

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DANIEL P. SULLIVAN

Interviewed by: David E. Reuther
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INTERVIEW

Q: Good afternoon. This is an interview with Daniel Peyton Sullivan for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I am David Reuther.

Dan, you have had a very interesting life; you are one of the Foreign Service Officers who have a China-missionary background. In fact, you were born in China in July 1929. Could you give us some background on your family?

SULLIVAN: My father graduated from the University of Michigan in 1922. He went out to Shanghai to teach economics at St. John's University, the Episcopalian missionary university in China, located in Shanghai. His older sister had gone out earlier to be a secretary to the bishop, and that was the tie-in. He was there from 1922 to 1943, with some breaks where he returned to the United States.

Out there, he met and married my mother, who was connected to the Southern Methodist foreign missions in China. Her mother, a widow, was Secretary for Women's Work for the Southern Methodist Board of Missions in Nashville, Tennessee. It was located at Scarritt College.

She had occasion to go out in 1922 to China for a year to see how her flock was doing. She took her youngest daughter along with her. One of the older daughters was married to a Methodist preacher already in Shanghai. He was the pastor of the large downtown Methodist church, Moore Memorial Methodist Church, right across the road from the racecourse in Shanghai.

They met, married, and produced three children. I am the middle one. We were connected with that church until our departures from Shanghai, the circumstances of which we will get to in a little while. They were different from my father and the rest of us.

Q: You were saying that your father went to the University of Michigan. Was he a Michigan boy, raised in Michigan?

SULLIVAN: Born in Ypsilanti, raised in Detroit. He was the youngest of three children and the first person in his family ever to go to college. He got his Bachelor's, and subsequently his Master's in Economics, at the University of Michigan. He did all the work for his doctoral dissertation and submitted it. He was back in China, and the dissertation was in Ann Arbor. The advisor died. The university came in and tore his office apart, and they lost the dissertation.

He rewrote it. By the time he had finished getting it rewritten – incidentally, it was on the subject of the labor movement in China during the 1920s and 1930s, a fascinating subject to read about – it was after Pearl Harbor and the Japanese had moved in to occupy the center of Shanghai. He knew he wouldn't be able to get it out through the Japanese. He buried it under the house. We wanted to go for years to get it.

I finally went back to Shanghai in 1992, courtesy of Pam Slutz, who was the Deputy Principal Officer there then, an old friend. She put me in touch with a fellow who was a teacher at Fudan University in the Department of American Studies.

His name was Edward Xu. He has his Ph.D. from Princeton. His father and grandfather were both doctors who went through the medical school at St. John's University. Edward would have gone to St. John's if there had been a St. John's by the time he got to be college age. He wrote a history of it. His dissertation back at Princeton was on American missionary higher education in China, the case study of St. John's University.

When we got there, he started telling me things. He knew more about my father than I did. He knew everything that was in the university library.

Q: You were looking for the copy of your father's dissertation.

SULLIVAN: Yes. Edward arranged for us to be able to go and look under the house. I can just imagine Edward going to the officials in Shanghai and saying, "I have been contacted by this American gentleman who wants to come here. He has a filial duty to perform."

I can just see him doing it. And it happened. No police interfered. The university took up the floor of the house, so I could get down underneath where the brick columns were somewhere down there. We didn't find the dissertation. Maybe we didn't have the right information. It was somewhere under that house, but we didn't find it. So Dad never got the Ph.D.

Q: Your mother's side of the family, where are they from?

SULLIVAN: They are from the south, generally Mississippi-based. Mother was born in Winona Mississippi. Her mother and father were both born in Mississippi. He was a Methodist circuit rider preacher and died early. She was less than a year old when he died of – actually, I'm not sure which disease it was, but it was a disease that came along, something like diphtheria. She was a widow for nearly 60 years.

She taught math at Whitworth College in Brookhaven, Mississippi. Then she had this job with the Southern Methodist Board of Missions in Nashville. She finally retired with another one of her daughters, who was married to a druggist in a small town in Mississippi, Lexington.

Q: Your father is out in China and your mother comes out for...

SULLIVAN: She comes out for the year. She had graduated from Vanderbilt and worked a year in a hospital in Nashville as a blood lab technician. In Shanghai, Margaret Williamson Hospital, the first hospital solely for the care of Chinese women had been established in 1884 and named for the American woman who donated the money to start it. They could use her services, so she went to work there for that year.

At the end of the year, when it was time for my grandmother to come back, my mother said to her, "I don't want to go back. I want to stay here." Just before my grandmother left, my mother said, "There is someone I want you to meet." It was the night before my grandmother was leaving. She said, "No, no, no." She said, "Mother, you may wish later on that you had taken the time to meet him." "Okay." So my dad was brought in for about 15 minutes and talked with my grandmother. Then she got on the ship and came back.

The next time she saw that daughter, the daughter not only had the husband, but also the first child. During that period, she must have wondered and tried to remember what that 15 minutes was like, what this guy from Michigan, this Yankee, was like.

She was not a professional Southerner, however. She lived in the little town of Lexington, which was a very, very racist town. She and Hazel Brannon Smith who was the owner and editor of the local paper were the two people in town who kept telling the people of Lexington that they didn't agree with their habits in terms of race relations. They disapproved thoroughly. Hazel Brannon Smith was a good friend of Hodding Carter, whose family in Greenville was taking the same opposition to customary white Mississippi practice. Both my grandmother and Mrs. Smith lived in Lexington.

We asked my grandmother one time: "How do you manage to live here this way?" She said, "They know how I feel. There's no sense in my banging them over the head. They just know how I feel."

Q: Meanwhile your family is growing up in China.

SULLIVAN: Yes. I grew up in China. I was there for the first eleven years, my older sister for fifteen, and my younger brother for eight, except for the two times we made trips to the States to go on furlough. My sister made three trips.

Q: Do you recall when those two trips were?

SULLIVAN: The first one was in 1933-34, and the second one was in 1939-40.

The practice of the Episcopal mission board was that foreign staff got furloughs. You could either have eight months every five years, or a full year every seven years. We always did the eight-month one. We would go and live usually in Ann Arbor while Dad was working on one part or another of his doctorate: course work or something connected to his dissertation, or studying French or German or something like that to meet his qualifications. So I lived in Ann Arbor three or four times.

Q: The 1930s were a pretty interesting period to be in China. Do you recall any of those events as you were growing up such as the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge Incident?

SULLIVAN: Certainly do. We were in Japan for the summer, our usual practice. The Sullivan family had developed, starting in 1930, a habit of going to Japan for summer vacations, to a place called Lake Nojiri up in the Japanese Alps, Nojiri-ko, 'ko' being lake. It was one of three well-known foreign summer areas. One being Karuizawa, and the third one was Rick Straus' old place up north of Tokyo – I'll come up with the name later. Rick was a fellow Foreign Service officer I got to know later. He and I have always had this thing back and forth about which is better: Nojiri or his.

We were there in the middle of the summer and along came the war. The fighting began in July around Shanghai. We couldn't go back immediately at the normal end of the summer and Nojiri is not a place where you can stay through the winter. We didn't know how long we would have to stay. We were offered the summer house of the Episcopal Bishop of Japan's – his name was Reifsnyder – at Karuizawa; a place that was available to him for vacations and so forth. The house was loaned to us, starting in September, so we went over there. My dad was there for a while.

Then an opportunity came and he got a ship back into Shanghai for the beginning of the school year. It being 1937 and the fighting going on around Shanghai, St. John's could not operate on its own campus.

If you see the map of Shanghai here, Soochow Creek wanders across the northern part of the city. Out on the west five miles from the Bund there is a loop and that was right opposite what was called Jessfield Park, a big park. That was St. John's University campus. There would be firing across it, probably the Japanese mainly. There were shell holes in the tennis court right in front of our house, and things like that. It was just too dangerous for the campus to stay open. People made excursions there, but you couldn't operate the campus, so the university operated downtown for a while.

Dad got into Shanghai and began his teaching. The rest of us stayed on at Karuizawa until I would say early November. The fighting hadn't moved away yet. When our ship got to the mouth of the Whangpoo River, we got off it and were taken up the river on a French gunboat, with sandbags all along it. All of us were in behind the sandbags, just in case.

The gunboat brought us into the center of Shanghai, the international settlement, which the Japanese had not entered. The center of town, made up of the British, Russian, American, German, Japanese and French concessions formed in the nineteenth century, had been designated as the Shanghai International Settlement, a vast, mostly Western expatriate zone, formed in the nineteenth century. Although, the French being the French had kept their concession separate. In 1937, the Japanese had taken their concession out of it, but the rest of the international settlement and the French concession were still there and remained there until the morning after Pearl Harbor when the Japanese came in and took over the center of the city.

So temporarily, were in an apartment just down the street from the Shanghai American School, which was located in what they called Frenchtown, the French Concession. The school was on Avenue Petain, two blocks down. We lived there for a couple of months anyway, until the fighting moved away and we could go back to the campus.

Q: So you were pretty much aware of what was going on. At this time, the Japanese bombed and sank the USS Panay, for example in December 1937.

SULLIVAN: I had had my eighth birthday that summer in Nojiri. But, yes, we were aware of what was going on. We had gotten back in November. This sinking happened on the Yangtze River near Nanking, now called Nanjing. But that wasn't the only bombing. In fact, there would be notifications that the Japanese were going to stage an air attack on the Chinese parts of the city at one o'clock on such-and-such an afternoon. We would go up on the roof of the apartment building and watch the Japanese dive bombers go in, hitting Nantao, the old city about two miles away. Or Chaopei, the north side of the Chinese city. Those were areas where the Chinese resistance was the greatest. We would watch the planes go into their dives and so forth.

Q: My understanding was the Nationalist government put its best troops out in front of Shanghai to prove that...

SULLIVAN: I didn't ever hear it said that way, but they did have raids over in Chaopei on the north side of Soochow Creek, where the main railroad station was. The railroad station was a place where the Chinese put in considerable resistance earlier, probably in July, August and September. There was a lot of fighting.

Q: Then the fighting moves on and Shanghai settles down?

SULLIVAN: The fighting moved on up into Nanjing. Of course, the Rape of Nanjing follows. By that time, the Japanese occupied and controlled the whole area around the

outskirts of Shanghai. There wasn't any more armed Chinese resistance in that area, but the Japanese did not come into the International Settlement or the French Concession in the center of the city.

Q: So St. John's starts back up on a fairly normal basis? Who are the students at St. John's?

SULLIVAN: Fairly normal, yes. The students were largely Chinese. There were a few foreigners. Instruction was in English. All the major Christian Universities taught in English, except one. I have to put this in to honor my wife. Her father taught Public Health and Parasitology at Cheeloo University (formally Shantung Christian University) in Jinan in Shandong Province. That university taught in Chinese.

When my wife's parents first went to China in the early '30s, they went to language school in Beijing, Peking as it was called in those days. He had a year there before he actually started teaching in Jinan. The interesting thing about it was that he and the various other teachers of technical subject matter discovered that there weren't Chinese words for many of the things they had to teach about. So they established a little committee to consider possibilities and agree on what word to use for technical terms.

That committee was taken over after 1949 by the new central government. The official group for establishing technical terms is derived from that committee at Cheeloo University.

Q: That is an interesting story; because the whole issue of modernization, when you are talking about Asia, is how do you pass on modernized scientific knowledge? One primary source for the Chinese was Japan. The Japanese were writing scientific language in characters. So the Chinese would pick up the characters the Japanese were using for some technical things, primarily military and public health, and then using them. Of course, trying to invent their own.

SULLIVAN: My brother-in-law, my sister's husband, a Wisconsin boy, was a Presbyterian minister. They met in Union Seminary in New York and then went to Japan as missionaries. He already had studied chemical engineering and electrical engineering at the University of Wisconsin and had a PhD. In Japan, he taught physics and chemistry at Doshisha University, a Christian university in Japan. Because he was a scientist as well as an ordained minister, he could be an example of Christianity but not proselytize. When they came back from Japan for health reasons of their oldest son, he started teaching at the University of Wisconsin. There, he and a Japanese colleague produced the definitive dictionary of Japanese-English technical terms.

Q: That was very important work. So, things have settled down in Shanghai a little bit. Your family is moving on.

SULLIVAN: We came back to the States in early 1939 for the second furlough that I went on, the third for the family as a whole. My sister was alive for the first one. I was for the second and third one.

In fall 1939, we were due to go back to China. We were going to spend Christmas in London, and take the Trans-Siberian to get back to Shanghai that way. We left my mother's family in Mississippi, driving to New York. We stopped for a few days in Birmingham, Alabama, with one of my mother's college friends.

Lo and behold, the first of September arrived. On the first of September, war broke out in Europe. The Germans attacked Poland. By the third of September, the British were in the war too. It all broke out September 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Going to a place that was going to be at war didn't seem like a very good idea. So we turned around and went back across the Pacific, and arrived back in Shanghai in late January, I believe it was. Maybe it was very early February 1940.

Then again, we had to come up the Whangpoo in a warship behind barricades. That was a common practice, I think, for passenger vessels at that point.

Q: What kind of ships was going across the Pacific at that time?

SULLIVAN: The American President Line and Canadian Pacific.

We traveled sometimes on American President Line, sometimes on Canadian Pacific. We made our spring 1939 crossing on the Canadian Pacific (*RMS Empress of Russia*) through Nagasaki, where they loaded coal because *Russia* was still a coal burner. Then we went into Victoria and got off the *Russia* because it was going on to Vancouver. From Victoria, we took the Duchess Ferry down to Seattle. We made arrangements to pick up a car and drove to Michigan from there.

Q: That must have been a great exposure to the United States.

SULLIVAN: Yes. I used to sit next to my dad with the maps. I was ten and got to be the navigator. I had maps of the whole trip. I could tell you for years where we ate every meal, where we spent every night.

Q: In that pre-war period, there weren't the standardized motels that you have now.

SULLIVAN: There were some, but nowhere near as many. I got to see both Glacier and Yellowstone Parks for the first time when I was ten. I have been since. It was a great trip. Then we drove to Mississippi and back to Michigan. That's what we got to see.

Q: At that time, Europe is more and more embroiled in war. In May, Germany attacks France. Are you back in Shanghai by May 1940?

SULLIVAN: Yes, we were back by about early February. Then we were sort of settling in for the next five-year period, which would have put me as just about a senior in high school if I had been there the whole time. In the fall of 1940, the State Department recommended that non-essential civilians leave China. They chartered three large ocean liners to go out there to bring people back.

Q: Again, American President Line?

SULLIVAN: No, neither of the three was. One was United States Line, the SS Washington, which was a major Atlantic passenger vessel. The other two were Matson liners, the SS Mariposa and SS Monterey. We had five days or so to decide whether to leave and get on the ship. My folks made the decision that my mother, sister, brother and I would go, and Dad would stay.

At the same time up in Jinan, the decision was being made during the same five-day period that my wife's mother, sister and she would leave. They went on the Mariposa, and her father stayed.

Cheeloo University was behind Japanese lines from 1937 on. It continued to operate that way until sometime in 1941. The U.S. wasn't at war with them, so there wasn't any particular danger to Americans, other than being around an occupied area. However, somewhere along the line the University decided to move from Jinan, Shandong to Chengdu, Sichuan. The students walked. Maybe some went by train or something like that. Anyway, they moved to Chengdu. My father-in-law went by way of Hong Kong and flew. He was with the university there in Chengdu.

In 1942, he joined the Office of War Information, the OWI, the predecessor of USIA (United States Information Agency), and worked in Chungking. He was in Chungking through the war, except for one trip out over the Hump to the United States in the summer of 1943

Q: What were the conditions under which the State Department was making these recommendations? And making them so quickly?

SULLIVAN: I don't know the background to that. It seemed sudden, in terms of my memory. You would think that if the ship was going to be leaving Shanghai in five days, it had to be fairly close. So it had to have been sent sometime earlier. There had to have been some sort of planning period. Clearly it was evident after 1939 that war was imminent. However, I have always lived with this story of the five-day decision period, and packing up in five days. Of course, Dad was staying in the house. So there were limitations to how much was to be packed.

Q: So your mother, two siblings and you boarded which ship?

SULLIVAN: The SS Washington, which went from Shanghai to Manila, where it was to pick up US Army dependents. They could be ordered out, and they were. Women and

children were ordered out. That's where the big load on the *Washington* came from. As we sailed out of Manila Bay at nightfall and passed Corregidor, the island was lit up, spotlights were lighting the sky and planes circled overhead as the troops said good-bye to their families, some certainly for the last time. The next stop was San Francisco.

Ironically, the day we were closest to Hawaii was December 7th, 1940. We were to the north of it, going through a very bad storm on December 7th, 1940. We arrived December 11th in San Francisco. Then we took the train to Mississippi.

Q: When you came back to the States in 1940, where did you stay, with your mom's people?

SULLIVAN: Yes, in Jackson, Mississippi. We rented a house. But at least there was family there for back up.

We were there a year-and-a-half. We finished off that school year—I was in the seventh grade—and then did a whole other school year, my eighth grade. Then at the end of the summer in 1942, my mother said, “No. It's nice to be around my family, but I'm taking these kids up to Ann Arbor.” We spent that summer with friends in Rockbridge County, Virginia, at Rockbridge Baths, at their family's summer camp.

My father's sister and brother were in Detroit. There were also some cousins and so forth, although nowhere near as big a family or support mechanism, but she wanted to get us out of Mississippi, although she never said so directly, but it was clear she wanted better schools and to have us grow up with different attitudes. So she moved us to Ann Arbor, where we had been before on leave

Q: In the meantime, Pearl Harbor occurs.

SULLIVAN: We were in Jackson, Mississippi. I was twelve. About 90 miles away to the south, down in Magnolia, Mississippi, there was a seven year-old girl, whom I wouldn't have looked at for years but ended up being my wife.

Q: In the summer of 1941, your father came Stateside and then returned to Shanghai.

SULLIVAN: That's right. He was still under contract to teach, but he came and spent the summer with us. We spent some time in the Great Smokies. Our friends had a house that had not yet been taken over by the government. They could continue to use it until the last member of a certain generation of the family died. So we spent part of the summer there, with wild bears around, which made things interesting.

But up until December 8th, 1941, St. John's University continued to operate as it always had, within the cocoon of the International Settlement of Shanghai. I can remember back in late 1937 or 1938 the British Tommies had the responsibility for riding the perimeter of that particular part of Shanghai. The university was at this bend of Soochow Creek. There was a road all the way around the campus. Once an hour, the Tommy truck would

arrive at the gate. All of us kids would run. They would pick us up and give us a ride around the campus. That sort of thing lasted until December 8th.

On that morning, the Japanese moved into the city and took it over. I don't know the details of what happened. I think the American marines had already moved out to the Philippines and fought there later. What happened to the Seaforth Highlanders, the British contingent that had run the Tommy Truck, I don't know.

On December 8th, the Japanese moved in and established their control over the center of the city. They took over from the International Settlement government and from the French Concession government. They began to put in their own rules. They inventoried everything. They did not put European foreigners and Americans into camps initially, unlike what happened in the Philippines, Malaya, or other countries in Southeast Asia, or other parts of China.

My assumption has always been that they wanted Shanghai to continue to operate as the bustling economic place it relatively was, even in wartime. They considered that to their benefit, that they would still be doing that. So bankers, university professors, and whoever happened to be around, were not interned – British, Dutch, or American. They were registered. They were limited in what they could do. They had to turn in their cars. All their furniture was registered by room in their houses. On the list, it said that objects could not be moved. If they wanted to move it, they had to go and get a permit to move an object that was not supposed to be moved.

The Japanese did several things that were interesting. For instance, they gave colored armbands to each nationality of Westerner who was there. I forget what the Americans had. I do remember hearing that they gave the Germans, their allies, yellow. The Germans were absolutely furious, because yellow was the color that the Germans were giving the Jews. They complained bitterly to the Japanese about this. The Japanese drew themselves up and said that yellow was an imperial color, it was an honor to be wearing yellow, and you will wear yellow. And they did. There were these sorts of things.

It is my assumption and I don't know the basis for it, whether it was factual or not, that by early 1943 after the first exchange of American civilians for Japanese civilians, the Japanese got sufficiently upset about what they were hearing done to the Japanese in the United States, in terms of camps. They said, dammit, we are going to do the same thing.

So in 1943 they put citizens of Allied countries—Americans, British, Dutch, French—living in Shanghai in camps. Word came out that all the foreign faculty, both American and British at St. John's, were to assemble over on the other side of Jessfield Park, and walk five miles down to the Bund. They would then be transported across the river and put into the British-American Tobacco warehouse, where there was a camp of British, Americans, and Dutch. There were about 100 men altogether in this tobacco warehouse. Families were interned in another camp.

Interestingly enough, what you used to always see in pictures of Shanghai was the Bund. Now, they have turned the camera around and look over at Pudong and these huge modern buildings. One of these modern buildings is right in the location where the tobacco warehouse was. I didn't know exactly where it was for years. I knew it was in Pudong.

Then I got a map when we visited Shanghai in 1992 and went down to the newly revitalized Thieves' Market. There was a guy offering a map of Shanghai, ostensibly to a guy who is always in my mind as "The Dutchman." Well, he walked away, I stepped in and bought it. The map was done by a British book firm during the time I had lived there with all the street names I knew, not the newer Chinese ones. I have it framed. It shows all the little slices of property along the water in Pudong and the companies that they belonged to. And there is the British-American Tobacco Company slot. Now, you can put that against the other pictures and see that building is right where the warehouse was.

Anyway, the Western men went into the Pudong camp in January 1943. My dad said the Japanese clearly wanted to humiliate them by making them walk through the city down to the Bund. It turned out that there were crowds that came up along the line of the march. Friends would run out to meet the marchers. Dad and the others had been able to send one trunk ahead of time; anything else was limited to what they could carry as they walked.

When they got out on the street all their friends started carrying their stuff for them. It was more like a victory parade, with the Japanese looking on as though this didn't work out the way it was supposed to.

After he got back to Ann Arbor in December 1943, one of my dad's comments was that the next time he goes to jail, he wanted a definite term. It was the indefinite nature of how long it would be when he went to the camp that concerned him.

Sometime in 1942, the US government began to negotiate for the exchange of civilians caught behind Japanese lines by the War. The first exchange, primarily government employees, was in June 1942. Sometime in the winter of 1943, my aunt, Mother's sister was visiting us in Ann Arbor. One day an FBI agent appeared at the door asking if Mrs. Sidney Anderson was present because he needed to talk to dependents of prospective exchanges on the next trip. When he was ready to leave after talking to her, we asked if he was also checking into the status of Phillip Sullivan. He said there was nothing in his office on that day but he would check. Several days later, the doorbell rang again after dark. I opened the door and there was a big man with a big smiling face. I whooped and ran for mother, "Mr. Gibson is back." Dad was on the list.

Q: So some were designated, but not all?

SULLIVAN: There were only a certain number of spaces. There was another camp across town for families. The women and children out of that camp were repatriated, but

the men did not. The priority set up by the State Department had been families first, then single men. However, the families that had left earlier raised a big stink and said, “Look, three years ago, you asked us to leave, and we did. Now you are going to bring out the families including the men that didn’t separate then and bring them out ahead.”

Somebody must have said that does seem a bit fair. I guess we’ll have to break up the families. We’ll bring out the women and children, but the men who kept their families with them will have to be farther down on the priority list. That means they will have to stay.

That’s the way it worked out. The men who sent their families when encouraged to do so, moved up to Priority #5. Priority #1 was for government. The embassy people in Tokyo, the consular people, and so forth and so on were on the first exchange. Japanese officials here in the States were on the first exchange, going back the other way.

Q: It is interesting that they allowed the second ship to begin with, because there it is supposed to be reciprocal.

SULLIVAN: It was. There were more Japanese nationals in the States who wanted to be repatriated. At least that’s what I learned as a kid: One for one. “Iga, iga.”

So there was an agreement for a second exchange. The United States went farther down our list, and they went farther down theirs.

The commandant of the camp Dad was in had been a dentist from San Diego. He was not interested in the job of camp commandant at all. He would much rather be back in San Diego playing golf apparently. He was very unhappy.

My Dad and the others went into that camp not knowing how long they would be there. In fact, those that qualified on the #5 list—men who had sent their families home in 1940—were only in the camp about five months. He was on that list and among those who came out on the second exchange.

I am not sure when they left Shanghai on a Japanese ship, but they went to Goa. The second exchange was in Goa where they boarded the Gripsholm passing the Japanese as they got off. The first exchange had been in Lorenzo Marques.

Q: I was wondering about his status, because you have this movie, Empire of the Sun [1987].

SULLIVAN: A fascinating story. And the fascinating thing is that the story is about the experiences of a kid who was my age exactly. I we had not been evacuated in 1940 that could have been me. They filmed it in Shanghai. I recognized that when I saw the movie. I recognized various places in French Town that appeared in that movie. The kid lived in French Town, fairly close to the Shanghai American School on what was Avenue Petain. I found the thing that was different was that the trees were all bigger than they had been. It was absolutely fascinating to go through that.

Q: So your father is repatriated on the second SS Gripsholm voyage. So he comes into the east coast then?

SULLIVAN: They stopped in Rio, and then went up to New York. Mother went to New York to meet him. My aunt, the one who was married to the Methodist preacher in Shanghai, the head of Moore Memorial Methodist Church, stayed with us part of the time because she had come home and he had stayed as pastor of the church. He was on that exchange and went to New York with Mother.

Q: When your dad got back to Ann Arbor where the family had moved, he very quickly gets this job at the University of Michigan?

SULLIVAN: Yes, teaching in the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). Then later he was named the supervisor for the program.

The program involved language training in either Chinese or Japanese, and area studies. He taught the area studies. There were many such programs around the country, not for language, but for all sorts of training. The program at the University of Michigan was one of the first area studies programs in the country and was the precursors of the fine Asian Area Studies program they have now. My brother has his notes from that, his class notes, and the whole curriculum. Ultimately they will go to the University of Michigan, which wants them.

Q: They are not the only ones. It's very valuable material these days. If you just Google ASTP, there's quite a bit out there. Obviously, it's not as complete as it should be, because the program ended very quickly.

SULLIVAN: Some of the students were sons from families we had known in China and Japan. We had known them when they were 13, 14, and 15. Now they were 18 to 21, or something like that. They would come through in this program. They were from business families, school families, missionary families. So we kept seeing people my folks would call kids; they were older brothers as far as I was concerned, including my sister's old boyfriend.

Q: Let's backtrack a little bit. Your Shanghai experience places you among a large cohort of China-born Foreign Service officers. Did you know any of them at that time? Did you go to school with them?

SULLIVAN: The ones that went to the Shanghai American School (SAS), I did. They tended to be older than I was. There were a number of people who worked in one part or another of the U.S. Government that I meet again.

Q: The Washington Post had a recent article about a reunion of the Shanghai American School, and spoke of the warmth of its ties after all these years and the very special nature of having gone there. Had you?

SULLIVAN: I was at that meeting, although I was not a member of the classes (1940 - 1943) around which it was built. There were a number of people at that meeting.

Q: Now SAS covered what grades?

SULLIVAN: It was 12 grades. I skipped the first grade and went to school in the second grade. My mother had been sick with tuberculosis, so I stayed home and she taught me at home. By the time I went to SAS they put me into the second grade. So I was a year younger than everybody in my class (1946). And was younger up until I was at Episcopal High later on, where I stayed an extra year.

My mother had graduated from college a year young and thought it was a mistake so she wanted me to stay at the school an extra year, which I did. So I went to college with people my own age, not a year older.

I was in the seventh grade when we left China. One of the people in the eighth grade that year was Jim Lilley. I have the yearbook book from that time. I showed it to Jim. He was at the dinner party we hosted for Sichan Siv and his wife, before they went back down to San Antonio. Jim and his wife were two of the people at the dinner. I hauled out the old yearbook from Shanghai American School and showed him his own picture. He looked at the class picture and said, "Ah, the girl I was first in love with."

I said, "Who was that?" He said, "Mary Kate Craighill." I said, "You can't do that Jim. She was my girl." She was a year older than Peyton Craighill, who had gone to SAS and then graduated from Episcopal at the same time I did and went to Yale. Jim died recently.

Q: Yes. He just finished an autobiography and I must say, after serving under him twice, I did not understand that he was very moved by his older brother's suicide and that motivated him the rest of his life.

SULLIVAN: I didn't know that. They were an up-country family. I think he was only in the Shanghai American School that one year. He doesn't appear in the previous years.

Q: They were in the Shandong area, I think. Now your father comes back from China and is working. Do you understand what that army training program was? What they were trying to do with that?

SULLIVAN: They were training people for use as intelligence officers, to be translators and things like that; so that the Army had a corps of people who could do all the things a language officer can do that if you're not a language officer, you can't do.

Q: Your father is working in Ann Arbor. And you were going to school again?

SULLIVAN: I went to school in Ann Arbor for the ninth and tenth grades. After that, after the end of the tenth grade, I went off to boarding school in the fall of 1944, to Episcopal High School in Alexandria, Virginia.

