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WILLIAM DOHERTY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background

- Childhood in Cincinnati
- Family's trade union background
- Georgetown Law School

International Trade Union Confederation

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

Postal Telephone and Telegraph International

American Institute for Free Labor Development

- International trade union relationships
- Grassroots activities
- Relationships with embassies
- AID
- Trickle-down economics
- Latin America
- Housing projects
- Cooperatives
- Cuba
- Globalization and the end of the Cold War
- Welfare reform
- American Center for International Labor Solidarity
- Unions in Brazil
- AFL-CIO
- Final thoughts

Retirement: December 1995

INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Doherty.]

Shea: This is Thursday , October 3rd, and we're in the office of my good friend Bill Doherty and we're going over his experience with the State Department Labor Attaché Program and also his experiences as the director and founder of the American Institute for Free Labor and Development.

Bill, correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you got your start in the international trade union activities with the ICFU.

DOHERTY: Well, frankly that was my start, but I'm going to be able to pull out from my pocket right now I think, if I'm lucky, and I find it. My first paid up trade union card which this year will be 50 years old and that card is signed by the then Secretary/Treasurer of the America Federation of Government Employees in what we then called them lodges I think, we didn't call them local unions. Lodge 32, well I guess I'm not going to find it, I thought I carried it with me. It's yellowed and I'm very proud of it, but cannot find it at this time. Anyhow it was my first union card and I then quickly moved on. I was in law school, Georgetown Law School, and we're now looking at the brand new Law Building which has carved in the wall of that building for perpetuity, "Law is but the means and justice is the end" and while my last year of law school, I got the opportunity because my father -- and that's why I strongly believe in nepotism ever since -- was on the executive board of the Postal Telegraph and Telephone International, which in 1951 was being reorganized after having been pretty well put out of business as were most trade secretaries by the intervention of World War II. Surviving World War II was basically the ITF and the metal workers and a few other small ones. An old guy by the name of Fritz Gamora was able to preserve the PTTI in Switzerland, neutral ground, sort of running it out of his kitchen and we were helping to get it together to make it into a worldwide organization again. Dad was taking the lead in that along with Joe Burner, the telephone worker, and through their contacts and their knowledge and I became interested. I had already become the President of my local and I was interested in labor movement. Frankly, knowing that anything I did in the United States under the labor movement would be under my Dad's shadow, and sort of a clan effort of a good kind of nepotism. I mean a lot of people condemn nepotism but I figured that when God himself saw the world in deep trouble he turned to his own son to save it and I figured if nepotism was good enough for God, it was good enough for me.

Kienzle: Could you say just a little bit about your father and what his position was and family background?

DOHERTY: My father was in a trade union most all of his life. He came from a very poor Irish family. Had to quit school and go to work when he'd only finished six years of grade school. He was born at the turn of the century. I guess he was born in 1901, my mother was born in 1899. In 1918, when he was 17 years of age he had gotten a job as a

Western Union messenger. He then learned the Morse and International Code and became a calligrapher and worked his way up, about a year later, as the manager of a Western Union office in Cincinnati, Ohio. He was already a Trade Unionist and when Western Union went on strike, even though he was a manager, he went out with the workers and it got nasty and somebody, whom he claims to this day he doesn't know who did it, threw a brick through the window, a plate glass window of the Western Union Office and they were after him, so he ran across the river, the Ft Thomas Kentucky, and he joined the Army. Once he was in the Army he got shipped off very quickly. He was part of the U.S. Expeditionary Force to Siberia. Many people don't know that we were supporting the White Revolution at the time and he ended up spending three years in Vladivostok and then another year or two as the Chief Communications Officer for the U.S. Army but he was assigned to the Navy at the time out of Corregidor in the Philippines. By the time World War II came around he watched Corregidor fall with great sadness, and that terrible march, the Bataan March if you remember where all the GI's were shot up. He came back and he married my mom and they proceeded to start having kids, I'm the oldest of 11.

My mother came from a very high class Irish family . The Dacey's of Norwood Ohio, but in the depression of 1908-1909, sometime like that, my grandfather was kind of whipped out. He owned Terry McGovern the boxer. He owned his own boxing, he owned his own race horse, he was a great sportsman and rich in real estate, so my mother had to go to work and she was a telegraph operator and they met tapping the pipe to each other.

Kienzle: In Cincinnati, Ohio?

DOHERTY: In Cincinnati. Dad, couldn't support the family so he got a job in the Post Office. God bless him, all during the depression he was the only one with a steady job 1200 bucks a year.

Every other member of the extended Doherty family, and my mother's people all Catholic Irish all rather productive, some of them still are. I've got eight and my brother John has what 10, 11 and my brother Jim has another seven. We're not doing those things these days.

Dad became a letter carrier and started becoming active in the union and he became president of his branch, a local out in Ohio, Cincinnati . Then he became a National Officer and then in 1941, was elected as the National President, he was only 38 years of age at the time, 41, he was born in 1902 , I guess. He was elected to the Executive Council of the AF of L and he was the youngest member. That was in the days of Bill Green, and Dan Tobin and Bill Hutchinson and George Meade, the Secretary/Treasurer in those days. Interesting thing about that is he worked very, very closely with Dave McDonald of the steel workers to bring about the merger of the institutions in 1955. Then a couple years later ...

Shea: I was working and your father was the President of the Government Employees Council.

DOHERTY: Which is now the Public Employees Department (PED).

Shea: Your father was the president.

DOHERTY: That's right. That was on 9th and (Inaudible) Avenue.

Shea: I worked in, and they didn't have any room so they booked me...

DOHERTY: You know the plumbers now own that building.

Kienzle: Were you raised in the Washington D.C. area?

DOHERTY: No, I was raised in the Cincinnati. I came here my first year in high school and I've been here ever since. I'm a 60 year Washingtonian. I guess I've been called. Except I've lived overseas. I've lived in Mexico.

Kienzle: Where were you in Cincinnati?

DOHERTY: Across the river in Covington, Kentucky. But that's like being in Bethesda, Maryland it's like being in the suburbs. So then Dad continued the trade union career, became very powerful up on the hill. In those days government workers and postal workers could only get stuff done through lobbying. Many of them would like to have worked in that area, because they were able to get more done through lobbying than after they were formed into sort of a semi-private, quasi-private Post Office Department. Although they did get legislation through that allowed governmental workers the right to bargain with everything, except the right to strike. I mean you have the right to arbitration, mediation and so he topped off his trade union career. He was instrumental in convincing Jack Kennedy to take Lyndon Johnson, who was his very close friend. Lyndon Johnson was the Senate Majority Leader at the time, and my Dad, as I said, was a trade unionist and a very powerful on the Hill and he helped to broker that deal.

Kienzle: You mean for vice president?

DOHERTY: Yes for vice president. And the next year Jack Kennedy nominated my Dad -- who wanted to retire early and give some of his very loyal officers down through the years the chance to take over the leadership -- and he became Ambassador to Jamaica, the first trade unionist that became ambassador. There is some talk that Stephansky, as Labor Attaché, became an ambassador. But Stephansky was not in the true sense of the word a trade union leader. But dad was the first trade union leader. The second one I think was John Henning who went to New Zealand.

Shea: He went to New Zealand, and then he returned and he was the Secretary/Treasurer of the California State Federation of Labor.

