nasty and ill-fated trip out to Geneva by the then-Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, John Bolton, who, as you know, later became U.S. permanent representative in New York. The goal of his mission to Geneva was to get the Human Rights Commission to disinvite Yasser Arafat from speaking before the Commission. I said this was an ill-fated mission because, if you understood the United Nations, you knew this could not happen. The PLO was accredited as an official observer organization of the United Nations and as such, it was entitled to speak. If the PLO’s status at the UN was going to be changed it would have to be by a decision made in New York, not in Geneva. Now, if Assistant Secretary Bolton didn’t know this much about UN procedures, or seek advice from those who did before launching a mission, this shows a real lack of both knowledge and judgment. I think Bolton was really more interested in making a political point for domestic audiences – to show how strongly pro-Israeli he was – than to really try to accomplish something useful at the Human Rights Commission.

Anyhow, when he finally accepted our explanations as to why he couldn’t do what he wanted, then he changed gears slightly and his crusade became “we have to be sure that he is not given any of the honors given to a head of state.” In practical terms, this meant that Arafat should sit at the PLO seat in the assembly hall to give his speech, rather than standing at the podium in the front of the chamber. I’m not at all sure this was a distinction that anyone would notice or care about, aside from those who understand the most arcane UN protocol procedures. In any event, Bolton was determined. His approach to making this happen was also a bit peculiar. He decided he would try to browbeat the WEOG into accepting his position. Once WEOG accepted, he thought, then we could force the position onto the rest of the Commission Members. The whole idea was basically a non-starter. We could have told him – and, in fact did tell him – that the WEOG would not agree and even if it did, the rest of the Commission members would not agree. There was already a precedent for Arafat to speak from the front of the room and there was no way that a majority of Commission members were going to support a change to that. Bolton brushed off any objections we tried to make. He had with him a recent tape recording of Arafat calling Jews “dogs” and he thought that would convince people to crack down on him. I don’t think anyone was surprised, however, to learn that Arafat made anti-Semitic remarks. Bolton played the tape at the morning WEOG meeting and then gave an impassioned lecture – really, he
was shouting and red-faced – to the assembled ambassadors telling them they had to prevent Arafat from standing at the front of the room. His presentation was so embarrassingly out-of-control that it was followed by a stunned silence. The ambassadors, to no one’s particular surprise, except Bolton’s, were offended by the manner of his presentation. When no one else asked for the floor, the WEOG chairman said “Thank you. Since there are no other comments, we’ll move on to the next order of business,” and he changed the subject. Bolton was flabbergasted, outraged, that his proposal would not even be discussed by the WEOG, much less accepted. I remember the French Ambassador eventually took the floor and returned to the subject and gave Bolton a mild-mannered dressing down, saying that the WEOG didn’t need to be lectured in that fashion by an American representative and that he disagreed also on the substance of the proposal. A couple of other WEOG members did the same. I should add that Bolton also took the liberty of inviting the Israeli ambassador to attend the WEOG meeting, which was a real no-no under WEOG procedures. The meetings were held at the German mission and they refused to let him into the meeting room, so he sat outside in the lobby while all this was going on. It was embarrassing for everyone. The only result of the whole episode was to strain our relations with the WEOG. Arafat came to the Commission and spoke from the front of the room.

Q: Bolton is, to say the least, a controversial character and in a way, this has been his modus operandi, to be a controversial character and a publicity-seeker from the far right. I mean, this is the way he gets his sustenance. How did you, when Bolton came out and before, did you just kind of roll your eyes and you know, let him do his thing and fail or how did this work?

EICHER: Well, in fact, that was the first time that I had dealt seriously with him. We did try to explain to him the procedures and the background, as well as how the Commission and the WEOG worked, what the rules were, and what could actually be achieved and what could not be achieved. But he was determined to go his own way on this. He even had a fight in front of two or three of us from the political section, a roaring fight, with Ken Blackwell, our Ambassador to the Commission, threatening to fire him on the spot because Ken pressed our views that Bolton’s plan wouldn’t work. Bolton just would not be dissuaded from pursuing his goal. I think he was probably egged on by Morris Abram, our Head of Mission, who was always trying to do everything he could to support Israel. But Abram should have known better. In the end, you’re probably right that Bolton was looking more at politics and at his domestic audience than he was at the chances of success or of trying to do something constructive at the UN. If you want to get something adopted at the UN, you don’t announce it and try to browbeat people, you have to do a lot of careful planning and speaking quietly with people to build support, especially speaking to Third World delegations. All we did in this case was alienate our friends. We never even took it up with countries other than the WEOG, which, I guess, was just as well.

Q: I guess Burma was really almost isolated. There wasn’t a hell of a lot you can do about that was there?

EICHER: No, there was not a lot we could do about Burma. The other country that we really spent a lot of time on was Yugoslavia. That started to fall apart while I was in Geneva. When the war broke out, it was a big issue in Geneva.
Q: What were you doing? What was the issue, vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, in the Commission and what were the results?

We were working on it in a number of ways, although I’m not sure how much we actually accomplished. We were able to call the first-ever special session of the Human Rights Commission, which established a precedent that the Commission could be called to meet in emergency session instead of having to wait until the regular session the following spring before it could take up a fast-breaking, serious human rights issue. So that was a nice step forward. Since the U.S. had called for and organized the special session, I ended up as chairperson of very large, informal drafting committee. Since our Yugoslavia resolution was the only item on the agenda, everyone showed up; we must have had 100 delegates who wanted to make their additions and changes to the draft. And John Bolton came out again for the special session. I’ll give him some credit for that. He did support us and did a quite reasonable job in helping us on that. We were able to pass a resolution that had all the appropriate condemnations of various bad things that were going on in the former Yugoslavia. I’m not sure it made any real difference on the ground, but it did help highlight some of the problems and solidify international opinion on them. Even though you could say that it didn’t accomplish much concrete, it was regarded as successful enough that we organized a second special session a few months later, as things got worse in Croatia and Bosnia. The former Yugoslavia became a fixture in human rights meetings for the remainder of my time in Geneva.

Beyond the Human Rights Commission, as things got worse in Yugoslavia, we actually established a sort of little cell within the political section to follow events there, because a lot of information was coming into Geneva, primarily through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which had its headquarters about a block from the U.S. mission. The refugee section of the U.S. mission was also much involved since UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) was involved, as a result of all the ethnic cleansing going on. I had a political officer who would meet every day with the Red Cross and then send in a daily report to Washington on what was going on; it was one of our best sources of information before we opened embassies in Bosnia or the other new countries. When we did recognize Bosnia, it was too dangerous to actually have an embassy in Sarajevo, so the U.S. ambassador-designate, Victor Jacovic, was based in Geneva and worked out of my political section for several months.

The first peace negotiations – the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) led by Cyrus Vance - David Owen – was also based in Geneva, right in the UN headquarters building there. I had an officer responsible for follow what was going on in those negotiations and would get involved myself from time to time. Aside from day-to-day coverage, there were occasional big negotiating sessions that resulted in a team coming out from Washington, often led by Secretary of State Christopher. Christopher, in fact, became a very common visitor to Geneva.

Q: Was the enormity of the... particularly the Serbian, but also Croatian, activities, that is, what the Serbs were doing to the Bosnians and to some extent the Croats, coming through? The situation there was damn close to the Holocaust, right in Europe, forty years after the end of World War II. How was this impacting on you all?
EICHER: Well, as I said, it was an issue of overwhelming interest and generated a lot of attention and work for us. We were living comfortably in Geneva so it wasn’t impacting our daily lives in that sense, but it was a major tragedy and everybody recognized it as such. There was a lot of hand wringing going on. The U.S. felt the Europeans should take the lead and the Europeans couldn’t get their act together to take vigorous action. The was a UN force there – UNPROFOR – but it wasn’t very effective, and administratively it was handled out of New York, not Geneva. There was an ongoing effort in Geneva to see if there was anything we could do, any way we could contribute, and that’s what led to the Human Rights Commission special sessions, and to our work with the ICRC and UNHCR, and with the Vance-Owen negotiations. But, realistically, as active as we tried to be, we were to a large extent on the margins. The peace negotiations didn’t really pick up steam until the Dayton talks, which was after I left Geneva, and after Vance and Owen had bowed out. One other thing we did try to do, in fact, in a very early resolution, was to help set the basis for the war crimes tribunal, but our initial effort on that in Geneva was quickly eclipsed by more serious work in Washington and New York, so war crimes moved out of the Geneva optic.

Q: Did Cuba come up at all?

EICHER: Cuba always came up. One of the main U.S. goals every year was to pass a resolution on Cuba and we did indeed do that every year. In fact, when I first arrived in 1991, my deputy, who had been there several years, briefed me and said, “Peter, there will be dozens of resolutions at the Human Rights Commission and we’ll be expected to be on top of all of them, but in the final analysis, don’t forget that the only one that really matters to Washington is the Cuba resolution. If we pass a Cuba resolution, the Commission is a success; if we don’t, we’ll be seen as having failed.” I think that highlights the Cold War mentality that still prevailed when I got to Geneva. In fact, the Cuba resolution was always important for us politically, but as the Cold War dynamic ended, it was no longer the central theme of what we were trying to do at the Commission. When I got to Geneva, Cuba was the only country resolution that the U.S. took the lead on; by the time I left, we had the lead on at least half a dozen country resolutions, including China, Yugoslavia and many others that took more time than Cuba.

