The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

LINDA SCHMITT GALLINI

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is 10 April 2007, and this is an interview with Linda Schmitt Gallini. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Do you go by Linda?

GALLINI: Yes.

Q: Linda, let’s start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

GALLINI: I was born in Greenwich, Connecticut on September 1, 1946.

Q: Can you tell me something about your Father’s family and what you know about it?

GALLINI: I would be delighted. My Father was an extraordinary man. His name is John Louis Schmitt and he grew up in Meriden, Connecticut. His Mother was born in the United States but his Father was a German immigrant. His family was very poor. My
Grandfather was a cooper who made wooden barrels. I was told that he tended to spend part of his paycheck in the bars on the way home rather than spending it all on the family. My Dad was the oldest of five children. When he was in eighth grade he dropped out of school and went to work in one of the factories in Meriden. One day he was operating some heavy equipment and caught his right hand in it and cut off four fingers. All that was left was his thumb. This was long before doctors were able to re-attach severed body parts so for the rest of his life he functioned with one normal hand and one significantly deformed hand. I never realized until I was a teenager that he had a physical disability. He never complained. He never let on that there was any kind of problem. You would notice when he was shaking hands with someone, he would shake with his left hand. He was originally right handed and he had to learn how to write and do everything else with his left hand.

After the accident he realized that he could never support his family by doing manual labor and that he needed to get an education. So at the ripe old age of twenty-one he went back to ninth grade. He enrolled in Mount Hermon School for Boys in Massachusetts that focused back then on helping children from indigent families get an education. My Dad studied very hard and did very well. He was President of his class. But by senior year he was completely out of money. He was on his way to withdraw from school when he stopped by the post office to check his mail. In his mailbox he found an envelope containing enough money for him to finish his education at Mount Hermon. He never knew where it came from but over the years that followed he tried to help other financially strapped students pursue their studies.

After he graduated he went on to Yale University and earned a degree in economics while working at various jobs the whole time he was in school. He then took a job on Wall Street with a financial firm. I don’t know which one. He was making $50,000 a year -- that was significant money back then. He managed to put his two sisters through college and provided opportunities for both of his brothers to be far better off than they otherwise would have been.

My Dad loved the water and he spent as much time as he could at the Atlantic Ocean. He and his best friend built a boat. They were out fishing together one day and my Dad was invited to his friend’s home for dinner that evening. The plan was to introduce my Dad to a young woman who was a friend of his best friend’s wife. He showed up for dinner in his fishing clothes. The young woman, Clara Jane Smith, had bought a new dress and had her hair done. As my Dad told the story, he walked into the living room and fell in love with my Mother at first sight. She took one look at him and was distinctly less impressed! But four months later they were married in New York City at The Little Church Around the Corner. Another of my Dad’s friends and his wife were the only witnesses. My Dad continued to work on Wall Street until my older sister, Dureen, was born in 1941. When she was about three years old, Dad came home unexpectedly early one afternoon. My sister went screaming for my Mother because she didn’t recognize this man who was coming in the door. Dad would typically come home after she was in bed in the evening and leave before she was up in the morning so she didn’t see a whole lot of him.
The next day my Dad went in and resigned from the company on Wall Street and moved the family from Greenwich to a little town called Woodbridge that is just outside of New Haven, Connecticut. He opened his own investment firm in New Haven which he named Income Funds, and for the rest of his working days he focused on helping people who otherwise would not have had enough money to live comfortably, send their children to college and to retire. When I was growing up it was not unusual for people to tell me, “If it weren’t for your Father I never would have been able to...” fill in the blank - put my child through college, have a comfortable retirement, have my own home. So he really focused on helping people improve their lives.

My parents bought a house in Woodbridge, the original part of which was built prior to the American Revolution. You could stand outside in front of the house and look at the central core and you could see where wings had been added on both sides over the years. Like so many simple farmhouses in New England the house had been expanded significantly. It was big, painted white with black shutters. The house sat on four acres and there was a big barn, a greenhouse and a chicken coop out back. I loved that house. It had a creaky old basement with a room we called the barroom with an actual stand-up bar that was used as a speakeasy during prohibition. When we sold the house, the folks who bought it were checking out the septic system and discovered a room in the front lawn that was used as part of the Underground Railroad during the Civil War.

My Dad loved to garden and he had gardens everywhere. I swear he could walk by a plant and it would straighten up and grow about six inches! He and another friend helped developed a strain of chrysanthemums that were called pom-pom mums. The blossom was about the size of a baseball. Back in the days when I was growing up if you went to a sporting event and especially a football game, many of the girls would have these big chrysanthemums pinned to their jackets.

My Dad spent hours and hours in the three-room greenhouse growing anything and everything. He often left the greenhouse door open and every spring barn swallows would nest inside. And every spring he would send my Mother off to the local garden shows with the tulips he had grown and she would always come home with awards for the tulips. Most of the time we had fresh flowers in the house either from the gardens or the greenhouse.

Unlike my Dad, my Mother was not much of a gardener. She had grown up as one of twelve children on a farm in Windsor, Illinois.

Q: Where did they come from, your Mother’s family?

GALLINI: I don’t know. The family name is Smith. Unfortunately, when I was growing up we did not go to visit my Mother’s family in Illinois. My sister remembers visiting them when she was four or five years old. One of my Mother’s sisters and her husband - Aunt Mary and Uncle Harold England, came to visit us in Connecticut but not often. Aunt Mary made the best fudge in the world! Both she and Uncle Harold loved growing roses and won many awards for their roses at rose shows. That was really the only
exposure I had as a child to my Mom’s family. She didn’t talk very much about them. But she was determined to get off the farm. She worked her way through nursing school at the height of the Great Depression and rose to the top of her profession as operating room superintendent. She worked in this capacity for six years at the Decatur and Macon County Hospital. She was engaged to a man who was killed in a car accident shortly before they were due to get married. To try to escape the memory of her loss she moved from Illinois to Meriden, Connecticut where she had been offered a job as operating room superintendent at the Meriden General Hospital. She kept herself and her home as immaculate as she kept her operating room. When she and my Dad were engaged, my Dad wrote out her resignation from nursing. Back in those days it was considered humiliating if a wife worked outside the home because it implied the husband could not provide for his family. Dad certainly was determined to provide for his family!

We lived in our charming colonial home from the time I was three years old until I was in sixth grade. Then my parents decided to build a new home several miles away but still in the little town of Woodbridge. Keeping up with a spacious old home and extensive gardens was a lot of work and they decided it was just too much for them. They were getting older and wanted a place that was easier to maintain.

Growing up in Woodbridge in the 1950s and 1960s was like growing up in a perfect picture postcard. Woodbridge had a charming town square with the quintessential New England Congregational church that we attended. My elementary school was across the green from the church and very close to the town library. The town clerk’s office was on another side of the green. In June members of the Congregational Church would gather in the town square for strawberry shortcake. Everyone knew everyone and it was like having a big, extended family. It was the kind of upbringing that was as close to idyllic as you can get.

Q: Well let’s talk a bit about your family religion. You were Congregationalist?

GALLINI: Yes.

Q: Did religion play much of a role?

GALLINI: Yes. Both of my parents were very devoted to the church. My Dad had actually grown up as a Lutheran. I don’t know what my Mother’s original denomination was. It might have been Congregational. I don’t know. But both of them taught Sunday school. My sister and I both sang in the church choirs. My Dad was the Sunday school superintendent for several years. He also served as a financial manager of the church for years and set up endowments for the church to support it financially. He and our minister were good friends. So we were in church every Sunday for the entire morning. Back in those days Sunday was truly a day of rest. You went to church, you went home and you had Sunday dinner right after church, and then usually had a quiet afternoon. There were no stores open. You didn’t go anywhere except to visit family. Sometimes my Dad would watch a baseball game on television. I remember the first time a television was introduced into our lives. It had a very simple black and white screen and knobs for “off”
and “on” and just a few channels. My Dad would curl up on the sofa, turn on the ball game, and promptly fall asleep. When I was in high school my Mom and I would watch “Bonanza” on Sunday nights. It was a very different world from today’s pace of 24/7. There was a real focus on family and community.

Q: What was the town like, what were the people doing there?

GALLINI: Back then Woodbridge was transitioning from a farm community to a residential community. Generally farmhouses were scattered and not close to each other. New homes increasingly were cropping up in the spaces between existing homes. I remember when I was in elementary school a rather large group of homes was built right down the road from our house. It was a slow transition into a more residential community, and now of course, it is practically a suburb of New York City. It has become much more densely populated but the town square and buildings there remain as I remember them. At least they did the last time I was there which was a long time ago. After we moved when I was in sixth grade I used to ride my bike to school. It was about a three-mile trip up and down some pretty substantial hills so it was good exercise. No one locked home or car doors. We never started locking anything until I was in my late teens. Children in the community started in kindergarten and went all the way through high school together. It was a very tight knit community. If there was a problem, neighbors helped each other out. My sister and I baby sat for half of our neighbors over the years.

Q: Well how about composition? Was there an ethnic mix there?

GALLINI: It was a very Anglo Saxon community. There was one African American girl who was in my class from elementary school through high school. Her name was Penny Sills. When I look back on it I think she must have been very lonely. She was a very quiet young lady; I can still see her face. She kept pretty much to herself. Diversity was almost nonexistent. I was actually raised with three biases: anti-Catholic, anti-Italian, and anti-Black. I was told that Italians were not very hard working or industrious, Catholics were very rigid and dogmatic, and African Americans were just not trustworthy. Of course I ended up dating an African American and marrying an Italian who was raised as a Catholic so I don’t think the biases actually sunk into me.

Q: At home as you grew up was there much discussion about the world or the area or not?

GALLINI: There was some, but it really was much more family oriented. We socialized regularly with my Dad’s family. My Grandmother was still alive and she came to stay with us often. I had an uncle who specialized in traumatizing others, so there was always another Uncle Ray story to tell.

Q: Where did they live?

GALLINI: My Dad’s family lived in or fairly close to Meriden, which is about a forty-
five minute car ride from Woodbridge. Often on Sundays we would go and visit the family, or they would come and visit us. My Uncle Bob and his wife Aunt Louise had a cottage on a river that was about an hour and a half ride away. In the summertime we would all go to the cottage. Uncle Bob taught me how to swim and how to row a boat.

Q: Did you have lots of cousins?

GALLINI: I did. Uncle Bob Schmitt and Aunt Louise had three children (Michael, Miles and Bobbi Lou) Uncle Ray Schmitt and Aunt Sylvia had three children (Candy, Gary and Heidi), Uncle Bob Bray and Aunt Toddie (my Dad’s sister Elsie who for some reason was nicknamed Toddie) had three children (Bonnie, Rob and Debbie) and Uncle Pierce Taylor and Aunt Lillian had a daughter, my cousin Susan. We all grew up together and spent a lot of time together.

Q: As a child were you much of a reader?

GALLINI: I was a fanatic reader. For as long as I can remember, I have devoured books. The home my parents built had a den with build-in bookcases that were full of books. So I was always prowling through the shelves. One day when I was in high school I pulled out Gone With the Wind, and read it in three days. I think it is 1600 pages, and I never put it down. I can still hear my mother saying, “Put that book down and come eat dinner!”

Q: Do you recall any series of books or a single book that really sort of grabbed you early on?

GALLINI: Absolutely. I loved Laura Ingalls Wilder and her Little House on the Prairie series. I must have read those books fifty times.

Q: What were you getting, I mean I was a guy. I never read those.

GALLINI: I was fascinated by the descriptions of life during the late 1800s in which she lived, and the way her family just forged its own beginnings over and over. It helped me understand what people faced as they moved west and settled more and more of the United States. When I finished my graduate studies and my doctoral dissertation I went back and re-read the whole series again. As a more mature reader I was really struck by how impoverished the family was. It was a realization I didn’t have when I read the books when I was younger. To me it was fascinating to learn about how people lived in the second half of the nineteenth century as pioneers. I still have all those books to this day.

Q: Were you much of a dreamer?

GALLINI: I remember as a child lying out in the grass and staring up at puffy white clouds and trying to make shapes out of the clouds. But overall I would say I’ve been a fairly disciplined person. Given my Dad’s experience the importance of a good education
was drilled into me. He used to say that a good education is something no one can ever take away from you. It is important for whatever you do with the rest of your life. It was just assumed that I would go to school, study hard and do as good a job as I possibly could. I was basically a straight A student pretty much all the way through high school, except for chemistry which we won’t discuss.

Q: I was going to ask in school, what were your favorite and less favorite studies?

GALLINI: I was always good in English and history. I was pretty abysmal in math and science.

Q: It sounds like you were really training from an early age to be a foreign service officer. That gets to be almost a constant. Not completely but....

GALLINI: I was told that girls did well in English and history and boys did well in math and science. It frustrated my Father to no end that I was a dunce in math because he could do virtually any kind of math in his head. But I focused on English and history and because I read so much I knew a lot of words. I liked words, and so it was fun to write; it was fun to read. Those were my strengths academically. I avoided sciences like the plague. Sometimes I wonder how I ended up working on nuclear non-proliferation for my career.

Q: What was your elementary school like there?

GALLINI: I am guessing that my elementary school was probably built in the 1930s. It was sort of a homey institutional building if I can put it that way. It was a brick building that was two or three stories high. Not terribly big. The classrooms all had windows so you could see what Mother Nature was doing outside. When I was in 6th grade my classroom faced out toward a hillside, and it was on that hillside that my parents were building our home, so I could practically watch the construction. There was one teacher per class. If you were lucky you got a good teacher. Most of them were pretty good teachers.

Q: Mostly women.

GALLINI: Mostly women. Our elementary school principal was a gentleman, but I don’t remember any other men on the faculty.

Q: Where did you go to high school?

GALLINI: My high school was about a stone’s throw from my elementary school. When I was in 7th grade the town built a new school that included 7th and 8th grades as well as high school. It was called Amity Regional High School and it served three communities. While it was being built my class in 7th and 8th grade was bussed to a neighboring community to go to school. The new school was finished by the time we started high school. Since it was only 3 1/2 miles from my home it was easy to go back and forth. By
the time I was in high school, my Mother and I had become increasingly close, and we had a routine. I would take the bus in the morning to get to school, and then she would be waiting to pick me up at the end of the day unless I had some after school activity. We would go home and sit in the kitchen and have a cup of tea and chat about the day. Then she would start fixing supper, and I would go do my homework.

Q: Were you involved in many extracurricular activities in high school?

GALLINI: I was always involved in music. I sang in our church choir, the high school choir, and was in the drama club. I even sang in a barbershop quartet for a bit. I was also involved in the German club for a while but that was mostly an excuse to cut German class.

Q: What was the dating pattern at high school in those days?

GALLINI: I guess high school life in some respects was similar to the way it is now in the sense that even though it was a very Anglo Saxon community and not ethnically diverse, the student body divided itself into different groups, different cliques. There were those who were considered attractive and popular and those who weren’t. But they weren’t called nerds back in those days. They were called eggheads. They were the students who were serious about their studies. I sort of fell into that category. My Father’s view was that I could date when I was forty-five years old but not a minute sooner. So I was never encouraged to date. But I did go on my first date when I was in 8th grade. My parents drove me to the 8th grade dance. My date was a boy who played in a band as the drummer. After that I did date some, much to my Father’s dismay. But I had a curfew. God help me if I came in two minutes after my curfew. To say that I was discouraged from dating would be putting it mildly. Studying was what I did primarily. At our high school there was a lot of underlying competition among the students who were serious about their studies. One of my friends who lived right around the corner was a very serious academic. I desperately wanted to be better than he was academically. So we had a very unspoken competition between the two of us. I think he ended up graduating 6th in our class.

Q: One of those things you will never forget.

GALLINI: Right. But you know we didn’t have to contend with the amazingly awful things that go on in schools today. There were no guns in schools. There were no drugs. People had barely heard the word marijuana. There was nothing resembling hard-core drugs. The biggest thing you could do wrong was get caught in the bathroom with a cigarette or a beer. Both of my parents smoked. I hated the way smoke smelled. I have never in my life taken a puff off of a cigarette because I hate the way it smells so much. So I was never tempted to smoke. I took a couple of sips of beer in high school and hated the way it tasted, so I wasn’t going to get caught smoking or drinking.

Q: It took me a long time to learn to like beer. I can remember my best friend sitting in his room and drinking Coke and taking an aspirin. That was supposed to do something?
That was our drug experience.

GALLINI: It was a much simpler life in so many ways when I was growing up. There was not in any way the focus on 24-7. Sundays were a day of rest, a day of family. The focus was on your community and helping your neighbors.

Q: Did you get down to New York from time to time?

GALLINI: I only remember going once to New York City when I was growing up. I was in 8th grade and we went to Radio City Music Hall and stayed at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. I remember not really liking the City because it was dirty. There was a lot of litter and when the wind blew you could feel dirt particles hitting your skin. That has certainly changed for the better over the years. But we didn’t really go out much at all. I think I was in the 6’11 grade when I went to my first movie. That was in downtown New Haven.

Going into New Haven was a big deal. We shopped mostly in a little community that was in between Woodbridge and New Haven. My Mother had a very predictable routine. Monday was laundry day. Tuesday was ironing. Wednesday was cleaning. I guess Thursday must have been cleaning as well because it was a big house. Friday was the day she would grocery shop. Every Friday morning my Dad would put $30.00 on the kitchen counter and she would take the money and go buy food for a family of four and pick up his shirts from the dry cleaner, and have money left over. Not too much, but a little bit. Back then you could feed a family of four on less than $30.00 a week.

Q: Where did your family fall politically?

GALLINI: Both of my parents were Republicans. When I was in high school, we had a social studies teacher who was a refugee from the Soviet Union. She was a very good teacher who made me realize that not everyone in the world lived the way I did. I think that was when I started becoming interested in what was going on in the world. I can remember junior and senior year in high school getting into political discussions with my Dad about what was going on between the United States and the former Soviet Union. We had drills when I was in school during which we would hide under our desks in case of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. So there was a real sense of an ominous entity called the Soviet Union.

Q: What about getting the news? Were you getting the Hartford Courier?

GALLINI: We got the New Haven Register, which my Dad would take to work. He also read the New York Times regularly and the Wall Street Journal. My Mother read the paper in the evenings after the dinner dishes were done. I really didn’t get into the habit of reading a newspaper until I was in high school. But every weeknight, I think it was at ten minutes to seven, we would have dinner about 6:30 and by ten to seven the radio would go on, and we would listen to Lowell Thomas bringing us the national and international news.
Q: He had that wonderful voice you know.

GALLINI: He did. He was very easy to listen to. So that was really was my main exposure to whatever news filtered into my brain.

Q: Did travel abroad or anything else ever come in. I mean did you think in terms of someday getting out and seeing the world, or were you pretty content.

GALLINI: We traveled very little. At the time my world was shaped largely by what was expected of me. I was to get a good education, go to college, get married and raise a family. Travel just wasn’t in the equation. My Dad only rarely took a vacation. I can remember going three or four times to the Atlantic Ocean seashore during the summer. My parents would rent a cottage for a week in Old Saybrook, Connecticut. My Dad loved the water, but my Mother did not know how to swim. There just wasn’t any place to swim on the farm in Illinois where she was raised. She was terrified of the water. She was terrified of the notion of her daughters going in the water. And of course being the immaculate housekeeper that she was, having sand tracked into the cottage from the beach was not her cup of tea. So she was not a happy camper going to the shore. My Dad enjoyed it but often he would go into New Haven to work, and then come back to the cottage for the night. So his definition of vacation was very truncated.

Q: Did you ever have trips getting into the car and driving up to Canada, things of that nature?

GALLINI: Once we went to Lake Champlain and rented a cottage up there. It was lovely. But because my Dad took so few breaks, we really did not travel much. I think my parents always expected to travel and do other recreational activities when my Dad retired.

Q: Well while you were in high school were you sort of being programmed to be a young woman of the 1960s? Were you focused on getting a good education and getting married and having children and being a mother and a wife and that sort of thing?

GALLINI: That is exactly what was expected of me.

Q: Was there any feeling of contradiction, I mean between getting a good education and then being sort of a housewife?

GALLINI: Back in the early 1960s what was expected of me was a very common expectation in our community. It was very consistent with what my friends were being told by their parents. The notion of the 1960s rebel was not something that crept into the world in which I was raised. I never really thought much about it.

Q: By the way, just going back to what is often a benchmark in people s experience. Did the election of 1960, Kennedy versus Nixon, your family being Republican. Did that engage your family and you and your imagination at all?
GALLINI: Absolutely. We talked a lot about it. During the campaign Kennedy visited New Haven and gave a speech at Yale. I can remember going into New Haven and joining the crowd on the sidewalks and watching all the cars going by taking him either to or from the speech. I don’t remember which. It was a big deal that a Catholic was running for President.

Q: Were you one of the jumpers? This was when young girls who were Kennedy fans were jumping up and down?

GALLINI: I wasn’t a jumper, but I was a cheerer. I was certainly taken with this very appealing, very handsome, very articulate young man who became our President. I can remember the exact spot where I was standing in my high school auditorium when we got word that Kennedy had been shot on November 22, 1963. I was at choir practice. My Mother picked me up after it was over and I went home and glued myself to the television for several days, crying the whole time. It was awful.

Q: When did you graduate from high school and what happened next?

GALLINI: I graduated from Amity Regional High School in June 1964 as a member of the National Honor Society. I was ranked seventh in my class of over 300 students. I had applied for four colleges. I was told to go to the best school that accepted me which turned out to be Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts. So that’s where I went.

Back in those days you filled out a lengthy paper college application form. Heaven help you if you misspelled anything because then you had to start all over again. All that you knew about the school is what you read in the school’s catalogue. You didn’t go visit the school. You didn’t stay overnight. If you were lucky you might know someone who attended it. But I knew Mount Holyoke by reputation only until the day we drove in and unloaded my belongings into the dorm. That was the beginning of my college education.

Q: What was the term so commonly used at Mount Holyoke?