In the spring of 1945, Dad came to Washington. He's come down to interview, I think, with the State Department. They wanted him to come down and be the labor officer for East Asia. In essence, that's what he did from the time he arrived in 1945 until he died in 1957, through different arrangements. Sometimes it was a geographic bureau; sometimes it was a functional bureau. He ended up in FE (Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs). He was the labor advisor in FE.

Q: He did do his work in economics and his dissertation on labor in China, so it was a natural fit.

SULLIVAN: He was really rather crucial in the establishment of labor officers, I think, throughout the department. There was one for each bureau, but I think he was one of the first. I know he hired a lot of people who, later on, became well-established labor officers in EAP (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). Who was it that later became Assistant Secretary for Labor? I'm having trouble with names as I get older.

Q: About the time he comes to Washington, President Roosevelt dies, on April 12th, and Germany surrenders in May. It must have been quite a time to be in Washington. The whole family now moves to Washington. You're already here.

SULLIVAN: I was already here. My younger brother, McDonald, comes down with the folks. He's the only one still home year round. My sister was at Wellesley. During the school year, she was there. In June, when the school year was over, she came to Washington. My folks end up first renting a little place on Lorcom Lane in Arlington. Then they bought a house at Glebe Road and 16th Street North. It was the family house.

My wife, our first two children and I lived in it a year after the folks died. When we went out to Kuala Lumpur, we sold it for the benefit of the estate.

Q: The war ends. The family is together. What academic years were you at Episcopal High?

SULLIVAN: I started in the fall of September 1944. I was there for three years. I've got two diplomas from them. One was in 1946 and one in 1947. The second one is with advanced standing, because I had an extra year to catch up for that year that my mother had me skip earlier. She didn't think skipping was a good idea. So, I graduated from Episcopal in June 1947 and in September 1947, I entered Princeton University.

I was in the NROTC (Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps) there. It was the first year they had nation-wide exams under the Holloway Plan. The Navy had decided that they didn't get enough officers out of the Naval Academy. They needed more. How were they

going to get them? Well, the Army has OCS (Officer Candidate Schools), but they came up with this.

The Navy established 52 units that year at 52 different colleges. They assigned about 30 people to each one. You had to get yourself into the college, and they would assign you to a unit. If you could get into one of those 52 colleges, they would put you into NROTC at that college.

Q: How did you pick Princeton?

SULLIVAN: I had always expected to go to Michigan, up until the time I graduated in 1946. In that last year, just enough of my friends at Episcopal were applying to Princeton, that I decided I would apply too. And so I did.

I'm sure Dad had it all worked out with his friends in Ann Arbor and his contacts in the university that I would have been able to get into Michigan without difficulty. Then I went somewhere else.

Q: Were you just following your friends? This is the end of the war.

SULLIVAN: More or less. It seemed like a good school. Nothing wrong with Michigan, either.

Q: What was your academic interest?

SULLIVAN: I ended up in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public International Affairs (SPIA), in their East Asia Program.

The way SPIA worked, or what is now called the Woodrow Wilson School, on the undergraduate level was that you could take courses in history, economics, sociology, and language. They would all apply toward the requirements for a degree in the area studies program.

Q: Then Princeton had one of the Holloway Class seeds from the Naval ROTC, and you joined that out of an interest in...

SULLIVAN: There was a nation-wide competitive exam for entrance in about December 1946, or something like that. It was staged in a large room of people at what was then George Washington High School in Alexandria. Fifty thousand people took the exam nation-wide, and three or four thousand were offered chances to get themselves into one of these colleges. Michigan had one too. I could have gone that way. My scores were good enough to be invited to be accepted into the first Holloway Plan class. And there I was.

Q: Was that right upon entrance in Princeton?

SULLIVAN: Yes, being accepted in the NROTC was set before I was accepted at Princeton. Once I told the navy where I had been accepted, they said, “Fine. We’ll assign you to that unit.” But, yes, you had to get yourself into the college.

The second day I showed up there, I walked over to the Office of Naval Science and reported in. They had me put my hand up and I got sworn in for the first time. I have repeated that oath to the Constitution many times since.

Q: During your junior year, the Korean War starts. Did that affect the way people were looking at things?

SULLIVAN: The terms of the contract, as it were, for the naval ROTC, was that if you took a course in Naval Science—one course each semester, eight courses over four years—you went on an eight week summer cruise during each of the three summers between academic years. You were commissioned on graduation and committed to serve 15 to 24 months of active duty.

What happened in the summer of 1950 is that the North Koreans came down across the Thirty Eighth parallel in late June, just about the time we were supposed to report one place or another for our summer cruise. I was going into the senior year. Some of us were assigned as if we were junior officers. I went to a destroyer in Norfolk. I think there were six of us who were going there. The changes that had to be made to adapt to getting the fleet out to Korea meant we were transferred, along with a lot of other people going to a lot of other ships, to a hospital ship. We were there on the hospital ship in Norfolk for the rest of our summer cruise. We didn’t go to sea. The ship we had been assigned to went into special training, then headed out to Korea.

The other effect of Korea was that on graduation, it was made quite clear that we wouldn’t be in the Navy for just 15 months. They had the option to cut it off at 15 months. We were going to be in for 24 months. They had a right to extend our enlistment for another year after that. We were all extended for 36 months. So we didn’t get out if we wanted to get out and do something else until June 1954.

Q: What was your navy service after Princeton?

SULLIVAN: I went to a pre-commissioning detail of a World War II destroyer, the USS Owen, DD-536, a Fletcher-class destroyer, which was in mothballs in California. I went to San Diego. After a little while of organizing, we went up to Long Beach, where the ship was. We moved into the ship. It got re-commissioned. And we underwent training back down in San Diego.

We sailed down the west coast of Mexico, through the Panama Canal, and up to Norfolk, just before Christmas 1951. Then we went through more training on the east coast. After that we went into the Charlestown Navy Yard at Boston for a major overhaul to bring the ship up to date. You couldn’t see a thing for air search radar that was on the ship for more

than five miles. If you were lucky, you could see something for more than five miles. It needed complete replacement.

The surface radar worked all right. We would navigate with that and spot things at night. That was fine.

I took some leave while we were in the shipyard. I was home when I got word from the ship that I had received orders to go to CIC (Combat Information Center) Officers School at Glenview Naval Air Station in Glenview, Illinois, just outside of Chicago. I would then be assigned to another ship.

So I had 20 weeks at Glenview. I was then assigned to another pre-commissioning detail. This was a marvelous ship called the *USS Norfolk*, DL-1. They were experimenting with how to make something a little bit bigger than destroyers. It was a little hard to put an admiral on a destroyer. So we had a flag plot or admiral's quarters as well as captain's quarters.

They made two types of DLs. The *Norfolk* started out on a cruiser hull. That's why it got the city name of Norfolk, since cruisers were named for cities. The others were named like destroyers, after people. They were a little bit smaller. The McCain class, I guess named after Senator John McCain's grandfather. That class, they built a lot more of. They were called frigates or destroyer leaders. I think they are called frigates now.

I don't know where the Norfolk is now. It's obviously been de-commissioned [15 January 1970]. She was very, very highly experimental – everything from the engineering plant to the gunnery and to the equipment in CIC. A lot of it didn't work too well, particularly the engineering. It eventually lost a screw in a high-speed trial off the Delaware Capes.

Q: With you on board?

SULLIVAN: No, I was not there anymore. When I was on her, we had wiped some bearings and were limited to 17 or 18 knots, instead of the 35 it could make. We went down to Guantanamo for underway training for ten weeks. So I've been to Guantanamo and I've been to Port-au-Prince.

When I got to Port-au-Prince, the senior watch officer was a nice guy, who was an old mustang named Will Howard. He was the gun boss. I had a thing with him about my watch assignments. We had four watches per cruise. Every time we went to a new port, my watch section had the first day of in-port watches and I had the first in-port watch. This meant I had all that business of getting boat schedules set up, boat crews, and we didn't get to shore, at least until later.

Well, I waited three days in Port-au-Prince. I got to shore on the third day. I went up and saw the palace. I went to a place up on the mountain. There was a restaurant that hung out over the edge and looked down on the city. It was a fascinating view.

Q: After the Norfolk, what was your assignment?

SULLIVAN: The day we got back from Guantanamo, my three years was up. I went to be mustered out and come home. At that point, I very quickly shifted to the next stage of life.

The previous Christmas, 1953, I had been introduced to this sweet young thing who was seven when I was twelve. Our families had met because of our joint China connection: a mutual couple of friends of both families, the Greens who had been in China and then again in Burma with the Winfields, came through and were staying with Margaret Winfield's parents, who had just recently moved to Washington. Her father had been with MSA or TCA, on of AID (Agency for International Development) in Burma. They came back from Burma and bought a house in McLean in the summer of 1953. He was starting with AID here in Washington.

After looking around for churches, they had gone to the Rock Spring Congregational Church at Rock Spring Road and Little Falls Road, near the Washington Golf and Country Club in Arlington. In the course of something, Mrs. Green told a story about my parents getting back to New York and the arrival of the *Gripsholm*. All these women who had been separated from their husbands arrived in New York to meet at the Prince George Hotel, the designated meeting point. They hadn't seen their husbands in a few years.

Suddenly, someone calls out, "Bess, there's Phil!" My mother looked out of the window, and climbing out of a taxi was my dad. He was the first person who appeared—the third person off the ship and the first one to get to the hotel.

Mom headed for the revolving door going out. He headed for the revolving door coming in. They got caught in it, and went around about three times before they got together out on the street – to the applause of hundreds.

Well, that was the story that was told about my folks. Mrs. Hunter, the wife of the pastor at Rock Spring said, "Oh, you mean Bess and Phil Sullivan. They live a few blocks over here. I work with her on the Council of Church Women all the time."

A phone call was made and my parents came over to see the Greens at the Winfields' house. The mothers got talking. One mother had two girls in college at Wooster, Ohio. One mother had two sons in the navy: me and my brother, who was a seaman down here at Anacostia. The Winfield family had been in Rangoon, Burma. The girls had both gone out to northern India for senior year at Woodstock School. Both had come back to college at Wooster.

That year, there were two of them at Wooster. One was a sophomore and one was a freshman. The family had come back here. The mother didn't know any of the young men her daughters might be involved with for dating. She kept sending letters saying, "I've just met the nicest family. They have a college-age son."

One week, a letter said, "I've just met the nicest family. They have two sailors."

Margaret and her sister just rolled their eyes. But the result was that we were the two sailors who were brought to dinner during Christmas vacation when I was home on leave. They were home from college. My brother was already here. A year and a day later, Margaret and I were married.

It's incestuous. And it turns out that my grandmother who taught math and who was also Dean of Women at Whitworth College in Mississippi, where later on, Margaret's grandfather was President of this college. They knew each other. We were going around saying that we had better not look too closely, because our children could be pointy-headed idiots if we looked too far. We never found an actual blood relationship, but there were an awful lot of families who knew families.

Q: You were mustered out of the Navy in 1954.

SULLIVAN: Yes. The reason I went into this discourse here was that Margaret's father then plays an important role. I started hanging around all the time.

"What are you going to do, young man?" I said I was thinking of maybe going to graduate school, then taking the Foreign Service exam. He said, "Well, I've just filled in a year teaching at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), filling in for their Far East professor, Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger." His father, Judge Linebarger was the Secretary of Sun Yat-sen, so professor Linebarger had grown up in Nanking.

SAIS had summer sessions in those days. Perhaps they still do, but I don't know. The particular subject that summer was Africa. I thought I would take the summer session just to get used to going back to school and see if that was where I wanted to enroll in the fall. So I did. And yes, I did want to enroll in the fall. By then, Margaret and I were engaged to be married.

Q: Was that in 1954?

SULLIVAN: Yes. We got married just before Christmas 1954. We met on December 22nd, 1953, and we were married on December 23rd, 1954.

Q: So you took the summer session in 1954. You have now fully enrolled in the fall of 1954. Was it a one-year or two-year program?

SULLIVAN: My class (MA1956) was the first class that required two years. The school had trouble apparently with the people a year ahead of us who didn't pass the level of knowledge required on the oral examination, so SAIS made it a two-year Master's degree course. It had been a one-year course. I was in the first group that was in the two-year course.

There were some people ahead who came back for a second year, not having anticipated that they would be there two years.

Q: What was the focus of your studies?

SULLIVAN: Southeast Asia.

Q: Why was that of interest to you?

SULLIVAN: I had lost my Chinese language capabilities, and those were Wu rather than Mandarin, from the age of four during our 1934 furlough back to the States from Shanghai. But Asia still seemed interesting. I think China studies were a bit too formal in terms of the instruction one would need to go through. I thought maybe Southeast Asia would be a little looser.

Q: Do you remember what your dissertation was? Or did you do comprehensive examinations?

SULLIVAN: You did comprehensives at SAIS. You didn't do a dissertation for a Master's degree. You got well started on ten or fifteen potential one. We did a paper for every course. They were all 30 to 40 pages or so. Any one of them could have been turned into a dissertation topic. One could have gone on. I had done an undergraduate thesis at Princeton; everyone does to graduate, and had written on the Chinese Communist Land Reform Program.

Q: Did you take a course from Professor Linebarger?

SULLIVAN: I sure did. It was a China-Japan course.

Q: During this time, you took the Foreign Service exam.

SULLIVAN: I took the Foreign Service exam in the winter of the second year there, seated at the next desk to Ronald Duane Palmer, who went on to be our Ambassador in Togo and Malaysia.

Q: What was the Foreign Service exam like at that time?

SULLIVAN: The Foreign Service exam had three parts. I think it was just one day. There was general knowledge, general ability (an analytical type thing) and language. Does that make the three? Or is language separate? I think language was one of the parts. I think it was done in one day, a morning and afternoon.

There was an oral interview later on if you passed that.

Q: Do you recall anything about that interview?

SULLIVAN: Yes I do, indeed. I remember who the chairman of it was: John Emerson, the father of Don Emmerson, the academic Indonesia specialist. I don't remember who the other two were. We were sitting at a "T" table. There were three of them up there, and I was down at the end. You know, they tried to scare you. It lasted a couple of hours. I think I got them on my side. They asked about the following scenario: the Korean War had started, and if you were China and wanted to attack, where would you attack?

What did I say? I think I said, "Go into Southeast Asia." They said, "Not Taiwan?"

And I said, "No, there's 100 miles of water on the way to Taiwan. The Communists don't have the capability to carry across that, and then defend it to make the landings. Sure, they can hit with aircraft and send boats out, but they would lose an awful lot of boats if they tried to do it that way."

I either said that or I said, "Attack again in Korea." I remember distinctly saying that I would not do it in Taiwan.

There was another question. They asked me to name the countries around the border of China. Then at another point, they asked: "What do you think of the role of the British? Are the British doing their share?"

I said, "Do you mean the Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme (CD&W)?" I think the fact that I knew of that and could give them the name of it really startled them. I said, "Yes, do you remember how devastated the British were so soon after World War II and the tremendous rebuilding of the economy that they had to do? I think that their contribution to other countries through CD&W is really quite good. It's a good show for them to do that. They had some problems, sure. We've all had some problems with aid programs."

Anyway, they invited me to continue to my candidacy for the Foreign Service.

Q: That's right. You got feedback right away.

SULLIVAN: Within an hour, they would come back out and tell you whether they were inviting you to continue your candidacy, because there had to be medical and security clearances done. They couldn't say for sure about those. They explained that was why the best they could say was that they invited you to continue your candidacy.

Q: As luck would have it, you then joined the Foreign Service in August 1956. So, you had a real job then.

SULLIVAN: I had a real job, just as I had a son three days before. Our first son was born three days before on August 12th. I entered on August 15th.

When I got my degree in June I needed income because the baby was coming so I had been working in a gas station downtown for the first part of the summer. Someone from SAIS had run across an Esso station down at Constitution Avenue and Delaware Avenue and found work here. It was a big building. On the ground floor under the building, there was a huge Esso station. The guy who ran it, the District Director I think, had these guys coming in from SAIS. He tried to convince us that we all wanted to be Esso executives for the rest of our lives. We said, no.

Q: When one joins the Foreign Service and does all the paperwork, you go to basic training, A-100. Do you recall who was in you're A-100 class, or what was the number of that class?

SULLIVAN: I don't remember the number, but it was the September 1956 class. The big star of our class was Jack Matlock. Others who rose quite high were Peter Moffat and Dick Moose. Those were probably the three that advanced the farthest. I'm not sure if there is another ambassador or not. I don't think so. Moose was not an ambassador anywhere; he became Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management [1977], Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs [1977-1981] and then Under Secretary of State for Management [1993-1996].

Ammon Bartley, who died of brain cancer later on, was in the class. John Kimball, Moose and two others were all bachelors and shared a house in Alexandria at that point. One of those was Hardy, who was a consular officer in Santiago, Chile during the Pinochet regime, when people were starting to get killed down there—the ones being detained in the stadium. He was one of the targets of the people who sued. A movie, Missing [1982], was made about that incident with Sissy Spacek in it. Another one of my FSI classmates was John Helble.

I remember four or five of the women in our A-100 class. We had a big class of about 41 people, including Winnie Weislogel, Mary MacDonald, Marguerite Cooper – later Marguerite Cooper-King – and Anne, whose maiden name I don't remember, but she ended up marrying a fellow in our class named Roper. She came back in many years later, I understand, when women who had left to be married could. I'm not quite sure of this. I saw papers with her name on them as the Minister for Economic Affairs in Paris.

Another woman, whose name I cannot remember, married another member of the class, and had to resign. They went off to Accra for a tour. She was very unhappy, not with Accra, but with having to resign. They did the one tour and then disappeared.

Q: For background purposes, could you explain what the Department rules were at that time for female officers?

SULLIVAN: The Department rule at that time was that a woman could not be a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and be married. If a woman married she had to resign. Later on, the rule was changed.

A number of women came back into the service later on. I know Phyllis Oakley, married to Bob Oakley who was my Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) in East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP).

Q: That the environment at the time, all white shirt and ties?

SULLIVAN: If you were in a tropical posting, you might be able to get away with a seersucker suit.

Q: At that time, how long did the A-100 class last? What did it cover? How did they introduce you to the Foreign Service?

SULLIVAN: They had two ways of handling it, depending on whether or not you were going overseas at the end of the 12 weeks, or whether you were going to have a first tour in the Department.

If you were going to have a tour in the Department, they broke it into two parts for you. You did the first six weeks, which was the history of the Foreign Service, a general introduction. The second six weeks concentrated on consular work, particularly visas and passport stuff. You had to begin to learn some specific detail in order to be effective when they sent you out to your first post, where you were going to do consular work.

I was going to be assigned in the Department as a first tour, so I did only the six weeks.

Q: Where was the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) at that time?

SULLIVAN: When I began, it was on C Street. There was a three or four-story red brick apartment building right about where the Secretary's office is now. It was on our side of C Street, at just about 22nd Street. By the time I went back for the second half of the A-100 course two years later, that building had been destroyed, and FSI moved into the garage at Arlington Towers.

Before it went into its own building in Rosslyn, it was in the garages of Arlington Towers, I think it was called.

Q: Yes, a lot of officers who went through Vietnamese language training talk about language training in the garage.

SULLIVAN: I did my Indonesian language training there. I think I did my French there too, but I can't remember exactly when I did French.

Q: How early did you find out what your assignment was, and how did that assignment process unfold?

SULLIVAN: I don't remember exactly. I think we were all just hauled in, those of us who were going to be assigned to the Department, and they read off the list.

Q: Was this right at the start of the six weeks, or at the end?

SULLIVAN: Toward the end of the six weeks, I think. We know we were going to be in the Department or go overseas, one or the other. We didn't know specifically at the beginning.

Then they told us where we would be assigned. I know ten of us were assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), in what was SA-1 at that point. It was on 23rd Street at D. It no longer exists. The Division for Research for the Far East (DRF) was on the 8th floor, the top floor. There were three branches: Southeast Asia, China, and Northeast Asia. I was in the Northeast Asia one.

Other geographic areas were on lower floors. A lot of people, of that group of ten, were assigned to Biographic Information. I remember Peter Moffat was one of them. I think Jack Matlock was also assigned to Bio in the beginning.

Q: What did Northeast Asia cover?

SULLIVAN: Northeast Asia covered Japan and both Koreas.

Q: Do you recall who the boss was, the chief?

SULLIVAN: The chief of the Northeast Asia Branch was Bill Magistretti. My recollection is that the head of DRF was a guy named Evans. I don't recognize the name you have a Department telephone book, as a name of a person I was involved with.

Q: What kinds of things were you given to do in this first assignment?

SULLIVAN: The organization for Korean affairs, which was much smaller than the assembled wisdom for Japan, which had a much larger room. There was also an Australia-New Zealand person who sat in the same room with us, those of us who did Korea. Eventually, one person came in and did Japan, and sat in the same room with us. That was Rick Straus. He and I were desk to desk.

We had only three people assigned to Korea. The head of the Korea sub-section was Dick Petree, who was a civil servant at that point. He was going to be incorporated into the Foreign Service. He had not gone on Foreign Service assignments yet. He came into that job as a civil servant. He had been the navy language school equivalent of ASTP to learn Japanese earlier and had come in that way. He was replaced by Bill Sherman later. So my first two immediate bosses were Dick Petree and Bill Sherman. They were the senior Korean political analysts. The economic guy, across the hall in the economic section, who handled Korea, was Erland Heginbotham.

That was my gang. I was assigned, more or less, to keep an eye on North Korea on a daily basis, to the extent we could keep an eye on North Korea and to write NIS (National Intelligence Survey) contributions.

Q: So, little think pieces.

SULLIVAN: Well, they gave you an outline of what they wanted. The theory somebody had at that point was that you could put into published volumes the basic intelligence you needed on this country and that country. I thought the countries probably changed faster than the volumes did.

There was a whole outline of about 30 different ones. The chapters began in the 1920s with political; the 1930s was economic, something like that. Then they gave you an outline of what they wanted you to cover. Most of it was contracted out to places like American University. There was a lot of that done on other countries that way.

Q: Yes, American University and the Library of Congress were doing those area studies books at that time.

SULLIVAN: Anyway, we were assigned some work on the NIS.

Q: Let me interrupt. You were saying there were some major trends going on in the environment that I would like to touch base on. You were talking about Wriston. Could you explain what that whole process was and where it came from? How did it impact on people you were meeting?

SULLIVAN: There had been a commission headed by Wriston, who I think had been the President of Brown University. Periodically, the State Department examines itself and says, "What are we doing right? Or what are we doing wrong? Where do we go from here?"

They were very much concerned by the fact that so many of the Department of State's positions were occupied by civil servants, people who came in and did a lifetime of work in the Civil Service in this job or that job, or something else. They thought that the Foreign Service Officers ought to come back and get involved in policy formulation, much more than in fact they had been. Those jobs were essentially filled with these people who were appointed from the Civil Service, and therefore in a job cone for a career, and not being moved around.

Their recommendation was that those who were in the Civil Service in the State Department be incorporated into the Foreign Service. There was a limitation on age, if you were beyond something like 55. My father was too old to be Wristonized, so he stayed on as a civil servant. Eleanor Lansing Dulles who was a specialist in Germany was too old, so she stayed on as a civil servant. Dick Petree was not too old and became an FSO.

Interestingly enough, the fact that I worked for him had something to do with his onward assignments. He was a Japanese language officer. My father was the Labor Advisor for FE and was looking for someone to be the Assistant Labor Officer in Tokyo. He asked me what I thought about the guy I worked for. I said that I thought he was terrific. He asked if I thought he would be good. I said that as far as I knew, I thought he would be sensational.

So Dad recruited Dick to go to Tokyo as Assistant Labor Advisor. It was his first assignment in the embassy of many over the course of years. His last assignment in the Foreign Service was as Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations for Security and Political Affairs, with the rank of Ambassador (1976-1981).

Q: Let's go ahead and finish on the Wriston. It was a way of meshing the Civil Service and the Foreign Service to get this rotational system?

SULLIVAN: Yes, so the rotation would affect particularly the geographic bureaus. I don't think the effect was meant to be on things like science or that sort of functional bureau, such as the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Maybe some of the Economic people would be career people staying in there. Again, this would rotate Foreign Service Officers into and through geographic bureaus, and maybe the Economic Bureau.

INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) was an exception. Although were some FSOs coming through, for memory and library purposes, the Department deliberately keep INR as a bureau staffed by long-term people who had been doing this for 20 years. They were the Department's memory.

Q: So, this was a way of getting Foreign Service Officers onto the Columbian Desk or the German Desk or into positions that were encumbered by the Civil Service people. Did those Civil Service people then convert to the Foreign Service also? Did they become worldwide available?

SULLIVAN: Up to a certain age, yes. Then they become worldwide available.

Q: So Wristonization was going on in the 1955-56 period? So all that took place basically before you arrived.

SULLIVAN: I think the Wriston Commission had written its report. Its recommendations had been approved before I got there, but the process of people actually switching over when they did was taking place during that period.

Q: One other trend in the environment at that time was Senator McCarthy. Your father was in the service working for the State Department. Did that impact on anything that he was involved in? How did the family look at those sorts of things? You must have sat around the dinner table.

SULLIVAN: With concern about Mr. McCarthy. Dad had occasionally testified up on The Hill for various things to do with the budget for this or that, or a particular program

that had to do with labor. This included bringing Labor into the Micronesia, the TTPI (the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) from maybe the Philippines or Japan, or someplace like that. State would be involved in supervising the grand rules under which that was done, so he was involved in that.

I think he testified once or twice in ways than Senator McCarthy might not like. It didn't particularly bother him. He was in his mid-fifties. A person who was more affected by it was my father-in-law.

He had written a book after his time in Chungking during the war, *China: The Land and the People* – a marvelous title – Gerald F. Winfield. I ran into that book in my sophomore year in college. I had to buy it for a course at Princeton as a sophomore. It was not exactly a usual book. A usual lands and peoples book wouldn't include that if you took all the liver flukes of the people of China and laid them end-to-end, you could go to the moon and back seven and a half times. That's not the sort of thing an author includes.

But he was a doctor of public health specializing in parasitology, which was part of what he had taught in China. He developed a way of breaking down night soil to where it was no longer infectious, by composting it. The heat killed the parasites, mainly amoeba. That was his contribution to public health in China, training a lot of people.

Later on, in fact, after the United States reestablished diplomatic relations with China, he some of his ex-students got in touch with him. He was invited to come back to the university, which was occupying the buildings of what had been Cheeloo University. He really wanted to go and redo and the experimentation on this particular subject, to see how things were. But he ended up with a brain tumor and was unable to do it. But he was in touch with some of his old students.

Q: But are you saying he was affected by the McCarthy period?

SULLIVAN: Yes, he had written things for Amerasia, so he was on the list of people who were suspect. He sat my wife and her next sister, who were still teenagers, and said, "You should know that if there is another list of names sent out by Senator McCarthy, my name will probably be on it." There was not another list. He never did get in trouble, but he was concerned he might be.

Q: I am intrigued because I just read Julia Child's autobiography. She talks about her husband Paul being pulled in. In the autobiography, this incident goes on for some period of time. They were quite seriously harassed.

SULLIVAN: I saw that in the movie Julie and Julia [2009]!

One thing about my father you should know. When I was in college, about junior year or maybe early senior year, I was talking with Dad about the Foreign Service, saying it sounded like a good thing to do. I would have to go out into the real world. I couldn't keep fooling around at college, not after the navy. He invited me and one other person to

have lunch together. He arranged a lunch with John Service. We had lunch with the Hot Shoppe that was at the Key Bridge.

The night before John Stewart Service was arrested, he had dinner with my folks at their house in Arlington. The folks always wondered if the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) was sitting outside in the car keeping an eye on the place. They never knew.

Q: There's a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) case for you.

SULLIVAN: So, it was skating on the brink a bit, I guess.

Q: In 1957, you've just started in INR, but you said while on assignment your father was in an airplane crash. Could you give some background on that?

SULLIVAN: He was the Labor Advisor – that was the last title he had for FE, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, which has gone through several name changes. It went from that to Bureau of East Asian Affairs, then Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs – FE, EA and EAP were all the same organization, but one looks at the world in different ways on different perspectives.

He frequently attended ILO (International Labour Organization) meetings in Europe. He certainly went to the Asian regional meeting of the ILO meetings as part of the U.S. delegation. ILO delegations were different from any other delegations to international organizations, because any one country had three parts to its delegation. There was a labor delegate, a company delegate, and a government delegate. There were people representing each of those three parts. He would go as the government representative.

There was to be an Asian regional organization conference of the ILO in New Delhi in the late fall of 1957. He had orders to go. He was going to take some leave after that to stop in Japan. He and my mother would have Christmas with my sister, who lived in Kyoto at that point with her husband who was teaching at Doshisha University at that point. He was a Presbyterian minister. He had engineering degrees in both electrical and civil engineering. He was teaching young Japanese on the technical subjects involved.

The plane disappeared a little over halfway to Honolulu. Parts of it were found three or four days later.

Q: Was it flying from San Francisco to Honolulu?

SULLIVAN: Pan Am Flight 7. Yes, that was the leg that both my mother and father were on at the time. She had not been back to Asia since 1940 and wanted to visit her sister in Hong Kong and my sister in Japan. My mother would have gotten off there in Japan. He would have gone on. I don't know where he would have changed planes, or anything like that. He was to end up in New Delhi and then come back to Japan afterwards.