We actually had a lot of interaction with the Cubans, most of it very unhappy. The Cubans were extremely adept at working the Human Rights Commission and caused us an enormous amount of trouble and headaches. We succeed every year in getting our resolution adopted condemning human rights violations in Cuba. But they managed to succeed in muddying up a lot of other things we wanted to do and generally to cause trouble. In fact, they also sponsored a resolution against the U.S. every year, which was not about human rights in the United States but was one that they called “unilateral coercive measures.” Basically, without naming the United States directly, it was a clear condemnation of the U.S. trade and financial embargo against Cuba. And, every year the Cubans were able to get most of the countries of the Commission, in fact a large majority of countries in the Commission, to agree to a resolution saying that “unilateral” embargos like the U.S. embargo on Cuba – our trade restrictions on Cuba, which they would call a “blockade” – were coercive measures and were a human rights violation that should be condemned. And they succeeded in that.

Q: This sounds like shadowboxing or something.
EICHER: It was shadowboxing to some extent. We would pass our resolution against them, and they would pass their resolution against us. Ours was certainly more significant, however, since it would name Cuba directly, and since it appointed a special rapporteur to investigate and report on human rights problems in Cuba. Still, you’re right that there was a lot of shadow boxing going on at the Human Rights Commission and, in fact, that could sometimes be a lot of fun to work on. I much enjoyed negotiating in the United Nations and many of the endless debates and talks over how you were going to word something, or how you could promote your initiative or kill someone else’s bad initiative, or how you could word an amendment that could get adopted and substantially change the meaning of a resolution you didn’t like. Sometimes it would be scoring points over your opponents rather than necessarily creating anything that would really matter in the real world. So, this part of the work could be fun, or could be frustrating, but a lot of it was just a game. We realized that. I had visitors who would come out for a few days to help with one issue or another who would say, “Oh, my God. Condemn or strongly condemn? Deplore or deeply deplore, what difference does it make? How can you deal with this every day?” Once you got immersed into the minutia, however, you started to realize that in the context you were working in, it did make a bit of a difference.

Further on the Cubans, when I say they were excellent at causing trouble, it went way beyond the “universal coercive measures” resolution. Every year they would come up with some truly evil little ideas that, if adopted, would have undermined the UN human rights structure that we were trying to build up. It would be almost full-time work for a couple of members of our delegation to try to head off various bad Cuban initiatives. With the help of the Europeans, we were usually able to render them harmless, but sometimes they would score points. They were masters at coming up with things that, on the surface, would appeal to other Third World countries. There was a shifting little group of other countries that we sometimes called “the bad guys,” including Iran and Syria, among others, who were always ready to work with the Cubans. It was very irritating. But, a lot of us got to know each other and there was some camaraderie, too. In later years, at the OSCE, where there were no such overt “bad guys,” I sometimes actually missed not being able to have a good, parliamentary fight with the Cubans and Iranians. It could really get your adrenaline going.

Q: Let’s take, still sticking to human rights, after four years there, did you see any machinery that was set up that was making a difference between whether somebody got their fingernails pulled out or not?

EICHER: I think we did. I think we really made some progress. I think the things we did really helped some people. How much of it was due directly to our work or how much was the happy confluence of events in the world that we were able to take advantage of, somebody else would have to judge. But we did create a lot of UN mechanisms which are making a difference. We created a lot of special rapporteurs, who are special UN envoys who go look at particular problems or particular countries and publicize problems and try to persuade the governments to improve practices. So, there is a special rapporteur on torture and a special rapporteur on religious freedom and a special rapporteur on independence of the judiciary and a whole string of others, most of which were created during my time in Geneva, who are out there highlighting problems, proposing solutions and making a difference. Plus, of course, the High Commissioner
for Human Rights and the advent of actual UN human rights offices in different countries of the world have started to change the international culture about human rights and the acceptability of foreigners raising human rights as an issue. I think these mechanisms have started to get some governments to behave more responsibly in some cases. We also created new treaty provisions on human rights, for example, a protocol to the anti-torture convention under which an international team could visit prisons, unannounced, to check on conditions and what was happening there. The U.S. used to support that kind of initiative; we really believed in fighting torture. And, of course, with every resolution, we were setting standards of what the international community should be abiding by. For example, I think one of our Yugoslavia resolutions was the first time that rape was labeled as a war crime. That had important implications for later efforts to prosecute crimes.

So it was rewarding in that sense. You know, as often as you didn’t get the result you wanted to on a particular resolution, or even though you sometimes felt like you were only playing politics or working around the margins of important issues, very often you really did feel as if you were making a difference. I think our work did improve people’s lives and cast a bit of light into the darkness. I think we did save some individuals here and there, and hold some brutal regimes to account, and establish some lasting procedures. So you could feel good about human rights work. I liked doing it; I felt like I had found my niche.

I think that perhaps one of the lasting legacies of some of the work we did – the work we participated in, and in some cases launched – is that now, within the United Nations system, human rights is truly ingrained as one of the major, mainstream issues. When I got to Geneva one of the goals I had was to try to bring human rights out of the narrow confines of the Human Rights Commissions and into the broader work of the UN and the other UN agencies. I visited a lot of agencies and I asked them about it. Almost uniformly, they would recoil. You know, the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees would say, “Oh, no. Human rights is a political issue; keep it in the Human Rights Commission,” and WHO would say, “it’s a political issue, keep it away from us.” And this is the kind of response I got, from one agency after the other. By the time I left Geneva, every one of these same agencies was proudly saying, “We do human rights; we work on human rights; our program is based on human rights.” Even UNICEF, which may be the least political of the agencies, was saying that their entire program was based on a human rights convention that originated in the Human Rights Commission, the Convention on the Rights of the Child. So it was a real change in approach. In the work of the UN now, human rights is almost always taken into account as a matter of both policy and bureaucratic procedure; there is a human rights person sitting at the table during policy discussions, and there are human rights experts attached to most UN field offices. So I think that’s an important legacy.

Q: Did you see any NGOs, non-governmental organizations, taking on a stronger role as being an unofficial adjunct to the whole human rights process?

EICHER: I think so. As a result of human rights having a greater role, their influence also became greater. You also have to give them a lot of credit because they’re the ones who are on the ground, around the world, finding out what the problems are and publicizing them, often at great personal risk. Very often they face persecution for trying to get the word out. I have tremendous admiration for them. They also came up with lots of ideas on how to promote human
rights, some of which were great. They were happy to share ideas and delighted if a government actually took up one of the ideas and supported it.

Q: Over the years, over time, we’re talking about the last couple of decades, these groups have really become an extremely important element.

EICHNER: Absolutely. We always found that you could work in partnership with them to great effect. A lot of officials, including American officials, considered NGOs a pain because they were always criticizing us as well as other countries, and they were never satisfied; they always wanted you to do more. But you need to accept that that was their job, their purpose, to urge governments to do more. As a representative of a country trying to promote human rights, I quickly came to understand that the NGOs were our natural allies, even if they didn’t always agree with our positions. And they were generally easy to work with and to get along with. They were so used to being blown off or ignored by government delegations that they were really pleased when a delegation was actually willing to take them seriously and cooperate with them, even if you couldn’t always agree with them. I spent a lot of time with them and gave events for them at my home. They made wonderful partners.

Q: I don’t know if this is still in your province but with the rending aside of the Iron Curtain, one real negative was human trafficking, essentially the recruitment of Eastern European young women to become prostitutes. Often they did not know what they were getting into. This whole trafficking of humans and also, I guess, of young boys and all. Did that fall under your province at all?

EICHNER: This was just starting to be seen as a big issue at the time I was in Geneva. It wasn’t yet seen as an East European problem at the time, but it was emerging as an issue that was referred to either as “modern day forms of slavery” or as “sale of children,” depending on which facet of it you were considering. There were a few activists and NGOs already doing some work on “modern day forms of slavery,” which included everything from vestiges of slavery-like practices in Mauritania, to forcible recruitment of child soldiers in Sudan, to sweat shops and various kinds of indentured labor, as well as what we now call human trafficking. The U.S. had not really taken this up as a big issue yet.

