The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS A. HARTWICK

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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   Born in Mile City, Montana on July 29, 1950
   BA in Government, College of William and Mary 1972
   MA in Economics, Washington State University 1976
   MS in Applied Economics, Stanford University 1985
   MS in National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 1993
   Entered the Foreign Service 1977

Niamey, Niger; Economic/Consular Officer 1977-1979

Washington, DC; Staff Aide to Undersecretary of the Economic Bureau 1979-1981

Washington, DC; Economic Bureau, Energy Office 1981-1983
   Portfolio of U.S.-Canada energy relations

Bangui, Central African Republic; Deputy Chief of Mission 1983-1985

New Delhi, India; Finance and Development Officer 1986-1990

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Economic Counselor 1990-1993

New Delhi, India; Economic and Scientific Affairs Counselor 1994-1997

Vientiane, Laos; U.S. Ambassador 2001-2004

Washington, DC; Faculty Member Economics Department 2004
   National Defense University

South East Asia; Senior Coordinator for Tsunami Reconstruction 2005

Washington, DC; Senior State Person ICAF 2005
   National Defense University
   Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Q: Today is the 25th of January 2010 and this is an interview with Douglas A. Hartwick. The A stands for what?

HARTWICK: Alan

Q: Do you go by Doug or Douglas? All right, well let’s start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

HARTWICK: I was born in Mile City, Montana, the end of July, July 29, 1950.

Q: All right that puts the Mile City is named after an Army officer wasn’t it?

HARTWICK: I believe it was.

Q: I think it was part of the Indian Wars.

HARTWICK: Part of the Indian Wars. Mile City is in Custer County and Custer is named after George Custer who we all know for the Battle of Little Big Horn, that’s right.

Q: Yeah. All right well let’s talk a little bit about your family. On your father’s side where do they come from?

HARTWICK: My father’s family came from Norway and my father would have been a second generation Norwegian. His grandfather came over from Norway in the late 1800s, went to Minnesota, lived in Minnesota for many years and then my father’s father moved from Minnesota out to Montana as a homesteader.

Q: Do you know anything about the Norwegian connection?
HARTWICK: A bit, a bit. That family came from Osen up in North Central Norway along the coast. Norway was very poor at that time so my great grandfather at about the age of 15 or so basically as the oldest set out on his own and managed to get his way onto a steamer to go to the United States. He, or his family, had some church connections in the United States who he thought were going to direct him and find him a job and so forth; it proved to be very hard on him because when he got over to the other side that is on the American side it wasn’t at all what he expected. It was a lot tougher and he was basically an indentured servant for several years and he got his way finally up to Minnesota.

Q: Do you have any stories about settling and Montana and Minnesota?

HARTWICK: My father, at my urging many years ago he had so many great stories that he sat down and wrote a whole slew of them. So two years ago he sent me these stories and I edited them and put them into a book called the Hartwick Saga, which I presented to him and to the rest of the family over Christmas 2008-09, a year ago. My father died in October and unfortunately Alzheimer’s kind of weakened him pretty badly so I don’t really think he knew who had written the stories. He was reading some of them but he said, “These are really interesting who wrote these?” I kept say, “You did.” “I did?” “Yes,” I said, “I edited them and you wrote them.” So anyway I have quite a few stories of that whole period.

Q: Did your father go to college?

HARTWICK: He went to Custer County Community College for his first two years back in 1940-’42 and then after Pearl Harbor he was ultimately drafted and went in in late ’42. Because he had done two years of college by that time and had studied science issues he was offered a place in OCS, Officer Candidate School, as a chemical warfare candidate for being an officer in chemical warfare branch; so he went ahead and did that.

Q: On your mother’s side where do they come from?

HARTWICK: My mother comes from Utah. They are Mormons and my father and mother met after my father was drafted and he went down to Fort Douglas, Utah, for some of his initial activities when he was a private. That is when they met at the USO. Her family goes back a long way as all the Mormons do; they track themselves.

Q: They go back into eternity.

HARTWICK: Absolutely they do. My mother is not a practicing Mormon and hasn’t been for many, many years but my aunt is very practicing. She has done an enormous amount of work in terms of the family background on that side.

Q: Did your mother go to college?
HARTWICK: My mother did not go to college. She met my father at the USO and they got married about a year and a half later before he went off to Europe. Then she worked in various factories until he came back in 1946 and that is when they resumed their life.

Q: Well then why were they in Mile City?

HARTWICK: My grandfather, Tolley, decided to go out and make a go at farming because the Homestead Act had opened up Eastern Montana in great big large tracks of land that would be given to you if you agreed to live on it and work it. This must have been about 1912 or ’13, I’m not sure of the exact date my father was born in 1921. But about ten years before that time my grandfather and grandmother on my father’s side moved out there and preceded to have a family out there, build a sod shack and the whole routine and make a go of it taking land that had never been farmed before and seeing if they could make it profitable enough to live.

Q: Sort of Little House on the Prairie type thing.

HARTWICK: Exactly, Little House on the Prairie. My entire father’s family, two sisters, a brother and himself were all born out in basically on the prairie with my oldest aunt, number two, and her younger brother being born, I believe, in this sod hut, if you will. Quite remarkable to see the photos, just hard to imagine to go from there to here. Then eventually life just became too difficult to really eke out a living out there. It’s actually pretty marginal land in eastern Montana with terrible winters, very hot summers, not a lot of rain: all the reasons why it was basically used by the Plains Indians for riding on and chasing buffalo and other things and not really for farming. So by about 1927 or ’28 they decided to move into the closest town, which happened to be Mile City about 30 miles away. They lived there from then on.

Q: What were you father and maybe your mother doing in Mile City?

HARTWICK: My father was growing up and so he grew up as a small child and eventually went to high school there and doing a little work in various places.

Q: Your grandfather then was he a....

HARTWICK: Well, grandfather had been a trained lawyer when he was living in Minnesota, as had been his father. So my great-grandfather was a lawyer and a judge and Tolley was a lawyer but I think he was very restless and when this land opportunity came he really wanted to get out from under the yoke of the family in Minnesota and go west. So that is what he did, he and his wife went west and staked a claim in this process and they stayed out there from then on. I’m not sure if he ever practiced law out in Montana after that or not. He did make a valiant effort for the better part of twenty years to be a good farmer; he was basically a studious man so he set about learning how to be a farmer by studying a lot about it and so forth. I think in the end it was just very, very difficult.

Q: Did you grow up in Mile City?
HARTWICK: No, I never did. I just happened to be born there because in 1950 when I was born my parents were back to visit his parents in Mile City and my mother was pregnant. They went back for the summer and he had a job in Mile City as the senior resident lifeguard at the pool in Mile City where all the kids go to swim in the city; so he had that job that he had kept every year to earn a little bit of money.

How I ended up at where I am today was as a result of the war. My father was sent overseas to Europe and he went over as a chemical warfare officer but luckily as you know there wasn’t really any chemical warfare during World War II. So he was assigned to a transportation unit that did odd jobs, always with the expectation if anything happened on the chemical side he would quickly take off for his regular duties and luckily that never happened. But he had never been overseas or ever traveled at all actually from Montana until he went basically east and then ultimately to Europe in 1944; it kind of changed his life. So he, like so many people, if you read the book The Greatest Generation, was like so many people and he went off to Europe and stayed. They got married in May 26 and he was shipped off somewhere around June 10 to Europe and he didn’t come back until August of ’46; so he was gone for about two full years.

When he came back he was basically a changed guy; he wanted to finish his college since it had already been two years. But at that point his whole thinking about what he wanted to do and the big world out there really had transformed his own sense of direction. So they went back and he finished school back in Montana, University of Montana, and my mother came up and joined him at that time. Upon finishing school he decided to go to Switzerland and get a master’s degree in international affairs. So off they went to Switzerland in ’48-’49, came back in ’49 and he then went to Stanford University and it was at that time that I was conceived, the summer of ’50 when I was born. So he pretty much had moved out of Mile City by the war time; he never really went back there except to visit.

Q: Of course the schooling this was all part of the GI Bill.

HARTWICK: All part of the GI Bill, right, to finish his schooling and then to come back and do more at Stanford and so forth. Then when he was at Stanford they had me and life as a student became a bit more difficult. He was in a Ph.D. program for economics and decided at that point that maybe getting a job made much more sense than to continue his struggle as a student. So after maybe a year and a half, he elected to put me and my mom in the car, pack everything up, and drive due east back to Washington, D.C., where his sister lived and start looking for a job.

He came here and interviewed here and got a variety of opportunities he was applying for. In the end he was offered a Civil Service type of job as an international affairs person in UN affairs at State.

Q: So he came in to State and then did you grow up in Washington?
HARTWICK: He ended up being asked to join the Foreign Service under the Wriston Program and he did so, I think, in 1955 and was assigned as a new junior officer to Guatemala. The family consisted of me and at this point I had a sister, three years younger, who was born here in Washington, DC and then the family, the four of us, went off to Guatemala in 1956.

Q: You were in Guatemala for how long?

HARTWICK: We were in Guatemala until 1961. I have a younger brother and he was born in 1960, in fact his birthday is tomorrow, January in Guatemala, Guatemala City.

Q: Do you recall Guatemala?

HARTWICK: I recall Guatemala. Since I was the oldest I probably have the best recollection of everybody of the siblings. What I recall about it in bits and pieces it was very much a developing country; it was a country of small windy roads and very high mountains; a lot of volcanoes. The beaches were black, it was pretty, and the people wore a lot of colorful outfits. We lived in a couple of different houses in two different neighborhoods the second one being a much bigger spread-out house. We experienced earthquakes and I remember running across the yard in our second house and being knocked to the ground when the whole ground was beginning to move and I couldn’t get up. I kept trying to get up and couldn’t so what we’ve come to learn about Guatemala is it’s sitting right on a big fault; these things happen. That was where my first training was in school pretty much. I went to the Evelyn Rogers School in Guatemala in Zone 10.

Q: Why Evelyn Rogers?

HARTWICK: That was the name of the woman who made the school and put it together.

Q: What was your father doing there?

HARTWICK: He was basically an economic officer probably a second secretary. He did like a lot of junior economic officer’s odds and ends about the state of the economy and helping with trade and business relations. He filled in the consular section as we still do these days and had some harrowing experiences. He took me on a few trips to different parts of Guatemala that I recall. He had one consular story that he liked to tell because it always touched his heart about having to tell an American businessman whom he knew that his family had been killed in an airplane crash. I think it was basically the first time that I’d seen my father cry, once, and I probably would have been about seven. But to have to tell this man that his whole family had died and try to help him through all of this. These are the trials and tribulations of being in Foreign Service.

Q: As a kid were you learning Spanish?

HARTWICK: Yeah, I did. At Evelyn Rogers the curriculum was mostly in English but I picked up a lot of Spanish and studied Spanish there. Later on in my career I went to live
in Spain and therefore had a chance to pick it up and move it to another level, as did my sister and my brother. I did have some Guatemalan Spanish friends and did have other kinds of friends in the neighborhood. Guatemala was a very colorful place, a lot of Indian mix with the more traditional better-educated groups in the bigger cities. My parents were the ones who really loved that cultural uniqueness so we visited all kinds of places throughout the country. We attended some of the religious festivals that they had and they were really quite remarkable. I remember Easter in Guatemala which is principally Catholic. I saw the amazing procession of great big shoulder carried floats with big massive representations of scenes in the bible. There were scenes about Christ and his death and his carrying the cross that they would build and paint. Then they would lay out a kilometer or a kilometer and a half of colored sawdust carpet that would be where the Christ float would be carried across it. I remember as a little kid this was just unbelievable, it was such a spectacle. My parents kind of enjoyed those kinds of different experiences so they made sure we all went.

**Q:** Well that brings up your family you mentioned your mother became sort of a lapsed Mormon. Was religion at all much of a factor in your upbringing?

**HARTWICK:** No not particularly although in Guatemala my father and mother were both active in what they called the Union Church in Guatemala City; it was basically a multi-denominational church. My grandfather on my mother’s side was not Mormon, my grandmother on my mother’s side was Mormon. In the world of Mormonism when one isn’t and one is you are straddling two different worlds. My grandfather never really wanted to be a Mormon and never chose to join the church and that is how it was until he died in 1986, many years later. It was about the same with my father. He was not particularly religious and he didn’t want to become a Mormon. Mother was already, having grown up in a household that was sort of between the two. She herself didn’t become very Mormon either. The Mormons are pretty persistent so I think just about everywhere including where she is right now the Mormons come a knocking to find if Sister Kay is she around we would like to talk to her. They are very tenacious.

**Q:** I remember when I was in the Senior Seminar one of our members came from a Mormon background and before they opened up the Temple up in Montgomery County we were going to go see it. He said, “For God’s sake, don’t tell anybody that I was a Mormon.” How about being a Foreign Service family it probably wasn’t very important but did the family have political leanings?

**HARTWICK:** No, not really that I recall. Going overseas at the age of approximately six myself and that first assignment was almost five years I don’t really recall politics or political kinds of issues.

**Q:** They normally don’t it’s much more...

**HARTWICK:** We came back when I was eleven years old and I cannot really recall too much about political leanings and so forth. When we left Guatemala and came back in ’61 my father was assigned to Organization of American States, the OAS, and the offices
were part of the U.S. Mission to the OAS. He was involved working closely with a political appointee the first kind of time that I recall in my mind that such things existed and so forth. He did that for several years and as a result of that he met President Johnson. He knew a number of people who were, if you will, political as opposed to just career people and he worked for the ambassador to the OAS who was also a political fellow. But that certainly didn’t mean that much to me as a kid. In the end I don’t recall much of a political bent from either of my parents.

Q: Let’s take early schooling in Guatemala then. Were you much of a student?

HARTWICK: I think I was always a reasonably good student. I don’t have a lot of recollection about it actually.

Q: In sort of the early years were you much of a reader?

HARTWICK: Oh I remember reading the kinds of books that I think young people read in their sub-teens like the Hardy Boys and all of those things having read those in great depth and perhaps some of the other kind of adventure kinds of stories. Failing that I don’t recall being a massive reader per se.

Q: When you came back you were eleven years old?

HARTWICK: Yes.

Q: You were in Washington from when to when?

HARTWICK: We would have come back in 1961 when I was eleven. We stayed in Washington from ’61 until ’65 and the summer of ’65 my father, Tobby, was assigned to Barcelona, Spain as the deputy principal officer so we went overseas in roughly June of ’65.

Q: As a kid you were in Washington when Kennedy was assassinated.

HARTWICK: I was and I do recall that it was a traumatic experience for everybody including my family. I remember the television was all but stopped for almost three days. We watched program after program about Kennedy and his life and all the various bits and pieces of it. Then I recall being taken down with my mother and father to his funeral in Washington, DC and standing out and watching. But I recall very distinctly the caissons rolling with the boots on backwards on top of the horses and the flag-draped coffin on the caisson. I remember this whole phalanx of grown up people all dressed up looking very sad coming along. Of course, part of it was the Kennedy family but there were people like…well the one that sticks out in my mind was Charles de Gaul.

Q: A very tall guy.
HARTWICK: A very tall guy and I guess I remember because he sticks out and I remember that very clearly these people walking along behind; so that had an impression and I do recall that very distinctly.

Q: How did you find school in the States?

HARTWICK: When I came back in 1961 I went to Kent Gardens Elementary School in McLean, VA. There I remember I quite enjoyed school and I don't recall any particular problems. I remember a couple of teachers that I had, one that taught music appreciation and cultural kinds of things, which I very much took to. It was about the only time I think back when I had someone who actually sat down with the class and put on classical music and told you what it was and described bits and pieces about it which was quite remarkable. You'd think having spent many years overseas in schools something like that would come again but it didn't. It happened to me in Kent Gardens Elementary School. I enjoyed school then and I remember I used to walk from our house down and across this one set of gully area up to the other side where Kent Garden School was. I did that I think until the sixth grade and then seventh and eighth grade was in an intermediate school, again not too far away in the McLean area called Longfellow Intermediate School. I did two years there and don't have any particular bad or good memories there although being driven hard in the gym and doing science courses that I found to be interesting but troublesome in terms of chemicals and Bunsen burners and that kind of stuff. That was actually when Kennedy was shot. We were in the gym that very day and everyone stopped and they put it on the radio in the school. We were playing some sort of crab ball or something like that. We all had to stop and it became very serious. As I recall, we were all sent home three or four hours later.

Then my last year there, 1964-'65, I went to McLean High School. I found the transition from intermediate school to McLean High School actually pretty hard. Like a lot of kids I was fourteen/fifteen. I wasn’t necessarily part of the cool kids. I was trying to fit in and see how my interests were with everyone else. It was the first time I was exposed to high school kids drinking and carousing and if you are going to be cool and part of the inner groups you had to do a lot of that kind of stuff. I remember thinking this actually wasn’t me at all, and I didn’t enjoy that. I needed to grow, get bigger. I enjoyed sports a bit but it was really the first time I ran into bullies too who either picked on me or my friends. So when my father came home and said we’d been transferred to Barcelona, Spain, I remember my first reaction to it was…two reactions: I had not a clue as to where Barcelona, Spain, is and, two, I can’t wait to go. So in roughly June of ’65 we packed up and headed off to Spain.

Q: You were in Barcelona from what was it ’65 to?

HARTWICK: My parents were there from ’65 to ’68 and then he was transferred from Barcelona in country up to Bilbao, Spain, where he became the principal officer. I went to school one year in Barcelona but the school wasn’t actually doing very well so my parents decided to have me go to boarding school in Rome, Italy.
Q: Well let’s talk about Barcelona. Do you remember the school and the city?

HARTWICK: Well I would have been 14 or 15 so I was I think really exploring and being exposed and learning lots of new and different things in Spain. My Spanish from my younger days came back pretty quickly so I became quite proficient in Spanish. The school that I went to, Barcelona International School or something like that was quite small. I think all students together were from kindergarten to twelfth grade something like 200 students total, maybe not even that many. So I remember I had a handful of classmates that were good friends and it was the first time that I had a girlfriend that I can recall. I think I got a good enough education for the one-year that I was there, but I don’t recall it very much. I remember Barcelona being a fascinating city; it was a port city and we had ship calls from the U.S. Navy. It had some remarkable churches in it and it had the Salvador Dali great big La Sagrada Familia, I think it is called.

Q: That’s Gaudi.

HARTWICK: It had the famous area called Las Ramblas where it was wild and exciting and lots of things going on down by the port area. It had beaches nearby, and my father and mother both enjoyed getting out and doing lots of different things. We explored different parts of the area outside of Barcelona; we’d also drive to Madrid and down to Valencia.

My girlfriend was important for me because she had been living there with her parents for several years already and she opened my eyes to a lot of different things going on. She was American and her father had worked for Pan American. Her name was Sandy Larson and she and I palled around together and visited there; they had a summer cottage down on the beach and we ended up doing lots of things together for that first year. The school wasn’t all that good. I think my parents were concerned that the size of the classes -- too small -- and somewhat iffy in terms of different teachers and whatever. I don’t recall the details on that too much but I do recall that my father’s boss at the time was the consul general, a guy by named John Ford. He had decided too that he didn’t like his kids going to school there anymore and so it was a group effort to think let’s move our children to another school. John Ford had I think six children, all boys, and I was about the same age as the fourth or third child so several kids were older but they had already begun to take their older boys and send them to a school in Rome, Italy -- the Rome International School. While I wasn’t Catholic there was a compelling reason why as we got to be older maybe going to a better school made sense. That’s why my father did it one year there in Barcelona and then sent me off to Rome. Off I went with John Ford’s kids one of which had graduated and two in the same school as I was and that worked.

Q: What was school like in Rome?

HARTWICK: Well that was a whole other world. One it was a Catholic boy’s boarding school so there is the boarding component, there is the Catholic component and there’s the all-boys component. It was bigger by a long shot than Barcelona was but very structured and rather rigid and very disciplinarian kind of school. I went to school there
two years. I made a lot of good friendships and I maintained some of those friendships, but the sense of loyalty and warmth of feeling towards the school and the administration of the school is something that, I think, never developed by any of us. If anything, it built us as a band of brothers against the school all the time.

Q: Who were the fathers that ran it?

HARTWICK: It was the brothers of Holy Cross who are associated with Notre Dame University and St. John’s University in Texas. You had to wear a coat and tie to class and as I said it was a boy’s school not a girl’s school. Your ability to go out of the school was very restricted only on the weekends and only for a certain number of hours and they had to know where you were going to go. All of these things were factors but we were all teenagers so…I would have gotten there when I was sixteen and left when I was almost 18 for two years between my junior and senior year.

Q: How was the educational bit?

HARTWICK: Well the education of it was a bit better than the little Barcelona school. We had good instructors, a very structured program and I was one of the better ones in school, I think, so virtually everyone who graduated from there went on to university either in the U.S. or Europe; it was pretty much a given. On balance I maintained good memories of my friends there and some of the things that we did but not so much about the school and the way we were treated.

We had one incident when I was about ready to graduate as a senior. Since it was an American school or international school with most of them Americans there was strict prohibition in anyone drinking. Of course, it was in the middle of Rome, where there was no prohibition of underage drinking at all. In Italy it simply wasn’t an issue. I do recall that we did work on the senior prom and we did establish a committee and the committee of four or five of us ended up being the organizers. Three of us were really very good students in this school and the fourth was an okay student and the fifth was the president of the class. That was the body that put it together. Well, when we went to find a place to have the prom we didn’t do it at school we went down to a restaurant downtown. So when we sat down and they made us an offer for whatever it would cost us for the whole thing they included free drinks as well. So we said it sounded like a great deal. Well the prom came off without a hitch, no one got drunk, no problems. We were in the boarding school, we had to get down there, we had to get back and we had dates from other schools in the area and so forth. But we were very, very proud on how well it had come off. The brothers were there, they supervised, they chaperoned, if you will. Anyway, the next morning we were all called in one at a time in front of the headmaster and deputy headmaster and we were interrogated about having set up the prom with free alcohol. Those buggers threw two of the people out and wouldn’t let them graduate. The other four of us were allowed to graduate but not allowed to graduate with the class and we were told to call our parents and cancel because many parents were going to come to Rome for the graduation. It was a very traumatic thing because we had a couple close classmate friends who were not allowed to graduate and were thrown out. The other four
of us...I suspect, in part, because we were very good students the valedictorian, the salutatorian and a couple others were all part of that group of four so we were not thrown out but we were not allowed to graduate physically with the class. I remember it was an ending to my period of Notre Dame International School that left forever a bad taste in lots of people’s mouths.

Q: I suppose I can imagine you are not one of the devoted alumnae?

HARTWICK: Not at all and in the end the irony was my parents were furious about it, not at me but at the school the way it was all handled because the more they learned about it the more they were shocked that this had been handled the way it was. Ultimately, some of the parents of people who were thrown out really complained bitterly and made a complaint back to the head of the order. Two years later the headmaster was relieved as the investigation continued. It ended up being quite a big mess, tarnishing the administration of the school.

I ended up going to the College of William and Mary pretty quickly.

Q: Okay you went to the University of William and Mary.

HARTWICK: Right.

Q: Why there?

HARTWICK: I applied to a variety of schools and I think on my list were the University of Virginia, William and Mary, Bucknell, the University of Richmond, Duke University and I think one other; I was fortunate to get into all the different schools. I was particularly interested in Duke but again being overseas and being this in 1967-68 I never received an acceptance until it came by sea mail approximately May of 1968 and by that time I had already accepted William and Mary. Why William and Mary? Well, again I didn’t want a terribly big school. My sense was it would be fun and better not to go to a big a school. Bucknell was a lot more expensive than William and Mary; my father still was a Virginia resident. UVA was still a boy’s school about ready to become coed but still a boy’s school and I did not want to go to a boy’s school anymore. I wanted to go where there would be women. It wasn’t too far from Washington, DC where my parents were going to be eventually coming back.

Q: So you were there from when to when?

HARTWICK: ’68-’72.

Q: This was the height of the student...

HARTWICK: The height of the Vietnam War.
Q: How did that play and Civil Rights how did that play out? When you arrived any way were those major issues?

HARTWICK: The Vietnam War was a major issue, absolutely was. Civil Rights was an important issue too but, in fact, William and Mary was so overwhelmingly white it just didn’t seem to be a factor for the campus. When I came in I elected to go into ROTC; they had Army ROTC at William and Mary. During the course of the year it became increasingly evident to me that I didn’t really want to be in the military and certainly not in 1968 and certainly not to go to Vietnam; so I did it for one year. I didn’t have any problem with the military. I think the whole issue was where was this taking me, why was I doing it now and there was no doubt that there was a very negative mindset in most schools about being in the military and doing military kinds of things. So I dropped ROTC after the first year and lost the credits for it but didn’t really worry about that at all.

In ’68, ’69 and ’70 these were all very volatile years for rebellion against the Vietnam War and acting up. There was the march on Washington, there was Kent State, and all these things went on during this time. I was an activist as were many of the students there. I wasn’t terribly activist, but I was involved with some of the anti-war protests. I remember traveling to different schools to attend rallies. There was the march on Washington in 1969 in November that was really cold but it was one of the biggest marches they had had to protest the war. I remember demonstrations on campus. I remember Virginia police coming on campus in riot gear, mixing it up with students and so forth; this was all going on at that time. It was a big distraction but part of what student life was like at that time.

Q: Was there also involved in the you might say the generational thing never trust anyone over thirty? Was that being played out or occupying administrative offices, etc.?

HARTWICK: There was a bit of that, but William and Mary proved to be I didn’t realize it at the time when I was applying there and going to school there but it was a very conservative Virginia school.

Q: Yeh.

HARTWICK: Now I didn’t know much about Virginia schools and I suppose in retrospect I might have preferred a school a little less conservative but it turned out to have been very conservative. We had virtually no Blacks; we had a handful playing basketball and that was it. The mentality was a very traditional Virginia mentality; almost all the students came from various parts around Virginia but usually of reasonably conservative families and so forth. I do recall that one of the frustrations of the student body was that here we were protesting some of the most what would seem to be simple kinds of issues in terms of just how we were treated as students let alone the Vietnam War when many, many big universities were way beyond that really into important political issues on the Vietnam War. For example, my freshman year women were not allowed to wear pants unless there was snow on the ground. Otherwise they had to wear
skirts my freshman year, 1968. There were, of course, no coed dorms whatsoever and parietal privileges, which they called letting a girl come to your dorm, was permitted once a month on Sunday afternoon from 1-4:00 p.m. Those were the issues so it was a very, very conservative body. By the time I left three years later all that was gone but that was a time of great change even for little William and Mary just in terms of the administration of the school and so forth.

Q: Were you an activist, a moderate activist or what?

HARTWICK: Oh, moderate. I was an activist. I was involved in a few committee things but I was not a firebrand. As I said, I went up to Washington for some of the protests and another one at UVA for some of the protests. I remember going to this protest at UVA at the basketball arena. Allen Ginsberg and Jerry Rubin and a couple of other big names of those days were the featured people. I remember it being wild and crazy times when there was pot smoking and that kind of stuff but I remember Rubin getting the crowd to start chanting; “off your parents” because you can’t trust anybody, you just said it, you can’t trust anyone over thirty, right? I remember sitting there with a couple of my friends thinking where is this going? This is unbelievable so we came away shaking our heads with whatever is going on with the radical movement against the Vietnam War. I don’t want to off my parents; my parents had nothing to do with this. But I had a chance then to see some of my high school friends from Rome who had gone on to Brown, one to Texas Christian University, another went to William and Mary with me, another one went to different places. So we got together and started comparing our experiences and it was an interesting learning time, I think, for all of us. But I clearly was going to one of the most conservative of the schools, small, really it wasn’t rural but it certainly felt pretty rural.

Q: Virginia was one of the more conservative states anyway.

HARTWICK: Anyway the state was.

Q: So it remains that way today to a certain extent. While you were doing this in ’69 and ’70 I was consul general in Saigon.

HARTWICK: In Saigon? Oh were you really? You were the consul general in Saigon, oh my goodness, oh my goodness.

Q: I remember a few American students ended up there and ended up protesting in front of the embassy burning some candles. I’m not quite sure...anyway there were more photographers and news people than the students but they got them making this protest.

HARTWICK: That was a very unusual time. Ultimately I would be the ambassador to Laos and there we are in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and everything I did in Laos frankly during those years had to do with the Vietnam War period. I mean it all did, the political sensitivities, the government that was there, the refugees in the United States that remain very attached to Laos all because of the Vietnamese War. There were unexploded ordinance everywhere, there were POW/MIA. I remember thinking how ironic it was
here I am all these years later dealing now with the aftermath of something that I had been protesting though not the same country. So many veterans came to Laos who had been involved in the prosecution of the war in various capacities in Laos. Even though technically we never really had any troops there, we obviously had lots of people coming and going and doing lots of things in Laos. The old war veterans were coming back to re-experience and reconnect to something that had been very meaningful to them good and bad in many ways. It was a very visible and touching feeling. I liked my job in Laos. It had a special feeling of the healing, the repairing and kind of getting on with the modern life so in the end it set an awful lot of my agenda when I was there. I realized my predecessors had not had a chance to do very much of that and it was really time to do it so I devoted my three years basically to do a lot of that.

Q: At William and Mary what courses were you majoring in or areas?

HARTWICK: Well I found William and Mary to be for the first time in my academic career damn difficult. All of a sudden all the kids were smarter than I was. It was a real shock. So between a bit of carousing and hanging out with friends, and not studying as hard as I should, and feeling that I could slip by, in the first semester I managed to get straight C’s. This was a real blow to me and a blow to my parents. They were used to me getting virtually straight As all the time so what the hell is going on with you out there; my parents were still in Spain and I was at William and Mary. It really meant I had to recalibrate my study habits and attitudes and so forth. The second semester was also hard and I did okay but I still had basically a little over a C average. But then I found myself really focusing on having to buckle down and understand. Having been somewhat traumatized by not doing very well, I was afraid of taking harder courses versus easier courses all of a sudden. I felt like the William and Mary competition was sufficiently strong that I really had to not get into something that I couldn’t handle or you are really going to be in big trouble.

So I took my sophomore year to deal with that a little bit. I decided to study what at William and Mary was called government, which was really political science. They didn’t have much of an international relations program, but they had a couple professors for that area. So I became a government major and it didn’t help my grades a lot. I was still getting C plusses and B minuses at best, at least my sophomore year. My sophomore year second semester I decided I’d go take an economics course. I took an economics course and I actually quite liked it and I did quite well on it and it all came together.

So by that time when I got to be a junior and was already well into my government major. Then I started looking at job prospects: what would I do when I got out of school. I realized political science doesn’t mean anything. Economics actually I could do something with that. So rather than change majors, I decided to stick with government but take as many economic courses that I could and that is what I ended up doing. So I ended up getting my degree in government but almost all my electives were in economics. So I came out with actually almost two degrees. I had the same amount of hours in both.
Q: Did you spend any summers at all in Bilbao?

HARTWICK: My parents moved in ’68 to Bilbao so I spent the summer of ’68 before I went off to college and ended up traveling around Spain in ’68 with a couple of high school friends. My father felt that he needed to go to the city of Pamplona during the early mid-July festival of San Fermin.

Q: The running of the bulls?

HARTWICK: The running of the bulls. So many American kids went there, got drunk, got thrown in jail and they had to get let out. So you’re a consular guy. He could do a lot better job if he’s there rather than going back and forth to Bilbao. So that is what he did. For three years in a row he rented a hotel room for the whole week. He had great relations with the chief of police and the mayor and all these people. He would enjoy the festival although most of the time he was doing a lot of negotiations to get these kids out of the slammer; they were in there for drinking, for carousing, they would lose their passport, a whole variety of things. So I remember that summer and the summer of ’69 as well getting a chance to spend time in the running of the bulls.

Q: Did you run with the bulls?

HARTWICK: I ran with the bulls one time. When you run with the bulls there are thousands of people. They corral the bulls on one side of the village and then they run through the town to the corrida, to the bullring. Then they are pinned up and kept for the afternoon of that day to fight. So they run in the morning like at six o’clock. Basically they put up barriers but they run the bulls through the town and put them into the bullring into the pens. If you run anywhere in the later half then the joke always used to be you were the chickens, you were the cowards who ran. But if you are a real man you run with the bravos and you run in the front part. So, many of the Spaniards and foreigners both would stay up all night drinking wine and partying; it was quite a festival.

So the one time we ran we decided we would start in the bravos area because we were young and eighteen, right, and do the best we could to run with the bulls, ahead of the bulls before they got into the corrida. It’s at six o’clock in the morning and like almost any eighteen year old we decided we wouldn’t go to bed. We’ll just stay up and we’ll be alright. We positioned ourselves and there are literally thousands of people involved in all of this. When it’s time for the running of the bulls they fire off a rocket and everyone is positioned. The distance that the bulls run is something like a little over a mile. It starts in this one lower pen uphill, through sort of an old Spanish village out to the other end, and they put up these barriers. So this friend of mine and I decided to run and we started not right at the beginning of the pens but pretty close to them. We figured we could keep ahead of the bulls without too much difficulty. Well, the first part of it, the first 200 yards or so, is straight uphill. Then you get into a little square and then the road continues out on the other side. The bulls have never seen it before, and there are a lot of people running around, but there are walls or barriers to keep the animals pinned and in a certain direction. You have the six or seven bulls who are the fighting bulls, and then you’ve got
another six or seven cows or steers that are part of it too because the herding instincts are very strong.

When the rocket goes off, they open up the pens and they have bells around the necks of the bulls and the steers, so they all take off but you can hear them. We were not right next to the gate, but we were probably about one hundred yards and have a two hundred yard run up. We heard the rocket go off and, of course, then there is a buzz in the crowd and it is just sort of electric. Then you heard the bells start to ring and we all started to run. There are quite a few people there, and you start to run. We heard the bells and all of a sudden those bells were coming really fast, they are coming like mad. You’re trying to run, and you realize that those bulls who, when you are standing in a bullring or in a ring and looking at the animals down below, yeah they look pretty big, but you don’t think about it. But when you are on the ground with them face-to-face, eyeball-to-eyeball, these animals are big. We are running, running as fast as we can and it’s like we are going half speed and they are going full speed. It is about two hundred yards from where they let them out until you get uphill, and then it opens up into this square, and then it goes on the other side, right? Well our thinking was, well, my God, we’ve got to get up to the square because the road narrowed down just before the square. So both of us got stuck just before the square; we couldn’t get in. The road narrowed, all the people had dispersed either into the square or climbed over the barriers. We were against the wall of a big building so we couldn’t get across to climb over the thing, and there were too many people anyway. The bulls just come and they just blast past us, but it’s so narrow and I remember going up against the wall and being hit on the side very hard and then falling to ground and then just laying, if you will, in the gutter against the wall, just covering my head that is tucked into the corner. It was finished in ten seconds, they were gone. I got up and I was looking around for Mike, my friend, and Mike’s over there and we say, “Oh geez” and we tried to run and chase the bulls but it’s ridiculous. Those animals were gone and we were running up trying to chase them and we were already tired from that 100 yards we’d sprinted up having been up all night. Then as soon as the bulls go by all of the people start jumping on top of it running behind the bulls too. So by the time we started to get into the square and tried to follow them there were way too many people and we just stopped. So we are catching our breath a little bit and I open up my jacket. I had this nylon pretty firm with a liner on it jacket and I opened it up because I was feeling my side. I had a welt all the way across my stomach where I had been hit by some, it had to be a horn, and it didn’t catch my pocket so it hit here and went across. It was a very slippery nylon jacket, and thank God it was because I had this welt all the way across my stomach.

Anyway, I saw my parents about a half hour later because they were up in the mayor’s office or something; they had a view where they could see it and were looking for where was Dougie and they couldn’t see him anywhere. They didn’t know what happened to these guys. I said, “I’m okay, I’m okay.” When we got together they were aghast. I only ran one time and that was enough.

Q: Did your father pass on anything about the Basque movement and all that?
HARTWICK: That was going on at the time, but it was still the Franco period and there was a strong lid kept on all things Basque. It was not even permitted to speak the Basque language or in Barcelona to speak Catalan, which a lot of people did; but a very heavy hand kept down all of that. There was only a small handful of what we would call today terrorist incidents, which really were more in the form of assassinations at the time. But it was not like a constant fear that people had; it was an unusual thing, a bit more sporadic. They did uncover in 1970 a plot to kidnap the American consul and some of the staff that were there, that the police basically warned my father about not long before he left. Things were beginning to pick up and, of course, once Franco died and Carlos came in as the king, he took off a lot of the more oppressive rules and regulations and heavy-handedness of the police. Then things started to actually percolate more. It wasn’t that loosening up made it better, it actually made it somewhat worse because the groups started to organize more. But luckily during the period my father was there we never really had an incident, to my knowledge anyway, that either he was targeted or that they had serious terrorist things other than the odd assassinations that happened like the police chief or something like that.

Q: Okay well let’s go back to William and Mary. Okay you graduated from William and Mary when?

HARTWICK: I graduated from William and Mary in 1972, in June. I spent my summers going back and forth to visit my parents in Europe, principally in Spain, until 1970 when my father was transferred to Cotonou, in what was then called the country of Dahomey. So that would have been my junior year when he was transferred down there. You may recall I think it was the GLOP program during Henry Kissinger’s time.