No one ever did figure out what happened to the plane.

Q: So both your parents were on the plane and you lost your parents.

SULLIVAN: Interestingly enough, they were not carrying tickets in the same class. He was traveling for the government. In those days, the government traveled first class, so he had a first class seat. She was back in economy, because we were paying for that ticket.

I have always wondered for myself, not for the public record: were they together or not when the trouble began?

His body was one of the 19 that were recovered. Hers was not. There were 44 people aboard and 19 bodies were recovered, along with some number of boxes from the plane, mostly from the rear end.

Q: Probably at that time, it was a prop job.

SULLIVAN: I've always suspected it was a prop. It was a Stratocruiser. A couple of them had thrown propellers off through the flight deck. I just happened to be reading the report the other day when I was shuffling things around on my bookshelves. There was an email a couple of days ago from a fellow whose father was the second assistant pilot.

On the 50th anniversary, there was an article in the *San Francisco Chronicle* about this, which talked about this man who spent 50 years trying to find out what happened. It also talked about another person whose sister was a stewardess. Someone sent us that in 2007. I had sent an email to the paper, asking that they send it on to these guys.

I never heard from anybody. Suddenly, a week ago (2010), an e-mail came in from one who was the son of the second assistant officer, saying he had no record that they had been in touch with him. I don't think they had, but I brought him up to date on that.

I went and looked for, and found the report. I just read it again. They talked about this problem with propellers. That whole particular class of engine had been corrected. It was a very high-powered engine. Who knows? I've always thought it threw a propeller off through the flight deck. In any case, they were not able to get a message out. They had reported in ten minutes earlier as they passed the mid-point of the flight to Hawaii, according to the times on watches. Who knows?

People who have listened to the tapes – and I don't know where the tapes are now – some thought they heard a very faint message of some kind. No one has been able to nail that one down.

Q: Your first tour is in INR. It ends in January 1959.

SULLIVAN: January? I think so because I know we arrived in Kuala Lumpur in late February.

Q: This assignment obligated you to take the second half of the A-100 course. What fun was that?

SULLIVAN: It was okay. What I remember particularly about it were the characteristics of the people they brought in to run the courses on visas and passports for the benefit of young, bright FSOs, one of which was Larry Eagleburger. I think Paul Blackburn was another, if I remember correctly. We knew each other on a first name basis from somewhere, and I think it was from the “second-half” A-100 course.

Q: The focus on consular affairs is the regulations.

SULLIVAN: You had to learn what the law was. You had to learn what the history was. You had to learn what the procedures were. You had to be able to make the judgments as to whether someone qualified or didn't qualify for a visa, or for a passport, or was or was not a citizen, and so forth.

The thing that I've always remembered, with some wry amusement, was that the character of these people who came in to do most of the talking, was, it seemed to me, anti-applicant. They would almost ask the question of the class, “Under these circumstances, does he win or does he lose?”

Someone would say, “I think maybe he should get the visa.”

“No, no! He loses! He loses! He loses!”

They would bounce up and down with such enthusiasm at denying someone a visa or denying their application for a passport on the grounds that the person was not a citizen. They seemed so pleased and happy with a negative response.

I do not know who they were, but I remember that reaction struck me.

At that point, we had a meeting in which everybody who was taking the consular affairs section was told where they were going. I knew where I was going, because one of my father's friends in FE, had called in and said, “Where would you like to go?” I said, “What's available?” He said, “One of them is Kuala Lumpur.” I said, “That sounds grand to me.” So during this group meeting, they came to my name, and the fellow says, “Well you know already that you are going to Kuala Lumpur.” I nodded. Everyone turned and asked, “How did you know where you were going?”

Actually, following the crash, I was summoned to meet John Foster Dulles. I think Murphy was the Under Secretary. State Department didn't have a Deputy Secretary in those days; it was an Under Secretary. I think it was Murphy. I got called into see both of them to express their condolences. I met with the people in FE: (Assistant Secretary) Walter Robertson and (Deputy Assistant Secretary William) Sebald, right off the bat. They were on to me right away with anything they could do.

Q: Going back to the assignment process itself: it was pretty opaque. You were told where you were going.

SULLIVAN: You were told. These were the day before bidding. This was not where you put down your list of where you wanted to go among the things that were coming up. That happened later.

Q: You were assigned to Kuala Lumpur and arrived in February. What did you know about Malaysia before you arrived? Did the Department or the desk prepare you? Or was this your own background knowledge?

SULLIVAN: That it had been British. That it had been independent for about a year. That there were social tensions between the Chinese and the Malays. It was just my own background knowledge.

Q: They handed you a ticket?

SULLIVAN: I think there may have been a one-week course for everyone who was going to Southeast or East Asia. There was at one point something like that. It was not very detailed, any of it.

Q: You were saying that at this time you got off language probation also.

SULLIVAN: Somewhere along the line in there, I did have enough weeks of French – ten weeks? I don't know. It could have been. I'm not quite sure where on the calendar I can put it in. This was to get me up to 3/3 [Ed: FSI scores for reading and speaking] ranking. I had taken the exam at the beginning and came in with a raw score of 69. You needed 70 to get off probation, and I got a 69.

Q: Getting off language probation is an important threshold?

SULLIVAN: It was, because I don't think you could go overseas without getting off of language probation.

Q: Of course, if you couldn't go overseas, you were of no use to the Foreign Service.

SULLIVAN: It may have been connected with the second half of the A-100 course. It was in the garages. It was not in this other building: I say Three, whatever the building was on C Street.

Q: How do a young Foreign Service Officer and his family get to post in early 1959?

SULLIVAN: You fly. And you have an argument with the grand old dame who handles reservations for FE. What was her name? Shipley? I think it was.

She had an idea about how everybody should travel. Someone had told me to watch out for her. By then we had a second child, a six month-old girl to go with our two and a half year-old boy. She would try to save money and have you hold that child in a lap all the way. That child was entitled to a berth if you are going on a DC-7, which had berths. We were entitled to two berths, and a whole seat for that baby.

I went in and she said, "Okay, three seats and a sky cot." I said, "No way. Four seats. It's a long trip. The regulations as I understand them say we are entitled to four." She took a piece of paper and threw it away, or something like that, and announced, "Four seats, you can have them."

Q: What was the itinerary at that time?

SULLIVAN: It was slower, compared to the others. Most of the flying was by Northwest, as far as Singapore. We took off from National in a DC-7 that stopped in Detroit. We arranged it so we had a day in Detroit, because of my cousins and Dad's sister and brother were there. Then it went on to Minneapolis, Spokane, and to Seattle.

In Seattle, we changed flights. It was a DC-7 again. It went to Shemya, then Tokyo. They couldn't make Tokyo without a refueling. So it refueled at Shemya. Have you ever heard of Shemya, Alaska?

Q: Way out at the end of the Aleutian island chain. I think it is two islands short of the tip of Attu. There was a World War II airfield on it, and Quonset huts. Shemya is where in the more recent period, Defense wanted to put their great big huge radar for missile defense.

SULLIVAN: Shemya was eight hours from Seattle, non-stop. We had flown overnight on the plane, with two berths. Each of us had one child with us. We were entitled to four seats and didn't have to have them sitting on our lap.

It was morning when we landed in Shemya. We came down and it was snowing. It was blowing across the runway. It would blow across this way, and then it would blow back. By the time the plane finally stopped – it was blowing like hell this way, and it was blowing like hell that way. Our son, the two and a half year old, was in my lap as we landed and he had thrown up all over me. We had to get him to this Quonset hut, so I carried him wrapped in a blanket. I took him into the men's room and tried to clean both of us up. I remember Shemya. Then it was Shemya to Tokyo.

We had some time in Japan. We went down to Kyoto and visited my sister. We had built in three days to visit them. We flew from Tokyo to Osaka, were met at the airport there and went on to Kyoto, then later flew back to Tokyo. That leg was on us.

We flew on to Hong Kong. My aunt and uncle were there, the ones that had been in Shanghai. By then, he was Methodist District Superintendent in Hong Kong. We spent a couple of days with them, and then went on to Singapore. I think I had a day of TDY

(temporary duty) in the Consulate General there before going on to Kuala Lumpur, so Singapore was the first US diplomatic post I walked into as a Foreign Service office.

In those days, you traveled much more slowly and much more genteelly.

The final leg from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur we took a local flight. It was not a grand American airline. There was no American airline serving that route.

Q: What was it like arriving in Kuala Lumpur?

SULLIVAN: We were met by Til Purnell, the wife of Skipper (Lewis) Purnell, who was the Political Officer and in my second year, my boss part of the time, before he left to go to London

Skipper and Til were there in the embassy. I think it was their first post. The Winfields knew the Purnells because they had been stationed in Rangoon while the family was there. Margaret's father by then was working in Rangoon as the Program Officer for the Special Technical and Educational Mission (STEM), a predecessor of USAID. Margaret knew both of them then as a 17 year-old who had recently graduated from high school. Til was the one who came to the airport to meet us.

Q: In Washington what were you told your assignment was going to be?

SULLIVAN: As part of my rotation through assignments there I started by doing the consular work. The person who did that job was half time economic as well. That was about right. There wasn't that much consular work. We had visas. We had passports. We didn't have a lot of either one. But some consular questions were tricky.

For example, there was a Chinese-American couple that was close to people in the Embassy. They had another child and wanted an American passport for the child. I think the couple were both naturalized. However they had not lived long enough in the States to transmit citizenship. Someone had earlier issued passports to the older kids. I told the Ambassador that I couldn't add the youngest child since that child, or the others, didn't qualify under American law. Homer Byington was not pleased.

Q: Would you describe the embassy in Kuala Lumpur when you arrived? Who was the ambassador?

SULLIVAN: The Ambassador was Homer Byington, Junior [Ed: serving from December 1957 to April 1961]. His father had been chief of personnel in an earlier time at the State Department—he used to be called The Chief. Homer, Jr. had been born in Italy. His son, Homer III, had been born in Italy. Terts, as he was referred to, I never met, because he left the post to go back to the States and join the Foreign Service before I got there.

Terts and his wife were assigned to Milan. They got pregnant there. The Italians said that diplomatic status no longer applied when there were three generations of children born in

Italy. That child would be Italian. And if it was a boy, the Italians said he had to serve in the Italian Army. Instead, that child was born in Switzerland.

I was told I wouldn't really make it in the Foreign Service unless I became more like Terts. I don't know that I "made it" in the Foreign Service, but I was not Terts. I think he served one tour and then left.

Alex Davit was my semi-boss, head of the Economic Section. I took over the consular work from Mike Ely who moved on to do economic work full time. Graham McKelvey was the Labor Officer, but he was stationed in Singapore. Frazier Meade was in the Political section. Roy Nelson was the other third secretary. There were two of us who were third secretaries. Skipper Purnell was the head of the Political Section. Walter Davis was there as the Agricultural Attaché.

Q: You were saying there were two junior officers there, Nelson and yourself. Did you follow each other around?

SULLIVAN: No, we didn't really have cones at that point. Roy was assigned as the GSO (General Services Officer).

Q: The consular work at Kuala Lumpur at this time is pretty light?

SULLIVAN: Relatively light, yes. The consular section was one officer and one local secretary. That was it.

Q: So you had time to also work for the Economic Section? What kinds of things was the section reporting on in those days?

SULLIVAN: The one who was reporting on labor was Bill Donnett. Alex basically did the financial stuff. I tried to follow rubber, or who was involved in rubber anyway. I didn't do very much in the way of economic work.

Consular was just under a full-time job. So economic reporting was "as time allowed," if you will.

Q: Did you get much of a chance to travel around Malaya at that time?

SULLIVAN: Not a lot. I had a terrible time getting leave at any time. We wanted to see if we could get up to Angkor Wat. This was after Jim O'Sullivan became the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission). I talked to Jim about getting some leave. A charter flight was going and we wanted to go and leave the children in KL. We could go, providing no one in the Embassy got sick. In the end, however the flight was cancelled and we didn't get to Angkor Wat until much later.

Now that I remember, we did get one week's leave in Malaya. We drove up into Pahang and at a certain point, then put the car on the train, and then go up to Kota Bharu on the

east coast. We then drove down the east coast and then back across. We took our oldest son but not our daughter.

On duty, Skipper and I once went over to Kuantan, the capital of Pahang Province on the South China Sea coast

An American had been involved in an auto accident in which a bicyclist had been killed. The companions of the bicyclist had chased the American into the woods and then tried to beat him. He finally got away and we went over to try and aid the cyclist.

The police had figured out, it turns out, as Skipper and I talked with the investigative officer, that there had been a sudden swerving of the bicycle. The car hit it, yes, but there was evidence that the car had tried to avoid the bicycle as it suddenly swung in its way. So they said the American was not at fault. Skipper asked, "Would help if we got him out of here? Are you going to have a court case?" We could see that he was back there to testify. They replied that would be very helpful. So arrangements were made behind the scenes to put this guy on a plane that afternoon to Kuala Lumpur. Then we drove back, about a five to six-hour drive.

We got leave once to go with friends from the German Embassy up a river to the national park.

Q: What was the diplomatic community like at that time?

SULLIVAN: Small. Everyone knew everybody. There were 30 or so embassies. People knew everyone pretty well all the way through. I did have an interesting time once, introducing two people who were both at the British High Commission but didn't know each other. It was extremely large.

Q: What was it like working for Ambassador Byington?

SULLIVAN: It was fine. His wife was one of the great dragons, not as great a dragon as some I have known. She wanted her ladies to go downtown wearing hats, gloves and stockings. She was a bit stuffy.

Q: This was an era in which the wife of the ambassador had almost as much clout, if you will, with the distaff side, as he had with the officers.

SULLIVAN: Very much so. Nevertheless, we had a good time. We enjoyed it.

Q: You were in KL (Kuala Lumpur) when the Kennedy Administration was elected.

SULLIVAN: Yes. There was an interesting thing about that. The election came along and Kennedy won. Ding, ding ding, went the telex machine. Our press guy, Milton Max Chase, Uncle Milty went over to see what it was. It said that the President-elect accepted

the resignation of certain people in the Foreign Service, and certain ambassadors. One of them was Homer Byington, Jr.

So he said, "I've got to get over to the embassy and find out how the Ambassador wants to handle this." It was about six blocks away. He went racing over and come into the ambassador's secretary, Elaine Evans, and asked, "Is the ambassador in? Can I see him?" She said, "Okay, go ahead Milt." She sent him in, and he said from the door, "Mr. Ambassador, how should we handle this, about your resignation being accepted?" He said the ambassador's face just went white, and he said, "No."

It turns out that the Byingtons had contributed strongly to Nixon's campaign.

He left Kuala Lumpur and went on to be Consul General in Naples, a position he held for seven years before he retired.

Q: The next ambassador, Charles Baldwin, comes in very quickly after the new administration is in place.

SULLIVAN: I don't remember much about Baldwin. We left in March 1961 and Baldwin hadn't even arrived yet, I don't think. He was named, but he hadn't arrived. The new administration didn't come in until January 20th.

Q: Can you situate our relations with Malaysia at that time?

SULLIVAN: Malaysia, actually at that point still Malaya, on my arrival, had been independent about 18 months. It was a former British Colony, or collection of colonies; the relationship with the United States was a pretty good one. But it was a new one. Neither country had much exposure to the other. This was before the United States became the principle location for overseas higher education of Malaysian students. That was a major focus of the relationship, because people with American degrees at that time were largely Chinese-Americans or ethnic Chinese citizens of the federation of Malaya, and the government would not recognize their degrees. They had such trouble as - a degree from a place called Harvard - "now how do we know that is as good as Oxford or Cambridge?" That quickly changed but there was a period where acceptance of American university degrees was a problem.

Q: At that time, what was the balance of power and relations between the Chinese and Malays?

SULLIVAN: Even before independence, the domestic political scene had evolved to the point where there was a group called the "alliance" which had a Malay Party, a Chinese Party and an Indian Party in it; the three of them were partners, with the Malays being clearly known as the dominant Party, the Chinese association was secondary; and the Indian congress the smallest. Each had some ministries and they all had members of parliament, as they ran on the United Alliance ticket. It was their way of moving their

communal problems in-house and trying to solve them within the party rather than on the parliamentary floor.

There was an insurgency that had originally begun in 1948, coincidental with Communist Party revolts in a number of other countries. By the time we arrived in February 1959, the British had declared an Emergency and been trying to isolate the Communists in the jungle by creating fortified New Villages where they moved residents of the surrounding areas. Outsiders were prohibited overnight and the villagers were prohibited from taking food and water outside the villages when they went out to farm.

When we got there, travelers, including people like us with diplomatic plates on our cars, still had to go out through a checkpoint with no food in your car for some ten or fifteen miles up the safe path before you got back into what was considered cleared territory. We were there for the big ceremony celebrating the end of the Emergency when General Templer came back and was greeted like a god.

Q: This is always cited as an example of successful counter-insurgency. Do you have any wisdom on the way it was done - second-guessing, or was it an unalloyed success?

SULLIVAN: I think it was a success. There was some resentment by some of the rural Chinese who were moved into the New Villages, as they were called. These villagers thought they were a little bit restrictive, but I think it was effective. The architect of it was a British civil servant, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense I believe he was.

Everyone makes the comparison with Vietnam. I think one of the differences perhaps was because it was much harder for the Communist Party in Malaya to get supplies because it was isolated. They didn't have as much chance of an overland trail, and at the end of that they would have had to cross the Thai border. It wasn't exactly a supportive arrangement for the Communists, although they did retreat into some camps they set up on the Thai side of the border.

Q: In the early stages of a new country, you would have been dealing with people who would be the architects of their future development. How were relations between young Malaysians and young Americans at that time?

SULLIVAN: I think very good myself. You're right; we did get to know many people throughout the government. Nearly everybody in the Malayan Government—the Government of the Federation of Malaya, to be correct for the time—except for some of the ministers, was fairly young. This was particularly true of the foreign office staff. They were just putting together the Malaysian foreign service and well-selected new people were just coming on board. Because we were all of an age, we knew many of them socially and as friends as well as diplomatic colleagues I think four of them we knew there later served as ambassadors here in Washington—we knew Zain Azraai and Bert Talalla particularly well.

Malaysia, as distinct from Malaya, came into being when Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo all joined together in 1963, two years after we left. Singapore left Malaysia in 1965, but the other parts of Malaysia stayed in the new nation.

Q: After two years your next assignment, in 1961, is the Kaduna consulate in Nigeria.

SULLIVAN: Yes, where I replaced one of my FSI classmates. I forgot to put Gerry Linderman's name on the A-100 list. He left the Foreign Service after serving in Kaduna and a tour in Leopoldville. He went back and got a doctorate in American History, and was on the faculty at the University of Michigan for decades, teaching American history.

Q: Can you describe that consulate? How was it established? Where was it and what was it supposed to be reporting on?

SULLIVAN: Kaduna was a political post. Nigeria was divided into three regions, plus a capital territory around Lagos. There was a western region, an eastern region, and a northern region.

The Northern Region was the biggest. It was more than the size of France. The country was essentially ethnically divided. The dominant tribe in Western Nigeria was the Yoruba. The dominant tribe in Eastern Nigeria was the Ibo or more properly the Igbo, the people who later ran Biafra. Up in the north, it was the Hausas and Fulanis. The Fulanis were the nomadic cattle herders who roamed across much of West Africa; the Hausas were more settled down. The Emirs, who headed their own ancient traditional kingdoms or regencies, were all Hausa.

In the British time, when Nigeria was brought under a single colonial rule and the regions were established, the advantages in education went to the southerners, west and east. When they got around to establishing a Federation of Nigeria there were federal positions as well as regional positions. Most of them, no matter which region, went to southerners—particularly Ibos—because they were better educated in the Western sense and considered more highly qualified.

There was no love lost among these people. Not just these four major tribes. There are many, many others. But these are the dominant tribes in the regions.

The tension was fueled by the way the Ibo civil servants, when they were assigned to the north, tended to treat Hausa and Fulani. In the post office for example, an Ibo postal clerk would have a very distinguished Hausa standing in front of him trying to buy stamps. Unless the money was perfect, exactly as it should be, the Ibo would tell him to go away and get the right change. Ibo nurses would charge Hausa patients money for bedpans in hospitals, things like this. Consequently, the Ibos in particular were disliked by the northern aristocracy.

The Ibo were heavy in the military. Lots of other people were in the military too, but the Ibos controlled it. So, in 1966, it was not surprising when the Hausa prime minister and

the Hausas' northern Nigeria premier were killed in the first Ibo coup. They killed the Yoruba prime minister in the west also. Somehow, the Ibo prime minister in the east didn't get killed. Then they declared themselves independent, as Biafra. This was well after we left Kaduna in 1963. But given what we had seen when we lived there, I was not surprised to hear that Ibos in Sabon Gari, the Strangers Quarters, in Kaduna, were killed in good numbers once the Sardauna of Sokoto, the Northern Premier, and Tafawa Balewa, the federal Prime Minister, had been killed. That occurred in January 1966. By then I was back here in IO (Bureau of International Organizations) as a staff assistant.

Anyway, the Consulate in Kaduna had been opened in 1959, prior to Nigerian independence in 1960—well before the Biafran War. The reason for a Consulate in the Northern Region was because of the Hausa dominance in the federal government, other than the army. The Sardauna of Sokoto was Al-Haji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the principal figure. He didn't want to go to Lagos, so he sent his first lieutenant, Tafawa Balewa, down to be federal Prime Minister, and he stayed as Premier of the Northern Region.

So, we were there to listen and observe; to have ears close to where the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, was; and to be helpful in the development. He was really an Othello-like character.

Q: He was fun to deal with though.

SULLIVAN: He was tricky to deal with at times. My first principal officer, the one who opened the post, Pat Quinlan, was from a little town in southwestern Minnesota, Camden, Minnesota. Pat went home on leave and, while he was in Camden, he addressed the Rotary Club. He was asked some questions and he answered them quite forthrightly. He got back to Kaduna and went to play fives, which is an English handball game, with the Sardauna and the Sardauna says, "Mr. Quinlan, "Did you tell the Camden Rotary Club that such and such?" The northern Nigerian government's clipping service had found it.

Q: So Kaduna was a regional watching post?

SULLIVAN: Yes, Kaduna was the regional capital in the north, which had been established by the British in the colonial period to have a capitol that was not the seat of one of the traditional Emirates. The northern parliament was there. The Sardauna was actually from the town of Sokoto, but he was also resident in the northern capital

Consulates were also opened in Ibadan in the Western Region and in Enugu in the Eastern Region, making three consulates, plus the Embassy in Lagos.

Q: It was a fairly small consulate. There was you and who else?

SULLIVAN: There was a Principal Officer, originally Clifford "Pat" Quinlan and later Pat O'Sheel. I was the Vice Consul. Then there was a couple, she was the Secretary and he was the Admin Assistant as it were—he didn't have a consular commission. His name

was Frank Belsito. His wife was the Secretary. Those were all the State Department Americans in the consulate.

We also had a USIA officer and one sort of regional AID officer to help run AID in the north and support the various technical people who were out there.

Q: In the early 1960s, how does the consulate communicate with the embassy?

SULLIVAN: Sometimes by phone. I don't recall us sending telegrams unless they were unclassified. I don't recall us ever breaking out a onetime pad. I didn't know how to do it. I suppose Frank Belsito knew how to do it. Maybe his wife knew how to do it. I don't recall us ever sending classified cables.

Q: So, most of your reporting is couriered down, letters and aerogrammes.

SULLIVAN: Yes, and sometimes phone calls.

Q: Who is your contact in the embassy? Who oversees the consulate, the Political Section?

SULLIVAN: The Political Section largely. I'm not sure who the Political Officer was. Gerry Bennett was there in that section. There were two Bennetts: there was Josiah Bennett and Gerry Bennett. Josiah Bennett was an old China hand, a language officer. He was one of the few who had come through from the World War II days. He had survived.

Q: Did you have many people from the embassy coming up and visiting you?

SULLIVAN: No, not a lot. The ambassador came up once on a trip. I think when I was there acting as Principal Officer. I traveled with him through Kano and Sokoto, and then came down the other side of the river.

DCM Gerry Green came north once on his way to "the great central African cookout" in Fort Lamy, Chad. It was a group of FSI classmates all assigned in West Africa getting together and driving through the area to do it. My wife and I took him and his wife to Zaria (a Sultanate town near Kaduna) and Kano on their way to Chad.

Q: Who is the ambassador when you get there?

SULLIVAN: Joe Palmer.

Q: What's he like to work for?

SULLIVAN: Great. Absolutely great. He was a very capable ambassador. He was one of the few Africa specialists. He treated people very well, and so did his wife. I know my wife used to say, "You know, after Kuala Lumpur, you've got to wonder. If Margaret Palmer asked me to walk uphill on my hands, I would do it, because I know she would

have a good reason for me to do it, and that she would tell me when she could.” They were that kind of couple.

Q: This is during the Kennedy Administration. What about the Peace Corps?

SULLIVAN: We hadn’t been in Kaduna long when the Peace Corps arrived: Nigeria One.

We had been in Kuala Lumpur when the Peace Corps was established. Sargent Shriver came through and explored with the Malays whether or not they would accept the Peace Corps. The Malaysians accepted the idea but the Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) had not arrived before we were transferred in March 1961, about the time that President Kennedy actually established the Peace Corps.

The first group for Nigeria arrived after we had been in country about six months. Does the name Marjorie Michelmore mean anything to you? Marjorie Michelmore was in Nigeria One. After the group arrived they had training down in Ibadan, which is the capital of the Western Region. From her hotel room, Marge Michelmore looked out and she saw people of the male persuasion walking down the road. Then they would walk off into the tall grass, squat down, do their business and then come back to continue their trip. She was shocked and said so on a post card she was writing.

Well, that wasn’t very bright. She left the card in her room and apparently somebody found it and published what she had written. It was a great *cause célèbre*... She apologized, and was sent home. She had been scheduled to come to the North. However, the whole business was probably one of the best things that ever happened to the Peace Corps. As they sent PCVs out, they would tell them about what happened to Marge Michelmore and use that as a way of reminding them they needed to be mindful of what they said about the host country and its people.

At least two Volunteers were assigned to a single school so they would not be by themselves. They were all going to be English teachers in secondary schools with tin roofs and air conditioning. Sargent Shriver didn’t like the idea of the air conditioning. It was too fancy for Peace Corps volunteers. But if you live under a tin roof in northern Nigeria, you need the air conditioning. Otherwise, you don’t want a tin roof.

Q: There was quite an adjustment for the Peace Corps people, as well as the Nigerians.

SULLIVAN: I’m sure there was. They were living in much more fancy establishments than when we were in Sierra Leone later on. When we were in Sierra Leone, some of the volunteers were in round mud huts with a thatched roof.

In Nigeria all the volunteers were assigned to teach English language in secondary schools. And were treated on the par with their Nigerian teacher counterparts in the secondary schools.

Q: In those early days of the Peace Corps, what were the instructions as to the embassy's relationship with the Peace Corps people?

SULLIVAN: We would entertain them and casually talk with them about how they thought things were going. We weren't using them as sources, as though they were supposed to know anything. You would just ask them, "How's life?" and see what they would say. You could ask them things that would give you an insight into something. By and large, we didn't see too many of them since they were so scattered around and we didn't travel all that much. But there, and later in the Philippines and in Sierra Leone, we visited them when we were out in the field and certainly fed them when they came in town.

Q: What kind of car did the consulate have?

SULLIVAN: There was a sedan. I can't remember what brand. There was a Jeep as a second car. I remember that, because when the AID secretary died and I had to go off to the hospital and see if I could find someone who could read with me what was in FAM about how the body had to be prepared if the family the remains shipped home. What did you have to do? There were specific regulations. This was an issue since in Kaduna bodies were normally buried without embalming within twenty-four hours.

I found a Scotsman on the hospital staff, a pathologist perhaps who looked at what was required and said, "Oh yes, we can do that." In the Consulate warehouse listed under the USAID inventory there was a "Case, Transfer," which was a coffin that could be sealed shut. So, with the help of someone who was prepared to embalm, and a coffin that met US import standards, we could prepare the body so it could get home.

We did that. Because international flights were not necessarily daily, the coffin was kept for several days in the warehouse before it was driven 150 miles up to Kano, where the international airport was. When Frank Belsito and the driver pulled away, the coffin was sticking out of the back end of the Jeep with a red flag on it. They had to drive up and log it onto the airline to get it to Colorado. The Consulate local staff were leery of going into the warehouse for a while because the body had been there.

Q: How about your reporting access when you were up country? Could you pretty much meet anybody you wanted?

SULLIVAN: Yes, pretty much. When we got there, the top of the civil service (permanent secretaries and such) was still largely British. There were maybe three or four permanent secretaries with the regional ministries who were Northerners. By the time we left, they were down to about one or two Brits, and Northerners were in charge all over.