The “sale of children” aspect of it, like so many other human rights issues, became very politicized. The U.S. was against taking action on this issue because, I think, there wasn’t a clear understanding of what was really going on with modern day slavery and because the Cubans and some others were successfully twisting it to suggest that American adoptions of Central American children was part of the problem of “sale of children.” There was even one very awkward evening at the Human Rights Commission when I was in the U.S. chair, during an effort by the Commission to get approval for drafting a new convention – or more technically a protocol to the existing Convention on the Rights of the Child – on the subject of sale of children. We had instructions that if it came to a vote, we the U.S. should vote “no.” The European country that was in charge of derailing this resolution – Portugal, as I recall – managed to mangle it, and all the European countries then suddenly changed their positions to support the resolution. We were left standing alone in opposition. The optics were terrible – the U.S. was the only country in the world blocking progress on protecting children from predators. There was no time
for new consultations with Washington to modify the U.S. position. So, after a lot of unpleasant back-and-forth debate on the floor of the Commission, I made a policy decision and violated my instructions and joined consensus on the resolution. I thought Washington would be furious and worried about what kind of reprimand I might get. But, as it turned out, no one in Washington seemed to care very much, so I guess the story had a happy ending. The protocol in question was eventually drafted and adopted, and it is now part of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Most countries have ratified it, but the U.S. never even ratified the Convention, much less the protocol.

As for human trafficking as we know the issue today, it had not yet become a well-publicized issue while I was working in Geneva. A bit later in my life, when I was working for the OSCE, I worked a lot on combating trafficking; I actually established the first OSCE programs to combat trafficking.

Q: What about Rwanda?

EICHER: Rwanda did happen, yes. That was one of the huge human rights tragedies that happened while I was in Geneva. Maybe the biggest. We did have a special session of the Human Rights Commission on Rwanda. I was there for the preparations but didn’t attend the actual session, since I was back in the U.S. for my oldest son’s wedding. The Human Rights Commission did adopt a resolution, which, I guess, helped attract world attention to the horrors that were going on there, even if it didn’t change much on the ground. But on Rwanda, what can I say? The world failed Rwanda. There were just too many crises going on at once. Most Western focus was still on Yugoslavia. Even on that, the West wasn’t ready to intervene militarily, and that was much closer to home and getting much more media attention. There were also little wars going on in a number of the former Soviet countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia. The war in Chechnya was also starting. Everyone was still talking about the “peace dividend” that was supposedly coming with the end of the Soviet Union and, instead, here were little wars breaking out all over the place. Governments didn’t have the stomach for military intervention, especially in Africa, which seemed so much further away. In fact, only a few months before, the Clinton administration had tried a small scale military intervention in Somalia to restore peace there, which ended up being a failure; remember, the U.S. withdrew after a Blackhawk helicopter was shot down and bodies of American soldiers were dragged through the streets. So the U.S. really wasn’t ready for another African adventure and other countries didn’t step up to the plate, either.

The crises in Yugoslavia, and especially in Rwanda, did get people talking about the idea of “humanitarian intervention” as a right or a duty of states when horrible things were going on in a country. The idea was very controversial because normally the UN wouldn’t interfere in any country’s internal problems unless they also threatened international peace and security. The genocide in Rwanda helped make the idea of humanitarian intervention respectable, if not fully accepted.

Eventually, later on, Rwanda became the first country in which the UN established a human rights office, under the authority of the new High Commissioner for Human Rights. So that in that sense, looking through a bureaucratic lens, the machinery that we had set up by creating a
High Commissioner was ultimately used to help deal with the aftermath of the genocide. But international efforts on the genocide itself were totally inadequate and too late.

In fact, back then everyone – including the United States – was unwilling to concede that what was going on in either Yugoslavia or Rwanda was genocide. There is a UN Convention against Genocide, that the U.S. and most other countries have ratified, that obliges the signatories to take action to end genocide if it is taking place. So the U.S. at first avoided using the “g” word, and eventually starting using the term “acts of genocide,” instead of just plain “genocide,” since the lawyers said that would not trigger our obligations under the treaty. It was crazy.

Q: Was Rwanda one of these things that developed so quickly that it was almost not feasible to have a real response, or not?

EICHER: Being in Geneva, I wasn’t really close enough to the policy makers to be able to make a real judgment on that. Certainly, it happened very quickly and unexpectedly, at least from our perspective in Geneva. It was also over fairly quickly; it lasted only about three months, I think, which, of course, is a long time if you’re on the ground watching people get killed, but a short time in terms of building up momentum for international intervention in crises. Yugoslavia, in contrast, went on for years. I think it would have been possible for the international community to have a more vigorous response to Rwanda, which might not have prevented the genocide from starting, but would have ended it more quickly. But for all those reasons I mentioned – and probably other reasons that I didn’t know or have since forgotten – there was just no inclination by the international community to get involved, until it was way too late.

Q: Did that hang over you? Were people coming in and telling you about the horror stories or was there sort of a filter to that while you were there?

EICHER: The information we got was indirect. I didn’t have a lot of people coming in telling me specifically about what was happening in Rwanda. There weren’t Rwandans getting on airplanes to Geneva to tell their stories personally. But we were getting information from the International Red Cross and from UN agencies and from NGOs and even from our own government. It would be nice to say that the international community didn’t act because it didn’t know what was going on, but I think people had a reasonable idea what was going on. Perhaps there wasn’t a full grasp of how extensive, how massive the genocide was, but there was enough information to know that there was a really big, serious problem going on in Rwanda.

Q: Before we leave Geneva, I think we’d better talk about some of the other aspects of this. We’ve talked almost completely on human rights. Were there any other issues you were involved in?

EICHER: Yes, there were quite a few. I spent a reasonable amount of time with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). I had an officer working full time on each of those in my section. For me, it was mainly a supervisory role, although there were issues that I got involved in. In particular, each of those organizations would have big annual meetings, the World Health Assembly and the International Labor Conference. I was always on those delegations, which were often headed by a U. S. cabinet secretary; usually, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services and Secretary of Labor would come out for the meetings. It was often Donna Shalala and Robert Reich during most of my time. In the WHO, a lot of the issues were technical health issues which I didn’t have much to do with. But there were always political issues that would come up; a certain number of political issues would always arise within these organizations and that’s really what I was there to deal with.

One issue you could count on almost every year was a membership issue: are we going to let the PLO have a seat or not? We were always trying to make sure the PLO did not get admitted as a state, although we didn’t try to block observer status for the PLO. But every year it seemed that there would be a fight in the credentials committee, with someone trying to sneak the PLO in while we weren’t looking, so we would have to be there to object and to fight it off. Then we started to have the same kind of fight about Yugoslavia. Our position was that when Yugoslavia broke up, Serbia did not automatically become the successor state that automatically got Yugoslavia’s seat in the UN and other organizations. The Serbs were already regarded as the aggressors in the Yugoslavia conflict and we didn’t want them to be rewarded as the legitimate government entitled to a seat at the table at every international organization; we thought they should apply for membership, just like Croatia and Bosnia and the other successor states had to do. The Serbs, however, took the view that they were the successor state and acted as though they automatically inherited the UN and other agency memberships. So, one of the sometimes-tedious things we were doing at all the different agencies in Geneva was trying to make sure that the Serbian regime did not show up and claim the Yugoslavian seat. In fact, we had to brief every delegation to every small technical meeting about this and ask them to give us a call immediately if any Yugoslav appeared. This happened often, at first, and I or one of my political officers would have to run down to whatever meeting it was and give the standard speech about why Serbia should not claim the successor seat for Yugoslavia. Sometimes we had to demand a vote or obstruct proceedings until we could get them out of there. We had to deal with this issue at the Health Assembly and the International Labor Conference.

Q: Were we carrying that particular pail of water or were other delegations doing the same thing?

EICHER: Most of the Europeans were with us. Their missions weren’t quite as big and well organized as we were and often didn’t have people attending the little technical meetings like we always did, so very often we would be the first to hear about the problem. But, since they shared our position, one of the things we would do if a Yugoslav did show up was to phone around right away to the other missions and make sure that other representatives who shared our views appeared at whatever little technical meeting it was, to join us in our objection. Sometimes they would even take the lead in objecting. There was a period where the Serbian membership issue came up constantly, but eventually the Serbs realized they were beaten and showed up less often.

There were also other political issues that would come up. One issue that seemed to come up regularly in the World Health Assembly, for example, was an item called “the health effects of nuclear war.” This was an attempt by a few of the radical Third World countries to stick it to the United States. The idea was that the U.S., being the last remaining superpower, should get rid of all of its nuclear weapons in the interest of world health. Well, I guess you can’t argue that nuclear weapons aren’t bad for people’s health, but this was clearly a disarmament issue that had
no business being decided in the World Health Assembly. There were all kinds of strategic arms limitation talks going on in Geneva; that was the place to discuss disarmament, not in the WHO. Those were the kinds of things that would come up. There were also leadership issues. The head of the WHO was a Japanese man, Dr. Nakajima, who had proved to be a very ineffective administrator. We were trying to organize a campaign to get him replaced, but even though pretty much everyone acknowledged that he was bad for the organization, the Japanese were pretty effective in keeping him there. He was eventually replaced, but not until after I left Geneva.