GALLINI: The faculty and staff at the college often referred to the students as “Uncommon women in the age of the common man.”

Q: I know it well. I went to Williams College and Smith and Mount Holyoke were areas I explored as a young man. When were you there and what was it like? This was your first time away from home wasn’t it?

GALLINI: Yes, other than staying overnight with friends in the local community when I was growing up and attending a couple of week long summer camps. It was a complete change going from a world that was so comfortable and so completely familiar to a school I had never seen until I got there. It was a beautiful campus, very spacious with many beautiful old trees. But my freshman dorm was nothing to write home about. It was
a very typical dorm at that time. My room was called a “temporary double,” which meant it was a room for one person into which enough furniture was crammed to barely accommodate two people. It was so tight that you practically had to go out into the hall to turn around. Back in those days before you left for college you filled out a form about what characteristics you wanted in a roommate. In my case I think the school lost my form. About the only thing my roommate and I had in common was that we both liked to sleep with the window open. She was tall and lanky and seemed uncomfortable in her own skin. She was also very messy. You could practically draw a line down our very compact room. My bed was always made; hers never was. My clothes were always hung up; hers never were.

I very quickly discovered that I had to go to the library to study. I could not study in the dorm. To this day I am distracted by music. If I hear music, I focus on the music, not on what is in front of me. I could almost always hear some kind of music in the dorm. So I went to the library. I still remember trudging in the wintertime through the snow to get there. Those of us who studied in the library tended to be a pretty predictable bunch and you saw many of the same faces regularly. We all kind of picked out our own little spot in the library where we went to study. I had a favorite chair in the reading room where I would always go if it was empty and settle down to read and study.

I was extraordinarily unhappy my first year at Holyoke. I was homesick although I wouldn’t admit it. I didn’t really care for my roommate. But I did strike up a friendship with three other girls, Elizabeth Mueller, Leslie Luxemburg and Kendra Gaines. Kendra and I quickly discovered that we sang very easily together, and we became a duet.

Before long we were being asked to sing at various campus activities. Prior to Christmas break we went into the stairwells of the dorm where there was a charming echo, and we sang Christmas carols. All the way up the stairs the girls opened their doors to listen. It was a real bright spot.

My parents came for Parents Weekend in the spring of my freshman year. While she never said a word about it during the weekend, my Mother was experiencing dizziness and poor vision. At the end of the academic year I went home thinking that I was going to be modeling for the summer. I had gotten a job at one of the department stores in New Haven as a store model and I was very excited about it. As it turned out I never spent a minute doing any modeling because my Mom’s major surgery happened just after I got home.

She had a blockage in her carotid artery. Back in 1965 the medical world had not pioneered the medical techniques we have today. Her surgery was essentially experimental. Since she was a nurse, she knew she was a guinea pig but she was willing to try it. At that time the medical community was just beginning to develop the technique of cooling the body prior to surgery to slow the blood flow so there would be more time to complete the surgery. They gave her less than a 50-50 chance of surviving. But she got through it. I remember the day of her surgery as if it was this morning. I nursed her all that summer. That was the summer I started to learn to cook. It was not pretty.
Q: Did she recover from your cooking?

GALLINI: She tolerated it with great patience. She was always willing to give cooking advice but I rarely seemed to translate the advice into an eatable result. She was pretty much bedbound for that summer, which she hated. We had been close prior to her surgery but that summer we became very close. I spent hours and hours just sitting next to her bed. We would talk about anything and everything.

Q: What were her interests?

GALLINI: Her family. She was always interested in what her family was doing. Her biggest fear was to be a burden on anyone. She didn’t want to impose on anyone. She had a love of baseball that was almost a contradiction in terms because she was very petite, 5’2”, very ladylike, very proper, very well mannered, always cognizant of what the neighbors might think. But she was an avid baseball fan.

Q: Which team?

GALLINI: She was a big fan of the Dodgers, back in the days when the Dodgers were in Brooklyn. Just to be different I rooted for the New York Yankees. We had endless conversations about baseball and teased each other a lot about our respective teams. We also talked about my Dad’s gardens. She loved the flowers. She was not about to go out and get her hands dirty. She had her fill of that as a child on the farm and wanted no part of it. But she did enjoy being outside. And we talked about books and about what was in the newspaper. We talked about recipes. She was very much a homebody, very focused on making a warm and inviting home for her family and friends and taking care of them.

By the end of that summer my Mother was strong enough to take care of herself and she didn’t want me to get behind in my studies. So I traveled the eighty miles back to Mount Holyoke and started my sophomore year. By the time Christmas rolled around in between the first and second semester of my sophomore year, my Mother’s doctor said she had recovered. She could do anything she felt up to doing.

My roommate Elizabeth came home with me for Christmas in 1965. I had parted company with my freshman roommate and was rooming with Elizabeth Mueller. We roomed together sophomore and junior year. We were very close friends. She grew up primarily in Brazil, spoke fluent Portuguese, and often told me stories about growing up in Sao Paulo. I can still remember drifting off to sleep hearing stories about finding tarantulas in the dining room and what it was like to have servants. She, of course, could not go home for every holiday, so she came home with me for Christmas that year. We had a wonderful Christmas. Everyone was in good spirits. I remember my Mom cooking Christmas dinner. Thank heavens he cooked and not me!

I went back to school after the holidays but returned home immediately in late January after receiving a phone call telling me Mom was back in the hospital. She had a massive
stroke. On the 31st of January 1966 she passed away at Yale New Haven Hospital. I can still see the young man, probably an intern, coming out of the room where she died to tell the family she was gone. I remember saying to him, “It must be hard for you to do something like this.” But I was devastated. She was my best friend. By then my older sister had married and was no longer living at home. My father practically disintegrated under the weight of his grief. So I went from having a very close family to having what felt like very little.

Q: What was your relationship with your Father?

GALLINI: My Dad and I were very close when I was little but when I started growing up he became the very overprotective Father. We had a number of disagreements over things that are part of growing up like dating and curfews. During my teenage years my mother and I grew closer and closer. Of course the summer she was ill we were just inseparable. So it was incredibly hard to lose her.

Back in those days you buried your dead, and you went back to your life practically the next day. That is what I did. I went back to school. I can remember sitting in the library with a book in my lap in my usual chair just staring out the window. I could not function. Finally one of my professors asked me what was wrong. In those days the school did not notify your professors, so nobody other than my roommate and a few close friends knew that my Mom had passed away.

I started going home every weekend because my Dad was so grief stricken. There he was in the home my parents had built only five or six years earlier, all by himself. He went to the cemetery in Meriden every day to put fresh flowers on my Mother’s grave. My parents had put off so many of the things they wanted to do together until Dad retired. Now it was too late for any of those things. One of life’s lessons I learned is never put off doing things that are really important to you. Live every single day to the fullest.

Going home almost every weekend posed a bit of a challenge. I remember hitch hiking from Mount Holyoke to New Haven, usually with one of my friends. I rarely hitch hiked by myself. But back in those days it was not unusual for girls to hitch hike.

Q: We all did. It was a nice form of transportation. You got to talk to people. I mean I used to enjoy getting out and hitch hiking to places.

GALLINI: You never knew whom you were going to meet. It was great. I remember one gentleman who spoke almost no English but did speak German, and so we chatted with me using my limited German. It worked. Trying to get home by bus was practically hopeless. You had to get from South Hadley to Springfield, then from Springfield to Hartford and then from Hartford to New Haven. It took between five and six hours. But if I hitch hiked, most of the time I was home within an hour and a half, or two hours at the most. Of course I never told my Dad I was hitch hiking.

By the time my spring break rolled around in my sophomore year my Dad’s younger
brother Uncle Ray had decided my Dad needed a change of scenery and he whisked us off to Acapulco, Mexico where we stayed in a resort for a week. It was the first time I was ever on an airplane. I can remember how lovely the stewardesses were and how elegant their service was. Back then, flight attendants were almost all attractive young women. Occasionally you’d come across a young man who was a steward. But it was far more common to have young women tending to the passengers. These women were dressed in stylish attire distinct to each airline. They served good, hot meals on real china set on white linen cloths. I remember being very impressed -- quite unlike air travel today.

At the time I was dating a young man who was a student at Yale University. When we got back from Mexico he and I went to a movie on Saturday night. I planned to go back to Mount Holyoke the next day. About 10:30 that night I developed a sharp pain in my side and I asked him to take me home. So bless his heart, he loaded his bicycle into the back of my Mother’s car that I had driven from Woodbridge into New Haven. He didn’t have a car; he just had a bike. He drove me home, took his bike out of the back of the car and biked back to Yale at 11:00 at night. I’m not sure how many miles it was, but it wasn’t close.

I always checked in with my Dad when I was home from a date. So I went in and he was in bed but he wasn’t asleep. I just said, “Dad, I’m home and I’m going to bed; I don’t feel good.” That is all I said. But he came up to my room about forty-five minutes later to check on me. I was just doubled up in pain.

It turned out I had appendicitis. Back in those days you could call your family doctor at any time during the night and that is exactly what Dad did. After the call he whisked me off to the emergency room. My sister Dee was living in New Haven. She and her husband Al were graduate students at Yale Divinity School. They met my Dad and me at the hospital and I was taken into surgery immediately. I had a great big incision and I spent a week in the hospital and then another week at home. By the time I went back to Mount Holyoke I honestly don’t know how I finished that semester. I was hopelessly behind in all of my classes but somehow I passed them all.

I think what got me through this time was singing with Kendra. We did a lot of singing together. We were even on television once. It was a lot of fun. She spent the summer with me at the end of my sophomore year. Before we went to Woodbridge we went to visit her parents in Chicago. Her Mother was a gourmet cook and she had designed her small kitchen perfectly. She could stand at the kitchen sink and reach practically everything in the kitchen from that one spot. She gave me a lecture about cooking because I told her how much I hated it. She told me I could learn a lot about the world by cooking, including geography, history, religion and much more.

For some reason I took her lecture seriously. After Kendra and I went back to Connecticut, my Dad brought home a cookbook written by one of his clients. I started reading this book and following the directions. We did not have a small kitchen. We had a kitchen in which you could walk miles fixing one meal. The countertops provided enough space to spread out every pot and pan we owned which is precisely what I did. I
created some of the most awful messes you have ever seen in a kitchen. But I actually got interested in cooking, and people started saying, “Hey, this tastes pretty good.” That was the beginning of my continuing interest in cooking.

The summer of 1966 I worked in a women’s clothing store in Hamden, Connecticut. Among other things I developed the art of stuffing oversized women into smaller bathing suits than they really ought to have tried. But it was an interesting summer. Kendra and I did a lot of singing in and around New Haven. I also started dating a gentleman who happened to be African American, and learned a lot from him. In the fall I went back to Holyoke for my junior year, and Kendra went off for junior year abroad in England. That put an end to our singing at the time.

By the beginning of junior year you were supposed to declare a major. I came pretty close to flipping a coin between English and Political Science. But I chose Political Science. The teachings and experiences of the woman who had been my social studies teacher in high school stuck in my brain and I was increasingly interested in the fact that I lived in big wide world with so much to learn. In my senior year I wrote a thesis on Japan using what was then a new methodology known as quantitative analysis. I never really mastered the doctrine. To me it still is a very artificial exercise to try and use mathematical modeling to predict human behavior. But that was in vogue back then.

Q: You must have caught it just when it was really beginning because it has taken over and quite frankly sort of ruined the whole field of political science. It seems you have a bunch of people running around looking for the alchemist’s stone or something.

GALLINI: The quantitative approach to analyzing historical or social events is something that to me is very artificial and contrived.

Q: Because it is worthless.

GALLINI: While I was struggling with my thesis I walked into my advisor’s office in the middle of my senior year realizing that the expectations with which I was raised were a bit of a problem. Here I was in college. OK, I checked that box. I was going to graduate; I was supposed to do that. Then I was supposed to get married and have a family. Well there was a small problem. I wasn’t really dating anybody seriously. It was clear to me that I was not going to do what some of my friends were doing, which was to graduate and get married. So I did the only thing I knew how to do, which was to go to school.

I asked my advisor “Who has the best East Asian Studies program in the country?” She said, “The University of Michigan, but you won’t get in there.” I thought Hmm, OK. At Holyoke I was not the all-star student that I had been in high school. Like many other students I discovered that I’d moved to a new level when I got to college and there were a lot of girls who were smarter than I was. I was beginning to sort out some of my conflicting feelings about life in general while I was in college, as so many college students do. At the time continuing my studies seemed to be a whole lot more do-able than getting married. So I applied to several graduate schools and was accepted at the
Q: This would be ‘68.

GALLINI: Correct. I graduated in the spring of 1968. I had stayed at Mount Holyoke not because I wanted to but because it was the last thing that my Mother knew about my life. I was incredibly unhappy there for the most part and the day I left was one of the brightest days of my life. I have never gone back.

Q: Well looking back on it, was there a beginning of sort of awakening of the new woman? Was that happening or not?

GALLINI: That did not happen until I set foot in Ann Arbor. In August 1968 we loaded up my possessions and my Dad drove me west to Ann Arbor, Michigan. I had never been there and I didn’t know a soul. After a bit of hunting we found a one-bedroom apartment and moved in my stuff. My Dad had basically said, “Look, I paid for your college education. You are going to have to come up with the funding to go to grad school.” I was getting a bit of a stipend from U of M. But I knew I would be looking for a job, so I wanted to be right downtown so I could walk to wherever I needed to be since I didn’t have a car. The apartment was on Thompson Street which was a great location.

After we signed the lease my Dad left to drive back to Connecticut. I guess I had been in the apartment maybe two hours when there was a knock on the door. Since I didn’t know anyone in town other than the rental agent I assumed that was who was knocking. It was August. It was hot. There was no air conditioning. I opened the door. There stood two guys in shorts and tee shirts, one taller that the other, obviously moving into an apartment. As it turned out their place was right down the hall. The taller of the two said to me, “You left your key in the door.” I said, “Oh thank you very much.” Indeed I had left my key in the door. It was after all the first time I’d ever used a key to lock anyplace where I lived.

That is how I met my husband. Marc Gallini and his roommate, Ed Kronk, were moving into an apartment a couple of doors down from mine. Marc was beginning medical school and Ed was beginning law school. On that day I met two people who became part of the rest of my life. Ed was dating a girl named Margaret Dixon who was just starting her own graduate work at Michigan State University in East Lansing. She came to Ann Arbor for Labor Day weekend, which coincided with my birthday. The four of us stayed up much too late drinking orange juice spiked with, I can’t remember if it was vodka or gin. We had a terrific weekend and did a lot of laughing. Marc and Ed had a very tiny apartment with bunk beds, another one of those go-out-in-the-hall-so-you-can-turn-around kind of places. So Margaret stayed with me. The four of us bonded like long lost close relatives. It was just immediate friendship.

U of M was everything Mount Holyoke wasn’t from my perspective. It was booming and bustling and diverse. There was so much going on. Marc and I went to see Judy Collins in concert on our very first date. Everywhere you went on campus there was a list of
coming attractions and movie theaters. South Hadley, Massachusetts doesn’t even have a movie theater, or didn’t back then. I don’t know if it does now. For me it was the beginning of wow, it is an incredible world!

Q: What about in ‘68 Vietnam. What was happening there? How did you feel about it?

GALLINI: As a political science major at Mount Holyoke I tried to follow the course of the war. The New York Times had pretty much daily coverage about what was going on in Vietnam. I practically foamed at the mouth over what I regarded to be an incredibly misguided war pursued by a very misguided administration. Other students didn’t seem to be as opposed to the war as I was. I tended to get a reaction of “You don’t say. Oh, (yawn) gee, what is for lunch?” I mean it was a very passive community by and large. Having gone through my Mother’s illness and her death, I was not inclined to be a 1960s rebel. I wasn’t out demonstrating. I wasn’t out rebelling. It was only when I got to Ann Arbor that I could relate to those people who were still speaking out against what was going on in Vietnam.

Being the academically oriented and slightly pragmatic soul that I was, I knew I had to pay my rent. I found a job with a Japanese professor at the School of East Asian studies who was working on a book. Back in those days you did not have computers; you had manuscripts. In order to move a paragraph or a sentence or a word, you had to cut the words out of the manuscript and physically move them to a different location. So that was my job, to follow his edits and to move different parts of the manuscript. I started working for him right after I arrived in Ann Arbor. He came in on a Saturday morning in late September or early October, and found me at work. “What are you doing here?” he asked. I sort of backed off a bit and said, “Well I’m doing my job.” He said, “Why aren’t you at the football stadium?” That was my introduction to U of M football. I had grown up knowing that Yale had a football team. But even though my Dad was a Yale graduate and we lived near New Haven we very rarely went to a Yale football game.

Football at the University of Michigan was totally different from anything I had ever experienced about the sport. Marc, Ed and I very quickly became addicted U of M football fans. Fortunately you could get student tickets for pretty nominal sums. So going to a football game on a Saturday became a very common occurrence.

Meanwhile I was taking an intensive Japanese language class from 8:00am to 10:00am every weekday, as well as a full course load, and studying for classes, especially Japanese because you were supposed to study at least two hours a day out of the classroom for every two hours of class time. I was also working 20 hours a week. It was pretty demanding. But I absolutely loved it.

One of the first people I met when I started my intensive Japanese language class was a young man named Thomas J. Miller. Tom was still an undergraduate and we hit it off practically from day one. I still remember not too long after I met him I walked into class and said to him “What’s wrong? You look green!” He replied, “I got engaged last night.” He was engaged to his childhood sweetheart, Bonnie Stern. They had both grown up in
Chicago, were U of M undergrads and went to graduate school at U of M. They both became lifelong friends. Tom and I developed a very friendly but very real academic competition between the two of us. It was quite intensive and a terrific incentive.

Q: It is good to have a pacer. That is very important.

GALLINI: He was a definite pacer, very hard charging and motivated, but very down to earth, a lot of fun. The master’s program in which I was enrolled was a two-year program. By the middle of my second year, Tom and I started kidding each other about what we were going to do next. He was also getting his masters in East Asian studies. His focus was on China while mine was on Japan. So we bet each other that neither one of us would get into the PhD program at the U of M Political Science Department. Indeed, when I turned in my application for the program I remember one sort of fatherly figure who was a Political Science professor explaining to me that “My dear, it is a very quantitative program, and you are coming from an area studies program that is not at all quantitative.” It focused on things like culture and religion and history, and didn’t have any kind of math involved in it. I thought to myself, OK, I will never be quantitative and I won’t get accepted. But I will always focus on history and culture and religion and tradition to try and understand another culture. For many years I regarded this approach as a way to try and walk a mile in another person’s shoes if I can put it that way. I want to understand as best as I can what it is like to grow up in a very different world from the very sheltered life I had as a child.

The long and short of it was both Tom and I were accepted in the PhD program. We worked our tails off. We both got our PhDs in August 1975. I have a picture of Tom and me in our backyard in Ann Arbor, Michigan where my husband and I had a 10 foot x 10 foot vegetable garden. We had a little patch of corn in the garden. Tom and I thought it was appropriate to be standing by the corn since we had written a good deal of corny stuff in our PhD dissertations.

Q: What was the title of your dissertation?

GALLINI: The title of my dissertation is “Implementation of International Safeguards in the Japanese Context.” If I had it to do over again I’d probably call it “Implementing Safeguards in Japan.” But back in my graduate student days I thought I was supposed to come up with a fancy and somewhat wordy title so that’s what I tried to do.

One day when I was about mid-way through my doctoral studies I was waiting for an elevator in the U of M School of Graduate Studies. A gentleman whom I did not know came up to me and introduced himself. His name was Dr. Lawrence Scheinman. I did not know it at the time but I had just met another life-long friend.

Dr. Scheinman offered me a summer research job. It turned out he was a Professor of Political Science whose office was adjacent to my advisor’s office. Being a hungry graduate student, I immediately said, “Sure, I would love a summer research job.” Then I asked, “Doing what?” He said, “Studying international safeguards.” I said, “International
“WHAT?” I then spent the summer learning about something called the international safeguards system. It is a unique international inspection system applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based in Vienna, Austria.

The IAEA was created in 1957 as one of the tools the international community was attempting to develop to manage a new and horrific threat to international security. When nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world very quickly came to grips with something never previously experienced. Since that time the world has continually faced the fundamental dilemma of how to manage nuclear material and technology. This dilemma is grounded in the reality that nuclear has a split personality. On the one hand nuclear materials and technology can be used in a whole host of ways for many peaceful purposes. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the world was just beginning to get an inkling of the incredible scope of peaceful nuclear applications. On the other hand the sobering reality of what had happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki made it clear that some kinds of nuclear materials and technology could also be used for the most destructive purposes ever devised by humanity. From the very beginning of the nuclear age countries have grappled with the goal of maximizing the many contributions nuclear materials and technology can make in peaceful programs while at the same time minimizing to the extent possible the prospect for nuclear materials and technology to be used in nuclear weapons for horribly destructive purposes.

As the principal pioneer of nuclear technology the U.S. sought at the end of World War II to maintain a monopoly over this technology as a way to limit its dissemination to other states and minimize prospects for its misuse. This approach quickly became unsustainable. Scientists from several other countries, including Canada and South Africa, were involved in the Manhattan Project that created the first nuclear weapons. Both Germany and Japan had fledgling nuclear programs discovered in the aftermath of World War II. Clearly the horse was out of the barn and it wasn’t going back. That reality forced the United States and other countries beginning their own work in the nuclear field to address the critical necessity of crafting tools to manage this new technology effectively. The challenge of managing nuclear material and technology in ways that permit its peaceful uses and constrain its non-peaceful uses goes to the heart of preserving both U.S. and international security.