DOHERTY: My dad was born into the trade union movement, I was born into the trade union movement. I'm very proud to tell you that all of my five sons are trade unionists. Two of them are journeymen. One is a letter carrier out in Virginia and is active in the union. My other little guy is from the plumber and steam fitters union and he now is an operating engineer actually and he has a slew of buildings that he's now the manager of and he's doing very well. Then I have my son, Lawrence Michael, who's the EFIOL director of the Brazil program and he's married to a Brazilian with three lovely Brazilian grandchildren for me. He was running the George Meany Institute now he's back in Brazil running the Brazilian program. Another son, Martin Francis, who worked for John Sweeney -- he's very close to John, they're very good friends -- and the AFCIU for eight years in the International Department but he's now stationed in Harare in Zimbabwe and he's in charge of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, Libya, Botswana and of course Zimbabwe. He's very active. And my third son, Brian Doherty, is a special assistant to Jack Joyce of the Brick Layers, helps him in his training and organizing activities.

Shea: ... bricklayers?

DOHERTY: My son Brian is a brick layer, yes. I will again repeat that I think the nectar of the gods is nepotism.

Kienzle: Okay, can we turn now to your career and ask you, when you left Georgetown?...

DOHERTY: That's it, I just gave it to you, ha ha. Instead of going to work for PTTI (Postal Telephone and Telegraph International) got a job as an assistant regional director, a very young man, I was 21, 22 for J. Crain in the ICFU in Brussels, Belgium. So I worked in Belgium for a couple of, three years, and then got the idea of starting... The trade secretaries had not expanded. I noted this by working at the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and I thought, I'll go learn Spanish and I'll become a Fritz Gamora the head of the PTTI, the inter-American representative and I came out of Belgium and went to Mexico City and set up..., I guess I was the first American Trade Unionist to at least establish a presence in Latin America. So Rufino Grimaldi was active at that time in the AF of L. Well, that was a year or two after the merger, yeah the year of the merger was the year that I started with the (unsure) VCI, I started the ICC in 1953, so then I worked with the PTTI until 1960 in Mexico City we moved our office to Rio de Janeiro .

Kienzle: The merger was in 1955.

DOHERTY: 1955 was the merger and then when we got the institute going I decided to come back and Sarafino was the first executive director of the institute and I was the second. A job I held rather steadily employed for 30 some odd years.

Kienzle: Would you describe how the institutes were established, you mentioned that earlier.

DOHERTY: Well they were established all from the experience that we had in the PTTI. Was an education and organizing program to train teachers, sponsored by the CWA, Communication Work of America, and the PTTI North American Affiliates and it was financed by the International Cooperation Agency which was the predecessor to the AID, Irving Tragen was on the detail to the Foreign Aid, it may have been the FOA, the Foreign Operations Administration it had a different name then, MSA. By the way every one of these initials that I use are at one time or another different initials for what has been AID for the last 30 or 40 years, because in order to get the legislation through on the Hill you couldn't keep (inaudible). The Marshall Plan was looked upon as a big give-away program and they had to keep changing the initials to say well we've already accomplished the purpose of the original agency and this is a new gimmick. And then when John Kennedy came along you remember he did the Alliance for Progress and because the Alliance for Progress brought a lot of money available to Latin America. George Meany who Joe Burn had convinced we needed him in the institute, not only to continue the program but that to organize it in an area of communications, without organizing in the general trade union area did not make sense. So Meany went to Goldberg and they brought in a guy from the University of Chicago to do some research for it, I think his name was McCollom.

Shea: Yes, that's right. He came to Brazil.

DOHERTY: But then after a while they came up with the original institute was going to be labor management. If you recall we had Peter Grace and Governor Rockefeller, Nelson Rockefeller, David Rockefeller was on the board and when Lane Kirkland became president, would be what, about 1979 he just didn't think the time was right to continue to try to cooperate in a labor management undertaking. Management had already proved itself to be greedy and recalcitrant and was negative. So he fired Peter Graves. I went with Lane Kirkland who went to New York and we had lunch in the corporate dining room of the W. R. Grace Company, had one course after another, one drink after another. It turns out, and this is an interesting but probably will not long be remembered, that as a young man in South Carolina, Lane Kirkland in Camden, South Carolina, used to muck out the stables for the polo horses. This part of South Carolina was famous for polo. Peter Grace in 1933 or so was the Captain of the U.S. Olympic polo team and so Kirkland didn't realize that he was cleaning up the horse shit that Peter Grace's horses was dropping all over Camden, South Carolina. But those two guys got into a discussion of polo and they knew polo. It was almost like you were discussing baseball cards. Kirkland could name the whole Olympic team that Grace was the chairman. So we didn't discuss labor or labor management relations. For two hours, we discussed polo. It was getting late in the afternoon. We had gone to lunch about three o'clock, when Peter Grace turned to Lane and said, "Lane, I understand you came up here to fire me. Don't you think that's it's time that we get that over with?" And Lane says, "Peter you're perfectly right and you are fired."

Kienzle: Was that the structure when the AIFLD (American Institute for Free Labor Development) was first set up? How did that actually work?

DOHERTY: It worked very well from 1961 to 1979.

Kienzle: And what did the business community actually contribute to the administration?

DOHERTY: Political clout to get money out of the Republican Administration to be very frank with you. No but the idea was that we were trying to get the part of the Alliance for Progress, the business community in Latin America, to understand that trade unions were an important role to the democratic process in the modern capitalization of industry and that there was a real role for collective bargaining so that the businesses that were on the board were those that were convinced much in ILO fashion. Although there was much more competition now with the management factor in the ILO, that good labor management relations and good collective bargaining was the wave of the future. It was a way to combat injustice and poverty, and a better sharing of the pie, *et cetera*. It was a noble experiment that I think had positive effects, much as I think the Alliance for Progress was a noble experiment and had positive effects. It died, unfortunately, because when Lyndon Johnson became President, he wanted a new image and didn't want to continue in the Kennedy mode. But I have no regrets. And I happen to agree with the Kirkland decision. In 1979 we had been of the ICFTU for quite some time, and the left-wing forces throughout the world were accusing the AIFLD of being a CIA front, and not only CIA but, to make it even worse, sold out to management. We were a scab organization and not militant trade unionist in their eyes. Of course, we were. And so Kirkland said, "Well, since we've been out of the ICFTU all these years, and we're going back in, let's remove that argument." As Kirkland has always done, and as I would always do and George Meany, vigorously deny that the CIA ever had anything to do with the AIFLD. I would be willing to swear on a Bible, and I'm a practicing Catholic, that the CIA did not finance the AIFLD. But that doesn't do any good because even if they did, I would have to deny it. And therefore, the denial will never be accepted anyhow, so I don't bother going around denying it.

Frankly, we did not need the CIA. That was why we started the institute with foreign aid money. We just simply didn't need it. I'm not trying to be holier-than-thou; I'm just trying to tell you the simple facts of the matter is that it would have been disastrous to take CIA money, and we did not take it and would not have taken it. We were very seriously criticized in '79, or Kirkland was, for having institutes. For by that time the African Institute, the Asian Institute, FUTUI may have come into being by then. I'm not too sure the age -- but as we were going back into the ICFTU that our institutes were government financed, which indeed they partially were -- if not substantially were, to be frank with you. Well, the Europeans and the Canadians and the rest of them got tired of harping about us. They finally got wisdom. They went to their own governments, and then suddenly they started getting more money than we did, and all of a sudden it became holier-than-thou to take money from governments. It was bad while we were doing it, but good, of course, when they did it. But this is the innate jealousy, and I understand why they would be envious of us.

Shea: Is this the Germans?

DOHERTY: Most countries in the world are very envious of the United States, and because of their envy and their jealousy, they're anti-American. Whatever the Americans do is wrong unless *they* happen to do the same thing; then it becomes right.

Kienzle: What percentage of your funding came from AID or, I guess, NED (National Endowment for Democracy)?