Q: A global outlook thing that he was to mix people up so that...

HARTWICK: That’s right. We don’t want these specialists who don’t know anything else we’ve got to send them to places they don’t know much about so they become good generalists. So Toby, my father, after spending five years in Spain, three in Barcelona and two in Bilbao, they saw on his record that he had studied in Geneva and spoke French. So they said, “Great, you are a perfect candidate to go to Africa,” which he had no interest in going but he was suddenly informed you’ve been transferred you are going to be DCM in Cotonou, Dahomey. Off they went and it was a shock to the whole family. I had already left home so I was going back and forth coming back from college. College in those years was 1970-’71 and I went to Dahomey, to Cotonou for my summer as opposed to where I had been going in Spain.

Q: How did Cotonou or Dahomey, strike you?

HARTWICK: I had never been to Africa so the opportunity to visit a new place like another continent was to me actually very exciting. I knew they spoke French there and while I spoke Spanish, I didn’t speak French. I had always been interested to see what French would be like. So here was an opportunity to get a feel for that. It was a lot of curiosity. I didn’t have to live there for a long time but I’d be there for the summer. What
a great summer trip for me compared to going back and getting a summer job and working at McDonald’s somewhere like a lot of my friends were doing; so I looked forward to it. When I got there my parents had already been there for a few months and they had gotten themselves somewhat settled. Although I was struck by how much French I could understand particularly when my mother and father spoke. Good old State Department, they didn’t give him any refresher training. They just sent him from Bilbao straight down to Africa, home leave in-between. So he didn’t go back and retool his French or anything like that. They just sent him down and he just had to scramble to get his French up to speed. When I first visited that first summer I was struck by how much of his French I could understand because it was actually not French at all but often like Spanish.

Q: What was he doing there?

HARTWICK: He was the DCM. We took a couple of trips. My family always liked to do that. One trip I recall with my father, just the two of us, he took me along. We took one trip across from Cotonou to Lagos, Nigeria. Porto-Novo, Benin. Porto-Novo is the old name of Cotonou. So across to Lagos wasn’t a very long trip, probably a two-hour drive maybe a little less. Imagine from a former French colony that was very quiet and laid back, to Lagos which was anything but laid back or quiet, and driving into Lagos. It was quite a shocker because we drove into town late afternoon. I believe we had a driver, but not quite sure where we were going. We turned down the wrong road and this was the time in the early ‘70s when they had a lot of bank robberies in Laos; so they had the full army to stop anyone from going down these roads. I recall very vividly this guy with a machine gun and wild eyes running up to our car with my whole family in the car. He stuck his machine gun in the window and yelled at us in broken Nigerian-English “What are you doing here? You are not allowed to go here; you’ve got to get out,” with his machinegun right in our face. I said, “Whoa, what’s going on here.”

I took another trip. My mother and I and my sister in an embassy vehicle my father bought as a used vehicle. We went up from the coast of Cotonou to Niamey in the country of Niger, across the Niger over to Upper Volta to Ouagadougou (Upper Volta at the time), from Ouagadougou down to Accra and then back along the coast. My father was chargé at the time so he couldn’t go so he sent us off on this trip. I don’t think I would ever do that for the rest of my life. This would have been about 1971 or ’72 and we had some interesting and different experiences. It gave me a flavor for West Africa, which I would not have had otherwise. That was 1972.

William and Mary, I graduated in ’72 in June. I worked as a waiter at the Kings Arms Tavern in Williamsburg, VA, which at the time, they’ve done away with this now, but at the time the jobs at the Kings Arm Tavern waiters were reserved for William and Mary’s students. It was quite a privilege if you could get that honor; not so much that it was so much an honor because you had to work as a waiter but you actually made pretty good tips. You dressed up as a colonial Williamsburg person and so forth. I did that for the better part of two years and then that summer I didn’t go to visit my parents anymore
because they were coming out of Africa in 1972. So I stayed that summer and worked as a waiter; that was my first job post graduating.

My parents came back and my father did not have an onward assignment. Normally he would have had something lined up but he did not have anything lined up. He did not want to go to Africa; he did not want to go back to Washington if he could help it. So he had done the job that you know probably better than I do of dancing around, not getting some jobs and see what else is out there. It certainly wasn’t a very transparent process compared to today. In the end he decided he had a tremendous amount of home leave left over so he decided he would take home leave and stay on the phone and something will come up.

So they came back in the summer of ’72 and briefly stayed in Washington. They went up to Seattle which was their home leave point and stayed in Seattle all the way until about December or January, I think Christmas was up there. My father started getting alarmed that he couldn’t find a job and he was very concerned about where that was going to go career wise. So the whole family came back and I came back with him and I found a job pretty quickly. My first professional job, and my father was assigned to Wellington, New Zealand.

They left that February for New Zealand, early ’73. My first job that I got when I got back to Washington was as assistant manager of a restaurant in Alexandria. Since I had done this waiter job and had some on the ground experience rather than just book learning, I was able to parlay that into an assistant manager job. But I realized this was not going to be something that I wanted to do very long; it was long hard hours. It was fun enough but I was getting home every night at one to two in the morning. I was waiting to see what would happen, I was combing the Washington Post for ads for jobs and there were some jobs there; I sent in my resume, I was interviewed and I got hired. In February of 1973 I started work in Rosslyn for a beltway bandit think-tank operation.

Q: Obviously you must have thought about the Foreign Service as a career as you were part of it.

HARTWICK: Not at that time. I didn’t know what I was going to do with my life. The Vietnam War was still going on. Charting your own course, not being part of the establishment, not being part of the government and what it does, was still very much a mindset that I had not abandoned. I had not thought a lot about it in great depth, but if I had thought a little bit about it I didn’t really want to go join the government. Then I had this job opportunity that came my way, which turned out depended completely on the government for all of its contracts, but I really wasn’t quite ready to say I want to go jump into a career right now; I was only 22 at the time. I thought I needed to get a professional job; I needed to take measure of what I want to do where I want to go. I had a girlfriend through three years of William and Mary and she and I had broken up the summer that we graduated. So I was still unsure where that was leading me or taking me so I got my first job at this think tank called CACI which still exits. Basically I worked there for a year as a research assistant and in the tiered groups of people there were
research assistants on a professional level, then you had associates, then senior associates and then partners of the firm. I actually got along very well with people there. I liked the people.

Q: What were they doing?

HARTWICK: The contracts that I worked on were think tank futuristic strategy thinking about developments for different parts of the world and things on contracts laid out by DARPA, Advanced Research Projects Agency from DOD. We were doing studies and think tank kinds of projects for DOD that fit into their strategic planning functions that they were doing.

Q: Okay this was all fun but here you are trying to figure out major efforts where were you getting your skills to do this?

HARTWICK: It actually fit in well in the sense that I was a research assistant so I was smart enough with a good enough education to know a bit about economics, a bit about political science, I had been traveling around the world ever since I was a boy and I could read and write pretty well. So that fit in to doing the simple analysis and data collection and writing up certain kinds of reports that they needed and the more I could do the more they would give me to do. Actually, it fit in pretty well coming out of an academic environment as I started to do papers and do data collection and analysis and stuff that wasn’t too dissimilar from what I had done before.

Q: What places were you looking at?

HARTWICK: One of the areas was. Others were talking about economic developments in key parts of the world. I was not an economist, I was just out of undergraduate school so I wasn’t much of anything but I gathered data. In ’72-’73 learning about computers was really picking up; no one obviously had laptop computers or even desktop computers, but you had computer analysis where you would take down the data cards that you had made and put through a main frame computer and get the printouts they wanted. That was the kind of stuff that I helped them out with. They sent me to George Washington to take a computer programming course and stuff like that. It was all beginning to change at that era. But what I came away with was a clearer understanding that I really don’t know much of anything; I may have an undergraduate degree but that accounts for nothing with all these people. Almost everyone there I was working with was either ABD, all but dissertation, or had their PhDs already in economics, political science, principally those fields and they were already pretty accomplished people. They were good people and I got along with them pretty well.

What it said to me was, okay, I’ve got to go to graduate school; I don’t know enough. I don’t want to be a research assistant; I want to do a higher level thing, but I’ve got to go back to school to do that. So I worked at this place, CACI, for a year. In the meantime, you recall my parents moved down to New Zealand. So it seemed to fit in that I would stop work after a year at CACI, apply to a bunch of graduate schools, and go down to
New Zealand, visit my parents for a few months, and then I will come back and go to school; that was the plan. So I applied to several schools. My grades at William and Mary weren’t that great, my SATs or GREs were okay, but my grades weren’t that great. So I had to scale down what I thought or would like to go to where I was going to get accepted. I applied basically to masters programs because I really hadn’t convinced myself I needed to get a PhD. One of the senior associates of the firm, a guy named Bob Franco who really liked me, was an economist by training. He kept saying you’ve got to go back to school. I applied to the University of Washington, Washington State, the University of Colorado at Boulder, and maybe to Berkley. I found myself wanting to go out west. Washington, DC, was crowded, polluted, I was tired and I wanted to get away from the East coast. I wanted to go out west so I was thinking in those terms and out of the blue I get this acceptance to the University of California at Riverside which is where the guy Bob Franco had gotten his PhD. I get a letter of acceptance to go to Riverside; I hadn’t even applied there. I remember I was shocked to think how did this even happen I hadn’t even applied. Well it turns out Bob really wanted me to go to his school. I didn’t go in the end, but it showed me people can be very nice, and you don’t always have to follow the rules exactly as they suggest; I mean a few phone calls can actually be helpful to you. I had my heart set on going to the University of Colorado at Boulder in part because of the environment and just living in that area but then Washington State University offered me a fellowship assistantship. In the end, my father said you can have all the plans you want but you don’t have any money. I have to pay for it and I want you to go where you are going to be making some money or helping reduce the cost of what I have to pay. So I said okay that makes some sense and I understood that too. So I went off to Washington State University. In early fall of 1974 I began in the economics department on a master’s degree at Washington State University.

Q: At that stage of things how mathematical was an economics advanced degree?

HARTWICK: Increasingly, increasingly. I was not a gifted math oriented kind of person but I’m not bad either, if I apply myself, and that is what I learned at William and Mary. My initial reaction was this stuff is too hard and then I realized that if you actually worked at it, it wasn’t that hard after all. Even political science when I worked at CACI doing a lot of the political science stuff, one of the phenomenon underway was the transformation of political science. There is the typical writing papers of the different places, oh no, you had to get a quantitative analysis in political science; so all of this was changing. But in economics too you had to have a good grasp of calculus and if you didn’t have it you had to work at it; econometrics was an important part of it. So when I went back to school that was very much something that I had to take on board and so I did. I concentrated on transportation economics; don’t ask me, I don’t know why and econometrics and some international. I was in Pullman, Washington, eastern Washington state. It was a two year program, and I realized that compared to William and Mary and possibly other schools, it really wasn’t as good a school as I felt I should be going to if I wanted to get a PhD. Some of the students were good, some of the students weren’t so good, some of the professors were better than others.

Q: Well it’s not that desirable place.
HARTWICK: The place is even not that desirable, yeah.

Q: From what I gather eastern Washington is agricultural and there is not that much around.

HARTWICK: No and what I came to learn while I was there was if I had been an ag-economist candidate or student they had a superb program there which makes sense but I hadn’t really gotten into the details enough to know that. My plan was to get my masters. A couple of other students who were my colleagues and were the better students had also made the same decision that they weren’t going to stay on after their masters; but I wasn’t sure that I wanted to get a PhD. I was not convinced that was what I wanted to do. I couldn’t quite figure out what am I going to do with that if I do this.

You asked about Foreign Service. At that point it started to come back into my life a little bit, the thinking about it. I thought that in the fall of 1974, I’ll take the Foreign Service exam and I did. I think I took it in Seattle the first time and the second time in San Francisco. I decided just on a lark I’ll take the Foreign Service exam and see how it goes. I still had another year of graduate school and I didn’t know what I wanted to do in my life but I will go ahead and do it. So I passed the written exam and went to take my oral exam and I didn’t pass. I wandered all over the place with my answers, I was probably not very coherent and they pulled me in and said, “Thank you very much.” These were the days they told you right then if you passed or not. You sit for five minutes then you come back in and they say you passed or you haven’t passed. So it was a bit of a shock to me all of a sudden I didn’t pass and I thought oh my God that’s terrible; I’d passed the written handily, but I hadn’t passed the oral. So that made a challenge in my mind. I hate to be rejected by not passing. That’s no good. If I don’t want to do it that’s one thing, but if they don’t want me to do it that’s another.

So I resumed my graduate school studies at Washington State and since I had plenty of schoolwork to do I didn’t really worry about onward jobs at that point. But the next fall I took the Foreign Service exam again, passed the written again, and this time I had to go down to San Francisco to take the oral; they had reduced the number of sites that you could do it. Went down and took it, had learned the lessons of the previous year pretty much.

Q: Is this ’75ish?

HARTWICK: This would have been in fall of ’75. I took the oral exam then and the format was still pretty much the same; they started tinkering with the format level but it was still pretty much the same between those two. But I learned lessons from the first one so when I went in I was prepared a little bit better. If I didn’t know an answer I told them I don’t know the answer to your question and I don’t want to waste your time or my time giving you gobbledygook, I don’t know the answer. Some of them were, as they usually are, pretty tough questions about three dimensional art and this and that period. I said I don’t even know what you are talking about; but in the end I passed and I did fine.
Q: Do you recall any of the questions asked?

HARTWICK: This would have been in 1975 right? Vietnam was still on everyone’s mind but really they were extricating ourselves from it. I remember one of the questions asked because I had been reading lots of different things from newspapers and journals. I remember one was a criticism of the United States for its foreign policy and why we would not stay the course and that kind of stuff. I remember that was a good one because I had thought about that, I had read a piece that Henry Kissinger had done related to that and I felt I was on really good solid ground. We talked about international organizations. They had several questions on international organizations and even compared to the year before, let alone compared to William and Mary days, I’d developed a better sense of international organizations and had some questions on that. Anyway a different mix of examiners and I was much more comfortable the second time although I’m not quite sure why.

I had my New Zealand girlfriend visiting at the time, up from New Zealand, and she was with me and I do recall I came out telling her “Adrian, I passed, I passed” and her immediate reaction was to burst into tears. I said why are you crying? I’m still not to this day quite sure but I think in the end she wanted to go back and live in New Zealand and she knew if I was joining the Foreign Service that I would be running around the world the rest of my life and she didn’t want to do that; she wanted to go back to New Zealand and that in her mind that was a strong signal that that was going to happen that way which ended up happening that way. But the initial reaction I came out and I was so excited and elated that I’d just passed this thing and the first reaction was her breaking into tears.

Anyway, then I finished my studies. I interacted with a close friend of mine I’d worked with at CACI. He now was working at Amtrak as an economist and he wanted to leave his job and go live in New York. He said, would you like my job? I’d actually been studying, among other things, transportation economics; I’d done some of that stuff and I said, “Yeah.” So I drove back with Adrian with me; she still was very uncertain about what I was doing. I wasn’t sure what I was going to do, I’d passed the exam but I didn’t know if I was going to join State. I interviewed at Amtrak and was hired me on the spot. I didn’t even have to look for anything it just sort of happened; it fell right in my lap and the pay was pretty good.

Since I had passed the exam BEX kept calling me up and saying, “We are forming another class, would you like to be a part of it? You are in the economic cone, your numbers are pretty high and you are alright.” So I turned him down once, I waited about another two and a half months and they called me up again and I turned them down a second time. I had just started this job with Amtrak right and I was not certain about how I was going to do at Amtrak or whether I really wanted to do it or not, it was a whole nother experience, Amtrak experience. Then Adrian and I were having increasing difficulties. She was really not happy with living in the U.S. She wanted to go back to
New Zealand and she wasn’t certain about what she wanted to do. She wasn’t sure if she wanted to be with me or not back and forth; finally she and I broke up.

Then the Foreign Service calls me again. “Well we are forming another class, are you interested?” They called me up and said, “Look Doug, we aren’t going to keep calling you up every two months just because you can’t make up your mind. New people go on the roster, people come off the roster, but your number is high enough that you keep getting offers, but we can’t guarantee the next time or the next time that you are going to keep getting offers. So if you are not interested make up your mind.” Since I had just broken up with this girlfriend I just thought and I was not thrilled with Amtrak. They were paying me quite well. By this point I’d been there four months at Amtrak, but I decided you know, let’s go ahead and do it, let’s give it a go, what the hell. So I did. My boss at Amtrak invited me out to lunch and wanted to give me a raise and give me a new thing and I had to tell him I’m actually going to leave. Then I thought what am I doing here. So then basically I told State I would start in the class in January of 1977. My last day of work was like January 13 for Amtrak and on January 14 I started with State.

Q: Okay, I think this is a good place to stop and we will pick this up next time in January ’77 and we’ll talk about your entry into the Foreign Service.

HARTWICK: Correct.

Q: All right, today is the second of February 2010 with Douglas Hartwick. Doug you were coming into the Foreign Service.

HARTWICK: January 1977.

Q: What was your impression of the class; sort of the mixture and backgrounds and all of that?

HARTWICK: This is January 1977 we had a class of about 34 or 36 people. My recollection would have been about a quarter of them women and I don’t recall maybe there was one African-American, maybe. Basically we were mostly white Americans in the class and maybe 20-25 percent were women out of that class. So background varied in terms of where they went to school and what they’d studied and age group. I mean I think our age group ranged from 21 years old to forty something which is a bit unusual. The average class age for our class was something like 31; I was 26. They ranged pretty much from all over the United States, a pretty diverse group from that standpoint but not from an ethnic minority standpoint.

Q: Well then how did you find the basic officer course?

HARTWICK: Frankly my recollections aren’t terribly strong one way or another. I remember finding it interesting; I myself having been the son of a Foreign Service officer I came in with a lot more knowledge than the average person. Although ironically in my class there was another junior officer whose father had worked with my father in
Barcelona, Spain, so there were actually two of us on the same not just generation but very, very similar background. I found the whole idea was exciting to be joining the Foreign Service. I remember a number of FSI classes that we were sort of the A-100 course going out to Harpers Ferry for our retreat but nothing really stood out in terms of rather unique about it. I then took the consular training course and that was not long after they had completely revamped the consular training and they made it into a real life experience kind of training period where you had in-box exercises, where you had to go visit people in jail and where you had to have a whole variety of things; this was the first time they started to do this. I think we all felt that was really terrific and it had come off very, very well and it was a good learning experience.

At the end of the A-100 class I got my onward assignment. I was not keen on doing a consular assignment if I could help it. But even back then in 1977 everyone recognized that we were told that in all likelihood we would have to do a consular assignment at first. So I looked for an opportunity to both do consular work, if I could, in conjunction with something else. I was also interested in learning French and so I ended up picking Niamey, Niger, which was French speaking. I came in almost qualifying at Spanish but I hadn’t spoken Spanish since I was about 17. So I was like a 3-2+ and had not practiced at all. I knew I could get that up pretty quickly if I wanted to retake the exam but I was very keen on learning French having spent some time with my parents one summer in Africa. So I used that as an opportunity to do French. Niamey, Niger, was on the list of several different assignments. It was an economic/consular position and it required 3-3 French and timing was such that if I got out there in September that worked out pretty well. I ended up volunteering for Niamey, Niger, and no surprise I got my first choice.

Q: Surprise, surprise. Okay you were in Niger from when to when?

HARTWICK: I was in Niger then from roughly September 1977 until June ’79.

Q: What was the situation more or less in Niger when you went out there, when you arrived?

HARTWICK: Well the government was headed by a benign military dictator, Seyni Kountché, a colonel. He had a military cabinet and government. He had been in power for four or five years, I think. The United States got along with his government fairly well. We had a pretty good AID presence that we were continuing to sustain. It’s a very poor country so a lot of what I was coping with was being in a new embassy with responsibilities that were somewhat unfamiliar to me and trying to get a handle understanding what it’s like to be living in a country on the edge of the Sahara Desert; both very hot and very dusty and very, very dry and then trying to understand all the various component parts even though it was a small embassy particularly with AID we had a lot of additional elements to U.S. presence there.

The ambassador was Charles James, an African-American who had been working for AID years before. He had a lot of personality and was a lot of fun to work with and he thoroughly enjoyed being the ambassador and being in Niger. My direct boss was a bit
more of a taciturn guy who was very bright and very sharp and the DCM; his name was Jack Davidson. One of my colleagues was Joe Wilson IV, who for all kinds of reasons became well known.

Q: I’ve done a long oral history with Joe.

HARTWICK: Well Joe and his wife Susan were my sponsor; of course I wasn’t married and he was the GSO at the time. In any case, the overall experience I think was reasonably positive. I enjoyed getting on top of my job and the nice thing about having an economic/consular responsibility was if you got bored with one you had something else to do. I had a chance to issue all of about 270 visas I think. I think I issued one IV (immigrant visa) my entire time; maybe I issued two IVs my entire two years there, not quite two years. One of the two was actually to my future wife because she was the only one emigrating to go live in the United States and that was with me; so that was unique.

I enjoyed the exploration part of it all. Niger was a challenging place to be in, mostly desert. We had Peace Corps volunteers some 40 odd. With my AID colleagues I made a practice to travel and go out and visit many of them and got as far over as Lake Chad on the Chad border and way up north into real Fair Dinkum desert. Ambassador James and I flew up in the DATT (defense attaché) airplane that came up from Abidjan one weekend and we flew up there to visit some American missionaries. I recall that the airplane, this nice smooth Beech King twin engine very sleek aircraft, landed on a field made out of sand that was reasonably well packed. However, this airplane came in with its small wheels. As it slowed down it began to settle in and as they kept putting brakes on to slow it down more the wheels kept digging in. Before we knew it, suddenly the airplane spun around and stopped dead with one of their landing gear firmly buried into the landing strip. You can imagine the pilots were both embarrassed and terrified that their careers were over at this stage because there we were way up in a place called the Agadez. You have a map? There are no names up here. Anyway it was not far from where the French had an on-going uranium mining which comes back to Joe Wilson again because many, many, many years later one of the things he did, remember with his wife, he was selected to go and do a look see to see if there had been some evidence of a possibility of shipping uranium ore to Libya. I think it was Libya.

Q: This was Saddam Hussein?

HARTWICK: Saddam Hussein that’s right.

Q: In Iraq, yeah.

HARTWICK: Yeah, anyway so this same place Agadez or near Agadez where the mining operation was where Chuck James and I went. So he and I spent a strange night up there in the middle of the desert with American missionaries, a Little House on the Prairie kind of thing that they had built for themselves. After the airplane got one of the landing gear buried, the pilots basically radioed back that they had had some landing trouble. They completely striped the airplane of all possible weight that they could shed:
food, water, odds and ends of things and, oh, by the way, the passengers Ambassador James and junior officer Hartwick. Then they got a bunch of Tuareg to come out and push the airplane out of the hole where it was into a firmer position. They revved up the engines as fast as they could and then let go of the brakes and took off. Off they went and they flew around and wiggled their wings at Ambassador James and junior officer Hartwick down below standing not on the tarmac but on the edge of the desert and they were gone. Chuck James looked at me and said, “Well, now what?” They had arranged for an oil marathon or something like that, an airplane down from the coast to fly up with great big balloon sized tires, de Havilland Otter I think was the aircraft, to fly that thing up there and land and that wouldn’t sink into the sand and pick up Ambassador James and junior officer Hartwick. The missionaries loaded us up the next day and so we basically had a very interesting evening that night with the missionaries. They took us out and found some fascinating caveman paintings in the mountain area that was very close to where they lived; they were in these caves but not very deep in these caves. These were clearly virtually unseen by most men; quite a remote area, very remote. Anyway we came back.

Niger was a good learning experience. That is where I ended up meeting my wife.

Q: What was her background?

HARTWICK: She had been working at the German embassy. You can imagine the small place like that there weren’t very many embassies and so there was a bit of a camaraderie among all embassies.

Q: Why would the German’s even bother to have an embassy there?

HARTWICK: Good question. I’m not really sure why. I never even asked that question. There were not very many. There was a French embassy obviously. The Germans had a presence in West Africa and one in Togo, of course. They had one in Abidjan and one in Niger, why I’m not sure; it was a very small embassy. There was an ambassador, number two, a consular fellow, my wife and a _________ called them, they were the people who took care of the filing; that was pretty much it.

Q: In Niger were the Libyans messing around in the area at the time?

HARTWICK: Not to my recollection; this would have been ’77 and you’ve got to remember, of course, the whole Sahara Desert is the upper two-thirds of Niger and then lower two-thirds of Libya. So you had really a mass of desert in between and really very little up in northern part of Niger and southern Libya, very, very little.

We did get world travelers who were crossing the Sahara Desert in caravans with these big German vehicles and so forth that would come across during the cool season. Not lots of them but we got some that came across. But I do not recall any Libyan problems up there; now there could have been a little bit on the border. Some of that border up there is very, very fluid. Later on, when I served in Central African Republic, the Chadians had
enormous problems by that time with Libyan involvement and that was in ’83-’85 so it was a little different but not that much later.

Q: As economic officer what was the economics of the area?

HARTWICK: Well the economics of the area were the poverty of the country and all of the AID flows of other countries, World Bank and others. I think the uranium deposit they had and the uranium for the country was also going to be very important. It dropped off very fast after that. So from an economic standpoint there wasn’t so much to write about or study; it was really monitoring the financial situation of the government, AID flows and how effective, in what area and by whom and then trying to keep an eye on the uranium deposits and the effort to exploit that which was just getting underway in ’77. It was a French company doing the work and to me it was really an opportunity to explore a very different world. So flying, traveling, driving along the southern part of Niger from Niamey all the way across which is where the main highway went was really a fascinating experience. It was so hot and so different and now in retrospect we see pictures of those things much more often but in the ’70s you didn’t see too much of that kind of stuff out there. You didn’t see it in common news reports or anything like that; very interesting.

Q: What about the Peace Corps what were they up to?

HARTWICK: Really odds and ends. We had forty odd and some of them were in public health, some of them were English teaching, some of them were in other kinds of instruction, mathematics or whatever but principally on the teaching side of things. Those poor kids were scattered all over southern Niger and it was unbelievable, horrible I thought. Here I was a junior officer living in the town and having my air conditioners and these young people basically my age and maybe a little bit younger were up living in mud huts, thatched roofs and sitting in temperatures of 45-50 degrees Celsius on a regular basis much of the year; so it was pretty tough on them. So we went out and visited a lot of the volunteers both for morale reasons to see what they were doing and hear what was going on with all the various tribal groups.

I went out with one of my AID colleagues, Sidney Bliss. We went out in a Land Rover to go visit some female volunteer and Sid was a practical joker. So we went out there and we brought her a bottle of wine. She was thrilled to see these two guys come visit her. She was thrilled to see these two guys come visit her. We had a very basic meal out there. There was no electricity virtually anywhere in the country except in the main two or three cities but you live by lamplight. Then it was time to go to bed and it was quite hot and everyone slept outside. So Sid pulled out one of those portable tape recorders and set it down next to his bed roll that he put out and just about the time we were going to bed he pushed the on button and you heard this sound of a whirr. He recorded the sound of an air conditioner. He recorded it and then he said to our volunteer friend, “I just can’t sleep without that sound of an air conditioner. So I hope it doesn’t disturb you.” I will never forget that it was one of the funniest things I ever recall. She looked at him in disbelief; he just pulled it off so smoothly you know.
I don’t know what other experiences in Niger would be of interest. We had a major break
down in the embassy in terms of the air conditioning system of the entire place and it was
shut down for almost two weeks during which was virtually all the time a hot spell. The
embassy was really built obviously for air conditioning; it had windows that opened but
opened very poorly and were very narrow windows so consequently it was unbelievably
hot in there. Then we had a sand storm blow through one day during this very hot period
and with all of our windows open that fine laterite orange dust that exists, one you
couldn’t see anything but when it blew into the embassy and we were all so hot and
sweating in this embassy with no air conditioning it just left orange everywhere.
Wherever you touched it was orange mud and finally the ambassador closed the embassy
down until the dust settled and they could clean it up because you couldn’t really work
there in that kind of crazy environment.

**Q:** Were you at all practicing your skills in contacting the Nigerien government trying to
get information from them?

**HARTWICK:** Well I was working had to get my own language skills up to speed
because, as you know, studying at FSI a 3-3 is one thing but getting out and really
working in that language is another thing all together. But as an economic officer and as a
consular officer both, I had ample opportunity to meet lots of different Nigeriens and
learn about the different tribal groups, learn about their government, learn about some of
its challenges, some of its weaknesses and so forth. I came away after about 21 months
having a good grasp of my entry level job and what the country meant.

**Q:** Outside of maybe uranium sales was there any particular interest in Niger?

**HARTWICK:** For the United States?

**Q:** Yeah.

**HARTWICK:** No, not really. I mean from a development assistance standpoint it was one
of the Sahelian countries. Prior to our getting there, there had been an extended several
year drought so AID had made a big push to provide extra assistant to the Sahelian
countries which included Niger. Of course, there was the old issue of seeking Nigerien
support in the United Nations. This, of course, was ’77 so very much in the middle of the
Cold War so having a friendly African government was always I think an American
interest from that standpoint. Our development presence was in those days significant but
not overwhelming and for the not quite two years I was there our main object really was
to keep relations on a good even keel with Seyni Kountché. He had plans to have
elections at some point but that never happened during the period I was there.

My first boss when I was there, Jack Davidson, left and he went down to be our chargé in
Togo. The second boss I had was Dennis Keogh. He was one of the first FSOs in the
modern era to be blown up by a terrorist bomb at a gas station in Botswana three or four
years later. But he had come there to be the DCM so he and I overlapped for the better
part of a year. He was a bit of a mentor and a good guy and he died about three years later
in this attack in Botswana. It was very bizarre. Little did we know that the terrorist world was beginning to grow and grow and grow out there.

Q: Was there a concern out there about fundamentalism? I assume it was essentially an Islamic state, wasn’t it?

HARTWICK: It was an Islamic state run by the military. I don’t recall that religion was an issue on virtually anything. Now that may be just because I didn’t deal with it very much but actually we had no political officer either and so the issue of fundamentalism and all of that was really simply not on our scope but I don’t think it was really much of an issue. Relations between Niger and Nigeria were important because Nigeria was a major oil exporter to the United States by that time and to the extent that northern Nigeria and southern Niger shared a lot of tribal links and so forth. But the trouble in Nigeria at the time was more for the Ibo down south where all the oil was being pumped, not from the north, ironically. The north was considered the most stable and the quietest for Nigeria and the whole idea from the American standpoint was we wanted to see good relations between Niger and Nigeria and that meant good relations between Niger and the tribal groups there and the tribal groups in other parts of Nigeria.

Q: Were the Tuareg the biggest tribal group or not?

HARTWICK: Tuareg were among them, but they were not the biggest ones. Hausa was probably the biggest tribal group, and there were a lot of Hausa on both sides of the Nigeria-Niger border. Tuareg was another group, Fulani was another.

Q: What was the role of the French embassy at that time?

HARTWICK: Well the French presence was big; they supported militarily. There was a fair bit of development and military assistance, but the French had the lead across the board on virtually everything. To me it was great fun and quite exciting to be invited to the French embassy and speak French to the French diplomats and so forth; they had an embassy about twice the size of ours. They obviously had lots and lots of French citizens who lived in those places and being aware of what they were doing and up to was really the fabric of the economy as well because so much of it was driven by a lot of the French colonial or neo-colonial presence.

Niger was very remote, it was very poor, and it was really more of an anthropology class in my mind when I was there in terms of just trying to understand how these different pieces fit together. Humanitarian issues existed in terms of the poverty and starving and so forth for a lot of the tribal groups in the southern part of Niger. But the rains had come and the problems that had been there three or four years before had not returned when I was there. To me it was an opportunity to learn about all the different kinds of linkages between Niger and elsewhere in Africa and the colonial presence or former colonial presence and then seeing how the United States fit into that overall mix.
I received a message from the State Department in either February or March from the economic bureau seeking my interest in coming to work in EB. I was very flattered to think that here I was out in deepest, darkest Africa and EB was pursuing me. I was still very naïve about how these things go. But I had done an econometric training when I had been at graduate school and somehow the venerable Frances Wilson of the economic bureau had looked through files and either she or some of her minions had seen all this. So she was looking to see who was transferring summer of ’79 and if they would be good prospects for the economic bureau and somehow I was on one of their lists. Suddenly I realized I was being pursued, but they said that I absolutely had to get back there by June 1st that they needed me and my work should get going on June first. That didn’t fit in for me personally very well because I had a girlfriend and I wasn’t sure I was going to go on with her. I really wanted to stay my full two years. I was conferring with Dennis Keogh and Ambassador James and trying to figure out what we wanted to do and they finally agreed, okay, you can go at the end of May and we will get you back there by June first.

On the personal side as a result of that my girlfriend then, Regina, and I weren’t sure how to proceed. So we concluded, okay, let’s get married. Obviously, that was a big decision for all of us. I would have been almost 28 at the time. So I informed Ambassador James and he said, “Okay, that’s great, she’s a great woman and we need to get this all squared away with the administrative side of the State Department and security side as well.” So we sent in a telegram to that effect as did she to her German headquarters. Her people came back and said, “Fine. So you will be transferred to Washington.” We went, “Terrific.” The State Department came back and said, “Okay, you want to get married, either you have to resign or she has to resign effective before your marriage takes place. We will not have her working, and if you don’t want to resign then she has to resign and she cannot be working for a foreign government.” Well than that threw us into a real tizzy because here now she had a job at the German embassy as a diplomat in Washington already lined up, good to go, diplomatic immunity, not paying taxes, a whole variety of things and my government was telling me she had to resign or I had to resign.

So we kicked it around and we finally decided what’s in a marriage? Marriage is a bond between vows and a bond between two people, that’s the most important thing. So let’s go ahead and do this. We decided we will marry one another but we won’t have any officiating at the marriage. So we will have our exchange of vows ourselves. We looked into having the mayor of Niamey be the presiding person and that sort of thing. She was not religious and I was not religious either so we weren’t so much looking at a religious ceremony. So we went ahead and did that and on March 31, at the ambassador’s residence, he suddenly got quite cold feet thinking he might get in trouble, if I recall. So he went off to Europe about three days before our wedding and came back about 4-5 days afterwards; but he said by all means use my house. So we had a wedding reception and exchanged vows on March 31 but never actually got married and then informed the State Department we actually were not getting married. So her assignment to Washington, DC, for the German embassy went through and I basically had to leave by the end of May. I went to Washington and she caught up with me in September of ’79 and joined me there. Then we moved in together in a house that we found and bought together but didn’t formally get married for another four plus years.
Q: Let’s talk about you were with the economic bureau?

HARTWICK: I moved into the economic bureau. Another little lesson of State Departmentese: I did everything I could with heaven and earth including getting married, if you will, to get back by June 1st. I show up on June 1st and I’ve been assigned to the planning and analysis staff (EB/PAS). I came to learn upon my arrival that the office director was just leaving within the week after my arrival. The deputy director was leaving within two months of my arrival. Things were beginning to slow down and PAS seemed to be an office they never were quite sure what to do with in the economic bureau. So I showed up and promptly had no real bosses for the next three months which frankly was very, very irritating having shifted my life around to do this. Basically it was Frances Wilson making sure that she had me locked in. I was quite disappointed when this happened because I ended up sitting around and twiddling my thumbs for the better part of three months before my new bosses came in and in a new direction. It was a little hard never having served in the State Department before to suddenly know what am I going to do in a somewhat odd little office of about five officers, including the director, to generate economic analysis of whatever the higher ups wanted. But without a boss in there we didn’t even know what the bosses wanted. Anyway I managed.

I had written several letters while I was still thinking about where I was going to work before the PAS job came up. I had written to the office of the undersecretary of economic affairs (E) to see if they had a staff aide or a special assistant job or something like that that might be suitable. They thanked me very much and said, “At this point things are sort of fluid but we’ll be back in touch.” Well, by September we got a new boss in in the PAS office but by late September I suddenly was called up to E and they said, “You wrote us a letter back five-six months ago that we have on file. Are you interested in working here?” At this point, having spent already spent three months in PAS not doing anything, a new boss had come in but he didn’t know what to do with this office yet either so I said, “I don’t want to burn bridges in EB but, yes, I am quite interested,” and so forth. Anyway, we negotiated around and I started working in E January 1980. I worked in EB for six months basically that was it.

So then that was my third assignment, if you will, going to work in E; first as a staff aide and then I managed to get myself designated as one of the special assistants.

Q: Well let’s talk a bit about Frances Wilson. Her name crops up again and again. Unfortunately, she passed beyond before I realized what an important figure she was in the economic bureau during the ’70s.

HARTWICK: Yeah.

Q: What was your impression of her and how she operated?