We were told when we arrived that we wouldn't be able to get any of the northern Nigerians to come to the house for dinner or anything like that. Or the perm secs might come, but their wives wouldn't come. That turned out not to be the case. We didn't mix British and northern Nigerians, but, provided the Nigerian Ministers were not invited

(which we didn't as a rule) many of the Perm Secs would bring one of their wives. We got to be good friends with some of them. One, the Permanent Secretary of Information, Amadu Joda, had a daughter who was very popular in our family because she was a classmate at the school of our oldest son. He was the second smallest person in the school; she was smaller. She was a cutie.

One thing I regret not foreseeing at the time was that in the contingent of the army in Kaduna then a major—Hassan Katsina—who later became a Brigadier General and then became the first member of the military to be Prime Minister. He was the son of the Emir of Katsina. He was a world famous polo player who rode a horse as if he had been born on its back.

Q: Just for parallelism, how did one get to a Nigerian posting from Washington?

SULLIVAN: I don't know about how you got directly to Lagos, but to get to Kaduna, we flew to London and from London flew to Kano on British Airways—arriving before dawn because the airstrip was not long enough for a heavy plane to land on it after the day had heated up. International flights were met by part of the retinue of the Emir of Kano on horseback in flowing green and red robes who blew on long horns to welcome the arrivals. As I remember, a car was sent up to Kano from Kaduna to drive us there—several hours on a bumpy road. When we left Kaduna two years later, we flew on a small Nigerian Airways plane to Lagos and from Lagos directly to New York. The airstrip in Kaduna was short and had a metaled runway.

Q: Were there any other aspects of that assignment that strike you as interesting? You've done biographic work. You've been out in Asia. Now you're in Africa.

SULLIVAN: One of the things I remember particularly from Kaduna was something that had not been done when the first Vice Consul, Gerry Linderman [Ed: who arrived at post in February 1959] was there. That was to do the post's first E&E (Emergency and Evacuation) Plan. I tell you, that's quite a bit of work.

You're going around trying to find out where every airstrip and where every radio is in the whole region. That was interesting. At the time, the Embassy in Lagos had justified having a boat for evacuation purposes—but it was mainly used to get out to the beaches and we knew that. So, jokingly, we proposed that Kaduna needed a camel so the post could evacuate northward across the Sahara.

Q: Basically, this post had only been recently opened.

SULLIVAN: The Consul who opened it, Quinlan, was still there.

Q: Were there any other diplomatic missions in Kaduna?

SULLIVAN: There was a British Deputy High Commission, and a Sudanese Consulate General. There was one other. I can't remember who it was.

Q: I have another parallelism question. How did you get this assignment? Or is this still the old opaque way?

SULLIVAN: The message just simply came in: Actually, I was sitting at my desk in KL and in came the message. Somebody brought it to me. I don't remember who. Maybe it was the ambassador's secretary, who got a copy before I did, or somebody from communications. It was a very small post. I looked at it and said, "Oh my God." I went over to the phone and called home.

The background to this is that of the four previous FSOs who left the post, two went to Paris and two went to London. Davit and Ely went to Paris, Purnell and Frazier Meade went to London.

Q: So you thought a very favorable precedent had been set.

SULLIVAN: Certainly. So I called and the first thing my wife said was, "Have orders come in?" I said, "Are you sitting down?" She said, "Have we got orders?" I said, "Are you sitting down?" She said, "Okay, I'm sitting down. Where are we going?" "Kaduna." "Kaduna?" "Kaduna." We knew about Kaduna. We had been part of a group that had sent the Lindermans off from Washington with two year's worth of cans of this and that, supplies and had been sure they were going to the ends of the earth.

It was the same sort of situation years later when we sent Ann Swift, one of the group where were hostages for 444 days, off to Teheran. Of course, we had known her for much longer by that time. We had served together in Jakarta. We were at a party when Ann was leaving to go to Teheran and everyone was supposed to bring a limerick. After the embassy was taken over, we remembered the jokes, the puns and limericks we wrote – "Ay-ya-tola-ya-you-so" – thinking what have I done to Ann if they found that material in her apartment!

Q: Didn't your time in Nigeria come to a sudden end when you got very ill with malaria?

SULLIVAN: No we served the full two years. My wife had hepatitis but otherwise we and the kids were basically healthy. I did get malaria, but it didn't become apparent that I was carrying it until we had been back here for a year and a half. In those days you took chloroquine primaquine weekly to suppress it, but there wasn't any killer dose that you took at the end of the tour, so it was dormant. A year and half later, overworking myself shoveling snow, it broke through.

Q: It was quite serious, as I recall.

SULLIVAN: The thing with malaria is at first you are afraid you are going to die, and then you're afraid you are not going to die. It really is terrible when you are in the middle of the paroxysms—first you shiver and freeze and then your fever spikes and you sweat

out everything you have on. After a while it stops, but then like clockwork—in my case every 48 hours—it starts again.

Q: Your next assignment in the summer cycle of 1963 is to the Bureau of International Organizations. How did you get that assignment? Or was that equally opaque?

SULLIVAN: Out of the blue.

Q: What was the IO assignment itself?

SULLIVAN: Assistant staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary. There were two staff assistants and I was the junior one under Holsey Handyside, who was senior.

Q: He must have been interesting to work for.

SULLIVAN: He was great. I liked Holsey. I liked Handy. I did something foolish once. He waited a little while until we were alone. He took me aside and said, “You interrupted me when I was explaining something. I didn’t like that.”

“I’m sorry. I’ll try not to do it again.” Actually, I had said something he had not wanted said. I said, “Oh yes, we can do that. We do that in the department by going around this way.”

He didn’t want that person to be told that we knew we had extra ways of getting things done, in what we used to call the lymph system, the parallel system, that’s there. The blood system is your Assistant Secretaries, Office Directors, and so forth, going up to the Secretary. Next to that there is the whole Staff Assistant routine running up through S/S [the office of the Secretary of State], on which the other ones are dependent, although they don’t know it.

Q: That’s an interesting description of the Staff Assistant role. Here’s a major bureau in the Department. It’s the Kennedy Administration. There’s a lot going on in the UN (United Nations). What does a Staff Assistant do for the bureau?

SULLIVAN: The Staff Assistant (SA) sees to it that his own principals are served and materials are feed to them. He sees that the output gets to where it is supposed to get, promptly. It is sort of two-pronged like that. SAs show up early in the morning and go through the stack of telegrams for each of the principals: the Assistant Secretary and his DAS’ (Deputy Assistant Secretary). You sort them out so that by the time they arrive, on their desk is their first morning take of the telegrams and that is laid out the way they want them laid out. Harland Cleveland had a very specific way he liked his things done. So did Joe Sisco.

Q: What was Cleveland’s background? What was he like to work with?

SULLIVAN: There were some amazing people there at the time; the Assistant Secretary was Harlan Cleveland; among his earlier jobs had been the head of the Marshall Plan in Europe at the age of 29; editor of the Reporter Magazine; he had been Dean of the Maxwell School. His time as the editor of the Reporter Magazine was the one that struck me the most because that man could pick up a piece of paper, look at it and within two seconds could find any typo on the page. So the staff assistants who supported him as he wanted to be supported made sure that something was really closely proofread or sent back to UNP (Office of United Nations Political Affairs), headed by Joe Sisco and Bill Buffum, and told “he’s not going to buy that” because it had a typo in it.

Assistant Secretary Cleveland worked late. That was his main problem. His wife would come down, dressed in a long gown ready to go out to dinner, and Cleveland would work on to 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. Sometimes he would say, “I’m coming back.” He might show up after dinner, in which case there was still a Staff Assistant waiting for him.

Sisco always went home reasonably early, by 7:00 p.m.

A staff aide job is very time consuming. There was one week when Handyside, my second boss, was away on leave. I spent 101 and one-half hours in the office that week—not counting 30 minutes each way to commute from our house near Tyson’s Corner. And then I had to walk three or four blocks. Starting from midnight Sunday to midnight Sunday. Well, let me put it this way - 7:00 A.M. Monday morning to midnight the following Sunday evening. There were two Security Council meetings at 12:30 in the morning or 1:30 in the morning: one on Cypress and one on the Tonkin Gulf. It was quite a week. And I was alone as the only Staff Assistant in sight.

Q: Did you get much into policy?

SULLIVAN: No. Our job was to keep moving the papers and to make sure that everybody got them, particularly the Secretary. Harlan Cleveland had a habit of getting the paper, talking to the staff about it, initialing it, then walking it into the Secretary’s office himself. So we had to develop a pattern of always making sure that we had a Xerox copy. Xerox machines were few in the Department. We had to steal Xerox time on other people’s machines to make sure we had a copy before it went in to Mr. Cleveland so that we could take one up to Jean Davis, the head of the Secretariat staff, and say, laughing, “Jean, it happened again but here’s a copy, so watch for it to come out of the Secretary’s office.”

Q: I always thought Joe Sisco as a Near East bureau officer.

SULLIVAN: He became that. He came up through IO. Yes, he got to be Assistant Office Director in IO/UNP. By the time I arrived, he was the Office Director, and Bill Buffum was his Deputy.

While I was there, Sisco moved up to be the DAS covering UNP affairs, and Buffum became Office Director. Later on, Cisco went to NEA (Bureau of Near East Asia Affairs), and Buffum became the DAS. Then Buffum went to New York where he became an Under Secretary General.

Q: How was the IO Bureau Front Office organized? I assume the Deputy Assistant Secretaries had specific portfolios.

SULLIVAN: Yes, We had two. The senior DAS, concentrating on political matters and organizations, and the other dealing with economic and social affairs matters and organizations. When I arrived the political DAS was Woody Wallner and then he was followed by Joe Sisco.

Richard Gardner was in charge of the economic and social affairs stuff. That was his responsibility. But he was not happy about it. He wanted to be political, solely.

He didn't really want to do the stuff he was required to do, like sign off the delegations lists. Every delegation had to be authorized for the U.S. to pay for it, at this meeting or that meeting. It had to be signed off at the DAS level. That was Gardner's job. I was the Staff Assistant and kept putting these things on the desk for him. "Have you signed those Mr. Gardner?" Well, he wanted to be busy with something else, like writing a book, or some other things like that.

He was bright, but he just didn't want to do the things he was supposed to cover in his job. There were policy issues on the economic and social affairs side, but he really wanted to get into the purely political side. And Joe was not about to let Richard Gardner, a political appointee, sneak in on that stuff. Gardner later became US Ambassador to Italy. He finally got the chance.

Q: Was Gardiner a political appointee?

SULLIVAN: Yes, he was a law professor from Columbia.

But the most interesting person I dealt with in my job was Adlai Stevenson, the US Ambassador to the UN. He frequently came down to Washington to talk with Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Cleveland. It was always interesting to go to National Airport to meet him coming off the plane and walk with him through the terminal and have people recognize him. It was also interesting to have a twenty-minute talk with him in the car on the way back to the Department. He was easy to talk to, he talked about things that were going on, asked about my family, and gave me a cigar when our fourth child, a son, was born.

Q: You were only in IO from the summer of 1963 to September 1964. Was that the normal length for that job?

SULLIVAN: I did think during my IO assignment -- this was my fourth assignment under four different bureaus -- that's no way to survive. I'd better have a home bureau that I 'belong to'. How do you do that? Language training! So I picked Indonesian and in that 'joined' FE (Far East Bureau). That was toward the end of the term in IO. I got the Indonesian language training. September was when language training started. I think the IO assignment was set for two years, but language training is one of those things that can break it up. There is a certain time you've got to start. When I applied and was accepted for the language training, September was a good time.

Q: It's interesting because language training is normally attached to an overseas assignment.

SULLIVAN: In theory, the training was connected to an overseas assignment. I had orders to Surabaya. But just before we were scheduled to leave, my wife developed Hodgkin's disease, which in those days was considered fatal. The prognosis then was two years. But in her case there was a spontaneous remission. She is still going strong. We have been blessed.

While we were in the middle of our physicals to go overseas, this thing, an enlarged lymph node, popped out on her groin. Because we were leaving, our doctor, with the concurrence of the State doctor decided it should be removed rather than watched. After the operation the surgeon came scuttling down the hall and I asked, "Is everything all right?" "We'll talk later."

Later that afternoon, he told me that he didn't like the looks of this lymph node at all and that pending confirming biopsies to see what it actually was he assumed it was cancerous. That took a few weeks, but meanwhile, State cancelled her medical clearance. Our doctor sent slides of the node several places including AFIP (Armed Forces Institute of Pathology). They were the ones in the end who diagnosed Hodgkin's disease.

She started seeing a specialist who decided to watch her and treat the next time there was a fulmination because the medicine then was strong but could only be used sparingly. Ultimately, it never recurred.

But the loss of medical clearance for her broke the assignment. A place had to be found for me here somewhere. So I went into South Pacific Affairs in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Q: Let's go back to Indonesian language training. Was that in the garage? Wasn't all Asian language training there?

SULLIVAN: Yes, in the garage.

Q: How many Indonesian language officers were there at the time?

SULLIVAN: I think we were a class of six. I am trying to remember. Bill Farrand and his then wife Sandy, the first wife, were both in it. There was a spook named Jim Nichol. I can't remember who else was in there.

Q: So it was a fairly small class, with lots of tape time and lots of class time. What's Indonesian like to study?

SULLIVAN: Indonesian, Bahasa Indonesia, was not the major language of the Indonesian islands. It is based on a form of Malay that was used as a second or the language of Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, with some in southern Thailand and southern Philippines—all of them part of the wider Malay world both in language and broad aspects of culture.

In the late 1920s, the independence movement in Indonesia decided it needed a national language. The islands had 300 or more languages with Javanese probably the then most widely spoken. Bless them, they chose, smartly, to use the common secondary language based on Malay as Bahasa Indonesia, the language of Indonesia. It was everybody's second language and almost nobody's first language. Had they chosen, say, Javanese, it would have been viewed by everyone else as Javanese colonialism.

The people in the Philippines chose to in theory create a national language, Pilipino, but it is basically Tagalog. Today, Tagalog is a subject of much animosity between those who speak it and those speak other major languages, particularly Cebuano, who say the language may be called Pilipino, but it's nothing but Tagalog.

Q: This must have been disappointing. You've gone to Malaysia, but you didn't get language training. You went to Nigeria, but you didn't get language training. So now you had the full Indonesian training, but for medical reasons, you aren't going to go overseas.

SULLIVAN: So I was shifted to an assignment in the Department. By the end of another two years she had not had a recurrence and was apparently basically healthy, Medical said she could go to certain posts, depending on what we have there. Jakarta has a unit with two doctors and a nurse. She can go there and she can be gotten to Clark Air Force Base or Singapore. Yes, you can go ahead. There was nothing showing up. There was no continuation of the disease.

Q: So you have to take an assignment in the department. How did the Southwest Pacific thing come up then?

SULLIVAN: I had been taking the Indonesian language. If they could use me on Indonesia, that was fine. At that particular time, Indonesia was included in the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, which covered everything from Malaysia, Indonesia, but not the Philippines as they had their own office, to Australia and New Zealand, together with whatever little islands there are out there that are not French.

They assigned me as the Economic Officer to cover Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. So I did that, which meant I got to meet the Australian Prime Minister when he came. I was on the White House Lawn. Tom Conlon, who was the Australia and New Zealand Political Officer, came in one day and said, "I am leaving this weekend and Harold Holt is coming in three weeks. Have fun!"

So Margaret and I ended up on the White House lawn, with a bee in her bonnet. It was a perfect June day. Margaret's hat covered her head with blue flowers and a bee buzzed in. The gentleman who was representing the District Council and his wife next to us. We ignored the bee but I have always been able say she went to the White House with a bee in her bonnet. That's when I met Lyndon Johnson as we went through the receiving line. She met him again later on.

Part of the time during this Australia and New Zealand thing, I was taking care of LBJ's (President Lyndon B. Johnson) Ambassador to Australia, Ed Clark [Ed: who served from August 1965 to December 1967]. He was commonly known as "Mister Ed" a reference to a television show that featured a talking horse.

The Australians wanted somebody who was close to the President. So LBJ named a friend who was his lawyer and banker, from Fredericksburg, Texas. He was a big jovial kind of guy. He seemed like a hick. If you asked about somebody, he would say, "Well, we've howdied, but we ain't shook."

He was very much like that, and he was bright.

He went down to Australia. Here comes this "country boy" with an accent like a Texas hick. He went everywhere. He talked to everybody. They fell in love with him. He did what the Australian government wanted. He was very, very close to the White House. They had a voice, and it was someone who knew how to use a voice who was there.

Q: In July 1965, you have just joined the Southwest Pacific Affairs office as the Economic Officer for Indonesia. What did that office look like? Who was in charge? How big was it? What did it cover?

SULLIVAN: In the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Dave Cuthell was the Office Director. He was a very calm, reserved guy, with a wicked little sense of humor. He had two specialties: one was Turkey, and the other was the Philippines. He was a wonderful guy. I remember at a get-together once, I made some sort of an ethnic joke. I can't remember what the ethnicity was, but he let me know that he was not amused. And I don't make ethnic jokes any more. At least, I try not to.

Frank Underhill was the Deputy. When the office was later reorganized, Frank became the first Director for Indonesian affairs. He was my immediate boss when we got to that.

My responsibilities were essentially economic. With regard to Indonesia, I guess that meant keeping an eye out on a country going to pot in terms of their economy, and just following what was going on.

With regard to Australia and New Zealand, it meant listening to what Australians and New Zealanders had to say about how the United States handled their exports. Their complaints about definitions of types of cheese that they were being forbidden to ship to the United States, or there were limitations on how much they could ship to the United States, those sorts of issues.

They were both very nice, particularly the Australians, at telling me where they were going to go and whom they were going to complain to. I knew ahead of time that the Department of Agriculture was about to have the Australians hit them again. Of course, the Department of Agriculture can take care of itself. They can listen to a person, or maybe not listen to a person; pay no attention if they don't want to pay attention.

Whether the Australians were successful in their lobbying at any one particular time depended on – I don't know how to put it – the strength of American industry-backed interests in the Department of Agriculture.

I remember one particular case, and it had to do with cheese. The Australians made a cheddar like cheese which they called Colby cheese. Nobody else made Colby cheese. The Department of Agriculture said, "You can't ship that in. That's not Colby cheese; that's Cheddar cheese."

The Australians said, "No, no, no. It has to be 43.1 percent or less something, in order to be Cheddar cheese. This is 45 percent whatever it is. It doesn't meet the definition of Cheddar cheese, so you can't put a Cheddar cheese limitation on it."

They argued about this back and forth. One day, I went into Safeway and, lo and behold, I saw a bar of Kraft Colby cheese. I bought it, took it and gave it to the people in the Australian Embassy – bad citizen that I am – and they whooped and hollered, and raced up to the Department of Agriculture. They asked, "Who says that there isn't a Colby cheese different from Cheddar?"

Kraft had blown it. That was an interesting sort of fun part of it. They gave nice wine and cheese parties too.

We were talking a little bit about Tom Conlon's early departure. That left me with the Australian desk and my involvement in the Harold Holt visit here. LBJ liked Harold Holt so much that he asked him to come back here. He was coming here on his way to London for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference. LBJ said, "Come on back, you all!"

Lo and behold, he did. So we had two Holt visits in the space of about three weeks.

Q: That's a lot of briefing papers.

SULLIVAN: Yes, and there were a lot of visits from your ambassador at the other end. He was great fun. I rather enjoyed Ed Clark. The Australians started calling him “Mr. Ed” after the horse. They grew to love him.

Then come the office reorganization into country directorships. In that division, I went with Frank Underhill into the Indonesian side of things. Underhill was the Country Director. Kent Goodspeed, Bob Myers and I were the rest of the desk.

Q: What prompted that reorganization?

SULLIVAN: As I understand it, somebody and I’m not sure who it was, wanted there to be some reasonably senior official in the State Department to answer for every country. They could then call the Indonesia guy and not have this layer of regional offices within a regional bureau before you got down to the fellow who knew the answer.

This would be in 1965 during the Johnson Administration, after he won re-election. Johnson came in after Kennedy was killed in 1963. I don’t know where the impetus for that came from, but that was my understanding at the time. They wanted a responsible person that they could name.

Q: As you say, they went from regional groupings under the bureau to country desks.

SULLIVAN: Country directorates under the bureau.

Q: So Thailand was a Country Directorate with, for example, Pickering as a Country Director. In fact, he had been Thai Affairs Chief under the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs.

SULLIVAN: Yes.

Q: Of course, Vietnam was starting to churn at this time.

SULLIVAN: There was a task force, a working group.

Q: Yes, Bob Miller’s.

SULLIVAN:

Q: The Assistant Secretary at that time was William Bundy with Burger, Unger and Barnett as the deputies. Did you have any interaction with the bureau front office?

SULLIVAN: As economic officer, I should have. Bob Barnett was the one I was reporting to outside the office. The economic side went up through Bob Barnett.

Q: On the Indonesian side, what kind of issues were you covering at that time?

SULLIVAN: There weren't many in the way of economic issues at this point. The Indonesian economy was going downhill.

Herblock of *The Washington Post* had a wonderful cartoon one day. What had him doing it, I don't know. Here is a rock and waves, with what is left of the boat up on the rock. Lots of planks are gone. Anyway, it has gone aground, a wreck. There's a guy on the sinking ship looking like a pirate with an Indonesian hat on (like Sukarno always wore) saying, "Avast ye. I'm still captain here."

He is labeled Sukarno and the boat is labeled The Indonesian Economy. My wife called *The Washington Post* and asked to speak to Herblock. She got someone who worked for him. She asked if Herblock could send the cartoon, signed, to her because her husband was the Indonesian Economic Officer in the State Department, and he had just about laughed his guts out over what it was. Herblock never sent originals but did sign a print of the cartoon on good white paper and send it to us. It was just as funny as could be. We had it hanging on our wall for years, except for when we were actually assigned to Indonesia a couple of years later.

Not too long into my time on the desk comes September 30, 1965, which is a coup termed as, "Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (30)," in Indonesian or The Movement of the 30th of September. The abbreviation that was commonly used in Indonesia -- "Gestapu," taking the first letter or two of each word -- comes out almost the same as Gestapo, very deliberately so. So much so that Sukarno tried desperately to get people to say "Gestok" a similar abbreviation for Gerakan October Satu," the 1st of October Movement. It didn't fly. He could not get any response to his desire that it be referred to as Gestok. It was Gestapu.

Q: That coup against Sukarno was pretty important in Indonesian affairs. How was it viewed from your side?

SULLIVAN: It broke overnight. I had the responsibility to go in early that week to have the telegrams ready for the front office and Frank Underhill. I am shaving in the morning and Margaret says, "You had better hurry. There's been a coup in Indonesia." I said, "Come on. There wasn't a coup. It must have been the announcement of what they called a Nasacom government."

The Indonesians had been talking about forming a "Nasacom" government, which would have elements of nationalists, religious groups and communists. *Nas*, for nationalist, then *a* for agama (religion), *com* for communist. This idea was intended to be a cover to get the communists into the government and the army had been resisting.

Margaret picked up the portable radio by our bed and carried it into the bathroom. She held it there. She said when I heard the report that there had been a coup attempt of some sort, I nearly slit my throat when I was shaving. I got on the phone immediately to the

desk and found out that Frank Underhill had been down there most of the night. I said, “I am on my way, as fast as I can.” I didn’t get home until after midnight.

We moved up to the Ops Center (Operations Center) and established a task force up there. We had visits from Under Secretary George Ball and all sorts of senior people. The Secretary himself didn’t come in. Ball came in. Dave Cuthell, who had been the SPA Office Director, was part of the group up there.

We tried to tackle a variety of issues. What do you do about American citizens in the country? What do you do with American military forces anywhere? We decided to bring the American Navy down to about the latitude of Natuna Island, but not to have them go any further south than that, in case there was anything. We didn’t know who these people were. We didn’t know anything at this point. It was an absolutely fascinating day.

Somewhere in the morning in came a message from the embassy that gave the text of a decree, and another one that gave a list of the membership of the movement, the Gerakan. It had about 40 names. A lot of them were military.

Dave looked at this and said, “You know, there’s a guy over at the War College, the only person I know of who can help sort these things out. His name is George Benson. He was the Attaché and he’s now at the War College. Get him out of class over there at Fort McNair. Get him over here.”

An hour or so later, in came this big jovial fellow, George Benson. He was a wonderful guy. He was Mr. Indonesia as far as the U.S. military was concerned. He sat there and looked over this list. He said that it was heavily leftist, from what he knew of the military names that appeared.

He said, “Do you want to hear what puzzles me? Brigadier General Supardjo – there are two Supardjos. I just can’t believe one would be involved in this. The other one is in command of forces up in Pontianak in West Kalimantan. He’s not supposed to be in Jakarta.” It turned out it was the one from West Kalimantan who had snuck down to Jakarta. George Benson was a tremendous help to us in sorting out what seemed to be going on.

Q: So, in response to the coup, you basically set up a task force in Operations Center area, which was staffed by whom?

SULLIVAN: Everybody out of the country directorate, plus some other people from the bureau.

Q: Were there any DoD (Department of Defense) representatives, other than George Benson?

SULLIVAN: He was the only one I can think of. He was an extra asset. He wasn’t standing watches or anything like that. He was providing insight.

Q: The task force had a couple of tasks, if you will: collecting the information, and then analyzing it too.

SULLIVAN: Yes, and preparing status reports about three times a day.

Q: Did the task force operate 24/7?

SULLIVAN: We did for a while. I spent several nights up there as the overnight guy.

It took a little while before a clear picture emerged. What had happened was that armed groups attacked the homes of seven senior army officers. Six were killed either at their homes or later at a small village at Halim Air Force base. One general escaped and his aide, a lieutenant, was killed and the general's daughter died of wounds she received. These attacks were planned by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and lead by the Lt. Col. who was in charge of Sukarno's presidential guard. The attacks were carried out by members of the security guard and two Army battalions, one each from the Central and East Java divisions, who were in Jakarta to prepare for a forthcoming Armed Forces Day ceremony.

In the Op Center early that morning, nobody knew where Sukarno was. That was one of the big issues for the first few days. As it turns out, he went to one of his wives' homes. Apparently, he was taken from there out to Halim air force base where a meeting was held at the Air Force commander's residence.

The air force, particularly its commanding officer, was largely behind the leftist movement. Various members of the leadership of the Communist Party, including Chairman Aidit were at Halim, although I don't remember when that became known to us. They had some arguments during the day as to what Sukarno should do. As it turned out, and we learned later, Aidit wanted him to go to Central Java. But in the course of the day, in the Op Center, we didn't know all this.

The most critical action beyond the killings of the generals was the seizure by the coup forces of the radio station fairly early in the morning. There, the coup leaders broadcast a statement announcing the formation of a September 30 Movement (Gerakan Tiga Puluh September, GESTAPU for short). A second broadcast gave the names of the forty people in charge, many of them military.

The military situation in the city turned against the coup fairly soon. General Suharto who was commander of the Strategic Reserve, the Special Forces, took over most of the army, or the parts that were loyal to the major part of the government that had not taken part in the coup. The military units that had gone with the coup rather quickly surrendered.

Later in the day, Suharto's forces retook the radio station and the telecommunications building. Interestingly, other than at Halim, the action concerning the coup was all around

the edges of Taman Merdeka, the big public square in the middle of Jakarta: Telecoms (the telephone company), the radio station, the President's Palace, Suharto's command headquarters and – only coincidentally -- the American Embassy.

It wasn't clear what was going on until we heard the coup leaders broadcast. Three cheers for FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service).

Finally, Aidit went on an air force plane to Central Java, but Sukarno refused to go with him. Sukarno, instead, went 30 miles up country to the palace in Bogor, and waited events out there. It was very confusing for quite a while.

Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?

SULLIVAN: The ambassador at that time was Marshall Green [Ed: serving from July 1965 to March 1969]. He had arrived some two months or so earlier.

He said there were demonstrations in the streets, with big signs saying "Green, go home." He used to say, "Yes, but every so often you would hear someone say, 'Green, go home – and take me with you.'

He was a good man to have in the spot at that time.

Q: When did the task force stand down and you began to understand what was going on?

SULLIVAN: It was a couple of weeks before we closed down the office upstairs. We figured we could handle it from the desk. The embassy did a super reporting job, what they could find out from people. Some of their best sources were dead.

Q: How did you keep in touch with the embassy? Did you have an open line? Or was it basically all cable?

SULLIVAN: I think it was a radio link, probably from somewhere in the Philippines, or something like that. I don't think we were dependent on access through local Indonesian instrumentality.

Q: When these kinds of events come up, is the embassy sort of working its sources, and you're putting it together? Or are you telling them to go out and see this guy?

SULLIVAN: I think we left it very much to them as to who they had access to and where they could get information. They did a fine job reporting.

There were a few things that were still available, in terms of newspapers and things like that. The Communist Party newspaper, Harian Rakjat, came out on October 2nd, and supported the coup. The coup had failed by the time that issue hit the streets. But the paper put them on record as having supported it. However those who supported the coup had earlier claimed this was an internal army revolt against high living and corruption by

the leadership. That is why the generals had been killed, because they were all corrupt. This turned out to be the last edition of Harian Rakjat.