One other interesting issue that kept coming up at the WHO during my time – which really wasn’t a political issue that I had to deal with – was the question of whether to destroy the last remaining smallpox virus. Smallpox had been entirely eliminated as a disease all over the world; there hadn’t been a single case anywhere, in years. The two last remaining samples of the virus were held by the U.S. and the Russians at secure health laboratories. So, there was this ongoing discussion of whether it was better to destroy them, and thus permanently rid the world of what had been such a terrible scourge over many centuries, or keep them, because we shouldn’t be destroying the last of a species, no matter how bad it seemed to be. The inclination on all sides at the time was leaning to destroying them, but the final decision was never actually taken, so the specimens remained, hopefully, still safely locked up. In light of this background, I was amazed when I heard a couple of years ago that the current Bush administration was undertaking a massive program to produce smallpox vaccine and inoculate all the American soldiers going to Iraq against smallpox. I still can’t understand why this was necessary, unless we were wrong all those years in Geneva about the last viruses being tucked safely away, or unless it was all a propaganda effort to try to show that Saddam Hussein really did have a biological warfare program.

Q: At one time, particularly early on – and my oral histories go back to the beginning of the Cold War – there was tremendous emphasis on labor unions as a bulwark against the Soviets, who were trying to establish their own unions. Particularly as the political strength of labor unions had gone down in the United States, did you get a feeling that the International Labor Organization was not really a very high priority?

EICHER: Well, certainly I would agree that it was not a very high priority among all the issues and organizations we had to deal with in Geneva. But it did get some attention; as I said, the annual delegation to the International Labor Conference was sometimes headed by a cabinet secretary, at least during the Clinton administration. Since I knew so little about the ILO before I got to Geneva, I was struck at how big and active and well regarded it was. I was impressed at how effectively it operated. The ILO actually predates the United Nations. Even though it’s now considered a United Nations specialized agency, it’s older than the United Nations. It operates on a tripartite basis, which is unique. Every delegation, every country’s delegation, is made up of three components: government, labor and employers. So you really are including all the three of the components you need in order to try to reach some kind of consensus or agreement to move things forward on labor issues. I guess in my ignorance I had expected the ILO to be made up of a bunch of labor leaders pressing for action on their issues. And there were a lot of labor leaders, of course, but there were also a lot of chamber of commerce people and businessmen and government officials. Almost every year there would be an effort to pass a couple of new
conventions setting new and better standards on some pressing aspect of labor law or labor conditions. Some of these were major issues, like child labor, but a lot of them were just little things around the margins, say, setting agreed, minimum international safety standards in industries using some particular type of dangerous materials. There are now over 200 international labor conventions; it’s a wonderful body of standards, even though some of them are not very strict. About a dozen of them make up the “core conventions” that people cared most about, but there were also many others. These conventions are treaties, which legally bind countries to abide by them once they have been ratified. The ILO continues to set standards and to monitor the implementation of standards on many, many labor and safety issues. It’s quite a useful process. I was really very impressed with the ILO and was happy to have been involved with it.

Q: What about say, India and Pakistan, particularly India, a big democracy but one where an awful lot of kids, very young kids, are involved in child labor. How was it dealt with.

EICHER: The ILO wasn’t generally an organization where you would take a particular country to task for what it was doing. You know, if you wanted to criticize India on child labor, you would do it in the Human Rights Commission, not at the ILO. Delegations at the ILO usually tried to maintain a constructive, cooperative approach. Because of the tripartite nature of the delegations, even India’s delegation would have labor leaders who were likely to be saying the same about child labor as India’s critics would be. It wasn’t an organization where I recall there being a lot of high-level confrontation and finger-pointing, although sometimes that did happen. More likely, if the ILO saw a problem with child labor in India, it would look for ways of trying to put new rules in place aimed at making things better. For example, there might be a new convention that would prohibit child labor in dangerous industries, like the glass industry or the match industry, or that would limit or end some specific practices. You know, recognizing the reality that children are working, at least let’s start by getting them out of the more dangerous industries, and make a step toward ending the worst abuses. The ILO also had mechanisms to check on how countries were doing in meeting their obligations.

Q: In human rights, was child labor a problem, an issue?

EICHER: It was an issue that did come up, although it was not a front-burner issue. One particular children’s issue which came up during my time was street children. The Europeans, in particular, seemed to be very interested in trying to do something about the problem of street children in Latin America.

Q: Brazil, of course, is a prime example.

EICHER: Exactly. Although street children are a problem in many countries, the situation is particularly bad in Brazil and, although the Brazilians were not specifically named in a resolution, they certainly felt like it was criticism aimed at them. In fact, I have to admit that as much as I recognized street children as a problem, I was not very happy to see the Europeans take this issue up in the Human Rights Commission because, if you recall, I said that we had been able to forge a coalition of Eastern and Western Europeans and Latin Americans, that was critical in order to get enough votes to pass anything positive in the Commission. So, as the Europeans started
targeting Latin American democracies on this kind of issue, those countries started wavering on their support for us on some of the other issues, like China, or Burma or other things we wanted their help on. Still, I remember that we did pass a resolution on street children. We were able to maintain Latin support on most of the other issues, but it became more difficult once they found themselves as targets.

The other child issues that we were involved in, included negotiating a couple of protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. I’ve already mentioned the protocol on “sale of children.” Another protocol was on the age of military service. That one was an effort to make it an international standard that kids could not be recruited into the armed forces until they turned eighteen. This was a problem for the United States because at the time we could still recruit people at seventeen and a half.

Q: As far as I know, regardless of past standards, people joined the military and particularly the navy, at seventeen.

EICHER: I think the U.S. has now changed its policy on that, partly as a result of this protocol that was negotiated in Geneva and even though the U.S. has never ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. I think our first gambit was, “OK, we recruit at seventeen and a half, but we’ll make sure no one goes into combat until age eighteen.” I was actually surprised when the U.S. changed its position on this and now, I believe, we do not recruit people younger than eighteen. This was actually a bigger problem for some of our allies than for us. The British and Dutch, I think, still had a practice of enlisting boys of sixteen on naval ships as cabin boys. They also phased that out, I think. So this, maybe, is one more example of our work at the Commission having an effect in the real world.

Q: One last question. With the political appointees coming in and out – you mentioned Bolton – was there, in the four years you were there, did you see much of a clash between the political types versus the career types in what you were doing?

EICHER: Other than that one incident with Bolton that I mentioned, very little. Again, it was very reassuring that human rights had a solid backing within all stripes of the U.S. government, under both Republican and Democratic administrations. To some extent, interestingly, the more liberal Democrats and the more conservative Republicans would tend to have the same views on human rights issues, and it was the middle-of-the-road politicians who would sometimes let you down. These were often reasonable people but, while they supported human rights, they would often look at the bigger foreign policy picture and their views on trade relations and so forth might trump their concerns about human rights. China was a good example of this; the middle-of-the-road politicians would speak out about human rights problems in China, but then vote for permanent most-favored-nation status for trade with China. But the very conservative Republicans – the libertarians and politicians concerned about individual rights and too much government meddling – and very liberal Democrats tended to be very solid supporters of human rights in any country.

Q: You know, when you think about it, it’s a little hard for anyone to say, “Well, you know, yes, we know they’re beating up and jailing people, but we’ve got other fish to fry.”
EICHER: Indeed. One of the things I loved about working in human rights was you always had the moral high ground. You could really believe in the positions you took, really have confidence that you were doing what was right. I liked human rights work enough that I spent the rest of my career on it. When I left Geneva in 1995 the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, who I had gotten to know fairly well from his trips to Geneva and through our work together at the World Conference on Human Rights, John Shattuck, asked me to come back and be his special assistant in Washington.

To wrap up on Geneva, I should just say that living there was very nice, as you might expect. It was a small city, only about 300,000 people I think, but it felt very cosmopolitan because, being a UN headquarters, there were so many international people there. There wasn’t all that much to do right in Geneva, but we entertained officially quite a bit and had a busy official social life. We also made a lot of good friends. Two of our sons graduated from the international school there, which they liked very much. Geneva was beautifully situated right on the lake and within easy drive of an endless number of wonderful old castles, or medieval villages or alpine resorts. Switzerland was so beautiful we used to say it was like living in a postcard. And Geneva was a great base to get around to other places. We could drive to France in six minutes from our house, and could be in Italy within an hour’s drive. Germany was only a couple of hours away. So, we ended up seeing a lot of Europe, which was a great plus.

LEON WEINTRAUB
International Relations Officer, US Mission to the UN

Mr. Weintraub was born and raised in New York City, educated at Hunter College, Brooklyn College and the Universities of Pittsburgh and Wisconsin. After service in Liberia with the Peace Corps he entered government service, first with the Navy Department and then with the State Department Foreign Service. His service in Washington and abroad involved him with a variety of countries and issues including African Affairs, International Organizations, Narcotics and Peace-Keeping operations in Africa. His foreign posts were Bogotá, Tel Aviv, Lagos, Quito and Geneva. Mr. Weintraub was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

WEINTRAUB: Commerce. For the ITU (International Telecommunications Union), at senior meetings we had senior people from other agencies in the government from the ICC (International Communications Commission), International Communications, whatever it was called, I forget what we have in the United States. Perhaps it’s the FCC, Federal Communications Commission.