HARTWICK: Well the truth was I really didn’t know her. I mean I met her for the first time after I arrived and her reputation preceded her to everybody in EB. She had been in
that job as the executive director of EB for maybe twenty-five years; she had worked forever in that job as a civil servant. She knew the building and she knew what her job was in terms of supplying and staffing up the economic bureau. She was a horse trader too. She knew how the system worked, how to get people, how to give up people, how to call in chits when you needed to and that kind of thing. There was no one in that bureau that didn’t somehow have a Frances Wilson stamp on them in some way or other. I went off to E for a year and then I came back to EB after that year, and in the meantime, if I recall correctly, she retired. The general mindset I think in the EB front office was they couldn’t believe they would have a life without Frances Wilson. One, they respected her; two, they feared her in some respect; three she was so respected in what she did that the whole idea of bringing in a whole new executive director was a shock to the system. But I think I only met her twice the whole time and it would have been very brief. She remembered my file too. She obviously was one of those persons who really knew who were all the people in there and where they came from or what they were doing and where they might be going next or how she might direct them next. But she was a factor in the ‘70s and late ‘60s for the economic bureau and it affected a lot of people’s careers I suspect, important people later on.

Q: Oh yes.

HARTWICK: Yeah.

Q: What about you went up to be first staff aide to whom, what were you doing and where?

HARTWICK: Well the undersecretary at the time was Richard N. Cooper. This was in 1980 so this would have been late Jimmy Carter period. He was a highly respected economist from outside, he was not a political guy; he was politically connected somewhat but he was very much an academic economist. I arrived in that office just as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began.

Q: That was December at Christmas.

HARTWICK: Of ’79-’80, that’s right. I showed up there, as I recall, the first week of January so having Christmas time off I showed up and as you recall the Carter administration reaction to the Soviet invasion was deep angst, fury, we’ve got to stop this if we can kind of a thing short of war and overt action. So one of the things that the administration launched was an all-point study of how do we put an embargo on the Soviet Union in every which way that we possibly can. Well the economic bureau in E is the policy office and the undersecretary ended up being the center of a lot of that maelstrom of how do we punish the Soviets for having done this. I arrived and within a week we were working virtually twenty-four hours; I remember I was completely blown over. I had gone from doing almost nothing in EB prior to Christmas to jumping into a staff aide job where the place was operating twenty hours a day. It was grueling and I ….

Q: What were you doing?
HARTWICK: I was both learning the new office and helping support other staff people in there. The secretaries were there doing a good job. I was making sure that Cooper had the paper flow he needed. I was making sure that the various bureaus putting paper up for the secretary and the under secretary to examine and look and talk about that all that was as it should be. I was making sure that Cooper was getting all that he needed from our bureaucracy. There was a lot of pressure and a lot of attention and a lot of on-going sense of this was a very serious moment.

Q: Basically you were trying to stick it to the Soviets?

HARTWICK: If you recall, we didn’t really have any leverage over the Soviets short of trying to make their life difficult; at least certainly not in 1980. In 1980 one of the big things was what do you do about the Olympics coming up. The other one was the great big natural gas pipeline being built from the Soviet Union into Europe, which many, many American companies are involved in; a lot of our key allies were involved. How do you build the alliance to reinforce the embargo; embargoes are obviously only as good as long as everyone participates and if they don’t then it starts to fall down. So all of that was going right through Cooper’s office. It was a very, very intense time working with the Brits, the Germans, the French, the EU and trying to get all these different moving parts to work together. We wanted to really punish the Soviets if we could. The Europeans are a lot closer to the Soviet Union themselves in terms of proximity and needs and were a bit more hesitant and it was fascinating watching them from that standpoint. What I found as a junior officer just moving in there it was very stressful. I was newly married too so all of this was going on at the same time. But we all survived and it put me in a position to understand a lot more about the workings of the U.S. government because when I came back and worked in EB it was a dead office, nothing was happening. Then six months later I’m in the middle of a maelstrom of the U.S. government trying to punish the Soviets and what did the State Department do working with Treasury, working with Commerce, working with a whole variety of different groups. That’s what really sticks to my mind more than anything else.

By the late summer of that period there was a turnover in the office and I was fortunate to get Cooper to agree to let me take over some substantive responsibilities not just paper flow responsibilities. So he designated me as his civil aviation staffer as well as to monitor what was going on in our relations with Japan from an economic standpoint. I was very pleased that I had a chance to do that because I did both the staff aide work of sorts but things had slowed down by the late summer and I knew enough about all the jobs that I could actually devote myself to the substance of the two different job areas; so I did that. That allowed me to be substantively be involved with the economic bureau in civil aviation, with the Department of Transportation, with the Japan desk and so forth and get known a little bit from that standpoint.

That led to my one trip with Cooper to Japan. That saw me through to the end of the year. At that point the executive assistant for Dick Cooper, Ed Morris, moved down to be a DAS in the energy office. I thought getting involved in the energy area would be
interesting too. So I finished my stint with Cooper and I moved down there in January of 1981 to work for Ed Morris. All that was job engineering and getting set up. It was fortuitous in getting me into position for doing some of the things that I liked to do.

Q: On the home front did you find that you and your wife had all opposing views? The German’s didn’t jump into this boycott with any pleasure or did they even get into it at all?

HARTWICK: Well they did get into it and they had to get into it. Their biggest concern was they were already quite dependent on the Soviet Union for natural gas imports and that was really one of the most difficult things between the United States and the Europeans. We were trying to stop the pipeline which would deny the Soviet Union the resources of selling all its natural gas to Europe. In a perfect world that sounds like a good thing to do; the problem was the Europeans were all dependent on that natural gas so they were not very keen. So that is where we had a lot of arm twisting and negotiations and cajoling of our European partners to try and be supportive of doing this. In the end it didn’t work very well. The Europeans were sympathetic to stopping the Soviets in Afghanistan but not sympathetic to cutting off all their energy resources coming out of the Soviet Union. In the end the pipeline did go through and part of the symbolic nature of the embargo shifted an awful lot to the Olympics and Cooper’s office didn’t do Olympics; that was more of a role for P and other parts of the bureaucracy. That became the real way for sending a strong powerful signal to the Soviets that we were not going to participate there in 1980; remember it was in Moscow as it turns out. That was not an E issue that was much more of a P issue and so the focus shifted over there.

So I moved down with Ed Morris who had been my boss in E and I liked very much. He was a young, very bright guy and had been a faculty member at Princeton for a while but he was a very active fellow; so he went down to the Economic bureau and had me come down there with him. I took over the portfolio of U.S.-Canadian energy relations which in 1980-81 was when we had the oil embargos. From the Middle East you had OPEC flexing its muscles; the cost of fuel suddenly tripling on the streets of mainline America in 1979. So moving early in 1980-81 to the energy office it was an area where energy was very sensitive and very, very important to us and, of course, our energy relations with Canada were also very important.

I mean here is our next door neighbor sitting on an enormous amount of energy and yet we had taken them for granted all these years and were paying rock bottom prices for natural gas and other kinds of energy things, electricity from Quebec and so on. So I found that to be a very interesting time, ’81-’83, the Canadians having recognized the Americans had been taking them for granted and then suddenly putting energy issues at the front and center for the United States and actually much of the world as a result of the OPEC effects and the Soviet Union and the gas pipeline. Energy issues took on a whole new meaning. All of a sudden the idea of secure sources of energy and so forth were very, very important. The Canadian dimension of that had natural gas pipeline from southern Canada, it had the Alaska pipeline they wanted to build, it had relations between American oil companies active in western Canada and eastern Canada and Ottawa and
the Canadian government not happy that all the oil companies out west happened to be controlled by American interests. So there was a lot of tension going on with our neighbor Canada at the time. Pierre Trudeau’s government was fairly liberal and we had a time in ’81, of course, when Ronald Reagan comes into power so we had really some difference of ideological approach. I had an opportunity to travel to Ottawa several times. I went to Calgary several times, to Vancouver and it was an exciting period. It also gave me an entrée into understanding how complicated the active energy interests were in the United States whether it was the regulation of natural gas and the pipelines to the oil companies and how they viewed Washington and how Washington viewed them. It was a very interesting period and went by very quickly.

Q: Well did you find the Canadian’s had quite different goals? Were they difficult to deal with or what?

HARTWICK: Well the Canadians are always our close neighbors and friends. That being said, in the rarefied atmosphere of heightened energy security needs, and the fact that the prices of energy had been ramped up so much in the previous twenty-four months, from ’79 on the Canadian attitude, the Canadian government’s attitude in particular and eastern Canada was shifting itself rather dramatically. From their viewpoint, they needed to secure their own energy needs. They didn’t want to just sell it all at bargain prices to the Americans and have the Americans take them for granted even though energy exports were very important for Canada then as they still are today. They suddenly realized that they needed to price them according to new world prices, that they needed to make sure that they had enough in the ground for themselves, and they didn’t want to be too dependent on the Americans for fear that they would be dictated to by American energy interests. So the government at the time came in with a whole new mindset about that and they introduced the NEP, the New Energy Policy. It basically was how do we start nationalizing much of the petroleum interests in Canada. You can imagine how that went over in Texas and in Washington. We really were in many ways suddenly facing a whole new relationship with Canada in the area of energy. We already had other trade issues with Canada for a long time that weren’t terribly well handled by both sides so energy became front and center of pretty big issues and pretty much remained that way for quite a while. The NEP never in the end got implemented the way they originally drafted it, but once again when they drafted up an NEP with all its various elements, the U.S. energy sector just went crazy trying to fight it. Of course, that meant they brought all the powers to bear as much as they could on the Department of Energy and the Department of State to fight their fight for them and with them; so that was a very interesting thing.

In watching western Canada and its reactions to all of this compared to eastern Canada, western Canada did not want to be beholden to and did not want to take orders from eastern Canada at all. The governments in Alberta and British Colombia did not want to be taking directions from all the easterners. It was interesting to see the alliances of western Canada and more with the position of the U.S. government as compared with eastern Canada. Eventually, the Trudeau government had to stand down. They were not voted in again. Much of the NEP never went into effect.
**Q:** It was Mulroney.

HARTWICK: Brian Mulroney, right. Then the energy prices came back down so that much of what had caused such great consternation in ’80, ’81 and ’82 suddenly became less of an issue. We worked very hard on the pipeline from Alaska with phase one and phase two. The politics were very significant and the amount of money being invested to build that thing was very, very big. It was a good learning experience and I felt that Ed had ran his office very well. One of the deputy directors was Al Larsen who went on to great fame. He was one of the deputy directors and a good guy. We had a really crack group of officers working in that little group, that little cell; it was quite an exciting time for all of us.

That takes me to about 1983. In the meantime, my wife, Regina, now was informed by her government that she was going to be transferred back to Germany the summer of 1983. We had learned this not long beforehand. The Germans tended to work a bit more advanced than we were, so we had learned that my wife was pregnant, that she was expecting in January our first child. So she informed her government that she was going to resign effective December of 1982 and she did so. So on December 10, I think, 1982 when she was about eight months pregnant we ran down to the Arlington courthouse and had a civil ceremony formally getting married which we hadn’t been up until that time. In the economic bureau I was coming out since my two year tour was up in January of 1983. I decided to extend until the summer because there aren’t many jobs in January.

**Q:** Oh yeah, yes.

HARTWICK: I went ahead and the extension went through. I learned from my contacts in AF that the Central African Republic DCM position was suddenly open because the incumbent ambassador had fired his DCM. The personnel person said too bad you aren’t available Hartwick; you might have a chance of being a DCM at a young age if you were free. I mulled that over and spoke to my wife and she said, “Yeah, why don’t we go for that?” We were about ready to have a baby. We both had lived in Africa with her having lived for several years there. So we felt very comfortable there and we thought this may be a good opportunity for us to go overseas. We had a new small child, we could have household help, and we would get out of the Washington craziness and she was losing a job.

**Q:** Education wasn’t the...

HARTWICK: Education wasn’t an issue at all. Health would be important if we had a problem but if we didn’t have a problem then it wasn’t going to be a big issue and she had already formally told them she was not going to go on to Bonn. She wasn’t going to go back to Germany with her job; so maybe this was a good time. So I went back and I spoke to Ed Morris and he said, “Well, okay if you want to break your assignment I’ll support you if this job is possible.” So they sent my name out to the ambassador at the time, a guy named Art Woodruff, and he had very few options because here he had fired his DCM in October/November and he wasn’t going to get anybody for the next four or
five months. So he looked at my resume. I’d served in Niger, and so he said, “Okay, let’s do it.” I arrived in February 1983, in Central African Republic as the DCM. I was pretty junior, pretty young, pretty naïve and probably a bit arrogant for the simple fact that I thought if the previous DCM had been fired he just had not done a good job and I was sure I would do a good job. Well the problem apparently of the previous DCM had been an African-American. The admin officer had been an African-American and she was an extremely difficult officer, one of the most difficult officers that certainly I had ever met.

Q: She was the GSO of the ambassador?

HARTWICK: She was the admin officer of an embassy that had an ambassador, DCM, admin officer, economic officer, political officer, station and so forth; it was a pretty simple makeup. I knew that that was why he, the DCM, had been sent home. The ambassador had been unhappy that the DCM had not been able to rein her in and some of her excesses, of how difficult she was because the embassy had been complaining. I thought well I can deal with this. I wasn’t sure why I thought I could deal with this. I just told myself I can deal with it. Well I got out there and it was every bit as difficult as one can imagine; this woman was extremely difficult.

Q: What was the problem? Describe your relationship.

HARTWICK: Well it was less my relationship although I will describe that in a second. What I inherited was a situation where you had an ambassador who was basically not an Africanist at all, who had come in from EUR, he had been there for about not quite two years when I got there. He was very aloof, not interested in embassy management per se, but interested in what he was doing as ambassador and his contacts with the government and so forth but he was not engaged much in the embassy. So his previous DCM as much as I could determine had his hands full trying to deal with this admin officer and probably other sections too. Again, sometimes African posts are not staffed with the best of people and have lots of difficult challenges here and there. The admin officer, to hear her describe herself, was a person who goes by the book; well going by the book in this little post meant she was a terror on people. She was very mindful that she had to account for absolutely every penny and get every penny for the U.S. government whenever she felt something was not as it ought to be. For example, your servant throws coffee grounds down the drain in your house and it gets stopped up. You call GSO to get it fixed; GSO sends you a bill for the whole cost of fixing it because your servant put coffee drains down there.

Q: Good God.

HARTWICK: Oh it was unbelievable and I can give you a million examples. So I came into this new job not knowing a lot of details, knowing that that had been a problem, coming in to say I am going to get along with her, I am going to do what the ambassador needs, I will try to help improve morale and we’ll take it from there. There had already been a lot of bad feelings because the previous DCM had left. He wasn’t a bad guy; he actually was a nice guy but she had gotten the better of him, it was pretty clear. The
ambassador told me he should have fired her rather than firing him, but he was afraid that she might go after him in some sort of ugly suit that she might do, and he felt he needed someone else who could deal with her and Ollie didn’t do a good job. So he got rid of Ollie.

Well, then he informed me of all this after I got there. I had only been there a few weeks; he went off on leave for three weeks up to Europe and I had an impossible time with this woman. She refused to do anything I asked her to do. It was unbelievable. He told me I was to have the following things done for the embassy. He wanted to have his car done. He wants to order this, order that. I would pass this on to her and she would refuse. I said, you can’t refuse, we need to do this, this is what the ambassador wants done. You can’t refuse; there is no point in refusing here. She said, “He didn’t tell me directly.” What do you mean he didn’t tell you directly? He told me directly. Within two weeks after he went on leave she had submitted a seven page affidavit accusing me of sex and racial discrimination. Seven pages, and I had only been at post not even two months I don’t think. That set the stage for what was going to be in the end a very difficult assignment for me in this job with this ambassador and with this admin officer. Unfortunately, as interesting as the Central African Republic was it ended up almost ruining my first effort as a management person. Dealing in this small post trying to keep the place from coming apart, you can imagine how difficult it was.

I did not know she had submitted this affidavit against me as she put it through the pouch. No telegrams went out on this stuff. It wasn’t until months later that we got a notification from Kinshasa that they were going to send out a counselor who deals with personnel disputes: someone in the embassy who is designated to do that kind of stuff to try and see if you could deal with it at post; so much the better. If you couldn’t deal with it at post, maybe having an impartial person come in and try to make some recommendations. If you can’t do that then maybe go back to the department. So they had basically routed it down there. So in comes this person from Kinshasa. That was the first I’d learned that she had submitted this memo against me two months previously through the pouch. It had a whole laundry list of accusations and then a long list of what her demands were to satisfy her complaints against me. What it basically asked was that she could operate as a complete independent authority from the DCM from here on out, that I would not sign off on her telegrams, that I would not do this, etc. I said I cannot agree to this, this doesn’t make any sense. Anyway, it went on for quite a while. In the meantime Woodruff, the ambassador, his tour was finished and he left. So I had three months of being chargé. I was terrified that as chargé I was going to have someone sent in on top of me because we had this ongoing dispute and now no big senior American ambassador boss. The Department didn’t do that. Luckily they had confidence in me that in running the post things overall were okay. I did my best to try and get along with her and we would wait until the new ambassador came in.

So three months later a new ambassador did come in. He came in with what to me was a terrible attitude saying I am not a party to this dispute. I know nothing, I don’t want to get involved. I have a DCM here and I have an admin officer here and their problems are nothing to do with me and my running the embassy and I will not take sides. Meanwhile I
couldn’t wait for him to get there because I was on pins and needles all the time with this woman. Things like I needed to see a FAM; she would lock her door and wouldn’t let me into her office to see the FAM.

Anyway, in the end she left after one year. The complaints against me were never resolved whatsoever in any informal way at the post or with other posts. The EEO office finally sent in two lawyers to take depositions from the entire embassy staff along all the accusations about me as DCM. You can imagine how disruptive this was to the whole embassy of eight people. In the end they did a massive 55-page study of all the things and concluded there was no basis on anything that I was accused of. But it basically took the guts out of a better part of a year and a half because of that fighting. She was transferred basically a little over a year after I had been there. She went to Tijuana and I had one more year left on my assignment. It was a very scary thing frankly.

Q: What happened to her in Tijuana do you know? It sounds like a real...

HARTWICK: She went in there as the admin officer in Tijuana. She was there about a year and took out a massive EEO case against the principal officer in Tijuana. That went on for the better part of a year and she was awarded a two-grade promotion based upon her accusations that apparently were substantiated somehow in the investigation in Tijuana. So she went from being an FS-3 to an FS-1 after that. Then she rode out, as I understood it, her FS-1 period for however many years and she retired. But I think I was the third EEO case she had taken out in successive positions.

She was frightening. She scared me because she was about ten years older than I was and when we got into these discussions about trying to make sense out of her accusations and what she was asserting either against me or about a situation…I was trying to get her to be pragmatic and sensible about her approach on some of the problems we had in this little difficult and terrible little post. Her eyes would just get very big and broad and start to bug out. She would get so upset you really feared something bad was going to come out of it. She got really emotional. She was not balanced.

Q: It does show how you might say the Department of State I suspect other elements of the government could be manipulated by somebody who could call in the race and gender factor. I mean if they are willing to play that card...

HARTWICK: Absolutely. She was known to the EEO office very well. They actually admitted later on to me at different stages they had sympathy for me and others that she had done this to, but there was no sanction on her. The government had to investigate all of her accusations. There was no penalty for her to continue to make them as she went from post to post. She was able to intimidate the various people at various posts; I mean I was intimidated. In the end when I wrote up the EER I tried to get out of being her supervisor. This goes back to ambassador number two. I said to him right in the beginning, a guy by the name of Ed DeJarnette. I said, “Mr. Ambassador we have an untenable situation here and I am not in a position, under the circumstances, to really be her supervisor. I cannot supervise her adequately; we have a very difficult situation. I’ve
managed through it for three months as chargé. You are now here. I respectfully request that you be her direct supervisor. I just don’t think that it makes any sense me being in the loop. I really can’t exercise properly any authority over her the way these circumstances are.” He thought about it and I think he checked with a couple of people in the Department and he came back and said, “No, Doug, I think you have to be her supervisor, you have to write her EER.” I said, “But just what am I supposed to say?” I said, “All she is going to do is gripe the entire thing, the system is not going to be at all held up by this sort of an EER.” He basically said, “Nope, I can’t do that, you have to do it.”

So I sat down when it came to EER time and by this time she had just left post. I wrote her the most basic, flat EER. I didn’t criticize her about anything. I didn’t really commend her on anything but I had to commend her enough so that she wouldn’t gripe it by saying that I was intentionally trying to flat-line this thing. In the end I succeeded. I mean the system didn’t succeed but I managed. When the adjudication of this whole case came out she had already left post two. This happened afterwards. Her choice then was: the EEO office has examined this and they had concluded and found no basis for proceeding with respect to Hartwick situation. Consequently they were going to stand down, but she had every right to go to civil court and take up an EEO case against me at that stage. So then I was thinking now I’m going to have to hire a lawyer, but then the EEO office assured me that they would provide a lawyer to protect me in the event she did that. She had informed them that absolutely she was pursuing this to protect her honor and dignity. Well she didn’t do it in the end, and so it died at that point. It just faded away.

Q: But you know you hear of these cases of people who basically refuse to be effective and really most of the time they’ve got let’s say a personality problem.

HARTWICK: She did.

Q: I mean an extreme personality problem but here is an organization, the State Department, that can’t get rid of somebody like that.

HARTWICK: Oh, it was terrible because as this investigation took place and they sent these two lawyers out to post and at a small post you start taking depositions of people…

Q: Talking about Central African Republic.

HARTWICK: But we are talking about a personnel issue. I was the number two in the embassy and I was dealing with an admin officer who had taken out a sex and racial bias case against me that I came to learn about months after I had been working with her that she had already done this. Then this thing kind of played out. So you are coming in at the end of the discussion when it plays out.

When it came to taking depositions of the entire embassy, you are talking about maybe eight Americans we were there. So, okay, I’m the defendant, she is the plaintiff. I am
allowed to read everything that’s been said by everybody. But I’m not supposed to know who said what so they redact all the names with black magic markers. So you can’t see who said what but you know you’ve got eight people in the embassy. Anytime someone tells any story you know exactly who it is because it’s a small little intimate family. I mean I know that story, I know what happened; I know who is saying it. So it was a terribly painful experience because people who you believe were your friends, people you hoped you could count on when faced with a situation like that, whether you deny it or act like they never heard of it, and it was just horrible. I came away feeling just sick about the whole thing. Even the Department people who told me about her before I came out, that I was going to face a big difficulty with her, up and down the corridors they just denied they said anything like that. I felt really lonely and I suddenly realized I’m really vulnerable here. No one wants to get involved with a case like this. They don’t want to be accused of being against an African-American or taking a position and also she might go after them. So you were just on your own and I really thought maybe at that point maybe my career was going to be finished. I could go down with this thing but I didn’t; it was very, very painful.

Q: This pretty much took up your time there didn’t it?

HARTWICK: You can imagine. We had other things to take up our time. We had one of our consular officers drown in a pool.

Q: Oh no. How did that happen?

HARTWICK: He was a junior case officer. He and his boss had had a big party with North Koreans, a big coup for our intelligence services, a very big coup and they had gotten rip roaring drunk. They came home to the house of the station chief and were absolutely drunk out of their minds. One passed out in a chaise lounge next to the pool and the junior officer who, incidentally, was the stand-up supporter of me in this sexist and racial case. When they interviewed him he absolutely supported me down the line saying all the stuff that I had said and he recounted several stories he himself had had. His boss didn’t do it. He said, “Don’t know anything about it.” Anyway, he fell in the pool and drowned, a big six foot seven guy. He was obviously so drunk he fell in the pool and…it was horrible, horrible.

So we had a few incidents like that and things that had happened in this little post. It was a challenging place.

Q: Well then you left there when?

HARTWICK: I left there in June of ’85.

Q: Was there anything going on I mean I realize at some removed but were the Libyans messing around there at all?
HARTWICK: Well the political control of Central African Republic was a military government. It was a country fraught with just horrific political problems and tribal problems and it had been going on for a very long time. The Central African Empire. First it was the country of Bokassa.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: Jean-Bedel Bokassa, right. I got there in ’83; Bokassa was overthrown finally in 1979 so it was a country still recovering very much from the Bokassa period. Bokassa was a megalomaniac in this little central African country.

Q: Did he have lockers full of dismembered parts of children for his...

HARTWICK: Well those were all the stories and by the time I got there in ’83 not clear but the stories were there and lots of stories that were substantiated of things that he did. Masses of excesses. For example, when he did his coronation as the empire he flew in something like sixty white stallions from Belgium. In CAR and Bangui you saw these poor nags that had been abandoned that were struggling still to stay alive. My wife was a big horse person. Her heart went out trying to save these animals as there were still three or four still alive that theoretically someone of the Central Africans still owned that were stuck in these lots here and there and you could see them. They were diseased and their hoofs were all split, it was just horrible; it was very, very tough. Anyway, Central African Republic was very much in the recovery stage in ’83 when I was there.

As a former French colony the French were very, very active there. A big French presence, French military base in the central part of the country not in Bangui itself but nearby. The government was headed by a four-star general. Then his cabinet full of all various different tribal markings of all his military officers. It was so pathetic it was just a riot in terms of how these people interacted with one another and how this government operated. But we, the United States, wanted to be on good relations as they had the North Koreans and the South Koreans there; the Chinese were there in a pretty big way so we remained pretty supportive of the government. We wanted to get them on the line of democracy, wasn’t sure whether they would get there or ever did get there. We wanted to help them recover from the Bokassa period a bit.

They had a big change of minister portfolios and out of nowhere a first lieutenant becomes a foreign minister. Well he was linked to the right tribal group and he was the only one within the military that spoke English. Now how did that happen? Well, he had grown up in a village where there had been American Peace Corps volunteers so he spoke English and so he was designated the foreign minister. We immediately befriended him, and he had been taught by Peace Corps volunteers so he had this warmth for the United States because of his Peace Corps teachers teaching him English. So he called me in, he called in the ambassador, he called in the econ officer who was roughly his age as well and he said, “I don’t know what to do. They put me in this position I don’t know what I’m supposed to do. Can you tell me what I’m supposed to do?” It was the most incredible thing. I mean it went on and on. We got all the Peace Corps volunteer
passports together to get visas renewed; they had to get approved by the foreign minister himself. The ministry promptly lost all of their passports, they disappeared. I had to go in and see the foreign minister and find out what happened to the passports. He was sitting across the desk and here was this young guy, he was younger than I was, he said, “I didn’t do it, I didn’t do it, I didn’t lose the passports, I have no idea where they are. I don’t know where, it couldn’t have happened here, I’ve never seen them.” Sure enough about four-months later they found them somewhere in one of the ministry rooms. But it was just the most ridiculous thing you’d ever seen.

The Central African Republic had some tense moments too because…you asked about Libyans. They had some Libyan activity going on up near the border between there and Chad. There was a lot of concern that the Russians and the Chinese were doing things as well. The government was very corrupt and the government was very weak. Kolingba was very ineffective in terms of how he ran things. Crime was a bit of an issue and what you had was one of those very, very sad countries and you have a lot of them in Africa. I haven’t been back to Africa for a few years and I’m sure it hasn’t changed dramatically, but you had evidence everywhere you went in CAR particularly along the river. Here is Zaire, and Congo Brazzaville here. The river that goes down here was the Ubangi River. This looks like a border but actually it’s a river border. You had evidence all in this area of where the French had invested for infrastructure and activities. You had locks up in here to get around rapids; you had big stations where clearly it had villages built for whoever the prefect was or ______ who might be in charge. All of this stuff all over the place was in ruin. In the capital itself you had this great big hotel built right on the Ubangi River that basically had gone bankrupt and was now this massive eye-sore sitting there that no one wanted to buy. The government was so bad no one would do anything there without the government….I mean you couldn’t trust the government and the government couldn’t trust one another. So all the investors basically pulled out; it was just very sad.

Q: I remember as a kid sort of hearing the stories of travelers and the National Geographic about the Ubangi women were women who had very large lips that had disks put on their lips and they had huge lips.

HARTWICK: They were extended like that. Yeah. Well you had quite a few tribal groups in there. You had a very strong French presence still and so we at the embassy worked closely with the French military and it afforded me as the number two a chance to see a window of how this former colonial power operated in this country with a government which was so bad. Probably the guy who was the single most powerful man in country was a French colonel who was part of the French intelligence service who worked in the prime minister’s office. He just controlled everything; my God he was the lead guy. None of the Central Africans in the government would do anything without his approval. It was kind of an eye opener.

Q: Did you get any feel of the hand of Paris really?
HARTWICK: Well you did in a sense because, of course, the stories of Bokassa which predate my period there but the stories of Bokassa were rife with his involvement with Giscard d’Estaing and diamonds. Bokassa had two or three villas in France and he had looted the country and treasury…

Q: *Mitterrand was he part of...*

HARTWICK: What was Mitterrand at the time? Mitterrand was, I would have to check my dates to see who were the…Giscard sticks in my mind. Mitterrand was, of course, president then.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: President for what twelve years I think.

Q: *Somehow I think his wife ended up....*

HARTWICK: Yeah, yeah. So the French involvement there, the French behind the scenes stuff was massive. Now they were embarrassed by Bokassa; I mean he embarrassed the hell out of all of them; this whole thing of going from president, president for life, emperor. I mean the French were like what are we doing with this guy; we don’t know what to do with this guy. Then when he was finally chased out by his own people, he went to live in France. He wasn’t protected by the French but he went to live in one of his villas in political exile there. Eventually they finally brought him back. He did come back to Africa and came back to the CAR and was living under house arrest for two or three years and I think he died. So when I was there he had not come back yet, he was living in France; all that was in the back drop.

Q: *How about Islam was that a factor or concern?*

HARTWICK: No, and to my knowledge in CAR if they had any Muslims they were up in the north and not many. Overwhelming you had French proselytizing during the Kolingba periods, southern Sudan is Christian, right?

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: Mostly? Southern Chad kind of animist to whatever, maybe a little bit of Muslim but not a heck of a lot. These areas are damn remote up there.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: So you really didn’t have too much there. This area is all Christian related or whatever so you really didn’t have any.

Q: *That wasn’t a...*
HARTWICK: Religion was not a big factor. We had some interesting things going on in different places. In western CAR there was big logging activity going on. It was basically a Yugoslav company that had been set up from Slovenia. I remember going out there with Cyrus, the guy who eventually drowned in the pool. We visited this place called Slovenia-Buwah. Unbelievable, you are up there in the middle of deep, deep jungle. Did you ever see the activity that took place when they talk about African dark jungles? That’s where it was and there were four or five of these Slovenians, no women, just cases of alcohol and every day they would do some work in the morning and they would come back in the afternoon and they would just get blitzed. So we drove up there to visit this Slovenia-Buwah because it was the one viable activity going on up there bringing tropical timber down and being sold; that was part of the income for the country with legitimate licenses to do this stuff. What an eye opener getting up there. The kind of people who would go and live in these places to earn a living is just mindboggling.

Q: What about UN votes, I mean I take it the French pretty well called the votes didn’t they?

HARTWICK: CAR was pretty supportive of most the things the United States cared about as was France for the most part. They like Niger before, for me, were viewed to be reasonably pro-west and you could count on them most of the time, so that was part of what we were doing.

Q: So you left there in ’87?

HARTWICK: I left there in ’85.

Q: Where did you go?

HARTWICK: Then I did the Department’s long term training. I was disappointed as I felt that I would be promoted in CAR while I was there and I wasn’t. I couldn’t help but think that this whole thing that had happened with the admin officer had tainted me a bit. I’d taken the risk to go back to Africa. I’d taken on a hard job. I had the most unbelievably difficult time with this woman trying to get through this while maintaining my sanity, my family’s sanity, trying to keep the embassy together. I felt like this had been a real trial by fire and I had survived and I would actually get promoted. So I survived but it actually took me longer to get promoted than most of my friends back at the Department doing pretty mundane kind of work. I applied for the State Department’s “senior” university training because it would have been FS-1’s and 2’s. I was a FS-3 and applied for it and they went ahead and accepted me into the program even though I was the junior boy. I was assuming I was going to get promoted and then I didn’t get promoted and then I went to Stanford University to get a masters in economics.

Q: When were you in Stanford?

HARTWICK: I was in Stanford from ’85-’86.
Q: I read accounts of Stanford that their economics were way off into the world of figures, practically incomprehensible to anybody. How did you find it?

HARTWICK: You’d say that about most economics wouldn’t you?

Q: Yeah, but how did you find it?

HARTWICK: Well I applied to a program which when I put it on my resume I put applied economics because no one really understands it. But at the time when I applied which was in late ’84 the program I applied to was a masters at the Food Research Institute, FRI. It had been called the Food Research Institute and started in the early ‘60s as a result of development economists and Ag specialists collaborating for a better understanding of sustainability of long term food programs and development programs in the developing world. They focused on Thailand, they focused a bit on India, they focused very much on Indonesia and it was quite well regarded. It was called FRI, Food Research Institute. If I put that on my resume you’d probably think I did home economics or something so I never put down food research; I always put applied economics; that’s the program I applied to. Why? Because it was the development arm for Stanford University on development economics. The faculty in FRI were all co-located with the economics faculty. They themselves had taught classes back and forth. I took several courses at the economics department and the business school as well as meeting the requirements for FRI. So that’s where I went.

Economics is pretty mathematical and sometimes hard to understand. To me it was good because you have world-class people teaching classes that to this day are still world-class people; they were much more junior back twenty-five years ago but they were very, very good. I learned a lot. It was hard because here I am coming out of eight or nine years of being a State Department officer and then going straight into graduate school competing with people who are six, seven, eight years younger than I am and I had not been going to school; all of a sudden I was in their classes with them. Most of them were PhD candidates. I was just in for one year for a masters but I was taking the same courses and they weren’t looking at me differently. I was just one of the students. The first six weeks I felt like I’ll get by this whole thing. I got my first set of midterm exams back and I did okay but I knew damn well this is not going to cut it. It’s not going to cut it for me and it’s not going to cut it for anybody else if I’m bumbling along with B-’s on my exams. In graduate school you get A’s, you don’t get B’s and you never get C’s; you are out of there if you get anything lower than a B+ mostly, particularly if you are really going to try and get a PhD. So I had to really change my mindset and work ethic and get very serious on going back to school. So I did and I probably got a lot more out of it. I very quickly caught up with all of my fellow students and we all studied together. I got a lot out of it for that one year.

I took some classes at the business school and I saw an environment which is a bit different from FRI where I was located. I took some international trade graduate school courses and they were very, very good professors, some good macro economics professors. The year went by very, very quickly. The State Department paid me my
salary, moved my family and me there and paid the school for me to go there so what a deal; they paid $45,000 for me to go to Stanford is not too bad. I came away feeling very good about that.

**Q: In later years how did the training work for you?**

**HARTWICK:** Economics training?

**Q: Were you able to use it?**

**HARTWICK:** In a direct way not particularly. When I came out of CAR, FSI sent me to, and rightly so, a five or six-week refresher course in terms of just mathematics for economics. Now I had done econometrics and so forth in graduate school earlier so I wasn’t ignorant about it all, but if you haven’t used it in eight or nine years that stuff just disappears on you. So when I went to Stanford and did this year it was very helpful having had that training because I felt very comfortable getting into that stuff again without really worrying about it.

My next assignment was to India. There were two jobs I was pursuing. One was the possibility of going to India but I was ambivalent about it and the other one was to go to EUR to work in the European Union office we have in Brussels. In the end I chose the India job in part because the guy who was likely to be my boss or my boss’s boss I knew really well and liked very much. The guy who was in Brussels was very iffy as far as I was concerned; I didn’t really want to go work there even though it would be nice to live in Europe. It was my one good shot to go do that. I chose going to India and not going to work for this guy I had doubts about. I never went to Europe after that. I never had an assignment ever in Europe my entire career even though I thought I would be doing lots of things there. I spoke French; I spoke Spanish and a fair bit of German but never went to Europe. That assignment took me to India, India took me to Malaysia. In the end I went back to India a second time and the rest is history.

Using that degree it’s really hard to do that you don’t use that in an embassy. I mean I knew economics better than most people. I understood the macroeconomics dimension about what I was supposed to do better than most people. I was able to sit down and analyze balance of payments things very well because I knew behind the scenes what it was all about; I really understood it. So in a sense it helped me to that extent, but it was always unclear to me when I look at the State Department and the FSI econ course and training how heavy they push people in terms of becoming economists in the classic mode academics teaches you. How does that apply to the State Department and what we do overseas? The truth is not very well. Now I didn’t work in Europe. I didn’t work in the big embassy in Tokyo where I might have been able to do more of that kind of stuff there.

**Q: One of the things that strikes me in these interviews I do the question I often pose is how little connect there is between the State Department work and the academics. Just**
like the magazine *Foreign Relations* hardly anybody I've interviewed really read it very much.

HARTWICK: Yeah, I didn’t either. *Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy*.

Q: *Foreign Policy* and then you go on to much more exotic things. Of course, when you get into political science that is so far removed from anything outside of political science circles that it's incomprehensible to anybody else.

HARTWICK: Particularly when it was going through….I mean I hadn’t picked up much of that stuff in a long time now but there was an important phase when they were trying to make it much more mathematical and quantitative data based.