One of the key components of what has become known as the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is the IAEA. In his famous “Atoms for Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly in 1953, President Eisenhower called for the creation of a new international organization. At the time visions of a new organization were ambitious. Some envisioned creation of essentially an international nuclear commerce exchange organization in which the new organization would retain control over nuclear material and contract it out to states under specific conditions. But by the time the IAEA actually came into existence in 1957 it was a far more modest organization than initially envisaged. The Soviet Union raised concerns about the degree to which an international organization would have control over its sovereign nuclear program and basically rejected any expanded mandate for the new international organization. The proposed new international safeguards system to be applied by the IAEA was similarly scaled back.
significantly in scope. The first safeguards measures were applied only to assistance provided by the IAEA to its member states.

When the IAEA opened its doors in downtown Vienna, Austria in 1957 it had three main components- the Board of Governors, the Secretariat and the annual General Conference. At the time there were some initial proposals about how an international safeguards system should be structured. But in reality the safeguards system existed in name only since its actual parameters had yet to be defined. In September 1958 Japan requested the IAEA to supply three tons of natural uranium for a research reactor. This request for nuclear material was the first of its kind to be made to the Agency, and it provided the motivation for the IAEA’s Board of Governors to begin consideration of a set of safeguard principles. Final agreement on these principles was not achieved until March 10, 1961 when the Board approved the first draft of the IAEA’s safeguards system. The specifics of this new system were published by the IAEA as Information Circular 26 or INFCIRC/26 (official IAEA documents are numbered as “Information Circulars” or INFCIRCs).

The new safeguards system was distinctly limited. The procedures outlined in INFCIRC/26 covered requirements anticipated for the immediate future and related only to reactors with less than 1 00 MW thermal output, to the nuclear material used and produced in these reactors and to small research and development facilities. At the time it was expected that additional safeguards measures would be defined as the need arose.

By the time I encountered the safeguards system as a graduate student, the system had evolved considerably. Much of this evolution was due to the entry-into-force on March 5, 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or NPT. Forty three states were original signatories. By this time, as recognized by the NPT, there were five nuclear-weapon states, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. Many officials around the world involved in nuclear issues believed there was a very real possibility that the number of nuclear-armed states would continue to increase until twenty or thirty countries possessed these weapons. There was also a growing consensus that if more countries acquired nuclear weapons, it was more likely that these weapons would be used again with horrific consequences.

The NPT represents a key component of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and its entry-into-force provided a major impetus for strengthening international safeguards. The Treaty requires all non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA providing for comprehensive safeguards on all nuclear material under the jurisdiction or control of the state. This requirement for so-called “full-scope” or comprehensive safeguards coverage created a new standard for the safeguards system which heretofore had provided piecemeal coverage of individual nuclear facilities in states but not necessarily comprehensive coverage of all nuclear material in a state.

The requirement for comprehensive safeguards in the NPT also led to a major revision in the ways in which the IAEA applied safeguards. In the early 1970s a new set of
safeguards measures pursuant to the NPT were negotiated and became the new “gold standard” for states’ acceptance of safeguards. This new, more comprehensive safeguards system became known as NPT safeguards, or for the nuclear cognizant, INFCIRC/153.

Nuclear weapons were a new reality for my generation. People understood that these horrible weapons could destroy our world, and that the consequences of using them were so horrific that they should never be used again. Today the threat of their use remains very real but I think there is less understanding by the citizens of our world about how very real this threat remains. In today’s world people are more likely to identify terrorism or climate change as critical threats to U.S. security. But sadly the security threat from nuclear weapons remains very real and very serious.

In my mind it is a miracle that the world has not witnessed the use of nuclear weapons since the end of World War II. There are many reasons why this is the case. Part of it is just dumb luck. But much of it is due to the extraordinary, dedicated work of professionals around the world who are working to preserve and strengthen the treaties, international organizations, bilateral agreements, export controls and other measures collectively known as the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. I believe this work is even more important today than it was at the outset of the nuclear age.

So there I was, a graduate student in the early 1970s with a professor offering me an opportunity to work on something called international safeguards. I got hooked. The convergence of my interest in Japan and my interest in the safeguards system led to my dissertation proposal to study the way in which an international organization -- the IAEA -- interacted with an individual country -- in this case, Japan -- to implement effective international measures called safeguards.

The safeguards system is fundamentally a technical system, but it exists in a very political world. Countries are very concerned about preserving their national sovereignty and do not relish having international inspectors come in to look at their nuclear programs. At that time and to this day countries want to know the precise terms and conditions under which the inspectors will work. They want to be able to protect their industrial secrets.

Japan has few indigenous energy resources and in the 1970s Japanese leaders felt strongly that Japan needed to develop a secure internal supply of electricity to fuel its vast industrial complex. To meet this need the Japanese made a decision years ago to develop the entire nuclear fuel cycle and to expand their reliance on nuclear power. The nuclear fuel cycle refers to all the steps necessary to mine uranium, process it, use nuclear fuel and dispose of waste. But certain steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, including both enrichment and reprocessing, can also provide access to the nuclear material needed to develop nuclear weapons. This reality highlights the fundamental dilemma of how best to manage nuclear material safely and securely without increasing the prospect for the spread or proliferation of nuclear weapons. This concern was particularly relevant to Japan. Japan’s involvement in World War II clearly demonstrated its drive for dominance in the region. Countries in Asia have long been concerned about the prospect for Japan to
acquire nuclear weapons.

My dissertation proposal to study the IAEA and the way it interacted with the Japanese nuclear community was approved by the Department of Political Science and the University. To pursue my research I applied for grants and was honored by the decision of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to support my work. Under the terms of my grant from Carnegie I was to visit the IAEA in Vienna before going to Japan. It turned out that the cheapest way to do this was to buy an around-the-world ticket. So that is what my husband and I did.

Q: When did you get married?

GALLINI: Marc and I were married in May 1972. We dated on and off during the four years he was in medical school and we married just before his medical school graduation. My grant from Carnegie covered my airfare but not his. We had a ton of student loans and virtually nothing in savings. So to fund his travel, Marc worked in an emergency room in Cadillac, Michigan during the summer of 1973. His schedule was 24 hours on, 24 hours off for the whole summer. He was a brand new wet-behind-the-ears doctor seeing just about every God-awful thing that walks into an emergency room. But by the end of the summer he had earned enough money to match my grant from Carnegie so we could purchase around-the-world tickets and pursue my research.

The tickets came with some conditions. We were allowed to make as many stops as we wished. But each flight had to be at least 50 air miles in the same direction. We couldn’t back-track and we couldn’t fly north or south more than a couple of hundred miles. So we mapped out a route that took us several months and went to 10 different countries.

My professors at Michigan predicted that I would have easy access in Vienna to staff at the IAEA but would find it quite difficult to meet with nuclear experts in Japan. As it turned out, my experience was quite the opposite. In the fall of 1973 the IAEA was still located in its original building “on the ring” which refers to the old wall that used to surround the inner city. One of the first people I met at the IAEA was a gentleman named David Fisher. Mr. Fisher directed the IAEA’s Department of External Relations. He was from South Africa and described himself as the oldest denizen of the IAEA. He had been there many years. His office was small and cramped but larger than many of the other offices used by IAEA staff. Space was quite limited and you practically had to climb over one staff member to get to another one.

If a non-nuclear weapon state joined the NPT it was required under the Treaty to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA pursuant to the model safeguards agreement negotiated in the early 1970s known as INFCIRC/153. That is what Japan was doing when I arrived in Vienna. Since I was only in Vienna for a month I was anxious to talk with as many members of the Safeguards Department as possible, but there was a real sensitivity among IAEA staff about talking with outsiders while negotiations with Japan were proceeding. So it took time for IAEA staff to be willing to open up a little bit and actually talk to me. When they did talk I got a broad array of views from safeguards...
practitioners about the strengths and limitations of the international safeguards system. At that time the safeguards system was divided into several components, including inventorying nuclear material in countries and record keeping. It also involved on-site inspection by IAEA inspectors at states’ nuclear facilities. This raised continued concerns about the scope of inspections and the prospect for industrial espionage. As a result, states were only willing to allow international inspectors on their soil under very scripted agreements between themselves and the IAEA.

There had been a difficult and protracted debate in the Japanese nuclear community over whether or not to join the NPT. It was finally decided that Japan’s long-term interests in acquiring the entire nuclear fuel cycle would be better served by joining the Treaty rather than remaining outside of it, even though this would increase the cost and intensity of international inspections at Japan’s nuclear facilities. At the time a number of Japan’s nuclear experts made the case that Japan could not build up its reliance on nuclear power behind some kind of smoke screen. Japan’s nuclear program needed to be as transparent as possible to reassure the international community that Japan was not misusing nuclear material to create nuclear weapons.

Q: Well why wouldn’t they want to be? I mean they were the only country to suffer from nuclear weapons. I would think they would be in the forefront of wanting to show that they were no threat to anybody.

GALLINI: Well, on the one hand they were motivated to be transparent. They certainly had a unique understanding of the terribly destructive power of nuclear weapons. But on the other hand they also had one of the most advanced nuclear programs in the world and potentially were vulnerable to industrial espionage. The Japanese have practically made an art form out of importing Western technology and improving it. That is precisely what they did in the nuclear realm. They have long been on the cutting edge of pioneering new nuclear techniques. In the Japanese nuclear community at that time there was a definite sensitivity to being the focus of both international suspicion and international inspection.

Marc and I had a terrific month in Vienna. It was both professionally productive and personally a lot of fun. We loved the old-world, elegant feel of the city and I spoke just enough German to navigate around and see its many attractions. Our time there passed very quickly and soon we were off on more travels. Thanks to our around-the-world airline tickets we made several stops, including Rome, Athens, Moscow, New Delhi, Hong Kong and Taipei, before flying to Tokyo. It was nighttime when we flew into Tokyo and I remember staring out the window at the lights of the sprawling city below the airplane wondering how in the world I had gotten myself into this situation and how I was ever going to meet, let alone interview, Japan’s nuclear experts.

By sheer happenstance I had a letter of introduction to a very senior professor at Tokyo University written by a Japanese scholar who was visiting Ann Arbor. Thanks to his letter I was able to meet this professor who turned out to know virtually everyone in the Japanese nuclear community. For whatever reason, the professor took me under his wing, and he introduced me to someone who was, at the time, a very senior official in the
Japanese nuclear community. His name was Mr. Yoshio Kawashima, Executive Director of the Nuclear Materials Control Center. Mr. Kawashima in turn took me under his wing, and introduced me to one senior official after another after another. You could not have asked for a more welcoming, open, and delightful group of individuals.

It is a simple fact that all of my interlocutors in Japan happened to be male. I think it is fair to say that I was a novelty at the time. In the early 1970s it was still pretty unusual to see Americans other than U.S. military personnel in Japan. And it was definitely unusual to have a female from the United States pursuing research on the Japanese nuclear program, particularly in relation to international safeguards, at a time when Japan was negotiating its NPT safeguards agreement. But everyone was unfailingly polite and helpful in so many ways. Not only did a broad range of nuclear experts talk to me, sometimes for extensive periods, but also they arranged for me to visit different nuclear facilities in Japan. In particular I visited a very sensitive nuclear facility then under construction known as the Tokai reprocessing plant.

As noted previously, reprocessing is one of two stages in the nuclear fuel cycle that can provide access to nuclear material that can be used in nuclear weapons. The fact that Japan was building a reprocessing plant was a very sensitive issue for many countries. At the time the Japanese recognized this, and they knew that they had to be very open about what they were doing. But they also wanted to protect their technology because they were pioneering new approaches to a reprocessing plant that would allow it to be more efficient and less costly.

I can still recall my visit to Tokai. Our guide was a delightful and knowledgeable escort and I enjoyed the tour very much. As we were walking I happened to see some of the construction workers looking in our direction and dropping their tools. I guess it was a bit unexpected to see a Western woman with long blond hair wearing a hard hat at the site.

It was an extraordinary four month s. I had interview s almost every day. Marc took it upon himself to be my tour guide since I have no sense of direction and he certainly does. Getting around Tokyo at that time was challenging. There were few street signs, and I could barely read the ones we saw. Before we left Ann Arbor a colleague at U of M had given me the name of a student center in Tokyo where we might get help finding lodging and possibly meet other American students. It took some doing but we finally found the center and met an American couple there, Dave and Nan Rahn.

Dave’s parents were missionaries in Japan and he had grown up there. Unlike me, Dave spoke fluent Japanese. But he looked very Western and towered above the average Japanese with his 6’2” frame and blonde hair. Dave and Nan became good friends while we were there. One of my favorite memories was a time when Dave was asking directions from a Japanese policeman. The policeman said to him, “I am sorry, I don’t speak English.” Dave said, “I understand, but if you listen very carefully you will realize that I am speaking to you in Japanese.” It was a wonderful example of the very real perception among the Japanese that if you were Caucasian, you couldn’t possibly understand a word of Japanese. The fact that I made the effort to use my very broken
Japanese amazed many Japanese who clearly appreciated this effort. I knew just enough of the language to be dangerous! You can get yourself into a Jot of trouble very quickly in Japanese because there are three levels of politeness, and different endings on different words indicate how polite you are trying to be. Of course I was always trying to be as polite as possible but rarely managed to come up with the right words. Fortunately for me the entire Japanese nuclear community spoke English because at the time English-language skills were essential to studying and working in the nuclear field.

Q: When did you leave Japan?

GALLINI: We left in March 1974. We hated to go. I had interviewed almost 40 senior officials and others in the Japanese nuclear community about what it meant to have an international presence scrutinizing the Japanese nuclear program, what the Japanese nuclear program meant to the country in terms of energy security, and the implications of Japan’s leading role in nuclear technology. It was an absolutely fascinating experience.

Whenever I wasn’t doing interviews or research we saw as much of the country as our very limited budget would allow. Japan is a beautiful country. We had met several other Americans who were in Japan for various reasons and had a couple of wonderful adventures with them. One of our favorite experiences was with Dave and Nan. Dave’s parents had a cottage on a lake in northern Japan. It was in what the Japanese call snow country. It was the peak of the winter and we took a train to this marvelous lake. The lake itself was completely unfrozen but everything around it was covered with deep, deep snow. We had to dig down through the snow banks to get to the cottage and pry our way in through the door. We melted the snow for water while we were there. When you looked out the window you would see an incredibly bright blue lake surrounded by a totally frozen landscape. But the lake never froze because it is a warm water lake.

We spent a few days in Kyoto and loved every minute. At the time Kyoto was a remarkably serene and peaceful place where you often heard Buddhist monks chanting. People everywhere were incredibly helpful and kind and respectful. Our biggest culture shock after being out of the country for several months was going to Honolulu and discovering how rude Americans can be. But it was an extraordinary four months.

Q: Let me ask a couple of questions. in the nuclear establishment, in the first place, where had these people come from and gotten their training? Who were they?

GALLINI: Many of Japan’s nuclear experts at that time trained in the United States. After World War II the U.S. occupation of Japan had fundamentally restructured the country and opened many doors for Japanese students to go to the U.S. Virtually all of Japan’s nuclear officials spoke very good English. In the early days of the nuclear era the place to learn about nuclear was in the United States, and nuclear-related studies were conducted in English. This meant that students from other countries interested in nuclear issues had to learn English, which was an amazingly fortuitous combination for me given the woeful state of my foreign language skills.
Many of the Japanese students trained in nuclear science in the United States went back to Japan to build up its nuclear program, which was widely viewed as the only guarantee of energy security for Japan. For a country with limited natural energy resources, nuclear power offered a reliable way for Japan to generate electricity. So the Japanese were very committed to building up their program. At that time Japan did not have a problem with public acceptance of nuclear power. There was nothing like the very strong anti-nuclear power sentiment that developed in the United States in the 1970s and beyond.

The fact that Japan is the only nation to experience the horrors resulting from the use of nuclear weapons created a very strong national sentiment in support of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. It was a very dynamic sentiment. People very strongly opposed nuclear weapons, and, at the same time, strongly supported building up a peaceful nuclear program. Yet inherent in that peaceful program was the technology and material that could allow Japan to develop a nuclear weapon. This reality meant that Japan could go forward with its peaceful program only if it could reassure the international community that it was not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Japan’s acceptance of the IAEA’s safeguards system became a crucial means by which Japan could demonstrate the transparency of its nuclear program to the world.

While Japan’s involvement with the safeguards system was very important, it did not always guarantee a harmonious relations hip between Japan and the IAEA in the early 1970s. The IAEA was continuing to develop the safeguards system using new equipment and safeguards techniques. In some ways the Japanese felt they were guinea pigs for safeguards development since some of the new safeguards measures were first used in Japan. The IAEA was trying to figure out how to apply safeguards to increasingly sophisticated nuclear facilities in the most cost effective manner while Japan was working to create a more advanced nuclear program. It was probably inevitable that tensions between IAEA personnel and Japanese nuclear official s arose from time to time. For me it was a very interesting time to be in Japan and witness the dynamics between international and national officials.

**Q:** Where were the Japanese as far as their electrical energy production? Was a significant part coming from nuclear power?

GALLINI: Yes, the percentage of electricity generated from nuclear power has increased over time as Japan’s nuclear power program has expanded.

**Q:** Was there a problem at that time with the disposal of the fuel?

GALLINI: In the early 1970s nuclear waste management was not yet a major concern in Japan. But even in the early stages of developing their nuclear program the Japanese recognized that they had to deal with the spent nuclear fuel burned in reactors. They did so by using an interim solution and stockpiling the fuel onsite at the reactors in spent fuel storage ponds. As needed they kept building additional storage at reactor sites. There was discussion about building a central waste disposal site in Japan as well as discussion about shipping spent fuel to what was then the Soviet Union. In a controversial step Japan
opted to ship some of its spent fuel to France for reprocessing. At the time and to this day this was considered by some states, including the United States, to be a very sensitive subject. When nuclear fuel is burned in a nuclear reactor a new man-made element called plutonium is created (plutonium does not occur naturally). When spent fuel is reprocessed the plutonium can be separated from other nuclear waste products. Plutonium is one of two types of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons can be fabricated. In the early 1970s Japan had a growing nuclear power program and increasing amounts of spent fuel containing a steadily growing amount of plutonium. When Japan’s spent fuel was reprocessed, either in France or more recently in Japan, this provides access to a very sensitive material from which nuclear weapons can result.

Q: Was the nuclear program completely in the hands of the government?

GALLINI: At the time it was very difficult to draw a line between the nuclear industry and the government in Japan. In this country there are very clear divisions between our industrial sector and the government and at times the two can be adversaries. In Japan in the early 1970s there was very much a partnership between industry and government. It was a strong and harmonious relationship. Some critics alleged that the government existed only to promote Japanese industry. It was certainly not an adversarial situation.

Q: Did the people you were talking to express nervousness about nuclear development in China, and also especially in the Soviet Union?

GALLINI: The United States of course was the first to acquire nuclear weapons. But by the mid-1960s the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China were also nuclear weapon states. When we were in Japan from November 1973 to March 1974 there was something of an uneasy relationship between Japan and China. China certainly had not forgotten the harshness of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria during World War II. For its part Japan was sensitive to the fact that China was a nuclear-armed state. Japan was also quite sensitive to what was happening in Korea, and in particular the split between North and South Korea. Japan had a very real concern that South Korea might aspire to have nuclear weapons. The Japanese recognized they lived in a potentially unfriendly neighborhood. They had nuclear weapons to the north, nuclear weapons to the west. They certainly didn’t want additional countries in their region acquiring nuclear weapons. Meanwhile some of the countries in the region kept a watchful eye on Japan, knowing that it certainly had the technical and material capacity to acquire nuclear weapons if Japan chose to do so.

Q: When you left Japan did you return to the U.S.?

GALLINI: Yes. We left in late March 1974. It was very cold, and the home we were renting at that time did not have central heating. Very often when we returned in the evening after the adventures of the day, it would be at least as cold inside as it was outside. We would turn on the gas stove and the space heater and heat up some sake to try and ward off the chill. We had planned to stay until the end of March but I had finished my interviews and we realized it was a lot warmer in Honolulu than it was in
Tokyo! So we hopped on a plane and went to Honolulu where we were meeting my Dad. He had planned to get there a little bit ahead of us, but instead we met him at the airport. I can still see the look of absolute delight on his face when he laid eyes on us.

We spent several wonderful days in Honolulu and then flew back to Michigan. I went into splendid isolation for almost a year while I wrote my dissertation. My chief companion for that year was our dog. His name was Hector and he was a mix of poodle and something else so I called him a Schmoodle. We had a small home in Ann Arbor with a second story that was our guest room. I set up shop in our guest room, and would go up in the morning with a schedule in my head about how much writing I needed to do that day and stuck to it as religiously as I could. Whenever I couldn’t stand concentrating and writing anymore I would sit on the floor and howl with Hector. We could howl in harmony pretty well! He was my stress buster.

Q: What was the focus of your dissertation?

GALLINI: Back in those days, Graham Allison had written a book called the Essence of Decision. It outlined levels of decision making. He defines systemic decision making as sort of the wide world of forces over which we don’t have much control. Then there is the organizational level of decision-making, and the individual level of decision making. I attempted to apply his model loosely to the relationship between an international organization and the national organizations of the Japanese nuclear program. I have no idea whether I did a great job, an abysmal job, or somewhere in between. All I know is the University of Michigan accepted my thesis. Eventually I did get my PhD.

Q: Well what did you plan to do with your PhD?

GALLINI: Somewhere along the line I had read a book about the British civil service. According to the analysis British civil servants tended to be the ballast in government and kept it from going from one extreme to another in its decision-making. As a result decisions tended to be more informed and conducive to problem-solving. It occurred to me that being a U.S. civil servant could be a way to serve our country.

When we were in Japan, I had met several officers at the U.S. embassy. One of them, Myron Kratzer, who was the science counselor, gave me the name of a gentleman in Washington, D.C. who worked on nuclear issues at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). His name was Charles Van Doren. While we were still in Japan I wrote to Mr. Van Doren, introducing myself and explaining that I was in Tokyo doing my doctoral research on the Japanese nuclear program, and would be interested in talking to him about a job. I never heard back from him. So when we got back to the United States, and I was writing my dissertation and howling with my dog, I wrote to Mr. Van Doren again. I never heard back from him. I finished my dissertation, got my PhD and wrote Mr. Van Doren a third time. Again I never got a response. Finally it occurred to me that I probably wasn’t going to get a job with the U.S. government by sitting in Ann Arbor, Michigan and writing letters. So I went to Washington, D.C. for a week and pursued what was then the time-honored tradition of pounding the pavements to look for
a job. When I first arrived in Washington I telephoned Mr. Van Doren who was unavailable.