Anyway, in the more technical agencies we had those people. For the International Labor Organization, we had senior people both from State and from the Department of Labor but Mr. Helms, Senator Helms and others had problems with the ILO. Senator Helms’ constituency in the
South and others are not known to be particularly supportive of the labor movement, of union movements. But the ILO also had an interesting feature in its representation. It had what's known as tripartite representation. So in addition to the government delegates, at senior levels there were also delegates from the private employers’ sector and also from the labor sector. So each senior American delegation to meetings of the ILO had government representation, which was State and Labor Department, a private sector representation which might be from the manufacturing sector or the trade sector, from management, and union representation as well, and that's built into the way the organization works.

I also did a lot of meetings with the International Committee for the Red Cross, the ICRC, concerning the aftermath of the Gulf War, the first Gulf War. This task was not a part of my original “portfolio,” but it was one of the many things that often occur at embassies or missions that did not fall easily into any particular area. It concerned the issue of missing prisoners from that Gulf War. I think there were about 700 prisoners still unaccounted for. These were members of the allied forces but mainly Kuwaiti, either from the military or from the civilian sector. There were a small number of Saudis, a small number of Syrians (Syria was in the coalition), there may have been an American or two, but most of them were Kuwaitis. After the Gulf War, in one of the Security Council resolutions, the UN Security Council mandated that the ICRC would accept responsibility for a process that might find out about these people -- if they were missing, and if they could be repatriated if found. So the ICRC hosted meetings about three times a year, and the meetings typically went on maybe for three or four days. The ICRC was kind of the mediator. On the one side were members of the coalition; the U.S., the UK, France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Syria attended some of the meetings, but not all of them. And on the other side was Iraq, all by itself. And it was just a very painstaking exercise, - and I regret that I can't say it was a particularly fruitful one. If you get the impression from these meetings that this is what multilateral diplomacy is like, I don't think anyone would ever enter it. The Iraqis were, as far as we could tell, they were stonewalling all the time.

For example, the government of Kuwait, the delegate from Kuwait, would say, well, here's a case. They'd describe an individual and according to all the records this individual was last seen being led away by an Iraqi patrol. He was last seen in the custody of Iraqi soldiers on such and such a date being led away from this particular house. So where is the person now? And these descriptions might go on individually, case by case by case. And the delegation from Iraq, of course, said something like, well, we'll have to take this under advisement. We take note of all the particulars, we have to report this information to Baghdad, we'll bring this back and see what we can find out. Then at the next meeting they would make a report and half the time it was something like, -- well, there was sheer chaos in the bombing that started the war. Our holding areas were destroyed by bombs, there was mass confusion, the people ran away and escaped, we have no way to account for them. Or they'd give some kind of other story. And this would go on back and forth, back and forth.

Q: What was it- in a way, did you feel that this essentially was an exercise in futility, not just by the Iraqi attitude but probably what happened, that they'd been killed?

WEINTRAUB: It could be. I should add, at this point, that at almost all the meetings we were joined by the American ambassador in Kuwait.
Q: Skip Gnehm.

WEINTRAUB: Skip Gnehm. He came for a couple of meetings and then he was replaced by the new American ambassador, Ryan Crocker. And I got the impression from them that the government of Kuwait was on a mission and they were unable to face the public with the potential reality that 700 of their young men were not going to come back. You know, it's a small country, it would be a large percentage of the population. And I got the impression that many of these young men were from elite families in Kuwait. Just as in the United States during and after the Vietnam War, there were families of MIAs that formed a strong lobbying group, a domestic lobbying group in the United States -- similarly in Kuwait, there was a committee for the repatriation of the Kuwaiti prisoners. As I understood it, the official line in Kuwait was that these 700 people -- prisoners, if you will -- were being held somewhere, and we just had to apply enough pressure on the Iraqis, and we’d find out where they were and they'd be repatriated. And I accepted the viewpoint that Kuwait was a society that had been through such a trauma that they were not prepared to write them off, they were just unwilling to accept as a reality that they might not ever return. Obviously I was not directly involved with events in Iraq and Kuwait at the time of the occupation and liberation, so I had no way of knowing about specific events, but one could believe certainly that a lot of this happened. Whether a lot of those missing Kuwaitis survived, and whether a lot of them were taken back to Iraq and then executed in cold blood and dumped in a mass grave, we really don't know and certainly didn't know at that time. But that was quite a grueling experience.

I remember when our ambassador from Kuwait Ryan Crocker came to some of these meetings. He was obviously more used to bilateral diplomacy where things are much easier to get done. And the International Red Cross people, God bless them, had patience. The didn't get frustrated, they realized that they're the mediator, they have to keep a civil tongue to everyone, and they just kept at it. And of course while we were there, the International Red Cross lost some people in Rwanda, and other locations as well. I think they also lost some people in Angola when I was there. So I came away with very great respect for the International Red Cross, the ICRC.

Q: How'd you find this living in Geneva, pretty expensive, isn't it?

WEINTRAUB: Yes. Well, I looked at Geneva as kind of a reward for my family after the assignments we'd lived through, mainly in Third World countries. We hadn't been in a European country before. So, yes it was expensive but there was a cost of living allowance. Obviously we had housing allowances and we could live reasonably well. The cost of living allowance, as it did all over the world, took a few months to catch up after the fact, but our kids had a good school at the International School of Geneva -- not the best, perhaps, but I think it was a pretty good school. Our middle son did his full four years of high school there; our daughter finished up middle school and started high school. We traveled around a fair amount. Geneva's way in the west of Switzerland, so we were in France a lot, actually we did a lot of skiing in France. I learned to ski in my middle age. We made a few trips to Germany and we made one trip to London.

We made one trip, a very interesting trip, when we drove all the way to Bucharest, Romania. We
had a friend who was deputy chief of mission at the time in Bucharest, a friend from a Foreign Service family that we had served with in Nigeria. And, you know, in a Third World post like Nigeria you really develop camaraderie with families. And they had children about the ages of our children as well. So we drove from Switzerland through Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary and then Romania. And I think it was really an eye opener for our two kids that were with us. Our oldest was in college in the States, but our two high school-aged kids really had a front-row seat to see the differences as you drove east through Europe. Obviously Germany was a lot like Switzerland -- for the most part it looked pretty much the same. In the Czech Republic, you could see -- this was in '96 -- in the Czech Republic things were somewhat run down but humming along alright and of course downtown Prague, where we spent most of our time, was just lovely. And the roads were fairly good. Vienna and Austria were fine, of course. Hungary was another story. The roads suffered by comparison, of course. Budapest was fairly nice, though. You know, this is seven or so years after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet Union. Hungary was starting to emerge on its own but the roads, the restaurants were a bit more shabby and second rate.

But as soon as you crossed over the border into Romania it was another world completely. I mean, at the border, the road changed dramatically. There were potholes and street urchins, street beggars all around. It kind of freaked the kids out a little bit when we crossed over. Typically at a border crossings there's always a lot of people milling around, looking to change money, to sell things, to buy things. We had a mini-van which we'd driven all the way, and as soon as we crossed over the border -- we had this large vehicle, and I imagine they didn't see a lot of these large vehicles -- the little street kids were swarming around the car begging for money for food, whatever. I think it was really an eye opener for our kids. We spent the night on the road on the way to Bucharest and our kids didn't want to go out of the hotel that night. I wanted to walk around, walk around the village square. I was confident it was relatively safe around the village square of the town, but they were in a kind of a state of anxiety. And then the next day we managed to drive into Bucharest and spend a nice few days with our friends. It was quite an experience, that was.

Again, we made other trips to West Germany. We also went to Denmark one time. We went to the Netherlands. So we traveled by train and we did a lot also by car. We also made a trip to Italy, to Rome. Unfortunately we had a negative incident on the road, actually not too far, kind of near Milan. We stopped on the autostrada, on the highway, at a food court, just like you have on the New Jersey Turnpike. And when we got out after having lunch we found the car had been broken into. Someone had broken the lock on one of the doors and they rifled through the kids' backpacks and the kids had their CD players or Walkmans, whatever it was at the time, so the kids were really devastated by that. Not the monetary value; fortunately we had insurance that was able to cover that. But it was the feeling that you've been violated in your car. So that kind of took that trip down a notch, although we did continue on to see Venice, Florence, and Rome, but I think we shortened the overall length of the trip. Overall, we did a fair amount of traveling, and we did skiing. And I think the kids had a very good time. So I was happy we were able to do that after I'd taken the family through some hardship assignments.
Ambassador Sally Grooms Cowal was born in Oak Park, Illinois in 1944. After graduating from DePauw University she joined the United States Information Service as Foreign Service Officer. Her service included assignments as Cultural and Public Affairs Officer at US Embassies in India, Colombia, Mexico and Israel. She subsequently held a number of senior positions in the Department of State, including Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs and Deputy Political Counselor to the American Ambassador to the United Nations. In 1991 she was appointed Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. Ambassador Cowal was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.


Q: Then what?