DOHERTY: At any given moment . . . well, of course, that's another thing. You asked me about the businessmen. At one time they were contributing a couple of hundred thousand dollars a year because they were making tax-free contributions. They got registered as a 413c or a 5031b or 501c or whatever the hell it was. So they gave us money, I guess. But I'd say the percentage never got below 80. I'm just guessing that off the top of my head.

Shea: Who was the labor attaché when you were in Brussels at that time?

DOHERTY: Well, oddly enough, I can't recall, and I want to be honest with you, back in those days, in the early '50's, it was almost anathema to be even associated with anybody in the embassy because the charges. . . . In fact, they didn't have one. I'm sure they wouldn't have had one.

Shea: I was wondering if Arnold --

DOHERTY: But I had no relationship with the embassy at the time.

Shea: I was wondering if Arnold Zempel was --

DOHERTY: I know Arnold Zempel. I knew Arnold. In fact, didn't Arnold become the . . . he came back and was a big shot in the Department of Labor for many years.

Shea: Yes. He worked for Phil Delaney.

DOHERTY: Yes, I knew Arnold, but he wouldn't have been there in those dates. You've got a record there.

Shea: I've got it right here.

DOHERTY: If there was one there, I don't recall him. But now we're getting into this area that I forewarned all of you guys. . . .

Shea: Oliver Peterson?

DOHERTY: Yes, Ollie, of course! Jesus, that's what I mean. Oliver Peterson and I became intimately close to the point where my wife still talks to Esther. Esther became

the head of the Community Affairs Department. And we know Ollie and all the kids. Ollie died of a throat thing. Dear old Ollie Peterson! Ollie Peterson was a dear friend.

Kienzle: Anyhow, would you like to describe some of the major programs of AIFLD and what you feel it's accomplished?

DOHERTY: Well, yes. The AIFLD started out, basically, with three things in mind. One, building international trade union solidarity. Now what did international trade union solidarity mean? It means that there are practically . . . although Serafino Romualdi was working hard and started working even in World War II with Governor Rockefeller in an effort to keep the unions from falling under the sway of the Fascists. The Peronist movement was very strong at the time, and Perón had made a deal with Hitler. Serafino did a valuable job of counteracting that and building up relationships with existing confederations. In 1947 Serafino and my father helped to establish the ORIT, and as a matter of fact, there was almost a shooting incident between the Cubans and the Mexicans as to where the headquarters was going to be. We had formal relations through Serafino and the ORIT with the trade union confederations in Latin America. We were able to converse, dialogue, have solidarity support, actions against dictators, both right-wing and left-wing; but we didn't have the institutional contacts that would provide real understanding and friendship and confraternity with these institutions in Latin America, because most of the power in the labor movement in South America, like here in the United States, is at the national union level. And at the confederal level you do mostly politics and international affairs and things, but you don't get to know the movement.

So the idea was we would expand from just having those international relationship sort of things and "international solidarity" to on-hands relations where we would help train their organizers, train their teachers, so they could start education programs, share our experiences with them in the area of collective bargaining. We would share their experiences in terms of some of the things that they were doing at the time. From the time we opened up our doors -- I told you we trained the first 30 or 40 at Front Royal in 1957. I think we opened up the doors to start training in about 1962. It might have been the latter part of 1961. In fact, Jesse Friedman along with Sam Haddad and José Estrada, were the first directors of the educational operation. It's incredible, but if you look at the reports of AIFLD today, you'll see that close to three-quarters of a million trade unionists either coming to the United States, where there were literally 12-15,000 who came to the Meany Center. Prior to that, up until 1978 or so, we had a training center at Front Royal, Virginia. We also conducted education, we put directors out in the field, and we conducted education and organizing programs in every country. And so literally, through the multiplier effect, and that was Joe Burns' concept -- educate one, and he goes out and educates others. You don't give them fish; give them fishermen. That concept worked. You just told me you were at a course where the Argentineans were there. We subsidized everything in the beginning. Now they pay their own way for training.

And we're no longer training in terms of how to organize and collective bargaining and form a union. We train them in how we had to expel the Communists from our unions back in the days of the CIO and the early AF of L, and how we found the methods they

used to infiltrate our unions, and how to combat the Communist attempt to infiltrate the trade union movement in Latin America. It's because of that training on how to keep the Communists and Fascists out of the labor movement that we got the label of being CIA, because we did it very effectively -- either that, or the CIA circulated the story because they wanted to get better appropriations up on the hill and they had to have some success stories so they circulated the story that AIFLD was a CIA operation. But the truth is that we were very instrumental, for example, not only in combating the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. I personally was beaten up by Pinochet's police. I was hit over the head, I was tripped, I was tear-gassed, and I was water-cannoned. And the water in the cannon is sewer water, by the way. I stunk to high heaven. That night there was a reception for me at the embassy, and I had no clothes to wear.

[Interruption for telephone call]

Kienzle: It's about the purposes of AIFLD and you discussed the training.

DOHERTY: Yes, so it was to get involved in the actual organizing and educating at the grassroots level. It became a rather massive program because the trade unionists that would come to the Meany Center and to Front Royal would then be taught teaching methods, how to go out and organize at the grassroots level their own trade union education programs. Through the device of education and organizing, the influence of the AFL-CIO was not only tremendously expanded in every nook and corner of Latin America like it had never been. I'd say there was no other American institution that ever had the hands-on, deep populist influence in what was happening in Latin America at all levels. And the result of that was that after 30 years, and certainly after 10 and 12 and 15 years, the trade union leadership that was rising in the ranks from those local levels and from the federated levels, the top labor leaders, eventually were all educated at the Meany Center. They became congressmen, they became senators, Alois Alberto Monge became the president of the country. I mean, they became the prime ministers in Guyana. Forbes Burnham -- I introduced Forbes Burnham -- he went sour later; I'm still not too proud of it -- to George Meany when we did our first schools in Guyana.

So no one can challenge the political success of our trade union programs and the solidarity and the trust and the relationships that have been built up since. We were able to dissipate completely and totally any vestige of anti-Americanism in the working classes and the working populations of Central and South America, because they got to understand us and we got to understand them. We didn't always agree. We had a lot of disagreements. I remember one time George Meany went down to Argentina and condemned the hell out of Perón and practically got shipped over to Uruguay to finish his speech because it was still very close to World War II, and Perón was a dictator and he was a collaborator with the Fascists. But even the Peronist movement evolved to the point where by the second time he was in power he was more like a New Deal reformer, and his last time in power he was elected and he evolved.

Pinochet never evolved. We had to throw that bastard out. He's not completely out yet, by the way. Pinochet has until 1998 where he'll still be the commander in chief of the

armed forces. Then after 1998, he even has to give up the ghost. So we joined with them, for example, when Pinochet took over in Chile. We not only worked inside the country with a group of ten labor leaders that were democrats, most of them Christian Democrats. But those that were either jailed or exiled, like Manuel Bustos, we would meet them in Latin America. We'd even get them over -- the Italians were very good at giving solidarity, and so were the Swedes. In fact, the Europeans were great to fight against right-wing dictatorships. The Europeans wanted nothing to do with the fight against left-wing dictatorships. They were romantically inclined toward Fidel Castro and still are. They are romantically inclined toward the Sandinistas. But when you wanted to fight the Pinochetistas, they'd be right there. They were very selective in the kind of dictatorships they wanted.

[Interruption for telephone call]

Kienzle: Okay, we're talking about successes in Latin America.