Again, it was like when I studied government at William and Mary. We didn’t have that and by the time I came back and started thinking about going to graduate school it was really coming on strong and it just was an event analysis kind of thing. Can you predict things from different kinds of events and if you get in the right parameters and the right variables can you start predicting something is going to happen in a certain way through this event. All of that was going on and there must be something to it but I never actually used this and it certainly didn’t apply well to our business particularly.

Q: Well, of course, in your field, economics, they say what you really need is a three-handed economist.

HARTWICK: On the one hand, on the other hand on the third hand.

Q: On the third hand.

HARTWICK: In 1986, when I got to India I had the macro portfolio. We had a very big AID mission in India, we had a fair size economics section in the embassy, and then we had a commercial section too; it was a big embassy; one of the biggest in the world. So I was the macro guy for the embassy. My title was finance and development officer so I did the macro work and finance. I did liaison between the embassy and the econ section and the AID mission that was located, at least the leadership of AID, in another building but right next door. I got along very well with them and I would go to their staff meetings. I would allow that to help me keep advising the ambassador from my perspective as to what was going on. Of course, AID and the AID director and the deputy director talked to the ambassador all the time as well. I was the econ section window into the AID function of what was going on which was actually very helpful. Now my FRI training and studies there informed that whole process. I had a better and good grasp because when I had gone to graduate school before I had never studied environmental or developmental economics. It didn’t do much for me and I hadn’t done that before whereas I did.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop Doug. You are off to India and you served in India from when to when?
HARTWICK: My wife was pregnant with our second child, I got the Department to agree to let me stay out in California doing a TDY at the Geological Survey in Palo Alto and I got to post right after my daughter was born. It would have been late October 1986. That began my India period.

_Q: Today is the 17th of February 2010 with Doug Hartwick and here we go. I think we are arriving in India, is that right?_

HARTWICK: My first posting in India was basically October 1986 and I left approximately July 1990.

_Q: Okay, so what was your job?_

HARTWICK: My first job when I arrived was in the economic section where I was the regional resource officer.

_Q: Okay, could you just describe U.S.-Indian relations at the time and where did India stand? What were points of interest and disputes and all of that?_

HARTWICK: 1986 India was still desperately trying to recover from the assassination of Indira Gandhi which happened in the fall of 1984.

_Q: This was done by an extremist._

HARTWICK: By Sikh extremists

_Q: Sikh extremists._

HARTWICK: Actually it was done by her bodyguards.

_Q: Oh yes, yes._

HARTWICK: Infiltrated her bodyguards and assassinated by her bodyguards but India was very much in the recovery phase of that. Another major event was India was still recovering from the terrible Bhopal disaster; remember the leaked gas that killed hundreds of people?

_Q: It’s still a name to be reckoned with in the world._

HARTWICK: Well it is and it’s actually an issue that still hasn’t gone completely quiet in India. I mean despite court cases and settlements and everything; it’s a big issue.

The bottom line is a significant quantity of very lethal gas leaked out of this plant; it was a Union Carbide plant. I’m not sure what they produced there either it was carbon black or something else.
HARTWICK: It leaked out and it walked across the village nearby it just killed hundreds of people. It was terrible. In the end Union Carbide accepted responsibility but tried to figure out how much was that worth and had to go through the whole process. As I say it is still going on and that was 1984, I believe. It was right around the time when Indira Gandhi was killed. Anyway those are two events that stuck in my mind as being factors.

Where were we bilaterally in terms of relationships? Well Indira Gandhi had passed from the scene. She had set a very strong tone throughout the ‘70s and the ‘80s until she passed away and really staking out her father’s very strong attempt to have India be at the center of the non-aligned movement. That, of course, for the most part meant keeping us at arm’s length. She had embraced and continued to embrace, as had Nehru, a closer relationship with the Soviet Union for a variety of reasons. Strategically we were closer at the time to Pakistan in the ‘80s. So Indira Gandhi had a very close, strong relationship although nominally they were non-aligned and were not a Communist country at all; they were a democracy even back then, but they had a very close relationship strategically with the Soviet Union. So we, the United States, while on the surface we had good cordial relations, we were always frustrated with our ability to try to somehow take these very superficial cordial relations and have them be more meaningful on the ground. The economy was not open. It was, if anything, centrally planned to the extent that the Indians could centrally plan anything. So they had five-year plans, old Soviet Union style. They had their own economic relationship based upon a sort of a ________ variation of economics in terms of exchanges and sales and arms and different exchange rates for different kinds of things; quite complicated.

So from an economic standpoint we had a very modest relationship. We had had Peace Corps in the ‘60s and during Indira Gandhi’s time they had ended Peace Corps. We had had a very powerful AID relationship then. India had gone through in the ‘60s and ‘70s some terrible famines mostly due to weather and a variety of things. We had stepped in to help them out, but it was one of those things when you help out a lot sometimes that causes resentment as well. So there was a fair amount of resentment I think on the part of the Indians and Indira Gandhi during that period.

So when I got there in 1986 Rajiv Gandhi was the prime minister; the Congress Party was in charge. He had started to set a different tone with respect to the United States, a somewhat warmer tone and more interested in wanting to do more in opening India’s economy up to the outside world and not be so dependent on the Soviets. So that was the beginning of an opening period when I was there and we hoped to start establishing a better sense of working together with the Indians on the economy and economic reform. So a lot of people describe India’s economic changes to Manmohan Singh and the period in the mid-‘90s but, in fact, a lot of it started with Rajiv Gandhi.

Q: It always struck me I mean you had two factors here sort of on the diplomatic side, I mean the personnel diplomatic side. One was the obvious misfit between the Soviets and
the Indians. They were just people who really had very little in common in a way and the other one was that American-Indians tend to preach to each other which...

HARTWICK: Oh there is a lot of...they...

Q: But at the same time you can talk the same language and I mean certainly they had to be a lot easier dealing with on both sides than with their Soviet friends or something.

HARTWICK: It’s a subject of hundreds and hundreds of books that whole relationship both the Soviets with the Indians and the Americans with the Indians during that time period. But the geo-political lineup was such that India clearly felt it needed to buttress its own set of relationships against the Chinese and against the Pakistanis and we were friends with the Pakistanis. We were not particularly friendly with the Chinese, but the Chinese and the Pakistanis were very close and so the Soviets fit in there naturally and the Soviets appreciated that. The Soviets saw that picture and when they made virtually their entire arsenal of armaments available to the Indians at very, very attractive prices the Indians would have been insane not to take advantage of it. One, they didn’t have any foreign exchange and two; the Soviets were the major power compared to the United States in terms of arms and that kind of thing. So there was a strategic relationship that fit very well for the Indians and the Russians both even though in terms of connections between the people they were very superficial their whole life.

Q: Could you describe the embassy, who was the ambassador, how it worked, how you fit in, what your impression was of our embassy at the time?

HARTWICK: Okay, when I arrived we had the venerable Ambassador John Guenther Dean, it was 1986. He had been there, I think, about a year and he replaced Harry Barnes. The DCM was Gordon Streeb who was someone I had worked with years before which is why I went to India. I didn’t go because I had a passion for India; I didn’t really know much about India except it was a big embassy and a challenging place. But Gordon had urged me to come and so off I went. There was an economic section of about five or six officers, the political section relatively the same, maybe one officer more. A large chunk of the embassy was very much focused on gathering intelligence and keeping an eye on what the Soviets and the Indians were doing. From the Indian standpoint you had a lot of Indian Intel watching the Americans and what the Americans were doing.

Q: Yeah. Did you feel you were being monitored, followed...

HARTWICK: Yeah, not in an oppressive way, but, yes, you were aware of the fact that people would follow you at night at times and we were always warned about that. We had a couple incidents with an attempt by the Indians to figure out a connection between an American Intel operative and an Indian informer or whatever you might call them. The Soviets were part of this, linked in there as well as you can imagine. There was a case where the station chief called a handful of us in to warn us. We were out and about in the community actively and I was active in the business community in various places and he knew me. So he called me in along with four or five other people mostly in the political
section to say we are having a case of spy dust that you need to be aware of. Spy dust was basically that whether it came to money or going certain places something that was invisible to the eye that you couldn’t wash off had been sprinkled around; so only people who had been there and then showed up later on with the spy dust must have been associated with someone else that they are having an eye on. This was in ’86, ’87, ’88 and the Soviet Union had not collapsed. It was in the dying stages but no one knew in ’86, ’87, ’88 that in 1990-91 the Soviet Union was about to collapse and you didn’t know that. In the neighborhood the Pakistani situation was always uncertain. The Soviets were in Afghanistan. The Indians were very supportive of whatever government in Afghanistan was anti-Pakistani in essence and that, again, put them more in cahoots with the Soviets even though I think the Indians were not happy at all with what the Soviets were up to in Afghanistan. It was hard for them to keep a completely invisible profile because they were supporting the government, the government that the Pakistanis didn’t like; so all these roots of angst go way back in that time.

Q: It’s the great game; it’s like three dimensional chess in a way.

HARTWICK: Yeah, yeah so I mean that was an issue. During the Rajiv Gandhi period in the late ‘80s, India had an active space program; launching satellites to be sent into space is a bit of a stretch, but launching satellites and a missile program which the United States did not support whatsoever. Although from a scientific standpoint we supported some of their peaceful activities in regard to satellites but not their missile program because the dual use of missiles was too obvious and the Indians were hell-bent on doing it. I had two different jobs. When I first arrived I was regional resource officer and that had been left over from previous decades where in major embassies around the world there was someone whose job was to look after energy, minerals, petroleum and just report on what was going on. To show it was a bit of a holdover from yesteryear, I partly reported to the Department of the Interior on my reporting. By the time I got there in mid to late-‘80s a lot of the stuff I would be writing about you never were clear about who read any of this stuff; no one at the State Department read it for sure so it was going off into this dark zone. One of my responsibilities was for the region although my predecessor had not had a chance to travel too much nor did his predecessor. I wanted to do it because the regional part put it back into the job which had been called regional resources but, in fact, only went to India. Early in my tenure there I took a trip to Nepal, over to Bangladesh, and tried to understand the resource/energy linkages among the various countries there. It was actually a fascinating trip for basically a mid-level officer not well informed about that region. I did not go to Pakistan, but Nepal and Bangladesh were all part of it at that time.

Q: Was that an area of strategic mineral wealth or not?

HARTWICK: Not particularly for the United States in part because India didn’t trade very much. So what it had in terms of mineral resources including petroleum, which was mostly off-shore, was something that was not being traded, it was only being consumed locally and being exploited locally. Gordon Streeb had urged me to come and do this job and when I got there I thought what kind of a job was this I was doing? I’m writing all these crazy reports about bauxite and things. Who cares about this stuff with all due
respect? And I realized pretty quickly that Gordon Streeb didn’t know very much about it either and he wanted me to come work there; he thought that was a good idea but in terms of what the job did I didn’t do much of anything.

Q: It sounds like a holdover from really days way gone by where...

HARTWICK: Fifties and sixties.

Q: ...we had sort of an encyclopedic thing of there are file cards under bauxite and every country had to write on bauxite and I knew people who were writing on the horseshoe industry and that sort of thing.

HARTWICK: Yeah, yeah.

Q: At one time the CIA was sponsoring what was the name of this thing where we had to...it was a world encyclopedia essentially.

HARTWICK: Way back when, there wasn’t that much information about major parts of the world. It just wasn’t widely available and obviously you had no internet. But even going to libraries or going to journals trying to get good information about what was going on in different parts of the world particularly in something as esoteric as minerals actually is not that easy to find out. India was more closed than it was open in terms of what was going on there. I concentrated on strategic minerals of different kinds, metals too, and what was their stockpiling, what were they mining, were they exporting it. There was this strategic dimension with the Russians, the Soviets, were they exporting or importing that kind of stuff. There was an aspect of it, but the truth was there was an awful lot of wheel spinning about stuff that wasn’t so important and that became pretty obvious to me. But I had gone during the summer to the U.S. Geological Survey both in Washington, DC in the Reston area and then also in Colorado just to study resources and learn more about all the different kinds of issues from a scientific standpoint. You can imagine being sent off to the Rocky Mountains for a couple of weeks, hanging out and going with these geologists back in there to look at some of the fossils and look at some of the mining ore areas they were doing; it was really cool. So I really thought this was great fun.

Anyway the initial responsibility I had then was also civil aviation in the economic section. The civil aviation part was where I spent a fair bit of time.

Q: Where did they get their planes?

HARTWICK: Well India’s civil aviation sector was very, very much in its infantile stage, so they flew some Boeing’s. They were bankrupt for the most part, obviously a state run government, a state run company, Air India and India Airlines. It was just all the worse things about India you can imagine; it was all personified in the aviation system. Everything was antiquated, it didn’t work very well, the Indians themselves hated it, but it was an interesting sector because already at that time many international airlines were
flying into India including the Americans from United to American to others looking into it anyway. We were negotiating a civil aviation agreement with India, and I became the key person in the embassy in that. Obviously we sent negotiators from Washington to meet with the Indians, but I knew the India scene and I felt I played a good useful role in it; that was a stimulating thing.

After the first year the number two in the section, Bruce Duncan, was transferred. He had been a real economist as opposed to a light-weight economist most of which the State Department has. He had run the FSI econ course for years and years and then had lateralled in to the FS-1 level. Then he got promoted and he went to Indonesia. I knew I would take his job which was the finance and development officer. So the first year I was the regional resource officer and the second year I became the finance development officer and the number two in the section of five or six people. That was actually good because it got me more in the mainstream; I had been off studying economics at Stanford in 1985-'86 and then I went out to India and then I was doing this crazy reporting on regional resources. I wasn’t doing much econ kind of things I felt, and then I was doing development issues because I was the liaison with our AID mission from the embassy. I would go to their senior AID staff meetings and this was a pretty big AID mission. So here I was an FS-2 attending all their big meetings and got to know all their key people. It was very helpful.

Q: Particularly under Gandhi in India we had this really frosty relationship but yet AID seemed to keep chugging along. How stood AID at that time?

HARTWICK: Well you’ve got to remember it’s a massive country with a lot of immense fundamental development problems. At AID the United States continued to make a lot of money and resources available to help India. The AID presence evolved a lot from the days of the PL-480 food that they were giving India because of India’s famine problems. We were trying to implement the old expression that you can give the person what is it a fish a day or whatever?

Q: A fish a day or...

HARTWICK: Or teach him how to fish and he’ll take care of himself. AID had gone through that process of giving them food but helping invest in the sixties in what is now known as the green revolution. By the time I was there in the mid to late ‘80s AID had moved far beyond that kind of more traditional stuff into other sectors of the economy. They were trying to reform the stock market, digitize it, helping promote entrepreneurial skill sets in different sectors of the economy where it might not have been as strong as it should have been, a whole variety of different kinds of things they were doing. Then they were doing some agriculture stuff too but in a more sophisticated, higher level sort of way.

Q: Because it obviously had become terribly important later on but had the computer, still in the early days, but was the computer well lodged in India at the time?
HARTWICK: No it really wasn’t well lodged even in the embassy either. When I came from Stanford in 1985 I brought an IBM, what they called a portable, but it was really not portable; it was an IBM with a big handle on it but it weighed like 25 pounds. It didn’t have a battery. You still had to plug it in somewhere and it had this little green screen like that on it.

Q: You are showing about a six inches of screen.

HARTWICK: Six inches of screen, the box was this big and you needed two hands.

Q: The box was about two feet square.

HARTWICK: So it was the first real portable computer that we had, and I think I was one of the first ones in the embassy and I bought it for a special student price at Stanford.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: It was pretty limited but no, India was not computerized really at all.

Q: So a computerized generation was not growing up in India.

HARTWICK: Not yet. India has a strong scientific base to a lot of its public policy and its recognition of I think in its own culture the importance of science.

Q: In a way it’s really like the Russians, very mathematical.

HARTWICK: The government said this is important, we will devote resources to do this and resources to do that; it wasn’t driven by the private sector as much as it was the public sector.

I got involved in the whole area of export controls and licensing technology to India that was sensitive to the United States which had never really happened before. You were beginning to do things with India already at that point that had not taken place.

Q: Well export controls I would think they would be more interested in import controls?

HARTWICK: The U.S. was interested in controlling what we exported to the Indians.

Q: Okay, alright.

HARTWICK: The Indians wanted to get everything they could put their hands on.

Q: We are talking about American control.

HARTWICK: The Indians wanted to get everything they could get their hands on and the biggest issue when I was there was India’s purchase of a super computer.
Q: Oh yes.

HARTWICK: This was the days when we still had super computers. But this was the days when…

Q: This was Cray?

HARTWICK: Cray.

Q: C-R-A-Y. Now this is a big thing.

HARTWICK: India’s meteorological department wanted a super computer and in the end we negotiated the terms for giving them one or selling them one that had an awful lot of provisos in it and lots of sort of things. Our greatest worry was that India was going to somehow make great use of this great computer for ballistic missile testing and research.

Q: And nuclear?

HARTWICK: And nuclear. They wanted it ostensibly for meteorological research. Obviously what happens in India’s monsoon weather is critically important for this country which is overwhelmingly agricultural, as it still is today. Trying to forecast rains and patterns and all that is really, really very hard. But it opened up the window to a whole set of issues that I was there on the ground floor.

Q: Okay, you’ve got the super computer; you’ve got meteorological studies versus ballistic things and all how the hell can...

HARTWICK: Civil aviation.

Q: Civil Aviation, these were not things a normal Foreign Service officer has any inkling.

HARTWICK: Then there was finalizing negotiation of a tax treaty with India. We had been negotiating with the Indians back and forth obviously without a great pace for thirty plus years on a tax treaty. I was the finance guy of the embassy and no one else really wanted to get involved with tax treaty finance issues.

Q: Why was that?

HARTWICK: Well I had just come out of Stanford. I felt really pretty good on the finance side. I understood the stuff, and I was the macro reporter for the embassy so I knew what was going on in terms of their economy. But you got into the esoteric world of tax treaties which is its own unbelievably different world. So I became the embassy person as a party to the tax negotiation overwhelmingly for the Treasury Department and a little bit for the State Department but mostly Treasury and then the Indian finance ministry and their people. We had two rounds of negotiations and so by the time I left in
1990 the two sides had reached an agreement. I don’t know when the treaties were actually signed as treaties of course, have to be ratified by the Senate and I think it was ratified in ’92-’93 so some years later; But we actually reached agreement.

Q: What were the basic issues that you tried on a tax agreement?

HARTWICK: Oh, I’m not going to go into that here it’s too much and at this point my memory doesn’t serve me very well in the area of tax treaty. But double taxation is a good example.

Q: Ah yeah.

HARTWICK: You try to set up a structure so that the two tax authorities can one work together to ensure that taxes are not being evaded by companies or individuals by virtue of this differences between the two; that the two sets of authorities recognize each other’s taxing authorities but not to the penalty of the individuals or companies involved. So that if you pay taxes on one side you won’t have to pay taxes on the other and you have to someway get this sorted out; there is a whole host of issues around that. It was actually ahead of itself because our economic relationship with India was still in a very elementary state at that point and yet we managed even though they had been having these discussions back in the fifties and sixties. Treasury was trying tax treaties everywhere. They wanted to establish a basis for tax treaty relationships around the world with the United States. So that is why they started early with the Indians in the fifties and here we were in the late eighties finalizing it. The Indians had gotten a lot smarter about it too. But this is during the years that I was working on it.

So I was doing aviation, finance, development issues, macro-economic reporting and export control. The last area I jumped into was narcotics; at that time India was one of the three largest producers of legal morphine. So the idea of India growing opium legally and not have it illegally leak into the world system was already something we were paying a lot of attention to. That was an area with DEA working on it and then in some embassies the political section might be working on narcotics; this was before we had a narcotics section in the embassy.

Q: Well narcotics is infamous for the fact that whatever you do with it it ends up as a terribly corrupting factor both in what it does to police and others but also as an attraction for criminal elements. How about in India during that time was that a problem?

HARTWICK: Well in India it was always a problem, always a worry. Wherever you grow opium you always have an opium problem whether it’s addiction or corruption or all of that and India had that. So the issue from the American standpoint was it was important for American pharmaceutical companies to have access to the legal opium that they used for their own drugs that we don’t grow in the United States but the Indians do. We didn’t want to see any leakage of that narcotic into the open market. So the trick was working closely with the Indian authorities to make sure that what the farmers said they
were going to grow is what they grew, that there wasn’t excess slipping into the system. To me it was an interesting window on the area of narcotics that I didn’t know much about; this was ’89-’90 so it was toward the end of my tenure there. Later on when I ended up in Laos the whole issue of opium was critical to what we were doing.

Q: Okay, give me an impression of your impression of Indian bureaucracy because I think of this I go back a long way where I never served in India but I did cover Bahrain at one point which was in those days the British had it and was staffed with Indians. Every desk was piled high with these files and all tied up in ribbons and all that.

HARTWICK: That was very much alive and well when I was there. You can imagine when we were doing the discussions for tax treaty negotiations back and forth and then when we got to the point where we finally reached agreement then it was a matter of the signing of the tax treaties. So I was the go-to-embassy guy. I was both sitting down at the high-level discussion but I was also running around behind the scenes scurrying around with all the clerks to get all the stuff finalized, the pieces of paper with the seals and the ribbons and all that kind of stuff toward the end. It wasn’t just sitting in high-level secretaries’ office with all this history around. You are scurrying around in the back hallways up and down and watching the rats climb over the piles of these files and stuff. The Indian bureaucracy joke at the time was if an Indian bureaucrat told you your file was under review it meant they had lost it and it would be under review forever. If they said, “Your file was under active review,” it meant they were actually looking for it somewhere.

The Indian administrative service guy was extremely powerful, very bright and in their own way very impressive but very rigid, very bureaucratic, did not reward people for taking initiatives; on the contrary they usually got into trouble if you did anything new. So I had an intimate close up knowledge working with all these people. Whether it was aviation, narcotics, the finance area, those law areas where I worked closely with different sets of bureaucracy and different sets of people: it put me in good stead because when I came back four years later in India many of the people I had worked with had continued to move up. It is a rigid system and you don’t move up too fast, but you do move up whether you are good or not. So when I came back four years later people I knew had moved into more important positions. They were at the joint secretary level which were the go-to-policy people at the lowest level but the ones who got things done. In that sense I admired them because they were very bright. It was a very competitive service but they were very, very powerful. They weren’t paid much money but they got all the perks and in terms of power they were little God’s people. They ran all of India. I learned a lot about the system as a result of these contacts.

Q: Well did you have a problem being your rank was not at the top of the embassy of getting to see the right people and all that?

HARTWICK: I found this is one of those areas where I was very pleased to have been on the economic side of the embassy. People in the political section worked for the most part with the prime minister’s office or the external affairs ministry; the State Department
equivalent. In both of those areas the idea of protocol and rank was extremely important to the Indian bureaucracy within the external affairs ministry. So if you were a first secretary you were only a note taker. That was basically it, and you didn’t go to anything important and no one would ever see you because you were a first secretary, which is what I was at the time. On the economic side, whether it was a civil aviation ministry or civil aviation security or ministry of finance or whatever, by the end of my four years I could count as close contacts and good contacts many many people who were up to the level of the secretariat in the Indian government in terms of the ministries. Part of it perhaps was my ability to present myself in a good way to them but a lot of it was because they didn’t have that much interaction with embassies and they were less rank conscience. They weren’t part of the protocol thinking of external affairs or State Department kind of thinking. They were actually dealing with the American embassy and I was the face of the American embassy. My boss who might have been the economic counselor or the DCM didn’t necessarily get involved in some of the esoteric stuff that I did. For example, on taxes, when I went in and saw the revenue secretary talking about taxes, my boss didn’t know anything about this stuff either. It was arcane, the nature of the tax treaty, and yet it was very important to the finance ministry and I was the go-to person. So it gave me access to people that if I had been a political officer I never would have seen people at that rank.

Q: I’ve talked to people who have served on the India desk in Washington and it probably is different now but saying the Indians really suffered from this rank consciousness because they would insist on seeing or being seen by somebody who is an appropriate rank. Often it was the desk officer who was really running the things and where the Pakistani’s had no problem with this. They would go running over to see whoever has control but the Indians would say well only the ambassador or the Secretary of State who never had time to see them and all. They didn’t go to Congress and this is one of the great lessons you learn in Washington, you don’t play that protocol game. You go where power is which can be in the media or the Senate or the National Security Council or farther down the line.

HARTWICK: It wasn’t until years later when I did some work with Pakistanis on Pakistan, in the U.S. when I was at USTR, when I realized there are a lot of similarities. You can imagine as both Pakistan and India come from the same bolt of cloth, but after fifty years of separation Pakistan is so much smaller, it has such a different feel to it and the Pakistani bureaucracy itself is so much smaller. They don’t see themselves the way the Indians see themselves in terms of we are India, we are this big powerful country even though at times they were sick of themselves and felt they were inadequate. They had this outward need to demonstrate that you don’t diss me, you will treat me with full complete respect. Nowhere stronger about that than in the external affairs ministry where that rank consciousness was always there. Whereas you go over to the ministries where I spent 90 percent of my time you just didn’t run into that at all. You had to pay proper respect. If you go to see the secretary of civil aviation he is a pretty important guy and he might be over in the prime minister’s office on his next assignment. But you go and call on him and you treat him very very nicely and obviously you are very very junior and he
is very senior but he would accept a meeting with you all the time. So I got to work closely with a lot of those people that otherwise I wouldn’t have done; that was good.

Q: Did you get any feel although you were dealing in a different area with the Indian business community?

HARTWICK: India’s business community was pretty extensive, they very much valued contact with the American embassy; a lot of it was visa driven. They really wanted to know somebody in the embassy who could help them get visas particularly in the 1980s. They didn’t have much money, they all wanted to travel. I think many of the more visionary business people recognized that India’s reform efforts in the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties really would help them establish connections on the outside for their companies even though they were mostly focused on India and that is still the case today. But one of the surprising things about India when I got there in ’86 and then throughout the entire period I was there, on two different assignments, India’s business community is very social, parties all the time, dinners all the time, weddings all the time and they loved to have the embassy be involved with it. One of my responsibilities, along with the commercial section, was to stay connected to the Indian business community and the American business community obviously. So I spent a lot of time in the evenings going to dinners and cocktails, hotel stuff; the Indians were very, very social so my wife and I met many many people. We established a lot of good relationships and I’m still in contact with people that I met in the eighties, some government but mostly the business people.

Q: Did you get any feel that there was a split between the view of the United States by the business community and maybe some of the other bureaucracies and the one that came from the top which was still at a distance and somewhat aloof?

HARTWICK: I think during the period I was there there was change going on. Rajiv Gandhi had brought in a new attitude in terms of economic reform beginning to be set in motion. There was a new attitude already then too between the United States and India. By the time I came back in ’94 the Soviet Union had collapsed so some of the major big building blocks that might have been there in the sixties, seventies and even early eighties were beginning to shift; some of these big plates were beginning to shift. In terms of bureaucracy, there was a change of appreciation in particular, not necessarily in the external affairs ministry, but in other ministries there was a growing appreciation of contact/interaction with the United States, with American companies, with American technology. That was a good feeling, that was an environment that I liked to work in.

Q: Obviously it was going to be on the rise.

HARTWICK: Far more I think from India looking to us than us looking to the Indians. Our problem I think, sitting in Delhi, was interacting with the American bureaucracy starting with the State Department but also DOD, Treasury and others. Treasury had the finance area which was a little bit more interesting; then also a small area of the U.S. Treasury. But the ability to work with the American bureaucracy and deal with some of the prejudices that exist was a stumbling block in many respects as was dealing with the
Indians. I mean it was tough because there was the sense of we have to do everything with the Indians just as we do with the Pakistanis; we can’t trust the Indians, you can’t do this, you can’t do that. That mindset is still here today in many respects but it’s evolved enormously from back in the late eighties when I was there.

I found from the Indian bureaucracy and through the areas that I described, whether it was civil aviation or tax treaty work or narcotics, is we worked pretty well together. I also found there was an enormous amount of similarities between the American bureaucracy and the Indian bureaucracy, obviously some differences but some similarities too. In a sense that helped me understand better how to work with the Indian bureaucracy and how to represent U.S. views and interests to them in a manner they could understand better. That came out very much in the tax negotiations. I was in one of the final rounds as we went back to Washington to the Treasury Department. I found myself in those meetings sitting on the American side for part of the meetings and then I would go off at the break and sit and talk to the Indians. A couple times I found myself sitting down on the Indian side in the meetings trying to explain, this is all in English, but a lot of technical terms and misunderstanding of what the American technical term meant and what the Americans were thinking about compared to what the Indians were picking up. Since I was living in India and I was living and breathing some of this I found myself actually sitting down with the Indian side trying to whisper in their ear to say that what someone really means is the following meaning; don’t react to what he just said because he is trying to suggest this and that. They were listening to me as I was literally having to go back and forth.

Q: This is one reason why it’s great to have people in a foreign country. The idea that you can do this by telephone or video conference you don’t get what the German’s call that denken fits gefer. I mean by being there you understand.

HARTWICK: Early on, when the tax treaty suddenly looked like it might get a whole new burst of energy I must have been at the post only about a year or so I think. I had just taken over this finance development portfolio and John Guenther Dean called me and he said, “Treasury is sending a delegation out to resume the negotiations on the tax treaty.” This is the way Guenther worked.

Q: The ambassador whom I interviewed.

HARTWICK: I know you did you told me that. Anyway, he squinted his face and he said, “Hartwick, this is going to be the most important thing you will ever work on during this tour and it may be one of the most important things you have ever done in your career. You are lucky, don’t let this thing get screwed up. You hang in there, this is really important. People don’t understand that in the embassy, they don’t. I’m telling you, it is very important.” You know you come away and there I am in my mid to late thirties and it is like, “Oh yeah, wow, okay.”

Q: And John Guenther Dean was a...
HARTWICK: This is his fifth ambassadorship right?

_Q: Yeah._

HARTWICK: I’m thinking I better pay a lot of attention to it. In the end it was good for me but it was tremendous as an accomplishment when the two sides actually finally reached an agreement and we were right. Unfortunately, by that time John Guenther Dean had already left.

_Q: Could you talk a bit about to my mind it is almost a tragedy and it certainly had a profound effect on him having interviewed him and all. From your perspective what happened in India?_  

HARTWICK: I got along with him quite well. Internally he was a real lion in the embassy, the old gnarly lion; he had some quirks to him. I was a first secretary, so I didn’t go to senior staff meetings, although he was pretty welcoming if you wanted to come every now and then. So I enjoyed going to the staff meetings as much as I could get away with it without having my own boss get annoyed with me. Of course, I was number two in the section for three of the four years so often I was standing in for the econ counselor anyway but I attended quite a few staff meetings. Dean’s ability to lay out issues that he was working on, or goings on between India and the United States, in a strategic way he would paint this picture that, my God, you felt like you were in the center of the most important things that were going on in life. His eyes would be alive; not every staff meeting, mind you, but every now and then you would go to a staff meeting and come out saying whew. He could really pull in disparate things going on. How were they affecting things we were all working on today; and why what we were doing really had to be done the right way and here is where it was going to be taking us. It was great and I’ve never been in a staff meeting like that. He was just tremendous.  

But he was a bit odd at times; he was very mercurial. I was on the embassy tennis team and the agency had an on-staff psychiatrist at Embassy Delhi. He was one of my tennis mates; he was picked to go back with John Guenther Dean when he was sent back. The elements of his problems were not terribly clear to me. He got paranoid; he had taken a couple trips back to the United States and I guess he had been rebuffed in Washington and he felt that people were trying to undermine what he was trying to accomplish. I think he got paranoid that he was being watched by, I’m not even sure who they were, others, maybe the Russians. He would have left about 1988, in the fall I think, roughly speaking. He became very paranoid to the point where this tennis friend of mine ended up accompanying him back along with a security officer. He was concerned for his own life. He really was quite upset and then he got back and they decided that’s it. So he didn’t return to help pack up and say good bye; then he was a broken man. He was a contentious fellow but we all felt badly for him and we all knew this was not a way to end a career. It was a horrible, horrible thing.

_Q: Also looking at this one of the problems as I’m talking to all these people during this oral history program he was an outside man. He had very little time..._
HARTWICK: In Washington.

Q: In Washington yeah. He was ambassador five times and even before he was ambassador he was shot down in a helicopter in...

HARTWICK: Vietnam.

Q: In Vietnam, I mean, and the last man out in Cambodia. Really assassination attempts and...

HARTWICK: Bombed in Lebanon.

Q: Bombed in Lebanon and on and on. But he didn’t serve much in Washington and if you don’t serve in Washington you don’t develop corridor contacts and if you are abroad all the time you are probably doing far better work but it’s a little like a court that if you don’t serve in the Byzantine court you are in trouble.

HARTWICK: But he was a very impressive fellow and you felt like you were around a certain element of professional greatness when you are working for him. As I said, that little vignette about him calling me in for the tax treaty was just an example. His staff meetings he had immense confidence in himself; there was always that edge between confidence and just being totally conceited. Still, I felt as a younger officer around him here was a guy who had unbelievable experience that he drew on. He understood these tectonic plates of things and how they were working and how India fit into what he wanted to do, what the U.S. wanted to do. He had a sense of that and, as I said, I think he was there for two years out of my four and then we went through a succession of two other ambassadors; a political appointee I think John Hubbard hired by the Reagan administration. He came right at the end of the Reagan administration and didn’t even get confirmed. He was only there for a one year interim and then he was back; he had come from USC, he was a political appointee. Then replacing John Hubbard was a guy I had known working in the Department when I was a junior officer, a fellow named Bill Clark, William Clark, Jr.

Q: He was an Asian hand.

HARTWICK: Very much an Asian hand. He didn’t know anything about India so his reward as an assistant secretary for Asia/Pacific under President H. W. Bush was to come to India. I liked Bill Clark. He and I got along very well.

Q: I knew Bill when I was consul general in Seoul when he was political counselor.

HARTWICK: He had his own ego and, contrasting the three different ambassadors in the space of three years, from John Guenther who started to self-destruct with his paranoia, and then you had John Hubbard who didn’t have a clue what was going on and didn’t really care. He was out there as this was his one shot at being an ambassador and wow
wasn’t this going to be fun and then Bill Clark coming out there. I left in 1990 and Clark stayed on another two years, I think, after that so we overlapped for about a year.

Q: Did the fall of the Berlin Wall, I mean you were there just at the very beginning of what turned out to be a very decisive time in world history but did that have any affect at all?

HARTWICK: Somehow it didn’t affect the peoples and issues. In the last six months I was there I had finally gotten the econ section working, at least the people who worked for me, in a manner we were able to monitor the economy and what was going on. I could see that for the Indian economy, in terms of its foreign exchange holdings, the bottom had fallen out of it. We were analyzing data and I was using my Stanford training to put together a balance of payments model to figure what was going on. You saw that India was just running out of money; it was burning up all its foreign exchange. I remember going in and talking to the finance secretary. It goes back to these high level contacts. He had been economic advisor and today he’s still a very senior player in the Indian government, Montek Singh Ahluwalia. I never liked him that much. I always felt like he never gave me the straight story, but he was a very influential guy and he would let me call on him and I did so. This was probably in April 1990 and I said, “You know Montek the numbers look like the foreign exchange is gone.” “No, no, no, no, no this is all just circumspect. No, no, no things are all right.” I said, “Are you going to take some special measures or whatever?” “No, no, no,” he didn’t want to talk about anything like that. Well I left in 1990 that summer and ’90-’91 they went bankrupt. They went into the IMF, they started selling their gold, they didn’t have any more money. They were completely shot. That could have set the basis for Manmohan Singh as the finance minister and they then instituted a number of very important reforms starting in 1991. By the time I came back in ’94 the whole picture started to change even though they were still, financially speaking in terms of foreign exchange, just coming out of a very dark period.

I saw it through our little balance of payments analysis with my assistant a guy named Bodraj. Bodraj had come with these numbers and we played at them and put them into a grid and kind of worked out and said they are out of money; they are out of money with flows coming in and flows going out; so it was interesting.

Q: Okay. Is there anything else we should cover do you think before we move on?

HARTWICK: Well, my period in India was quite varied. I came away with a lot of exposure and work in areas that if I had gone to a lot of other places it never would have happened.

Q: No.

HARTWICK: I was very, very fortunate.

Q: Well this is, of course, the thing when you are dealing even at a lower level but with a major country you end up with major responsibilities.
HARTWICK: Yeah and this was early enough in the late ‘80s that it wasn’t that Washington controlled absolutely everything. The input embassies could have, and they still have some input obviously, but I felt like we had a good role to play and I was able to play a lot of it and I felt really rewarded from all of that.

Q: Also, looking at the big picture you were there at a time when India and the United States particularly in the economic side were moving towards an, accommodation is even too mild a term, moving towards an almost embrace; it hadn’t gotten there yet but...

HARTWICK: It hadn’t gotten there.

Q: But the fun is for a Foreign Service officer to be there at the beginning.