COWAL: Well, just prior to my retirement, and while we were trying to decide what to do with the rest of our lives, and whether or not I would hang around for a second chance at a foreign mission, Madeleine Albright had asked me to go to Geneva with Geraldine Ferraro, who was heading the delegation to the Human Rights Commission.

Q: She is a former representative and had run on the vice presidential ticket with Walter Mondale.

COWAL: With Walter Mondale in 1984. I think she had been the human rights commissioner for a couple of years. Suddenly in that January 1995 session of the Human Rights Commission, the United States decided for the first time that they wanted to bring forth a resolution, on the human rights situation in China, which is a very difficult, very needed thing. Clearly, the human rights situation was, and I think to a certain extent remains, far from what you would consider ideal. When I was political counselor at the UN, I had gone and helped the Human Rights delegation I think twice. It's a subset of UN things. If you understand how the UN works as a political body, and I understood that, plus I had been at the Human Rights Commission, you understand that it’s much, much harder to bring actions against countries that have some power and influence than against countries that don’t.

It’s kind of an easy deal to condemn the human rights abuses in Myanmar, for instance, because Myanmar has very little influence and very few friends.

Q: That’s Burma.

COWAL: Burma. It’s a much bigger deal to try to do that in China. Most countries, whether you’re talking about the UN Human Rights Commission or the UN General Assembly, they only have two or three issues that really matter to them. Therefore they’re willing to trade votes on everything else in return for a favorable vote on the one or two or three things that matter to them.
I think one reason the U.S. is often so isolated in the UN is really because we do play politics also, but first of all we care about a lot of issues in a lot of places in the world. And, secondly, we’re usually unwilling to trade votes on things that matter to us. We have policy positions on most things, and therefore we’re not very flexible in terms of trading these votes.

I think many countries, just think, “Win the few you care about and nobody at home or elsewhere will ever know how you voted on the rest of the stuff.” We have this much more rigid system, much more scrutinized by the press. If we simply gave away votes on various items, that would not go unnoticed, so it’s a very different thing. But in 1995 the Clinton administration and Madeline, who was about to become secretary of state but at that time was the ambassador to the United Nations, knew that it was going to be difficult to bring up anything on China. In the Clinton administration way of doing these things, they had put together a delegation to the Human Rights Commission which they thought reflected human rights, some of the good things they believed about human rights. So the delegation was large, but not very professional. In other words, they had picked a Native American and they had picked an African American, but not people who had UN political experience. They had picked someone who was handicapped, and they had picked someone who was homosexual.

You get the picture. They had put together this sort of rainbow delegation because they liked the fact that the United States stood for equality of opportunity, and that was human rights to them. But, suddenly, as the days grew shorter to the beginning of this six-week session of the Human Rights Commission, they realized they had some political issues, and really a delegation that didn’t know how to work the UN as a political body. So they asked if as my last hurrah I would go and be the political adviser to Geraldine and the delegation, and I agreed. So we went off to Geneva for what was my last State Department assignment. While in Geneva, the United States was, of course, as it always is, working on several things at the same time. One of them was to be very actively involved in the organization of a new UN program that was to be called the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS.

The United States, of course, had fought hard to establish this organization. We, like many of our counterparts from Europe and Canada and other places, had felt that there was a growing AIDS crisis. I think, A, there was a growing crisis, B, the perception and the reality was that the UN wasn’t taking it on very successfully, that the UN was very fragmented in its approach to this. UN agencies didn’t coordinate their work, that at country level they often were either right on top of each other or leaving huge gaps. They never sat down together, so UNICEF didn’t know what UNVP (United Nations Volunteer Programme) was doing, which didn’t know what the World Health Organization was doing. It had been kind of relegated as a health issue, but it was becoming obvious it was more than just a health issue. And, of course, neither the United States nor these Western European countries wanted too much to take on AIDS as a bilateral issue, because it was so controversial.

It was thought to be mostly homosexually transmitted, it was all about public policy about private behaviors, and those are very difficult things for governments to deal with. I think 10 years later, nine years later, we still see some of these difficulties, this being the day after World AIDS Day, but we’ve come a long way, certainly. So, the United States had taken an active role in saying that there ought to be a new UN approach. It ought to be well financed and it ought to
deal with the developing world, and that it ought to do this not just from the perspective of the World Health Organization, but as a joint program of the UN. It had been agreed that this program would be established. Then the United States, as its wont, of course, decided that the candidate to run this, since it was going to have initially more American funds than funds from any other government – again, it was going to be at least 25 percent American, which at the time was the percentage we paid of all UN agencies, because we were thought to be 25 percent of the gross national product of the world. So, since we were going to be 25 percent paying for this thing, we wanted the leadership of this organization to be American, and had proposed a candidate, a qualified candidate who was at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Suddenly the Europeans all got together, and they got together behind a different candidate. That candidate was a brilliant, young – in his early 40s, I guess – Belgian scientist and researcher and virologist and immunologist, who had discovered the Ebola virus in Africa, and who had done some of the first work on AIDS in Africa, proving conclusively that AIDS was not just a homosexual-transmitted disease, that AIDS was transmitted from a vehicle for transmission, usually sexual or blood or other means of transmission, bodily fluids, and it found a happy receptor in whatever part of the body it happened to go.

Therefore, he was beginning to see as early as the late ‘80s that in Africa it was not a homosexual disease, it was a heterosexual disease. So he had a lot more prominence, and he was already at the World Health Organization, working on the Global Program on AIDS, and so he got the job. The United States eventually supported his election, and this was all done via a new governing body that was set up to run this new organization. The United States was one member and I think there were 17 or 18 or 20 international members from the developing world and from the donor community.

So since we weren’t going to have the director role, we decided that it would be nice to have an American deputy director, and I just sort of floated on the scene at that moment. Someone who obviously had worked for a long time with the U.S. government, who had some UN experience, who had a lot of developing country experience, who had no particular public health experience. So the U.S. ambassador in Geneva, Dan Spiegel, a Clinton appointee who had been very involved in setting up this new organization, arranged a meeting between me and Peter Piot, the Belgian who had been selected to run UNAIDS. He offered me the job as the director for external relations. I later became the deputy director, but this was to be one of the three or four senior positions in the organization.

It didn’t happen quite so easily. First, because I was not USAID’s candidate. Since they were going to put in the $15 million that we were going to pledge as an initial contribution, they wanted to it to be somebody who came out of USAID, and that was not me. Secondly, my husband was still alive and he looked at Geneva and said, “You know what? I don’t think after Trinidad I’m not so sure I want to be in cold and gray and dark Geneva, and besides,” he said, “I know you. You’ll work 14 hours a day and you’ll travel 50 percent of the time.” Because this is not only AIDS, which we could see was going to be galloping along. This agency was not going to be out of business in six months when we had discovered how to handle the AIDS crisis. It was also this whole ambitious task of going about doing the UN’s work in a very different way. So I think he was very clear about seeing this for what it was, that this was going to be an incredible challenge, and said, “If you want to do that, great, fine, do it, but I’m not going to stay
in Geneva, I’m going to go to Mexico and sort of pick up my business and my life. And when you can get to Mexico, great.”

I thought about that long and hard. I had sacrificed a lot of things also to make this marriage work and so on, and so I turned the offer down and we went to Mexico. About a month after that, my husband died of a heart attack, very suddenly. This was within three weeks of my retiring from the State Department, so it was a very tough period of time. I didn’t know what I was going to do, but it certainly didn’t occur to me to go back and try to rethink some of these things. Anyway, making a very long story short, about six months went by. Meanwhile, Peter Piot had rejected all of these AID candidates who had been presented as possible deputy directors, because he just didn’t feel it was the right mix. He just didn’t feel they were the right people.

Along about August, he was visiting Washington, and they were kind of on his case about why he hadn’t picked anybody, and he said, “Well, the only person I’ve interviewed for the job that I thought was the right person was Sally Cowal, and she turned it down.” The person he was talking to said, “Well, a lot of things have happened in her life. Maybe you ought to try to get in touch with her again.” By then, AID was convinced that they were not going to be able to provide the candidate, so he got in touch with me again. By then I was sort of over the shock, and I was absolutely ready for a challenge, to go and live in a different place and to do something different and to pick up a very active professional career again. So I went to Geneva for a week and looked around. I decided that it would be a challenge and an exciting thing to be a part of this new agency, which hadn’t yet started – 1995 was its planning year, and it was due to start work on January 1st, 1996.

In October I accepted the job and moved to Geneva in November of 1995. My late husband was exactly right. I worked 14 hours a day and I traveled 50 percent of the time. The difference was, I didn’t feel torn about this. That was exactly what I wanted to be doing, was immersing myself in a global issue and in a crisis. My own thought, as I got more mature in my State Department days, was that the world had changed a lot since I had begun. After all, you and I, Stu, are of the same generation. We began in the Cold War, and we knew where the enemy was and the enemy was the Soviet Union or it was Godless Communism, or it was a threat. I’m not a McCarthyist, but it was a threat to society and values as we saw them, and as I still believe them. I joined the State Department shortly after the assassination of Kennedy. I had been very moved and motivated by the Kennedy aura and mystique, so for years we ran in Latin America and other places on this.