DOHERTY: Okay, well, so that's AIFLD. By the way, and the nice thing, and I'm sure that as you get into this survey, similar successes were of course had in Asia and in Africa and now in Eastern and Central Europe, with the one exception. We had a great advantage in Latin America in that we didn't have the tremendous cultural and ethnic diversity that you have in other parts of the world, that while they were Spanish-speaking and while in some of those countries there was a great *mestizo*, a black-Spanish-Indian blood mix (and there always remained the Simon-pure elites in these countries that were either Hispanic or Italian that sort of ran the banks and controlled the money), most of them were Christianized and most of them considered themselves to be part of the new world. And they considered North America to be part of that new world, too, and that we were all out of sort of the same anti-European revolutionary mold, having broken away from the mother countries. That really contributed to a very deep understanding, and I must tell you that on my first visits to Latin America in the '50's, out in the boondocks, out in the areas where I'd work with the *campesinos*. I went up there, we built *campesino* service centers and everything. A Communist leader had the control of the rural area of Brazil. We went up and confronted him. But you'd go into these humble homes of workers and farmers, and you'd find a picture of John F. Kennedy in the '60's. In the '50's, Abraham Lincoln. I'm convinced that even at their primary school level, they learn more about the United States and about our revolutionary heroes and our presidents -- both good and bad (I mean, in Mexico they get a rather convoluted history of what the United States is all about) -- but the presence of the United States, even in Patagonia, is massive. And I guess we in the AFL-CIO, through these very large-scale outreach programs, were able to tap into that sentiment in a way that businessmen don't tap in, and I don't think religious leaders, I don't think political leaders do. We've just got a unique relationship.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe the relations between AIFLD and the embassies in the field and what kinds of problems may have occurred and how they were resolved?

DOHERTY: Yes, I'm going to give you one flat example, and Jim Shea sitting here can testify to this.

In 1959 or '60 when I first established the AIFLD office in Rio de Janeiro, because I wanted to be closer to the southern cone and because we were expanding in Brazil, neither the embassy nor the consulate, except for Jim (Shea), would talk to me, or the labor attaché. I could get no backup or support. When AIFLD got established, we got the government contract and we started proving ourselves, I guess, useful to the US Government establishment. We became very necessary collaborators -- I guess the word collaboration has been misused -- cooperators, I guess, and more often than not, the State Department part of the embassy would understand that because of this outreach, more than just a source of information, we were doing good things for America, good things for the United States. And they would encourage us, would share information, but labor attachés -- even ambassadors -- would start getting hands-on. I guess at the end of my career there wasn't an ambassador in Latin America I didn't know, because we got to the point where an ambassador wasn't assigned without the State Department sending the ambassador over to have lunch with us, get to know us, get to have an exchange with him. The labor attaché became not only closely identified with what we were doing but most of the relationships were so good that our director and the labor attaché would co-plan. They would decide on priorities. They would share experiences.

Again, we'd be criticized by our enemies as being the appendage of, if not the CIA, certainly the State Department. But that was a free and open and willing collaboration, depending primarily, I think, on the relations between the AIFLD and the State Department at the Washington level but also on the personalities. The guys that were labor attachés usually opted to be a labor attaché and decided it wasn't going to be career enhancing, and they just liked working in labor in those days. And the guys that were our directors were trade unionists. So they had a lot in common. There were two American buddies of trade union inclination or persuasion working together. I don't think you ever met an AIFLD director that didn't cooperate with you in your long career. And so that was another good thing that came out of it.

Now that created problems for us and AID people. By the time the Alliance for Progress became big and massive and big money and AID bureaucrats running all over the place -- I'm not condemning AID, because without AID and a lot of support from fine people in AID -- from Brian Atwood and my friend Otto Reich and on down -- but at the local level.

Shea: You mean _____ Alliance.

DOHERTY: He and I ended up being good friends after a while, by the time he became a director over in _____, by the time he was out of Latin America. But we had terrible fights. The AID people considered the money to be theirs, and that we were interlopers -- although we were taxpayers and workers and the money was ours too -- that we were taking away from them their money. And most AID people were anti-labor. There are exceptions to that rule. So they did not like the contract we had with AID. They

didn't like the preamble to that contract, which was basically said that to help build democracy and democratic institutions, that trade unions were a vital element in the democratization of the hemisphere, in fighting against dictatorships of all kinds. And a lot of them were going to bed with some of those dictators, frankly, in the AID missions -- not that they were pro-dictator, but they were pro-program. They want to keep their programs going. And we didn't give a damn whether we. . . . in fact, some of these places, to get kicked out of them was badge of honor. I was very happy to be kicked out of Nicaragua by the Sandinistas and Cuba by Castro and Santiago by Pinochet. You know, it wasn't that bad. So I'd say that the cooperation between not only the labor attaché program but the State Department and the American hands, the office of Latin American affairs, was very cordial, very cordial, wouldn't you, Jim?

Shea: For example, Bill. . .

DOHERTY: . . . in the Reagan Administration they had one who eventually became the ambassador to Brazil, and he was just plain anti-labor. Well, we were at loggerheads most of the time. Motley?

Shea: Oh, sure.

DOHERTY: He was just anti-labor. We didn't get along very well.

Kienzle: When you'd get differences in the field, how were they normally resolved? At the field level?

DOHERTY: Oh, yes. For the life of me, I can't remember ever complaining at the Washington level of anybody in the labor attaché field.

Kienzle: Oh policy issues?

DOHERTY: Not really, no, because our policies were not at that great a variance with what we're trying to accomplish generally. I'm trying to think of some hostilities, but again, don't trust my memory.

Shea: Just the fact, for example, in Argentina we got support from McClintock and from Ed Martin.

DOHERTY: Yes, that was true of ambassadors almost inevitably.

Shea: And in Brazil, Crimmins gave you great support.

DOHERTY: And Lincoln Gordon -- oh, you're a long way back now -- was the ambassador to Brazil (1961-1966). And as a matter of fact, my son Lawrence Michael is in São Paulo now. He said, "Bill, this is fantastic, between this tour and my last tour. First of all, the consul general invited me in and had a reception for me because our office is in

São Paulo, and the ambassador reserved a spot to have lunch with me when he was coming down to visit São Paulo.” He says the relationship is fantastic.

Shea: Melvyn Levitsky is the ambassador now.

DOHERTY: So that depends on personalities too. And sometimes the ambassador just doesn't want to have a hell of a lot to do with you because he's a political appointee out of the business community. But if he's a smart guy -- and usually even out of the business community you got to be where you are because you were a smart guy -- he soon saw that if you really wanted to get down to know what's happening in the streets, well, we knew the streets, we knew the alleyways, we knew the rural areas.

Shea: Yes, for example, in Argentina, you had Carter Burgess, who was president of Trans World Airlines. He certainly gave you support all the way.

DOHERTY: Yes.

Shea: Did have people, especially in the AID missions, who were hell-bent on free-market economies --

DOHERTY: Yes, putting us out of business. They thought unions were a capital draw-down. You can't start dividing the wealth till you create it. Well, first of all, they didn't care whether the wealth ever got. . . . They were Milton Friedman economists.

Shea: Exactly.

DOHERTY: They were the Chicago boys. They were the trickle-down boys. And the AID agency, even to this day, in the international financial institutions, that's why they're trying to privatize Social Security out of business at the World Bank level and at the IMF level and at the Inter-American Development Bank level. I mean, the government is loaded with very conservative economists that don't see the bigger political picture that workers ought to be involved and have a voice in their own destiny. They don't buy that. That's not their social philosophy. They have no social philosophy.

Well, more often than not, those were the types that worked in AID, because they considered that to be “developmental,” whereas in the State Department you had people that were much more concerned with the longer view, and not only the traditional relationships that we had state to state, but wanting to maintain an even better and more productive relationship in the futures. So that's what we had in common with the State Department.