HARTWICK: You are exactly right. We negotiated the first ever civil aviation agreement; we negotiated the tax treaty and finalized it. These are like important building blocks. The dual use technology agreement that I worked on ultimately set the stage, fast forwarding up until two years ago, when you had the one, two, three agreement between the United States and India on nuclear cooperation. The building blocks for why there was trust in our ability to do things with India started at that time from that original dual use agreement that I worked on as an FS-2 officer. These were not known to the outside world, nobody knew anything about these things, but later on you came back and you realized these were important building blocks and I was involved.

Q: Also, too, the development of an American diplomat I’m sure this gave you a hell of a lot of confidence in the economics field.

HARTWICK: Well I did and then the internal things helped. I had a chance to work with John Guenther Dean and then I myself felt quite confident in what I was doing and in my grasp of the issues; I had a lot of new contacts in India. I got promoted to FS-1. In my third year in the Central African Republic I felt that as hard a job as that was that actually slowed me down because I had the problem with the EEO problem. I ended up getting promoted more slowly than I even thought would happen. When I got out to India by the third year I was there I got promoted so all of a sudden I caught up and I was only in rank as an FS-2 to FS-1 for two years. So I caught back up and I felt that I had been rewarded well and I felt that was a positive boost for my career. It opened up for me to apply for other jobs coming out of India. I was looking for an FS-1 or a stretch job and that was important for me.

Q: What was your impression of I realized you were at the top level of being a diplomat but what were you getting of Indian society? At the business level what was your impression of it?

HARTWICK: Well during the course of those four years I learned a lot about Indian culture and Indian society in general. The different kinds of groups, a lot of it derived from religion, caste groups and so forth. I saw the nature of people who were in business
and how they were viewed, how they viewed themselves, or how they were viewed by other parts of society. I saw how the Indian government administrative service viewed themselves and how society viewed them and why they were the way they were and what’s the caste group they came out of. I was watching the military a bit as well and then I gradually and steadily learned more about some of the different ethnic groups and religions in India spread around because India is such a big country. Even little countries like Laos are very complicated and most people don’t know about it and most people don’t really care. But India is such a big country and it takes a long time and I really believe you can’t be an Indian expert without having lived there a period of time. So I was able to get a feel for these different groups and how they relate to one another. This is changing today in 2009-2010 and is different than what it was back in the ‘80s. But viewing the business communities and the role they played in society, the mistrust and distrust other elements in society had with people who were in business. It is not by accident that there is a lot of mistrust about Indians and Indian business. You know, you can’t trust this you can’t trust that, in India you can’t trust I mean to this very day because people doing business, people seeking profit by and large have been known to and we have that in the U.S. too, we have that in every country but in India it was very strong. I think when I was there in the eighties it was very strong. I’ve come to understand that and appreciate these differences from the eighties up until today.

I and my wife have had very good friendships with some of the leading business people over the years. In those days it was their parents who were the leading business people and they’ve come on to take on and assume the responsibilities of their company and their family. Now I know their kids are multi-millionaires who continue to move on and so forth; very bright and very well educated. But you would never see them ever in government. We have people going in business coming from business and people going in law firms and coming out; they don’t have that kind of crisscross in India at all very little, a little bit now compared with the old days but then it was none.

Q: In business, for example, were there business castes? Or in other words the color of skin or belonging to I’m speaking of someone who doesn’t know the area.

HARTWICK: Yeah, they do. India is a massive country and you’ve got northern India and they have their own religions and their own castes and their own make-ups. Then you have southern India that is really quite different. They speak different languages. You have Islam all over and spread around India, and with Islam you don’t have castes but you do have a classification, if you will. The caste system still is very strong in parts of India and in echelons is now broken down a fair bit but it is still there; it is always there. People who are a certain caste by and large you tend to see them more in government or military service or education, the upper level caste. The medium level or lower level caste you tend to see them more in businesses, you see them in some cases in the military but that is part of the way that society is ordered. The prejudices and views when I was there in the eighties compared to today was just so strong.

Let me give you a brief example. I learned this in space and relearned it again when I was back working with Lockheed Martin this last time in that the responsibilities of
The authorities for India’s defense lies with the public sector, lies with the government. Back in the fifties under Nehru’s period you didn’t have a trustworthy private sector, you didn’t have much of a private sector anyway; government had to do everything. Government was going to set up the seat of ministry, government was going to set up the automobile industry, everything was going to be done by the government or licensed to the private sector to do it with a very watchful eye at all times. Keep an eye on those private deals because you couldn’t trust them for nothing. But when it came to the national security of the country and defense of the country you couldn’t even do that. You did not trust the private sector for anything, nothing. You set up a whole system where public sector companies built the rifles, made the bullets, built the tanks. Everything was done by the public sector completely. So today, 2010, the world has changed a lot and the most dynamic elements of the Indian economy were all the private sector and they’ve evolved from being only eternally focused on India to now reaching out to the rest of the world and so forth. We all now know names of Indian companies whereas twenty-five years ago you would not have known any Indian companies’ names. Today lots of people have certainly heard of Tatas, you’ve heard of Reliance and some of these big companies that are out there; they are all around. But as for the defense sector to this day, the fight still continues. You cannot trust the private sector with responsibility of national security. The public sector companies that have grown up back in the fifties and the sixties until today remain to this very day still viewed as really having the country’s interest at heart, unlike the private sector which is such a different model from how we do it. We wouldn’t ever do that you know.

Q: Did you have any feel for Indian migration to the States because now my God every time we have a commentator or something in the technological field or finance on public television chances are that one of the people will have an Indian name.

HARTWICK: Well remember I mentioned about visas? I was not a visa officer, I was in the economic section, but I had a window in the business community and in some respect the government community. But the government community didn’t seek visas anywhere near like the private sector did, like the Indian private community. The desire on the part of Indians to get an American visa to come to study in the United States or to come and try to do business in the States was unbelievably intense. It was the kind of thing that I was fielding questions about visas all the time. I was putting in recommendations or trying to fend off people who wanted recommendations all the time for the whole four years I was there. You could feel this massive desire to want to get out of India, connect with the United States or at least broaden their own vision and that included going to the United States. A lot of it was education driven, and we used to say with some pride there were about a million Indians in the United States back in the mid-eighties; now we talk about two and a half to three million Indians in the United States, people of Indian origin.

Q: So at the beginning have political clout and...

HARTWICK: And the people who went to the United States almost all of them were well heeled with plenty of money that they finally got out, pretty good connections, tended to be in the business area or science and technology areas because they were very bright and
there was so little opportunity in India. Things were so stifled they couldn’t wait to get out; all that shifting. But we are the beneficiaries of that all over the place.

Q: Being in India did the overwhelming mass that I think of as poverty and all that you think of the Indian street did that have an effect on you at all?

HARTWICK: Sure, it can’t help but have some effect on you. You deal with it in different ways. When people came to live in India as part of the embassy community they really did break down into two groups; either people really liked it and they coped with the bad parts of it in their own way or people really didn’t like it and couldn’t wait to get out and left and never came back. We saw a lot of that in the American embassy there; the American business community itself was not very large, so the American official community was the biggest component of it. India’s poverty was grinding, it’s terrible, it’s bad today, it was worse then. You couldn’t help but have it overwhelm you at times and there are so many people and so many animals and so much filth on the streets and everything; it just smashes you right in the face every time you come back in the scene if you’ve been away for a while.

Once you are living there, just like all the Indians, you cope with it by lots of different coping mechanisms and before you know it a lot of those problems are things you don’t even see anymore. Every now and then something will shock you again into it but by and large you just start to ignore certain things. You don’t see it any more, you just take it for granted and just move on. That is how I think most people did it. Does it affect you? Sure it did. In 1947 India, I think my numbers are right here, when India became independent in 1947 India had about 350 million people.

Q: That’s about where the United States is today.

HARTWICK: 1947. Now fast forward 65 years and they are 1.1 billion people. I mean it is mindboggling that’s how many people are there now, and you still have areas in India where they are uninhabitable so you have chunks of India like the United States where there is nobody. There are so many people, and you just get used to so many people around you. If you aren’t comfortable with that you can’t survive there let alone when you turn on the heat in the mid-summer. When you get into May and June, temperatures outside are over 115 in the sun and everything becomes so oppressive between the dust and the people, the animals, the traffic and it’s pretty overwhelming.

Q: Did you feel as you said this is the first time in India. Did you find yourself up against the Indian club? I don’t know what they call it but Indian hands in the Foreign Service or not?

HARTWICK: I didn’t feel too much of that. I did not serve on the India desk in Washington. I was at Stanford and then went straight out. I did four straight years in India and I came away with some expertise. I did not want to make at that point India my life. I went to India for particular reasons and I came away getting a lot out of it, but I was looking also to continue to get new experiences. I wanted to go somewhere further East
in Asia. I did dabble with the notion of going down to Latin America since I spoke Spanish and I had not had a chance to go there. I could realize that the farther East I’m going, the less likely I am going to go down south somewhere and I almost went to Argentina; I was competing hard to be the econ counselor in Argentina which in 1990 was going through one of its many down periods but it would have been very interesting to go there. But in the end I got an offer for Malaysia so I ended up going there.

Q: Okay so we will pick this up...this is probably a good place to stop.

HARTWICK: Yeah.

Q: It is 1990 and you are off to Malaysia, is that right?

HARTWICK: I was promoted in the fall of ’88 so I was starting to look for onward assignments in the fall of ’89. The econ counselor job in Malaysia was open. I was not keen on going back to Washington yet. I still had two small children and so had wanted to stay overseas. But I wanted to go somewhere in East Asia; I considered do I want to make an effort and go back and study language and so forth or not. I thought what if I went to study Chinese and end up hating it. Then I’d have invested two years in a language training and then another 2-4 years so I’d have done 6-8 years in China and I might not even like it that much and Japanese is the same way; Korean is the same way. I said let me look at Southeast Asia where the language issue is less of a problem and less of a factor and I will see how that fits in with what I want to do so that is where Malaysia came in. It was open. I didn’t know anyone at the post to speak of but I did want to go there if given a chance.

Q: That brings up a question. You know we are training officers here on the campus of the Foreign Service Institute in for example Hindi. You say well you have this huge country and Hindi is sort of the major language and all but you’ve got so many others, i.e., Bengali and anyway did you find the lack of language training made any difference?

HARTWICK: In retrospect, seeing how I spent almost nine years in India I still don’t speak Hindi. I guess the answer is it didn’t make that much difference. If I reflect on my Foreign Service experience of having gone to Laos and having had a chance to study Lao for ten months and actually became quite proficient in it, I learned a hell of a lot more about Laos in a shorter period of time having spoken the language and I’m sure I have missed out enormously about India that I regret my not having studied the language. But the State Department never would send me to language because I didn’t really need it to deal with the people I had to deal with. They had one language designated position in the political section; I don’t think they had any in the econ section. That kind of drove the situation in the decision of not speaking the language. I tried to take language on the side but I just found I was too busy; I had too many things going on and didn’t have time to study. I did have a couple of instructors who came over to my house where I tried to study and it was too hard; I just wasn’t able to do it. In India where you benefit from speaking Hindi in particular is mostly in the north and by getting a window on the politics and the rural societies where English is not very common. That would have been much
more important to me had I been a political officer. Particularly on internal politics, that would have been of much greater value because of a lot of the politicians and a lot of the political dynamics going on, reading the vernacular press all that kind of stuff. There was massive English press in India; seven or eight major dailies and maybe more than that now. But as they used to tell us when we go to these press reads that our USIS friends used to have; the press officer would come and give a quick read out with two or three Indian assistants and would come in and give the ambassador and senior officers a quick hint on what was going on in the local press. I mean the vernacular press was like five times, six times, bigger than the English press. If you ignored the vernacular press that’s what people read and in India it was typical that one vernacular Indian newsletter was read by seven different people so you had to pay attention to that stuff. Yet not being able to speak the language and Washington’s attitude at least for econ people was, eh. If you want to study it do it on your own we’ll pay for it on the side if you want; I never had time.

Q: Okay, so we will pick this up the next time 1990 and you are off to Malaysia as what was it?

HARTWICK: Counselor.

Q: Counselor, great.

Today is the 24th of February 2010 with Douglas Hartwick and Doug we think we may find we want to fill in or work on it but we are moving you out of India and you are off to Malaysia. Now you were in Malaysia from when to when?

HARTWICK: I was in Malaysia from 1990-93.

Q: Okay, now did you take Malaysian or had you had any experience or anything and what were you doing?

HARTWICK: No, after four years of India, I had been promoted to the FS-1 level and I had the opportunity to get to a new and different level job. The economic counselor job in Kuala Lumpur was open. Southeast Asia in 1990 was really vibrant, coming on.

Q: These were the Tigers.

HARTWICK: These were the Tigers, that’s exactly right, the Southeast Asian Tigers. Malaysia was certainly a central player in all of that. I’d worked in Africa in an extreme development environment but which was not going anywhere fast; and then India with its own internal very inwardly focused sort of efforts to develop but lots of problems but a massive country. So going to Southeast Asia which was very trade oriented, outward oriented and just blasting along virtually all the countries at least the ones we knew…

Q: This is really the height of enthusiasm. What was the situation in Malaysia at the time sort of political, economically and all and then Americans in the country.
HARTWICK: For the region of Southeast Asia, there is a little bit of history. Southeast Asia had started pulling itself together in the mid-sixties creating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was an economically focused organization in part because politically no one could touch anything. You really could talk about economics and get along better economically and one of the abiding principles was non-interference in each other’s political affairs because each one of them had baggage. But by 1990 ASEAN and the leading countries of ASEAN really was doing very, very well. They had taken on the whole notion of export led growth; they themselves all had small internal markets anyway. They all had different niches in the market in terms of what they were doing internationally, but Malaysia in particular was a very successful trade oriented country of about 20 million people when I was there. So you go from a country like India approaching a billion and then you go to a county of about 20 million and that was basically not even the size of Bombay, India. So it was an interesting quick shift.

Politically Malaysia was led at the time as it was for approaching twenty years by the prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Mahathir had come up through the ranks; he had been a medical doctor when he was younger but a very active politician from northern Malaysia. He had a very strong sense of vision as to where he wanted to take the country and to where he thought it ought to be going. ASEAN was part of it but also Malaysia was in his mind clearly first and foremost. Malaysia had a lot of different challenges to it. It was a developing country but it’s racially quite mixed; in particular you had the Malays, principally overwhelmingly Muslim. You had Chinese who had been immigrants in the previous hundred years from lots of different places and then you had Indian stock, particularly south Indian stock that had been brought over to work the plantations in the twenties and thirties.

Q: Were these Tamils or?

HARTWICK: Tamils. So you had those three and then there were a few indigenous people particularly when you get out. You look on a map and you have Malaysia in the lower part of the peninsula and that is principally what most people consider as Malaysia in terms of the political dynamics and so forth. But actually you have all this other part too.

Q: You are talking about the part I call Borneo.

HARTWICK: That’s right. This is the Kalimantan or Borneo Island and this whole northern part is all Malaysia too, east Malaysia and quite different over there. You have a lot of different ethnic groups over there.

Q: I think of the Dyads or what are they.

HARTWICK: The Dyads tended to be a bit in Malaysia more on the Indonesia side, southern part but a lot of interesting ones; I don’t remember their names now. But they were in political union with UNNO which was the central party that Mahathir ran.
Mahathir’s central party was very much driven by the Malay. UNNO was an amalgam of three different groups that worked together but it was very much controlled by the Malays. Now Mahathir’s outward foreign policy was he recognized Malaysia as a small place and he believed strongly that binding with ASEAN and his fellow neighbors, even though they often didn’t get along all that well with some of their neighbors, was much better than trying to go things alone. He was also fiercely independent and outspoken so unlike most of the other countries from Thailand to Indonesia and even Singapore. Mahathir made a name for himself being very outspoken. In particular sticking his finger in the U.S. side whenever he wanted to because he felt that big countries bully smaller countries, big countries take advantage of little countries and he was going to be very vocal about what he felt if he and his country weren’t treated very well.

Internally you had ethnic politics which were actually very taboo but always beneath the surface, very important on issues and Mahathir managed those. Externally you had Mahathir being fiercely independent while at the same time working within the ASEAN context on the economic side but we had all these political overtones and things.

When I got there in 1990 the United States and many, many, many American companies had discovered Southeast Asia in particular from an economic standpoint. Since I was the head econ guy then at the embassy it was actually a perfect thing and it was a very interesting contrast for me professionally and even academically in the sense that India was internally focused all the time and when you go to Malaysia it’s outwardly focused almost all the time. Unlike in India, where you had very few American companies and all of them struggling just to survive in an almost hostile environment toward foreign business. In Malaysia you had exactly the flip side of that; you had the government super welcoming foreign companies to come in. So it was a very interesting contrast professionally.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

HARTWICK: The ambassador was Paul Cleveland who is now vice president of DACOR, the Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired group. He was an East Asia hand mostly and had been ambassador in New Zealand and this was his second and last ambassadorship. He was a bit of a John Wayne kind of guy, a tall rangy fellow, quick to anger quick to forget, kind of a gruff guy, smart, a good fun guy to work for.

Q: Okay well now in the first place when you went out there is it Mahathir? Mahathir I won’t say a controversial person but he was certainly a figure.

HARTWICK: He was pretty controversial even internally.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: He was a ruthless politician so you never crossed him and in fact there are stories about that later on.
Q: We will come to this but what were you getting when you went out there about him within the State Department, what reputation did he have and what were you picking up going out?

HARTWICK: I think there was grudging admiration that he was doing good things in Malaysia economically. I think from the State Departments standpoint from an economic side I think we very much liked his approach toward free trade and opening things up; we didn’t have complaints on that front. There were other certain areas where we wanted to see that government be more flexible such as the ______ area of banking. I think there was caution about him because he personified the notion of crony capitalism so he had lots of his close friends, be it Chinese or more so Malays, who were in key position who really reaped massive benefits from his rule.

Politically we always wanted to work with him as best we could and we were always cautious that we were about ready to get zapped for some reason or other; we never really quite knew from where or when that was going to come so there was a lot of caution dealing with Mahathir but on balance he was reasonably supportive. Now you remember 1990? What happened in 1990?

Q: The Gulf War.

HARTWICK: The Gulf War happened. So here you have Mahathir head of a Malaysian state, head of an Islamic state. Even though half the country was not Islamic, the government was Islamic in a pragmatic manner. Okay so in 1990 we had the Gulf War. I left India in the summer of 1990 and flew in August 1990 to Malaysia. The Gulf War hadn’t happened yet but the invasion of Kuwait had happened by…

Q: The first of August.

HARTWICK: The first of August. I think I went to Malaysia on the second of August and it was literally happening when I left the U.S. When I got to Malaysia it was like, oh, my goodness, the whole place was coming apart. Malaysia was in a challenging situation in that it was an Islamic country. Mahathir had a reputation for sticking his finger in our eye when he really didn’t like something and yet here was a big country, Iraq, smacking a little country and they were both Islamic and Mahathir found himself in a tough situation. Then we came out as the most vocal, we and the United Nations, but we were leading the United Nations as the most vocal against Saddam Hussein. Well to Mahathir’s credit he finally concluded this was untenable: that this big country Iraq should not be hitting this little country, Kuwait, even though many of us knew Kuwait wasn’t very popular in the Middle Eastern area for their own sort of arrogant reasons but one should never be invaded like that. So Mahathir came out quite forcibly against the invasion which put him, ironically, on the side of the United States which was not particularly what he wanted to be; he liked to be independent. It turns out Malaysia was a Security Council member during that time. They were one of the two Asian countries on the Security Council rotating and so we really needed to work with them so politically that was very important. So when I got there that became certainly from the political side a big deal, a
lot of work. Working with the Malaysians, mindful of the Malaysian sensitivity, of their wanting to be independent, mindful of its view of itself as an important leading Islamic pragmatic country for trying to come with something that made sense in terms of Security Council votes to keep pressure on Saddam Hussein. That whole fall was very, very intense with all of that. We had to work hard to take their views into account but in the end they were quite pragmatic which made Washington feel like we can work with this government on sensitive political issues which was important to President George H.W. Bush.

Q: Let’s talk about how did the embassy strike you? You had come from the large internally fixated embassy in New Delhi, India, to a different type of embassy. How did the embassy, the officer corps, the outlook and its ability to operate?

HARTWICK: Well it was a whole different scale. You went from one of the biggest embassies in the world with dozens of U.S. agencies, half of which were secretive, you didn’t really know who was what and they didn’t really talk internally, to a much smaller embassy that was much more manageable in a brand new, five year old building that was done in a very architecturally interesting way. You had far fewer agencies and people knew one another and got along so from that standpoint it was very, very pleasant. It was my first overseas assignment in East Asian affairs because South Asia was part of Near Eastern Affairs and actually never fit anywhere. They certainly weren’t viewed as Asian. No one in EAP ever thought of India as part of Asia at that time. Now all that is shifting today and it is shifting quite a bit but in those days it was not. So to me that was my first job in East Asia even though I had not worked in Washington East Asian affairs. Now I was moving in coming in from India to a new bureau. The embassy was a nice size. My section had four or five officers. The political section was about the same size. We had a nice USIS contingent. We did not have any AID unlike in Delhi where you had a massive AID operation. We did not have any constituent posts in Malaysia whereas in India we had four or five so in a sense the scale was really quite different.

To me the issues were particularly interesting. Paul Cleveland quickly assessed me as a good officer and that the economic side was really very important. He looked at the overall embassy goals and objectives and said, “We have to have the economic dimension of this dead center in terms of what are U.S. interests in Malaysia.” Of course, I was the new incoming head of the econ section so this was great. The commercial section and my section were working together and were really at the core of what Paul said we ought to be doing more of. With the exception of this big overlay of the Gulf War going on. But then the Gulf War did not go on yet; it was a run up to the Gulf War.

Q: ...Desert Shield, a big huge half a million troops were put in there between August and January of 1990.

HARTWICK: And all the pressure in the United Nations Security Council and so forth to bring pressure on Saddam Hussein to back off peacefully so we didn’t have to go to war, at least that was the general view. Malaysia played an important role in that. The solidarity between the Muslim brothers and sisters versus the West which was leading the
pressure effort on Saddam Hussein started to manifest themselves increasingly in public opinion in Malaysia. Saddam Hussein did all kinds of things that played to that. He had lots of pictures of him, if you will recall, but pictures of Saddam Hussein praying all the time, green Islamic flags and so forth around him.

Q: Wearing an Arab costume.

HARTWICK: What we found when I was there that first fall was while politically at the United Nations we were working well with the Malaysians the public opinion in Malaysia was beginning to side more and more with Iraq. Somehow Kuwait was being forgotten about. That move was not being set by the official press as Malaysia never had much of a free press; it had a government controlled press. So the press was all right, but the press tended to be driven by English. What you ended up having though was you had a strong Islamic community, the Imams and so forth, and increasingly they were preaching that the West was going to be beating up our Muslim brothers and sisters in Iraq and the Middle East. You did have an Iraqi embassy there and they were doing the best they could behind the scenes. It was interesting to watch this evolution take place. So when the shooting actually finally started in early ’91, if you recall, it didn’t go on very long it was like a 2 ½-3 week war for battles. As soon as that happened we became suddenly, if you will, internally in Malaysia, targets more than anything else; we all became very, very concerned. Intel information, working with the Malaysian Intel groups, they became very concerned that we were intentionally going to be targets.

Q: This is also in the Philippines, Indonesia, I mean it was...

HARTWICK: All over the area.

Q: All over the area.

HARTWICK: The Philippines are more a Christian Catholic country with a Muslim minority which can be very ugly but it had not turned all that ugly yet; it got worse after that. Malaysia had not been that ugly yet either but we were picking up lots of intel signs of the possibilities. We had a drive-by shooting in front of our gate at the embassy for example. They ended up catching the guys. So the Malaysian government was pretty cooperative with us. They gave us all new license plates so that our diplomatic license plates went away and we all had regular license plates; we became real low profile for a while. But it only went on for three weeks or so because after three weeks the war subsided. That was it.

Q: Did the war I mean this was on CNN and other things. It was such a technological war. Certainly the military of every other country was looking very closely at this but also the people. Did the technological superiority catch the eye of the people?

HARTWICK: What I recall was that massive build up and the strategy to defeat Saddam Hussein. There was an awful lot of tension, as I recall, in the international press as well as in Malaysia about Iraq’s big army and Iraq’s formidable capabilities as well. That, of
course, helped shape the American preparation, which is why we built up so much; if we were going to deal with this don’t forget Colin Powell was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. It was the emergence of his view of overwhelming superiority that you’ve got to be able to do it. So that is why it took so long to stage what we needed to get it done.

Malaysia is not a militaristic society at all. Their military plays a very minor role and they never invested immensely in armaments even though they’ve had some skirmishes with the Thais on the southern border and a little bit with the Singaporeans. I don’t think in the Malaysian mind and their own perspective about themselves that they ever doubted the United States didn’t have great military capabilities. Remember what I said about the Mahathir rhetoric about big countries beating up on little countries. I think when President Bush chose not to pursue Saddam Hussein, not to invade Iraq, I think from a Malaysian standpoint that helped us a lot. I think it was consistent with we were being principled in our approach in our dealing with this incursion. We had the United Nations and Security Council back up behind it which Malaysia had been a part of it. We stopped at the border and didn’t keep on going; which again we didn’t beat up on a small country. If we had been a big country beating up on a small Iraq, that would have engendered a lot more sympathy for the Iraqis. The tone as a result of the public perception of how the United States played in all of this was always in the backdrop. While politically the government was quite supportive, even though it didn’t say very much publicly, it was very quiet publicly, but behind the sense they were being very supportive and we were working well together. None of that really came out in the press. The press increasingly had a theme of Iraq, our Muslim brother, being beaten up. Then on the weekends and the Friday prayers that was a tense time which continued on for some while. Obviously when the war subsided and that started to fade that became from the Malaysian standpoint less and less important at least from my recollection.

Q: Did Malaysia play any part in a communications buildup? Singapore did I believe as far as...

HARTWICK: Not communications as in logistical support. Thailand did and Singapore did but Malaysia absolutely did not.

Q: But there was no particular reason...

HARTWICK: There was the idea that we are independent, we don’t want anything to do with this. In fact, there was internal grousing that Thailand had been far too supportive, and between Malaysia and Singapore they have always been grousing about the two of them because they really do fundamentally dislike one another.

Q: Was Lee Kuan Yew still in the...

HARTWICK: Lee Kuan Yew has always been around but not in power at the time.

Q: Yes but he is still the power...
HARTWICK: Goh Chok Tong was in power. He was very much in evidence. You saw their support of U.S. efforts and the Thai supports. They’re both the size of Malaysia. For Malaysia to have a little scratchy period about both of them, it reaffirmed from the Malaysian standpoint that they wanted to be fiercely independent. So they had no role at all.

The one good area I think that came out of that period, and it must have been evolving already, but it certainly was advanced in pretty good waves I think came from an intel standpoint. We worked well together in the build up to the Gulf War and we continued to work well after that. Now Malaysia was a significant Islamic country in Southeast Asia although a lot smaller than Indonesia. They viewed themselves as a more purely Islamic as opposed to oddball Islamic, as some might suggest, for Indonesia. It was important that Malaysia would work with us on an intel standpoint in trying to track bad guys. Because after the Gulf War we started to see the terrorist elements beginning to build in the world and in Malaysia as well. Singapore had a problem, Malaysia had a problem, of course the Philippines had a problem, and we know what happens many years later in Bali, Indonesia, and so forth. Certainly in 90-'93 when I was there our intel connections grew well and we worked well with them on that front.

**Q:** Okay let’s talk about dealing on the economic side dealing with the Malaysian government. In the first place, as an economist, how were the statistics and the bureaucracy of Malaysia, as that was in your parish you might say?

HARTWICK: The ministry of international trade and industry in Malaysia was controlled by Raffia Aziz, who had been a very active politician herself, one of the few active women politicians under Mahathir. She took her job very seriously and she really wanted to promote trade and investment in Malaysia; so from my standpoint it was really pushing on a lot of open doors. We already had a lot of American companies; they’re were little factoids that were fascinating. For example, in ’91-'92 something like 70 percent of computer chips for personal computers were built in Malaysia. Whether it was advanced micro systems, micro devices or Intel or whatever, they were all being built in Malaysia. Their role internationally was already becoming quite formidable so we had quite an array of very good quality American companies working in Malaysia. Lots of health care companies producing anything from rubber gloves to condoms were in Malaysia because they had very advanced rubber plantations. There was mining for tin and a variety of other things. Malaysia was pushing as hard as it could to get into the manufacturing side and then as a leading platform for export and that was very, very different for me compared to India.

**Q:** How was the school system? Was it designed to turn out both engineers and good workers for the technological businesses?

HARTWICK: No. I guess people often say education is always an area in need of more reform in every country. In Malaysia Mahathir was driving to open the country up and it was trying to make itself a manufacturing base for in particular, the United States, but Europeans as well. China had not quite emerged on the front yet which it did later. There
was a strong push to strengthen their capabilities on the technical side. But with a small country like Malaysia, and their willingness to embrace things from the outside, made Mahathir look to where they could get training outside as they sought to build up internally what they can do. They also were trying to take advantage of sending students to other countries. That puts us back again to the racial mix in Malaysia and how did that play out.

The internal objective of Mahathir among many others was to improve the Malay people, which was about 50-55 percent of the population, to foster their economic well-being vis-à-vis the Chinese minority which was closer to I’d say 30 percent; the rest would have been tribals or Tamil Indians. So Mahathir put together a set of policies that absolutely, unequivocally skewed things in helping Malays at every turn. On the education front that was part of it as well.

In Margaret Thatcher’s time she thought to shore up finances of the British Empire. She changed policy on the education front and had Commonwealth countries start to pay the full cost of their students going to school in the UK. So the UK dimension of its relationship early in the mid-80s was very important because of education; they were sending a lot of Malaysians and Malays to the UK. So when she changed her policies and started having them pay full board, including Malaysia, Mahathir was very offended by this; he felt that the old bond had been broken and the hell with the Brits. We are going to go elsewhere. So they then began sending lots of students to the United States and lots of students to Australia. Frankly, I think the preference was U.S. first, Australia second, because we could absorb enormous numbers of students.

Q: Were they going to any particular places in the States to schools?

HARTWICK: The Malaysian government got behind making scholarships available to Malay students; they had very few scholarships available to Chinese students or Tamil students mainly for Malay students. Enterprising American universities picked up on this quickly and started to solicit those students to come to their universities in the United States. You had Malaysian students and the government was giving them full stipend and paying full fare because it was still cheaper than the UK. So there was a consortium set up in KL of a handful of American universities that worked with the embassy a bit but mostly worked independently on their own to funnel interested Malaysian, mostly Malay students, through that process and then to the United States. Right now today we talk about somewhere in the area of 90 thousand Indian students in the United States today, in 2009/2010. That is on a basis of 1.1 billion. I was in Malaysia in the early nineties, and by the time I left in ’93 we had about 90 thousand Malaysian students in the United States on a base of 20 million people.

Q: Good God.

HARTWICK: So you could see how important it was for Malaysia. At the same time, regarding Malaysia I talked about some of its ethnic and social challenges. One thing that Mahathir didn’t encourage but didn’t discourage was a return to a roots feeling for the
Malays in particular; women’s dress with headdress with scarves on, an embrace of the Malay language versus English; they all studied in English after the first three or four years of school. They all went to English schools basically. To differentiate the Malays from the Chinese, and the Chinese were awfully good students anyway and they seemed to have an advantage, there was a big push that Malay would be an essential first language and English would be an additional language. Well they did that for eight, nine, ten years and so by the time I got there we had an interesting development. You had lots of good English speakers but a lot of the younger people, the people in their late teens early twenties, their English was pretty weak; they could do fine in Malay but they couldn’t speak English very well and they couldn’t read or write English very well. So then you had this problem of the pendulum switches. We want to send people to the United States in great big numbers and focusing mostly on the Malays you had a problem that a lot of Malay students actually didn’t speak English all that well. So remedial English and TOEFL and those kinds of things became very important. Their parents fifteen years before actually spoke English pretty well but now these kids didn’t speak that well. But all that was going on simultaneously with trying to build up the education base for the country of which English is going to be critically important.

Q: I would imagine that the Chinese were in a way taking care of themselves.

HARTWICK: Well, yes and no. I mean it is like one of these myths that all Jews are rich, all Chinese are rich, it’s not true. There are some really good ones who are rich, yes, but there are a lot of people who aren’t. So in the end they were really disadvantaged. They couldn’t turn to the government; if they weren’t rich they were out of luck. So one of the problems we had internally with the embassy when we dealt with visas, for example, was we didn’t really worry about Malay students. They would all come back. We had to worry about the Chinese students because they wouldn’t come back because it was oppressive enough in the early nineties in Malaysia for Chinese students that they felt disenfranchised a fair bit in their own country. So when we had Chinese seeking visas it was mostly because they didn’t want to come back to Malaysia; they felt that they were really disadvantaged whereas the Malays felt they were being taken care of. It was interesting from a consular standpoint because you really start focusing on this racial group rather than that racial group and, of course, that goes against our own ethos; you aren’t supposed to do that, but the truth was 90 percent of your visa jumpers were going to be Chinese and almost none of the Malays. So you focus everything on the Chinese which we didn’t really like to do but that was where it was then.

Q: At that time China was not much of an attraction? China was just beginning to...

HARTWICK: No, China was really not much of a factor. Mahathir was mindful of China in the north and he had Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong down south in Singapore talking about the need to work more closely with China. He always resented that these two Chinese guys from Singapore were talking like that and he was a Malaysian “Damn you are not going to tell us how to do things”, right? But he was maintaining contacts and working with the Chinese; the Chinese were really changing their policies now toward Southeast Asia. All during the ‘80s they were becoming increasingly warmer and
friendlier whereas when you look at Malaysia’s past and its history back in the fifties and the late forties the Chinese Communists were instrumental in trying to keep an insurgency going on in Malaysia that the Brits were trying to stop.

Q: Yeah, this was going...

HARTWICK: Very badly.

Q: What did they call it the...

HARTWICK: I don’t remember.

Q: ...I can’t remember but I remember Sir Gerald Templar, the man who ran the counter terrorism and did a very good job cleaning it up.

HARTWICK: Yeah. In the late fifties and early sixties you still have Chinese Communist supported camps in the jungles of Malaysia; that was the backdrop of the Chinese. Now fast forward about ten years or fifteen years and it appears when I was there it wasn’t that much ancient history; it wasn’t that far although the Chinese policies toward Southeast Asia they had embraced their sun sign policy and started being much friendlier, warmer and much more supportive and it became a bit different. You had other issues going on too; you had the post-Vietnam period; you had the boat people, Malaysia’s role in that. You look at Vietnam on that map where did the boat people go? And this was still going on. We had camps in Malaysia. The boat people who were escaping from Vietnam in the eighties and early nineties were coming down here. I mean it was Malaysia either way.

Q: I know the poor Vietnamese boat people were having terrible problems with the Thais and piracy, rapes and this...

HARTWICK: Well you could see it was open water.

Q: ...but were the Malays part of that or were they just didn’t want the people there?

HARTWICK: Mostly didn’t want the people there, officially as the government.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: I mean we were having trouble with the Malaysians for quite a while pushing people off. So while they were targets of Thai and Indonesian bandits/pirates, the problem with the Malaysians was they didn’t want any more people. They had enough and they would stop them, reposition the boats and tow them back out to sea and let them keep going. So a lot of people died from that.
Q: Yeah. I don’t think of the Malaysians as being particularly involved in sea activities as more the Thai’s and Indonesians. Is that true or not? Are many fishermen?

HARTWICK: Well Malaysia is a smaller country and if you look at Malaysia on the map you realize they actually, from a fishing standpoint, are quite active but not with big massive fleets. Mindful with Singapore and Indonesia of the Straits of Malacca, very, very important area, but Malaysia never invested massively in its military capabilities. It was more mindful of a police standpoint.

Q: We are talking about the Straits of Malacca.

HARTWICK: The Straits of Malacca is important really for shipping in this part of the world. There were lots of pirate problems all in this area and that continues to this very day. This is a pretty narrow strip; 250-300 ships a day pass through here so it’s pretty active. The boat people were all coming down here in this area where it is all wild and crazy.

Q: We are talking about the lower half of Thailand where it abuts between Burma and Malaysia.

HARTWICK: One of the other political issues out here involving China in the South China Sea is the Spratly Islands.

Q: The Spratly Islands.

HARTWICK: There are a lot of competing claims between Vietnamese, the Filipinos, the Malaysians, the Cambodians and then the Chinese. But Malaysia never invested massively in its Navy; it didn’t put a lot of money into that; they had a lot of patrol boating and that kind of stuff.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about the economic situation there. As the economic counselor what were your principal concerns?

HARTWICK: It was a bit like pushing unopened doors particularly in the area of manufacturing and trade. It was trying to continue that process and not let some of the political tensions that seemed to always never be very far from the surface with Prime Mahathir and his government spill over onto the economic area. So I was a member of the chamber of commerce. My counterpart from the commercial section and I were two basic members of the board of directors. There was a lot of concern on the part of American business that they not be somehow tainted by some of the potential scratchiness between the United States and Malaysia as different things were evolving over this time. So we worked hard with them to keep improving the American company image.
There were pockets of challenges. The banking environment was not open and we had big American banks wanting to be more active, to open up more branches, to have fewer restrictions or regulations of things they wanted to do. Sometimes we related to that same racial driven policy that existed in the country; those things spilled over into the economic policies for you will make certain amounts of loans to this community or that community and that affected some of the American companies as well. So we had a fair amount of attention on that.