Q: One of the roles the desk plays in a situation like that is to keep the rest of the government informed. You were putting out timed situation reports probably, liaising with the National Security Council, and making sure that everyone else understood, in addition to probably beginning to set the policy for other agencies who were going to respond to it.

SULLIVAN: A lot of that was above my pay grade, in a sense, the high political stuff.

What happened was that we in the Op Center watched. The word for us was low profile. Marshall Green's phrase was, "We keep a low profile. We listen to everything we can hear, but we keep a low profile." We didn't want to get ourselves into a position where anybody could say, "But you did it."

So we kept a low profile. They also did that in Jakarta, except they were talking to anybody they could talk to. People were beginning to come to the embassy, various players in the Indonesian scene, with their pitches for this and that. It was pretty quickly decided that our interests were in supporting the side that was represented by the army, or what was left of the army, and certainly not the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party).

It was pretty clear to us that the PKI had been in charge of this. They denied it, and said it was military against military. A couple of battalions were involved on the coup side. The soldiers might not have known what the hell they were doing but they went along with their commanders. Or how far down into the ranks support for the coup went. The Presidential Guard was involved in the original seizure of power in the middle of the night. Suharto, and his strategic reserve troops faced them down pretty quickly.

Q: Just to connect this interview with other officers' interviews with regard to the task force that was set up, who was basically in charge of it? Who else served?

SULLIVAN: The EA office kept coming in. I would say that Cuthell, who didn't really have a job at that point since his office had been disbanded underneath him. I'm not sure what Dave was doing at that point. He was available and he was a very solid anchor on which to build an operation.

Back to the coup. Up until March 11th, 1966, Sukarno fought back. He had come back into Jakarta and was holding cabinet meetings. He and Foreign Minister Subandrio, who was a supporter of the coup also, were trying to gain back lost ground and undercut Suharto, whose position was Commander of the Strategic Force. The army had turned to him, more or less as in charge of the loyal parts of the army. A lot of the air force was in support of the coup. A lot of the navy supported the coup. The Marine Corps largely supported the coup. There was this battle going back and forth.

On March 11th, 1966, there was a cabinet meeting in the presidential palace in Jakarta, right across Freedom Square (Taman Merdeka) from the American Embassy. Somebody came in and said something in the ear of Sukarno. He and Subandrio got up and left. Subandrio was in such a hurry, he left his shoes under the table. They went up to the palace in Bogor.

The army then designated three people to go to Bogor to confront the president, and insist that he sign a piece of paper, turning over his powers to Suharto. After much debate and reluctance, he did. This piece of paper was known as the Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, or the Order Letter of March 11th, and with it the acronym, SUPERSEMAR.

You have to know something about the language and culture of Indonesia to understand the power of that. There is a distinctly Javanese character in the widely performed wayang (shadow plays) recounting the Mahabarata named Semar. Semar is a servant, in some ways, a clown, but he is also a god. Semar and his three sons, also clowns, are key players in all the Mahabarata stories. Within Javanese culture, Semar speaks to the gods as equals, using the lowest form of Javanese.

In the wayang world, these people play roles very much like Falstaff. They are in the story, but periodically they step out of the action to do a scene. It may not be in Javanese, but in everyday Indonesian, or even in English, and they are making commentary. They can comment on anything. Thus they have enormous cultural and spiritual power.

Sukarno was never able to crack down on anyone who pretended to be Semar on a stage, or anything like that. To have something come out that is SUPERSEMAR, every Indonesian instantly knew that this was power; this was superpower.

Suharto was in charge of the government beginning March 11. He later got officially elected president, but he had the power from that point on.

From then on, the US government's job shifted. It became how do we go ahead and support the people who want to reform the government and the economy? Certainly, we don't support the remnants of the Communists. So: Where do we put in aid, and what kind?

All sorts of people kept knocking on the door (literally and figuratively) and saying, "Psst, I know just how to do it. You give me money, or you send me this."

It was a very ticklish time to do things. The textiles industry was in bad shape. They needed cotton and they didn't have any money. We provided PL 480 (Public Law 480) cotton. That was the first thing that we did.

There was a little bit of stuff handed to the army, behind the curtain, through a guy who was stationed in Bangkok. He was in touch with an Indonesian army officer in Bangkok who was in touch with the right people in Jakarta.

It was still being done in an extremely low profile way. You don't want to get out there and be very noticeable. Eventually, it led to the question about what do we do with this wreck of an Indonesian economy? What can we do to help this new group?

Something had to be done about debt, because you couldn't pump in new money unless you knew what the claims were on the old money. Indonesians had been buying everything overseas in rupiah, were behind in repaying and the rupiah was becoming worthless. Debt increased as foodstuffs and small things were bought.

There were also requests for new assistance. So there needed to be a debt rescheduling.

The French jumped in with the Paris Club and organized a debt meeting. The Dutch came through. Of course, the Dutch had the biggest claims, since all their Indonesian holdings had been expropriated. The Dutch came into Paris and said, "We waive payment. Now we can go ahead. Everything has been nationalized. Just forget it. It's out there. We'll work on individual industries, like Heineken. We won't jump to the head of the line to claim first."

There was a bit of a problem because the Japanese had been careful to make sure that their debt was largely commercial and got the head of the line payment. They backed off a little bit too. It all worked out, the rescheduling of the debt. Then, what do you do on the other side?

Then the Dutch took over. They chaired something called the IGGI, the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia. It met first twice a year, then later on once a year, for a number of years. You got all the donor nations who were willing to give aid to Indonesia together. They would make pledges as to how much to do.

We had a big hand in that. The decision, of course, was not mine but up the line. They went to Congress for agreement to go ahead on the basis of one-third U.S., one-third Japan, and one-third other donors. That gained acceptance. These meetings would take place in the Hague and actual pledges were arranged.

I didn't get to go to the first IGGI meeting, but I got to go to the second one. That comes up at the end of my tour on the desk, before I was assigned to join the Embassy staff in Jakarta. (I got there in August 1967.) I forget what month it was, but Holland was fairly cold. It was probably March 1967, or something like that. I accompanied Frank Underhill to the second IGGI. Bob Barnett was there. Rud Poats, the head of AID Asia was there.

The Indonesians had done a number of things. Suharto was not broadly educated. He had some military training. He didn't know anything about economics to start with, but there was in Jakarta a group of Indonesian economists that the Ford Foundation had the brilliant foresight some years before to send to various graduate schools in the United States for economics. Most of them went to Berkeley, and they were known as the Berkeley Mafia, although they didn't all go to Berkeley. The group included Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Emil Salim, Subroto, and Ali Wardhana.

One of them began giving economic lessons to Suharto, who turned out to be a bright student of it. He made all the right decisions about what you do and what you don't do with money.

One of the problems had been, in terms of the import system in Indonesia that you had to have a permit for everything. You had to buy the permit from somebody. There was no control over the value or the utility of what it was. You just bought the permit and then you could go ahead and buy what you wanted in rupiah.

The Berkeley Mafia replaced that, with Suharto's agreement, with a system of auctions for foreign currency. You had to pay for things purchased outside the country with that. If you wanted foreign currency, you had to buy it with rupiah for its market value. The Berkeley Mafia said they wanted to do international business that way in order to make it real.

Widjojo, who I believe was the first head of the planning office was also Suharto's teacher and was the person who drew up these plans. He had sat read AID Regulation 1 to try and find out what was possible.

They wanted the process to be two-fold. There should be bidding for foreign currency, and a list, not of what can be approved but of what *cannot* be imported. There was a relatively small list of forbidden imports. The rest of it was up to market forces.

There were a lot of complaints about that from a lot of people, but it drew approval from inside the U.S. Government, although Rud Poats didn't like it at all at AID. People at AID asked, "How do we know they will import the 'right' things?"

I was arguing with people under him on the Indonesian AID desk, asking, "What are the right things? Doesn't demand mean something around here? So long as no one is importing poisons or importing diamonds, unless they are industrial diamonds, let the people put up their own money to buy the foreign exchange to get the goods they want to import."

This was going to be the big issue at IGGI 1. All the donors were going to get together at the first meeting. Although I didn't go to it, Frank Underhill, Bob Barnett, and Rud Poats did.

I did a lot of work on that. I wrote a memo that I sent up to Bob Barnett on whether or not we would support what the Indonesians were asking us to do. The Indonesian economists had proposed a combination of a limited prohibited list and a bidding session for foreign currency. I ended up with something like, "If we do not accept the Indonesian proposal of what they want to do, they are bound to fail. We should back their proposal."

It was about four pages of passionate argument. It was not a good Foreign Service thing to do, except it was effective. I gave it to Barnett and he read it. He sat up on the plane with Rud Poats, flying to the Netherlands. He handed him this memo and said, "Read this." Poats read it. According to Barnett, he said later on, "Your man is a little emotional, isn't he?"

But he bought it. When they got on the plane, our desk and the AID desk (they were across the hall from each other) didn't know whether or not Rud Poats would go along, and therefore make it a U.S. Government position that we would accept this.

The phone call came in the next day from the Netherlands. It was Underhill saying that Barnett had talked with Poats, and Poats had accepted what they called "The Big E System," this was the name the Indonesians had given to it.

I went across the hall to see our friends. Sherwood Fine was the head. He was very upset, but we were very pleased. Anyway, that was the beginning of the Indonesian economic recovery, which continued for years. They've done quite a good job, a responsible job. Not everything has been perfect, but they did a very good job on that. It was what they wanted to do.

It went through, and that was the beginning of the turnaround of the Indonesian economy and the end of 600 percent per year inflation that had occurred for two years in a row.

My reward at the end of my tour, on my way to Jakarta, was that I got to go to IGGI 2.

Q: As preparation for your next assignment? You've got the language. You have sat on the desk and watched the policy process. Now, they are actually going to let you go to post in the summer of 1967.

SULLIVAN: Yes, I arrived in Jakarta on August 8th. I won't forget that date because on that same day in Bangkok, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Agreement was signed. That was the day we arrived in Jakarta.

Q: What was your assignment and portfolio?

SULLIVAN: As a Political Officer under Ed Masters, who was chief of the political section. At the moment, he was up in Singapore recovering from a heart attack. He was gone for about the first four months I was there. I was in Jakarta for four years. I was originally assigned for a three-year assignment and was extended to four.

We came through Singapore, and went and met with Ed and Allene Masters at the hotel where he was recuperating.

Q: What does the Political Section look like when you arrive?

SULLIVAN: The Deputy Head of the section, acting as the Section Chief, was Mary Vance Trent, an old Indonesia hand. Her specialty was keeping track of the women who played a big role. She wrote two airgrams 100 pages long about women in politics.

Paul Gardner, Don Christensen and Dick Howland were also in the section. There was one person for external relations including bilateral U.S.-Indonesian government relations – that was me. Two others were on domestic politics, Paul Gardner, a genius on that, and Dick Howland, who was very good on that.

Don Nicol, had taken language with me. Bob Walkinshaw was the Labor Officer.

I guess seven, counting the Labor Officer, plus a whole flock down the hall.

Q: Normally, you see a fairly large political section as having an internal and an external section, if you will.

SULLIVAN: The Jakarta embassy was not really organized that way.

During the first year, I did the external-type functions. I was sort of a secretary for the Country Team. I took the notes on the Country Team meetings. I followed the AID programs and went to their staff meetings. I followed the Indonesian relationship with foreign countries. I was on that side of the house.

Someone senior to me was doing much of the external things, relating to Indonesia's relations with other countries. But I did some of the external relations reporting also.

At the end of the first year, Paul Gardner left Jakarta, and I took over his spot on the domestic side. That related not so much to individual political parties, because there were other political officers who followed Muslims as a group, or the nationalists as a group, but more or less the military, beyond what the attachés did with the military. We kept track of who was who in the government, and the election process.

It was interesting, because in 1971 they had an election that nobody talks about any more. It was the first one since 1958. By the next one after that, the 1976 election, Suharto had cooked the books enough. He had cut it down to three parties running. One was a Muslim party created by the government. One was the nationalist party, which was taken over by the government. Then there was the old nationalist party. They were the only ones allowed to run.

However, in 1971, there were ten parties on the ballot nine of which had been earlier-existing parties. Two earlier parties were banned. One was the communist party, because of the aftermath of the 1965 coup effort. The other was an Islamic party that had been involved in some rebellions back in the late 1950s.

Suharto and his New Order government affiliated themselves with GOLKAR (Golongan Karya), the Party of Functional Groups. They named the leadership in it, and they ran in

that campaign. None of other parties did very well, aside from the conservative Muslim party.

The newly created GOLKAR won. From what I observed that election was reasonably fair, it is interesting that nobody talks about that election at all. It was unique and sat there by itself. That was a lot of fun to cover. I traveled around the country widely, interviewing local officials and political figures. Toward the end of the campaign, the GOI wanted to stop Russian diplomats from traveling so all diplomats were confined to Jakarta.

My departure in 1971 was determined by when the reporting on that got finished. I couldn't leave until I got the reporting on the election finished.

Q: Your career makes a general point about the way in which the Foreign Service organizes these issues. That is, if you have enough staffing in the Political Section, you do have one individual look at external relations, and other individuals look at internal. That may be subdivided into somebody who just watches political parties, and somebody who liaises with the Ministry of Interior. In that way, the embassy gets its hands around all the basic issues that are going on.

Now, you started out on the external side of things. You mentioned that when you arrived at post, ASEAN had just been founded.

SULLIVAN: It was the same day.

Q: I assume you were the ASEAN watcher also.

SULLIVAN: Nothing much was happening on ASEAN. They met up in Bangkok. It was signed in Bangkok. So there it was. It got a little more active over the course of the four years, but I wasn't following it at that time. It wasn't particularly my responsibility to follow ASEAN.

Q: At the time it was established, what were the atmospherics around ASEAN? What was the intent, do you suppose?

SULLIVAN: There had been talks for years about some form of organization among countries in Southeast Asia. That was a MaPhilIndo – Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia – effort. I can't remember which country was pushing which branch. They all had different ideas of how they would go about it, and who would be in it.

The reconciliation was between Indonesia on the one hand, and Malaysia and Singapore on the other. When the Federation of Malaya and Singapore came together to be Malaysia in 1963, the Indonesians began what they called "Konfrontasi," or confrontation. There were several years of quite serious opposition in Indonesia to the establishment of Malaysia.

Q: It was a military opposition.

SULLIVAN: There was some military. It wasn't a full-scale invasion, but there was some fuss fighting along the border, on the Island of Borneo (which the Indonesians called Kalimantan) between the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan and Sarawak, one of the states in Malaysia, just to the north of that.

The Indonesians also sent forces, ranger-raider type forces, into Singapore. Several were caught. One was tried, found guilty, and executed. That was a very tense time. The Indonesians insisted that Singapore let this guy go. Lee Kwan Yew was not about to. They tried him, found him guilty, and executed him. Then the body came back. Jakarta was a very tense place on the day that that body came back.

Q: So you have this transition from the Sukarno period to now agreeing to ASEAN.

SULLIVAN: Actually, the trial happened after that, after ASEAN was established. I was there and actually went over to the British Embassy. The British Embassy had been burned one time back in Sukarno's day. The Assistant Military Attaché over there had gone out with his bagpipes and played on the balcony to the crowd. The crowd got mad, and they burned the place down.

That was back earlier, before I got there.

Going over to the British Embassy on the day the fellow came back, there was a feeling that maybe we ought to go over and stand there, and get in the way in case a crowd came again.

Q: Then Indonesia's participation in ASEAN ...

SULLIVAN: It was a healing operation for the region as a whole. The raids had all taken place before the agreement on ASEAN. The aftermath of the trial and the execution slipped over into the time afterward.

Q: Basically, at this time, the international community got together and was trying to help out this new government with debt relief.

SULLIVAN: The first one agreed to a relatively common pattern, which was later followed. A third from the U.S., a third from Japan, and a third from the other European states.

Q: With that differentiation in mind, how were you characterizing Japanese-Indonesian relations at that time?

SULLIVAN: Officially, quite good. The Japanese knew it was useful for everybody else that they be good. The Japanese were not popular in Indonesia. There was always the aftermath of World War II. People who had grown up as kids had lived under Japanese

occupation, particularly if they were in Java. The whole country was occupied, including the outer islands too, but it was concentrated. If you grew up in an urban area, there were Japanese troops there, and they were not popular.

Q: That's interesting because during the war, the Japanese gave support to Indonesian nationalists at the end. They actually helped create an Indonesian army, but they didn't get much credit.

It sounds as though they didn't get much post-war credit for that assistance.

SULLIVAN: No, not much.

They were there after the war and they participated very well in the IGGI.

Q: As one of several external affairs officer in the embassy, did you or the other people try to keep up with the other embassies?

SULLIVAN: We had contacts up and down the line with the Australians, the Canadians, the New Zealanders, and the Brits; not so much with the French. The ambassador was in touch with his colleagues. There was a lot more talking back and forth with the English-speaking Commonwealth countries, because they were more like us and we were more like them, at the more junior levels.

Q: I remember that at some of my posts it turned out that there would be a Tuesday lunch for all the young economic officers. They would share.

SULLIVAN: In Jakarta it wasn't that organized.

Q: You were talking about who was doing what. In the Political Section, Ed Masters was the Political Counselor.

SULLIVAN: Yes, at the time I arrived.

Q: Was there somebody who was head of the External Section, and a head of the Internal Section?

SULLIVAN: There was a deputy, who probably spent most of his time with Bob Slutz, who just died. First it was Mary Vance Trent, and she did domestic things. She followed women. She wrote two 100-page airgrams about the role of women in Indonesian political and social life.

Her successor, Bob Slutz, worked primarily on the external side. Paul Gardner was the senior person on the internal political side when we arrived.

Q: After a year, Paul left and you took his position on the internal side.

SULLIVAN: All the people who had been there at the time of the coup attempt in 1965 left about then, if they had not already left. Dick Howland left. Bob Martens had already left. Ed Barber left sometime in the first year we were there. We had a new Political Section come in.

Q: How did we see domestic Indonesian politics at that time? I assume they were trying to recover or stabilize from the coup.

SULLIVAN: SUPERSEMAR, which made Sukarno sign his powers over to Suharto, was in March 1966. It wasn't until 1968 that Suharto officially became President. There was a period in there where Sukarno officially remained the President, but had signed over all his powers. It was a little bit dicey.

There is in this structure of the Indonesian Government, not just a parliament but a sort of super-parliament, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), which met every five years. It had the power to elect the President. They had elected Sukarno for life the last time they met when he was still President. That had to be straightened out.

There were a couple of years where the power was clearly with Suharto and the military. There was a lot of dancing back and forth within the military too. The marines, the air force, and a lot of the navy had supported the coup. Some army officers had also supported the coup.

Suharto had the job of trying to straighten things out, and make sure the military all worked together on this. He did this quite successfully over the course of a year or two by shifting people around, getting rid of certain general officers who had been on the wrong side as it were. They didn't get any more assignments. Things like that.

The changeover had to be legalized. By about 1968, the MPR – in those days it was a temporary one, the MPRS – met and elected Suharto president for five years. So he officially became the President. Then the government and the Dewan Permusyawaratan Rakyat (DPR) the house of parliament that met regularly went ahead and did lots of things.

Q: The embassy's job in any country is to take the temperature of what's happening. I would suspect that the transition from Sukarno to Suharto offered more opportunities for embassy officers and the Defense Attaché's office to get out and meet Indonesians.

SULLIVAN: At that point, many people wanted to know somebody in the embassy, to have contacts in the embassy. In particular, there were many people who had been active in earlier years.

All through the 1950s and early 1960s, there was a small socialist party. A lot of the intellectuals were in that. For a party that never got more than one and a half or two percent of the vote, they were very influential. The leaders would end up being Prime

Minister or in the cabinet, things like that. They were well educated. Many had gone to school in the States or in Holland, those types of people.

Newsmen who had been restricted in what they could do would come out. A lot of people wanted contacts in the embassy.

The upshot was that when we came, we had many opportunities to get to know a wide range of people.

Q: I'm sure Paul worked hard to develop what contacts he could in the period he was there.

SULLIVAN: Yes, he did.

Q: Would it be going overboard to say that you turned over even more contacts at the end of your tour? More people were available and interested.

SULLIVAN: I would hope so, but I don't know that I did. Paul had done a very good job of getting to know people in key positions who were then available. I had some to turn over. I never met John Monjo, who replaced me, since he didn't come until after I left. There wasn't a direct handover there.

Q: Here you were, you have been there a year. You can see the domestic scene opening up in terms of embassy contacts. Who are you beginning to emphasize and what subjects are important in the reporting that you were turning in?

SULLIVAN: We were following how Suharto was doing in terms of running his government, particularly on the economic side. The year before he took over and during the first year he was in power – although I'm not exactly sure how it fell in 12-month periods, whether it coincided – there were two years in a row in the Sukarno era that there was 600 percent inflation. The way the Indonesians economy had run during the Sukarno period was that you had to have a permit for this or that. It cost to get a permit for anything so it was very corrupt.

As I said earlier, Suharto put the group of bright American trained economists (the Berkley Mafia) in key positions. One was in charge of the Economic Planning Bureau. One became minister of Trade and one became head of the Central Bank, things like that. Suharto wanted their recommendations on what to do.

Suharto's economists recommended a system in which foreign exchange was distributed on the basis of bids. They made a market. Whatever foreign exchange was available was competitively bid for.

They did put in a list, not of things you could import, but a list of things that you could not import. It was a banned list. Anything else was free to the market forces at work. If someone wanted to import something that wasn't prohibited and they were willing to pay

a high enough Rupiah price for it to make the highest bid, they would get the foreign exchange and import what they wanted.

This was a complete change from the situation before.

What it did do was it knocked sense into the economy. Inflation dropped to about 100 percent the first year. Then it dropped again, down to 25 percent or so. It got hold of the thing and got it back in shape. This was all done in conjunction with the debt rescheduling and the aid process coming through the IGGI, with the donor countries being helpful.

That and making sure that loyal military were identified, sorted out, and put in charge of various things, rather than disloyal ones who had supported the coup attempt.

It took a long time for things to shake out. That's what was being followed, that process of the establishment of the authority of the New Order, Orde Baru, as it was called.

Q: That suggests that the economic people had a role and were invited in to brief and teach. How about the political scene? Did they reconstitute the parliament? Were there new political advisors?

SULLIVAN: They worked up to the election of 1971, which was an election for the national parliament, and for all of the provincial parliaments.

Q: Did you have the opportunity to go out to some of these political leaders and see what they were doing?

SULLIVAN: Well, you could see them from a distance. We knew some.

One of the best contacts I had, one of the most useful, was an army major general who was in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They were not the police force, but were sort of political police. They had to draw up the new system of how the election would work. He was a helpful contact, explaining how the procedure was being put together.

He personally devised the ballot. He told me one evening when we had dinner together that he was really proud of that day when he invented the ballot. He had done a good thing.

The ballot was about the same size as a sheet of paper, 8.5 by 11 inches. There were ten parties running. There were pictures that represented the ten parties on the top half, in rows of five symbols. You punched a hole in the one you wanted to vote for. That was how you voted.

He put the symbols in two rows of five on the top half of the paper. After you voted, the ballot was folded to cover the symbols, and then folded again, covering the entire ballot

surface. And when it was folded, you could not see from the outside where the hole had been punched and how you had voted.

Q: So, he provided the sanctity of the ballot.

SULLIVAN: He did that and he was really proud of that. And it worked.

A person who was sitting there watching couldn't tell. By the time you turned out of a little booth, and you folded it before it went into the box. You couldn't see how the person had voted.

Q: How sophisticated.

With the 1971 election, that suggests that they are not voting for individual parliamentarians, they are voting for a party.

SULLIVAN: You voted for a party. Then given how many positions the party had won in a district, the named that number of candidates. They have now changed.

Q: That's interesting.

SULLIVAN: That has since changed. Now they actually vote directly for president, as of the last two elections.

Q: As the embassy is watching domestic things, sometimes something comes up that is a harbinger of an event that will come to fruition later. You were talking about the 1971 election and recreation of the political party structure. Were there any other events on the domestic side that you recall that sort of showed how the society might be evolving?

SULLIVAN: The communists, who were pretty well done in during the period following the failure of the coup attempt in 1965, made an effort in 1969 or 1970 to establish something comparable to the Yunnan area in China in the 1930s.

Q: The Long March.

SULLIVAN: The PKI picked out an area in the south part of the Blitar Kabupaten in East Java, which was hilly and away from the roads. It was up on a rocky, hilly area. They were going to make their own little barricade up there, an area or base they could control, like the Chinese communists did in Yunnan. The army went in and did away with it. The army defeated them. They killed them or captured them or whatever they did. That was a matter of some attention gathering at that point. It was sort of a focus of concentration, as it were.

They made sure that the PKI was out of the picture, working on bringing the economy around to where it functioned effectively, and reorganizing the political structure by setting up an election process. The parliament had to pass something that said there

would be an election at such a time. It was agreed when it would be and then authorized it. There was the preparation for that.

The powers that be, Suharto and his supporters, organized a group to serve as the political party for them. It was called GOLKAR, an acronym for Golongan Karya. Golongan means groups, and karya means work.

The tradition had been that every Indonesian party had its own labor union. Labor unions were affiliated with parties. Farmers units, high school and university students, all these groups were affiliated with a party. Each party had its own organization for each of these. Those were the Golongan Karya.

There was ostensibly a cover sheet that would pull all of these together. Each party didn't like having their group, which was dedicated to their purpose, affiliated controlled by a central entity, although they had not been centrally controlled previously.

The Suharto forces then organized something using the local government people, which were appointed downward from the central government, from the governors of the provinces down to the Kabupaten (county or regency) chiefs, and right on down to the neighborhoods. These people were appointed all the way down.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs provided the structure for the election, a discipline all the way down to the village level of authority. They encouraged the establishment of a Golongan Karya group in each local area, which became the focus of the political party.

The power came down from the army through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The minister was always a general at that point. That had not been the case necessarily beforehand, but after the coup was put down, it was always a general, one of the very close to the center generals.

By the time of the 1971 election, what you ended up with was a structure that was organized in every constituency. It was putting up the posters, and so on. It was well known what it was. They got about 70 percent of the vote in the first election.

People liked what had happened.

Q: The structure that you are talking about, the Golongan Karya, was it a single government structure? Or was it the structure for each of the political parties?

SULLIVAN: It's no longer for each of the political parties. They had been called that.

Q: So, did the government organize these different functions under the umbrella of a political party, if you will, bringing in these groups?

SULLIVAN: Yes, and they called it the Golongan Karya. Society was used to a system where you had these groups. For example, the national leadership of the university

students got out in the street and demonstrated in the early days, before I got there. After the coup, it was in support of the military and against the communists. Those leaders were pretty much incorporated into this.

What they ended up with was the government having control over a group, which it set forth as a political party and to which the populace responded. They did respond.

Q: So, was it all-embracing but not Leninist to the extent that it was there to control? Was there actually a popular response?

SULLIVAN: There was a response to it. It wasn't controlled from the bottom up by any means. It was controlled pretty much from the top down, but it was the institution that would be seeking votes in support of the government.

Q: It must have been very interesting to be there, watching this domestic healing and transition.

SULLIVAN: The U.S. was very much in support of the military at that point. The choice had been between Sukarno and Suharto, who emerged as the senior general who was not killed on the night of the killing of his colleagues. The next day, he used the reserve troops and put down places where military units, acting as the coup forces, had taken over: the radio station, telecommunications, things like this

Q: Another transition that occurred at this time was with domestic American politics. There was a presidential election in 1968. The Nixon Administration starts in 1969. Did the embassy, either in personality or in policies, see any change with that transition?

SULLIVAN: I don't recall any American domestic change. There was some disagreement in part of the United States about what was going on in Indonesia. Most of the center for the Indonesian Studies in the United States at that point was at Cornell University. People at Cornell had been writing books about the Communist Party of Indonesia and how great it was. The whole coup attempt, and particularly the defeat of the coup, hit Cornell. I wasn't there. I was never a member of the Cornell group. I had never gone up there for any course work or anything like that. They were rather bitterly opposed to the army coming out on top. So there was a considerable difference between those of us in the government and a lot of the people at Cornell.

They wrote their view of what they thought had happened: it wasn't a communist coup; the communists were good clean people who wouldn't do this. It was the really young, idealistic military who were upset by the corruption at the top levels of the military. They tried to get rid of the senior military and bring in a new force that would clean everything up, but agreed with the Communist Party.

There was only one of them in Jakarta at that point picked up by the military. He was let go and got out of the country. People at Cornell wrote a big paper like this, trying to make the point that what you were reading in the papers and hearing from the

government about what was going on in Indonesia was the wrong thing. It wasn't that way. It was this other.

Q: Putting forth a different narrative.

SULLIVAN: Yes. There are still some frictions about the aftermath of that.

Q: When you got there, Marshall Green was the ambassador [July 1965-March 1969]. What was he like to work with?

SULLIVAN: He was wonderful – humorous and funny. He had a tremendous sense of humor and was a master of the pun. He loved puns. For instance, when he was down in Bali, his wife's dress is laid out over the chair. When they woke up in the morning, there was a little dot here, a little dot there, and somewhere else. She was all upset. He said, "It's just Mao-zi Zedong." (Mousie dung).