Kienzle: Weren't there some exceptions? I think Jim Ehrman caused some heartburn.

DOHERTY: Well, yes, but not to the point where I would ever. . . . I think he ended up as a labor attaché someplace, in India or someplace, and India deserved a fellow like that. He got nasty. If a guy got nasty, we fight back. But even with him, we hold no brief

against him. He just had a different viewpoint, and frankly, at the time when we were trying to shore up the bastions of some democratic confederations that we not only had organized but had affiliated to the ICFTU, he was working exclusively with the left, because he had this view, this great prophetic view, that the left was the future. Well, he turned out not to be very prophetic because the left is not the future, and since then he probably does not broadcast those views. But he did that sincerely, in all fairness. He believed that. I'm not saying he was a Communist. He just believed that the right or the center was so badly scarred that the future of Brazil was the left. It turned out not to be so.

Shea: Bill, do you want to talk about your housing program, especially the. . . .

DOHERTY: Well, you're going back to . . . you really originally asked me what was the thrust of the AIFLD, what we were doing, and I got into education and organizing.

Kienzle: There were two other things that you wanted to mention.

DOHERTY: A couple of other things. One, I think Jim's mentioning it. As a result of the thrust of the Alliance for Progress -- pre-Vietnam and all the money we pissed away in that part of the world, which kind of did away with the Marshall Plan for Latin America that the Alliance for Progress would have been -- there was a big move toward trying to alleviate some of the terrible conditions of poverty and social injustice in Latin America, and we were invited to go into and use the AID Housing Investment Guarantee Program. *Déjà vu* -- that's what I was doing 35 years ago, and now I'm doing it again. As a matter of fact, there's not enough institutional memory here in Ullico to remember that we took an Ullico loan and used it to finance the John F. Kennedy in Mexico City. What we did was we got American pension money from the unions investing in housing projects being built by union cooperatives in Latin America, and AID would guarantee against default. Now they were not only guaranteeing unions. Of the whole AID guarantee program, we didn't represent 10 per cent of the total. Most of it was risk capital investment to try to make capitalism work in Latin America. As a result of that, however, we ended up spending more than \$100 million.

We built large-scale housing projects in about 10 different countries, and it was a tremendous undertaking because not only did we have to overcome the traditional corruption that takes place in these countries, but in every country they have different real estate laws, different construction laws, different standards, different bureaucracies to go through. I just didn't think I'd ever get anything built. But I was just in Mexico City three weeks ago. The John F. Kennedy housing project was named after him because Kennedy was assassinated while the project was being built. Senator Bobby Kennedy came down to dedicate it, if you'll recall, with Joe Byrne. It's still viewed as one of the best housing projects ever built in Mexico. 30,000 people live in it. And it's 30 years ago and it looks like it's new. And if you go to Argentina, you'll see the municipal workers towers. We built the Sam Gompers project in São. . . .

End of tape side A

. . . the end of the Alliance for Progress and we got priced out of the market because in those days you could lend at a rate -- none of this was subsidized other than a fee that we paid for the guarantee -- but money was going at five and six and seven per cent, and then with the inflation of the '60's, money got up to 10, 12 per cent, 13 per cent, and by the time you put the fees on and everything, workers couldn't afford it. We could not even build houses cheap enough for workers to buy. So we could no longer do business. These projects had to repay the mortgage. All the AFL-CIO got back was the mortgage repayment, and always at the level of whatever it would have been in the United States. We weren't in there to make money. (We were investing pension money: we had to make money. I shouldn't say we were not in there to make money.) We were not in there to make any more money in Latin America than we were making in the United States, charging the conventional interest rates, which is law -- the ORISA Law of the Department of Labor makes sure that we can't give our buddies loans at lower interest rates than what the market demands; that's part of the law.

So we build these projects, but in addition to that we started doing other projects, like *campesino* service centers. We saw that we could never put *campesinos* into decent housing but that at least we could give them a center which they could run their organizing activities, their coop activities. We did a lot of work establishing credit unions, agricultural cooperatives. As a matter of fact, if you go to Santa Fé, Bolivia, right now, we are the largest bean producers in that area with a coop that is owned -- and by the way, the beans go to Brazil; Brazil's probably the largest bean consumer in the world, but much of it is grown in Paraguay -- and that coop is still up and running. Tito Castro is still running it 20 years afterwards. We got into the cooperative field in a big way, credit cooperatives and producer cooperatives. And now recently we're in the field of ESOP's. As that evolved and as the Wall came down in 1989 and Communism was no longer a threat and we got rid of Pinochet and the only dictator left is Castro and the Europeans aren't going to let us touch him and he'll die in office probably, but he'll go eventually, and we'll be back in Cuba, too. My first country was Cuba. In fact, it was the Cuban telephone workers had a great union, even under the Batista dictatorship.

Shea: Vicente Rubiera.

DOHERTY: Vicente Rubiera -- he helped me organize Latin America. Rubiera recently passed away. They had great unions in Cuba. Everybody thinks that Cuba fell to the Communists because of poverty. Cuba had a higher standard of living than we did. The telephone workers of Cuba had a better contract with AT & T than CWA had, than Joe Byrne had. And in that day, the Cuban peso was at a par with the dollar. Now there were a lot of things wrong with Cuba too, but they had the strongest middle class and the highest wages in Latin America and the best unions in Latin America, and they were the first to go. The Cuban sugar cane workers in those days, in the 1950's, were making five dollars a day, and they were being paid year-round five dollars a day. Even when you have two crops of cane, there are down times. But they had such strong unions. They contributed the first million dollars to start the Plantation Workers International -- the

Cuban unions. These people in Europe don't know anything about their history or what's happening.

Shea: Rujal?

DOHERTY: Rujal was the head of the CTC (Workers' Center Union of Cuba) at the time, but to the extent that a Fidel Velásquez was totally cooperating with the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party, Mexico), he was cooperating with the Batista government, there's no questioning about it. But the Batista dictatorship was nothing compared with what came in its place. I mean, this guy Castro's a killer.

Shea: Do you want to talk about, for example, the Cubans who came on to help you out with the AIFLD?

DOHERTY: Well, yes, obviously because of this experience of Cubans as trade unionists, those that were able to ferret out of Cuba and escape persecution, both with the help of our embassy and the Brazilian embassy and the Argentine embassy -- everybody was cooperating. Venezuelans were big in this -- we were able to take these experienced trade unionists and use them as our directors and program officers throughout Latin America. They performed a valuable role. But there's none left in that generation. José Estrada would have been the last, and he's worth talking to for this project, by the way. He's not only an American citizen, but you'll get it from a Latin viewpoint.

Shea: I was sitting with him at the. . . .

DOHERTY: But you ought to interview him. He was the head of the Cuban Telephone Workers' Union, and the just recently retired. He was the director of our education, and he worked for us in seven countries in Latin America. He's an American citizen, naturalized, but he's still Latin; and he can give you the same story I'm giving you but from a Latin viewpoint, which will be very interesting for this project, I should think.

Kienzle: You've mentioned three areas of interest -- education --

DOHERTY: -- education, the social projects and the cooperatives --

Kienzle: Were there others that you'd like to mention?

DOHERTY: I'd say that the last area, and it's more recent, and I think we've been key players in it, is that when the Berlin Wall came down, 1989, the beginning of the '90's, it was obvious that world capitalism was hailing this as a victory for materialism and capitalism and that the appeal and the desire of workers for bread and peace and freedom was being lost, and that in the rush to get away from Communism, we were upsetting all types of social-democratic concepts that were legitimate and valid. Many of them were built through the Marshall Plan. If indeed the social support systems in Europe are better than they are in the United States, they are that way because of the Marshall Plan.