A significant area I worked on that was really as much political as it was economic was the role of ASEAN in Southeast Asia. It has continued to grow and we wanted to make sure that ASEAN be as open and as friendly to the United States and U.S. interests as possible and it not be driven in an exclusive manner that kept the United States out. In the early nineties with Mahathir and his independent attitude toward things, he wanted to promote the Asianness of ASEAN and to strengthen Southeast Asian ASEAN ties with Japan, Korea and then later on with China. Guess what is out of that mix? The United States is not there although we are the number one trading partner with all of those countries. So Mahathir was internally in ASEAN and his people pushed very hard for those kinds of policies. Consequently that became an important objective of the embassy, the supporting the push from Washington’s standpoint to fight that tendency from becoming institutionalized within ASEAN. If you look today in 2010 we actually haven’t done a very good job. One of the reasons we didn’t do a very good job I think was that the United States didn’t like the notion of us not being more included, but we never really wanted to do much about it; we just wanted to complain and say you shouldn’t do that.

Q: Looking back on it what could we have done?

HARTWICK: We could have certainly looked to build much better ties directly with ASEAN as an institution which was rolling in terms of programs, in terms of trade benefits, these kinds of things and frankly we never could do it. To this very day somehow ASEAN has never gotten up to the upper level in Asia for us to pay very much attention to it. The irony was this is a dynamic model. The irony was while we didn’t like being excluded we didn’t do very much to make ourselves included short of reminding them that we are their biggest trading partner. In the meantime, elements like Mahathir but also in Japan, Korea and later on in China the notion of working with ASEAN more closely and being included continued to evolve. So Mahathir came up with the first ASEAN plus three summit; well the plus three were China, Korea and Japan. I mean it wasn’t plus-4.

Q: These in ASEAN...

HARTWICK: It was ASEAN plus three. The world of ASEAN is its own bizarre, arcane network of connections and plus-1s and plus-3s and this and that. I won’t even go there since it is a very complicated thing. It’s its own strange little world; it’s interesting in its own way but in many respects it’s like having been driven by how many countries are in ASEAN and the fact that all members are equal and they all want contact with different, outside, non-ASEAN members and so forth it becomes very elaborate.
But in any case, Mahathir was one of the drivers, one of the leaders for trying to make ASEAN more exclusive; not more exclusive, more Asian. He came out with lots of outrageous statements about the Asianness of ASEAN and how Asian people are this way and Westerners or Americans are that way.

Q: In a way the Malays didn’t quite fit into some of the Asianness did they or not?

HARTWICK: The Malay stock comes from Cambodia and if you look at the map over there you have Cambodia in the center, Thai, Lao, Cambodian stock. Those were where the people and the ethnic roots go down to Malaysia and down the Malay part and also over to the Philippines; there are Malay stock in the Philippines. So if you see a lot of Filipinos and Malays and Indonesians, a lot of them look quite similar. Why, because that is where a lot of their ethnic stock comes from back to the map. But that is a Southeast Asian that’s not North Asian. It’s really quite different and from that standpoint ASEAN is ASIA but it’s a different group of Asians.

Q: Were you sensing anybody looking at China in the same? You look at Vietnam, for example, or Thailand were very dubious about China. Of course Malaysia had its essentially Chinese-Malay war during their time of confrontation well confrontation was with Indonesia but anyway...

HARTWICK: While I was there the China element was not something that Mahathir himself frankly embraced but he did want to embrace the Asianness. Many people speculated about this. The theory was that Mahathir had basically a pretty pro-Asian anti-white attitude toward how the world was ordered and this comes out of his own colonial background. China fits into the Asianness and not white colonial background and as China’s policies toward Southeast Asia began to be more peaceful and more conducive to working with them in a cooperative manner and increasingly economic oriented. If you go back to the eighties their policies weren’t economically oriented they were much more politically oriented. When you get into the mid to late-nineties and beyond they’re very much driven by the economic needs of China. All of that changed the tenor of the relationship between China and ASEAN and China and Malaysia particularly.

Q: During the time you were there in 1990-’93 was there concern on our part or there was this bubble that was building up from Japan down through Thailand, Indonesia and all of that with real estate and all of that like the one we have just recently gone through. Was that something we were keeping an eye on or not?

HARTWICK: No not particularly; I think the excess also contributed to the Asian financial crisis which was in 1997. Now I would have thought some of the smartest people would have been able to see something was amiss and maybe some of these countries needed to be more careful. But in ’90-’93, I think the notion that Southeast Asia had it right and had their policies right and had embarked on a very rapid economic growth as a result of these policies was the boilerplate talking points for almost all of Southeast Asia; different countries supposedly had their economics right better than
others. The Philippines never quite had it right all that well, Indonesia had a big complicated country, you had other issues out there too. But Malaysia in its own way felt it had it right, Singapore had it right, Thailand had it right even though you didn’t have to look very deep beneath the surface to realize a lot of other things were going on. But in terms of their economic policies this stuff made sense to them and it was producing real wealth, growth and development in these countries and we wanted to encourage it; quite frankly our companies were at the driving edge on an awful lot of this.

Q: How did the Borneo factor as I’ll call it that the Malaysian sector of that big island fit in there and also that peculiar place called Brunei, was this important?

HARTWICK: East Malaysia didn’t really fit very much in terms of what I just described as Malaysia’s outward oriented economic policy. I mean East Malaysia as in Kalimantan, Indonesia, the rest of Borneo as you look at the map were really viewed as sources for natural resources, trees, tropical timber and that kind of thing. The ethnic makeup of East Malaysia compared to peninsula Malaysia was sufficiently different that you had lots of different smaller ethnic groups that weren’t all that politically active and the population actually was pretty small despite the land area. You look at it and it almost seems to be the same; population wise it was really quite a bit different.

Brunei closely related to the royal families of Malaysia. In Malaysia you have a strong overlay of royal Malaysia and what you really have were many separate kings in Malaysia. I’m going to say five. There were all these principalities years ago that ultimately came together. They had a rotating kingship as the old political structure that like in the UK, didn’t have a lot of political power but it had a lot of honorific power and importance to the country. You had that in Malaysia and so the kingship of Malaysia rotated among the five key principalities that had existed before. To this very day it’s an integral part of what Malaysia is all about, the awarding of titles and all this kind of stuff is extremely important; it gets a lot of attention in Malaysia.

When you go across to East Malaysia, Brunei was one of those principalities that takes its history back like the other Malaysian kings. However, it was sufficiently off on the side and different that it was invited to join the Malaysia Federation; it was called Malaya Federation when it was first created back in the fifties and they chose those not to join. I may be wrong and they may have joined for a little while but decided they didn’t want to stay in. so they pulled themselves out and became Brunei, basically based upon the king of Brunei and his family and what his controls were which goes to show it’s not a very large place. It managed to do what it wanted to do because of all the resources it had, basically resources of oil offshore. So it was its own separate entity.

Working very closely with Malaysia when ASEAN was first created, Brunei was, in fact, not even part of that, and then they were convinced they should join ASEAN. So when the first core ASEAN was created I think there were five members. A few years, there were six and then in the late 1990s, when they expanded and brought in another three and finally four more so ASEAN became ten as it grew. Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and
Burma joined later, but Brunei joined later than the original five; it’s always had its history of being self-sufficient.

**Q: Did Brunei play any role as far as helping its neighbors or not or was it pretty much sitting on its wealth?**

HARTWICK: It played a minor role. I think it was always mindful of being so small and being surrounded by Malaysian interests that they made sure they worked well with Malaysians. It is an Islamic Kingdom so in that sense it had politically a lot to do with Malaysia as well. If you look at Indonesia most of the island of Borneo is Indonesian; that really is a very remote wilderness jungle Borneo is. So while from an Indonesian standpoint it is very much a part of Indonesia, very little low population, also used basically for natural resources and timber and is not a place with lots and lots of people.

**Q: The Indonesians had policies and hadn’t gotten very far I take it of where you put your excess population and all. Was Malaysia doing anything similar?**

HARTWICK: I don’t recall them doing anything like that. You had pockets of peninsula Malaysians living in and politically active in East Malaysia but not large. So if you looked at the ethnic makeup of the Malays and so forth they were basically a small percentage compared to what they were in peninsular Malaysia. It tended to dictate a somewhat different sort of attitude and more laissez-faire attitude I think. As long as those two states in East Malaysia didn’t get out of hand and again start acting too troublesome from Mahathir or the government’s standpoint they were pretty much left to their own devices.

**Q: Particularly with all American interest how stood the problem of corruption during your time?**

HARTWICK: Corruption was a big problem. Mahathir was a personification of crony capitalism. You skew things in favor of your friends and you bend or ignore the rules to benefit people you want to benefit including yourself and your own family but also all of your friends. His friends were all Malay and he had a lot of Chinese friends. Part of the way he was able to placate the Chinese minority was making sure that the key leaders got more than their share. So that was fundamentally always a problem.

When we had so many of our American companies working there that was probably the biggest challenge. If they came in and worked as a manufacturing based ______ exporter they basically could take advantage of what Malaysia had to offer. They didn’t have to get into the Malaysian political scene too much. They didn’t have to try and win contracts in Malaysia, they just had to get the government support to do what they wanted and make sure that under the labor laws were treated fairly. That was overwhelmingly what the American companies did in Malaysia and that continued on very effectively the whole time I was there.
When it came to the issues of corruption, American companies had great difficulty bidding on some of the pretty ambitious contracts that the Malaysian government was letting out. We all have seen pictures of what is known as the two Petronas Towers. Typical of Mahathir, he wanted them to be the highest in the world. So they went up and then up at about the 70th floor they had a linkage between the two buildings. They are built out of stainless steel; they are pretty impressive buildings. Now they were not completed when I was there, but the groundbreaking was done in 1993 when I was there. Mahathir had every intention of making Malaysia very prominent on the map and cost was not going to be a factor in many ways. Well, American firms wanted to be a part of that in many respects and we couldn’t be a part of it; it became so clear that what you had to do to win any of these contracts was in direct violation of our Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. So American companies did almost none of that sort of business. They built a massive airport way ahead of its time, a lot of stainless steel in the airport. If you go travel to Malaysia it’s a very impressive airport to this day and its already been operating for over ten years. You just say, what a place! This thing got started back when I was there and the first estimates were $5-6 million and by the time they were finished it was closer to $10 million. It is just a beautiful airport built for the next fifty years and that was the kind of thing Mahathir did on a regular basis.

So corruption was always an issue and it became a problem for us whenever we wanted to do business. I remember Enron came in there and they wanted to do some energy projects and some water projects. In the end they left; they couldn’t do it. I had known Enron people when I had been in India the first time. They just couldn’t make anything go because no matter which way they tried to get it done before they knew it there was a payoff required to get something done. They said they can’t do that so they walked out; so that was an issue.

Human rights was also a problem because Mahathir would not brook any opposition. That included individuals as well as groups of people. So the political opposition in Malaysia was always in the crosshairs of Mahathir and his people. They would play dirty if they had to. Anwar Ibrahim at the time I was there was the finance minister and very much up and coming; by the time I left he was going to become the prime minister heir apparent for Mahathir. When I first got there he was emerging as a big player but he was in his forties and he crossed Mahathir too boldly one time and that was it. Mahathir had him beaten up and thrown in jail; he didn’t die, but was almost a martyr and became a cause célèbre for all opposition to Mahathir and he is that to this very day, many years later. But Mahathir really just pulled out all the stakes and went after him in a very ugly way; he got beaten up by the police. It was all over the press and here he had been a sitting minister and treated like that. So the corruption side of that was always there and it even spilled into the human rights side.

I did a lot of work on intellectual property rights. We were trying to work more closely with the Malaysian authorities to strengthen protection of intellectual property. You had a lot of manufacturing of disks that were illegal and that kind of pirating going on.

Q: Tapes in those days.
HARTWICK: Tapes evolving into disks.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: As with a lot of developing countries there were laws that the United States and American companies felt to be very weak and we kept pressure on them to improve.

Paul Cleveland was there for one year and then he was replaced by John Wolf. John Wolf I had known in my earlier economic days. He was just a little bit older than I was but he was a very hard charger and very successful; so in 1991 John replaced Paul Cleveland as the ambassador. Cleveland frankly had a difficult tenure in Malaysia. His macho John Wayne attitude was exactly the worst thing to have in a place like Malaysia. Mahathir felt that the Americans were tough cowboys and arrogant. Paul was not arrogant but he did have this demeanor of a John Wayne kind of guy, and Mahathir treated him terribly. He also ordered his foreign affairs minister basically to treat him terribly. It really ruined Paul’s whole tenure while he was there. The first year, year and a half weren’t so bad, but when Paul had to go in and deliver tough messages on some of these issues I’ve been talking about it really did not go down well at all. He was virtually ostracized for a while.

Mahathir basically did the same thing with the Australian high commissioner at the time. There were some movies being put on in Australia. Supposedly these were fictional, but it sure looked like Malaysia. They presented some of the abuses in prisons and that kind of stuff. Mahathir was so furious with the Australians he basically ordered no contact with the Australian high commission at all from the foreign affairs ministry. When you got on his bad side you knew it. Paul unfortunately just took a whole lot of that and by the time he left he felt very frustrated, angry and bitter. We all felt badly because he was targeted very clearly, I think, by the Malays. The Malays rather than the Malaysians but the Malays in particular you could sweeten things. There were a few of them in the ministry who controlled the foreign affairs ministry; they were not easy people to deal with. They were very tough with chips on their shoulder. When they were not happy with what you were doing they were nasty, rude and everything else. It was kind of the worst I had ever seen even when I was in India which can be very tough but the Malaysians were even tougher.

Q: What about when Wolf came in?

HARTWICK: Remember when I mentioned about Mahathir’s efforts to push the Asianness of ASEAN. There was a specific policy that was described under ASEAN and Mahathir was pushing it. He was the architect of this policy and it became Paul Cleveland’s job to do what he could to present our view that we felt this was excluding the United States intentionally, which it was, and we didn’t like it. In the last few months of Cleveland’s tenure he was dealing with that issue; he basically became the focal point for Mahathir’s ire that we didn’t like his policy. And Mahathir knew very well that we were working with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and everyone else to fight that policy.
as well not just with Malaysia. We were gathering other ASEAN governments to support us against that. Of course, typical for us, you know everyone is afraid to go against someone else and Mahathir’s big vocal and everyone rolls their eyes saying, well you know how he is and so forth. But as far as Washington was concerned, we didn’t like this and we didn’t want it to continue. So Cleveland took the brunt of a lot of that and by the time he left he left feeling very frustrated.

Wolf came in with the virtue of pretty quickly after he arrived there was a new assistant secretary, a new administration and a new attitude. So John like all good diplomats he worked that to our advantage and how can I set a new tone with the government and so forth. Paul left and our government turned over. This must have been ’92 going into ’93. So John Wolf worked very hard to change the tenor of all of that and with considerable success. I think a lot of the Malaysians themselves were tired of the rancor. The Clinton administration came in and set a different tone saying that they wanted to have a better relationship with ASEAN and Malaysia in particular. So that improved things right there and John was the beneficiary of that and he helped sort of push them.

I admire John. He did some good work including one of the first arms sales we ever did to Malaysia. They were not particularly military oriented but Mahathir decided that he wanted to strengthen the Malaysia air force because he knew Singapore had a strong air force. He didn’t like the fact that the Singaporeans could almost flip their noses at Mahathir because they had a very effective air force most of which still operated out of the United States; they were trained in the United States and kept a squadron in the United States and then they would keep a couple squadrons in Singapore and then they would go back and forth. Well Mahathir decided that really wasn’t in Malaysians’ interest so he decided to upgrade their air force and Wolf went after the business. The Singaporean’s were flying F-16s which Mahathir pretty much excluded right away. He didn’t want F-16s. For whatever reason they were not suitable air craft. He went in the direction of F-18s which were built by McDonnell Douglas; they were twin engine planes. The U.S. Navy flew them so he felt they may be a bit better. But the competition was very stiff with regard to the Russians who made MiG-29s, a somewhat similar aircraft. Wolf was tenacious about this and he kept McDonnell Douglas in the mix the whole time and kept at it. In the end when Malaysia finally made a decision I felt John had pushed so hard and we had made such a big thing about that as a part of our relationship that Mahathir, even though he still wanted to stick his finger in the U.S. side, finally decided something that made no sense at all. He took the new air force they were going to build and cut it in half and he ordered half MiGs and half F-18s. Mind you they weren’t ordering very many aircraft. It was something like ten or eleven aircraft from each country. It was like where is your economy of scale? This is ridiculous; you’ve got to train everyone on one aircraft and then the other aircraft and the logistical supply chain for parts for two different airplanes and they are in two different places. The Russians don’t speak English. That is how Mahathir was. That is what he was going to do when it came down to it so they bought MiGs and F-18s. I think Wolf did a great job hanging in there; not just Wolf but McDonnell Douglas too. They had worked very hard to build a relationship with the Malaysians and they just had enough that they found that was part of the deal.
There was a new buy about ten years later. Then they bought only MiGs. At that point Boeing, which now owns McDonnell Douglas, didn’t do a very good job. Finally the craziness of buying two aircraft went away and the F-18s were much more expensive than the MiGs. So they went with the new round of MiGs but what a crazy country at times.

*Q:* Speaking of the commercial side did by any chance Malaysia fit into the sex industry that Thailand certainly has benefitted. I use the term benefitted from or not or was it just not the same culture?

HARTWICK: No, Thai culture and Malay culture are very different, very, very different. Within Malay culture you’ve got Chinese culture and you’ve got Malay culture and then Indian culture. Malaysia did not traffic in people. It was not a country where the sex industry was very strong. I think they had it, of course they had it, but not like…

*Q:* I wouldn’t have thought…

HARTWICK: …in Cambodia or Thailand or whatever.

*Q:* What about tourism and beaches and things like that? Was it very much into…

HARTWICK: Malaysia was making a big effort. If you are in Malaysia you don’t see or hear so much, but they have been unbelievably effective in massive tourism campaigns to attract people to come to Malaysia. Malaysia Truly Asia is one of their songs; you might even have heard it. But if you watch CNN when you are traveling it’s just like a non-stop drumbeat about Malaysia and they have the most beautiful pictures and people and music and it’s wonderful. Frankly when you’ve lived in Malaysia that’s not how Malaysia was but their ability to paint this picture very effectively was superb. Even to this day when you go on CNN, literally when you went to Europe or certainly to Asia within an hour you’d see an ad about Malaysia from Malaysia Tourism, Malaysia Truly Asia. When you watch it and you know what politically had been going on and what really happens in Malaysia you look at this thing it is so idyllic and so wonderful. It’s very clearly targeted to foreign western tourists to come so that has been a very big industry for them and it’s been very, very successful for them.

*Q:* All around the area how do they stand oil wise?

HARTWICK: When I got there in 1990 oil wasn’t an important component for their economy but their economy had grown fast enough that they were actually importing oil. They had offshore oil exploration and resources already proved up but by the time I was there it was fairly mature and EXXON was the American company most active there and they had a pretty big presence up on the north central peninsula coast of Malaysia. The national oil company was called Petronas. The government identified Petronas as the richest of Malaysian companies. Therefore they were going to be the proud owners of the huge Petronas buildings even though they couldn’t afford about a quarter of the whole
building. They were told, this will be your building you will be responsible for this. When I was there Petronas was very active in exploration in other countries including in Iraq and other places so Malaysia’s oil industry really was at a mature stage and it hasn’t changed a lot since then. They continue to pump oil and do some exploration but it hasn’t changed dramatically; it was significant for them but it was becoming less and less of importance for them compared to manufacturing exports and that kind of thing.

Q: What about other countries I’m thinking particularly about Japan, maybe Korea, as far as competing with the United States for pieces of Malaysia?

HARTWICK: Japan was the biggest player in Malaysia and we were the second biggest player. We had continued to emerge and grow faster than the Japanese by the time I got there but the Japanese companies were clearly the benchmark for success in Malaysia. The Japanese community was very large in Malaysia so there was a lot of rhyme and reason for Mahathir to embrace Asianness and all of that under ASEAN because the Japanese in particular had a very big presence. They were partners with Malaysia in its national car and you saw them all over the place so when you had American companies doing a lot of manufacturing you had a lot of Japanese companies doing a lot of manufacturing of Panasonics, Sony and all of that. I think one of those factoids again, I talked about computer chips when it came to video recorders as opposed to CDs now but back in the early ‘90s it was all videos we didn’t have CDs quite yet. Something like 80 percent of all video machines were made in Malaysia and they weren’t made by American companies. By that time we didn’t make them and they had been all Japanese companies making them for the most part. Koreans were coming on but the Japanese were overwhelmingly making those, JVC, Panasonic, Sony and so forth all over Malaysia that was really, really big. That same model of manufacturing made for export was used vis-à-vis Japan as well as the United States and other places; a lot of what was made in Malaysia went to the United States or went to Japan. Japan was very important on the business side of things but there was a political backdrop that Mahathir would periodically trot out which was to remind the Japanese that they were real bastards in Malaysia during World War II and that Malaysians had not forgotten. Whenever they got a little too pushy then all of a sudden that theme would reappear. The Japanese didn’t want to be reminded of that and they would back off a little bit and it was played very, very effectively.

Q: How about the Brits were they working under a handicap or what?

HARTWICK: There was the legacy of the colonial background. I think the British, like all of us, would emphasize the positive parts of it and deemphasize the negative parts but they were actually fairly minor players all in all. Trading with ASEAN was obviously important and was obviously important for us. Australia was playing a much more Asia oriented policy role as well and the Europeans were somewhat active, but in Malaysia they were less of a factor. I had some good French friends who were there and they were active as the French business people often are but again it was sort of a niche market; it was not a big presence kind of way.
Q: You mentioned before the boat people. Were boat people from Vietnam a problem that we were dealing with?

HARTWICK: By the time I go there in 1990-’91 and ’92 a lot of the worst problems of the boat people had been resolved. The ugliest part of the boat people coming in and being pushed off and sent farther down Indonesia and elsewhere most of that had happened in the early and mid-eighties. So when I got there in 1990 there were still camps of boat people in Malaysia but the flow had stopped pretty much. Occasionally there would be a new report; the flow had mostly stopped. A lot of the human rights issues were what do you do with the boat people. Most of the boat people wanted to go to the United States so we had a big program in the late ‘80s. It was still going on when I was there but was beginning to wind down with interviewing these people and seeing if they were suitable for entry into the United States as political immigrants or whatever. Australia was doing a bit of that themselves so that was going on. We still had personnel in the embassy whose jobs were going out and doing nothing but interviewing up in these camps when I first arrived in 1990. But luckily that chapter by 1990 was finally winding down; it was a very, very heart-wrenching time.

Q: Sure.

HARTWICK: It was very difficult you can imagine.

Q: I think this is a maybe a good place to stop. Is there anything more we should talk about Malaysia do you think? How was life there for you?

HARTWICK: I was active on the business council. I made American business friends there that I’m still close with. It was an interesting widow into the business community. When I was in Africa as a junior officer and then later on in India we just didn’t have that many American companies and they were so busy struggling it was hard to establish the kind of good rapport that I got in Malaysia. I found Malaysia overall a little less stimulating than India in terms of the culture and in terms of just the challenge of working there. I established very good rapport with my Malaysian government counterparts in particular in the international trade ministry, and I stayed in contact with them for several more years thereafter. We worked well together and I enjoyed them. It was important to be able to work well with some of these otherwise scratchy Malaysians so I think that part of my work I found very satisfying.

Malaysia has a very hot climate even compared with India hot in the summer. Malaysia was just relentless so while you had the sense of the beauty of the beaches for tourists, the reality was my god it was hot and it was humid. KL was surrounded on three corners by mountains so the pollution and the heat and humidity would build up and wouldn’t leave. I remember that was one of the surprising things: the notion that you are going to southeast Asia and in an idyllic way you think about how nice it’s going to be. I remember thinking how at times it was so oppressively hot and at times there was so much pollution in the air because it would back up against the hills and just sit on you. I would go visit some of my ministry people and we would sit up on the 30th, 40th floor of
the ministry building and you could barely see the city down there. Later on it got much worse because in Kalimantan in Indonesia on the island of Borneo they had peat moss fires. They would clear large sections of the forest, come down and truck them out. But part of the way they cut them down in this very active forest you would just burn them, cut and burn, cut and burn. Well they had peat fires going in here and that smoke, the air in the summer time in this part of the world moves very slowly but it tended to drift this way.

Q: Off to the west.

HARTWICK: Off to the west northwest, so from Borneo, Kalimantan, it would go right over Singapore and in particular right over KL. So with the mountains around it and very little air movement we just had acrid smoke. When I was the office director in 1997-98 one of the first things we ended up doing was getting permission to evacuate the embassy on environmental grounds. When I was there, luckily, in ’93, the fires of Kalimantan were not that much of a factor so I’m talking about self-generated pollution. By the time ’97, ’98, ’99 came it was actually that plus coming in from across the water and we had to evacuate the embassy based upon health reasons. Essential personnel stayed behind, but families left and the State Department paid for it; it was that bad, which is not what you would expect for Southeast Asia. It’s gotten better now but the peat moss fires in Kalimantan they couldn’t put them out; the smoke was coming out from the ground and you just couldn’t put the fires out and it just burned and burned and burned and the smoke would just keep coming and coming and coming.

Q: Okay we will pick this up the next time in ’93 where did you go?

HARTWICK: In ’93 I went to the National War College.

Q: Okay we’ll pick it up then.

Today is the third of March 2010 with Doug Hartwick and we now are going to the War College. You were at the War College from when to when?

HARTWICK: 1993-94 following my assignment to Kuala Lumpur.

Q: Okay, what was your impression of the War College at the time?

HARTWICK: I was really glad I went. I actually didn’t think it was time for me, career wise, to go. When I left India back in 1990 the Department was trying to oblige me strongly to go to the War College; I was recently promoted FS-1 which was the typical time when people go. I was trying to go either to Buenos Aires or maybe to Malaysia and I was very interested in doing either of those but Malaysia seemed to be the hottest prospect. So I had to fend off the Department which was trying to force me to go to the War College, “You have been selected to go and have to show us due cause why you can’t” kind of a thing. Well anyway I managed to get out of it.
At the end of three years in Malaysia I had been four or four and a half years in grade. The way, of course, the senior Foreign Service or applications to get in is, as we all know, you open up your window. What you do is you apply to be considered to go into the senior Foreign Service from the mid-ranks to the senior ranks. You tell them formally in a telegram I want to be considered now for the senior Foreign Service. You then have six years of reviews and if you don’t make it in six reviews you are retired no matter what your age; most people get to that stage and they are in their early forties. So some people game it by putting off when they put in the application, wait three, four or five years and then put it in and then you already have several evaluation reports in your file that all get taken into consideration and your window opens up later so you have more years to be considered.

Well, I hadn’t done that. I did it fairly early opening up my window. So I went to Malaysia, got out of going to the War College, and the reason I’m going into this is the vagaries of the assignment system. You just never know how they impact you. So leaving Malaysia, my former ambassador in Malaysia, Paul Cleveland, had gone back to Washington. He was working for Undersecretary Frank Wisner in the office called T for security affairs, technology affairs. I felt that having been out of Washington for so many years this was a good time for me to maybe transition back into Washington. Since I was an economic officer and had done a lot of economic assignments I thought it was time for me to not do an economic assignment; I needed to make myself a bit better rounded to be considered later on for either office directorships or deputy assistant secretary slots or ambassador slots. I then, after Malaysia, made a push as the assignment process was evaluating me, to go to this higher level office, T. Paul Cleveland was working there, my former ambassador in Malaysia. I liked him a lot, and he was very keen in supporting me and told me he was having a great time working for Frank Wisner who was one of the venerable ambassadors of our system; I was lucky enough to get assigned there. I was assigned fairly early on, I think in December of ’92, so the summertime would be when I would be transitioning back to Washington and all things seemed to look set up.

In February I get an announcement. This would have been February of ’93. A new administration is coming in. Suddenly the word goes out that seventh floor offices have become too powerful; we are cutting all of their staff by 25 percent. When you get to the seventh floor those are the undersecretary, deputy secretary, secretary of State offices so they are considered to be the most powerful. The sixth floor is the assistant secretary level and all of their staff and lots of other things. So the announcement came out that they are cutting back the staff 25 percent for the seventh floor and Mr. Hartwick your job has been eliminated. So here I was in late February and it was like “what?” All the best jobs are gone by late February. I had to go looking for onward assignments again. All my protesting and whining made no difference. They were not going to fill that job, it was going away.

Q: This was the Clinton administration coming in.

HARTWICK: It had nothing to do with the administration.
**Q:** But it was a new administration.

HARTWICK: This is just the internal meanderings of the State Department personnel system and trying to reposition and taking slots and moving them around but this is what they did. So then I suddenly felt vulnerable and thought now what am I going to do because here I was four to five years into my rank as FS-1, I had my window open already for two years, and now I suddenly was unassigned so where am I going to go? So I did the best I could to find out and the answer was “good luck.” I realized that the War College had a slot available. Finally it became clear that there just wasn’t anything good. So off I went to the War College.

I ended up finding the War College to be great fun, very stimulating and it opened up a whole other world to me in the end that I would not have run into otherwise. It put me suddenly rubbing elbows with a lot of military people; I had never been in the military, I never worked up close with a lot of them and I found the National War College stimulating. A lot of the work that we, the FSO types, would do going to the War College was actually pretty easy for us. It was much more challenging for the military because they weren’t used to writing papers and reading articles, talking policy, they were much more sort of operators.

**Q:** You were there almost as a resource weren’t you? There is a certain resource element to an assignment there.

HARTWICK: For a National Defense University we were asked as a resource but the State contingent, the personality, the civilian contingent was about 35-38 people out of about 190 in the War College class of 1994. The rest were divided among the four bigger services and then the Coast Guard. The State Department contingent was about half of the civilians; so we were about 17-18 officers out of 190 or so. We were pretty much sprinkled around different committees, different sets of groupings, for that year. Really the benefit for us was learning about our military services and what they are all about and what they are being trained for and having them working up closely with us to see who we were. It was a pretty interesting learning experience. By the time the military are twenty years into their careers most of them had never worked with the State Department, they’d worked with a lot of civilians but they really hadn’t worked with the State Department for the most part. We were like a strange exotic animal to them and all kinds of prejudices and mind sets had already been formed. So I think most of us found it to be challenging and stimulating working closely with them because they were these military guys from all the different services and each service has its personality and orientation and then here we were the State Department. It is like a lot of people in the United States don’t really know very much what it is like to be an American in part because they are never bumping up against non-Americans in non-American environments so they don’t have a sense of what are we like. As an American you are normal, you are what you are, right? Well if you go off and live in Albania you will suddenly get a sense you are quite different from somebody else and actually there is a perception of who you are as an American and you begin to realize your cultural background is quite different from theirs and you start to have a bit of an identity. That is how I think I felt and many of us from
State felt at the War College. All of a sudden working very closely with all of our military colleagues it gave us this feeling of we’re the State Department versus we are the Marines, versus we are the Air Force, and so forth. But while you are both learning about those services and who they were and what they represented, what they were proud or what they weren’t you suddenly started to feel who you were because lots of questions about what you were, lots of sense of your background; I found that to be very, very rewarding.

*Q:* Part of your thing is to look at a different culture and figure out what makes them tick. Was there something that was going on with the military, these were at the colonel level though weren’t they?

HARTWICK: Lieutenant colonel, colonel.

*Q:* Lieutenant colonel, colonel level. In a way was the Vietnam War over and done with or looking back on mistakes were they looking toward the future because the Soviet Union had well disintegrated?

HARTWICK: This struck me as a cultural aspect of where we were. Mind you this is 1993 so what happened in 1990, 1991?

*Q:* The Soviet Union collapsed.

HARTWICK: And what else happened on the military front? Put yourself in a military mind frame, the Gulf War.

*Q:* Oh yes.

HARTWICK: The Gulf War happened. We put Saddam Hussein back in his place, we demonstrated to the whole world our military machine and how effective we were. So 1993-’94 that was the talk, that was what it was all about. It was the prowess of the American military that is unmatched around the world by far. There was virtually no discussion of Vietnam, zero. They did have a course about the Vietnam War but half of the enrollees were civilians; the military didn’t want to go through it. It was like why do you want to talk about the Vietnam War? So I thought for sure there would be that element back there and I had read several books about the Vietnam War having come up as a war protester, student kind of thing; I had read quite a bit about it, the Vietnam War memorial. That topic did not get a lot of time. A lot of the people in the military at the War College, about the same age as I was, many of them hadn’t gone to Vietnam. They came in right around the end of the Vietnam War and they had joined the service. Well in 1972 there are not many of us willing to jump into the service I’ll tell you that when I graduated from college. If you got drafted that was one thing but you didn’t go out and join the military service, not that many people did. So it was an interesting dichotomy between civilian State people and particularly for me.
Q: The people you were talking to you say they came in around the early ’70s. Were they from either military families or from areas particularly the south that supplied or were they...

HARTWICK: I’m not sure you can make too broad a generalization. You will find in the military today and the military of the people that I was working with were similar too; many of them came from military families, not exclusively. Most of them didn’t come from big urban areas like New York or Washington or San Francisco or Los Angeles. They tended to come from across the board of the United States. So you got a sense of how broad our military was.

Q: Did you find you might say a dearth of people who were coming from the Ivy League type backgrounds?

HARTWICK: You had very few of those. There are five War Colleges in the system; Navy has one, Army has one up in Carlyle, Pennsylvania, Air Force has one in Alabama; the Marines don’t have one they use the Navy one. Then you have two located at National Defense University at Fort McNair; the National War College and then you have Industrial College of the Armed Forces, ICAF; so you have five altogether in the system. You can make a broad generalization that is not all that effective but it has some element of truth to it; the National War College is probably the best of the best. We, State, sent 17 there, we sent about 20 to ICAF, and then we sent onesies or twosies to the other schools because they are out of Washington. They are less desirable from the Washington standpoint, from FSO standpoint. Anyway, so the quality of the officers at National War College and then later on when I instructed at ICAF much the same were really quite high. Many of these, you didn’t see them at Ivy League, what you really saw really were people who were West Point or Air Force Academy graduates some of them most of them were not. But clearly you had West Point graduates, Annapolis graduates and some very sharp people some very, very bright people. They weren’t necessarily schooled in academics any longer and most of them really only had BAs but they were sharp and a lot of the Navy guys, for example, and some of the Air Force guys were all engineers. If they had been driving submarines and that kind of stuff most of them had an engineering background or an aeronautics background so smart people.

Q: Did you come away with I mean in the broadest extent but could you characterize the various services as you saw them at that time, the officers you were seeing?

HARTWICK: Well there was a book that I came across and I think it was one of the ten thousand assigned readings; they gave us assigned readings like you wouldn’t believe. It was overwhelming. About eight inches tall of a binder just full of two-page Xeroxes of all these articles and then often other things you would have to do as well; assigned readings. There was a book I came across called The Masks of War. It was something written in the late ’80s basically trying to describe the personality of an Air Force officer, of an Army officer, of a Naval officer. They talked about what it was in their cultures that what was deemed important by the system, by the institution so how was it you got promoted and what were some of the attributes of people in certain special classes in
those areas. You have operators or shooters in the Army or in the Marines and then you have the support people, the people who do the signal corps, the transportation corps and all of that. How do all of these fit into the hierarchy? It was a very interesting book. In many of the electives you had to write a paper or two. You presented it to the class and there would be discussion. The papers were more like undergraduate school. Maybe four, five, six pages but properly documented so you had to do some work.

I took The Masks of War and decided who are we in the State Department and it was a very interesting exercise. It made me sit down and try to figure out okay what are our cultural attributes, what’s important to us for us to get promoted for us to do well be successful, what’s does the culture demand of us. So I read this book and I put quite a bit of time in it and ran around and talked to a number of my colleagues there and a few elsewhere. Mostly I did interviews getting my colleagues possessive views and I had my own views and then I wrote it up. I did a little bit of research on it too and it ended up being an extremely successful thing; I got an award for it and then they ended up putting it as required reading for the next five years in those big binders because there had never been something written like that before.

Q: Well what did you come up with?

HARTWICK: We tend to be individualists, not team players. Now the military, I’ll give you an example for the Marines. Officers eat last. You support your troops, and you take care of them first and foremost because without them you are nothing, right? So there is a whole culture about that and you can feel that when you are with them. Marine officers may be really smart, they may have really big egos in their own way but they always subjugate all that to the Marines and that is first and foremost part of their culture. Anyway, one of my observations about the State Department was we were individualists, we tended to work alone, we tended to be evaluated by what we did ourselves, by ourselves not in a collective setting. Some of this has evolved over the years but we are talking about in the early ‘90s.