This was a struggle against a country, or a group of countries – China, Russia. I came to believe, as the Berlin Wall fell and as the Soviet Union fell, that that was no longer the principal battle in the world. It was no longer Communism. That struggle had been won. The upcoming struggles were so much more for me multilateral in nature. You couldn’t fight the drug problem alone, you couldn’t fight the AIDS problem alone. There were a whole lot of things in the world that the United States could only do if it did it in conjunction with others. Until all of us are safe, none of us is safe. Certainly, I saw AIDS in that context. It was very interesting to me, because it was so many things. I don’t think I would have gone to work for a program on tuberculosis, although I come to understand that it’s also a huge challenge to human development and progress. But AIDS interested me because it was so economic and it was so political and we were losing
schoolteachers by the scores in places in Africa. Who would teach the children? So I was interested in this and interested in pursuing something at which we looked at things as countries together against poverty, disease, underdevelopment, all of the things which were part of this AIDS crisis. That’s why I went to work for the UN Programme on HIV and AIDS, and it was a wonderful experience.

Q: You were doing that from when to when?

COWAL: Nineteen-ninety-five to 1999. So I spent a formative four years for the organization, and four years for myself, from when I was 50 until I was 54, still geared up. I think what we were able to do, really, in those years was to put AIDS on the political map, to overcome denial, which is what was happening in the developing world. They were denying that AIDS was a problem. And then overcome complacency, which was the issue in the United States and in Western Europe and in Japan. There had been this little blip on the radar screen 10 years earlier, when we first heard about HIV. It seemed like it was going to be on everybody’s doorstep, and then it became fairly obvious it wasn’t going to be on everybody’s doorstep. We all went back to sleep. Not quite, but, I mean, there was a lot of complacency and a lot of denial.

I think that at UNAIDS we got the world together behind a common set of statistics. You see them again. They just came out for this World AIDS Day. 40 million people are infected and 3 million people died last year. At that time, there were no agreed-upon set of statistics. There was no agreed-upon approach. There was no treatment, of course, at that point. What was good prevention? Well, important to prevention, we began to discover, more important maybe than anything else, was political commitment: leaders of a country and business leaders and political leaders had to be open about this. They had to acknowledge it, they had to put funds for it. They had to work with groups who were clearly the sort of drivers of the epidemic, but were not normally parts of society – stigmatized communities, such as homosexuals and commercial sex workers and drug users. It’s very hard for governments to get their hands around. Will they work with them? Do they run into all kinds of political opposition if they try to work with them? If they decide to work with them, how will they do that?

My job was director of external relations. At first we thought that was just raising the funds for this organization and sort of having a little press campaign which said, “Oh, there is a new agency out there and it’s called UNAIDS, and here’s what it does.” It became obvious that really this was all about getting the political commitment necessary to really address this, with the money needed and with the political will needed, and doing things like getting it on the agenda of the UN Security Council. There had never been a disease taken up by the Security Council before, but getting Al Gore to go and sit in the U.S. chair for this debate at the Security Council, to make it part of the agenda when President Bush goes to Africa to visit, to talk about AIDS. Clinton went to Africa twice and never talked about AIDS, and so we made U.S. ambassadors aware of it. We made it part of this agenda, and I think that was an important contribution to making the world ready to deal with an unprecedented epidemic.

Q: How did you find the response of the ambassadorial or diplomatic services of Western Europe and the United States and Japan and all that?
COWAL: Well, it was very difficult to penetrate, and I think the fact that I came from that world helped a lot. I used to say I was the non-lawyer in the law firm. Pretty much everybody else in this organization was a public health physician, and damn good ones, some of the best in the world. Peter, who still heads it, is brilliant and actually is a pretty savvy politician, but was not a diplomat. The person who headed our clinical studies was a Senegalese physician and public health person and very knowledgeable. And the person who headed our country programs was an Australian physician and public health physician, worked with aboriginal communities, was a wonderful guy. They were all wonderful doctors, but they didn’t necessarily know how to either work the UN or work the foreign ministries of these countries of Japan and of Western Europe. I think that was something that I was able to do, because I had not only been in the U.S. diplomatic service for so long, but having had these stints in sort of the multilateral organizations, I just knew a lot about it. I think it added a strength.

Here we are now, 10 years later, and I’m in a public health organization. To me, it added a whole dimension about international relations, international public health, that I had only had a very distant relationship with in the past. I felt it was a wonderful opportunity to learn something. It also showed how difficult it was to work in the UN system. It remains difficult. I think it’s improved somewhat over the last decade, but it’s still a pretty difficult environment. We used to joke in UNAIDS that we didn’t know if the behavior change we needed to bring about to make the world safe from AIDS, or the behavior change to get the UN to work together was more difficult, but they were both extremely difficult.

Q: Was the problem AIDS itself? Because when you say AIDS, you’re talking about sex, or was it just that this was something new?

COWAL: Well, I think it was all those things. It’s basically public policy about private behaviors. It’s what people do when they’re in their own bedrooms or when they’re shooting drugs in their own back alleys. These are very difficult things for governments to come to grips with.

Q: We’re in 1999 and you’re off to Geneva.

AKER: Yes. My arrival there nearly coincided with the merger of USIA with the State Department, by the way.
Q: What were you going to do there?

AKER: Deputy Counselor for public affairs. This turned out to be the most enjoyable tour of my career. I was there for four years.

Q: This was until 2003?

AKER: Until 2003, doing public affairs for all three of our missions there; the US mission to the UN offices in Geneva, the US mission to the World Trade Organization and the US mission to the Conference on Disarmament: all three of these things are there.

Q: You know, just thinking about it, this would be sort of a unique post in that you really have no particular work towards the Swiss public and all.

AKER: No. In fact, Switzerland was not even a member of the United Nations when I was there. Despite the fact that they had hosted the UN and before that the League of Nations since the beginning, they never joined. They had several referenda in which they had voted not to join. The last year I was there, or maybe it was the year after, Switzerland voted, narrowly, to join the UN as a member.

Q: Alright, well you want to describe the mission mix in Geneva and what you were about with them?

AKER: Well the mission mix is quite interesting because we had three ambassadors and three missions. Two of them were in the same large building; the third, the WTO (World Trade Organization) was in a different part of town, for the first couple of years. Later all three were consolidated under the same roof, but there was little coordination between the three missions. There were no regularly scheduled meetings between the ambassadors. About the only functions they shared were HR (Human Resources) and PA (Public Affairs). I worked with all three of them, so it gave me a pretty good overview of all the various things that we were doing.

Geneva is something of an idyllic place; you’ve probably been there?

Q: I’ve just been through.

AKER: It’s a beautiful setting in the Alps, and the lake is gorgeous. It’s a quiet, family place: not a place for you if you’re looking for nightlife. But I found multilateral diplomacy, although it can be frustrating, to be about the most interesting thing I’ve ever done. I got quite interested in the multilateral ethos, the multilateral way of doing things, and ever since I have regretted that I didn’t do more along those lines.

Q: Alright, well, let’s take one at a time. What were you doing for—?

AKER: At the mission to the UN, you have several annual meetings that were key dates on the calendar. One was the UN Human Rights Commission, which met every year in the late winter to early spring. There would be votes on various issues that were tests of strength and influence;
there was always a vote pushed by the United States to condemn Cuba for human rights abuses. There were various votes regarding Israel and the Palestinians and votes to condemn China for its human rights policies. These mattered a lot to people in the IO Bureau and to real wonks on these issues, but I don’t think the larger public paid that much attention. It was quite interesting to see the emotion, the time, and the effort that our delegation and our mission put into them.

Q: Where was the emotion?

AKER: On certain issues, for example Cuba, there is a very devoted American constituency watching for any sign of change or weakening in our policy. And this constituency has a lot of influence in DC. We would send a large delegation every year, including several members of Congress, who’d take part in the meetings and planning sessions and would be riding herd to make sure the diplomats representing the US were absolutely firm on this issue. It was quite revealing.

The annual meetings of the Red Cross, the World Health Organization and the UN High Commission for Refugees featured similar red line votes on issues, especially was anything to do with abortion and international organization funding of abortions. People from the Hill and NGOs attended and let us know that our every action and every word were being watched closely.

Another example issue was the land mine issue. The Clinton Administration and later the Bush Administration both had the same policy: we were against banning the use of anti-personnel land mines. This came up before the UN High Commission for Refugees and other bodies. We always voted against the prohibition of land mines. We were pretty much alone in the world, along with China and I think Russia. This was a very emotional issue: activists and delegations would bring children from Angola or Afghanistan whose legs had been blown off by land mines; a giant symbolic chair with a broken leg was erected in front of the UN building there, the old League of Nations building, to highlight the issue. Many Americans were also for a prohibition. But, of course, since both US administrations were against the prohibition applying to the U.S., we toed the line.

Q: Why would we be against prohibiting land mines?