In Japan, prior to World War II, they didn't know what a labor union was. It was under the Office of the Military Government of the United States in the MacArthur period that the trade union law was written, and today the Japanese unions are so strong thanks to the fact that they lost a war to us. If today the social protections afforded the workers by way of health benefits and social security and retirement benefits and job benefits and unemployment benefits are better than us, we helped build them. We ended up being more successful sometimes overseas than we were in the United States.

But this new *laissez-faire* neo-colonial capitalism, or as they call it, neo-liberalism, was coming to the fore. The thesis was that trade unions were an anathema to the development of a strong private enterprise economy. So we not only had to take a defensive position, but in an effort to globalize the world for the free enterprise system, we had to make sure that we got involved in the globalization. So since that globalized effort had pretty much been turned over to the Club of Seven, the Paris Club, and to their institutions, going all the way back to Breton Woods, the IMF and the World bank, and to the regional development banks such as the IDB and private enterprise programs like OPIC, we decided we'd have to become players. So the AIFLD stopped in its tracks, re-gearred its whole efforts, and decided that its new education program, its training programs, would be in the area of human rights, workers' rights, trade policy. What is GATT? What is NAFTA? What is the WTO? What should the role of workers be in that? What is the World Bank? What is the IDB? What is the IMF? And what should the role of workers be in that? And what are the catchwords in globalization that's out to destroy the movement? What do they mean when they say "flexibility at the workplace"? Flexibility at the workplace means "destroy unions." That's just a euphemism. So we re-gearred our whole educational effort, and it would be interesting to you to pick up -- AIFLD is going to be out of business in December -- the current educational manuals. Those Argentineans that are at the Meany Center that you saw yesterday, if you look at their course contents, it's no longer how to organize a union, how to bargain collectively, what a good labor law is -- it's all about how do the Argentine workers protect their social benefits with the onslaught of a voracious type of capitalism and materialism that wants to cut them out of the social fabric of the nation? So it's a new emphasis on democracy and democratic standards, on helping the workers to defend themselves against an insidious worldwide capitalist movement that wants to destroy trade unions as a part of the equation. And I think that's, I guess, our third and most important challenge that the AIFLD was able to establish in the last half decade.

Shea: Bill, I was 20 years in Argentina, and there was certainly no doubt that through the efforts of AIFLD, through the education program and your housing programs you were able to turn their situation around completely. We have, in my opinion, the strongest unions in Latin America, by far.

DOHERTY: I'd say they still are. And by the way, that's indicative, if you look at the current gross national product, the domestic product, and the per capita share, even with the vaunted success of the Chilean economy, the per capita earnings in Chile are at about \$2,200 to \$2,300, and if you go to Argentina, with all of its unemployment and all of its

problems of keeping their peso on a par with the dollar and everything, it's at least twice as high.

Shea: Oh, it is.

DOHERTY: If it's, say, \$3000 in Chile, it's \$6000 in Argentina. And Chile would now probably be second only to Argentina. Third would be -- would have been -- Venezuela, Venezuela because of its oil economy, and its wealth at one time was almost on a par with Argentina. But the Venezuelan economy has gone to hell. Oil prices were broken, OPEC was broken -- OPEC, not OPIC -- and the Argentine unions fell onto hard times because they had it all going their way and the social structure of Argentina and of Uruguay and the role the unions played in it was so well developed that people forgot the concept of producing wealth before you can share it, so they all went into debt. So debt is a big bugaboo to a lot of these countries. But there are a lot of success stories, even in Peru and in Ecuador, where the unions are increasingly playing an important role. Part of this globalization effort, of globalizing the economy and the introduction of the free enterprise system *pêle-mêle, laissez-faire* and using the instrumentalities of the elites that run the Paris Club, involves telling the governments that they've got to eliminate government projects and government programs because they're too wasteful; and what falls within that realm is not only health insurance and medical facilities for the poor people, but the very social security systems, like the one we've got that began in the New Deal and is now 60-some years old. These forces -- the Cato Institute in this country and the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chambers of Commerce and the Republican Party -- are trying to destroy Social Security. Oh, they'll talk about reform and privatizing, and there's no question that there's going to have to be a re-gearing of Social Security because there aren't as many people in an actuarial system that are now supporting the number of workers that are going to be living off of it -- like us. And there has to be reform -- I'm not denying that -- so one of the things we're doing today -- the AIFLD is responsible for it -- and the work that I'm now doing with Ullico and with the Haszenfathy Institute and with the International Pension Education Research and Training Program is to help those countries withstand the onslaught of eliminating the social benefits that workers have, but going for reform rather than destruction, and how to combine an effort at privatization that will, indeed, involve the workers and not just downsize all the corporations and downsize all the job opportunities. Something that we're going to be learning here in the United States because, with our welfare reform, which is now associated to work, we're going to be going back into the business of the New Deal, by having WPA's and CCC's, and the government's going to become not necessarily the primary or the last employer, but it's going to have to have employment and manpower policies, because you can't have jobs for people when the corporate structure of the nation is downsizing that are even going to pay the minimum wage level unless we do something about job creation. So we're deeply involved now, not only in making noise about getting into the trade agreements and getting workers' rights protected in the international loan agreements and in these privatization efforts, but we're now involved in amalgamating workers' capital in these pension funds -- that all over the world they have but heretofore the unions have allowed professional managers and insurance companies and banks to invest for them -- and telling the unions they've got to

become involved in their own investment. And the example that we've given to them is "J for Jobs" program that shows how we take workers' capital and invest it in the creation of jobs. And we also take workers' capital and invest it in projects that have a social end that earn us as much money, if not more, than if we _____.

Kienzle: You're speaking now of your current funds.

DOHERTY: The current job, but I got involved in this with the AIFLD right before I left, so that's sort of the last function in which the AIFLD had become innovative, that is, continuing the struggle for human rights and preserving the rights of trade unions to exist in the new trading agreements and the new globalized efforts to make us all capitalists. But the whole idea of not allowing the very people that want to destroy our jobs, to use our own capital to do it. So that puts us into the field of ESOP's (employee stock ownership plan), puts us into the field of worker participation in industry, worker participation in ownership, and worker, certainly, participation in the lending of its funds toward projects. A big push will be, again, in housing because in every one of these countries the housing deficit is absolutely fantastic, and nobody's going to put money into housing because the profit levels aren't there.

Kienzle: And you left AIFLD on the 1st of April, 1996.

DOHERTY: Actually back in December 31st last year. I was on the books for three months, but Jesse took over immediately -- thank God. One of the incentives for me to leave AIFLD was to step aside because I wanted to see Jesse get a shot at the job, and when I went to talk to President Sweeney, John Sweeney, he'd loved Jesse, and so there was no problem. I told John what I would be doing and that I'd step aside and I'd let him take over on January 1, although it became effective April 1 of this year. And I'm just sorry that Jesse -- he did a great job, but he became very, very ill in the last two or three months.

Shea: When we interviewed him he was --

DOHERTY: -- already starting to. . . . Yes, his big idea was he was going to retire this year, and he wanted to do what you guys are doing in a very formal way, but he wanted to sort of imitate. . . . Serafino had a great book he wrote called *Presidents and Peons*, and Jesse strongly felt that the role played by labor in international affairs since World War II up until now was going to be completely overlooked if somebody that had the institutional memory didn't write it. Now his quest was to write it. And he was going to be supported by John Sweeney in the process of doing it. He'd already talked to Lane Kirkland and Tom Donohue and others that would cooperate with it. Jay Mazur of the UNITE was going to help subsidize it. And you guys are probably the last ones, if you preserved the tape, that have Jesse talking on these subjects.