I was in Washington for a week. This was long before the days of networking and internet resumes. I didn’t know anyone in the city. I really didn’t have any names other than Mr. Van Doren’s. So I used phone books from the different Federal agencies where I thought I might like to work and looked to see if they had any kind of international relations department or section. If they did I called whoever was head of the office and asked for an interview. To my total amazement I had roughly 40 interviews in that one week. Not one single person turned me down. I regarded it as absolutely extraordinary. Of course all of my interviews went pretty much along the same lines. I spoke with a variety of people, all of whom said, “Keep in touch, here is my card, but I don’t have any jobs at the moment.”

Soon it was Friday morning and I was scheduled to go back to Ann Arbor late in the afternoon. About 8:00am I picked up the phone and dialed Mr. Van Doren’s phone number. Lo and behold a male voice answered the phone. I said, “May I speak to Mr. Van Doren please?” A male voice said, “May I ask who is calling?” I identified myself. There was a long pause, and I heard this male voice say, “I’ve been expecting to hear from you.” It was Mr. Van Doren.

He invited me to lunch that day, and we had a wonderful conversation. We knew so many people in common. He was both charming and the quintessential absent-minded professor type. He graduated from Harvard in 1946. After about thirteen years practicing corporate and financial law on Wall Street he became interested in nuclear non-proliferation issues and joined ACDA. He was involved in negotiating the NPT and became a walking encyclopedia on U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy.

After our delightful lunch he said to me, “Well we don’t have any jobs. But keep in touch.” So I got on the plane and went back to Ann Arbor. I called him in January. He had nothing. I called him in February, and there was nothing available. By March I decided it was time to go back to Washington and pound the pavements some more. So I went back and my first phone call was to Mr. Van Doren. He asked “Where are you?” I said, “As a matter of fact, I am in the lobby of the State Department.” ACDA was one of the smallest Federal agencies and was physically located in the main building of the U.S. Department of State. It only had about 200 employees. He said, “Why don’t you come up. We might have a job.”

He introduced me to his boss, and I chatted with him. Mr. Van Doren’s boss then introduced me to his boss. The long and short of it was I met with everyone even remotely connected to the hiring process including the Director of ACDA, Dr. Fred Iklé. At the end of the day I was offered a position under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA). The IPA essentially allows universities to lend personnel to government agencies for one year. Federal agencies reimburse the universities for the cost of the detail.

I later learned that ACDA rarely hired anyone “off the streets.” Not only did you need
genuine technical expertise but also you needed a connection in the “old boy network.” Virtually all of the professional staff at ACDA were men. But at that time the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was pressuring ACDA and other Federal agencies to hire more women. So senior ACDA staff decided to take a tentative step with me. Since they weren’t offering a civil service position they didn’t need to make a long-term commitment. The initial offer was just for one year. After about six months I was told I could compete for a permanent position. So I went through the process of applying for and competing for a civil service position, and was hired officially by ACDA.

Q: This was when?

GALLINI: I started at ACDA on September 7, 1976. By September 1977 I was in a full-time career position.

Q: Where stood your husband in all this?

GALLINI: While I was writing my dissertation, my husband worked at a medical clinic in Chelsea, Michigan, a convenient drive from Ann Arbor, with a doctor who was both a mentor and a very good friend. It was a good job and Marc enjoyed the work. But he decided he was perfectly willing to pack up and leave for Washington D.C. That was quite a major decision for a husband at that time!

When it became clear that I would have at least a one-year position at ACDA we started searching for a new job for Marc. Our friends Tom and Bonnie Miller had moved to Washington when Tom landed a job at the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Service Officer. They copied the medical sections of the Yellow Pages in the Washington D.C. and northern Virginia phone books and mailed them to us. On a manual typewriter we typed a letter of introduction that inquired about possible employment and we made 50 copies of it. Then we mailed a copy to all the places my husband had identified from the Yellow Pages where he might be interested in working. Within 36 hours we got a phone call from a doctor in northern Virginia who said, “I am really interested in talking to your husband. When you come out to Washington we want to take you to lunch and show you our practice.” It turned out to be a doctor with a partner who had a very busy Family Practice in Mount Vernon. So my husband joined them. That is a saga unto itself. But it became a very compatible, very productive, and very enjoyable relationship that lasted many years.

Q: Well then let’s go back. In 1977 you actually held a civil service position in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This was the end of the Ford administration leading into the Carter administration. Could you talk a bit about what ACDA was like at that time?

GALLINI: ACDA was an extraordinary organization staffed in large part by very experienced professionals. The depth of knowledge and expertise on nuclear arms control issues, the former Soviet Union, and nuclear technology was extraordinary. I was assigned to the bureau dealing with nuclear non-proliferation. The bureau was staffed by
about thirty amazingly bright officers who all happened to be male. It was located in the old section of the State Department and Mr. Van Doren’s office was one of the most historic offices in the building. I can still remember my first staff meeting. The room was barely large enough to hold all of our office staff and we were quite crammed. And there I was -- thirty guys and me. I could understand very little that was said. Back then there was no such thing as a new job orientation. All of these gentlemen clearly knew what they were talking about but I certainly didn’t.

It didn’t take long to realize that none of my new colleagues had a clue about what they thought I should be doing. Everyone was polite but very focused on the work being pursued. I was assigned to share an office with another staff member. He was going through a very difficult time in his marriage. I spent the first couple of months in my new job trying to help him decide whether or not to keep his marriage together.

I finally concluded that no one was going to instruct me about how to do my job so I started meeting with each individual officer to find out more about who they were and what they were doing. Each of them except one was very accommodating and very willing to chat. The one exception just looked at me and said, “What are you doing here?”

It quickly became clear that it was a very busy time for U.S. nuclear policy. The Ford Administration was working to finish a major examination of this policy across the board and how it should be conducted. The ink on the study was barely dry when the Ford Administration ended and the Carter Administration took over on January 20, 1977. As a nuclear engineer, President Carter understood the nuclear fuel cycle and its vulnerabilities to misuse. He sought to limit access to nuclear materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons, specifically high-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (PU). To do this the Carter Administration proposed changes in some of the ways international nuclear commerce was conducted. Some other governments felt the proposed changes would limit nuclear cooperation by changing established patterns of cooperation, and in essence deprive other countries of the benefits of nuclear technology. This led to quite an outcry from a number of other states that objected to what they saw as the restrictive nature of the Carter policy.

In response the Carter Administration launched an initiative known as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, or INFCE. This international study group set up individual working groups to examine specific stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The basic goal was to reduce or eliminate the prospect for nuclear weapons proliferation from the development of the nuclear fuel cycle. The term “proliferation resistance” was commonly used at the time. INFCE produced an enormous amount of activity in the international nuclear community during the Carter Administration. INFCE working groups met all over the globe. These groups were managed by a senior oversight committee that also met in different countries.

I was assigned to work on INFCE working group VI that dealt with nuclear spent fuel management. I had been in my job for six months or so when I told Mr. Van Doren that I
was pregnant. I could practically hear him muttering “Oh what now? She’s been on the job six months and now is likely leave in another six months. Why should we hire women when all they do is get pregnant??” Our son was born in October 1977, just thirteen months after I was first hired.

About two months before my son was born, my immediate boss, Rick Williamson, appeared at my desk. He was a Foreign Service Officer at the time and very interested in nuclear issues. “So,” he said. “What are you going to do about working after the baby is born?” I replied, “I have no idea.” And indeed I had no idea. Here I was in a professional world that was pretty much all men. It was a time when there were very few professional women, especially in the nuclear field. My mother was gone. We had no family in the area. My sister and her husband, a Presbyterian Minister, lived in up-state New York and were very busy with their children and my brother-in-law’s church. So I really didn’t know what I was going to do except I knew I had to figure it out. Rick looked at me and said, “Why don’t you consider working part time?” I said, “Oh, that sounds like a great idea.”

I went to the personnel office in ACDA and was told that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had a policy on part time employment for Federal employees but it had never been applied in ACDA. I asked whether a part time arrangement could be worked out for me. To my absolute amazement my boss and his boss said, “Sure you can work part time. How many days do you want to work?” I said, “Well how about three days a week.” They said, “That would be fine.”

The day our son Brian was born my world turned totally upside down. All of a sudden I had a whole new set of priorities and responsibilities. Overnight my professional career suddenly slid decisively down my priority list and being a mother soared permanently to the top.

But after three months I went back to work three days a week. I was still assigned to work on INFCE Working Group VI that was wrestling with a range of nuclear spent fuel management issues. There were concerns about where and how long to store spent fuel. Should it be disposed of in a permanent repository, and if so, where? Should it be reprocessed? If so this could greatly increase access to plutonium, a very sensitive material. Across the international nuclear community there were a variety of views concerning how to deal with these and other spent fuel management issues.

The day I returned to work after Brian was born was the beginning of a new learning process regarding how to juggle the demands of home and family and two careers. There were no role models to emulate. So-called “Women’s Liberation” was just beginning to surface. So my husband and I just made up our own approach as we went along. It wasn’t easy. We were living about twenty-five miles south of Washington, D.C. in the town of Lorton, Virginia. At the time Lorton was a rural backwater, noted only for the Federal penitentiary located there. Our little community was close to the Potomac River and we had some wonderful neighbors. One of our neighbors cared for Brian for about two years and then our next-door neighbor took over his care while I was working. She became his
second Mother. From the time Brian was born until he started kindergarten, I worked part time. As he got older I slowly increased my time in the office. What amazes me still is that it worked reasonably well. My colleagues knew when I was at work and helped me make the best use of my time there. They also knew they could call me at home if need be. This was long before cell phones and the internet and telecommuting.

Q: Going back to the Carter administration when you came in, you say the focus became more on restricting certain types of nuclear cooperation. Did that come from Carter himself?

GALLINI: I believe it did come directly from President Carter. He was very concerned personally about what he saw as the very real risk of nuclear weapons spreading.

Q: Could you describe the attitude in ACDA toward the other nuclear-weapon states, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China?

GALLINI: Then, as is certainly the case now, there was a lot of common ground among the United States, the United Kingdom and France. France has a major civil nuclear program that generates about seventy-five percent of France’s electricity. The French are a supplier of electricity to countries in Europe. All three countries were wary about the Soviet Union. The Chinese back then were kind of a sleeping dragon. There was some, but relatively modest dialogue with China. But China had not yet become a major international presence.

Q: Were the Chinese going for electricity generation or were they pretty much pursuing a weapons program?

GALLINI: At the time China had a fairly modest nuclear weapons program. My recollection is that China was motivated to acquire nuclear weapons principally for the prestige they felt this capability would give them. I don’t recall an active bilateral nuclear dialogue with China at the time. But there was a very active U.S. dialogue with several European countries including Germany, Belgium, France, United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Spain as well as Japan. All of these countries were concerned about having sufficient access on the international nuclear market to the technology and materials they needed to go forward with their own civil nuclear programs. They were also concerned about whether nuclear energy would be a reliable resource for them not only in the 1970s but also in the years to come. They saw the Carter policy as a roadblock to smooth international nuclear cooperation. The Iranian hostage crisis shifted a lot of international attention to this issue but nuclear-related concerns remained.

Q: What were you doing during the Carter administration?

GALLINI: The main thing I was doing was trying to juggle the responsibilities of being a parent and being a professional. I used to think that every day was “mission impossible!” My boss who had suggested that I work part time told me that once I had a child I would never feel like I was doing the best job either at home or at work and that I would always
feel pulled one way or the other. That was one of the most accurate predictions I ever encountered.

It took time for me to figure out the nature of my job and what was expected of me. Nobody sat me down and explained to me how ACDA fit into the realm of Federal agencies or what the clearance process was or how to write the many different types of documents used in the foreign policy process. I just had to figure it out.

I learned very early on that one of the most important resources available was our secretaries. They were extraordinarily helpful and kind and they knew how to navigate in the bureaucracy and get things done. Back in those days a number of secretaries in ACDA were very skilled in the countless details involved in clearing and finalizing a broad array of different documents that informed policy makers and assisted in decision-making. It was quite an education for me since it was very different from the academic world I had known for so long. I worked for eight years in ACDA and in many respects it was like being part of an extended family. Many of the colleagues with whom I worked became life-long friends.

Q: Did you find yourself working on any particular set of nuclear issues?

GALLINI: Yes. Much of my work focused on ways to strengthen the NPT and the IAEA, both widely regarded as the bedrock of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. One of my early tasks in ACDA was to promote additional adherence to the NPT. This meant identifying those countries that had not yet joined the Treaty and crafting approaches to persuade them to join. And I worked on the review process related to the NPT. I also started learning the complexities of the Federal budget and the ways the U.S. supported the IAEA financially. Being a “fund raiser” for the IAEA started early in my career and continued throughout much of it. Overall I focused on the multilateral aspects of the non-proliferation regime during my career.

Q: What were some of the problem countries outside of the NPT?

GALLINI: When I started at ACDA in 1976 my colleagues often referred to the “naughty nine” or the “dirty dozen” countries suspected of aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons. The suspects included Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, India, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan. Over time and for a variety of reasons, several states suspected of harboring nuclear weapons aspirations joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and became advocates of non-proliferation. South Africa, which dismantled its existing nuclear weapons and became a strong voice against nuclear weapons proliferation, is a particularly striking example.

Q: What about Israel?

GALLINI: Israel was a special case. Israel remains a special case. Israel is a very difficult conundrum for many of those who work on nuclear issues.
Q: Well it is widely understood that Israel has nuclear weapons, is it not?

GALLINI: When I was a junior officer in ACDA, very few countries in the Middle East were NPT parties. We made a major effort to promote adherence to the Treaty in the region. I can still remember the talking points I wrote that were used in many Middle East capitals. They asserted that if countries joined the NPT this would put pressure on Israel also to join. One by one all but one country adhered to the Treaty. Only Israel remains outside the NPT. And it wasn’t long before the other countries in the region turned our talking points around and urged the U.S. to make a concerted effort to get Israel to join the Treaty. It actually is official U.S. policy to promote universal adherence to the Treaty but I don’t know how often we have raised this with Israel. But at that time there were a number of countries that had not yet joined the NPT so I had plenty to do.

It wasn’t long before I became involved in the NPT review process. Under the terms of the Treaty, five years after it entered into force the states party to the Treaty were to hold a “conference of Parties... in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.” The Treaty also provides the option of holding subsequent conferences every five years. The first so-called NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1975. Additional conferences have been held every five years since (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995,2000, and 2005). To prepare for a Review Conference or “RevCon,” a two-week Preparatory Conference or “PrepCom” is held in each of the three years preceding the Review Conference. In other words, there is an international NPT-related meeting four out of every five years, with the fourth year being the Review Conference itself. While the first RevCon was held in Geneva, the majority of PrepComs and the RevCon itself now take place at the United Nations in New York.

In 1975 the first RevCon produced a consensus final document that was seen as a useful guide for how countries should deal with a broad range of nuclear-related issues. The meeting was regarded as a “success” since it forged considerable agreement on these issues. The next NPT Review Conference in 1980 was deemed a “failure” since it did not produce a consensus final document. The results - - or lack of results - - at these meetings played a considerable role in shaping international perceptions of nuclear issues. In no small way RevCons help shape the context in which the world addresses these issues. After the 1975 RevCon there was a sense of some satisfaction among NPT parties that they were dealing effectively with nuclear challenges. After the 1980 RevCon there was more of a sense of disharmony, and a feeling that the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including notably the NPT, was faltering in some ways.

In 1981 some of my colleagues in ACDA were beginning to discuss preparations for the 1982 PrepCom that would launch preparations for the 1985 NPT RevCon. While I was involved in some of these discussions I was more focused on moving to a new job in the State Department. I had been hired into a position in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) with a promotion. Shortly after I started my new job one of my ACDA colleagues who had been involved with the 1980 NPT RevCon tracked me down and said, “Gallini, you have to go back to ACDA and work on the 1985 NPT Review Conference.” I said, “I
can’t do that. I just accepted a job in NEA. They are giving me a promotion. I am going to work on nuclear issues in the Middle East.” “No”, he insisted, “you have got to come back.” The next thing I knew the gentleman who was my boss in ACDA was in my new office offering me a promotion to return to ACDA and work on the 1985 NPT Review Conference. I decided to accept the offer and went back to ACDA.

I found it quite a challenge to try and shape the outcome of a major international meeting that was at the time three years into the future. There was the 1975 model regarded as a “success” and the 1980 model that was deemed a “failure.” Yet looking back on these events I felt there were some useful lessons to be learned. In particular I believed it was important to engage as many NPT parties as possible in the RevCon process, listen to their views regarding the Treaty and encourage them to consider the ways in which the NPT served their security and economic interests. I also came to believe that the “success” or “failure” of any RevCon should not be defined by the presence or absence of a consensus final document. For me the true measure of a RevCon’s “success” was determined by the degree to which NPT parties actively participated in the RevCon process and expressed strong support for the Treaty.

At that time, much of the U.S. diplomacy prior to the 1985 RevCon was aimed at Western Europe and Japan, with little interaction with developing countries. Yet more developing countries were joining the NPT. So in 1982 and 1983 we began an effort to engage as many countries as possible in what became known as NPT diplomacy. We sought both to remind those governments that were already NPT parties that their security was better served through clear support for the Treaty, and to convince those countries outside the Treaty to join it.

We started a multi-year effort with a cable to all of our embassies tailored to whether their host government was or was not an NPT party. We wanted as much input as possible from all of our embassy personnel worldwide about what approaches would work best in dealing with each individual country on NPT issues. We sought information on the key decision makers, particularly those involved in nuclear issues for their governments. We asked many questions. What kind of approach does the government take to nuclear matters? Are they pro or are they anti? How does the population feel about nuclear issues? How vested is the country in anything nuclear? What does the embassy recommend about influencing decision makers? How can we best get our message across? Should we do it in talking points or a paper, newspaper editorials or a public diplomacy campaign or some combination of approaches? What does it take to get this country to become a genuine supporter of nuclear non-proliferation? We got back a whole host of different answers and we tried very hard to tailor our diplomacy to what our embassies advised. We spent a lot of time getting materials translated into other languages so they could be readily used by our embassies. Over time my colleagues and I built up a fairly comprehensive overview of how countries felt about the NPT and what role they were likely to play in the NPT review process. We used this information throughout the run-up to the 1985 RevCon.

To launch the work of the preparatory process for the 1985 RevCon we proposed an
informal caucus of NPT parties on the margins of the 1982 UN General Assembly. The idea was to get as many parties as possible engaged in NPT issues and to keep them engaged throughout the run-up to 1985. After the caucus we engaged NPT parties in as many venues as possible, including a variety of multilateral meetings and an extensive campaign by senior U.S. officials involved in NPT issues to conduct bilateral consultations with a broad range of NPT parties in their capitals. Our goal was to know all of the key players on NPT issues internationally, how they viewed the NPT and the NPT process and what role they were likely to play at the 1985 RevCon itself. By the time the 1985 RevCon convened the head of the U.S. delegation as well as many delegation members were personally acquainted with many of the delegates from other countries and were often on a first-name basis with them.

Even as this work was progressing, President Reagan took office on January 20, 1981. Very quickly it became clear that he was determined to reverse the Carter nuclear policy and to re-establish the United States as a “reliable supplier” in nuclear commerce. One of President Reagan’s principal advisors in the nuclear realm was a gentleman named Richard Thomas Kennedy. During the transition from President Carter to President Reagan, Kennedy joined the U.S. Department of State as Under Secretary for Management. Kennedy had previously served many years in the U.S. Army and as a Commissioner at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Once he arrived at the State Department, Kennedy began spending more time on nuclear issues than on management. Finally Secretary of State Al Haig asked him whether he wanted to remain Under Secretary or serve as the President’s Special Representative on nuclear issues. Kennedy opted for the latter. Under President Reagan, Kennedy became the U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the U.S. Representative to the IAEA. He served with the rank of Ambassador under both Presidents Reagan and Bush. For the twelve years of his tenure, Kennedy ran U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy with authority and in-depth knowledge of the issues. Some referred to him as the U.S. “Nuclear Czar.”

As it turned out, I did not attend the 1985 RevCon. In 19841 was offered a position in the Bureau of International Organizations (10) in the Department of State to serve as the desk officer for the IAEA. My predecessor left me incredibly big shoes to fill. His name was Tom Gabbert. Tom had suffered from polio when he was a teenager, and he walked with a distinct limp. But he was fiercely independent. There was no way his physical limits were going to limit his professional career. He had worked on IAEA issues for more than twenty years, including at the U.S. mission in Vienna, Austria where the IAEA is located (the U.S. is represented by its embassies in different countries and is represented by its missions to international organizations). He had worked at the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA), the predecessor organization to the U.S. Department of Energy. He was steeped in nuclear issues.

Tom had been selected for a senior management position in ACDA. When I was selected as his replacement in 10 he became both my mentor and my dear friend. Underneath his gruff exterior was a heart of gold, and he was unfailingly kind and patient in dealing with my daily pleas for guidance. I well remember the day I got a call telling me that Tom had
slipped in the State Department cafeteria and broken his leg. This came at a time when
the U.S. was dealing with some difficult issues at the IAEA and Tom’s expertise was
greatly needed. Despite the pain from his injury Tom consistently offered guidance and
support to those of us trying to cope with these issues.

I moved into the IO Bureau in September 1984. On my first morning I was presented
with an 18-page single space list of 10 acronyms. This was my orientation to the IO
Bureau. During my first afternoon in IO I boarded an airplane and flew to Vienna to
attend my first official meeting at the IAEA. I guess that is a pretty clear example of “on
the job training!”