There were four main attributes that I came up with. Great importance is placed on analysis and writing ability.

Q: One of the greatest compliments one can say of an office is “Oh, he or she drafts well”.

HARTWICK: Oh yeah.

Q: Well when you think about it...

HARTWICK: We don’t train, that was another one of our attributes.

Q: We don’t train.
HARTWICK: We don’t train. Now that’s changed a bit thanks to Colin Powell and others who came in and said, “Oh my God, they don’t do anything in this place, they just think they know it all.” Right? It’s not quite how it was but that was another thing, we don’t train, we learn on the job. We don’t place value in planning anything and we plan very, very poorly in the State Department. Again, if you are around the military you realize planning is everything; they get frustrated with themselves because they never plan enough but in the military things always go wrong so you try to minimize the risk by reducing the plot so thinking through what is going to go wrong and then having an alternative to it when you need it, right? You reduce the likelihood of things going wrong by planning extra carefully really being careful about having put things together so things don’t go wrong and they still go wrong so you’ve got to have backup plans. We really didn’t do things like that at all.

Q: One of the things I used to tell young Foreign Service officers coming in is that we often lead by indirection. Somebody would say it would be nice if somebody would do this or do that or we phrase it in such a way that you wouldn’t feel that you were told.

HARTWICK: Not directing people, yeah.

Q: But actually I would say look and listen because you are being told and I guess at a certain point they would say where is such and such a paper or such and such a thing and you’ll say well you never told me to do it. You were told but you just didn’t understand.

HARTWICK: I found out later on when I was an ambassador that that is a good observation because I think that was one of my weaker points. I didn’t like to tell people to do things. I would leave them strong suggestions and assume they would just do them and then they wouldn’t do them. Then later on I would start to get annoyed and say why didn’t you do it and it was like well you didn’t really tell me to do it.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: So I did a fair bit of that when I was ambassador in charge of a much bigger mission. All of a sudden I realized I had to be much more directed. I had a DCM. She frankly did whatever she wanted but she didn’t really act as the enforcer and after a while my whole position as ambassador shifted from being the nice guy to being the not nice guy because things weren’t getting done. Then all of a sudden she became the wonderful person in the embassy and I was the bad guy; I thought what is wrong in this picture here. The DCM is supposed to be the enforcer and get it done, the implementer. Then all of a sudden I was the one chasing down people saying why this isn’t done, why that isn’t happening. Anyway it was a good realization.

Q: But these personality things come through. Could you differentiate a bit between particularly the Army, the Air Force and the Navy and the Marines as far as their approach to things at all?
HARTWICK: Yeah, oh absolutely, plus of course their orientation toward what was their mission. You know in the military their mission is everything. We talk about mission, all of us have missions but the mission in the military, no matter which service, is deeply, deeply bred for every unit, every larger unit, every bigger and bigger unit right on up to the whole military itself as to what their missions are. So that was the structure that I think in the State Department we in some ways lack compared to the military. But yes, you certainly could feel what was the Navy’s mission compared to the Army’s and it’s all part of their personality in the end. The beauty of the War College was we ended up getting a chance to travel and visit basically representative operations all around the United States. Then we did an international trip too. I went to Korea and Japan. All of that was very, very helpful because it gives you an idea what was important to the Air Force, how did the Air Force view itself, what was their mission, what was the Army, what were the Marines, what were the Coast Guard. I had two Coast Guard people in my organizational unit in the War college. I knew nothing about the Coast Guard and I ended up learning quite a bit about the Coast Guard; so in that sense that was very helpful to me.

Then you know almost two-hundred people strong those people go off into the Pentagon, go off all over the place and I stayed in contact with some of them. Some have gone on to be really big players now.

Q: One of the things I’ve talked about obviously in doing this is a significant number of people who have been to the War Colleges and one of things many of them said was of the various branches of the service the thing that surprised them the most was Marine officers who got up to that senior rank, particularly in the Marine Corps getting to be colonel is much more senior than I would say maybe in some of the others.

HARTWICK: The Marine Corps is not that big.

Q: Yeah, but they found that the senior Marine officers they dealt with were the most impressive because they thought that these would be kind of guys who would just charge up the hill but by the time they got to be senior they for one thing they were dealing in complex operations and all but impressed them the most.

HARTWICK: I can’t say that I came away with a view that one group of officers was more impressive than the other. I think in the Marines you have a smaller service and consequently even by the time people become colonels they have a broader perspective because they had to do a lot more smaller things for themselves. They are not so specialized. You get into the Air Force and you have a tremendous number of specialists and in the Army there are so many specialties. So even by the time people get to be like a brigadier general they will come up and become really specialized by that point whereas the Marines are less specialized in that sense. You can have aviators, you can have infantry, you can have so much support people but you don’t have all these breakdowns of little groups that go on to becoming colonels as a sort of conclusion of their career mostly at colonel level. They can be very narrowly focused in terms of what they are responsible for whereas the Marines are somewhat less than that.
Q: Again going back to the spirit of things I think it’s important because this is the one time where we get the Foreign Service looking at its fellow officers and dealing with foreign policy matters. Was there any feeling that maybe we had not completed the Gulf War that we had quit too soon or not?

HARTWICK: There was a lot of sentiment, I think, among some of the officers that we should have done more, gone farther. But I also found that certainly at the lieutenant colonel, colonel level and Navy captain that they did not indulge a lot in criticism of some of the decisions of that time. They were making sure they did their job as well as possible and working with one another as well as possible. During Jimmy Carter’s time when we had the hostages taken in Iran and there was a military effort to try and free the hostages, 1980. It was basically at the tail end of the Carter administration; it was a pretty desperate attempt by the United States to try to break the terrible impasse of all these hostages being held in Tehran. We wanted to put together a special operations effort to come in, sneak in, free them and take them out. It was needless to say a very elaborate and difficult mission to try to put together. We did it very badly in the end. They had airplanes at night that crashed on the ground and blew up and they had all kinds of real problems so people died and they never got anybody out; they didn’t get close to getting people out. One of the conclusions of that was that the services didn’t work well together. So they passed a law, Goldwater-Nichols I think it was called, in 1986. The fiasco in the desert in Iran was in 1980 so by 1986 Congress passed a law which basically ordered the military to learn how to work together at all different levels.

I went to the War College in ’93. Goldwater-Nichols was ’86; that is only seven-eight years later and they had really tried to enforce personnel and a whole variety of changes on all the systems on all the different institutions to make them start to work together much, much more; they called that purple. So you had green for Army, blue for Air Force, white for the Navy and you had purple for everybody and you had to have a certain number of purple assignments. You had to do a variety of different things from then on after the law was passed. They changed the Joint Chiefs of Staff makeup, and the responsibilities. They took the responsibility for running operational kinds of things away from the senior military at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and put it to operational commands; there were a lot of changes. That was still working its way through the system, but it had already been there for several years and so these officers were themselves all thinking about the importance for their own careers of working together better which is exactly the intent of it.

Q: Did you get any sense of unhappiness with the Clinton administration because Clinton had not served in the military and there was the homosexual, which is still with us, the homosexual idea...

HARTWICK: The don’t ask, don’t tell?

Q: I mean was that at all...
HARTWICK: Our military officer corps in general is reasonably conservative. Don’t overly generalize about it but they are generally pretty conservative. When you get a more democratic or liberal oriented government in Washington there were lots of concerns about is that the direction the United States needed to be headed and so forth. But we were having challenges there too you remember; you had the Somali thing happen, I think in 1993, where you had effort on the part of the Clinton administration to engage overseas and it did not work out very well. You know there were a lot of concerns about was the command…our military looks to the commander-in-chief and the civilian in control of all this in a very serious manner. So you don’t criticize the commander-in-chief. Whoever the president is you don’t criticize him so you would never hear anything like that. But on balance you talk about a pretty conservative group of people and that is still the case today. In 2001 I did the Capstone Program with brigadiers and there I was the sole State Department person out of a class of 36. A change of government had just happened but very, very strong conservative views about things and the same sort of prejudicial views about the State Department that I experienced when I went to the War College. Here it was eight years later doing Capstone and I got the same vibes again; it was like kind of a strange feeling.

At the War College I felt that I had learned a lot. I wrote a lot of papers. I ended up doing well when it came to the paper writing so I got like number two out of all the most important awards that they granted to all of the people in the War College class that year. I graduated in the top ten percent of the War College, a designated distinguished graduate (DG). So I was lucky enough to be a DG.

So, I thought, okay, I’m back in Washington I might as well stay in Washington and find a job in Washington. I wanted to follow up my Malaysia experience which I enjoyed with maybe another assignment in the East Asia bureau. Vietnam was on my mind. I thought well I’ll go work on the Vietnam desk in the office that is responsible for it. Well even though I had a good record, even though I had done well in Malaysia and so forth it became very clear that there were a lot of promises already made. I had never worked in the East Asia bureau in the Department. I’d worked overseas but it became very difficult. I settled on one job that I thought I would be well suited for and the office director and deputy director liked me a lot but then they basically told me I’m sorry but this has been reserved for a woman, we don’t have enough women in EAP. We’ve been ordered so don’t look here you aren’t going to get this job we’ve got to have a woman. I thought “What? You can’t do that, you can’t tell me I can’t even apply.” Well in the end that’s kind of what ended up happening. I pushed for that job and a couple others and in the end for one reason or another the ones that I thought were the best prospects just sort of slipped away and I was not able to get any of those jobs.

Then out of the blue I got a call from the India desk. Was I interested in perhaps going back to India? Well I had been in India three years before. India was a good assignment, but it was hard and India is not for everybody. They said, “Ambassador Wisner has been selected to go out to India and he would like to interview you if you are interested in going to India.” I went over and saw Frank Wisner and interviewed with him. I liked him right away and he liked me right away. It was a stretch assignment so it was basically a
senior officer job. I was not a senior officer yet, but since it was already April they hadn’t filled the job. The incumbent in the job had decided to retire because he was very frustrated with his career so he up and retired. Wisner knew he had to replace him and he knew I had spent four years in India from my record. He and I met and so he said, “Hartwick, you are my man and you are going.”

Q: What’s the job?

HARTWICK: It was econ counselor, econ minister counselor, which is the same job I had done in Malaysia. I, of course, had worked in two different jobs four years earlier in the econ section in India so I knew the lay of the land very well and I think that’s what Wisner liked about it. He said, “Don’t you worry about the stretch I’ll get it done.” About two weeks later personnel cleared it and I got assigned to this job. By this time I had two daughters who were getting a little bit older, but we knew the schools were good. So I never went back to work in the Department. I was previously going to go work in Frank Wisner’s undersecretary office so the irony came all the way back and all of a sudden he was leaving that job and he selected me to go be his economic guy in the embassy in New Delhi.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about the family. This is kind of rough you bring the kids…how old were your kids?

HARTWICK: Let’s see my first daughter was born in ’83 so this was ’93-’94 so she would have been eleven. My little one was basically three and a half years younger so she would have been what seven and a half to eight.

Q: High school is the real...

HARTWICK: We knew the schools in Delhi and we knew the school was very good; my wife had taught there when we were there the first time. So we were happy on that front and from that standpoint we knew what we were getting into.

Q: So you went to India from when to when?

HARTWICK: Well so I got in India basically in July of 1994 and I stayed there until July of 1997 so a three year assignment. Ambassador Wisner got out there within a week or so of my arrival and departed within a couple of weeks or a month of my departure time too so basically he and I were there together.

Q: Okay how stood, we’ve been through this before but, what was the situation when you got to India in ’94 both internally in India, the Soviet Union had collapsed and I mean there wasn’t a Soviet Union anymore and also relations with the United States?

HARTWICK: I was comparing where I was in 1990 having departed and where was India and where was I in 1994 when I went back in. Rajiv Gandhi had been assassinated; when I left in 1990 he was still the prime minister, he was killed in late 1990 or early ’91.
So you had a different prime minister and a different government. A number of the people at the minister level were still in government, some had been moved around and, of course, the Indian bureaucracy solid mainstay as it is for the Indian government they were all still there although again like all bureaucracies the better people were being promoted. So when I came back four years later many of the people I had worked with in a more junior level were now at a more senior level, but I knew people all over the place for having done four years prior.

Relations were not changed dramatically with respect to the United States. What had happened from when I left to when I got there you had had the Gulf War. India was always a bit ambivalent about the whole notion of what we did in the Gulf War; India was both supportive but they were never comfortable with it; one country, basically a bigger stronger country, beating up on a smaller country even though the smaller country was not a good country, not a good leader. So our relations were correct and good and warming, I think, but they still had a long way to go. The problems between India and Pakistan remained still front and center for India. Our relationship with Pakistan remained a sensitive one and one that the Indians really felt very frustrated about. They didn’t like us treating them as Pakistan. They didn’t like it in the eighties. They didn’t like it in the mid-nineties of still kind of a tit for tat between the Pakistanis and the Indians and there was still a fair bit of that in Washington. We, in the embassy, were mindful that that was something that really grated on the Indians a lot. So the issue was for Frank Wisner and the assistant secretaries that we had was how do you change that dynamic a little bit. But not enough had happened on the ground to change it very much. So the truth was our relations were okay, pretty good, the Soviet Union had gone away so for India in a sense that connection had melted away. Our relationship had gotten a little bit better but not dramatically changed and I think was partly limited by what was going on in Pakistan. We were working with both Pakistan and the Indians.

What had changed was India had embraced really an economic reform agenda. It really had started during Rajiv Gandhi’s period. With the new government coming in, and the now current prime minister who was the finance minister when I came back, was the one he gave all the credit to for having had the vision to really break down the old Indian license system for everything and start freeing it all up and let the private sector do what the sector could do and get the government out of the middle of everything. But that process in any country takes a long time, and in India it is still underway; by the time I got back there in ’94 there was a spirit of we’ve got to change things, we really have to do it differently, we can’t do what we’d been doing before. So that was really refreshing because I was the head econ guy in the embassy and Frank Wisner, to his credit, recognized the political dynamics had its own importance and priority. He could move a lot of that ever so slowly in his own role as the ambassador. On the economic front he felt he could play a much more active role and help American businesses and help the Indians continue their reform effort and he saw that as a long term benefit to the United States. So he threw himself very much into the spirit of helping the Indians reform and engaging the American business community and the Indian business community and us being very proactive; well that was just fantastic and for me it was great.
On the political side things hadn’t changed as much as everyone would have liked, but on the economic side things were beginning to change very significantly. They were welcoming us, they were happy to work with us as long as we weren’t too heavy-handed about it. So that became really good for me going back to India in that sense and there is nothing like working when you’ve got the head guy or gal, ambassador, when they are really keen on some of the issues that you are working on as that makes you feel that you are really contributing and doing well. That was really very important, I think, but that was really the bilateral dynamics for India and the United States; that sort of characterized them.

Q: At the ministry level was it the ministry of finance or trade or what type of ministries did you work with?

HARTWICK: I tended to work with the economic ministries so tentatively finance, commerce, civil aviation, a few other smaller ones, the ministry of science and technology, ministry of telecommunications, different ones depending on what was going on. We did a fair bit on energy trying to help India and work with India to reform its energy marketplace whether it was electricity to oil and gas and other kinds of stuff because we, the United States, had a lot of experience and we felt that it would benefit the Indians a lot; so that’s where I spent most of my time.

I continued to do narcotics. I did some stuff with their ministry of interior and their police when it came to narcotics and that just sort of came my way. It was fun for me because I came back, I knew a lot of people and they had all gotten more senior so they were in better positions for me to work with and for me to have better influence, if you will. That, I think, worked out overall across the board.

I got there in 1994. I got good ratings and then I was promoted in I think it was in the fall of ’95. There was no sense this was a great opportunity and I’ve finally made it; it was really an odd sort of anticlimactic feeling. There was this malaise of general feeling about working for the government and the State Department was much the same. In the State Department there was so much unhappiness and the system of being down sized and no more money to do anything; there was just that feeling of permeating the whole, even in the embassy they were going to shut down the science section. They got rid of the science counselor and then they approached me and they said, “Okay you are going to be in charge of the science section as well.” I said what do I know about science, but it doesn’t matter you are going to oversee the science thing. We are getting rid of the science counselor position and won’t replace him; people are going to report to you. So I ended up having dual responsibilities for a while. But it was just sort of that feeling that did you really want to be in government. I had two officers working for me in the econ section: one was the junior officer. I think it was his first assignment and he just said “I just can’t take this; I don’t want to do this.” He quit. It was like huh; he was a very bright guy but he just quit. Another guy was an FS-2, a mid-level range. He had already been in about ten-twelve years. Chrysler approached him and he decided to quit and go work for Chrysler. So two of my best officers out of six within a year both quit. There was a whole
feeling of things really not moving in the right direction. Then I got promoted in the middle of this but so like so what.

Q: Did you find you’re dealing with one of the great bureaucracies of all time, that’s the Indian bureaucracy. Okay they are trying to do without licensing and get the government out but bureaucrats are programmed to get into things and particularly I would think Indian bureaucrats would be. I think you would be running into all sorts of things you want done run into roadblocks of people who didn’t want their rice bowl threatened by like getting them out.

HARTWICK: We, the American government, if we played much of a role it was pretty marginal. If India was going to reform itself it was going to reform itself without the Americans doing it. So what we really tried to do was engage the bureaucracy and the government itself through Ambassador Wisner to keep encouraging them in the direction they were going but by no means was it something we were doing. They were doing it by themselves. From the period of 1990-94 when I got there they had bottomed out and ran out of money and they were bankrupt on the world scene. They had no more foreign exchange; they were down to like two, two and a half weeks of foreign exchange for their entire country to cover their needed imports; that is like zero in your bank account. That really gave the government, at the time, the most forward leaning thinkers the opportunity to say this is not working, we’ve got to change something. Of course, there was a time in 1990-91 that the Soviet Union going out of existence and other big developments that the Indians felt shocked that their system needed to do something different.

So by the time I got there in 1994 they had already gone through a lot of this process. I think the general view was and certainly in the economic ministry was that they needed to reform things; that was the spirit of the government. That was what they should be doing; that is what they should be getting credit for and those were the brightest among them doing the best thing. So that spirit of economic reform had taken hold by the time I got there which was quite different than what it was in 1990. Even though a lot of the people were the same people all of a sudden they had gotten sort of a new religion. From that standpoint we worked with a process that was already well under way which was an Indian led process for sure; we just tried to make sure we could play a role, if we could, by our relations in a manner that kept encouraging those developments.

Intellectual property rights was a good example; where we had been in the late ‘80s and where it was in the mid-nineties was a lot of evolution going. When I went back as USTR several years later it evolved even more dramatically in that direction. India was catching up with the rest of the world and certainly the developed world in terms of its attitudes in a lot of ways.

Q: You think of the two great engines of economic power of India and China. I’m told that China today has to create somebody said like 26 million jobs a year just to keep up. India, I guess at the time we are talking about, just trying to keep ahead of the game must be in the same thing of having to create jobs. How was that going?
HARTWICK: When I went to Malaysia one of my observations was that India in 1991-1992 was adding the population of Malaysia every year, about twenty million people a year; that’s a lot of people to be added per year. You’ve got to feed those people and those people have to find jobs. Most countries don’t deal with anywhere near that kind of scale; so quite right India continues to face terrible challenges that most countries never want to face in terms of their population. Unlike China, where they virtually stopped at population growth, in India it still continues on; they made progress now in recent years but even then they hadn’t made a lot of progress. It was still pretty much over two percent population growth per year and that’s for a country already over a billion.

Having been there for four years, and then off for four, and then back for another three, I knew a lot about it. I found I enjoyed working with my embassy colleagues quite a bit more and we worked well together unlike times in Malaysia where I felt some of my colleagues and I didn’t get along very well despite hard efforts. We had a different spirit, part of it forged by Ambassador Wisner and the DCM but mostly by Wisner. We all worked well together. Anyway that took me through ’97. My girls went to school there at the American Embassy School (AS) in New Delhi; it was a good period.

I got promoted, as I said, in late ’95 so I began in the fall of ’96 looking to leaving in the summer of ’97. I now began looking at senior officer jobs, not worrying about trying to get stretches. I felt I really had to get back to Washington and I had to get out of an economic job. I should get something else. I wanted to get back to the East Asia bureau because I liked East Asia. I’d already done two stints in South Asia at this stage and having liked the Malaysia job a lot and liked Southeast Asia I wanted to get involved in all of that. So then I targeted being the office director for basically the maritime Southeast Asia, we didn’t call it that then we called it PIMBS, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore, PIMBS sort of like a drink except with a B. Having been in Malaysia, having done well in India and when I went back and interviewed with a bunch of different people I managed to get the job. So looking at the map Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia on the two continents and Singapore so you had this area basically for the office directorship. Then the other directorship was basically Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos and Burma.

In the summer of 1997 there was some consideration of maybe me staying another year, but Ambassador Wisner had been reassigned back to the U.S. and the DCM, Matt Daley, was going back to the U.S. and a couple of other people were going back to the U.S. So the consideration was maybe I should stay on and be the at least acting-DCM for another year or possibly become the DCM depending on when another ambassador came out. But I had reached my limit of India and it was like I can’t do this anymore, let me go back to Washington. So that is what ended up happening.

_Q: Before we leave India could you talk about your relations your dealing with the American and Indian business communities because this was a real growth period wasn’t it or not?_
HARTWICK: It was becoming a growth period but the real growth period for India really began after 2000, 2001. A lot of the reforms that were taking place early into late ’90s started to pay off in the early part of the 2000s; but we had American company interest there for sure. So I was on the American business council, AMCHAM, for India. My experience in Malaysia helped me do more in India this time and it put me in contact with a lot of good companies and friendships that I still have, with both Indian business people and American business people. Now I was dealing with some of the more important companies and higher level people and the increased Indian openness toward working with foreign companies and allowed foreign investment in India. The contrast between ’94 and ’97 and ’86-’90 was dramatic. Foreign companies were viewed with hostility and suspicion and all of that before. By the time you got to ’94-’97 that was changing; it wasn’t that they were welcomed with open arms but they saw value in working much more with foreign companies and they saw the value of attracting foreign companies whereas in the late ’80s it was absolutely not. It was really very hard; you had companies trying to get into India and the Indian system was basically set up to make it as difficult as possible for them. So those that came in did it through just sheer determination in putting up with a lot of Indian nonsense from the government. By the time you got to the mid-nineties that was beginning to change. Companies had always been interested in India in the sense you had a billion people out there and if you could get in on the ground floor you had a great place to do work. Of course that is one of the both attractions and one of the very big dangers; it’s like quicksand you get in there and it’s a different world and if you don’t know that world and it can be very, very tricky. So a lot of companies lost a lot of money. One of the beats that Wisner asked me to honcho as opposed to the commercial section which did a lot with the interaction with business was the energy area and energy reform. So we spent a lot of time on power companies and electricity distribution and generation in trying to unbundle their system which was all driven by each individual state in India which controlled its energy responsibilities; it wasn’t a central thing. You can imagine it ended up with these little fiefdoms all around the country that didn’t really work very well together and almost all the electricity entities in India were all bankrupt because they wanted to give power away to the agriculturalists so they would get the votes and they all went out of business; so, they were all operating on a shoestring or all basically bankrupt through budgetary supplements for everything that was going on. Well that was the environment of the American companies but the needs in India for energy investment were enormous. The country desperately needed more energy in a more modern system. There was a lot of opportunity to do that, so how do you work through that. They were just beginning to open up to the whole area of cell phone use. Here you got a billion people and can you imagine putting cell phones in everyone’s hands? A lot of calls are going to happen. So that whole process of getting it opened up and getting away from the Indian public sector in opening it so that the Indian private sector and foreign partners came in; that was under way and it was a very rich environment for a lot of change going on.

Q: How were they getting their energy? What was going on there?
HARTWICK: Well India’s energy needs were basically mostly provided by Indian energy sources. So overwhelmingly their power, electricity generated, came from coal based energy; so they had massive, massive coal deposits -- a lot of pretty crappy coal, pretty polluted sulfur-ridden coal, soft coal you would call that. But they needed to keep investing and the investment was always closed off and kept for the public sector. That meant that each individual state government in some cases with central government money would be building all these power plants. Well frankly it overwhelmed the system’s ability to meet the needs of electricity in part because it was priced low, theft of electricity was enormous, it was not policed well, investment either was prevented from going in there or the conditions were so bad companies didn’t want to invest in it. So that’s why it was really ripe for a lot of change. To this day it still remains a very challenging area because a lot of the changes they tried to do in the mid-90s or later didn’t really work very well.

On the petroleum side they have some domestic resources mostly off-shore but they did import. For natural gas the same thing; they had some domestic resources mostly off-shore. They wanted to import and that remains today some of the challenges so one of the most sensitive and politically volatile areas I worked was with the company Enron. We know Enron because it collapsed because of all kinds of malfeasance and people stealing candy from the shop and all that and it finally went under and so forth. Well Enron actually had a very active international wing too and they started off in the natural gas transmission business but then expanded into lots of other things. Overseas they were very keen on building an LNG plant outside of Bombay and then buying LNG from the Middle East and moving it across and then processing it in India and then helping India meet its natural gas needs there. So we spent an enormous amount of time working with Enron to try to facilitate this big deal. It meant working with the Maharashtra state government, the government around the Bombay area; it meant working with the central government which set the tone and a lot of the overall policies. Enron sought the kind of conditions they needed to be able to invest the money to get this plant going.

They had two partners, Bechtel and General Electric, which were minority partners ten percent each. Bechtel wanted to do the work and GE wanted to sell the turbines so they were also a part of this thing; but it became a humongous big mess because Enron had gotten on very badly with Maharashtra government in trying to use basically its relations with the United States government, us the embassy, and the central government that was supporting getting Enron in there to bring pressure to bear on the Maharashtra state government to stop giving them a hard time and issue the licenses and so forth. It was interesting because there were so many different issues going on. Enron, just like we heard about later on when it failed, they were a bunch of cowboys, they threw their weight around, they had this very glamorous woman named Rebecca Mark who was a very bright businesswoman, very attractive from Texas. She would come swaggering in and she was just like a rock star kind of person; everyone knew Rebecca Mark when she’d come in but boy she had an agenda and she didn’t mind running over people. Her deputy was Joe Sutton. He had been an ex-military guy, a retired colonel. He came out of the armored corps, and some of his buddies had worked for Enron and said, you’ve got to
come work for us we are doing really well. So he did and he operated his business like he
was driving a tank. Every time he came in it was like oh, my God, now what’s going to
happen when he meets with the Indians. He’d come in and he’d beat on the table “The
embassy needs to help us more, we are being cut off at the knees by the Indians, you’re
doing this and that, we need you, you’ve got to help us more.” It just caused a constant
attention.

The whole Enron thing ended up completely blowing up after I left. It became at the end
of the ‘90s decade early 2000s just a total mess. They shut the whole thing down after
they had built this stuff. It was in two phases; one was just going to be generating power
using Indian produced natural gas liquids, and then the second phase was the LNG. LNG
is extremely expensive, the upfront investment for LNG transportation, processing and so
forth because it operates under very, very, very low temperature. It takes massive
investment to put an LNG plant together. In the end the price for BTU, if you do it right
and you have enough volume that you are doing over a number of years to amortize the
investment, comes out to be okay, still expensive, but okay. Natural gas is cleaner
environmentally, but the upfront investment is enormous. So that means whoever gets
into this business really has to be assured that it is going to work for the next twenty
years. So the terms of the deal and the investment terms and everything were really very
sensitive and that was what Enron was trying to do. India had never done LNG before.
They wanted to be able to get natural gas from the Middle East but not through a pipeline
across Iran and Pakistan. That was obviously very problematic having a pipeline across
their arch enemy Pakistan to get gas. Well that remains still an idea that is out there but
the idea of getting LNG and floating it around and bringing it in by ship sounded like it
made sense to the Indians and that is how the theory was. That was our experience with
Enron.

Wisner and I struggled with how to help Enron and yet contain Enron from both shooting
itself in the foot but also shooting all of us in terms of ruining our reputation with the
Indian government. They were such cowboys in the way they went about their business;
very, very tough. I can’t recall what the incident was but Rebecca Mark came in and did
something. I was upset, Wisner was really upset, we thought this was the stupidest thing
they had ever done and really ran a risk of blowing the whole Enron effort of the better
part of two years out of the water. So Wisner decided to call up Ken Lay, the Chairman
of Enron. He had come through a couple of times and we had met him. So Wisner calls
up Ken Lay in a nice way but dying to say you’ve got to rein in Rebecca Mark, you’ve
got to rein her in. She’s pushing this way, it’s really going to backfire on you. You know
when an American ambassador calls the chairman of a big corporation it’s got some
import. Wisner said to me and both of us thinking, boy, I hate to do that; we like
Rebecca, she’s attractive, she’s fun, she has a lot of chutzpah but she can be her own
worst enemy, I hope we didn’t really damage her too much by calling. But we called her
boss and basically complained she was pushing too hard and it was really going to
backfire like that. We thought she was really going to get in trouble somehow and that
showed how naïve we were about how corporations work. Anyway, so about four months
later I was talking to one of the more junior people in the Enron operation to find out
what happened as a result; they did end up adjusting whatever they were doing and it
turns out we found out the word was that she had gotten bonuses something like $600 thousand that year for the effort she put in in India. $600 thousand and we are a bunch of government stiffs and what am I making something like $110 thousand or something at that point but that was for a whole year and this was like a bonus she got on top of everything else. Joe Sutton got a big bonus and they got promoted and they became the new head of something else they were doing. I remember Wisner and I and several others couldn’t understand it at all. We just don’t seem to get it. We are clearly way out here in the middle of nowhere not understanding clearly how things work. So it was funny when the Enron thing just a few years later finally blew up; those were the same names the same personalities of the people.

Q: What happened to her?

HARTWICK: Rebecca Mark and Joe Sutton were bright people and they decided to get out of Enron early for whatever reason. At this point I left India and they didn’t come back and I haven’t seen them since that time but Enron I think crashed and burned about 2002-2003, I think.

I learned later that Rebecca Mark and Joe Sutton both quit and they sold, this was like 2001-2002, they sold most or all of their Enron shares when it was still very high and they were both zillionaires. She went off to do something else and if you Google her you’ll probably find she is doing something major; they came away with tens and tens of millions of dollars from their Enron stock. Of course, it was about a year and a half later the whole thing collapsed; so she got out. There was an attempt on the part of shareholders to go after her and Sutton and several other people who had gotten out early but they never could pin them on having done anything wrong. They got out fortuitously for them early enough that they never did get tapped and that was what brought down Ken Lay and a bunch of others; people getting out, getting the money and faking to the world that the stock is still worth a lot when in fact the company was on the ropes. But she got out in time.

Q: Okay so you then we’ve got you going back. Shall we stop here or shall we pick up?

HARTWICK: Let’s see where are we? We were talking about going back to PIMBS. We can stop here, why don’t we stop here so now we are done with India, done with the War College. I left my India career at that point and my onward assignment got locked in to go back to Washington, DC.

Q: What year was this?


Q: Okay we will pick it up then.

Okay today is the tenth of March 2010 with Doug Hartwick and Doug it’s 1997 you are leaving India and you are going to Washington. What are you up to?
HARTWICK: All right 1997, summer, I was assigned to be the office director of PIMBS in the East Asia bureau; PIMBS stood for Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore.

Q: By the way while you were doing PIMBS was there any overlap at all or interest or something between those countries and India messing around the Indian Ocean or anything like that?

HARTWICK: Very little, very little. I think India’s relationship with East Asia and Southeast Asia in particular was really in the very early stages. India was not particularly a trading nations and it still isn’t. It tended to have its own internal markets and for so many decades it had a very hostile trade regime so it was hard to export to India and hard for the Indians to be competitive exporters with all these issues. In fact, even the connections between Southeast Asia, a massively trade oriented group of countries, and India was surprisingly light so there was not a lot of connect between India and Southeast Asia.

However, in the mid-’90s it was beginning to change a little bit and I think India began coming out of its shell and some of the more forward leaning visionary Southeast Asian leaders were mindful that a connection with India, this massive country of over a billion people was something that might be important to them.

Q: Well also it didn’t make any difference but a lot of Indians were in those countries as traders.

HARTWICK: The Indian connection with Southeast Asia if you go back a couple thousand years is quite extensive. Indian culture, Indian immigration down through those areas. You’ve got Indians and Sikhs and Buddhists of different kinds all the way through Southeast Asia that really all come from India. India did do boat and some trading early on before the more modern government took over in Delhi in ’47-’48. So there were some connections. It’s just they were not very strong and even though you might have had, such as Malaysia, fifteen percent of the population from India I mean they maintained some connections but in terms of the connection between the Indian government and those Southeast Asian governments and so forth pretty light. ASEAN had a lot of partner countries and it was only four or five years ago that India became a partner country for ASEAN; maybe five or seven years ago.

Q: But still...

HARTWICK: But still it wasn’t in the ‘80s, it certainly wasn’t in the ‘90s either. They hadn’t gotten to that point. Why? Because the Southeast Asians just didn’t have a lot of connections with India and they didn’t necessarily want much of a connection with India. All of that has continued to change now pretty severely.
Q: Now talk about nation relationships. How stood you when you were coming from your broad experience looking at PIMBS, these countries in the State Department. How would you rank the group itself and some of the countries as far as interest at the upper level of the State Department or government?

HARTWICK: The upper levels of the State Department are interested by and large in areas that pose real challenges or in some cases acute problems. Those areas that have fewer problems or fewer challenges somehow are left to just run as relationships on a day to day basis. So Southeast Asia was really pretty much at that point, 1997, with the exception that of what happened in 1997 July, the beginning of the ASIAN financial crisis.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: Right. Now where did the Asian financial crisis really start? Thailand. Where did it spread? Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines. So when I got there I’d say the issue of Southeast Asia was a group of countries that we traded a lot with, the interest to the United States was very much on a commercial front but very, very important and growing fast. Then there was this whole connection issue of Southeast Asian nations with China, Korea and Japan excluding the United States. So there was this sense that the Americans didn’t want to be excluded, we wanted a broader strategic relationship but driven by the economics with Southeast Asia but we weren’t prepared to do a heck of a lot about it. Even to this day our relationship with ASEAN is not nearly as developed as that with Japan was and as the Chinese one is.

Q: You arrived just when all hell broke loose didn’t you?

HARTWICK: Pretty much. I arrived in my new job in late July.

Q: Okay, well let's talk about the crisis and what we were doing about it from your perspective and then we will talk about our relations with the various nations individually. Had somebody been saying the sky is going to fall, the sky is going to fall regarding the debt crisis and all?

HARTWICK: In part the Asian financial crisis was such a shock was because there were a few people saying there was a looming crisis if some corrective measures weren’t taken; but not many were saying that, not many were paying much attention. So the very fact that the crisis happened the way it happened was because people weren’t aware that it was about ready to happen. There were a lot of telltale signs in retrospect that something bad could happen and I think the situation in Indonesia was particularly acute. It was linked to the political system that had been managing Indonesia since the sixties. That itself was pretty fragile whereas in the other parts of Southeast Asia, even though you had a terrible financial crisis, you didn’t have a political crisis in the same degree that you had in Indonesia and those were all linked. I’m not an expert in the area but I did work a lot on this as it happened. It really started in Thailand. That was not one of my countries but it was nearby. The role of the United States at the time, with respect to
Thailand, was to try to prevent this crisis from spreading but not to get us too wrapped up in actually solving the problem itself; this is very typical of the U.S. government and in particular of our Treasury Department: they see themselves from behind the scenes as the world’s best experts for managing crisis and managing these kinds of threats to the financial system, but they don’t want to put the weight of the U.S. government behind them to help solve the crisis. They want to give the impression that the U.S. will step in as best it needs to to avert a real crisis. This is what we saw in Thailand; as you will recall there was a financial crisis also in Mexico some years before.

So here comes this new problem in Thailand and the preconditions in Thailand actually found themselves in other parts of Southeast Asia but it all started in Thailand. What the U.S. Treasury ended up doing was stating that the Thai had to find solutions themselves. They should be working with Japan and other financial powers that were working closely with Thailand. The United States would present a facility, if there was imminent collapse, to shore Thailand up in the crisis. The U.S. would step in with a certain X billion dollars backup. I was watching this from the back of the Desk next door and was familiar with these kinds of issues. There was great frustration on the part of the Thai and then the Southeast Asians in general that the U.S. didn’t do enough; didn’t seem to want to step in enough to help out. Well whether we did enough at the right time I think the general consensus afterwards was we should have been more forceful in the beginning and, if so, we might have been able to avert how fast it started to spread around. But we didn’t, and very quickly when the Thai situation started to go south all businesses, banks, everyone started to look at all the other countries in the area that had similar economic conditions and wondering if these were also threatened. You know the psychology of a market reaction to a potential big challenge or big threat is pretty significant. The perception of the problem becomes related to the problem itself.