Kienzle: Well, looking towards the future, how do you see AIFLD and labor assistance as a function of policy?

DOHERTY: Well, AIFLD is being merged into a new organization called the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). All the institutes are being merged in that. It will be run much more tightly out of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department. And that structure is now being involved because that happens on January 1 of next year, and those institutes are in the course of wrapping up their affairs now as they merge into the new organization. The new organization is going to emphasize -- I happen to believe that as we evolved we were already emphasizing it; I didn't get into it but we were emphasizing -- the multinational cooperative efforts between the trade unions to take on the multinational employer, who is exploiting workers by jumping from low-wage country to low-wage country, particularly when unions get organized. We can already establish that about a half a million jobs have left our textile and automobile and metal fabricating industries to go to Mexico across the border at one-tenth the wage, and in squalor and in miserable conditions, and until we can get the Mexican workers to cooperate with us, and the Dominican workers and the Honduran workers -- I'm not saying they're going to get dollar for dollar the same wage as we get, but at least have unions and the right to bargain collectively and the right to protect their dignity. A lot of that's going on now. In fact, Secretary Reich has been very instrumental in it, and you've seen some of the work that some of the movie stars have gotten involved in. But down in the field, AIFLD has long had a program of cooperating on a union to union basis with US unions in organizing their counterpart industries, even with the same logo and same corporate ownership.

The greatest success has been the Dominican Republic, where we were able to force changes in the labor law. There's now collective bargaining in the free zones. But in countries as advanced as Jamaica you can't organize in the free zones.

Shea: Bill, can I ask you a question about Brazil? Have you been able to shake off the government interference in the unions there?

DOHERTY: Well, it's happening now. First of all, CUT, which became very large and powerful -- although there are three legitimate confederations that exist down there: CUT and then the Força Sindical and the CGT -- the CGT and the Força Sindical argued against the *Imposto Sindical*. CUT led the effort against the *Imposto Sindical* and when they got political power, they saw they needed the money. The *Imposto Sindical* is that a day's wages would get deducted from every worker's salary and be divvied up between the government and the unions. The unions didn't have to worry about bargaining and the collective bargaining posture to get check off for dues payment or go out and get dues payment voluntarily from the workers. They in effect were very cleverly subsidized by the Getulio Vargas semi-Fascist system of a corporate state, and the three corporations were the government corporation, a business corporation, and a labor corporation.

Shea: Take off _.

DOHERTY: Well, actually it was a take-off on Mussolini, but these corporate state relationships became incestuous, and as a matter of fact, through it you would lose your identity. Mexico practiced a little bit of corporate stativism under the PRI and still does to

a certain extent. And that's one of the problems as to how independent the CTM is from the corporate state. Well, Jim foresaw and everybody did that until the union went out and raised money on their own, they're always going to be on, for the purposes of this tape, I'll call it the teat of the government, and that as long as they were on that, they were never going to have one of their own.

Jim, the answer to that is no, it still exists. And also, the social system in Brazil -- they call it *Providença social* -- it's a welfare state. They'd like to have it imitate what they do in Norway, Sweden, or Germany or countries like that, but usually it ends up belly-broke because of inflation, a lot of corruption, and it never gets paid off, and it's all though there in form. But even Brazil has not been able to resist the overtures of worldwide globalization and economic reform, and those things are withering on the vine. And now the big questions are how can the unions of Brazil face the neo-liberal threat that comes from *laissez-faire* type capitalism that's taking over in Brazil.

Shea: Do you still have the Insituto Cultural do Trabalho?

DOHERTY: Yes, it still exists, though I understand we don't subsidize it any more.

Shea: This is a trade union education program.

DOHERTY: It became very, very important in Brazil because just as Front Royal and the Meany Center was in the United States, Brazil is a continent. We had a local counterpart or a partner called the ICT. It had to be called that because if it had the word *union* in it we couldn't get it a *posodería jurídica*, a recognition under the laws of Brazil, and that's now existed for 35 years; that's a local training center which, again, has geared its agenda to meet this new threat of globalization and the privatization of the social security system. I'm meeting a fellow coming in to see me tomorrow -- a guy by the name of Francisco Oliveira, the coordinator of the social security group of the Brazilian Minister of Planning Institute for Applied Economic Research. He wants to know about general structure and financing of social protection programs, labor and social protection, unemployment insurance, federal guidelines, social security and health care with a fully financed scenario, social security tax collection, interaction, demographic data, retirement insurance. So *déjà vu* -- what's new? What's new is what we used to do by way of fighting democracy with ideology and philosophy and politics, you've got to now fight with money. It's a money game now. That's what capitalism is all about -- money. It's all about generating it, and nobody generates it more efficiently than a capitalist. But it's all about distributing it, and nobody distributes it worse than a capitalist.

Kienzle: How do you assess the prospects of this unified assistance institute if it's trying to create a counterforce to globalization and _____ ?

DOHERTY: Well, I think it comes into being at a very important stage of this historic development that we've been discussing. It's more needed now than ever, but unfortunately, the American taste for investing in foreign aid programs had dissipated, and so at a time when it needs great influx of capital -- and I told you that without aid we

couldn't have done what we've done. For example, I understand the first year of operation they'll only have about nine million dollars for all four institutes.

Kienzle: As compared to?

DOHERTY: As compared to in our better years we would have \$18 to 20 million just for AIFLD.

Kienzle: And for the four institutes?

DOHERTY: The four institutes at one time? I guess the sum total could have gotten. . . . I don't know the other institutes that well, and I don't know whether you're going to be working with them or not, but I guess there could have been close to \$80-90-100 million involved at one given moment. And that's down to nine, so cut into one-tenth.

Shea: What about Pat O'Farrell?

DOHERTY: Oh, Pat's retired a long time ago.

Kienzle: And the prospects for funding?

DOHERTY: Well, not that long ago -- two years ago, I guess -- for me a long time because I've only retired. . . . I've only been doing this since April, so I'm just getting involved.

Kienzle: What do you anticipate the funding down the line will be from the US Government?

DOHERTY: It's going to depend, I think -- and first of all, Clinton has to win, and then John Sweeney has got to exact a price from the Administration for AFL-CIO sponsored international affairs. Short of that, I think the future is very glum. I mean you can talk a good game, but you've got to have resources to do the job. In effect, if the financing dries up, the overseas networks that are alive, where we have directors -- I just told you about a son in Zimbabwe -- well, they have an office in South Africa; they have an office in Cairo; they have an office in Lagos; and they have activities with the unions in all those areas in Africa that will dry up. Likewise in Asia. They have Eurasian offices. There are all kinds of programs that got started in every Eastern European country. There is even an office in Moscow. There's an office in Minsk. That will all dry up, and when that dries up, if you're going to have representation and presence, you've got to have program. And without representation and presence, you really can't have program, because all you're doing is throwing the money away.

Kienzle: Let me just sort of as a follow-up question: you mentioned that the new institute will have much closer relations to the international department.

DOHERTY: Of the AFL-CIO.

Kienzle: Of the AF of L-CIO. Do you want to describe what your relationship was with Irving brown and others?