Q: How did we view the IAEA at the time, its staffing, its effectiveness, its way of
operating?

GALLINI: In the 1950s when the IAEA was created, there was considerable enthusiasm
about developing the potential of nuclear technology. Nuclear power was expected to
generate cheap electricity - - the slogan at the time was “electricity too cheap to meter.”
The relatively few countries with nuclear programs were just beginning to get an idea
about how many so-called “non-power” nuclear applications there could be - - applications
in medicine, agriculture and industry for example. But countries were not willing to allow
a new international organization to encroach on their national sovereignty. As a result,
the IAEA began its existence as a small and modest international organization. For its
first fifteen or twenty years, it was an international forum for nuclear scientists and
technical experts mostly from Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. to meet and discuss
their research and mutual interests in nuclear development in a very low-key and quiet
environment.

It wasn’t until the end of the 1970s that this environment began to change. More
developing countries joined the IAEA. As membership expanded, political issues began
to creep into IAEA meetings, including its Board of Governors meetings. The Board is
the executive body of the IAEA and plays a significant role in formulating and directing
the Agency’s work. The number of seats on the Board increased over time, from the
original 23 to the current size of 35 as membership in the IAEA continued to grow.

One of the first political issues to impact the IAEA in a significant way was the issue of
apartheid. Under the complex formula in the IAEA Statute determining the composition
of the Board, South Africa had consistently served on the Board as the most advanced
country in nuclear technology from Africa. A number of countries, notably from Africa,
took issue with South Africa being on the Board because of South Africa’s policy of
apartheid. In the late 1970s Egypt replaced South Africa on the Board, an action seen by
many as a violation of the IAEA Statute. It was probably the first time political reality
prevailed over the provisions of the Statute.

Political issues intruded even more emphatically when Israel bombed the Osirak reactor
in Iraq in June 1981. This action touched off a major political crisis.
**Q:** Was Iraq a signatory to the NPT?

GALLINI: Yes. Iraq was one of the original parties to the NPT. As a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, Iraq was obligated to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material under its jurisdiction or control. At the time of the Israeli attack the Osirak reactor was under international safeguards. Acceptance of safeguards is widely regarded in the international nuclear community as an important indicator of a state’s willingness to be transparent with its nuclear program. At the time the raid on Osirak was seen as an attack both on Iraq and on the safeguards system and there was an onslaught of criticism against Israel.

At the September 1981 meeting of the IAEA General Conference, Arab states made a concerted effort to suspend Israel from the IAEA. The IAEA General Conference meets once a year and is open to all IAEA member states. It provides a useful forum for senior officials from many states to meet and discuss nuclear issues of interest. Until 1981 the General Conference was typically a predictable and largely unremarkable event. But in the aftermath of the June attack on Osirak, a number of countries convened in Vienna at the annual General Conference convinced that punitive action should be taken against Israel.

The IAEA Statute does not provide for expelling a member state from the IAEA but it does provide under Article XIX for “suspension of privileges” if “a member ... has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute ...” Suspension of a member requires a two-thirds majority of members “present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors.”

Israel’s attack on Osirak put the United States in a very difficult position. On the one hand the U.S. was the principal advocate and supporter of the IAEA and had been since the inception of the Agency. On the other hand, the U.S. has had a special relationship with Israel since Israel’s creation. Not surprisingly, the U.S. made the most determined defense of Israel possible at the 1981 General Conference. The irony of the U.S., a staunch supporter of nuclear non-proliferation, defending Israel, long suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, was not lost on states participating in the General Conference. At the end of the day the Arabs settled for a symbolic gesture of suspending IAEA technical cooperation with Israel that amounted to a very feeble slap on Israel’s wrist.

Efforts to penalize Israel for attacking Osirak became an enduring issue at the annual IAEA General Conference. They continue, largely in symbolic form, to this day. But at the 1982 General Conference the Arab states intensified their efforts to suspend Israel from the IAEA.

In 1982 the General Conference convened just as extensive efforts to select a new IAEA Director General were culminating. The IAEA Director General or DG heads the IAEA Secretariat and is the chief administrative officer of the IAEA. He is appointed by the Board of Governors for a four-year term and takes direction from it. He is also the
principal liaison between the IAEA and its member states.

By 1982 IAEA member states had very little experience in selecting the DG. The first DG was Mr. W. Sterling Cole, an American who served one term from December 1, 1957 to November 30, 1961. The second was Dr. Sigvard Eklund from Sweden. Eklund served five terms as DG from December 1, 1961 to November 30, 1981. When he announced his intention to retire he touched off an international search for his replacement. It proved to be a very difficult task.

At the time U.S. officials involved in finding a suitable replacement for Eklund took the matter very seriously. There was quiet and broad agreement among many countries that Eklund’s replacement could not come from one of the five recognized nuclear weapon states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China). There was also tacit agreement that a representative from the developing world was not likely to have the stature and expertise needed for the position. Finally it was agreed that a Swede could not follow a Swede who had held the job for twenty years. In a series of interagency meetings U.S. officials drew up a list of desirable characteristics for the IAEA’s next DG, including demonstrated management skills, broad familiarity with the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and strong support for the international safeguards system.

As the search continued a number of candidates emerged, including representatives from Germany, Mexico, Japan, the Philippines and elsewhere. In one of his Cabinet meetings President Reagan decided the U.S. should support the Japanese candidate as a means to ease tensions with Japan over trade issues. Those of us immersed in the day to day details of trying to find Eklund’s successor were concerned that Japan’s candidate, who was very intelligent and capable, might not prove to be a strong advocate for safeguards. As a result the U.S. voiced modest support for Japan while continuing the search for additional candidates.

During the summer of 1982, the IAEA Board repeatedly met in special session to vote on the various candidates vying for the DG position. (It is worth noting that the Board traditionally seeks to reach decisions by consensus and at the time voting by the Board was quite unusual.) While the voting process eliminated one or two of these candidates, overall the Board remained deadlocked on Eklund’s replacement. My colleagues and I drafted countless demarches to other governments trying to figure a way out of this dilemma and identify a candidate who could command genuinely broad support. The last thing I did before I went on vacation that summer was to clear out a cable to Stockholm strongly urging the Swedish government to come forward with a candidate. At that stage in the process U.S. and officials in other countries had abandoned that notion that a Swede could not follow a Swede as DG. Sweden was deemed a credible and impartial source for a candidate who would be even-handed and broadly acceptable to the global nuclear community. In response to pleas from the U.S. and others, Sweden did in fact come up with a candidate. My colleagues and I worked frantically to generate the broad support necessary for this candidate to be approved by the Board prior to the September 1982 General Conference that had the final say on his selection.
Ultimately we did finally manage to get broad support for the candidate, who was largely unknown to the international nuclear community at the time. One of my colleagues in Vienna, Peter Brush, told me that after the Board endorsed the Swedish candidate, he had run into the Swedish Ambassador in the halls of IAEA and said, “Oh Mr. Ambassador isn’t it wonderful? We have now selected the Swedish candidate to head the IAEA.” The Swedish Ambassador smiled and said, “Yes it is very nice, and now may I present to you Dr. Hans Blix.” Dr. Blix was the Swedish candidate who would now serve as the DG of the IAEA. I still remember four years later when Blix gave his acceptance speech for his second term, he said, “I can only assume this time around governments know who they are getting.”

Before becoming DG, Blix had served briefly as the Swedish Foreign Minister. He proved to be a superb choice to head the IAEA Secretariat. When he joined the IAEA on December 1, 1981 Blix knew little about the organization or its portfolio. But he was an incredibly smart and fast learner. He proved to be as even handed as we had hoped the new DG would be. He certainly came in for occasional criticism over the sixteen years he served as DG. But during his tenure the IAEA developed significantly as its membership increased and its responsibilities and programs expanded as well.

Even as the 1982 IAEA General Conference was endorsing Dr. Blix as Director General it was also dealing with efforts by the Arabs to oust Israel from the IAEA. The Arabs had introduced a resolution that, if approved, would suspend Israeli participation in the remainder of the 1982 General Conference. The resolution had gone to a vote and was narrowly defeated. With the issue seemingly decided the President of the General Conference moved on to the next agenda item. Discussion had begun on this item when a representative who had been absent during the vote addressed the Conference saying he wanted to re-open the voting. The IAEA Legal Advisor was asked whether this could be done and he responded affirmatively, not realizing at the time that his ruling was a violation of the UN Rules of Procedure. So the President re-opened the voting, the representative voted in favor, and the resolution was adopted.

It was about 4:00pm on Friday afternoon so the operative consequence of adopting the resolution meant that Israel could not participate in the final hours of the General Conference which ended that Friday. However, prior to the General Conference the U.S. had conducted a worldwide campaign urging that no punitive action of any kind be taken against Israel at the General Conference and asserting that if such action was taken, the U.S. would withdraw from the IAEA, and reassess its membership in it. Immediately after the resolution was adopted the entire U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador Kennedy, packed up its briefing books and walked out of the meeting. When delegation members called back to Washington and reported what had happened, the officers in Washington backstopping the delegation were dumbfounded. The United States had just withdrawn from one of the most important international organizations whose work was crucial to U.S. national security. Now what?

When the U.S. delegation returned to Washington those of us involved in IAEA issues
faced the very difficult question of how gracefully and credibly to reverse the U.S. departure from the IAEA and re-insert the U.S. as a member in good standing. It was unthinkable for the U.S. to remain outside the IAEA for any extended period of time. The U.S. had proposed creation of the IAEA and led the work to create the Agency. It was the principal source of support for the organization, both financially and technically. At the time approximately one hundred Americans were working for the IAEA. It was critically important not to disrupt U.S. support for the international safeguards system.

Yet the U.S. had removed itself from the IAEA.

At the time there was a Republican Senator from Wisconsin named Robert Kasten. Senator Kasten led an effort to have the U.S. Senate pass a resolution stating that the United States could not resume participation in the IAEA until the Secretary of State certified to the Congress that Israel was a member in good standing at the IAEA. This led to intense negotiations among Ambassador Kennedy, Senator Kasten and others in the Administration to determine how such a certification could be made. Kasten decided he wanted a letter signed by the Secretary of State affirming that Israel was a member in good standing at the IAEA. Without such a letter the United States could not provide its full funding to the IAEA. The so-called “Israeli certification letter” became an annual requirement that continues to this day.

Clearly the withdrawal of the most influential and important member of the IAEA just as he was assuming his new portfolio as the IAEA’s Director General was not a smooth beginning for Hans Blix. But there was an intensive effort in Washington to devise a means for the U.S. to resume participation in the IAEA and take its place on the Board of Governors in time for the Board’s February 1983 meeting. By February Senator Kasten had agreed to accept a letter from the Secretary of State certifying that Israel was a member in good standing at the IAEA and Blix had conducted extensive consultations with other IAEA members to ensure that the U.S. could smoothly resume participation in the IAEA. So the U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador Kennedy, unceremoniously appeared at the February 1983 meeting of the Board of Governors. Kennedy was well known to other Board members and he went around the Board room shaking hands like nothing had ever happened.

Q: Why was Senator Kasten so involved in IAEA-related issues?

GALLINI: Kasten was involved in IAEA issues only to the extent that Israel was involved. He was one of Israel’s biggest supporters on Capitol Hill. I had the impression at the time that he was very engaged with others who lobbied Congress to support Israel’s interests. In any case he was Israel’s ardent advocate. He was less than enthusiastic about the United States resuming its participation in the IAEA. I don’t think he was particularly interested in nuclear issues or in the IAEA and he probably saw little merit in U.S. support for the IAEA. So it was an uphill effort to get his agreement to have the U.S. re-engage with the IAEA but Dick Kennedy and others pulled it off.
I think both Hans Blix and Dick Kennedy heaved a big sigh of relief when they encountered each other at the February 1983 Board meeting. Both were delighted to have the U.S. reinstated in its leading role at the IAEA. The two of them became good friends. There was rarely a day that Kennedy wasn’t on the phone with Blix. From the beginning of the Reagan Administration until the end of the George H. W. Bush Administration there was no doubt in the international community about who was in charge of U.S. policy on nuclear issues. Every foreign official visiting Washington who was dealing with nuclear issues made it a priority to see Dick Kennedy.

Q: Did you have much contact with Israelis?

GALLINI: Some. Every June we would begin our efforts to mitigate action against Israel at the annual IAEA General Conference which is held in September. These efforts included consultations with the Israelis. While Israel is a member of the IAEA it is not party to the NPT. It has no legal obligation under the NPT to accept international inspection by the IAEA on its nuclear facilities. All the other countries in the region are NPT parties. So we needed to be very careful in the way we characterized Israel’s nuclear activities. But countries recognize there is a special relationship between the United States and Israel.

For the rest of the 1980s other states in the Middle East sought punitive action against Israel at the annual IAEA General Conference and the U.S. consistently supported Israeli rights and privileges of membership in the IAEA. That was the language in our demarches. It was always a difficult issue but we were able to keep a lid on it. By the early 1990s the issue began to simmer down. But it lingers. To this day the legislation requiring that the Secretary of State annually certify to the Congress that Israel is accorded its full rights and privileges of membership in the IAEA remains in place. So every year a memorandum goes to the Secretary of State for signature of the necessary certification.

Q: How did Kennedy deal with states of proliferation concern?

GALLINI: Kennedy believed in dialogue with other nations. When he first joined the State Department both Argentina and Brazil were suspected of harboring aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons. The Carter Administration had held both countries at arm’s length on nuclear issues but Kennedy initiated talks with them and over time persuaded both states to strengthen their nonproliferation commitments. They also created a new arrangement to strengthen the application of safeguards in both Brazil and Argentina. Both countries became leaders in the so-called Group of 77 or nonaligned movement on nuclear issues.

Kennedy took a similar approach to South Africa. For many years South Africa was believed to be seeking nuclear weapons and by the time Kennedy took his position in the State Department it was widely believed the South Africans had successfully fabricated these weapons. During his tenure at State, Kennedy made a number of very unobtrusive
trips to South Africa and worked very quietly behind the scenes to help the South Africans find a way credibly to dismantle these weapons that was seen as an essential step in ending apartheid.

In a very carefully planned series of steps the South Africans dismantled their nuclear weapons, allowed the IAEA to conduct extensive verification of this work and announced to the international community their intention to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. I was in Dick Kennedy’s office on the day the South African Ambassador came to deposit South Africa’s instrument of accession to the NPT. I had never expected to witness this event since I never expected the South Africans to give up their nuclear weapons. The fact that the South African government made it a priority to deposit its instrument of accession to the NPT directly with Dick Kennedy is a real credit to him and a clear indication of the respect he commanded among South African officials.

Q: What about the nuclear threat from India and Pakistan? When did that first raise its head from your perspective?

GALLINI: India conducted its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974. Indian officials called it a peaceful nuclear explosion. It was a clear demonstration that a country other than the established five nuclear weapons states could take nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes and misuse it to fabricate nuclear weapons. There was an intense effort by the U.S. for many years to shut down all nuclear cooperation with both India and Pakistan. Part of the reason I was offered a job in the NEA was to work on the U.S. campaign against a nuclear weapons capability in both countries. It was a major blow to those of us working on nuclear non-proliferation issues when India tested again on May 18, 1998 and Pakistan immediately followed on May 28, 1998. Unfortunately we had been losing ground with Pakistan repeatedly over time as other U.S. policy priorities edged out our non-proliferation goals.

During Dick Kennedy’s tenure in the State Department he was an advocate of dialogue with many states to encourage greater commitments to nuclear non-proliferation. But he did not advocate dialogue with India and Pakistan. Rather he supported shutting down every avenue of nuclear procurement we possibly could with both states. As a general matter Kennedy rarely read his talking points verbatim when meeting with foreign officials. But I remember him doing so in a meeting with a very senior nuclear official from Pakistan admonishing him to stop Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. In short, we did everything we could think of to thwart efforts by both India and Pakistan to cooperate in the nuclear realm with any country and repeatedly urged other countries to refrain from nuclear cooperation with either country.

Q: How were we viewing Iraq?

GALLINI: Had it not been for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 it is not clear when the extent of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program would have come to light. Iraq was party to the NPT and had accepted a legal obligation to forebear nuclear weapons. But in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the allied campaign to liberate
Kuwait that began on January 17, 1991 and ended on February 28, 1991, Iraq’s significant and advanced nuclear weapons program was exposed. Under Security Council Resolution 687 enacted on April 3, 1991, the IAEA was mandated to destroy, remove or render harmless all aspects of Iraq’s nuclear weapons activities. This Resolution also called for creation of a Special Commission to dismantle Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons as well as its ballistic missile program. This series of events led to a decade of intense activities, many led by the U.S., aimed at ensuring that Iraq’s work on weapons of mass destruction was credibly and completely ended.

I have long thought that the Israeli attack on Osirak made Iraq a more capable and determined proliferator. After the attack the Iraqis went “underground” so they could better conceal what they were doing. They duplicated what they had, so that if one component or facility was destroyed like Osirak, they would have another.

Iraq also proved that information about enrichment techniques (one means to acquire nuclear weapons-usable material) that had been unclassified by the U.S. since it dealt with old technology was still viable. Iraq used this information to pursue its clandestine enrichment work. The Iraqis told us that one way they accessed the information was by using U.S. public libraries. One of the lessons we should learn from Iraq is just because nuclear technology is old doesn’t mean it won’t work. It works just fine.

Q. What about Iran?

GALLINI: I had little direct involvement with Iranian nuclear issues over the years. Iran is party to the NPT and has accepted the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons. But the U.S. has long suspected Iran is seeking nuclear weapons and since the fall of the Shah in 1979 the U.S. has sought to isolate Iran and prevent any nuclear cooperation by any country with Iran. At international meetings such as the IAEA General Conference U.S. delegates were told to avoid contact with Iran’s delegates.

Q: What other nuclear issues engaged Kennedy and his staff during his time at the State Department?

GALLINI: Dick Kennedy presided over a whole host of nuclear issues from 1981 until March 1993. He worked intensely on both nuclear issues pertaining to specific countries as well as on the full range of issues related to U.S. support for the IAEA. He was also the U.S. Representative to the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) based in Paris. He traveled to many countries for bilateral consultations on nuclear issues as well as traveling regularly to Vienna for IAEA meetings, especially the Board of Governors. During the Reagan Administration official U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union were practically non-existent. But Kennedy led semi-annual U.S.-Soviet bilateral consultations on nuclear non-proliferation that was one of the very few channels of communication that persisted on a regular basis.

One of the major events that occurred during Kennedy’s tenure at the State Department was the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Ukraine. It happened on April 26, 1986. At
that time I was still the IAEA desk officer in the Bureau of International Organizations. As such I was often directly involved with Ambassador Kennedy’s office and the Ambassador himself since he served as U.S. Representative to the IAEA. I remember exactly where I was standing in our office suite when we first heard a report about a major nuclear accident somewhere in Europe. Practically in a heartbeat we were immersed in nuclear safety issues. At the time the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) were primarily responsible for nuclear safety issues. But it quickly became clear that the State Department would be directly involved in responding to the Chernobyl accident. Ukraine, the Soviet Union, a host of countries affected by radiation released from the Chernobyl site and the IAEA were all involved. State had the capabilities to monitor the crisis and help direct the response.

The Chernobyl reactor was a Soviet designed reactor built in Ukraine. In the immediate aftermath of the accident Soviet officials knowledgeable about the reactor’s design and characteristics were all but invisible. Ukraine’s nuclear engineers and reactor operators were overwhelmed by the accident. Other countries in Europe were largely in the dark about what was happening at Chernobyl since the Soviets released very little information.

To find help with the Chernobyl crisis the Soviet Union turned to Hans Blix and the IAEA. Blix was the first foreign national to fly over the site of the damaged reactor. During the spring and summer of 1986, there was frenetic activity on many fronts to deal with the damaged reactor, to try and put out the fires, to try and stem the spread of the highly radioactive smoke that was coming from the fires, and to address the strident concerns of those countries affected by the radiation.

Prior to April 26, 1986 the IAEA had a very small nuclear safety program with very modest funding. After the Chernobyl accident the IAEA suddenly became a focal point of international efforts to deal with the accident. Top nuclear experts from countries with advanced nuclear programs converged on Vienna to help assess what actually happened at Chernobyl, to identify the causes of the accident, and to deal tailor a comprehensive response to address the many concerns arising from the accident.

The IAEA presided over negotiation of two new international conventions relating to nuclear safety that summer. One dealt with provision of assistance in the event of a nuclear emergency and the other with the need for notification in the event of an emergency. The IAEA was assigned a central role in facilitating international notification of a nuclear emergency. It was also charged to facilitate assistance if a state with a nuclear emergency decided to accept assistance as provided for by the new assistance convention.

Q: What were we doing?

GALLINI: The U.S. was at the forefront of a broad range of activities intended to manage the consequences of the accident. This included accident clean-up, damage assessment, construction of containment over the damaged reactor and re-location of the population affected by the accident, to name only a few. We also led the negotiations on
the two new safety conventions and sought ways to strengthen nuclear safety programs not only in the U.S. but also at the IAEA, and to raise money to support all of this work. In a desperate effort to extinguish the persistent fire coming from the reactor, aircraft flew over it dropping concrete and sand. We provided medical assistance to some of the Soviet pilots, bringing some of them to the U.S. for treatment of radiation exposure. And we sent in medical teams to assess the impact of the accident on the population around Chernobyl. For over twenty years an American doctor headed up a team of experts that conducted studies on the effects of the accident. Chernobyl forced a very closed Soviet Union nuclear program to become increasingly transparent to the international community.

On January 7, 1987 our second son arrived! We adopted Daniel from South Korea after what was a long and difficult process. Marc, Brian and I welcomed our new family member at National Airport. Dan was four months old at that time. I can only imagine how very confused he must have been as his whole world changed around him. I took two months off before returning to work.