He did it to the American press back here. He later went to Paris to talk with the Vietnamese. He makes his first stop in Paris. He comes back out and the press is calling, "Ambassador Green! Ambassador Green! What about your talk with the Vietnamese? How did everything go?" The senior Vietnamese negotiator has been Xuan Thuy. Marshall replied, "One twee (one tree) does not a forest make."

He flipped out all sorts of things like that on the spot.

Q: Some embassies are noted for the front office taking an interest in the junior officers. Was that Green's style too?

SULLIVAN: Yes, in many ways, But there was a bit of problem in that Lisa Green had a reputation as being a 'dragon.' She got it from her mother, who was a Foreign Service wife whose husband became Minister to Iraq at one time. Their name was Crocker. Marshall told Margaret and me a story once. Margaret and I always ended up being the people who left the residence last after parties or receptions, the sweepers who made sure that all the guests had left. The Greens always saw the last staff members to the door. They were courteous in that way.

On one such occasion the guest of honor was the ex-Governor of Michigan [1963-1969], George Romney, who was running for President in 1968 against Richard Nixon. Well, he was doing this big tour where he ended up saying he had been brainwashed in Vietnam.

His front man was Jonathan Moore. I don't know if you ever knew Jon – he was a Special Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary in the front office of EAP at the time. He was an old Saltonstall fellow from Massachusetts. Jon was a good guy. I was his control officer.

Governor Romney came out and the Greens had a big reception at the residence for him. Margaret and I picked up Jon at the hotel and brought him over, so he was there with us. At the end of the reception, everyone was gone, but the three of us. We got to the front steps and I said, "You wait here while I go get the car."

I got our Jeep Wagoner and drove back up. Margaret then said to Jonathan, "You get in the front seat. I'll ride in the back." Jonathan said, "No, no, no." The Ambassador was standing at the top of a flight of about six stairs with his arm around wife. He started to laugh his head off. He pulled her down the steps and said, "The story remind me of my mother-in-law."

His story goes: they were coming to a Chiefs of Mission meeting in Belgrade. There were two other couples coming in on the Orient Express, and the train was late. Then they rushed off, rushed into a taxi, and started across town. After a little while, Mrs. Crocker said, "Stop, stop the car." They all stopped, thinking she must have left her jewels on the train or something like that. She said, "This won't do. We have to all get out. We are seated wrong." So all six of them had to get out and sit back in the taxi in proper protocol order, so they could arrive properly.

It was that kind of thing she had grown up with. Lisa never went to college. She married Marshall Green at 17. She was bright, but sort of uncertain of herself in many ways. She wasn't sure of her credentials. Consequently, she tended to overdo things a bit as Marshall moved up the line.

We didn't find any particular problem with her. Margaret was when we said we were going to Jakarta to: "Watch out for Lisa Green." On the other hand, she was told that Lisa Green was actually shy.

I think once Marshall made ambassador, then she felt she had accomplished whatever she had set for herself and for him. She relaxed quite a bit. They were very competitive in some ways. They got two copies of the Saturday Review. Do you know why? Because there was a double-croctic on the back page. Each of them had their own copy and, "Ready, set, go!" They would race to see who could fill it out first.

She relaxed a lot, I think, in Jakarta. When they retired and were living over here in Washington, she went to work at Sibley Hospital, working in a hospice for people with cancer. It was the only time in her life that she did what she wanted to do.

Marshall loved to play golf. A couple of years after Lisa died, he had something for lunch that he said she would not have been permitted, a BLT (bacon, lettuce and tomato) sandwich. On the 12th tee, he stood up there, addressed the ball, and collapsed. What a way to go, which is what his son thought. He had had a BLT and was playing golf. He had to go sometime, and that was a perfectly good time to go.

Q: Marshall Green was the ambassador when you arrived. In July 1969 he was replaced by Ambassador Galbraith, who had been ambassador in Singapore. What was that

transition like? Did they have different work styles that impacted on the work of the embassy?

SULLIVAN: It was a relatively seamless change. They were different personalities. Frank Galbraith was not a jokester like Marshall Green was. He certainly didn't have Green's mastery of puns, which had kept us all loose as a goose. Galbraith was the first Indonesian language officer in the Foreign Service. He was a good person to send in.

There was no change in the agreed tactics and strategy of the embassy and the department. We had differences with AID as to how to go about providing support, but that was the only difference. Then AID came around as IGGI got established. There was a little mumbling and grumbling, but they couldn't say, "No, you can't import that."

It wasn't their list of forbidden imports. I think that was more the personality of the guy in charge of the AID Indonesia Desk at that point.

Q: The assignment of Galbraith, a career Foreign Service Officer with Indonesian language training was helpful during this transition period.

SULLIVAN: Yes, it was very good.

Q: Today is Friday, January 22nd, 2010. We are continuing our conversation with Dan Sullivan. This makes the point that the narrative up to now about Indonesia is flexible. You were there for four years. Do you recall any particularly important Washington visitors coming in?

SULLIVAN: The Vice President, Spiro Agnew, came. There was a senior visitor who came when I was on home leave in 1969, but I can't remember who it was.

Q: Another thing of interest is that in Indonesia we had two consulates, one in Surabaya. The political section would have an interest in their reporting, guiding their reporting.

SULLIVAN: With Surabaya, and with the other consulate in Medan, everyone was pretty much agreed as to what the basic picture was. We wanted the information. What was going on? What is the military commander like? How is he handling the situation in North Sumatra or East Java? What is the public reaction to new forces? The consulates did a very good job.

When I was up there when I made visits, who was there? The only way we got to travel around very much was when we had to carry the pouch. I know I did get to Medan. There was a driver on Java, but you couldn't drive to Medan.

Q: Was your ability to get around the island a resource issue? Did the embassy not have the TDY funds to send you out or did they use the excuse of taking the pouch up?

SULLIVAN: The pouch had to get there. There was no courier to do it. Either a member of the consulate staff would come in, carrying in a pouch and carrying out a pouch, or someone would go out from Jakarta, carrying out a pouch and bringing back a pouch. On local leave time, the family drove around Java and Bali several times. But that was our own time and transportation, not the Embassy's. I did get to travel to some of the outer islands when I was covering the election in 1971.

Q: While you were there, did you have an opportunity to liaise with Ford Foundation people?

SULLIVAN: Oh yes, the Ford Foundation was very much involved. The big thing that they were doing was helping the Indonesians establish a family planning program. The government was very supportive. They wanted this. They didn't want the population to boom. It was big enough anyway, and it continued to grow. Family planning was supported by the government. As a family, we knew the staff of the Foundation well and continued to be in touch with them long after we left Jakarta.

Q: Sometimes modernizing countries have examples that they are trying to copy or not copy. Did you get a sense of, "Gee, we should be doing what the Japanese are doing," or what the Dutch did in banking?

SULLIVAN: Indonesia wanted to do it their own way. They rejoined the UN. They had pulled out of the UN in the Sukarno period and established NEFO (Newly Emerging Forces), creating the Jakarta-Hanoi-Pyongyang axis. Perhaps Beijing was in there too.

Suddenly, after 1965, they found themselves not in the UN and they asked to come back in. They were readmitted and everyone was trying to be quite helpful.

To just close off on Indonesia, I have here the staffing pattern in February 1971. Are there people there that you might want to comment on? For instance, I see Colonel Benson.

SULLIVAN: George Benson was there. Actually, he was not there as the Defense Attaché at that point. Maybe he was by 1971. He came out for a while. Frank Galbraith had arranged for him to be attached to his staff somehow. He wanted George to be there. It was difficult on the non-Indonesia specialist colonel who was there as the Attaché.

Q: Are you saying that Benson has a reputation of being an Indonesian analyst? Was he a Foreign Area Officer (FAO)?

SULLIVAN: He had been in Indonesia in the Attaché office as an Assistant Army Attaché. He knew more about Indonesia than anybody else in the U.S. Army. He was their recognized specialist. I told you the last time about him being called over on the morning of the coup. He was pulled out of the War College because he knew who all these people were on the military side, he really did.

He came back out, I think in June 1970, as a sort of special assistant to Galbraith, and then when the other fellow's tour was up, he was then named Attaché. He was there in this extraordinary situation for a while before, while the other guy was finishing up his tour.

Q: Once he was there and once he was the DATT, he was making quite a contribution in the Defense Attaché role.

SULLIVAN: Yes, very much so.

Q: Your tour there ends in 1971. Your next assignment is the consulate in Cebu, the Philippines. How did you organize that?

SULLIVAN: It was a direct transfer. That was a decision that was made in Manila. Frank Underhill, who had been my boss in SPA at the time of the Indonesia coup, was in Manila as the Political Counselor. He and his wife Savie came down to Jakarta. I think Skipper Purnell was the Political Counselor and became the DCM. We saw Frank and Savie while they were there.

Frank asked where I was going next. I said that I didn't know, I hadn't heard. We didn't bid in those days. He said, "Well, we're going to have a vacancy come up in the consulate in Cebu. Would you be interested in going there?" We said, "Yes, that sounds good."

He went back and talked Ambassador Henry Byroade [Ed: served August 1969 to May 1973] into asking for me. I assume Ambassador Byroade's approval was necessary or helpful. Anyway, Manila set it up with the Department and in came my orders to go to Cebu.

Q: Cebu was the only consulate in the Philippines. In Indonesia, there were two, but in the Philippines there was only one. What does that reflect?

SULLIVAN: It's the second-largest city in the Philippines, larger than Davao. The people who live around Manila were originally Tagalogs. In the northern part of Luzon, there are Ilocanos. There are lots of different ethnic groups within the larger Philippine community, with different languages.

Cebuano was the most widely spoken language in the country. There has always been this feeling that in Cebu that Manila doesn't pay enough attention to Cebu.

The geographic picture of the Philippines has Luzon in the north. It is the biggest island. The second-biggest island is in the south, Mindanao. In between, there is a group of islands called the Visayas. Cebu is in the center of the Visayas. Panay, Negros, Cebu, Leyte, Samar, and Bohol are the main Visayan Islands. There are three languages down there, all variations on Cebuano: one in the western part, one in the central Visayas, and one in the eastern Visayas. Interestingly enough, the dividing line between where these

languages are spoken is not the water between them, but the mountain ridge down the center of the islands.

Down the center of Negros, there is a line to the west of which is a different variety of the Visayan than Cebuano. I can't remember the name of it right now. It's not Ilocano. Halfway down Leyte, the ridge separates Cebuano in the center to Waray on the east.

There was a lot of traffic back and forth between the islands, much more so than between one side of the island and the other. It's an interesting little division there. And people did speak different languages.

I think they made a mistake in the Philippines about languages, and it still exists. It was a different decision than the appeal of Indonesia students who were pleading the independence movement in Indonesia in the 1920s. In Indonesia, they came up with Bahasa Indonesia and they chose to build a language around a variation of Malay. It was a market language and therefore many people's second language, but very few people's first language. There was only a small spot on the east coast of Sumatra, directly opposite Malaysia, where people spoke Malay as a first language. They were not a threat to anybody.

If the only alternative had been Javanese, the Javanese would have driven half the country berserk, because the Javanese would have been very hoity-toity about their position.

In the Philippines, it was the language spoken around Manila, Tagalog, which became the language. They called the national language Filipino. They did bring in a few words from other places, but the Cebuanos will tell you that it's Tagalog. Filipino is Tagalog.

Q: Right, but that wasn't the language of the Cebu area.

SULLIVAN: No, it was not. Cebuano was spoken in the central Visayas and in a great deal of Mindanao, because Christians from the Visayas had moved down into Mindanao to occupy land down there.

Q: You arrive in Cebu. Could you briefly tell us what the staffing is? What does your housing look like?

SULLIVAN: When I arrived, the staffing in Cebu included a Principal Officer, a Vice Consul and four local staff including a secretary who was cleared for Limited Official Use (LOU). There were also two clerks, one who did economics and citizenship, and one who supported the visa process. The sixth person was the janitor/chauffeur/pouch clerk, a jack-of-all-trades. The only change in my three years there was that I inherited one Vice Consul who was due to leave and other one came in. He left, and then I had a third one. So I had three different vice consuls in the course of three years.

Q: Was the post authorized to issue visas?

SULLIVAN: We could issue NIVs (Non-Immigrant Visas). We took applications for Immigrant Visas and sent them up to Manila. We did not issue passports.

Q: Were there other agencies represented at the post?

SULLIVAN: The Peace Corps was there. There was a Peace Corps staffer who lived in Cebu. The Peace Corps staff was divided on the basis of which programs they took care of. This guy took care of athletics mainly, physical education people, for all over the country. He sort of did the area a little bit too.

Q: Weren't there AID people?

SULLIVAN: There was one AID public safety guy there, but he didn't have an office in the consulate. He used his house or an office that the police gave him.

Q: Didn't you say there was a USIA officer available?

SULLIVAN: Right. And there was a library.

Q: That branch library would be helpful for encouraging local high school and university kids to come in.

SULLIVAN: It was only about two blocks from San Carlos University. It's not as old as Harvard, but it's older than William and Mary.

Q: You were saying that Henry Byroade was the ambassador at that time. Who was the DCM?

SULLIVAN: The DCM was Bill Hamilton.

Q: Were you liaising with the Political Section too? Who was head of the Political Section?

SULLIVAN: The head of the Political Section at that point was Frazier Meade, I think. Frank Maestrone came while I was there and was the Political Section Chief. Others were John Forbes and Elmer Hulen, Herb Ihrig was the Labor officer.

It had to have been Frazier, because I recall sending a report to Manila and Frazier bounced it, sent it back. What he sent back was a short report covering a memorandum of conversation that my wife had written about a conversation she had about land reform. Many almost middle class Cebuanos, teachers, small scale merchants and so on were buying small farms, perhaps as much as 12 hectares, not much and intended for retirement income, but larger than the 5 or so hectares that were proposed in the national land reform promotion to break up large plantations on Luzon. This was totally at odds with the AID position on "land reform" - what the Marcos land reform position was.

Frazier bounced the memcon back, in part because it was contrary to their position but also because my wife rather than a visiting academic or other researcher wrote it.

The Consulate had no classified typist - we had to type our own, so I did a lot of reporting by official informal letters with a copy to the embassy. A copy to the agency, a copy to INR, and the desk. Some of the carbons got kind of murky sometimes. I was used to sending those directly to Washington, but in this case I wrote a letter to the political Counselor and said, "I have counted to ten but I am still angry and I have mailed copies of what I said directly to the other places. I don't think this was called for. It was interference of what I think is an important regional difference."

Frazier and I had in Kuala Lumpur together. And he had been Principal Officer in Cebu two officers before me. Frank Maestrone replaced Frazier Meade.

Q: Was the U.S. popular or unpopular, feared, loved?

SULLIVAN: Fairly popular, except for the students. Younger Filipinos tended to be more critical of the United States or opposed if they thought we were backing the Marcos' - all those things. Older ones tended to have more ties and better memories of the United States. There was a movement going on at the time called the 51st State Movement, in which the Filipinos said, "The answer to our problems is to become the 51st state of the United States." And there were an immense number of people who became members. Many people I ran into would tell me they supported the Movement.

Of course there was no chance it would ever happen from the U.S. point of view but, on the other hand, you didn't want to insult people or hurt them so you just sort of nodded and tried to be non-committal. We would say something like: "We appreciate your attitude toward the United States, that's nice."

Martial Law was imposed after we had been in Cebu for about a year. After that, we simply reported on conditions in the southern Philippines as we saw them. I and one or another vice consuls were not always popular in Manila, particularly in the economic section. The economic section seemed to think martial law was good for the economy and it was good for foreign investors. The political section was not always happy with our reporting either. Cebu was the heart of the Marcos opposition.

Q: And what was going on at that time and of reportable interest to the embassy?

SULLIVAN: There was an election shortly after we arrived. It was to be held in November. Eight senate slots were up to be filled. They had a 24-member senate, with eight people elected at-large around the whole country every two years. They served six-year terms, but every two years eight would be elected. That was an election at-large. Then they had congressional seats, and they had state provincial and local elections - governors, mayors. I got there and the question came to mind about what to do about traveling around the consular district. Not that there was much money to travel with -

actually there was very little, and the inspectors later on had to jog the Department into giving us more travel money.

But I decided it was probably not a good idea to travel, except I made two trips before the election. I'll explain in just a minute. On the theory that anywhere I went, I had to go call on the governor or mayor, one of two things would happen. Either he would point to me at a rally, "there's the American, and I told him off" or he would say, "There's the American, see he supports me." Neither one of those seemed like a very attractive opportunity, so I tried not to travel until after the election. There were two exceptions; one, I went down to Dumaguete, where Silliman University was. It was a missionary university that had been started by American protestant missionaries. The other was the annual commemoration of the Leyte landing on October 20 every year. It was held in Tacloban, the hometown of Imelda Marcos and her brother Kokoy Romualdez. Every year, the Tacloban chairman of the Lions Club, which organized the commemoration, came and invited my wife and I to be their houseguests. We did that all three years, but that was one of the only two trips we made before the 1971 November elections.

Q: How did the election go?

SULLIVAN: It was quite interesting. Our host in Tacloban, Tony Benedicto, had been a local politician for a long time - mayor in the past, and a city council member. He had at one time been approached by a hungry and desperate young brother and sister whose branch of the family had gone broke; they came to him for advice and he gave Imelda and Kokoy advice. He was not in higher political affairs at that time at all. Everybody was saying that Marcos' party, the Nacionalista party, would win at least seven of the eight seats that were to be elected around the country. My friend, Tony Benedicto, who is dead now, said they had it all wrong. He said the Liberals would win seven of eight and "here are the people who are going to win." He gave them in order - one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and one Nacionalista will win the eighth spot. Well, I reported this: "one person's view but here it is." A Nacionalista came in seventh, but not the one he thought would. But he had the other seven Liberals absolutely in order. So here was the Consulate reporting what was completely different from what anybody else had been saying. It wasn't that I knew anything, it was that someone who knew a lot had told me and I had reported it. Manila began to pay a little attention to what we were picking up in the South. As a result of that, there was a completely different slant.

Q: Was there a separatist movement down in Mindanao at that time?

SULLIVAN: Yes, it was breaking out about that time, military action. We basically stayed away from it and didn't go down there. We went to some parts of northern Mindanao but not where there was fighting. But that was more after Martial Law than before.

Q: Remind me why martial law was declared.

SULLIVAN: Martial law came about because the Philippine constitution had a limit of two terms for the president and Marcos was getting close to the end of his eighth year. To stay in power, he declared martial law. He drummed up various types of excuses to justify it.

Q: Did you ever meet Marcos?

SULLIVAN: I never met Marcos. He stayed away from Cebu, which was very much opposition territory. In fact, in the three years I was there, neither President Marcos nor Mrs. Marcos set foot in Cebu City. They came to Cebu Province twice, once when I was on home leave. They came to the airport on Mactan Island across the harbor from downtown Cebu. They came over to the mainland and turned north and went up to Davao City, whose mayor was one of their supporters. Then came back to the airport and departed. In July 1973, they came down again for the dedication of two bridges, one connecting Leyte and Samar Island. Marcos dedicated that to his wife; her hometown was Tacloban. They were supposed to then come over, and on the 3rd of July they were to dedicate the bridge between Cebu and Mactan. Well, they had over-partied on the night of the 2nd in Tacloban, and on the 3rd they just didn't get up and come over to Cebu. It was all postponed 24 hours. When they did come, they came from the airbase on Mactan to the bridge, half way across the bridge, cut the ribbon, turned around and went back to the officer's club at the airbase and departed. They never came to Cebu, and I was not invited to that reception. Somehow, they left out the consular corps, meaning two career consuls there, the Republic of China consul and myself. So I never met the Marcoses. And because we had invited all the governors and other senior politicians who were to be in Cebu for the bridge opening to a July Fourth *vin d'honneur* at the same time the bridge opening was suddenly rescheduling, we didn't give a July Fourth reception either.

Of course, the declaration of Martial Law was a big event on that tour. There had been speculation that maybe there would be martial law; something would happen one way or another. But it came as a surprise. We woke up that Saturday morning (September 23, 1972) and, as was our custom, my wife and I turned on the radio to listen to the news from Armed Forces Radio. They were reporting that martial law had been declared in the Philippines. I hit her with my elbow and said, "I've got to get up and go to work this morning with martial law declared." Then I had to decide where to go. There were two military commands; one was the army command based at the 3rd Division Base at Camp Lapu Lapu with a Brigadier General in command; the other was the 3rd Constabulary Zone command. The Constabulary headquarters was practically next door to the consulate. So I thought I would go there first because it was closer. I drove to the Consulate, then walked down the street and walked right through the gate of Camp Osmena. No guards or anything like that; walked into a little building, up to the second floor and down the corridor to see if I could see General Luis Amor, who I had been working with on various projects. I poked my head in the door and his aide, a first lieutenant, was sitting there and I asked to see the general because I understood martial law had been declared. The Lieutenant put his head in and said, "General, Consul Sullivan is here and wants to see you." Luis called me: "Danny, come in."

So I did and said, "I turned on the radio and had heard that martial law has been declared. I anticipate that, as word gets around, many of the eight thousand American citizens in one place or another around the consular district will start calling me to ask advice. I want to find out from you what you can tell me about this and what advice you might have. Should they sit home; is there any anti-American aspect or anything like that?"

He said, "You might as well read my orders," which he handed to me. He had gotten the message at 11:00 PM the previous night; the man had gotten no sleep all night. He had the text of the martial law decree. I read it, put it down on the desk in front of me. As we talked, I read it again and again, trying to memorize the whole thing. He understood we could be of some help to each other in this in our respective responsibilities. He assured me that Americans need not worry, there was nothing directed against Americans in this, but it might be useful to stay home for the day. I thanked him and went back to the office.

Our communications with Manila were such that the only thing I could do was pick up the telephone. I won't go into the details of our communications, but we had no secure communications with Manila. I called the embassy in Manila. It was a Saturday morning, the 23rd of September, and I got the Consul General, Lorry Lawrence on the phone. He was the duty officer. I said, "Lorry, I've seen a piece of paper. Have any of you up there seen this piece of paper?" He said, "Dan, I don't think so." I said, "Well, let me tell you what was in the piece of paper I saw" and proceeded to give ten points or so. The only thing that had changed between 11:00 o'clock the previous night when Luis Amor got his orders until the government announced the formal terms of Martial Law the next afternoon was that they reduced the hours of curfew. The rest of it was the same.

I didn't get to see the result of that morning's activity for another six weeks. We had no usable cryptographic communications with Embassy Manila or the Department. Classified messages for us had to be pouched via US Air Force transportation plane that made supply round trips every six weeks to a WAF weather station down in Mindanao, in the course of which they would drop off classified document pouches prepared for us by Embassy Manila at Mactan Airport at Cebu. So it took six weeks before we got to see Embassy Manila's reporting telegram to the Department. The substantive beginning in paragraph two read: "Consulate Cebu reports that the text of the Martial Law decree contains the following measures..." I've always thought I must have been the last US government employee to see that. It was nice to scoop the Embassy.

Q: That's always nice.

SULLIVAN: My friend who worked for another agency thought maybe I had played a little foul ball with this. We weren't supposed to scoop them on things like this. One other strange thing about the Martial Law declaration was the date on which it was reported to have been issued. Saturday, September 23, was when it actually happened. However, if you go back in the history of the Philippines, it will tell you that martial law was declared on September 21st. The reason, I was later told, was that Ferdinand Marcos had a thing for the number seven, so he just up and changed it from the 23rd to the 21st

On the night of the 22nd, the Marcoses (actually, Imelda) arranged a party for the international press in Manila. They got all the foreign press out at Nayong Pilipino, effectively locked them in, and entertained them while the take-over was going on. Therefore, it wasn't until later in the morning or the next morning that they found out they had been hoodwinked.

Q: Was life different from the times preceding martial law?

SULLIVAN: Yes, it was less flamboyant, at least down where we were. People were scared. My way of looking at it was that you drive out investment. Local families who had money were putting it into cash. They were not investing or spending. They were scared of what would happen. A great number of assets during that period suddenly turned up being owned by the Marcos or their cronies. Arranged sales - people got forced into selling all sorts of things to the Marcos or their cronies. None of this was popular where I was, doubly so because Cebu was the heart of the opposition. However, Martial Law apparently was great for foreign investment. There was a remarkable difference between the viewpoints in Cebu and in Manila. Some in Manila saw this as very advantageous and the majority of the people down where I was thought it was awful.

Q: I would like to ask one other question about that time. In February 1972, Nixon goes to Beijing. That's an enormous shift. Did any of that filter down to Cebu? Were your contacts saying, "Wow! What are you guys doing?"

SULLIVAN: I don't recall. I do know that the only other official consulate in town with a career officer was the one from Taipei. There was no one from Beijing in the country.

Q: Certainly the Philippine government would be very sensitive to the U.S. approach on that issue. The U.S. recognized Taiwan as the Republic of China.

SULLIVAN: There were Honorary French and British Consuls--local residents who had been named by their governments.

Q: This raises an interesting question on social life: what did you do for the 4th of July?

SULLIVAN: We were actually in Cebu for one July 4th and that year, it got absolutely, completely disrupted. We had something arranged, which was going to be a reception at 11:00 a.m. for officials. In the afternoon, there would be a community picnic.

The government was building two major bridges. One between Leyte and Samar, Leyte being Imelda Marcos' home, that would connect with a road that then made it possible to drive from there through Samar to Luzon. The bridge was at Tacloban, the capital of Leyte. Imelda was scheduled to come down to dedicate that bridge on the 1st of July, I think. Her birthday was July 2 and she was throwing a party at the newly built family home. Then they were going to come to Cebu on July 3 and dedicate a bridge between Cebu Island and Mactan Island on the other side of the harbor, where the big airport was.

This meant that many governors and senior politicians would be in Cebu for the event and staying over until July 4. So on short notice we expanded what had been planned as a small July 4th vin d'honneur to a larger event to include all of them.

On July 2nd, their party must have been too big, because the next morning, the Marcoses and everyone traveling with them they couldn't get up. Consequently they postponed the dedication of the Mactan Bridge until July 4th.

On the morning of July 3rd, all the officials, the governors and so on, were all gathered in Cebu to be there when the Marcos' came. I had to go and find the governor and the police commander. This was during the martial law period, so the police commander was the guy in charge. He was holding a meeting in his office with all of these governors as they were changing plans. I asked to come in as I poked my head in the door.

He said, "Hi Danny. I'm busy." "Yes General, but I have one quick question. It will only take a minute, and many of the people in this room will need to know the answer you give me to this question. I've heard that the Marcos' are coming tomorrow to Cebu."

He said, "Yes, that's right." I said, "All right. That means we will cancel our 11:00 o'clock reception to which you and many of these people have been invited. He said, "Okay." So that got cancelled out. We were not invited to the bridge opening, which was just as well, since it meant sitting and waiting in the broiling sun. And we did not have an official reception, but we did have the afternoon picnic.

My first few weeks in Cebu were unique. Within the first three days after we arrived, the USIS officer, whom I had barely met, had a complete psychotic breakdown and I had to ship him up to Clark. Then I got held at gunpoint in my office. I had arrived in August 1971 and the vice consul who was there had not had any leave in a long time. Seventeen days after we arrived, my vice consul went off on some well-earned leave and I was handling visas for the first time in many years. The Vice Consul told me that they had been working on a visa fraud case and that there was this information in a file in the vault on it.

Just before noon on the first day that I was doing visas, the local consular clerk came in with three passports and applications, telling me there was a file in the vault on these applications. So I went back and checked the file again, and after taking care of everybody else waiting for visas, I called the applicant in, leaving his wife and his mother sitting out in the waiting room. He came in. I said that we had information that he had attempted to obtain visas by fraud for other people. He promptly denied it. I asked him some questions, but the answers were not satisfactory. I told him that I had evidence that history was not correct, that he was not telling the truth, that I believed he was attempting to obtain visas by fraud and that I was denying him under the appropriate sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

I started casually to do something, which at that point I think was done only between Cebu and Manila. We were only an hour apart by plane so that after a person was refused

at one post in the morning, he could easily go to the other consular section in the afternoon and apply for a visa. So we needed some way to let each other know rapidly. We developed a system of notations inside the back of the passport that indicated someone had been turned down. I started to make this notation that this fellow had been denied and he got terribly upset. He told me not to write in that; so I told him I had to write it he said, "Do not touch it; it doesn't belong to you; it belongs to the Philippine government." I started making my notation and he stood up and pulled out a gun and pointed it at me and said, "Don't touch that passport."

So I took my hands off it. I had let the interview go on long enough that lunch hour had arrived. Everybody had left the outer office except Carlos Ylanan, the consular driver, plus the visa applicant's mother and wife and an American representing a voluntary agency. I called out to the driver, "Carlos, call the police." That may have been a foolish thing to do. I was looking at this revolver and leaning back in my chair as far as I could. I learned later that one of the bullets I could see would rotate into the chamber if he pulled the trigger. Thank God he didn't. He reached over and grabbed his passport off the desk, threw things all over the place, and started backing toward the door of my office. Carlos had not heard me clearly. He got to the door and saw the guy backing out. The guy turned around, bumping Carlos' belly. Carlos ducked, the fellow went on backing out, grabbed his mother and wife by the hand (they had terrible looks on their faces) and they got out. So I called the embassy in Manila to tell them I was held at gunpoint in the office. That done, Carlos drove me home for lunch – exceptionally late. My wife says that for the first and only time in my life I made for the bottle of scotch and downed a glug of it before I told her what had happened

Q: Then, in 1974 you are offered your next assignment. How did you organize this? Did you really get a 3:00 o'clock in the morning call?