DOHERTY: Irving and I were intimate friends, to begin with, and if I were in a policy area, I'd make sure that Irving and George Meany and subsequently Lane Kirkland knew what I was involved in. But as long as I stayed within the policy guidelines of the AFL-CIO and it's political, economic, and social objectives, we had a very large degree of autonomy to go out and to our thing. We had the staff and the money to do it. Since the regional institutes, the Asia, Africa, Latin America, and more recently Europe came along at different stages, those relationships related to the history of when they got developed and how they got developed. AID financing went to the regions; it didn't go to the AFL-CIO or go to a central body. Capital and money is what runs things. Right now, beginning January 1, the new financing that comes out of AID will come out of what they call their Global Bureau. The Global Bureau is now responsible for the type of developmental programs as recommended by the institutes. So there will be one institute with one global grant from a steadily reduced amount of money available for this type of activity. I'm not trying to nay-say the future. I'm just looking at a political reality that if you don't get resources, you can't do the tremendous job that's been assigned to this new institution to build up multinational cooperation amongst the unions of the world so that they can combat the violations of human and trade union rights being perpetuated throughout the world by the multinational corporations.

Kienzle: Is there any prospect for either the AFL-CIO or international unions to pick up the slack?

DOHERTY: The AFL-CIO already spends a fourth of its income on international activities. I don't remember the figures; that's why I'd rather have you talk to somebody who's more current. But the AFL-CIO is putting about \$20 million of its own into international affairs. And it does spend money. That's why when you said "How much of the institute was government financed?" Well, 80 per cent. The other 20 per cent came from the AFL-CIO, and not only that, the AFL-CIO has all types of other activities in the international realm. It contributes to all the trade secretariats. It contributes to the ICFTU, and it pays its way to the ILO, except for a couple of tickets that are paid for. And so it's a pretty costly undertaking. The new challenge, as envisaged by the newly elected AFL-CIO leadership, I endorse completely, namely, mobilizing the multinational trade union forces to be on a better footing to combat the multinational employer. I'm just simply saying it's going to take money to do it.

Shea: Bill, do you want to comment a bit on the problems in Mexico right now and CTM?

DOHERTY: Well, I wouldn't want to comment on a problem, because I don't think there's a problem. I think that because of the lack of support from the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers) during the battle against NAFTA on the part of the AFL-CIO that the relationships have not been as warm and as close as they were prior to the NAFTA battle. Even within Mexico there is certainly a somewhat reform movement -

- I'd say more reform than revolutionary movement -- where Fidel Velásquez, who is now 94 years of age, and where the Mexican labor movement, the CTM, pretty well beholden to the 70-year political power of the PRI, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. One of the mainstays of that party -- along with the business community, the military, and the bureaucracy, as they call it, all the state agencies -- that was able to keep that party in power for the 70 years with the democratization efforts (that incidentally are a fallout from NAFTA). With opposition parties becoming more prevalent, a whole lot of younger generation labor leaders decided they wanted to be independent of the government and independent of the political parties. So there is a generational clash taking place in Mexico. The younger generation are more militant and more willing to cooperate with the AFL-CIO in joint organizing efforts against US and foreign-owned companies. A lot of the companies going into Mexico, by the way, are Asian companies -- Korean and Japanese -- using cheaper Mexican labor and going in through NAFTA to the US market, so that the Asian Rim (and Mexico is a Pacific country) has been extended to use Mexico as a cheap labor back door to the United States market. Because of that generational clash, because of old politics going out of fashion, there are conflicts within Mexico and, therefore, questions that we in the AFL-CIO are asking ourselves, as to who our partners will be in the future.

My view is that those partnerships have to evolve. The CTM still has five million people organized in that country. It ain't going to go out of business tomorrow, and we need help today. What I'm doing, and what I'm doing in the projects that I'm involved in -- I think it's the policy of the AFL-CIO -- we're working with those people who will legitimately represent the workers they claim to represent, regardless of their political identification or union identification, and who are willing to work with us. For example, the CWA is very deeply involved in a new organization that's called the *For*, but it's not their fault. The telephone workers down there are one of the leading institutions in the opposition, and they're now filing cases in NAFTA of trade union discrimination in cooperation with the Forum. Well, I'm working with the Forum, too. I just had a big conference in Mexico because Mexico has fallen prey to this privatization effort. The largest social security system in the world to recently be privatized is Mexico: \$40 billion. And it's going to be in the hands of private banks and insurance companies, and if the Mexican labor movement isn't smart and starts their own organizations like this, they're going to end up with the employer running the pension programs through American insurance companies. And so I was down there, met with 15 senators and 30 congressmen and the full trade union leadership of all elements. Much like Clinton was able to bring Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat together, I was able to bring the CTM together with the opposition because I was talking social security. It affects all of them equally. And it can be done; but there are a lot of hotheads around that don't understand the nuances of where Mexico was, where it is today, and where it's going to go, that want real quick, orgiastic revolutionary action.

Shea: Whatever became of CLaT?

DOHERTY: CLaT (child labor and trafficking) dissipated, pretty much, just disappeared. It's still active in a couple of little countries. I mean, Máspero was Peronist. He was also a seminarian and tied closely to the Belgian. In Belgium, the Flemings and the Walloons, the

fallout of that is that there's a Catholic labor movement and a socialist labor movement in Belgium. There used to be one in France and in Holland. There still is to a little extent, but Belgium's the only country where it counts. In fact, there was one in Germany, too. And so the Catholic labor movement of Belgium still subsidizes them a little bit, but not only is our foreign aid program drying up, but so are the foreign aid programs of all the other advanced countries. I'd say that if he might have been a bush full of thorns and just one of them broke open and was in our side, that would have been CLAT; and today it's a broken thorn.

Kienzle: Do you have any final comments you'd like to make?

DOHERTY: No, except that I believe that what is past is prologue. You could probably get that printed on a building somewhere as, you know, "A law is but the means, and justice is the end." I think that based upon my past experience and what I see in terms of where we're currently going, I believe that the labor movement has to deeply get itself involved in combating the terrible injustice perpetrated by American capital and a multinational employer. I think that Secretary Reich and the AFL-CIO, at his urging, have already started on that route of trying to get labor standards created. Some companies, like Levi, signing an agreement that it won't go into countries that persecute labor. I believe that the fight on organizing in the human rights front more and more evolves itself around the new world in which we live. A globalized world. A unified world, which, because of automation, computerization, the information age, transportation, indeed we are now in what was written about 20 years ago as the Third Wave -- well, we're in it. We're in the cybernetic age, and fewer and fewer workers are going to be needed to produce. Production jobs are disappearing because the robot's taking over, and robots don't pay dues. In fact, they don't even vote. So I think that what we're going to have to do is take a look at more and more about capital formation, creation of jobs, and making life a better life for all workers by having them more fully participate in the fruits of global earnings. And that means using workers' capital to show the way in terms of you don't have to downsize and destroy in order to build. I mean, in this country alone, all of our bridges need rebuilding, all of our roads. We haven't built a road since the Eisenhower Administration.

Shea: That's right.

DOHERTY: All of our schools are rotting. Look at the schools right here. Look at the schools here. They're red brick buildings falling down. We've got to spend more money on education, we've got to spend more money on training; we've got to spend more money on recreation. The recreation industry is a huge industry. Why let just a few elite go ski in Colorado? Let the workers ski. Let the workers work in the ski lodges. Let the workers swim. Let the workers play tennis. Let the workers play golf. Let's expand leisure time, and let's do it in a democratic society, do it in a free-enterprise society, do it in a society that protects property rights but also protects human rights. And with that, I end this discourse.

Kienzle: On behalf of the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project, I want to thank you, Bill Doherty, for giving us an interview. You're very informative.

DOHERTY: It's been fun.

Shea: A pleasure.

DOHERTY: It's been fun. I know that I'm going to be accurately quoted because you've got me on a god damned tape!

End of Interview