September 9, 1988 was my last day in the IO Bureau. From 10 I transferred to the Office of Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) that was then under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. My friend Tom Miller was instrumental in helping me make the transfer. I was charged with trying to identify and create effective multi-national approaches to combat terrorism at home and abroad. At the time there was no single multi-national organization with a mandate to combat terrorism and little international interest in creating such an organization. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was engaged in some counter-terrorism work as was the UN Secretariat. I soon discovered there was little prospect of connecting the piecemeal counter-terrorism efforts of individual international organizations into any kind of coherent whole. I also soon discovered that dealing with the reality of terrorism on a daily basis was incredibly difficult, at least for me. When Dick Kennedy offered me a position on his staff at the end of 1989 I accepted it.

By the time I joined Kennedy’s office in January 1990, international attention to nuclear safety had escalated considerably. The Chernobyl reactor accident was just the beginning of a significant expansion of international work to improve nuclear safety in many states. In 1989 when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and the Cold War ended, it quickly became apparent that there were a number of serious nuclear safety concerns in Eastern Europe where Soviet designed reactors were operating. I remember receiving a phone call in 1990 informing me that Congress was approving a million dollars for nuclear safety upgrades in Eastern Europe and asking for advice on how to use this funding. We channeled this initial funding through the IAEA to nuclear safety projects in Bulgaria and Romania. This became a multi-year and multifaceted program of nuclear safety assistance in Eastern Europe involving both the IAEA and bilateral programs.

In addition to nuclear safety issues there were also serious nuclear material security concerns in Eastern Europe. In some places sensitive nuclear materials were simply stored openly, not even behind a locked door. This raised concerns about the possible theft of nuclear materials and misuse of these materials. There were also concerns about
the health of workers at Soviet designed reactors. In short, there were enough issues at these facilities to keep nuclear safety, security and health experts from many countries working for many years to make improvements.

**Q: Were the nuclear facilities that the Russians had built in Eastern Europe sort of potential Chernobyls?**

GALLINI: Not exactly. The Soviet Union built two reactor types. The earlier version is a graphite-moderated power reactor known as an RBMK reactor. Chernobyl is an RBMK type reactor and there are several Chernobyl-type reactors still in operation. A key problem with the Chernobyl reactor was that it had no containment structure so during the 1986 accident radioactive gases were released directly into the atmosphere.

The second generation of Soviet-designed reactors is a pressurized water reactor known as a VVER reactor. These reactors came closer to meeting U.S. nuclear safety standards but each situation is unique. For example, Bulgaria was generating 40% of its electricity from four VVER reactors with significant safety issues. Our first preference was to shut them down but we couldn’t because Bulgaria would lose 40% of its electricity, and a lot of that was being used to generate heat in winter. We considered alternate options such as the use of generators but at the end of the day there was an intensive effort to upgrade the safety features of the reactors.

**Q: What were we doing?**

GALLINI: We were doing a lot. Both NRC and DOE had teams on the ground. The initial focus was on Eastern Europe. Over time, work expanded to Russia. The goal was to ensure that Soviet-designed reactors were as safe as possible. We had a very multi-dimensional problem and a multi-dimensional approach to the problem. And it is still going on today.

**Q: I should imagine the French would have been involved given the size of the French nuclear program.**

GALLINI: I don’t recall a particularly active involvement by the French. No other country built reactors the way the Soviet Union did. Soviet-designed reactors are inherently very different from the kinds of reactors built in the West. As a result there were a variety of technological issues unfamiliar to nuclear experts from the West. And of course there were significant differences in languages. Communicating in Russian and English has its own challenges that are compounded when yet another language is added to the mix.

Upgrading nuclear safety on Soviet-designed reactors was also made more difficult because the Soviet Union used some of its reactors for what is called “dual use.” This means that some reactors were used both to generate electricity and to produce nuclear material to fabricate into nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons the U.S. would not provide assistance to the Soviet nuclear weapons program. So how do you convince first
the Soviet Union and now Russia that it must dedicate these reactors solely to peaceful purposes and not to getting more material for nuclear weapons?

Q: Right from the beginning of your career did you find yourself and your non-proliferation colleagues in disagreement with U.S. officials who are dedicated to making and testing nuclear weapons? Did you get involved with this, and did you feel the pressure there?

GALLINI: The debate about whether to continue testing U.S. nuclear weapons and whether to develop new generations of nuclear weapons is a debate that continues to this day. Those of us who worked in the non-proliferation field focused primarily on other governments and the components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We were dedicated to trying to keep other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. As long as we kept to our mandate and didn’t wade into the debate about whether the U.S. itself should continue with the further development and expansion of its nuclear weapons program, we got along with the National Laboratories and received considerable support from them, particularly regarding how to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

We did rub elbows on occasion because the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT have made a commitment to steps to eliminate their nuclear weapons. In exchange, the non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty foreswear nuclear weapons acquisition indefinitely. This inherent bargain in the Treaty receives considerable international attention on a continuing basis because of the international review process associated with the Treaty.

Q: Well did you feel any concern on the part of Congressional staffers or members of Congress who were you might say friends of the testing and development community?

GALLINI: Over the years Congress has generally taken a bipartisan approach to nuclear non-proliferation issues. For years and years it was considered to be a priority for both Democrats and Republicans. There were several members of Congress, particularly on the Senate side, who were knowledgeable and supportive of the work that the State Department and other federal agencies did on nuclear non-proliferation. For example, John Glenn from Ohio was a tremendous supporter. On the House side Jonathan Bingaman from New York was also supportive.

I’ve worked with a lot of Congressional staffers over the years and made friends on the Hill. But this is Washington, D.C. after all and encountering different points of view is just standard. There have certainly been occasions when State did not see eye to eye on nuclear issues with the Congress. Generally though we got along pretty well.

Q: What about the Chinese? I mean we have a long-standing relationship with the Soviets/Russians and we worked with them, but the Chinese were newcomers to the table. We didn’t have that type of relationship.

GALLINI: From a nuclear non-proliferation perspective we had a very limited dialogue
with the Chinese for a number of years. They were very hesitant to join the international community in talking about nuclear issues. In the 1980s China emerged as a supplier of nuclear facilities and material but did not apply any non-proliferation conditions to its supplies. As a result of dialogue with the U.S., China slowly became more willing to base its nuclear cooperation on important non-proliferation conditions. China finally joined the IAEA in 1984 and took a seat on the Board of Governors. It joined the NPT in March 1992. It has been a slow process to encourage the Chinese to attach strong non-proliferation conditions to its nuclear supplies and dialogue continues to this day.

Q: Did you and your colleagues think the Chinese were doing something that they shouldn’t be doing or was it just they were uncomfortable in international organizations?

GALLINI: By 1964 the Chinese had already acquired nuclear weapons, a reality unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. But we hoped to engage them more in the international nuclear community on a range of nuclear safety and nuclear security issues. There was a lot China could learn from a dialogue on these issues going forward with its nuclear program. I think the Chinese finally decided that they would benefit more from engaging than from remaining a recluse.

I think in some instances language was an issue. It is always interesting to sit in an international meeting and tune into different UN languages (English, Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese and Arabic). You realize how incredibly great the potential is for miscommunication just because what is said in English doesn’t necessarily translate into another language in the same way it is understood in English. I have heard interpreters occasionally read back what they have just translated from English into another language and then back into English, and there can be a notable difference in the two English versions. It is always questionable in my mind just how much common understanding there is about a particular nuclear issue. Like so many other fields, the nuclear realm has its own terminology and clear communication is critically important. Yet in an international setting you are not always sure if you are communicating adequately.

Q: How would you describe the effectiveness of U.S. non-proliferation policy?

GALLINI: The answer to your question depends on how you define “effective.” In the world of nuclear-nonproliferation the ultimate goal is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. One of my first bosses in ACDA, Jon Boright, used to say that what non-proliferators were really doing was “slowing down the rate at which we lose ground.” I always thought that was a pretty apt description. When I started in the government in 1976 there were five recognized nuclear weapon states with India, Israel and South Africa lurking in the shadows. When I retired in 2006 Pakistan and North Korea had joined the shadows. Iran, Iraq and Libya have certainly raised concerns. So clearly proliferation of nuclear weapons has not been stopped. But I believe the U.S. and the rest of our world has benefitted greatly by efforts to slow “the rate at which we lose ground.”

Reviewing the effectiveness of U.S. non-proliferation policy seems to come up pretty regularly. In my experience, each new U.S. administration does its own review of what is
called nuclear non-proliferation policy. I joined Federal service right at the end of the Ford administration. Every administration since then has done its own version of assessing how to keep additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons. But the question has broadened over time. Now very often you hear references to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It is widely accepted that nuclear weapons are the worst weapons of mass destruction, but there are also chemical and biological weapons as well as the problem of missile proliferation. So increasingly the focus has been on how to control all WMD. Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, a tremendous amount of attention has also focused on the potential for terrorists to misuse nuclear material.

The current Bush administration uses the term “counter proliferation” to identify its approach to WMD. Some administration officials believe that the goal is no longer preventing more states from getting nuclear weapons. Now the goal is to thwart acquisition of WMD if possible and to have an effective response if a government decides to use WMD somehow or a terrorist acquires WMD. This notion of counter proliferation is one you see creeping into academic articles and government studies and discussions among governments. So the challenge has broadened over time and become more complex. When I started working the focus was on inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to states. Now concerns center on both states and non-state actors, specifically terrorists, and on a spectrum of different types of weapons of mass destruction. But it remains true that some countries have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons if they choose and it is clearly in U.S. national security interests to continue to dissuade them from doing so.

Q: How well did the intelligence community serve you and your colleagues?

GALLINI: When I was working there were times when I used to think that the intelligence community was neither: it was neither intelligent, nor a community in many instances. The quality of the information provided varied as you might expect since personnel change over time. What did not change was the outstanding quality of the work done by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) which had some very capable analysts who were career civil servants who worked for decades on nuclear non-proliferation issues. They helped a lot. One of the things you learn pretty quickly is never to believe a single piece of intelligence and to seek sufficient information to support intelligence conclusions.

Q: Why would smaller countries and countries without much in the way of nuclear interest chose to join the IAEA?

GALLINI: At last count I think there were 193 sovereign states and 139 of them were members of the IAEA. In the years following creation of the IAEA its member states consisted primarily of those countries that were pioneers in the nuclear field or had the greatest interest in nuclear issues, including the U.S., Western Europe and Japan. Over time additional countries joined the IAEA and its membership grew in size and diversity.

In addition to implementing the international safeguards system, the IAEA also has
programs in nuclear safety and security and in technical cooperation. Small countries and countries with limited nuclear programs tend to be interested in the technical cooperation program. This program has a budget of about eighty million dollars and provides IAEA member states with help in using a variety of nuclear applications ranging from agricultural to medical and industrial applications.

When most people hear the word “nuclear” they think either of nuclear weapons or nuclear power. They don’t realize that there is an impressive and diverse array of so-called “peaceful nuclear applications” that improve the quality of life worldwide.

There are industrial applications. For example there is a nuclear technique that strengthens the rubber used to make automobile tires. There are agricultural uses. Food irradiation is used to prolong the shelf life of food, particularly in regions where refrigeration is not always available. Wheat crops are more prolific today because of nuclear tracers that allow scientists to trace the way a plant takes up fertilizer and uses it. Medical applications are best known since many people have had an X-ray and since some hospitals have a department of nuclear medicine. For countries with new or small nuclear programs, membership in the IAEA is attractive since they can benefit in many ways from the IAEA’s technical cooperation program.

Q: So it is really not, I mean I always thought of the IAEA as an investigative thing, but it is really much more ...

GALLINI: It is a very broadly mandated organization. From the U.S. perspective our priority at the IAEA has always been the nuclear safeguards system. This system is unique. It provides international inspection and monitoring that allows us to track how countries use nuclear materials. The IAEA gives us eyes and ears on nuclear programs where in some cases the United States would never have any access, North Korea being a prime example. But the IAEA also has an important program in nuclear safety that expanded significantly after the Chernobyl reactor accident. Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 United States led concerted efforts to strengthen and expand the IAEA’s program on nuclear security intended to protect nuclear materials so they are not misused. Countries that are just starting nuclear programs or building up small programs turn to the IAEA ‘s technical cooperation program for assistance. While this international organization has a diverse portfolio, its work has not been widely known to many people over the years. I spent much of my career being an IAEA advocate.

Q: How about the leadership of the organization? How did you view the effectiveness and the leadership of the organization over time?

GALLINI: Leadership of the IAEA over the years has been quite stable. The original head of the Secretariat, known as the Director General (DG), was an American who served a single four-year term when the IAEA was first created in 1957. The second DG was a gentleman from Sweden named Dr. Sigvard Eklund who served capably for five terms or twenty years. The third DG, Dr. Hans Blix, also from Sweden, proved to be a superb choice. Over time he developed tremendous respect and credibility across the
globe. Blix made a point of visiting Washington, D.C. at least once a year. During many of his visits I was his “control officer” and had the privilege of accompanying him to many of his meetings with senior administration officials and members of Congress. He was unfailingly good-natured and kind and I discovered that we both liked to cook!

After sixteen years as DG, Blix announced he was retiring. In Washington there was very little question about who should replace him. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei from Egypt had served in several capacities at the IAEA, including representing the IAEA at the United Nations. While he was in New York he became a fan of the New York Knicks basketball team. ElBaradei is an international lawyer by training and was well and favorably known to many of us in the non-proliferation field.

It turned out to be a very interesting process getting Dr. ElBaradei selected as Director General. At the outset the Egyptian government nominated the wrong Mohamed! Egypt put forward Dr. Mohamed Shaker. He was a well-known diplomat and a very seasoned professional in the nuclear non-proliferation business. It took a remarkably convoluted process to get Dr. ElBaradei selected. But like Blix, ElBaradei is a very thoughtful and very well informed individual, who recognizes the importance of cultivating a broad network of relationships among IAEA member governments. So over time there has been a pattern of very capable leadership at the IAEA.

It is worth noting that since the creation of the IAEA there has been a tacit understanding among member states that a U.S. citizen will serve as Deputy Director General (DOG) for Administration. For many years this position was regarded as “second in command” of the IAEA. While there is now more of a willingness to deem all of the Deputy Directors General as equals, it is still the case that the DOG for Administration has always been an American.

Q: Who replaced Richard Kennedy?

GALLINI: No one. When the Clinton Administration arrived on January 20, 1993 it included some people who were not fans of Ambassador Kennedy. He was not always easy to deal with. So he did not endear himself to everyone. When the Clinton folks took over it appeared there were some individuals who were determined to dismantle what they perceived as the Kennedy empire. Kennedy’s position as Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation simply went away for a while. Management of the nuclear non-proliferation portfolio was moved to the Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM) and for some time it was hard to tell who was in charge of what.

Kennedy’s second title as the U.S. Representative to the IAEA is actually grounded in U.S. law. There is a law - the “IAEA Participation Act of 1957” - that specifies that the U.S. should have a U.S. Representative and a Deputy Representative to the IAEA. This reflects the conviction at the time that strong U.S. representation to the IAEA was essential to support U.S. interests in the new international organization. Traditionally the U.S. Representative was based in Washington, D.C. and the Deputy Representative was based in Vienna, Austria. This arrangement allowed the U.S. Representative to be in
continuing contact with senior U.S. officials dealing with nuclear issues in Washington, D.C. while the Deputy managed daily U.S. interactions with the IAEA in Vienna. The Deputy also served as the head of the U.S. Mission in Vienna that represents U.S. interests to the other international organizations located in Vienna. It took over a year before the Clinton Administration finally in May 1994 named one of my all-time heroes to serve as the U.S. Representative to the IAEA. His name is Nelson Sievering. Nelson had a long and distinguished career in the nuclear realm. At the same time a gentleman named John Ritch was named as U.S. Deputy Representative. John had previously served as Deputy Staff Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Q: Yes, Nelson’s name goes way back.

GALLINI: There were several men including among others, Charles Van Doren (who helped negotiate the NPT), Harold Bengelsdorf, Myron Kratzer, Robert Rochlin (who helped draft the text of the NPT and was instrumental in creating the non-proliferation bureau in ACDA) and Nelson who were early architects of what became the U.S. civil nuclear program and the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. Some of them were involved with the old Atomic Energy Commission that was the precursor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration, which was the parent of today’s Department of Energy. They knew everybody in both the U.S. nuclear community and in the international nuclear community.

Nelson received a degree in nuclear engineering from Yale University, and he worked his way through the ranks at ERDA. I first met him when he interviewed me for a position at ERDA when I was job hunting. I reminded him many years later that he had the audacity not to hire me! In any case he went on to be the DOG for Administration at the IAEA. He worked in Vienna at the IAEA from 1980 to 1987. He knew everyone from Director General Blix to the guards at the door. Whenever he visited the U.S. and was returning to Vienna he would stop at a bagel shop, his last stop before he boarded a plane, and appear the next day in the IAEA offices of several secretaries with bags of bagels.

Nelson battled cancer for the last fifteen years of his life. But he always had a twinkle in his eye and a smile on his face. He never lost his optimism and he was never without a kind word. He was incredibly smart and he knew the issues in his IAEA portfolio as well as Dick Kennedy did.

Unfortunately Nelson came on board in an administration that had some senior State Department officials who were largely indifferent to the IAEA. For whatever reason, the IAEA was tolerated as a necessity but not supported as a perceived asset. So Nelson was not given the support he should have had. Clinton administration nuclear priorities were dealing with Iraq’s clandestine weapons program and keeping up on Iran’s nuclear status. And then there was North Korea.

Q: How did you get involved with North Korea?

GALLINI: In March 1993, we turned off the lights in Ambassador Kennedy’s office and
he went into retirement. Dick had asked me, “What do you want to do now that I am leaving?” The new Clinton team struck me as pretty disorganized. I had spent my entire career in the State Department building, and so I thought what the heck. It would be interesting to go work somewhere else. I had a lot of experience working with DOE but I really didn’t want to go there. I didn’t want to go to the intelligence community. I didn’t really want to work on the Hill. So I thought what about the Defense Department? In fact I had rarely set foot in the Pentagon building. Being a veteran of the Army, Kennedy said, “The last place you want to go is the Pentagon.”

At the time a senior State Department official, Mr. Frank Wisner, who had been involved in some nuclear issues, was transferring to the Pentagon. I said to Kennedy, “He knows a fair amount about nuclear issues, and it would be interesting to work with him. He is bringing in someone from Harvard named Ashton (“Ash”) Carter. It could work out.”

The State Department agreed to a one-year detail arrangement for me to work at the Pentagon while State paid the cost. So I set up a meeting with Dr. Carter whom I had never met and he agreed to take me on board. I arrived at the Pentagon on a rainy Monday morning in May and reported to the office to which I was assigned. Of course no one there had any idea why I was there or what I was going to do.

In those days it was not unusual to have State Department personnel allocated to the Pentagon and DOD officials sent to the State Department for specific assignments. But there was also a long-standing rivalry between State and Defense on many levels. Any time someone from Defense is stationed at the State Department there is often a bit of hesitation while State personnel try to size up the new Pentagon arrival. It works the same way at the Pentagon as my new colleagues tried to figure out why I was in their midst.

My arrival at the five-sided building coincided with escalating concerns about the North Korean nuclear program. About a week after I started working at the Pentagon someone asked me, “What do you know about North Korea?” Weill said, “Absolutely nothing.” My interlocutor said “Great. Why don’t you work the North Korean nuclear issue.” So I rolled up my sleeves and started reading everything I could put my hands on about North Korea. And I met Dr. Steve Fetter.

Ash Carter brought Steve with him when Ash joined the Pentagon. Steve is a wonderfully unassuming, modest guy who is so smart it just knocks your socks off. Since he and I arrived at the Pentagon at roughly the same time we both needed office space. I quickly discovered that Pentagon office space was modest at best and it was really hard to find an office in the Pentagon. There are offices but they are packed. They are really pressed for space. So I found myself hunting in the corridors with Steve in tow, looking for a place to hang our hats because he was also working the North Korea nuclear issue. We found a fairly ramshackle office that already had two occupants but they agreed to take us in. One was a lieutenant colonel in the army. I quickly discovered that he liked to cook. The other was a Navy captain who was trying to figure out why we had crowded into his space. But he was a very nice guy.
The four of us spent a year in our ramshackle office at a time when the North Korean nuclear issue went from being almost obscure to producing almost daily banner headlines in the New York Times. Some articles contemplated the potential for a military strike by the United States against North Korea. I quickly met a lot of people in the Pentagon, many of whom were active duty personnel. It was not unusual to have one of them stop me in the corridor and say, “Gallini, I don’t care how you do it, but for God sakes don’t get us into a war with North Korea.” There was genuine concern that a war could happen.

Leslie “Les” Aspin was the Secretary of Defense at the time (from January 21, 1993 to February 3, 1994). He set up a task force of about twenty officials working on the North Korean nuclear issue, including myself. The task force reported to him almost daily. I remember learning a lot about North Korea but still feeling very frustrated that I really didn’t know nearly enough. There are different types of knowledge. There is knowledge from reading, knowledge from experience and knowledge that comes from trying to understand how another person thinks. I wasn’t even close to understanding how North Korean nuclear officials made decisions.

As the nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea escalated, I became convinced that we were not getting our message to the North Koreans clearly. I started harping on the term “communication.” Autumn was upon us and there was no heat yet in the Pentagon. We were working wrapped up in our coats because it was chilly. I remember reading a cable from Hong Kong. It was a report on meetings held by Reverend Billy Graham and several of his advisors who had just come out of Pyongyang. I don’t know how, but Reverend Graham had struck up a relationship with North Korean leader Kim II Sung. And for whatever reason Kim II Sung had asked Billy Graham not only to visit North Korea, but also to preach the Gospel in an atheist country where religion was essentially banned.

The report included a discussion of the nuclear crisis. One of Graham’s advisors said that he was convinced the North Koreans didn’t understand what the United States was trying to do. After I read this I made copies of the cable, highlighted the comment by the advisor and gave copies to my colleagues in the task force. The advisor was identified in the cable as a Professor of Korean studies at Columbia University. So I picked up the phone and called information and I got the phone number for Columbia University (this was before the internet and cell phones were available). I reached the Columbia University switchboard and asked to speak to the Professor. My call was transferred to the School of Korean Studies and a very cheerful sounding woman told me the Professor was on sabbatical and she gave me his home telephone number.