SULLIVAN: I was offered six choices, actually in a midnight call, from Sam Bartlett, who was in Personnel. That assignment cycle was in the year of the Global Outlook Program (GLOP) Henry Kissinger's personnel program. This was during his time as Secretary of State. As I understand it, he had been to Mexico City and was aghast with the self-centered gang in Mexico. Well, he came back and we had the Global Outlook Program.

The phone call was made during working hours in the Department, but we were half way round the world so it was well after we had gone to sleep. My wife answered the phone the first time, assured herself that there wasn't a problem with one of the kids in school in the States and, assuming it was a visa lawyer calling from the States on Consulate business (we got calls like that which rang in the house off hours), told the operator that the Consulate was closed and they could call back during working hours and hung up. She was just back in bed when the phone rang again, Sam himself this time, asking to speak to me. He said that, as part of GLOP they were thinking of sending me to West Africa, where I had been once, and gave me options. There were five DCM-ships and one Political Officer, in Monrovia, which were open. What was I interested in? The one that

sounded most interesting was Freetown, Sierra Leone. I said as much, and that's what came through.

They put my name to Clint Olson, who was the ambassador at the time and he accepted me.

While we were on home leave, the Olsons, who were also on home leave, invited the whole family to visit them in Pennsylvania.

Q: Let's talk about the mission when you arrived in Freetown in 1974. What did the embassy and the mission look like? What kind of building was the embassy in?

SULLIVAN: It was in its own building, right on a circle in the center of downtown Freetown. The symbol of Freetown is what they called a cotton tree. It was a big tree with lots of spread-out branches and leaves. When the British Royal Navy would capture slave ships in the Atlantic, they would bring them into Freetown's good natural harbor, lock the slaves up to the cotton tree, and then they would be freed and released there. That's how the city got its name

The embassy was right next to the cotton tree on that circle. It was a five-story building with a garage down below. It was a huge building for a very small staff. USIS (United States Information Service), which had a library, was in the same building. The Peace Corps was not. They were a block or two away.

It was a very small staff. There was the Ambassador, a DCM, a junior officer who did consular work, such as there was of it, and most of the economic reporting, and an Admin Officer. We had two secretaries, the Ambassador's and the DCM's, and two communicators. One was ours and one was not. And that was the American staff.

There was one, sometimes two, USIS officers. For a while there, we actually had two. I can't remember why we had two. That's my recollection anyway.

Q: What are the United States' interests in Sierra Leone at this time, in the mid-1970s.

SULLIVAN: I thought they were minimal. I really used to think that the thing we were most interested in in this country is how Sierra Leone voted in the UN in New York.

There was a small amount of American investment in diamonds and in rutile. Rutile is a mineral that is mined and used for paint. Maurice Tempelsman had a small diamond polishing factory in Freetown because the Tempelsman Syndicate wanted to be able to buy gem quality diamonds from the mines up country. And that was about it. There were some Americans scattered around, not many, mostly missionaries.

There was a Peace Corps presence, mostly teaching English and working on agriculture projects. Then they went overboard. We suddenly found out that the next week that 91 volunteers were arriving. The Ambassador didn't know it. Neither did any of us in the

Embassy. We knew some volunteers were coming, but we had never been told by the Peace Corps staff that they were going to have 91, until just before they arrived.

Q: Sierra Leone is a small country.

SULLIVAN: “Overloading it” was the reaction from the Sierra Leone vice president, a youngish, leftist-oriented man. He was very suspicious of the United States when he found out that 91 were coming.

We would have told the Peace Corps not to send so many if we had known.

They had gone around from government office to office to office. How many volunteers to train people would the Ministry of Education like? And so on. The Peace Corps staff totaled up the numbers and told their people in Washington, without telling us, that they had interest in so many.

Q: This illustrates the fact that from the time of its founding, the Peace Corps was separate from the embassy. It was not under the control of the ambassador. So they were running their own programs. They went around and got their statistics. They sent it in through their channels that the embassy didn't see. The desk didn't pick it up.

SULLIVAN: I don't think the desk at the State Department ever knew.

Q: How did it turn out?

SULLIVAN: Well, they scattered them around in various places. They knew where they would be going. We didn't know ahead of time. It worked out in the end, but it was overloaded. It set the vice president off in particular. He was suspicious of what the volunteers were doing. And he thought we were loading the country up with American spies.

Q: How would you characterize the government at the time?

SULLIVAN: Largely incompetent and crooked. The President was a delightful old rogue. I always said that one of the things about being in the Foreign Service is that you do get a chance to meet some delightful rogues.

Q: How would you characterize the embassy's contact with the government, your access and your understanding of what was going on?

SULLIVAN: For what we needed, we had it. I had a good contact with the Secretary to the President. I was Chargé for two months, something like that, between the two ambassadors.

I took up the note asking for agrément, and kept bugging them for a reply. Their system was that agrément had to be issued at a cabinet meeting. There was a cabinet meeting

once a week. It wasn't getting done, and it wasn't getting done. I was seeing the Secretary to the Cabinet, who had sons at the same well-known secondary school (a public school in the British sense) our son attended. On that basis, his family, and a few other senior government officials with sons in that school came to our house for supper or for movies.

I also had this period of time when I was in charge before the second ambassador came when I picked up a great many contacts. I did a lot more contact work than I normally would have done. Normally, it would have been the ambassador. I had already established some of that, and the Secretary to the Cabinet was one of those. He was very useful on a lot of things.

On the agrément he told me every week, "It didn't happen today, Dan." I said, "Val, they are pushing me from the other end. Why can't they get an answer?" He said, "I'll try to get the old man to do it, to get it raised, and to get the cabinet to vote on it." He tried and tried and finally succeeded.

Q: That also illustrates the value of making and maintaining good local contacts.

SULLIVAN: We had good contacts through the Foreign Office. It was a small one. We knew the Minister, who was a local Freetown Creole, Desmond Luke. I had access to him during the time I was Chargé. But I didn't need to use it.

There was a man who had been to the UN two levels down from Luke, who was handling UN matters. This was the number one piece of business we had with the foreign office, to go over the agenda of what was coming up at the UN. He would look at this issue this way, and that issue that way, and so forth. He was very helpful.

It didn't mean that they would end up doing what we wanted, because there was a certain leftist element in the government. It wasn't in the Foreign Ministry, per se, probably not, certainly not Desmond Luke or my other contact, the one who had been to the UN and was handling UN matters.

Q: How did you understand the academic background of the Foreign Ministry people? Did they have education outside the country?

SULLIVAN: Some did. Sierra Leone, remarkably, has several universities. It had Fourah Bay College, the first western style university built in West Africa which had been there since 1832, on a mountaintop overlooking the city. Our youngest son went to their elementary school that was attached to the Education department our first year there. It was not a bad university. The British had run it of course, until a few years before, until about 1961, when the country became independent. And there still were British faculty as well as Sierra Leoneans and people from elsewhere.

I was in Sierra Leone from 1974 to 1976.

Sierra Leone did appear in The Guinness Book of Records at that point.

Q: Should I ask why?

SULLIVAN: The world's largest diamond robbery.

Q: In your position as DCM, you would also have an opportunity to liaise with the other diplomatic missions in town. Who were the main ones?

SULLIVAN: The British of course. They had a High Commission. The French were there. The Italians had a resident Chargé; he was a businessman but he was also Chargé, not just an Honorary Consul. There were a good number of African nations there. The Nigerians, Liberians, Ghanaians, Guineans were all there. There were probably a few more African representatives. The North Koreans were there. The government had also recognized the South Koreans, but they were non-resident, with their Embassy in Abidjan.

The Sierra Leonean government made a mistake not long after Michael Samuels arrived as our new ambassador, as it happened. . The South Koreans sent a note asking for approval for a replacement. The Sierra Leoneans, however, didn't realize that the South Koreans asked for the new Ambassador to be resident in Freetown. And the Sierra Leoneans approved the request.

So along comes a South Korean representative to establish a South Korean resident mission in Freetown, where there was already a North Korean mission.

Mike handled that one. And fought the good fight. Mike carried it to the President urging him to stick with the decision that they had made, but they didn't know they had made. So both Koreas ended up in residence in Freetown.

Q: Or didn't understand the full consequences of what they had done. You mentioned that Ambassador Samuels came in [Ed: served from February 1975 to May 1977]. He was a non-career appointee, but this is a small African country of no super consequences...

SULLIVAN: Mike Samuels was an academic by background. He was an Africa specialist. He had been in Nigeria, teaching in a secondary school when he was just out of college. He was sick and was brought up to Kaduna, to be treated in the nursing home up there, when I was Vice Consul. I went and called on him asking, "What can I do for you, Mr. Samuels?"

I brought him some books and checked up on him from time to time, as you do for a U.S. citizen in need. He went back to his teaching place. I never saw him there. He was way down in the corner of the northern region. We didn't travel down there, in any event. I never got to Ilorin, where he was.

I found out as we were driving in from the airport the night he, his wife and son arrived, when he recalled this story to me. “Do you remember when we met?” I said, “I know that you were in Nigeria, but I don’t remember it.” He said, “Well, I was sick and came up.” I said, “Oh yes, now I remember.” I apologized for not having remembered.

He was ten years younger than I was. He had come into the Department of State with – somebody who came over from Georgetown and ran H (Bureau of Congressional Relations) for a while. Then he became an assistant to a Deputy Secretary, Ken Rush. Rush went to Paris as Ambassador.

So a place had to be found for his special aide, Mike Samuels. They scurried around and said that an ambassadorship in one of the smaller countries in Africa would be suitable. They looked around and there was Clint Olson [Ed: served from July 1972 to November 1974] going into his third year.

They said, “That’s long enough.” So word came out to Clint that he was going to be replaced. He went back to Washington to find out what it was. He discovered that he would make more in retirement if he retired as a Foreign Service Officer on the spot, and continued as Ambassador until such time as a replacement came. So he came back to post, not as a Foreign Service Officer anymore, but as a retired Foreign Service Officer, and still Ambassador. It made a difference of some thousands of dollars per year in his retirement.

Q: In preparing for the new ambassador, the desk would have been in charge of briefings on the Washington side, but did the post draft briefing materials to bring him up to speed?

SULLIVAN: I don’t remember that we did a great deal of briefing material from the embassy. We were a pretty small embassy. I corresponded with him a little bit ahead of time about what the President’s office proposed as a procedure for presenting his credentials. “It calls for you to make a statement. Here’s a suggested draft.”

Q: What was the nature of American interests in dealings with Sierra Leone?

SULLIVAN: An interesting question because of a matter of considerable debate between Ambassador Samuels and me. He had, as I like to put it, 20 good ideas of ways to expand and encourage the U.S./Sierra Leone relationship before breakfast every morning. I thought it was already vastly overloaded right then. He asked me one time, “How does Sierra Leone compare to other places we had been - Manila, Nigeria, Indonesia.” I thought to myself, in for a penny, in for a pound. He told me to call him Mike when it was just the two of us. I told him, “Mike, it’s a fascinating place and we are very much enjoying it. But it’s the only completely inconsequential country I’ve ever served in.” Well, I knew what I was doing. It didn’t hurt our personal relationship too much. We worked in harmony; I worked to his command; I was his DCM. My idea of what a DCM is, is you do what the boss says and you may make recommendations that would be otherwise, but he decides and you do it his way. He is the President’s personal

representative.

Q: Did you see any seeds of the current-day problems when you were there? Any antipathies, or Liberian interference, or any surprises?

SULLIVAN: I'm not sure I understand what has gone on recently. What surprises me about it, it doesn't seem to be tribal. Tribal differences were important in our day. The original ruling party in Sierra Leone, which was out of business by the time I got there, was based mainly on the Mende, the group that lived in the South. Siaka Stevens was president when we arrived. He and his party were backing a one-party state. The diamond operation in Kono was being ripped off. The municipal record (and the Guinness Book of Records) says that the site of the largest diamond robbery was in Sierra Leone. It happened before we got there. But there was a story. The police officer who headed CID that I got to know on other matters told me the background of that robbery. A small plane came down from the diamond mines in Kono with a load of diamonds for export and landed at a small domestic airport at Waterloo (a small town outside of Freetown). The plane was met by some people with guns who took the diamonds and drove their car into Freetown. The next day Siaka Stevens left on a sudden surprise trip to Europe—a brief side trip to Antwerp, one of the largest diamond exchanges in the world and then on to the banking center in London. At least that is what the CID guy told me.

There were some good, honest civil servants down in the central government but they had a hard time.

Q: How were relations with Liberia?

SULLIVAN: At that time I was there the governments were in the process of trying to improve relations. There was quite a bit of cooperation going on between Liberia and Sierra Leone. They established the Mano River Union during this period, with a treaty between the two countries that was something approaching common market; Guinea and the Ivory Coast joined later. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was also established during that time.

What was humorous at the time were other things that happened in Freetown. Every so often a huge Russian helicopter would come 60 miles down the coast from Conakry and land on a ball field outside Siaka Steven's house. Out would get most of the leaders of the Government of Guinea and off they would go into town to the stores. Freetown was not the best-stocked place in the world, but it was so much better than Conakry because that Russian helicopter would just struggle into the air when it took off to go back to Conakry.

Dan, I think we've wrapped up Sierra Leone. The intriguing question is, how was your next assignment organized? Was it another call in the middle of the night?

SULLIVAN: I cannot really remember what happened. I don't think we had got to where you bid on particular assignments yet, and the use of the bid list. I'm not sure what year that was, when that came along.

I learned somehow that the second spot on the Philippines desk would be coming open. That seemed like a fine place to go. It was a fine time to get back into EAP.

Q: You had been overseas nine years. So in July 1976, you come to the Philippines Desk in the Bureau of East Asia Pacific Affairs. How was the desk organized? Who was there at the time?

SULLIVAN: There were four of us. The Country Director was Ben Fleck. I was the Deputy. Joe Lake was the Political-Military Officer, subsequently Ambassador to Mongolia, and a China hand. The Economic Officer was Jim Sartorius.

I did political and bilateral relations. The Economic Officer did economic things. In the case of the Philippines, Political-Military was a pretty neat package because of the status of American bases and those sorts of things, and that's what Joe Lake was doing.

Q: That would have required Joe to do a lot of liaison with the Political Military Bureau, I would suspect, as well as the Department of Defense.

SULLIVAN: I'm not sure what the details were of what he did. I can't recall any time he was reporting to me as an Acting Country Director. I would have simply told him to go on up and see the Deputy Assistant Secretary himself. Joe was the one knowledgeable in that field and familiar with the state of negotiations with the Filipinos on base matters.

Q: One of the other interests that has grown over time since the Carter Administration is the drafting of the Human Rights Report.

SULLIVAN: I had drafted one in Sierra Leone—with no specific instructions—while we were still there. Instructions came out while I was still there that every mission had to report. But here were not particularly decent guidelines, so it was very difficult to do.

Then I think I drafted three of them on the Philippines while I was on the desk. The first two were specifically requested because of concern about the Marcos government but it was not yet the annual thing worldwide. By the time we got to the annual worldwide reports, the Human Rights Bureau had produced an outline of what they wanted covered, which in a sense made it easier. At least you knew what someone else was interested in having in there, or the subject matter anyway.

Q: At this time, the Philippines was under martial law. Marcos is definitely in power. What is the United States' attitude? How does this manifest itself in our relationship with the Philippines?

SULLIVAN: It was dominated by the perceived need to keep the bases, pretty much. The Pentagon really couldn't see light without the Philippine bases—Clark Field and Subic Bay were the main ones. That was a very major interest. I think it hamstrung what would otherwise have been the relationship with the Philippines.

Q: When you were there, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary who would have been in charge of Southeast Asian Affairs that you would be reporting to?

SULLIVAN: Was it Bob Oakley at that point? He was at one point, but I'm not sure if it was then or whether it was later on. I was only one year on the Philippine Desk, from 1976 to 1977. Dick Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary, wanted to reorganize the Bureau. My job was the one he wanted to put Ken Blakely in, so Ken succeeded me.

They were also reorganizing the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore country desk, which was one office. They combined it with Thailand and Burma.

Q: Let's back up, because you are arriving in 1976, an election year. Come 1977, the Carter Administration comes in. Holbrooke comes in as the Assistant Secretary. That's why there was this, "Let's reorganize and review." Your position on the Philippine Desk gets caught up in that.

SULLIVAN: Yes, and I was offered a Deputy Directorship in the Office of Regional Affairs in EAP, and urged I transfer to that. That didn't particularly appeal to me.

Then it turned out there could be a wholesale reshuffle involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. They would be combined with Thailand and Burma into something called TIMBS (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, and Singapore). The office continued to be re-organized over the years, but originally, it was TIMBS.

Bob Fritts was coming in as the Country Director for that group of five. I became his Deputy. Actually, I was less a Deputy Office Director than I was an Indonesia Political Desk Officer.

Hal Meinheit had Thailand, as did Tom Robinson. I had Indonesia and then there was an Indonesia Economic Officer, who I think was Ed Chesky at that point. Burma was Don Field, who also covered narcotics and was supported by Tom Robinson. Mark Easton covered Malaysia and Singapore.

Q: You are now covering from Washington your field assignment, Indonesia. How does Indonesia look from the Washington side, as opposed to the post side? What are Washington's interests?

SULLIVAN: It's the second time I've been on the Washington end of Indonesian affairs.

They had made a lot of progress. Economically, they were growing quite well. They had had an election in 1976. Human rights continued to be a big issue. Aceh was a major area of concern, because there were people being detained. The question was how many were detained?

Amnesty International produced a report on detentions in Indonesia, and estimated 200,000 ex-PKI members were detained. I didn't think it was anywhere near that number. They had a fellow in their office in London, a Malaysian-Chinese British subject who was their expert. He concocted a way of taking some sample of prison population and blowing it up to where there were 200,000 people held. But we never really knew.

In fact, about that time the Indonesians announced that they were going to release 30,000 people that they had held in camps on Buru Island. This was a prison camp island. They released 10,000 a year for three years, which left very few people. That was the third category of detainees. There were two categories above that.

Q: The background is once the coup happened and Suharto stabilized things, there were a lot of people that they simply detained.

SULLIVAN: And they established camps on Buru Island, which is out in the east.

Q: So the issue on human rights is who has the best information?

SULLIVAN: Dealing with Aceh at that point largely was having Amnesty International saying it must be true. The people at Cornell thought it must be true. "You can't trust those people down on the Indonesian desk."

Q: Now actually, let me get you into that. Human rights had been an informal part of U.S. foreign policy up to now. But the Carter Administration actually established a Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) in the Department of State. HA was eager to create and defend its turf. That bureau had a fairly high component of non-Foreign Service people from this human rights community. So there's a lot of pressure at this time on the desks from this brand-new outfit, the HA Bureau, to confirm but not deny what Amnesty International or other organizations, sometimes exile organizations, were saying about various and sundry countries. Indonesia gets caught in this.

SULLIVAN: Yes, as did the Philippines.

There was a fellow I used to have to deal with in the HR bureau who had come down from Teddy Kennedy's staff, Schneider, something like that. I got the impression that things must be different up on The Hill.

At State, in the clearance process, we constantly had to deal with him on a response to an incoming letter. We would have to work at an agreed response. We would work out something and get cleared language on a particular issue. And out would go the letter.

In would come a letter with almost the same question. So you would take the approved language and put it in, then go up and see Schneider. Then he wants to argue about it and move the goal posts. I got the impression that was the way they negotiated up on The Hill. You don't get an agreement and then stick with it. They constantly tried to move the goal posts farther on.

He would refuse to sign off on the same language that he had signed off on before. It was very frustrating.

Q: In the period that you were on the Indonesia Desk, were there other human rights-related things that came up?

SULLIVAN: Before I was on the desk, when Ford and Kissinger were in Jakarta in 1975, they went to see Suharto. Suharto asked them if they would have any difficulty if he moved into East Timor (which had been Portuguese Timor), that had been taken over by one of the East Timorese factions, Fretilin, (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), a leftist group tied into the communists in Portugal.

One night in August 1974, the Portuguese government had up and left and gone to an island 15 miles away. They were not in Dili at all, but they had turned the guns over to leftist local members of the police who were affiliated with FRETILIN. So FRETILIN took over and the Indonesian government became afraid that the communists had a place in the body of what should be Indonesia.

Q: So there are a couple of issues. You've got the last Portuguese colony, which is on the Island of Timor.

SULLIVAN: Timor is way down east, east of Bali by a number of islands. It's east of Flores, almost to the eastern end of the chain of Indonesian islands.

Q: At one time, Indonesia looked more like the Caribbean in that the Dutch had the main islands, but the Brits, the Portuguese, and whatnot had islands continued into the contemporary period. Was this the Portuguese island?

SULLIVAN: Yes, the Portuguese had the eastern half of the island of Timor.

Q: Did the Dutch have the western half?

SULLIVAN: Yes.

Q: And did you just have the anti-communist, anti-PKI coup in Indonesia in the 1960s.

SULLIVAN: The PKI-coup, which Cornell said was not a PKI-coup.

Q: Is the Indonesian Government sensitive to the fact that this is Portuguese?

SULLIVAN: And was sensitive to the fact that what they thought was a communist group was taking over. They wanted to put that one down. So they flew in and dropped paratroopers. Then the whole East Timor thing broke open.

That was before I went onto the desk.

David Newsome was the Number Three in the department. He had been Ambassador to Indonesia and he maintained the position in the department that we accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia as a fait accompli. That was not a popular position with many outside the department, but that's what the U.S. position was. It was largely due to the influence of David.

Q: By the time you are on the desk, you have to deal with this.

SULLIVAN: I dealt with the aftermath of this. Could you get things shipped to Indonesia for the use of the police or not? For example, one time Humanitarian Affairs and folks on the Hill wanted the U.S. to vote against a supply of various things that the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank wanted to do. HA would say, "No, you shouldn't do that."

One time, HA actually came out and opposed sending jockstraps to the Indonesian police. They were ordering jockstraps, and HA said no. When they found out what it was, we got a good laugh out of that and they backed off on that one.

They were constantly saying, "No, vote against this proposal to make a loan or a grant to Indonesia."

Q: Was HA's primary intent or thought that these guys are bad, so we are going to complicate their lives enormously?

SULLIVAN: That's how it appeared to me. I couldn't see any other justification for it. I think that's right.

Q: This didn't come out in the inter-agency meetings you were in?

SULLIVAN: No, it didn't. They would say what we shouldn't do. They didn't say what the other people necessarily should, or what position they would take if the other country conceded. They were very hard, unwilling to believe this figure of 30,000 internees on Buru Island. They were convinced, since Amnesty International said there were 200,000, that there must be 200,000. But there weren't. The Indonesians never really produced a number. I think the 30,000 figure, when it came out, was a bit of a surprise.

Q: During this period you are on the desk, there are quite a few inter-bureau meetings on human rights issues.

SULLIVAN: There was a lot of contact with HA on all sorts of things. There were clearances on letters from the public. There was public interest in both of these issues, both the internees/prisoners and Timor.

One particular example occurred when HA came roaring down one day. They were in touch with José Ramos-Horta, who was a member of FRETILIN. He was in New York

carrying out FRETILIN's interests as an observer or contact at the UN. Somehow Ramos-Horta had apparently given them this piece of paper that showed an advertisement for the OV-10, a ground support-type aircraft. Was it McDonnell-Douglas who made them? Whatever company manufactured the OV-10 was putting out ads in various magazines that had to do with aviation. It showed a picture of the plane and had a line that said to the effect, "The OV-10: Ask Thailand about it."

He came in with one that said, "Ask Timor about it."

We thought, oh my god, they've done this? Somebody up in PM (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) checked the newspaper. They checked with the company and the magazines, and they said they never said anything like that. There was one that said, "Ask Thailand about it," and various places. Ask such-and-such a place about it.

It turned out it was a fake. They took the T and the I, and made all the letters in the proper print and put this thing out, "Ask Timor about it."

In another instance, they accused the U.S. of having a military guy in Dili, working with the Indonesians. This was completely untrue. I don't believe there was. No one in the State Department knew about it or talked about it. There simply just wasn't anybody there.

They were making all sorts of accusations. HA came down waving this advertisement. After PM did their check on what it was and brought back the full story, they backed off, very embarrassedly. But they were prepared to believe it. Someone had done a hatchet job on Indonesia by putting Timor on it.

Q: Since Indonesia was in bad favor with HA, they were predisposed to be influenced.

SULLIVAN: Oh yes. They would say, "Look at this."

Q: One of the consequences of all of this is that any military to military relationship with the Indonesians is beginning to atrophy not only because of internal discussion with HA, but Congress is also tying the Executive branch's hands.

SULLIVAN: Yes. I think it was later on that the Senator from Vermont, Patrick Lahey (D-VT). I got something agreed to up there, to prevent Indonesia from having any IMET (International Military Education and Training) taking place.

Congressman (Donald M.) Fraser (Democrat) of Minnesota was also vigorous against Indonesia. John Salzberg on Congressman Fraser's staff was very vigorous on this.

Q: Did you have conversations with him? Would the hill staffers call the desks?

SULLIVAN: Yes. I ran into him once many years later and we were great buddies. It turns out we were both on the same side of what was going on in Israel, pro-Palestinian.

Q: That's probably not well documented in the written record that the desk might have, frequent contact with Hill staffers. The Hill does make an input. Foreign policy is not fully and totally decided at the State Department. It's a U.S. Government decision. That means that the Congress gets involved.

SULLIVAN: That's correct.

Q: This was probably one of your early, if not first, day-to-day actions with the Congress, as a desk officer.

SULLIVAN: Yes.

Q: What other issues are popping up in Indonesia relations? Indonesia is a major oil producer. You have all kinds of economic issues.

SULLIVAN: There began to be a subject that came up in discussion, and that was refugees. Vietnamese boat people were becoming a problem for Indonesia. The Indonesians did very well. Singapore was refusing to let boat people land. They did take a few in the very beginning, or let a few get off the boats there. Then Lee Kwan Yew decided no. They threw some people overboard at one time.

Q: The background to this was that Saigon fell in 1975 and you had a second spurt of boat refugees in the 1978-79 period.

SULLIVAN: They were coming out in fishing boats and things like that. As you and I know, this exodus ran much longer. I worked on it up until 1984, and boats were still coming.

Q: Yes, that Vietnamese refugee issue would be a major one.

SULLIVAN: The Indonesians did well. They let people land, but they weren't really happy about it. They had these islands out in the South China Sea, including a big island called Natuna. There were some smaller islands between there and Malaysia, the Anambas Islands. That would be where these boats would first land. Or they might come farther beyond that. The Indonesians put up temporary camps in the Anambas Islands.

Later on, they agreed to put one of the three training operations on an island. It was determined that Galang Island, 40 miles from Singapore, would be a suitable place for a camp. Refugees would be brought there who would be going to other resettlement countries, such as the U.S. or someplace else. They could receive training and so forth before they moved.

In the end, there were two different camps on Galang. One was a first asylum camp where resettlement countries to decide whether to accept them interviewed new arrivals or not. The other was non-first asylum, where people who had been approved for

resettlement were given various training such language and to help them learn what it would be like to live where they were going.

Q: When the Indonesians set these camps up, did they allow international NGOs (Non-Governmental Agencies) to set up programs?

SULLIVAN: Yes, they did. Indonesian military officials were in charge. They cooperated with UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees). UNHCR had people there. The US could put a training program into Galang, which we did for language and cultural orientation.

The people who went into that training had all been approved for resettlement in the United States. This was to help them adapt to the United States when they got there. It also smoothed out the flow, so it would be roughly the same number every month.

Q: You're in Washington handling all these issues...

Dan, you were on the TIMBS desk as the Indonesia desk officer from July 1977 until two years later in 1979. How did you get your next job?

SULLIVAN: I'm not sure I remember exactly how it all began. I think I ended up talking to Bob Flanagan, who had been in that job up there, and was moving up one level into a Deputy Director of INR's office, as an assistant there. He was working for Bill McAfee, a grand old man of INR.

I had known Bill the first time in INR way back when I was working on Korea, when he played on the same INR softball team that I did. He had also gone to Wooster, the college in Ohio that my wife Margaret went to for two years before we got married.

There was going to be an opening there for a chief of a branch. This is all in the Office of Liaison, which was part of the INR Bureau. It had to do with the contact with other agencies. My job would be the head of the branch that dealt with HUMINT (human intelligence) liaison. This was not anything that dealt with NSA (National Security Agency). I never saw anybody from NSA. That was a different office run by a different person.

It was not so much about covert stuff as it was about going to meetings with the intelligence community about analysis of reporting, and things like that. We were the contact spot. The FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) liaison guy would come over, and would always drop into my office before he went out around the building, as a courtesy to let me know who he was going to be talking to.