AKER: Probably because we use them more than anybody else. I’m just speculating here, but since we have so many bases located everywhere, their peripheries need to be protected. It’s a way to save personnel -- instead of having a guard every few feet you just put some mines in a field and people won’t go in. They can seal off that area. I think that’s the bottom line. We made little effort to take the moral high ground on this issue.

Another issue that we were not on the other side of the angels on, compared to the rest of the world, was the so-called child soldier issue. The Europeans in particular -- but others as well -- wanted to prohibit using children as soldiers. The use of children combatants was common in wars in Africa, in particular. It is similar to the land mine issue.

Q: Yes.
AKER: Kids in their early teens were killing and being killed and walking around with AK-47s. Our position was that, here in the US, we allow minors to join the military. Certainly, we consider 17-year-olds ripe for recruitment. We opposed any ban on recruitment of minors because we didn’t know where the line would be drawn.

Q: What was your role? We had these stands on things but there was no real public out there -- or were you preaching to the media?

AKER: There was a large media contingent, both stationed permanently in Geneva and others who came out for certain events like the annual meetings of the International Federation of the Red Cross, the Human Rights Commission, or the World Health Forum of the WHO. The press corps there was really specialists, so you had to know what you were talking about because these people had worked for years on these issues. And any time there was one of these gatherings, like the Human Rights Commission, you had a lot of administration figures who’d come, a lot of major political figures, and they’d all want to do press and I would be with them for their press conferences and TV interviews, shepherding people like John Bolton around.

Q: Well what were some of the things you did for the other missions?

AKER: I was most heavily involved -- in terms of the amount of work, with the US Mission to the WTO. The biggest issue was a new round of talks to reduce trade barriers. There had been an abortive WTO summit of world leaders in Seattle in late ’99, which was disrupted by protestors. Then we made another attempt to launch a new round which finally culminated in Doha with agreements, which have still never been carried out. These were issues in which there was actual money involved, big money for some people. US industry and agricultural interests and those of other countries were very interested in everything that was going on at WTO.

Q: I would imagine that by the time you got there our stand had been reiterated 100 times to a press corps which had heard it all before and so I would think that you were almost just going through the motions.

AKER: Yes, there is a certain amount of that in any kind of government public affairs work, obviously. In my last job here, as director of the State Department press office, we had the daily press briefing. Much of this is very, very repetitive. You know what they’re going to ask and you know what you’re going to answer but it keeps the news cycle flowing.

Q: I would assume that at least in the World Trade Organization -- the Doha Round and all, that different commodities would be under consideration each time around, wouldn’t they? So there’d be something.

AKER: Yes, there’s something new all the time, some new issue takes the forefront but there are certain hardy perennials that keep coming up. One of the biggest ones, certainly in my time -- I think it is still the biggest, year in year out -- is the question of agricultural protection. Everybody does it, then points the finger at everyone else and says “you are subsidizing your farmers and this isn’t fair “ We certainly did. The farm bill that went through Congress the year before the
Doha round raised US subsidies enormously on various crops. Yet we were saying this was not protectionism. It was the pot calling the kettle black but it keeps on going on.

Another issue that was big at that time was the issue of generic pharmaceuticals to combat AIDS and other infectious diseases. We were trying to protect U.S. pharmaceutical companies against what a lot of countries wanted, which was essentially to make the medicine cheaper so they could be delivered en masse to poor countries in Africa where AIDS was a severe problem. We were taking the not very popular view that we had to protect copyrights and protect the profits of big drug companies. There were many other issues but those two were dominant in the early part of this decade.

Q: I think that, in France, Jose Bove was very much involved in some of this.

AKER: He was very much involved in the Frankenfood thing. This came up less in the WTO context than it did at the World Health Organization and also in our bilateral relations with many European countries. The question of product labeling actually came up more when I was in Germany again. Europe does not have a central FDA (Food and Drug Administration) like the U.S. This really became a bilateral issue between the US and other individual countries than a multilateral issue. But Jose Bove was very much around at that time. I think he had set fire to a MacDonald’s somewhere in France and his trial became a cause célèbre because he was fighting against “Frankenfood.”

The question of showing any genetically modified ingredients on labels was particularly sensitive. The problem was that some European countries wanted labeling which required even the most infinitesimal amount to be advertised in flashing neon letters – I exaggerate here -- that would have made US products much more difficult to sell because of the negative reaction against genetically modified organisms.

We did bring farm groups from the U.S. to Geneva to talk to the media and to the public on why GMO (genetically modified organism) crops were actually good for the environment. USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) paid for most of these, explaining that with some GMO products you could actually cut down on the number of pesticides you’d use.

Q: Sure. Did the Swiss do anything outside of act as hotelkeepers?

AKER: There was one issue where the Swiss played a major role -- the Red Cross. The Red Cross is a Swiss-run organization. On some of the issues that I’ve mentioned, like land mines, refugees, the Swiss were extremely critical of our policies. This was the period that included 9/11 and our invasion of Iraq. Our relations were as strained as they’ve been in a long time.

Q: Did you spill over into our financial relationship- our embassy in Bern?

AKER: I had very little to do with the embassy in Bern. The only thing that they had that we did not have was the consular operation. I would deal with their consular section to expedite visas, for example, for Geneva-based journalists or diplomats who were going to the US on business, or people we were sending to the US on International Visitor leadership grants.
Q: How did the 9/11 attack affect Geneva?

AKER: There was a huge outpouring of public solidarity and sentiment. On the afternoon of 9/11, I was at a WTO conference with US public affairs officers from around Europe who had come to Geneva to learn about the WTO. The Doha round was only a few weeks away, so many colleagues from other US European missions were there. Out of the corner of my eye I was watching television, which would cut away -- we couldn’t hear the sound – to show something going on at the World Trade Center. Of course, as the afternoon wore on, the magnitude of the event became clear. That evening, people came by and laid flowers, notes, wreaths, dolls -- all sorts of things -- in front of the U.S. mission. It was an incredible outpouring, because the Swiss are usually very reserved. I think everyone was quite moved. This was not only the case in Geneva, though, it was happening everywhere in Europe and around the world. It was a tremendously moving thing. I remember the next morning “Le Monde” had a big headline saying “Nous sommes tous Américains.” Everybody was feeling a huge feeling of solidarity. It was very sad, as we built up to the Iraq invasion, to watch this feeling dwindle and then turn into resentment as, in many of people’s eyes, we misused the situation.

Q: From your perspective and your responsibility, the lead up to Iraq really didn’t particularly play, did it?

AKER: It certainly didn’t play there. One of the things that I had to do every year was go to the World Economic Forum in Davos. Just weeks before the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Powell came. I was in charge of getting together a round table with major European journalists who were in Davos covering the conference, to have an intimate talk with him. He essentially used talking points --boilerplate rhetoric. He did not convince anyone. He was considered to be a reasonable person by many Europeans, and the journalists were quite disappointed that he had gone along with the policy. After he was there in Davos, he made a speech at the UN, in which he talked about the “trailers of death.” It was the same line he had taken in private in Switzerland. Obviously, he didn’t make a very good impression at the UN either. He said afterward that it was the UN appearance was the worst day of his life.

Q: Did it have much impact on you?

AKER: I was very skeptical about our Iraq policy but I was always impressed with Powell, whom I saw on several occasions in other contexts. I found the man to have remarkable charisma and I thought he was an excellent secretary of state in many ways, especially for internal morale. He was one of the more popular secretaries since in my time, going back 30-something years. I actually worked more closely with a couple of others, including the current one and also Condi Rice before her, but the two secretaries of state that really made an impact on the people in the Department in my time were George Shultz and Colin Powell. I think they both gave you the feeling that they were straight shooters and they were team people – that they valued the work of the people in the Department. If you ask, I think people will often single out those two as being special. I’m not talking about their foreign policy or anything else, but just about them as-
Q: In personality.

AKER: Personality as a manager of an organization.

Q: Yes. I think this is true; your evaluation pretty much coincides with so many people I have interviewed.

How was life in Geneva?

AKER: It’s a quiet family place but it’s a wonderful place. If you love to ski you’re in paradise there, practically, because there are lots of great ski runs close by. It has good food, it’s beautiful, it’s a good central place to see a lot of Europe and it’s very, very international. It’s an interesting combination of a very international place that’s also very homey because it has a small town atmosphere, almost a rural atmosphere. In that respect, it’s a very pleasant place for a family.

Q: How’d you find your chiefs of mission?

AKER: They were all over the map in terms of personality In the four years I was there I had two different ambassadors to the UN, two or three to the Conference on Disarmament and two to the WTO. The one thing that was common to most of them is that they were almost all political appointees, just as the ambassador to Bern is also invariably political. These are the kinds of jobs that get political appointees. One exception I recall was George Moose. Who was ambassador to the UN and the specialized agencies. He was a well-known career ambassador; you may recall that he had been assistant secretary a couple of times. He was the exception, though. Most or all the others were political. I was particularly fond of Ambassador Linnet Deily, who was our envoy to the WTO under Bush.

Q: Well then, you left there in 2003?

AKER: Right.

End of reader