I called the home number and the Professor, Dr. Stephen Linton, answered. I said “I realize I am calling you completely out of the blue but I am a State Department employee who is on loan at the Pentagon, and I am working on the North Korean nuclear issue. My biggest concern is that we are not communicating clearly with the North Koreans.” He said, “Why don’t we meet.” And we did.

Dr. Stephen Linton was the son of missionaries and had grown up in South Korea. He
spoke fluent Korean and was a good friend of the North Korean ambassador to the United Nations. At the time official channels of communication between the United States and the DPRK were all but non-existent. It turned out that this North Korean Ambassador was the only diplomatic channel available to the State Department that was sending all of its diplomatic correspondence through this man to the North Korean government. Generally when documents were sent to New York the text was in English. When the Ambassador received the document he would call Dr. Linton and say “I have another message from Washington. Could you come in and help me translate it?” Between the two of them they would translate the English into Korean. In the tradition of North Korean diplomacy, nothing was ever sent back to Pyongyang that was bad news - such as U.S. dictates about the DPRK’s nuclear program. So the only parts of U.S. communications that went back to Pyongyang were what Dr. Linton and the Ambassador decided were “good news.” No wonder bilateral U.S.-DPRK diplomatic exchanges were so confused!

I learned a great deal about North Korea from Dr. Linton. For example, he explained that, unlike the United States, North Korea does not have lawyers. It is not a litigious society. It is not governed by law in the same way the U.S. is. If there is a problem between two North Koreans they need to have a relationship in order to begin to address the problem. For instance, if you are a landlord and your tenant isn’t paying his rent, you don’t go knock on the tenant’s door and say “Pay me the rent you owe.” Instead, you knock on the door and say “Excuse me, I hope I am not troubling you. I hope this is a convenient time to talk. I have come to inquire about your family because I am afraid there might be a problem.” In the course of inquiring about the family you learn that the head of the household has lost his job and can no longer pay the rent. Whatever the problem is, you go about trying to solve it with an approach that is entirely different from the Western or U.S. tradition. The key to problem solving in North Korea is through a relationship among the parties involved.

Since the creation of the DPRK in 1945 the U.S. government has never had much of a relationship with North Korea. Over the years whatever official contact there has been has been largely negative. There is a reason why North Korean leaders feel that the United States takes a hostile approach to North Korea. We do. We generally are telling them what they “must” do. North Korean leaders perceive what we are saying very differently from the way U.S. leaders would perceive it.

At some point in the Clinton administration, a decision was made in Washington to send a letter from President Clinton to Kim II Sung addressing nuclear issues. A communication from our senior leader to North Korea’s senior leader was seen as a viable way to start a dialogue on nuclear concerns. So the letter was sent and we soon learned that it infuriated Kim II Sung. He perceived the letter to be an insult. It was not addressed personally to him. There was no honorific title to identify him. The body of the letter was far too short. It did not begin by inquiring about his health and all of his family members. And it was signed by a man who was younger than he, which was another insult. So quite apart from solving the nuclear issue we created yet another communication problem.
It was clear that U.S. officials dealing with the DPRK nuclear crisis needed a better understanding of North Korean culture and tradition. At the time there were very few U.S. experts knowledgeable about these matters. Dr. Robert Gallucci had been named chief negotiator for the U.S. with North Korea. To his credit he asked these experts, including Dr. Linton, to advise him. It took a long, difficult and messy process to persuade the North Koreans to start negotiations on nuclear issues. But Gallucci understood the need for patience and a bit of ceremony. He knew he couldn’t simply open his briefing book and read his talking points. He is a very personable man and he slowly eased the North Koreans into a dialogue. At the end of a very difficult process, in October 1994 the two sides emerged from negotiations with a document labeled “The Agreed Framework.”

The Agreed Framework proved to be a very controversial document. The document provided a way forward on resolving concerns about the DPRK’s nuclear activities and aspirations while committing the U.S., Japan and South Korea to build a nuclear reactor in North Korea. Some U.S. officials sharply challenged the notion of building a reactor in conjunction with backing North Korea away from its nuclear weapons program.

From the perspective of changing DPRK behavior and reducing the risk that North Korea would actually acquire nuclear weapons The Agreed Framework made good sense. Our few experts on North Korea defended the deal. In their view The Agreed Framework would engage the North Koreans over a long period of time. This time would provide the opportunity to allow a relationship of trust between the U.S. and the DPRK to develop. This trust was essential for the DPRK to open up enough to reveal whether it had really shut down its nuclear weapons program. It was estimated that constructing a new reactor would take about ten years. During this time the North Koreans agreed to freeze their nuclear program that would stop any activities relating to nuclear weapons. To verify the freeze the DPRK would allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to be present twenty-four hours a day at their main nuclear facility at Yongbyon. The U.S. suspected this site was the principal location of North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities.

At North Korean insistence, the U.S. also agreed to provide heavy fuel oil to help address an alleged energy crisis made worse by shutting down a small operational nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Japan, South Korea and the U.S. committed to providing heavy fuel oil to run generators to help heat homes during North Korea’s winters. All three countries honored this commitment for several years.

Q: We had a close relationship with the South Koreans. Did they play any role in this, I mean from your perspective?

GALLINI: The South Koreans were very engaged. The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994 was a very serious matter. At the time the North Koreans saw the crisis as a bilateral issue between themselves and the United States. They did not want any other country represented at the negotiating table. But we kept the South Koreans fully informed about what was going on. Before Gallucci and his team met with the North
Koreans, they went to Seoul and Tokyo to consult. More recently there have been so-called Six Party talks with the DPRK. There was no comparable entity back in 1993 and 1994. The North Koreans insisted on a bilateral dialogue with the United States. At the time we felt that was the best way to try and get a handle on the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.

Once the Agreed Framework was negotiated South Korea was actively involved in aspects of its implementation. Under the Agreed Framework a full staff was set up in New York to pursue construction of the reactor called for in the Agreement. For the remainder of the Clinton Administration there was an on-going active effort by the United States, South Korea and Japan to do the site work, the initial design work and the initial construction of the nuclear reactor in North Korea. It did in fact begin to bridge what had been almost fifty years of isolation for the North Koreans. It was really in many respects a remarkable endeavor, which the Bush administration summarily dismissed out of hand when it came into office. I believe the Bush administration decision to end the work under the Agreed Framework was one of the gravest mistakes in American foreign policy. Once this work was ended there was a vacuum in U.S. policy on North Korea as the Bush administration turned its attention to Iraq. This afforded North Korea both the motivation and the opportunity to forge ahead with its nuclear weapons program and to become an increasingly dangerous force on the Korean peninsula.

By May 1994 my one-year detail to the Pentagon was up. Dr. Carter kindly suggested that I remain at DOD but I had already accepted an offer from Ambassador Sievering to work with him. During the time I was at the Pentagon, Les Aspen left and William Perry became Secretary of Defense. Like Aspen, Perry understood the potential for miscommunication between the U.S. and the DPRK over nuclear issues and was receptive to my continuing efforts to minimize this prospect. As I was packing up to leave DOD, one of my colleagues noted “You know, you managed to convince two Secretaries of Defense that communication is very important.” I was happy to hear it. Then I returned to the PM Bureau at the State Department in time to help arrange for Nelson’s swearing-in as U.S. Representative to the IAEA.

Nelson and John Ritch had their confirmation hearings on the same day. Before going to Capitol Hill, John walked into Nelson’s office and basically said “There shouldn’t be two of us. There should just be one of us supporting the IAEA and it should be me.” That didn’t get the relationship off to a very harmonious start. Throughout their tenure together there was an underlying tension between them.

John made a considerable effort to increase the size of the staff at the U.S. Mission in Vienna. Over the years the work of the Mission had increased considerably from its initial sole focus on the IAEA as additional international organizations set up shop in Vienna. By 1994 the Mission had a pretty broad portfolio and John built up his staff to about a dozen officers. Whereas Ambassador Kennedy had a staff of about eight officers in Washington, D.C., Nelson had me. We felt rather out-numbered. Meanwhile John began his efforts to change the 1957 U.S. law about U.S. representation at the IAEA and to meld the two positions of U.S. Representative and Deputy Representative into one.
John was based in Vienna but he knew enough people involved with the Congress to allow him to telephone them and urge them to support his goal. He made several efforts to amend the existing law, attaching his proposed change to various pieces of pending legislation. Nelson and I had enough friends on the Hill that we always learned about John’s efforts. Ultimately John was successful. I think it was part of the reason Nelson finally lost his battle with cancer. It was one of those quintessential Washington battles that go on behind the scenes that you wish never happened, but it did.

Our Mission in Vienna became a very different place from the one I had known for years. Up until 1994, not only did I know everybody at the Mission but also I knew spouses and families. I worked with a series of amazingly talented and congenial individuals who rotated through the Mission over the years. When I was working in 10 and on Kennedy’s staff I would frequently call the Mission (long before the days of email and texting) to consult on a host of issues ranging from budgets to personnel to nuclear safeguards, safety, security and more. The staff there was unfailingly responsive and helpful.

When John took over in Vienna, things changed quickly. The Mission staff of course reported to John and he was responsible for signing their performance appraisals. So doors closed. Mission staff became reluctant to deal openly with colleagues from Washington because it might raise John’s suspicions about what was discussed. Those of us from D.C. became adept at meeting Mission staffers in odd places and having coffee in quiet corners away from the Mission. But it was a far cry from the open, transparent and harmonious relationship that we had enjoyed for so many years. I really missed it. So did Nelson.

After I returned from the Pentagon, we finally had a secretary assigned to our little office. Her name was Sandra Heslep. Unfortunately, like Nelson, Sandra was suffering from cancer. My first glimpse of her was when she was settling in at her desk. She had on a very cute little white cap. Every day she wore a different cap, color coordinated with her outfit, because she had lost all of her hair from chemotherapy. But she was extremely capable and had a delightful sense of humor.

**Q:** What were some of the nuclear issues your office dealt with during the Clinton Administration?

**GALLINI:** Other than North Korea, the main issue that engulfed our office was preparation for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The NPT specifies that at the end of twenty-five years there should be a conference to decide whether the Treaty will be extended for a fixed period or periods or indefinitely. The decision would be made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. In 1993 the Clinton administration decided that the U.S. would strongly support indefinite extension of the NPT and set out to convince other NPT parties also to support indefinite extension. It launched the most extraordinary diplomatic campaign I ever witnessed during my career. An inter-agency task force was set up which met daily. Even though Nelson and I remained involved in North Korean nuclear issues until October 1994 when the Agreed
Framework put a lid on these issues for a time. Nelson also agreed to my participation on the task force. It was incredibly intense. We did literally thousands of demarches. We identified every decision maker on the planet who had a role in deciding how long to extend the NPT. We mobilized every U.S. ambassador serving in an NPT party. We mobilized the Secretaries of State, Energy and Defense. We called in the Vice President who headed our delegation to the 1995 Conference. President Clinton made it clear that he would involve himself whenever he was needed. It was the most coordinated, comprehensive and responsive diplomatic effort imaginable.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference opened in New York City at the United Nations on April 17, 1995. The entire international nuclear community was intently focused on this event. On April 19 as Vice President Al Gore was addressing delegates from all over the world, the Oklahoma City bombing took place. The magnitude of this tragedy, which killed 168 people and left hundreds injured, overshadowed the month-long Conference at the UN. But it did not preempt it and the work went forward.

From April 17 to May 12, 1995 delegates from 175 countries met to determine the future of the NPT. Members of the U.S. delegation to the RevCon worked from pale dawn to darkest midnight during this time. We had an unbelievably cohesive team. We were physically located at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations that was directly across the street from the UN building. This was before the Mission was renovated. We were in a section that I can only describe as a cave. It was on the second floor and was called an auditorium. It was dark. It was cold. There were no windows. The only air was provided by an unbelievably noisy generator that would run unpredictably and so loudly that we all had to shout to be heard. There were about twenty-five members of the U.S. delegation and every one of us shared this space for a month.

Q: This is not a huge room is it?

GALLINI: No. The auditorium was not a huge space. We shared computers. We often shared desks. We worked practically 24-7 for a month. Our delegation represented about ten different Federal agencies. But during all the time we worked together there was rarely a cross word exchanged. That was partly because we had excellent leaders. And it was partly because the delegation was staffed almost exclusively by career civil servants who had worked together for years, knew the issues meticulously, respected each other and looked out for each other. It was just a remarkable experience.

Since the beginning of the NPT review process in 1975 there has been a tendency for participants and outside observers to deem review conferences that produce a final document a “success” and conferences that do not produce a final document a “failure.” Every five years when a review conference convenes it is quite difficult to predict whether it will “succeed” or “fail.” The actual outcome is typically hammered out- or not- in the final twenty-four hours of the meeting.

In 1995 about two weeks into the NPT Review and Extension Conference I suggested to
some of my colleagues on the U.S. delegation that the outcome of the Conference was too important to leave to a questionable final twenty-four hours. Rather we should create some kind of tangible expression of support for indefinite extension of the NPT like a resolution that countries could endorse (Jack Ebitino who was on our delegation may be the only individual who remembers that I suggested this).

My colleagues quickly agreed that if the U.S. led an effort along these lines we would likely encounter resistance from countries in the non-aligned movement. So we turned to the Canadian delegation for its views. Canada agreed to put forward a resolution supporting indefinite extension and open it for signature. Canada ‘s delegates worked very hard to round up signatures on their resolution. Achieving indefinite NPT extension required a simple majority of the states represented at the Conference. Going into the final week of the Conference the suspense mounted. We were still short of a simple majority. Finally about eighteen hours before the scheduled closing of the Conference Canada announced it had garnered the simple majority needed for indefinite extension. Immediately there was a flood of additional signatures. On May 11, 1995 the Conference decided without a vote that “as a majority exists among States Party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.” It was not quite unanimous endorsement of indefinite extension but it was close. The members of the U.S. delegation left New York utterly exhausted but exultant!

Q. Sounds like the extension conference was a tough act to follow. How did the Clinton administration wrap up from your perspective?

GALLINI: The end of the Clinton administration was a difficult time personally for me. By the time I returned from New York in May 1995 it was clear that Ambassador Sievering was getting sicker. Nelson never lost that wonderful twinkle in his eye or his sense of humor. But his presence in the office became more uncertain. Nelson soldiered on as valiantly as he could but he passed away on March 6, 1996. At the same time our secretary Sandra was also starting to falter. As often as I could I took Sandra to her chemotherapy sessions. This meant that our three- person office was empty on some occasions or I left in the hands of an occasional intern. On the morning of Nelson’s memorial service I took Sandra to Fairfax Hospital for some necessary tests, went to the memorial service, and went back to pick up Sandra and take her home. She and I muddled along the best we could, but she passed away in January 1997. After she died I requested some time off. Both Nelson and Sandra were wonderful human beings and dear friends and it was very hard to lose them.

By the time I returned to work the Clinton administration was engaged in an intense internal debate over whether or not to fold ACDA into the Department of State. Secretary Madeline Albright had cut a deal with then Senator Jesse Helms over allowing the Chemical Weapons Convention to go to the Senate floor for ratification and Helms’ price to cut the deal was abolishing ACDA. The debate over ACDA’s future was not new- the issue had been raised several times during the Clinton administration- but no action had been taken. But on April 18, 1997 there was an announcement that ACDA would be
merged into State. On April 1, 1999 the merger occurred. Two new bureaus were created in the State Department. One was the Bureau of Non-Proliferation (NP). The other was the Bureau of Arms Control (AC). Most of ACDA’s personnel transitioned into one or the other of these new bureaus. At this time the work on the IAEA for which Nelson had been responsible was transferred from PM headed by Assistant Secretary Robert Einhorn to the NP Bureau.

I strongly encouraged Einhorn to create a separate office to support the IAEA. Over time responsibility for the many divergent issues relating to the IAEA had spread to several State Department bureaus, including IO, PM and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). My thought was to consolidate these many issues into an office dedicated to supporting the IAEA. As the dust from the reorganization started to settle, Einhorn agreed to create a new office responsible not only for the IAEA, but also the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was named the Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs or MNA.

MNA was a remarkable place. Our office director was a seasoned veteran of nuclear issues named Dr. Michael Rosenthal who had transitioned from ACDA. I was named as his deputy. The office had a dozen staff members and almost half had PhDs. While my PhD was in political science, the others were in nuclear physics or nuclear engineering. In addition to technical expertise, the office had several younger staff members, including a young lawyer. We were a mix of older and younger generations with both established expertise and developing expertise. It was a remarkably energetic, creative and productive office where staff looked out for one another. We had a lot of fun.

By early 2003, Michael decided he wanted to do something a bit different from being an office director. So we worked out an arrangement for him to work at the IAEA for a while. I was named MNA’s acting director. I always thought it was appropriate that this occurred on April Fools’ Day, 2003.

By the time MNA was created we were already engulfed in multifaceted preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This Conference was widely regarded in the international nuclear community as a serious test of the agreements struck at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in conjunction with extending the NPT indefinitely. Many of the non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT were pressing the U.S. hard to make greater progress on reducing its nuclear arsenal. Even before the 2000 Review Conference opened at the United Nations on April 24,2000, some in the news media were already predicting that the 2000 Conference would be “a failure” over nuclear disarmament issues.

Fortunately we had a remarkable leader who headed the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Norman Wulf was a lawyer by training who had spent many years at ACDA and was very experienced in nuclear issues. He was appointed in the Clinton administration as the U.S. Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation with the rank of Ambassador. From April 1999 until April 2000 several members of MNA’s staff worked intensively on preparations for the 2000 Review Conference. We wrote speeches and
prepared Congressional testimony. We wrote briefing papers and talking points. We drafted demarches on NPT issues for our embassies all over the globe. We came in early and left late. And we worked with unbelievably good humor. The office just hummed.

Norm traveled extensively in the run up to the 2000 meeting. He understood that one of the keys to making multilateral diplomacy work is having good working relations with counterparts from other governments. By the time the Conference opened, Norm was well known to many of the influential decision-makers from other governments who would represent their countries at the meeting.

By the time U.S. delegates to the 2000 Conference arrived in New York in April they were well prepared. The month-long Conference proved complex and challenging as expected. One hundred and fifty five parties to the NPT attended the Conference (out of a total of one hundred and eighty seven parties at that time). Negotiations were protracted and difficult. But for a variety of reasons the outcome of the Conference was ultimately deemed “a success.” Participating countries voiced strong support for the NPT. Capable leaders of the Conference’s main committees and subsidiary bodies helped guide discussion and debate productively. Modest progress on issues from the very beginning of the Conference led more and more NPT parties to compromise as states increasingly felt they did not want to lose the momentum achieved to a “failure” of the Conference.

In the end the Conference reached agreement on a consensus and substantive Final Document. One section of that Document deals with Article VI of the NPT that commits the nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament. This section includes “thirteen steps” to pursue disarmament including “an unequivocal undertaking” . . . “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” This part of the Final Document was seen by many participants as a particularly noteworthy accomplishment.

The deadline for concluding the 2000 Review Conference was extended several times as weary delegates worked through the night of May 19 and into the early evening of May 20. In the concluding plenary the President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Abdallah Baali (Algeria) noted “time is frozen. Is it morning or afternoon?” In his final remarks to the plenary Baali commented that the outcome of the Conference was “the best we could have achieved given the reality of the world around us” and that “today is a great day for disarmament and non-proliferation.”

A few months after the 2000 NPT Review Conference ended, George W. Bush was sworn in as U.S. President on January 20, 2001. Officials of the new administration had barely settled into their offices when the attacks of September II, 2001 occurred. These attacks were defining events for the Bush administration. They launched the U.S. invasion of and subsequent war in Afghanistan as well as, months later, the second war in Iraq.

On May 11, 2001 John Bolton joined the State Department as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Bolton had previous experience at State, having served as Assistant Secretary of the 10 Bureau from 1989 to 1993. Bolton
was well known for his distain of both international organizations and international treaties. He was also known for his distain of career civil servants. MNA had a perfect convergence of all three of these. It had a staff that was almost exclusively career civil servants who worked on both international organizations and international treaties. So from day one I think our office of remarkably talented career people was targeted by Bolton and his minions as one of the most suspect in Bolton’s domain.

Q: You mentioned minions. Can you describe who they were and where they came from?

GALLINI: Bolton’s chief of staff was a man named Fred Fleitz. He was quite unfriendly and very ideological. Another of Bolton’s staff was Dr. Jim Timbie. Jim began his career in ACDA but then spent many years in the Under Secretary’s office as an advisor on the Soviet Union and the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Someone once commented that Jim “conveyed like the furniture in the Under Secretary’s office from one administration to the next.” He was involved in many of the negotiations with the former Soviet Union and Russia over nuclear arms reductions. Why he stayed in his position when Mr. Bolton arrived I do not know. There were several other individuals on Bolton’s staff but Fleitz and Timbie were our principal contacts in Bolton’s office.

Early on in Bolton’s tenure it became clear that relations between the Non-Proliferation Bureau and Mr. Bolton’s office were strained at best. The first Assistant Secretary for the new NP Bureau was a career Foreign Service Officer named John Wolf. John Wolf had been Bolton’s deputy when Bolton was the IO Assistant Secretary. I don’t know what kind of relationship the two men had at that time.

Q: Didn’t you mention a Wolf before?

GALLINI: Yes. We used to joke that we had too many wolves. There were two. Both Norm Wulf and John Wolf were located in the front office of the NP Bureau. Norm served as Ambassador and John served as the NP Assistant Secretary.