There were a number of things we had to do about liaison. There was a place down the hall that did cover arrangements for assignments dealing with certain people. We handled certain stuff coming in from DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) on attaché assignments. We sent the notices out to embassies that colonel so-and-so or Naval captain so-and-so was going to be assigned.

Q: The Bureau of Intelligence and Research was the conduit at State for these other agencies to deal with State, passed up to State. I assume there would be meetings in which people would talk about what was of interest, what kind of information was of interest.

SULLIVAN: There would be meetings commenting on how each agency judged the reporting from such-and-such a post as good or not, or what it was that should be reported on. Periodically, they would have a meeting on a proposed list of reporting assignments, or targets: this is what we are interested in. That would go out to the post.

Q: That helps the post focus its own resources on what the intelligence community thinks is important. Of course, that list is an inter-agency list. It's not just what State is interested in, but what some of the other agencies are interested in.

The pace, I would suspect, was a little bit different there than fighting with the human rights guys.

SULLIVAN: It was much more gentle. There were about three or four officers and a secretary up there. I supervised three. One did most of his work with the FBI. Another dealt principally with defense attaché type stuff.

Q: How would you characterize the relationship between the various agencies in recent time? The press tries to create the discussion that they are not working well together.

SULLIVAN: I thought we worked well together. Everybody seemed to get along pretty well. One of the things we were involved with was when defector cases came through. They were handled through our office. We were a link in getting stuff in from CIA and then getting onto the appropriate desk, and so forth.

To some extent, we were somehow involved in the security of the new embassy in Moscow, but I cannot remember what we did about it. I cannot remember what our actual function in regard to that was. SY (Bureau of Security) was the main actor.

In general though, ours was a conduit job, largely, to make sure that people in the geographic bureaus of the department were informed that something was going to affect them. Frequently information came through us to a desk. We would take things down to the Soviet desk for them to read. "So-and-so wants to do such-and-such." We would either take a person or a paper, or something like that.

Q: At this time, the whole Tehran hostage crisis was going on. Did you see any change in your work focus because of it?

SULLIVAN: Let's see – I'm trying to put the dates in. That was in November 1979 and went into early 1981. That's right. It ended on the day that President Reagan was sworn in. That would have been January 20, 1981.

No, we had nothing particular to do with that institutionally. I spent a lot of time wandering in and out of the Operations Center. I knew the people on the task force down there.

I had a very good friend who was one of the hostages. As a matter of fact, on that Sunday morning when we heard that the embassy had been occupied and people taken out as prisoners, my wife and I hopped in our car, drove over to Georgetown and rang the doorbell of Ann Swift's mother. We asked her if she had the radio or television on that morning. She said no. We told her that the embassy had been overrun and they had all been taken captive. I volunteered to call the department's Operations Center and put them in touch with her. Ann's mother was her only family member.

We took her down to the department and into the Operations Center, where they were getting set up with the task force. That's when I met Henry Precht for the first time. I liked Henry.

If you were to run into a young FSO who is seeking mentoring advice, what would you say about this assignment?

SULLIVAN: Working in that office in INR is probably is not one that makes you stand out and gives you good publicity for promotion, but it's one in which you learn an awful lot about how the government operates.

It's like the Staff Assistant shop over in IO. Again, only one or two people know what you are doing, or observe what you are doing. They may or may not be of particular help, but you do learn how the department operates. I used to say it was like the lymph system, not the blood system that is all linked to the memos and so on. This was the lymph system next to it where the memos move into OCT (Office of Communications), into the pouch room, S/S (Secretary's Staff), all sorts of things that you learned as a staff assistant that you didn't know as a desk officer.

Q: There is value in figuring out how the department works. Now, out of the INR assignment, you are assigned to Singapore.

SULLIVAN: I went looking for this job. I heard that the refugee office, where I knew a couple of people anyway, would probably have a change in Singapore in the Refugee Coordinator who covered both Singapore and Indonesia. That was the way it worked. We'll get around to explaining that in just a minute.

I went and said, "I would like that job." I had Indonesian as a language. I had experience in Indonesia. I had been in the embassy in Jakarta and could deal with Indonesians. Obviously, there was going to be a lot of dealing with Indonesian government officials,

both on Galang and in Jakarta. They came around and said, "Okay." So I went to Singapore.

The reason the office is in Singapore and they are so intertwined is that the main camp in Indonesia is on the island of Galang, which is about 40 miles south of Singapore. The resettlement of refugees bound for the United States was all done through Singapore.

Q: And is Jakarta significantly further away?

SULLIVAN: Yes, Jakarta is 600 miles away. In all there were three major resettlement camps in Southeast Asia: one in Thailand, one in the Philippines, and this one in Indonesia. People who were going to be resettled went for language training and cultural orientation, at least if they were to be resettled in US. That part of the camp was the RPC (Refugee Processing Center). There were three in the region: one in Thailand at Phanat Nikhom, one in the Philippines at Bataan, and one in Indonesia on Galang Island, 40 miles south of Singapore.

The flow in Indonesia was from wherever people landed originally. Increasingly, they would be moved down to one of two camps on Galang. As I explained earlier there was a first asylum camp and then there was the RPC, which had the US training program in it. Nobody else used it for this. If other countries were taking people, like the Australians were, their officers would go over to the first asylum camp and they would interview people to determine who they would take, and so forth. And the Canadians acted likewise.

Q: This whole refugee organization was a response to the fall of Saigon. The State Department even created a whole different bureau, the Refugee Bureau. The Refugee Bureau was in charge of the Refugee Coordinators positions that were embedded in the embassies in Singapore, Bangkok, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.

SULLIVAN: Yes. So, I got the assignment to the Singapore Refugee Coordinator position. The two operations (Indonesia and Singapore) were combined in one office. The big work was Indonesia, much more so than Singapore. There was a special aspect to Singapore, which I'll get to in a minute.

The reason that the Indonesia work was done in Singapore was that when US-bound refugees left Galang, they were brought in by boat from Galang to Singapore. They were then put in a temporary camp on Hawkins Road out on the north side of Singapore, where they could be for seven days. Seven days at Hawkins road was the maximum stay Singaporeans allowed refugees.

They were brought over in time to be available for the plane that was being arranged by the International Office of Migration (IOM). IOM is headquartered in Geneva. They provided transportation and medical services in the camps. They shared an office with us in Singapore. They did all the arranging for chartered flights and so forth to come to Singapore to carry people to California.

Q: Specifically, would you describe your duties in Singapore? What was your staff?

SULLIVAN: When I arrived, the State Department staff consisted of four officers. I had a deputy, Gene Ewing. There were two other younger people. They used to go out to the camp in Indonesia regularly, accompanying caseworkers.

The whole refugee operation was jointly run for the benefit of a number of resettlement agencies in the United States. There were about ten agencies in the United States that took the responsibility of helping resettle people in one place or another.

Rather than have ten representatives in each of these places where refugees were being processed an agreement was reached that there would be a joint voluntary agency (JVA). One of these ten agencies would do the work for all ten in that location.

My JVA was the American Committee of Naturalization Services (ACNS), based in New York. Surprisingly, it was not church affiliated. It was one of the few that were not. The Lutherans had one. Hebrew Immigration Services was one. There were several that were not church-affiliated, but the agencies were primarily church-affiliated.

The Lutherans, I think, ran the JVA in Hong Kong. The JVA in Singapore supported the operation on Galang Island, the county seat as it were of Riau Islands in Indonesia. There were one or two people resident in the camp, including a doctor, an Australian who worked for IOM. The JVA had about 10 or 15 or 20 people, mostly young, who served as case officers who did the initial interviewing of refugees. Then the US Immigration and Naturalization officer came out and did the final interview. Some of the volunteers were recruited from the States and some were recruited locally in Singapore, There were a number of locals to help with the paperwork that had to go along with all this.

We had this rather large office, but most of it was the JVA office. The head of the JVA had one corner. We were in another corner. The best view of all—Singapore's amazing harbor—was the U.S. Government, for me and my helpers.

We got down to three, and when I left it went to two people. The fellow who was then my deputy took over as Refugee Coordinator with the last remaining other officer. We had an American secretary, a local hire. Her husband was one of the communicators in the embassy, so she had a clearance and could type classified stuff. We also had a local secretary who handled unclassified stuff.

There was an office for INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service), with an INS Officer resident who covered not only Indonesia and Singapore, but he also covered Malaysia. He occasionally made trips up to Kuala Lumpur to interview recommended candidates.

I've always described this whole operation as being like a Rube Goldberg machine: you try and make something like this work.

When the refugees arrived in Indonesia on a boat at some island, they were first recorded by the Indonesian authorities and then recorded by UNHCR people. They were then transported down to Galang and put into the first asylum camp. Then they were interviewed there by potential resettlement countries.

We had enough business that we kept some of the JVA resident there. They rotated in and out as to who it was.

Q: I would assume it was pretty Spartan living conditions.

SULLIVAN: It was Spartan living conditions. They were bright young college graduates. Maybe it was the first thing they were doing out on their own

I was well supported by them. They were good people.

Q: So, was your job to oversee this JVA?

SULLIVAN: My job was to try and make this whole thing work. We didn't have orders. I talked with their boss, coordinated with their boss, but I couldn't give them any orders. He worked for a guy in New York. Actually, he worked for ten guys in New York, because it was a joint voluntary agency. We could not ask the JVA to ask questions about the situation in Vietnam or other things that an Embassy Political Officer might want of the refugees. They did not want to be used that way by the government. They could do their thing.

Q: They had set questions, things that they were interested in, in terms of identifying the individual as a possible resettlement candidate. Of course the embassy might be interested in more political questions.

SULLIVAN: Or, "What do you think about the conditions in the country?" Or, "Do you know of anybody who worked for the United States Government?" Those were not questions we were allowed to ask them to ask. We could say that we were interested in these subjects, and if they ran across any information and wanted to give it to us, we would be gladly accept it.

Q: Once the JVA found someone who might qualify for U.S. resettlement, would they pass those cases to you?

SULLIVAN: All the cases were looked over by someone on my staff before they went to the INS officer. At various times when we had enough in line, the INS Officer went out, at least once a month for three or four days, to Galang to interview.

Q: So, he's not only looking at the file that has been worked up by JVA, he actually went and did a face-to-face interview. It's actually his thumbs-up or thumbs-down as to what happens to these people.

SULLIVAN: Absolutely, yes.

Q: You're just there to make sure all the wheels are greased.

SULLIVAN: Final interviewing was a Department of Justice responsibility, now it is Homeland Security. It's no longer INS; it's ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement). We tried to keep it all working out so that you could get the INS Officer out at a mutually convenient time.

Q: You were saying he had to cover Malaysia too, so it sounds as though it was a bit of a circuit ride.

SULLIVAN: He had a boss up in Hong Kong, later in Bangkok, a District Director for INS.

Q: So the embassy has to make space for you. They've long done that. There was a Refugee Coordinator at the American Embassy in Singapore?

SULLIVAN: There was. There isn't any more. I was the third one. Jim Shields set the RefCoord office up. He came through when I was doing a month TDY as DCM several years earlier. He showed up. He was assigned to see what ground was like that was available for a refugee camp nearby in Indonesia. I don't think he got out to an island and that later in the month someone else finally managed to visit Galang (suggested by the Indonesians as an appropriate place) and approve it for the purpose

Water turned out to be a problem. It was very scarce, but there was a spring, and they put in a pump house. Still, water was short.

Q: Did you have any congressional visitors?

SULLIVAN: While I was RefCoord, yes, we did. James Sensenbrenner came from Wisconsin. He proceeded to tell the senior class at the Singapore American School what a terrible thing the refugee program was. He didn't know anything about the Vietnamese refugee program, however. He was talking about the refugee program in Europe. Everything he said was about Europe.

I later wrote a letter saying, "I didn't interrupt you at the time, but you were wrong about your description. It certainly didn't apply to the operation that we had there, or the operation in Southeast Asia. Here is where you made a mistake. I just thought you ought to know."

I signed it and sent it to my bosses, saying that I wrote this thing after Sensenbrenner came through because I was so mad and angry. "If you think it's okay, go ahead and send it." And they did. I never heard anything more. He was just completely wrong.

Q: There wasn't a lot of understanding in the Congress of what these programs were.

SULLIVAN: We had a visit once from Steve Solarz of New York. He was in Singapore when Ninoy Aquino was murdered in Manila. Solarz and his wife made the decision that they would break off their trip and go back to Manila while I was bringing them back from the Hawkins Road camp to the embassy. They had been in Manila the previous week. And they knew Aquino from when he had been in exile in the States. So one listens in on history every so often.

There was a second operation that we ran. That was the Singapore operation. It was a bit different, quite different actually, from the Indonesian one. The Indonesian one had this process of going through first asylum. Then those that we selected were removed from camp one to camp two, where they had training before they were scheduled out to go on to the States. They could fly out of Singapore to either Hamilton Air Force Base or Oakland. Those were the two places that the charter planes landed in California.

Q: What was different about the Singapore program?

SULLIVAN: With the Singapore program, we could only get agreement to offload them refugees in Singapore who had been picked up at sea and were transported to Singapore as the next port of call. We only had authority to accept refugees arriving on US flag vessels. These we could guarantee to Singapore that we could resettle in the United States.

So there was this rescue at sea operation. We wanted to encourage ships to pick up refugees, rather than have them die out there in the South China Sea. If a ship couldn't off-load any refugees that it took aboard, they wouldn't pick them up. There were a lot of ships going by and leaving people in boats, some of whom might have made it to land and many of whom probably did not make it to land. But ships would only rescue if they could off load them at the next port of call. Singapore was not always the next port of call; sometimes it was Hong Kong or Japan.

The U.S. Navy was instructed to go ahead and pick people up, save them. American flag vessels were encouraged to pick them up and off load them at the next port of call. Singapore was the only place that had this rule that they couldn't resettle, so it worked out that we had a guarantee system.

A ship would come in. If it was a U.S. Navy or an American flag vessel with refugees aboard, we would sign a letter guaranteeing to resettle them within 90 days. This was interpreted to mean that within 90 days we would get them into Galang for training. Then they would come back through Singapore for a 7-day period. This was all understood and that was okay, perfectly okay with the Singaporeans and okay with the Indonesians.

Once the language training program got established on Galang, besides the refugees we had accepted from Indonesia, we began to bring people in to Galang first from Singapore and then later from Thailand. We brought in first Vietnamese, just Vietnamese, then

Vietnamese and Cambodians. We were getting land cases, as well as boat cases. So we had that complicated set of operations.

UNHCR had to get on the ship first before they could be off-loaded. Shashi Tharoor, who (at the time of the interview in 2010) was the Vice Deputy Foreign Minister of India, and has been in recent years, Deputy Under-Secretary General of the United Nations, was the UNHCR representative at the age of about 25 or 26 or 27.

Q: You have given the impression that the Singapore government was very strict. Did you find yourself having to intercede with Singapore government officials, or explain to them the U.S. position?

SULLIVAN: As far as Singapore was concerned, we operated within the rules Singapore was willing to accept or willing to approve. That was it. They were inflexible.

Q: So there wasn't much use in going into them to plead some particular circumstance or case or policy change?

SULLIVAN: No, once the rescue at sea operation was set up and they told us what they would accept, which essentially was that you have got to guarantee that you will get them out in 90 days. If you send them over to Galang and bring them back after training, on the second time they could be in Singapore only seven days, like anybody else coming from Galang. Our Hawkins Road camp in Singapore was a transit camp, period.

Q: It sounds as though there wasn't any necessity to constantly go back to the Singapore government and chat them up.

SULLIVAN: There was a woman in the Ministry of Internal Affairs who was responsible for liaison on these matters. She had other responsibilities as well, I am sure.

Q: Was it to your benefit to keep her as briefed as you could?

SULLIVAN: Yes, definitely. We worked well together.

Occasionally unexpected things happened. We had one case where Shashi called up and said, "I've got a very unusual thing. We've have someone who came in swimming, from Malaysia."

This was a fellow who had been a Vietnamese Air Force pilot. He had been imprisoned after the fall of Saigon. Somehow he got out and he walked across Cambodia into Thailand. He kept walking and somehow took a train down to near Songkhla. He got off the train and walked inland. He walked across the border into Malaysia and came back down to the train at Kota Baru. He took the train down to Johore Baru, and then swam across the narrow strait to Singapore. He then went and found a police station and turned himself in.

He was quite a character. Shashi asked, "Can you people take him?"

I said yes, on the grounds of having been that kind of Vietnamese military that we could. That was the kind of person we could at least ask INS to interview. It met the ground rules as we understood them. So we signed a guarantee letter.

I talked to the embassy about this one. I said, "We've got this strange thing and I want to send a guarantee letter on it."

I think it was Harry Thayer who then said, "Okay, go ahead."

Q: Was Harry the ambassador?

SULLIVAN: Harry was my first ambassador there [Ed: served from December 1980 to June 1984]. Stape (Stapleton) Roy was my second ambassador there [Ed: served from October 1984 to October 1986].

So we guaranteed the swimmer. He got to be fairly famous. Somebody came asking me about it. I made the point of saying to this newsman, "You know, I'm not really worried about this guy. I think that within five years he will probably be Mayor of Santa Anna, or something like that." He didn't go to Santa Anna. I think he went to New Orleans. He could take care of himself.

Q: What do you perceive was the attitude of the front office of the embassy toward the whole refugee program?

SULLIVAN: They were very supportive. There was one thing that they did not, or couldn't do. I was the third ranking person in Singapore after the Ambassador and the DCM. I was senior to the Economic-Political Officer. But they were under a limitation of 24 slots on the diplomatic list and they would not spare one for the Refugee Office.

The only real problem on that was that for a good long time, we couldn't have a car because we weren't diplomats. We could have bought a car and paid 200 percent duty on it and have a car like anybody else in Singapore paying 200 percent duty. This was 200 percent, not dollars.

It was an issue that the embassy and, I think, some other embassies, took up with the Foreign Office. They finally agreed that people would normally be on diplomatic assignments of an officer level, these people could buy cars and they would not have to pay the duty. But they could only sell them to people with similar status. We got a car, a tiny little Subaru.

Q: Was this for your personal vehicle?

SULLIVAN: Yes, a tiny little Suzuki 800. It was a tiny little thing, but it was wonderful for Singapore. We could both fit in. Our heads would fit. We had a tall son sitting in the

back seat and his head would bounce off the roof, but we didn't have a son resident except for holidays.

There was a navy office in Singapore in the same building that the refugee office was, which was across town from the embassy. One of them bought it, but he negotiated knowing there wasn't anybody else I could sell it to but him.

Q: So your offices weren't physically part of the embassy?

SULLIVAN: No, they weren't. They were on the 31st floor of an about 45-floor office building at the far end of the downtown, right across the street from the container port, about a block away. I looked out my window and there was the container port.

Consequently, we didn't have any marine guards. The marine guards never went to the housing, either. They may have gone to the ambassador's housing I suppose, and those places that were owned by the embassy. Most of us were in leased apartments.

Q: There were a fair number of Refugee Coordinator positions in Asia. Were there annual meetings?

SULLIVAN: Yes, there were. Two were held in Manila, one was held in Hong Kong. Bob Funseth would come out, and other people on up the line. We always had the Assistant Secretary for Refugees in the Department of Justice.

Q: That illustrates the point that this Refugee Coordination business was a multi-agency process. You've got the Department of Justice representative, and a few others, coming to these annual meetings sharing information, regulations and processes.

SULLIVAN: That, and what would have been nailed down in Washington was passed on to people in the field. We were told that we were going to do it this way now, this change in how we classify the people who come through. There was a big change the first year I was out there. At the first meeting I went to, they came out. Instead of having refugee categories 1, 2, 3, and 4, they had a whole different way of going about categorizing people.

Q: The JVA who is taking the initial interview is seeing certain ways in which this interview could be put into a category.

SULLIVAN: He has to.

Q: When that file goes to the INS representative, he says, "Okay, this is a Category B. These are the rules that I need to apply to that."

SULLIVAN: Yes. When we originally got there, Category 4 was everybody else; nobody was going to get resettled from Category 4. There were three categories of people who

qualified: people who had been our employees, people who had been employees of the government, and then relatives of people already in the United States.

Q: Right, that's the Family Reunification category.

SULLIVAN: Category 4 was everybody else. There is a story about Category four and the little boat that we had until ACNS found out that there was no insurance on it. We were told, "Our case workers cannot get on that boat, because there's no insurance. We don't want to get sued by the parents of these volunteers."

Q: How did that get solved?

SULLIVAN: They had to use the UNHCR boats, which apparently did have insurance.

Our program boat was an old fishing boat that was picked up by the program before I got there. Somebody wanted to name it for a beneficiary, Ivan something. There was a fight back and forth, before my day. Eventually, they agreed on a compromise. The boat was called The Ivan Cat 4. Category 4, it will never get to the United States. But it was American registered.

Q: So the volunteer agency had its own vessel.

SULLIVAN: No, they did not have their own vessel. They had to use the UNHCR's boat.

Q: Right, The Ivan Cat 4 had been their boat before.

SULLIVAN: It had been used to support them. It was still in operation and we continued to use it, the U.S. people continued to use it.

Q: When you went to visit the island, did you use it?

SULLIVAN: I went out to Tanjung Penang, an island in Indonesia, on a Singaporean ferry that ran daily. Then we would use our boat to go from Tanjung Penang to Galang. But not to come into Singapore. We could get it into Singapore by getting permission for it to arrive at a certain time. That included getting visas for the crew. When we planned to get rid of it, we did have it come for a last bash. We went all up and down the harbor with our officers and our friends from the Australian High Commission who worked our beat. We had a grand time. Then we let it go. It was last seen rotting around the backside of Singapore Island.

Q: You mentioned the Australians, the Canadians, and others. Did other countries have parallel refugee resettlement programs?

SULLIVAN: Nowhere near to the same extent as us. There were people who did refugee work for several other countries. Australia was one. Canada was one. They didn't take near as many.

Q: While your responsibility was Singapore and Indonesia, did you from time to time fly into Indonesia and contact Indonesian authorities?

SULLIVAN: Yes. There was an Indonesian, Colonel Said, stationed down in Jakarta, the head of a section called 3PV – I can't remember what it stood for, but it was the office that supervised refugee operations. He would show up sometimes in Singapore and we would get together with him. In a meeting one day, he said something like, "Mr. Sullivan doesn't tell me." He said this in front of all the volunteers.

I said to him, "I will give you a monthly written report on our operations." From then on, at the end of each calendar month, I would make out this thing. I would go down to Jakarta. This was useful for me to see my bosses, and to talk with the Political Section, the front office, and so forth. I would call on Colonel Said. I would hand him this thing for the next month. It had statistics.

The one thing I did not put in there was the number of people we turned down. We did talk about the number approved. We talked about the number who had left.

Q: Because the number turned down, meant those that stayed on the island.

SULLIVAN: You're right. He never asked for that figure. I tried not to provide that one. I needed him to see that we were being effective.

The number of people would fluctuate during the course of a year. June-July-August-September was the period we called "the yachting season" because the number of boats went up, markedly. The South China Sea was much calmer in those months than it was in the other months when waves were up. We had boats coming in around the clock and around the year, but it was much bigger in the summer yachting season, as we called it.

Q: Was that your last assignment?

SULLIVAN: Yes, that was my last assignment. I came home and retired on December 31st, 1984. I was sworn in as a WAE (When Actually Employed) on the first working day of January 1985.

Q: Would you explain what a WAE is.

SULLIVAN: WAE stands for When Actually Employed. It is a person retired from the State Department who is performing a part-time job. It's not usually in the line of policy command, although I guess maybe the one you do does a little bit. You are paid by the hour when you work, and there are limits on how much you can earn and how many hours you can work. You get paid at a particular pay rate.

Q: Someone has suggested that the retired Foreign Service community provides a security-cleared, highly experienced group of people, who can assist the State

Department in searches or other temporary kinds of jobs. What were some of the jobs that you performed as a WAE?

SULLIVAN: I had arranged to become part of the review of classified documents for possible declassification, but they were short of money and they couldn't pay for any at that particular point.

The Refugee Programs Bureau did want me. Bob Funseth said, "I want to see if we can get you as a WAE." I said, "Well, I am already on the Administrative Bureau's list, but they aren't using me at the moment." Bob said, "Let's do a transfer of charges." I said, "That's fine by me." So about two and a half years, I worked in the Refugee Programs Bureau (RP).

At that time, and I think it is still true, one agrees to sign on as a WAE with a particular bureau. If you work for another bureau the bureau that has enrolled you pays you and the bureau that used you reimburses the bureau that owned you. It is as cumbersome as it sounds and reflects the financial independence of the separate bureaus.

Q: What kind of responsibility were you performing as a WAE with the refugee bureau?

SULLIVAN: Handling correspondence. Mainly in the section of RP that supervised the screening of candidates for entry from Vietnam. I did a lot of correspondence. I drafted most all of it for the Orderly Departure Program. That was something that you got a lot of questions about. You had family here in the United States wondering if their father, a colonel, would get out of a detention camp and be able to come here.

The applications would come in. They had to be replied to. Or they would say, "What is the status of..."

Q: So the correspondence that you were dealing with was public correspondence dealing with the Refugee Bureau, probably seeking information on refugee cases.

SULLIVAN: Yes. Write to the Department of State's Refugee Program and it would end up there.

Q: Now if I understand it, the Orderly Departure Program was established in the 1980s to try to prevent the boat people by putting our people in South Vietnam to see who might qualify for resettlement to the United States.

SULLIVAN: That is correct. It was operated out of Bangkok. The Bangkok Refugee Coordinator had people he sent, once it was worked out that these people could come. They could go there and interview. It ran that way.

Q: You were there for two and a half years? Did you move on to another WAE assignment?

SULLIVAN: There was one thing about this that I will mention in a moment that was interesting. But at the end of two and a half years, RP ran out of money, and A (Administration) suddenly had money. So I went back over to where I belonged.

I went into the place where they handled FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests. It was in main State, right next to the cafeteria, in that office there.

There was one thing that came up when I was working in the Office of Refugee Admissions in the Refugee Bureau. There was a person who did refugee work in Geneva, Carl Beck. He used to come from Geneva to our meetings in Hong Kong or Manila. He was dealing with UNHCR and OIM at the Geneva end.

He was a very, very effective officer. The fellow who was named ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies in Geneva insisted that Carl take him on a trip to refugee programs around the world. I guess it lasted three weeks, or something like that. The night they got back, Carl called the administrative head in that bureau, Jim Lawrence, and said, "Get me orders. I am coming home tonight and I am not coming back."

This political appointee had been terrible from Carl's point of view and he just wasn't going to work with this guy any more.

So they were stuck with nobody being in Geneva. They figured it would take about three months to get someone there. So three people were lined up to go for a month of TDY each in Geneva. Two were civil service members of the RP staff, and I was the third. I got the middle month, which was from mid-June to mid-July. So I got TDY in Geneva for a month as a WAE. I didn't know you could do that sort of thing.

Q: That's a good illustration of the talent that is in the retiree community and how smart it is that State uses that talent, if it has the money.

SULLIVAN: Yes. Later on when I went to work for A, there was one time I was actually loaned to the Korean Desk. I worked on the little section of the Korean Desk that worked on KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organization). That was in the 1990s. I was there for about two months.

Q: You've seen more of the State Department after retirement than before.

Along those lines then, let's get our hypothetical college student out. What would you tell somebody who expresses an interest in the Foreign Service?

SULLIVAN: Someone told me on my very first post that there are only three things that can be wrong: where you are, what you are doing, and who you are doing it with. Those are also the three things that can be right. They are rarely all wrong or all right. With that fatalistic background you can have a good time. We found it very interesting. I don't know if it's as much fun as we found it in our day. I'm not sure I know enough about what life in the Foreign Service is like now. I have the feeling it's kind of different from

what it was through the 1960s, 1970s, and halfway through the 1980s. I just don't know if it's the same.

Q: Just think about raising a family overseas, as opposed to now. Now you've got the internet, downloading, and podcasts.

SULLIVAN: You can stay in closer touch with them.

Q: Exactly. When I joined the Foreign Service, you would hear people say, "Okay, the kids have come back after six years and they don't know what the contemporary songs are. They feel left out."

SULLIVAN: That was very true with our oldest son. He tried to be a teenage rebel in Jakarta, but he didn't know how to rebel, or he didn't know what he was rebelling about I guess. He's now a PhD. and is a professor.

You tried to learn from Time or Newsweek magazine about what it was like to be an American teenager at that point. They had to develop their own degree of how to rebel.

Q: Just another illustration in our profession: the young officers nowadays don't know what an airgram is.

SULLIVAN: And they certainly don't know, "Sir, I have the honor..."

Q: Dan, I appreciate your patience in going over this material one more time. I thought your career was so exciting that I should fill out a few more of the issues. Thank you very much sir.

SULLIVAN: You're welcome.

Footnote: Since this interview in 2010, Dan Sullivan continued to work as a WAE until November 2016, when he retired permanently. He served in the active Foreign Service for 28 years and then as a WAE for 32 years or a total of 60 years.

End of interview