John Wolf had the great good sense to select Susan Burk as his Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS). Susan is a career civil servant who started her career at the Defense Department before moving to ACDA. She is very smart and very experienced in nuclear issues. She transitioned from ACDA to State as an office director before moving to the NP front office to be PDAS. John also selected Dr. Andrew Semmel to be the political Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) in the NP Bureau. Andy had a distinguished career on the Hill working with Senator Richard Lugar for many years before joining the State Department. So there was a strong leadership team in the NP front office with four experienced and talented officers.

It didn’t take too long before staff in NP realized that John Wolf was not a “yes man.” When Bolton said “jump,” John Wolf’s response was not “how high?” John Wolf was thoughtful and logical. While his background was not in the nuclear field he rolled up his sleeves and learned as much as he possibly could as quickly as possible about nuclear issues. He asked lots of questions, including about how we dealt with Iran, Iraq and North
Korea and why we did what we did. His staff in the NP Bureau respected and supported John’s efforts to develop rational, carefully constructed policies to deal with a variety of nuclear issues. But John Wolf’s willingness and persistence in putting forward well-thought-out ideas soon made him suspect in Bolton’s mind. Bolton seemed to have the view that if you disagreed with him in any way you were disloyal. It wasn’t too long before there was a growing animosity between John Wolf and John Bolton. That animosity quickly served to distance the NP Bureau from the Under Secretary’s Office.

Q: What was Bolton’s approach?

GALLINI: Bolton and I rarely spoke to each other. I can only comment on what I observed. But it certainly did not seem that Bolton welcomed analysis of issues from different perspectives. He seemed to favor unilateral actions by the United States, including the use of force and application of sanctions. He seemed to disdain contact with other governments with the exception perhaps of the United Kingdom. His approach to issues often appeared heavy fisted and ill-conceived in my judgment. Virtually any course of action by the United States could be justified as a response to the attacks of September 11. And as much as I admire and respect Colin Powell, it seemed that Powell did very little as Secretary of State to rein in Bolton.

(I was late for work the morning of September II, 2001. It was a beautiful sunny day. I was just leaving home when the first attack on the twin towers was announced on the radio. My commute on highway 395, Shirley Highway, took me past the Pentagon every weekday and I was about a mile and a half from the Pentagon when it was attacked. I couldn’t see the building but I certainly heard the explosion. I was using the express lane on 395 that was one way going into the city. The heavy traffic came to a complete standstill. Within minutes rescue vehicles with their sirens roaring came racing up the shoulders of the highway on both sides of the stopped traffic. Heavy smoke was billowing into the brilliantly blue sky. I was listening to Washington, D.C.’s major news radio station, WTOP, and the announcers were struggling to articulate what was happening. After about an hour and a half a completely unseen hand just turned the traffic around to go south, away from the city. One by one each car made a U turn when there was room to do so. The driver of the car directly in front of me was a very attractive African American woman. As she made the U turn I could see tears just rolling down her cheeks. To me her image became a symbol of that terrible day.)

Q: I have to say that the Foreign Service particularly appreciated Colin Powell because he paid attention to the troops and got more funding for them. But other than that, he presided over essentially the most disastrous foreign policy that one can think of.

GALLINI: At that time it appeared that our foreign policy was run by Dick Cheney, John Bolton and Donald Rumsfeld.

Q: Do you think John Bolton was engaged in political posturing to appeal to his right wing supporters or was he reflecting his own personal views in his policies?
GALLINI: I think both. It seemed that Dick Cheney was Bolton’s mentor so Bolton paid attention to Cheney’s views. It certainly seemed to me that at least for the first term of George W. Bush our foreign policy was dictated, and I use that word deliberately, by Dick Cheney, John Bolton and Donald Rumsfeld. I think Colin Powell was swimming against a very powerful current. Perhaps history will determine that Powell tried very hard to be the moderating force and was simply brushed aside by the more ideological members of Bush’s cabinet.

Meanwhile at the State Department Bolton increasingly perceived the NP Bureau as trouble. When there was a high-stakes issue involved and John Wolf and Bolton disagreed on a course of action, Wolf on occasion would go around Bolton to Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage. This, of course, did not endear him to Bolton. The fact that Armitage consistently agreed with Wolf also did not sit well with Bolton.

By the time John Wolf resigned in July 2004 it seemed that Bolton had decided he was going to dismember the NP Bureau in whatever way he possibly could. He managed over time to put people loyal to him into several key positions and basically take control of the senior positions to which the rest of the NP Bureau reported. For example, Ambassador Norm Wulf retired and was replaced by a woman who had worked with Bolton when he was the IO Assistant Secretary. Her name is Jackie Sanders. She appeared to be totally subservient to Bolton. She took over Norm’s portfolio that included the NPT. Suddenly our office found itself reporting not to Norm Wulf, who was knowledgeable, experienced and a long-time friend and colleague, but to someone who seemed to have her cell phone on speed dial to Bolton who told her what to do. Every decision or direction that came out of her mouth appeared to come from John Bolton.

At the time we were just beginning the cycle of preparation for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Norm Wulf headed the U.S. delegation to the 2002 preparatory committee that proceeded uneventfully. By 2003 Bolton was maneuvering to put Jackie Sanders into Norm’s job and by the time of the 2004 preparatory committee meeting she was in place. During this time Bolton’s staff weighed in more and more heavily about how we would prepare for the 2005 Review Conference. Bolton had managed to put another of his loyalists into the position of Assistant Secretary for the Verification Bureau, another new Bureau created in 2000. He also filled as many staff positions with his sympathizers as he could. Before long these staffers were elbowing themselves into preparations for the 2005 Review Conference in a deliberate effort to slow or block the work being done by MNA. It was a miserable bureaucratic mess. And it was ruled over by Jackie Sanders and John Bolton.

As time went on the way we prepared for the 2005 Review Conference shifted from a broad, participatory, inclusive, multi-faceted dialogue with a variety of other governments to a monologue on “compliance.” To the extent that we engaged other governments prior to the 2005 Conference it was to deliver a stern message that countries must comply with their NPT obligations. Now please understand that I regard compliance with the NPT as a serious matter. But I do not believe we advance our goals by lecturing other governments unremittingly about it at the expense of all other issues of importance.
to supporting the NPT.

*Q:* It sounds like in a way they were setting up a straw man. I mean you can pound away on others with no result but you justify it because you are doing something.

**GALLINI:** What you are doing though is driving other countries further away.

*Q:* Of course you are.

**GALLINI:** I had the impression that the Bolton folks believed they were defending U.S. national security by harping on the importance and that they were addressing a real world threat that long-time career staff were too ossified to recognize. Career staff certainly did recognize the importance of compliance but not to the exclusion of every other consideration. The divide between the career folks and the political folks widened considerably during 2004 and 2005.

*Q:* Tell me, how did you fit into this? I mean you have been around for a long time. You were one of the old thinkers. From what I gather, John Bolton was not the greatest gentleman in the world. I would think that you would be an anathema to him and his followers. Did you have any connection with him or not?

**GALLINI:** My connection was primarily through Jackie Sanders since she was responsible for directing NPT issues. During 2004 and 2005 we were in the midst of the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference and there were a variety of NPT issues in play. But there were also other pots simmering to a boil.

The animosity between John Wolf and John Bolton was growing. At the end of the Clinton administration John Ritch was replaced in Vienna by a very respected Foreign Service Officer named Ken Brill. John Wolf and Ken Brill were close friends. John and Ken were on the phone together practically every day, coordinating and directing U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policies including those relating to the IAEA. It didn’t take long before their sensible and reasoned approaches were slapped down by Bolton.

Bolton remained incensed that John Wolf continued to consult with Mr. Armitage who supported John. So both John Wolf and Ken Brill became persona non grata to Bolton, and by association so did the IAEA. I was the acting office director in the office responsible for both NPT and IAEA issues and was clearly another one of those targeted by Bolton.

There were actually three of us in the NP Bureau subjected to Bolton’s ire. One was a career officer in the Senior Executive Service, Vann Van Diepen, and the other was a career Foreign Service officer. We use to joke about which one of us was number one on Bolton’s hit list. I guess by default I ended up number one because the other two left the NP Bureau before I did. The career Foreign Service officer, Mark Fitzpatrick, accepted a position at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 2005 and went on to a very distinguished career as an internationally recognized
expert in the field of nuclear non-proliferation studies. But as time went on it was clear that Bolton was still looking for ways to reduce and eliminate the role of career officers in the nuclear non-proliferation field.

I served on the U.S. delegation to the 2004 Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Jackie Sanders was head of the delegation. It was the only time in my career that I remember being embarrassed to be on a U.S. delegation. Some of our delegates were raucous and arrogant. There were times when the same U.S. statement was read aloud simultaneously in different sessions of the PrepCom. The statement harped on what countries should and should not do and drummed compliance, compliance, compliance into every listener. Jackie was assisted by Fred Fleitz as well as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Verification Bureau, Chris Ford, and Paula DeSutter, who was then the Assistant Secretary of the Verification Bureau. They were all chanting from the same song sheet that other countries should do whatever the U.S. deemed important and compliance, compliance, compliance was all that mattered. Those of us who took a broader and more reasoned approach, and certainly a more diversified approach simply hunkered down. We returned to Washington at the end of the meeting thinking this was not diplomacy. It was coercion. And that was basically the approach that characterized the rest of our preparatory work going into the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

The 2005 NPT Review Conference met at the United Nations from May 2 -27. I was told that I would not be included on the U.S. delegation to the Conference despite my attendance at the 2004 PrepCom. My colleague and friend Dean Rust, a veteran of a whole host of nuclear non-proliferation issues including the NPT, declined to serve on the delegation. Two MNA staff members, Dr. Beth Weithman and Dr. Nina Rathbun, were accredited on the delegation and spent a very difficult month in New York. The Conference was widely regarded as a “failure” since it concluded without agreement on much of anything, including a final document.

Q: What were you getting from your colleagues from other countries?

GALLINI: Sympathy.

Meanwhile, just as the 2004 PrepCom was winding up in the spring of 2004, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at the State Department was beginning an inspection of the two new bureaus created in 1999, the Non-Proliferation Bureau and the Arms Control Bureau, as well as the Verification Bureau created in 2000. This third Bureau was created from a part of the AC Bureau to address Congressional concerns about effective verification and compliance with arms control agreements. The goal of the inspectors was to determine how well and effectively these new entities were performing. MNA prepared a briefing book for our inspectors providing an overview of our work and resumes of our officers. One of our inspectors shared with me a copy of the final report on our office that described MNA as well managed, very congenial and highly productive. According to the report, “The office seems to function well as a team.”
At the end of its inspection the OIG provided nineteen formal recommendations in its final report on the NP Bureau. The first of these recommendations states: “The (State) Department should establish a task force to craft the merger of the Bureau of Nonproliferation and the Bureau of Arms Control...” The OIG also recommended in its report on the Verification Bureau that the bureau be eliminated and become an office attached to the Secretary of State serving in an advisory capacity. It said “The Department leadership should explore restructuring the Bureau of Verification and Compliance from a bureau to a specialized entity so that it will focus more clearly upon its central mandate.”

Just before he departed in December 2004, Colin Powell approved the merger of the two bureaus. Powell’s departure was widely seen both inside and outside the State Department as the departure of the last bastion of reason in the senior leadership ranks at State. At that time control of U.S. foreign policy moved into the hands of several highly conservative officials including David Wurmser and John Bolton.

When Condoleezza Rice became Secretary of State in January 2005, she confirmed her support for the merger. But she also put the proposed merger on hold pending the arrival of Bolton’s replacement as Under Secretary.

Bolton had been named as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He served in a recess appointment from August 2005 until December 2006 since the U.S. Senate did not confirm him for the position. But by the time Bolton left for New York he had positioned political appointees loyal to him in several senior positions in the non-proliferation and arms control realms. Paula DeSutter and Chris Ford remained in the Verification Bureau that was not reduced to an office. Steve Rademaker was Bolton’s selection to head the AC Bureau and Steve became the head of the merged bureau when it was created. By then the NP front office had shrunk. Norm Wulf retired. John Wolf left in July 2004 and Ken Brill departed from Vienna. Our PDAS Susan Burke together with DAS Andy Semmel led the Bureau for ten months. They prevailed as a strong voice of reason and support for the NP staff. How they managed to deal with the divisive forces swirling around them I will never know.

In the spring of 2005 I got in my car and drove to northern Virginia to meet with the gentleman who was to replace Bolton. His name is Robert Joseph. I first met Bob at the Pentagon in 1993. He and I were among those who worked on the North Korean task force that reported almost daily to the Secretary of Defense. I actually wrote down what I wanted to say to him. When I called to ask for an appointment I told him “Don't worry. I am not looking for a job. All I want is a few minutes of your time.” He said “Fine. Come on over.” So I did.

At the time Bob was working for a private consulting firm. His office was located in a very peaceful setting surrounded by trees. We joked about whether he really wanted to trade his manageable and calm lifestyle for the pressure-cooker world of the State Department. My message to Bob was simple. I noted that as a career civil servant I had worked for six Presidents, both Republican and Democratic, over almost thirty years.
During most of this time political appointees realized quickly that career officers are a resource, available to provide the best professional advice they can. But never in my professional career had I encountered the incredibly sharp divide between career officers and political appointees that prevailed in some areas during the George W. Bush administration. Bob had just retired as a career officer himself. I told him he would be in a position to be a healer and to bring the two sides together to pursue a more thoughtful and constructive approach to the work before us. He listened very thoughtfully. He was very gracious, and when I left he shook my hand and said “I’m glad you are on my team.”

Bob became Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in June 2005. Initially he seemed interested in meeting the people who served under him—not just office directors but the whole staff. But after his first visit to the different offices under his jurisdiction he vanished into the Bolton world. It quickly became clear that nothing was going to change. By the time Joseph arrived in the State Department, Bolton, Fleitz and others had thought about how the reorganization and merger of the NP and AC Bureaus would proceed.

The creation of the new bureau was a messy, biased and painful bloodbath of a number of career officers at the hands of a number of political neocons. While run-ins between career staff and political appointees occur from time to time at State, I cannot recall witnessing anything similar to the wrenchingly awful personnel upheaval that produced the new Bureau for International Security (ISN) in 2005. The Senior Management Panel (SMP) charged with standing up the new bureau consisted solely of political appointees from the Bolton camp whose deliberations were conducted secretly with no career officials involved. While the career staff attempted to push back on the heavily biased process there were virtually no effective protections in place that could help. On September 13, 2005 the blueprint of the new merged bureau was announced.

I happened to be in Vienna at an IAEA meeting on that day when I received a phone call from Andy Semmel to whom I reported. “Well, guess what.” he said. “There is a new office director for your office. Your office is being merged with another office in the former Arms Control Bureau and you are now working for Robert Luaces.” I had been demoted to work for a person lower in rank than I and with virtually no knowledge of nuclear non-proliferation issues. But he was well connected to John Bolton.

I wasn’t really surprised. During the poisonous merger process rumors about what might happen were rampant. I certainly knew the IAEA was not in favor with Bolton. That was clear many times, including in August 2004 when Bolton had taken upon himself an effort to undermine the leadership of the IAEA when he opposed the re-election of the Director General of the IAEA for a third term.

Q: Who was that?

GALLINI: Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. By August 2004 Mohamed had served as the Director General of the IAEA for seven years. His second term of office was due to
expire on November 30, 2005. At the IAEA the process of selecting a new Director General begins a year in advance of the expiration date of the term of the incumbent Director General so a new leader can be in place in a timely manner. The question of whether ElBaradei would seek a third term was beginning to percolate in the summer of 2004.

I had known Mohamed for many years and had worked to have him appointed Director General after Dr. Blix retired in 1997. Mohamed had told me that his family was encouraging him to step down and not pursue a third term. He was considering informing the Board of Governors at its September 2004 meeting that he would not be available for a third term. But in August 2004 Mr. Bolton started meeting with ambassadors from other countries and telling them that the United States would not support ElBaradei for a third term. As far as I know, Bolton had not consulted with any other U.S. officials involved with the IAEA about this and had decided on his own that ElBaradei would not have a third term. In September I called Jim Timbie who was on Bolton’s staff at the time. “Jim,” I said. “If Mr. Bolton continues to pursue his anti-ElBaradei campaign, I want you to know what will happen. ElBaradei is highly regarded in many countries. Bolton will antagonize other governments who are supportive of ElBaradei and who don’t have any idea why the U.S. would back off the strong support it has given ElBaradei over the years. Bolton will consolidate support for ElBaradei and when the Board of Governors endorses a third term for him the United States will be completely isolated.” Needless to say, Bolton continued his efforts to oust ElBaradei.

Q: Do you have a feel for what motivated him?

GALLINI: Well. I never had a chance to ask him. But I believe Bolton was seeking revenge. Both Hans Blix and Mohamed had resisted strong pressure from senior Bush Administration officials, including Dick Cheney, to change their reports to the UN Security Council stating that there was no evidence that Iraq was renewing its WMD programs.

At the end of the 1991 Gulf War a great deal of work was done through UN inspections to eliminate Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) was created after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 to conduct inspections in Iraq in search of Iraqi WMD programs and activities. Security Council resolution 687 gave the UN inspectors a strong mandate to move freely in Iraq without interference from Iraqi officials. From 1991 to 1995 UNSCOM uncovered large biological and nuclear weapons programs in Iraq despite considerable efforts by Iraq to obfuscate and mislead the inspectors. The situation in Iraq remained volatile with UNSCOM and the Iraq government repeatedly at loggerheads. Meanwhile UN sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s took an increasingly heavy toll on Iraq’s population.

In December 1999, Resolution 1284 was adopted by the Security Council that replaced UNSCOM with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Dr. Hans Blix who served as IAEA Director General from 1981 to November 1997 was appointed by the UN Secretary General to be UNMOVIC’s
Executive Chairman. Blix served from March 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003. Meanwhile, in Vienna Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei had taken over the helm of the IAEA in December 1997 and remained as IAEA Director General. Both UNMOVIC and the IAEA were extensively engaged in inspections in Iraq seeking to root out and eliminate any remaining elements of WMD programs.

Following the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001 in the U.S., senior officials in the George W. Bush administration were increasingly adamant that Iraq posed a grave security threat due to its WMD capabilities and sought a Security Council resolution supporting military action and occupation in Iraq. Both Blix and ElBaradei were called upon several times to report UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection results to the Security Council before a March 17, 2003 deadline set by the U.S. and the UK for invading Iraq. Both men repeatedly reported there was no evidence of reconstituted WMD programs in Iraq based on multiple inspections and detailed analysis. UN inspections- and Blix and ElBaradei -rapidly became anathemas to senior U.S officials, including Bolton’s mentor, Vice President Cheney. Cheney ‘s public disparaging remarks about both men are well documented.

I had known both Blix and ElBaradei for many years. I knew them to be highly intelligent, principled leaders who spoke the truth and were not easily intimidated by the pressure they faced from the Bush administration. My guess is that Bolton went after Mohamed in 2004 after Mohamed stuck to the truth about the absence of WMD programs in Iraq in 2003.

By the end of September 2004 Mohamed told me he was not inclined to have Mr. Bolton determine his future. Mohamed quietly informed the chairman of the Board of Governors that he would make himself available for a third term. From September 2004 until June 2005 Bolton pursued his campaign against ElBaradei. But he was never able to persuade any other country to name a candidate to replace ElBaradei. I was under instructions from Bolton ‘s office to write demarches to the thirty-five member states of the IAEA’s Board of Governors urging them to find a new Director General. So I did. I wrote talking points for our embassies to use with their host governments explaining that while the U.S. felt ElBaradei had served with distinction in his tenure as Director General, it was time for new ideas and fresh thinking and time to bring in new leadership for the IAEA. No other government agreed.

Even the Japanese disagreed. In the spring of 2005 Japan instructed its embassy in Washington to inform the State Department that Japan would support a third term for ElBaradei. This was most unusual since Japan and the United States worked closely together on nuclear issues and were generally in lock-step on these issues.

I found the entire saga both embarrassing and infuriating. When I look back on the demarches I drafted on this issue I just shake my head- it is a very good example of a civil servant doing her duty to a political superior knowing that the approach is ill- advised and certain to fail.
If Bolton had just backed off in September 2004, ElBaradei almost certainly would have chosen to step down as IAEA Director General by the end of his second term. Instead Bolton chose to pursue an effort that was internationally visible and at the senior levels of many governments. His effort proved to be an embarrassment and a clear defeat for the U.S. in the international nuclear community. In June 2005 the IAEA Board of Governors strongly endorsed a third term for ElBaradei with the U.S. mutely accepting this decision. In September 2005 IAEA member states meeting at the annual General Conference supported ElBaradei’s third term by acclamation. In October 2005, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei and the IAEA were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.

Back in Washington, Jim Timbie called me. I heard his voice say “I never said you were wrong.”

In August 2006 I was eligible to retire. It was clear to me that the animosity from Bolton and his followers made it impossible for me to accomplish much of anything professionally. There are times when you just can’t beat ‘em and I sure as hell wasn’t going to join them.

I was sorry to go. But over my career I had worked to strengthen the IAEA. I had at times persuaded some in Congress to increase funding for the IAEA. I helped strengthen the international safeguards system as well as nuclear safety and security. I’d helped many individuals find jobs at the IAEA and elsewhere. I was told, including by Dr. ElBaradei, that I helped the Agency win the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize. And I contributed to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Along the way I had traveled extensively and worked with many counterparts from other governments. And I had the incredible good fortune to work with and for some of the smartest, most talented and caring colleagues one could ever hope to find. Best of all I was still married to Marc and incredibly proud of our sons Brian and Daniel.

I’d like to end with a quote from one of the November 2004 OIG inspection reports that certainly captures my view of my professional colleagues: “OIG was duly impressed by the caliber, skill, and dedication of the people working in these bureaus (NP, AC and VC). Many of them have made, and continue to make, enormous contributions to advancing the security of the United States. Indeed, in the course of the inspection, several individuals were identified by our interlocutors, and properly so, as “national treasures.” These public servants have put the mission first, meeting difficult challenges and frequently making significant personal sacrifices. Their commitment to our nation is commendable.”

It is indeed.

*End of interview*