**Q: It’s seen as a run on the bank.**

**HARTWICK:** Yeah, the bank might be perfectly fine but if everyone wants his money out at the same time the bank is in deep trouble, exactly right, even though everything is actually all right. I don’t think that was the case in Southeast Asia but clearly there was a lot of very extensive borrowing that had taken place. There were a number of currencies that were overvalued. You had a massive building going on in all those different economies because it was like there was no tomorrow; it’s kind of like the situation we had here, a lot of similar traits to the nature of the challenge when suddenly people start to discover. So when money started to get tight and loans suddenly got called back in it started a cascade. Thailand got hit first and we tried to help out a little, we the USG, but we didn’t do enough and we kept waiting; basically the U.S. Treasury kept waiting to see if this was going to settle down and stop. Well it didn’t really settle down and stop. Malaysia became very tense and Mahathir again afraid of being beholden to the whole world and the IMF was very nervous about this might spread and infecting. But the worst hit country was Indonesia.

So I show up in July of ’97 and see the thing start to unravel in the fall of ’97. I was going to different meetings and, in fact, the DAS from Treasury was Tim Geithner.
Q: Huh.

HARTWICK: This was a 34-35 year old DAS at Treasury, quite cocky about his high position and he was significant and, of course, this was a financial crisis. So Treasury didn’t really care to have the State Department too terribly involved. They called the shots in the financial crisis, right? So we start having these meetings and I would go along with John Wolf, my former ambassador in Malaysia, who had gone back to be ambassador to the ASEAN and was the head econ guy in EAP at the time. So I started going with John as his financial support person in the Asian financial crisis and we started to go initially to a couple of meetings on Thailand. As we got into the fall the whole worry about whether it was going to hit the Philippines, is it going to hit Indonesia, Malaysia, how is this going to be affected? What started to happen was principally that a lot of Indonesian and Chinese who control so much of the money started to pull their money out of Indonesia and park it in Singapore or move it elsewhere. They sensed that things were really bad and they started to pull their money out and they basically caused the complete collapse of the economy.

Q: Was this connected to the Suharto family interest at all?

HARTWICK: Sure. I mean you couldn’t divorce it from the Suharto family and family interests and his leadership of the country because he had created such a fiefdom for his family and for himself and his crony Chinese-Indonesian crony money interest that when they started to take their money out it started to undermine the economy and undermine his ability to control things.

Q: When you arrived there how stood Suharto power wise in the country?

HARTWICK: They had elections and so forth but he was pretty close to being a dictator. His taking and consolidating power began back in the sixties. By this time we were in the mid-nineties and he had already been in charge thirty years. So he had established himself pretty well and his family had established themselves pretty well. The whole structure, whether it was the military or the economic underpinnings of the economy, thanks to his largess and his controls, all were beholden to him and to the controlling party. So, it was that structure that then started to fall apart. Then the issue became as much a political issue and later on totally a political issue. The economy was a mess, and the political structure started completely to come apart in Indonesia.

Q: How did you find our embassy in Jakarta in responding when you first arrive there?

HARTWICK: Pretty well. Stapleton Roy was our new ambassador. Before I left India I went down and visited all my countries and then came back to India and then I went to Washington to take over. I really didn’t know those countries. I had worked in Malaysia but I didn’t know the other countries very well so I made a point to visit them. So I had an idea of who was running things and a bit of the issues they were facing. But we didn’t know in the fall of ’97 what was going to happen in Indonesia. It wasn’t just a matter of
the economy. It became a matter of the entire political system itself coming unglued; then the economy also unglued with a lot of money going out. You had considerable American interest in Indonesia, a lot of oil interest there and you had a lot of other companies. Enron was busy pursuing opportunities in Indonesia as well but there were several companies doing that kind of stuff and these were pretty big projects. Indonesia is a big country and some of these projects were in the billions of dollars. As the whole financial system started to come unglued all of these projects started to come unglued. So from the State Department and from my office’s standpoint you had initially the economic picture starting to look pretty bad, rapidly starting to spread to the political picture. How were Suharto and his government coping with the problem; it became a severe problem that virtually no country could easily deal with. His government was so controlled by him and his family. The engagement of the Indonesia military was big in the very fabric of the economy in terms of owning and running lots of big companies. As things start to come apart so many of these countries were in very poor health even though they had beautiful buildings, the streets looked great, and people were driving fancy cars, it’s starting to come apart.

Anyway, so my job in PIMBS by the fall and early winter in 1997 was taking on a whole different look than what I had ever anticipated when I signed up to go there; it was very fascinating and there were an awful lot of very serious issues going on. So from that standpoint I was fortunate to be there although it was a lot of very hard work but trying to get on top. At first it started with the financial crisis, and as it moved toward the crisis in Indonesia getting as deep as it was, given how important Indonesia is in East Asia, that became almost all consuming for my entire office and certainly for me. That’s what I ended up doing most of the time. The attention for the problems in Indonesia went right on up to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of Defense, to Treasury because we are talking about a major country completely imploding.

**Q: What was Suharto and companies odor in the states at that time?**

**HARTWICK:** Pretty mixed. It’s a large Muslim country but one that has been by and large friendly to the United States. But a country where corruption was a big issue and where more importantly than corruption human rights remained a big issue. So as important as Indonesia was we had a constant challenge to deal with the human rights issues and the reputation of Suharto and his government in terms of how they managed their affairs and how they basically ran their governments. We had the problem of East Timor. East Timor had been around for several years as a major thorn in the internationally community’s side. The Indonesians basically had taken it over when the Portuguese left and continued to run it, even though East Timor had been for centuries separately run by the Portuguese. It really didn’t have that much to do with Indonesia; it had a lot to do with Portugal and then it was taken over. It was taken over in the ‘70s. Indonesia ran it really badly. There were a lot of human rights abuses and the East Timorese continued to push and agitate for independence from Indonesia, and the Indonesians didn’t want that. They didn’t particularly care to have a little Portuguese speaking enclave on East Timor when West Timor was part of their country. They had no intention of having East Timor be independent.
But the human rights abuses and the control of the military were so intense that you couldn’t ignore it. The United States didn’t want to ignore it so we kept trying to work with the Indonesians to somehow get them to be a lot less heavy handed and allow a certain amount of autonomy to East Timorese to govern themselves. This was all happening at the same time; so you have the financial crisis going on, you have the Suharto government not prepared to entertain any changes in East Timor. His government started to come apart. Ultimately he was overthrown, not in a coup but in a somewhat constitutionally unclear manner. It was under the umbrella of the constitution that the president was deposed and the vice president became the new president, temporarily. That was a fellow named Habibi. He was a very strange cat. He had come up through the Suharto system and he was very much one of the cronies and now all of a sudden he was the president. So you had the president who basically had resigned and he was living in Indonesia and you had the economy completely collapsed. In real term growth they lost 15 percent in one year if you can imagine a fifteen percent drop in one year and the country is pretty poor. So the economy just shut down, the currency broke, it just completely broke.

Q: So what happens in a country when you have something like this? You think of Indonesia that at last it can…maybe I’m wrong there are so many people that can feed itself. Are there real humanitarian problems?

HARTWICK: There definitely were. When you have the economy start to collapse like that, it doesn’t have any foreign exchange, it can’t go out and buy things the way it was doing even six months before. You start going from a financial crisis into a real humanitarian crisis and with the political crisis going on at the same time then you have people really up in arms and really upset about what is happening. There are many people losing jobs and the government coming apart, Suharto resigning. You end up getting the military involved and the police involved because they are trying to keep law and order and you are right at the edge; that’s what we had there. So in 1998 we had to evacuate the American embassy because we had rioting going on in several places in Indonesia, particularly in Jakarta, and it was a very scary time.

Q: Was the rioting against us or just plain rioting?

HARTWICK: No, rioting against the government and the change in government. So the tensions were very, very high. It had very little to do with us but it is easy to get caught up in all these things and individual bystanders are caught up in it. You had a big city in Jakarta with massive gangs and massive demonstrations going on. You had the police firing on some of the rioters and in some cases firing on demonstrators, not rioters, but demonstrators and people being killed. You can imagine it was a very, very tense time and frankly very scary.

Q: Okay, you’ve got this situation what were you doing? What were your cohorts doing during this time?
HARTWICK: We had voluntary departure and then you had involuntary departure and you draw down to core embassy. If it gets so bad you can’t even have core embassy like we had in Somalia then you take everybody out. In Indonesia we got down to voluntary departure, involuntary departure; in other words all but essential personnel out. So all dependents and all non-essential personnel in the embassy out and then you are stuck with a skeleton crew and you see how best you are doing and then work at it from there. The administrative burdens were a lot. When you get to an involuntary departure then you are talking about get the people out. You don’t just take care of the embassy. Involuntary departure is you advise all American citizens to leave as soon as possible, either on your own or we’ll help arrange it. So that burden came immensely to the State Department so you can imagine my office was at the heart of all of this. So we were having a wide range of meetings and long weekends and everything trying to arrange a whole variety of things. One, was the government really going to collapse, what are the consequences of that, how do we take care of the American citizens that are there, how do we get them out, how do we get the American embassy personnel out, how do we evacuate the embassy, how do we get them in and out of the airports with 747s that we were basically leasing to send in to take people out. It was a pretty exciting time.

When the real balloon went up, when it was really time to get people out I became the task force director for the evacuation of Jakarta. On the seventh floor we have this crisis management center. So I went up there and moved my office up there for I guess a couple weeks. Then you are dealing with all the different agencies that are represented there plus State, the consular section and all that kind, the consular function of the State Department. Anyway all of it is kind of a blur now but it was a very intense and exciting time but scary because you really fear people are going to be dying. Many Indonesians did, several buildings were burned down, people were killed rioting against Indonesian-Chinese. Even though a lot of Indonesian-Chinese didn’t have any money, the general perception was that the Chinese of Indonesia had pulled their money out and that is why we are having all these problems. So you had rioting, attacks in the Chinese sectors in Indonesia and buildings being burned down to punish the owners who were Chinese and that kind of stuff. In the middle of that we were trying to run our relationship with Indonesia and with the rest of Southeast Asia. It was pretty exciting.

Q: Could you use Australia as a safe haven or not? How did this work?

HARTWICK: No we didn’t use India and we didn’t use Australia. The immediate country and like-minded country in the region with which we could work closely and who had really good sources and good quality people on the ground were the Australians. So I worked closely with the Australian embassy in Indonesia but more importantly with the Australian embassy in Washington. The Australian government and the U.S. governments had very similar interests in this situation. And the Australians had kept a very pretty close eye on East Timor. That was another important issue for them so we worked pretty closely with them. When it came to the evacuation from Indonesia we tended to get people out to Singapore initially and then get them right back to the United States; those who wanted to go back. Generally that’s what the United States does when we are going to evacuate our embassy. We can’t tell people, private citizens, where they
are going to go. We just urge them to go and we will provide them with a first stop out and then they can decide what they want to do. For American personnel working at the embassy we would make a decision where to take them. By and large we repatriate them back to the United States right away. Dependents and so forth tend to either be put up at a hotel or by and large tend to go back to their home-leave points and relatives. It saves the Department a little bit of money doing it that way. When you evacuate you never know how long it is going to be so you make a plan that is going to be for two-three months and then you review the situation constantly. Then the clamor begins on the part of the embassy because they want their people back. They are on the ground and they are feeling like whew we rode the worse of it, it’s okay, bring the people back. Well the Department doesn’t want to react like that. The Department says, wait a minute let’s just go slowly. Then, my office, the consular function of the State Department and the embassy start to go in this real tussle back and forth about when do you send the people back and who’s making these calls. It’s reviewed by committee, it’s taken very, very slowly and is a deliberate decision. The embassy’s views and Stapleton Roy’s views were weighed in as ambassador but, in fact, he doesn’t make the decision; this big committee makes the decision. I can’t recall how long the dependents were out but it was five or six months; we waited a long time.

Q: What were the oil companies doing? Were they far enough removed from the place of trouble and able to keep up oil production and all?

HARTWICK: They hunkered down. They evacuated their American citizens but they sent them back a lot earlier than we did from the embassy standpoint. Again their facilities and a lot of what they were doing tended to be out of Jakarta. They tended to be in areas that didn’t have the immediate crisis that Jakarta felt. Surabaya had some other problems at the other end of Java but again nothing quite on the same level as Jakarta did.

Q: Were you having any trouble with the Aceh, whatever it is the top of Sumatra area?

HARTWICK: No not really. That’s a pretty poor area. It’s pretty rural and it was an area that was, in their own way, fiercely independent from Jakarta. It didn’t cause an immediate problem there. You worry about the repercussions in the region and that we have to get involved whether it’s security or even commercial. You’ve got massive flows of refugees and that kind of potential issue; but in the end that didn’t really materialize. We had the U.S. military, the Pacific Command, involved quite a bit because we looked to that as an important possibility for assistance to evacuate the embassy of American personnel in general. But the thing went south so fast we had to fly people out. The idea of getting ships in there to get people just wasn’t very realistic. By the time we got enough assets off shore the situation sort of calmed down pretty much.

But the current assistant secretary, Kurt Campbell, was the DAS for the Department of Defense doing East Asia at the time so I worked closely with him. We had a lot of meetings there about what could DOD do with respect to both our evacuation and then later on about East Timor; East Timor became an issue. Once the crisis by 1998 calmed down then the issue was what was going to happen in Indonesia politically and then what
was going to happen to East Timor. East Timor was raring to get out from the yoke of the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government itself was so totally consumed by its own internal problems so it was a time for potential problems with East Timor. Then the new president, Habibi, to the shock of the Indonesian government responded to some initiative and sat down and wrote out a letter where he basically agreed to the demands of the East Timorese for having a referendum for independence. He signed the letter and it was delivered; this was something that the Indonesians would never have allowed under Suharto. Habibi turned around and said, “Okay, you can have a referendum for independence.” Well that was basically the signal that Indonesia was prepared to let East Timor go; if they are going to do a referendum the foregone conclusion was the referendum is going to be 98 percent in favor of freedom away from Indonesia. There were riots in East Timor so it was a very, very unstable situation and that’s when our U.S. military got involved, the UN got involved. Our interaction with the Indonesian military became very tense because of the human rights problems that were going on. On the one hand we were working with lots of different elements in Indonesia about their upcoming election and how they would find a democratic solution to the temporary solution with President Habibi but at the same time the East Timor crisis was going on.

I had a chance to go to East Timor two or three times and meet with the UN people there and assess the situation on the ground; it was fascinating. My assistant secretary, Stanley Roth, had been interested in Indonesia for many years in previous jobs he had. So he paid a lot of attention to it which was good for me. I was the office director and had a DAS in-between the assistant secretary and me but, in fact, I did a lot of work directly with Stanley. He took a couple trips out there and I went with him one time and met with Habibi to talk about East Timor.

Habibi was a strange little fellow and he was only about maybe 5’3”, often dressed with a bow tie. Suharto was a big sort of lumbering guy, pretty good size; I would say Suharto was in his late seventies and not in very good health. Habibi was probably a guy about 15 years younger. So when Stanley and I went to meet with him he was a little bit unpredictable. He had been a minister in Suharto’s government for many years and was minister of technology and aviation and something like that; I can’t remember the name of the ministry but it was sort of an odd, odd ministry. So Stanley and I went and met with Habibi to talk about East Timor. It was a bizarre meeting. The meeting room was this massive Indonesian hall which was probably about I would say fifty meters long, a big, big room. It had two rows of chairs that faced one another with an empty area in the middle. At one end was this big potentate sort of a chair that was gilded gold sitting up. It was a nice throne, but they didn’t have a king. It was in essence like a throne, that’s really what it was, and this was Suharto’s environment, but Suharto now had stepped down. So when Stanley and I met we sat in a couple of chairs and Habibi had a couple of his people there and then he sat on the throne. Well he is this little guy sitting up on this throne and when he sat in the chair his feet didn’t reach the ground. A comical figure, this little petite guy with this bow tie, and he had very bright lively eyes. He had a big smile and his little feet were wiggling and didn’t touch the ground. Stanley and I came out after and we both went “Whoa that was bizarre.” This was the president of Indonesia we were meeting with.
Q: Was the whole East Timor thing or was there an analysis that he didn’t really give a damn and he had other things to worry about?

HARTWICK: That probably would sum it up: not that he didn’t give a damn, I think he had many more important things on his mind and Habibi wanted to be elected in his own right as the new president. I think he was trying to please the international community a bit. I think he was sensitive to lots of criticism of Indonesia and he wanted to see himself as a different leader from Suharto even though he had been brought up by Suharto all the way along. I think he really wanted to differentiate his leadership and his style from the guy who had been deposed and that was all part of it. We couldn’t quite figure it out once he did this. I think the great fear was he did it with no consultations inside his own government. I don’t care what government you are in, if you do it without consultations internally you can have some real problems later on.

Q: Of course it was a very powerful army.

HARTWICK: And a very powerful army and the army was absolutely involved in everything about East Timor.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: So you don’t just turn your back on it and act like that is going to happen. So that became a big serious issue because they might not reverse it in terms of Habibi’s letter saying that he would agree to a referendum, but then what’s going to be the role of the Indonesian army in the context of letting foreigners come in to make sure the referendum is free, making sure the army doesn’t interfere with how the whole place is secured in East Timor. All these issues were big, big issues. I mean human rights problems in East Timor had been…you asked what had been the relationship with the United States and Indonesia at the beginning of the crisis. We had not done any military cooperation other than very, very light training activities. We had not done any military cooperation or foreign military sales of any kind with Indonesia since 1991 and this was now ‘98. So for many years we had done nothing with them because in 1991 there had been some riots in East Timor and the military had just kicked ass; they had just blasted people all over the place. For human rights activities around the world, people were just aghast at what the Indonesian military had done to put down the riots in East Timor. So we had suspended everything with them and by 1997-98 that’s where we were still and in fact it got a little worse. We had been doing some little light training exercises with them, small unit kinds of thing, and a lot of it special operations and so forth. William Cohen was Secretary of Defense for President Clinton. Cohen got word that some of the really very negative activities going on in East Timor were being run by elements of the Indonesian military and that we were actually training those same elements of the Indonesian military in light tactical kinds of activities of special operations. When Cohen got hold of that he said, “That’s it, we’re not doing this anymore. Stop it immediately.” So the whole shutter went down on the system and to the embassy saying you cut this out. We had not sold parts, for example. Indonesia had a lot of American aircraft they had
purchased in the ‘70s and ‘80s and we had stopped all parts sales and most of their air force was grounded and ran out of parts and couldn’t get them anywhere. So we had elements in our relations in Indonesia that were not the best.

Q: How about what role did the Indonesian embassy play from your perspective?

HARTWICK: When I first came on board the Indonesian embassy was struggling with the crisis as much as we were. They’re here in Washington, the financial crisis, and the initial reactions of the Suharto government were anger and defiance about the collapse of the economy that seemed to be underway. They wanted help from the United States but also didn’t want the United States to interfere too much; you will recall that I talked about the Treasury Department, Tim Geithner and so forth. Well by the time the Indonesian financial crisis started to really serious it was about November of ’97. And there we stepped in with a much, much bigger package having realized we were too slow and too light handed in Thailand. By the time it came to Indonesia we put in a much bigger facility to try to shore things up. But unfortunately the situation was so out of hand that it was no longer a financial crisis it was also a political crisis developing. So in the end the problems were just too acute for any of us to be able to really contain.

The Indonesian embassy initially played a bit of a role in that but it became pretty clear that the Indonesian embassy was actually much of the time behind the curve because things were moving pretty fast. Once Suharto stepped down then the embassy was actually quite pathetic because by the time all that happened their economy had collapsed, all the people working in the Indonesian embassy weren’t even getting paid. They were getting paid such a little amount of money and the currency, the Indonesian Rupiah, was not worthless but it lost about eighty percent of its value. So the people were absolutely broke at the embassy. The embassy had to start letting people go or bring them back to Indonesia because they couldn’t afford to keep the embassy going. So I helped deal with a little bit of that because actually it was a humanitarian problem for the Indonesian embassy itself; people simply couldn’t get paid, they didn’t have any money so it was pretty bad.

Later on they replaced the ambassador with an economist, a guy who was not really a career diplomat type. He was much more of an economic guy but had done a lot of studies overseas in the United States in particular. He was picked by Habibi but he was sent because he had great credibility with economists and financial types around the world because of his scholarship. So he came to run the embassy. I worked with him very closely, and I found him to be a very good guy to work with as he understood a lot of the issues; every six weeks or so I would go sit down with him and try to understand what the heck was going on there. He was very generous with his time. I would go in and meet with him for an hour and I would start asking him questions. He would spin out all the various moving parts of what was going on in Indonesia and about eighty percent of the moving parts I hadn’t even heard of. He was going on about how important they were and you really learned a lot from the sense of that. You realized just how complicated this situation was on the ground and the different players or groups of players involved in that.
Another big issue in Indonesia was the run up to the national election and then the national election itself which took place in 1999, I think. That was also a very interesting experience because political parties that had been pretty much suppressed started to come out.

Q: Is this Megawati Sukarno...

HARTWICK: Right who was Sukarno’s daughter. And she seemed to be the up and coming person but there were lots of other parties out there; some were religiously based, some of them secular based, some of them regionally based in terms of who they represented in terms of some of the different tribal groups that were out there in other parts of Indonesia. I was trying to understand all of that; that is where my meeting with the ambassador frequently was helpful for me to try to get a better handle on different groups and who they represented and why and how they came together in the policy itself. Then I flew out there and was there for the election in 1999. I ran around monitoring the implementation of the election itself and traveled around with Ambassador Roy in his car. He and I went to different places to just observe polling place and see what was going on.

Q: I was going to say was it cast in iron that whatever happened we didn’t want to see Indonesia, with the exception of East Timor which was unique, fall apart? Were there any concerns?

HARTWICK: Well you realize pretty quickly that when the government is under mortal danger of collapsing nothing else really matters; you’ve got to have a stable environment before you can ever hope to have an economy begin to recover properly. Suharto stepped down leaving all the human rights issues and bitterness that basically started to emerge after thirty years of his control. He had dealt with threats to his regime in a pretty harsh way, sometimes quietly but nevertheless it was there and there was a strong sense of anger, resentment and injustice that had actually been tamped down; but once he stepped down it started to come out and how does that system manage that. You can’t pretend that the United States can manage it, absolutely not. But we tried to stay in touch with all groups and kept things as peaceful as they could be to the extent that we could influence them. We sought to provide the kind of assistance that the United States and the UN and others could do but certainly the US in terms of facilitating the free and fair election as best could be done under the circumstances. All of that with the intention of letting the really terrible, ugly pressures get released in some way but in a non-violent way and then ultimately have a system that reemerges at an election that allows a legitimate government to come to the fore; so that was a better part of two years of hard work doing all that.

Q: I can imagine two things with that in our mind. One was, of course, although it wasn’t as ominous as it later became but violent Islam getting more of a hold there and the other one would be turning the Indonesians turning on the Chinese. We had been tainted
during the ‘65ish period of assisting the Indonesian government in making a death list of mainly Chinese Communists.

HARTWICK: Against the Communists.

Q: I mean both of those must have been in our minds weren’t they as concerns?

HARTWICK: Yeah, I think we wanted to see an outcome come out of Indonesia that would restore stability and have a government that is reasonably friendly to the United States and to U.S. interests. But that meant frankly keeping violence at a minimum, that meant reengaging Indonesian military as best we could given some of the constraints, that meant helping the Indonesians themselves address some of the human rights questions without being overbearing or interfering and then doing what we could to help make the election come off well for them without again interfering or having the appearance of interfering. So you are both hands on and yet careful not to have too many hands on and that’s really how we managed our affairs throughout the whole time I was there.

Q: Was China fishing in troubled waters then?

HARTWICK: No, not too much. I think the Chinese didn’t know how to deal with the situation. The whole angle of India-Indonesia-Chinese taking money out and whether the connections to Mainland China and all I don’t think there was really any connection to all of that. I think there was a little bit of concern when the rioting was going on in Jakarta that anti-Chinese elements were leading the charge against Chinese elements in Indonesia.

Q: This is has been the pattern for thousands of years.

HARTWICK: Yeah and frankly you know the involvement of the PRC in Indonesia was very modest anyway. So this was not a time for them to be able to do anything about anything; they didn’t really have a significant interest there. Singaporeans a bit more. Singaporean-Chinese had a lot of connections with Indonesian-Chinese and Singapore was quite concerned to make sure that it worked as closely as it could with Indonesia. Singapore is this little postage stamp country of just a few million people dealing with a massive country like Indonesia spread 3,000 miles across the archipelago. So Singapore wanted to play a role but didn’t want to play too much of a role and certainly didn’t want to be viewed as siding only with Indonesian-Chinese. So they tried to work with us as much as possible and so we did. We did quite a bit of work with them but everyone at the assistant secretary level on up would fly in to Indonesia. Most of the time our officials went via Singapore and met with Lee Kwan Yew and Goh Chok Tong. These Singaporeans wanted to basically be consulted and they wanted to make sure their views were being heard and they did play a constructive role I think.

Q: I was going to say moving into Singapore during this time it was a pretty stable place wasn’t it or had they gotten pretty far out in the...
HARTWICK: Singapore managed to skirt much of the financial crisis. It’s in the middle of Southeast Asia and has lots of banks so it wasn’t unaffected but it managed to miss a lot of the problems. You had some challenges in the Philippines too, but it also managed to weather the storm pretty well compared to Indonesia. I think when Indonesia went where it went everything else looked like it wasn’t so bad in comparison; that was the sad story of Indonesia. Even Thailand where the economy virtually stopped for almost two years didn’t have a complete government collapse, it didn’t have rioting in the streets, and it didn’t have all that kind of stuff. Malaysia had its own ways of dealing with it. Mahathir did not want to follow the dictums of the IMF. He came up with his own economic solution. He fixed his exchange rate at a rate that he said was a fair rate and it was a pretty attractive rate for foreigners. So a lot of them didn’t take money out and thus a lot of the really deep threat that happened in Indonesia didn’t hit a place like Malaysia; although Malaysia did suffer a fair bit under the financial crisis for at least two years. So in the end Indonesia was by far the worst hit and Thailand was hit pretty badly.

Q: So what was happening in the Philippines during your time?

HARTWICK: The Philippines is always a challenge even in the best of times in terms of its politics. Fidel Ramos, General Ramos, was the president of the Philippines. When I managed to get time away from working on Indonesia, and once some of the most imminent crises in Indonesia worked themselves out, then if I went to Indonesia I tried to visit the Philippines or Malaysia at least once and Singapore as well.

I think the most significant thing other than helping stabilize the situation in the Philippines was to deal with the remaining problems associated with the closing of the two big military bases the U.S. had done in the early nineties. There we had to negotiate what generally is known as a Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA. That means whenever you have American military personnel in country their presence is governed by an agreement between the United States and that country that is different from civilians, different from tourists and different from official people there; they are treated like military personnel. That agreement means they don’t have to have passports but there has to be an understanding of when they come and go, how they are treated, and when there are problems of breaking the local law how they are dealt with; generally what that means is the U.S. military takes them on. Say someone gets raped; okay, it’s a Status of Forces Agreement that governs how they are going to deal with that person. If it’s an American military person who rapes a Philippine woman the U.S. military would deal with them under the SOFA agreement and so forth. Well ever since then when the U.S. closed its two bases and withdrew everything…

Q: The two bases mean Subic Bay and Clark Field.

HARTWICK: That happened in the early nineties. There had been a lot of chest-thumping on the part of the Philippine Senate about independence from the U.S. and we need to find our own way. We are not just a former colony of the United States; and it’s still there today. At the same time a lot of dependence by the Philippines on the United
States. The Philippine military was sad that most of the U.S. military had left because they themselves depended a lot on the United States; so those are some of the issues that needed attention. On the economic side we were trying to help American companies take advantage of the Subic and Clark Bases. The Filipinos wanted some activity to take place in these big beautiful amazing bases that basically the Americans abandoned. So the Filipino government was trying to attract American companies if they wanted to come and use, for example, Clark Air Force Base and FedEx to use it as a base of operations for FedEx to service the rest of Asia. So I was involved in some of those discussions and meetings with companies and visiting those places.

But the Status of Forces Agreement was probably the biggest thing that happened in the Philippines on my watch there and that wasn’t easy to negotiate. Because it was so contentious as a result of the history of the two bases, the closure of the two bases and the Filipino senate being very worked up about anything to do with the United States, we finally did negotiate. We had to change the name. We couldn’t call it the Status of Forces so it was called the Visiting Forces Agreement, VFA. We ended up negotiating a thing that made some sense.

The Malaysia situation in the late nineties started again and Mahathir’s excesses started to come out. We had some human rights issues that became quite serious. Mahathir ran his party and his government with an iron hand and he could be brutally tough on people who challenged him. While I was there in the early ‘90s the up and coming heir apparent was a man named Anwar Ibrahim. He initially was an education minister and then became the finance minister. By the time I left he was the deputy prime minister and finance minister. So he had been groomed by Mahathir; he was an attractive, very bright modern Muslim Malay. He put a very positive modern face on Islam in Malaysia. In Malaysia you had a lot of elements who were quite traditional and by traditional I mean opposed sort of a modernization of Islam in terms of how it existed in society. Anwar was known for being a much more progressively type person. But he crossed swords with Mahathir too publicly a couple of times. In 1998 or so he was suddenly arrested and charged with sodomy and beaten up in the police station and his picture was all over the newspapers with a big black eye and bloodied; it was terrible. Anwar had been not so much our favorite but he certainly was a guy that we were very much impressed with. We knew that at some point Mahathir was going to have to step down and Anwar was being groomed. All of a sudden Mahathir turned on this guy and just let him have it. It really put a deep freeze on our relationship with Mahathir because it was just too public and too ugly when he was beaten up in the police station and thrown in jail and accused of sodomy. It went on and on about the sodomy. He had apparently had this relationship someone claimed with his driver and it was just as ugly as it could get so that put a big chill on things.

We had meetings and some international sort of things going on in Malaysia in 1998–’99. There was an ASEAN meeting there and traditionally the president of the United States would attend very briefly. President Clinton was supposed to address a gathering of the leaders of Southeast Asia in 1998 or ’99 and at the last minute Clinton suddenly sent his regrets and sent Al Gore. Al Gore took the place of President Clinton to deliver the
speech. It was at the same time of the problems of Anwar Ibrahim. We knew that Bill Clinton if he came he would deliver a very good speech that would hit the right tones at this very intense time in Malaysian-U.S. relations. Well Al Gore came out there and spent no time on Malaysia, no one really knew how he would do in terms of a speech. We figured he would deliver a speech that would in substance be what Clinton would say.

Q: The home base of the speech was in Malaysia?

HARTWICK: In Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur. This was a big ASEAN meeting and first of all the Malaysians were upset, all the ASEANees were upset because Clinton all of a sudden didn’t come. He was already a rock star. Then comes Gore and okay they’ll take Gore. Our ambassador was excluded from meeting with Al Gore to talk about preparation for the speech. He wasn’t even invited in and he was fit to be tied. Well Gore gave a speech and he made some references to what was going on in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam and Malaysia, in a way that just infuriated the Malaysians and the rest of the ASEANees. They were all very, very upset with the speech. After the speech the delegation decided they were all tired and didn’t want to stay for the big banquet dinner. Everyone else was staying for the banquet dinner, but the American entourage with Gore decided they would get up and leave after the speech. So he delivered his speech and he sat down for ten minutes, and then they all got up, about twenty of them, en masse and left. It looked like it basically said, “See you later, we’re out of here.” That’s really how it came across and they got up and they trouped out and gave their good-byes and left. So there was the American senior delegation table now empty. As a guy who was the office director in charge of relations for that and among other countries and having lived in Malaysia myself only a few years before and knew how this was going to go down I mean it was so embarrassing. We were all just sick that it happened the way it happened. Gore left the next day and went off to some other place and got on the airplane and left. He just left this mess for the embassy to deal with. So you had the Anwar thing going on, you had this big meeting, the Gore speech and then off goes Al Gore.

The only thing that was happening in Malaysia at the time that I recall in ’98-’99 was there had been some peat moss fires. There were problems about environmental degradation and peat moss fires.

Q: This is the southern part of Borneo.

HARTWICK: ...the southern part of Kalimantan of Borneo. A lot of the cutting down of the tropical forest were underway here, big efforts. Then as they would be burning all of the refuse, all of the cut branches, and that kind of stuff would get into the peat moss and keep it burning. They could no longer put the peat fires out, the smoke would drift from southern Kalimantan, southern Borneo, across the straits to Singapore and right on up over Malaysia and just sit there. About half the year there is very little air movement in this part of the world. So the smoke would drift and just sit up here. It got so bad we finally got authorization for the first time in U.S. history for the State Department to allow voluntary departure of dependents because of air quality. It was just unbearable; it was just so smoky and dirty. So we couldn’t close the embassy, but we had voluntary
departure for dependents. We weren’t going to make all dependents stay there if they had somewhere else to go. That was another one of the things my office, as office director in EAP, I got very much in involved in. That had never happened before; we had never approved voluntary departure for something like an environmental situation.

Q: Was anybody doing anything about this smoke?

HARTWICK: Lots of people were trying to do things about it but this was Indonesia where you had so many other problems going on. Addressing the peat moss fires in the southern parts of wild and woolly Borneo was not an easy proposition. It was a very frustrating thing to a lot of Indonesians. They didn’t want it to continue, but they just couldn’t muster enough resources on how to address the problem. I’m sure to this day we still have plenty of smoke.

Q: Okay.

HARTWICK: Let’s just take a break and then the beginning now is kind of my nomination to be ambassador and the process of getting to go to Laos and then Laos itself.

Q: When did you get the nomination?

HARTWICK: Well I extended one year in my PIMBS office; that normally is a two-year assignment but I stayed for three years. There was a lot going on and I just thought it made sense. I was due to rotate out summer of 2000. The story of my nomination to be ambassador to Laos was unusual. I never really got on an ambassador list at the time back in the fall of 2000. I didn’t think I was going to go overseas and I don’t quite know how all this came about. But someone else had been put forward by EAP to be the ambassador to Laos. One of her dependents had severe health problems so while she went part way through the process she then withdrew. Stanley Roth put my name forward into the system and they picked me up at that time. That would have been basically December or January of 1999 or 2000.

Q: Okay, well we will pick this up then when we will talk about the whole ambassadorial process and going to Laos.

HARTWICK: The ambassadorial process was interesting because I ended up being one of the few in recent memory that actually had a hold put on me that torpedoed my whole nomination. I had to get renominated by a new president and go through the security clearance and a new confirmation hearing twice for the same country.

Q: Okay, today is the 17th of March St Patrick’s Day 2010 with Doug Hartwick. Doug you are going to talk about your travails with Congress.

HARTWICK: This was the early spring of 2000 and I was announced as President Bush’s nominee to go to Laos. When you are talking about countries that are off the
beaten track and not mainstream places where political appointees go, it’s really the Foreign Service that generates these things. I was President Bush’s nominee as the President formally does all nominations. I had to go through a full security clearance and eventually had my Senate confirmation hearing. Madeleine Albright was the Secretary of State at the time. The Republicans were in control of the Senate. It was all pretty straightforward. A lot of human rights questions about Laos. The process is the committee votes on you and then it goes to the Senate floor. Then you are held for a while until they get unanimous consent to pass everyone who is on hold.

So there was a very contentious period; frankly it was in the runup to the election, and I think there were a number of Republicans and others basically gunning for Madeleine Albright. They came out with whoever this group was, decided that Madeleine Albright had not done due diligence on their ambassadorial duties for security reasons. There had been this case, if you will recall, you will remember Stapleton Roy had this...

Q: Laptop.

HARTWICK: This lap top that went missing and…

Q: Laptop gate.

HARTWICK: Laptop gate. He was the head of INR at this time and ultimately they went after his deputy and he took great offence at that and he said, “If you are going to go after anybody go after me.” So he resigned basically to take the fall on this laptop gate; well this was all around the same time. A bunch of us as nominees someone went through the nomination packages. Apparently somewhere in all of this were security violations enumerated that people had. The senate staff basically reviewed all of these outstanding nominees because they were pending confirmation and said that it was an outrage you had laptop gate going on, you had nominees who were there put forward by the State Department who had outrageous security violations; Ron Neumann was one of them. I was one of them, all for a total of I think about 12 or 14 people out of nominees of 20 or so pending, 12 or 14 had 10 or more violations. So the committee was being held by Jesse Helms, he was the chair. The word came out that they were going to pass all the nominees except for those that had ten or more violations. Then they would have to look one by one to see whether they warranted being passed or not. I had ten; I think Ron Neumann had something like fourteen or sixteen.

Q: Can you explain what a security violation was and how you got one.

HARTWICK: It really wasn’t an infraction with respect to storage of classified documents, cables and so forth. If for example you left a safe unlocked at night in an embassy, even if you had Marine security guards, in fact virtually always violations or infractions were discovered by Marine guards. But, for example, if you left a safe unlocked or if, for example, you left a confidential telegram on your desk somewhere or if somewhere in your desk and maybe you inherited it from someone else that same desk somewhere inside the desk was a confidential telegram or document, then you would be
cited with a pink slip that they had found a document in your position that was not properly secured. In most case the Marines would note on there what was the likelihood of compromise; 95 percent of the cases or more there was no chance of compromise because it was inside a secured area of the embassy and therefore unlikely. But it was basically pressure to make sure that everybody handled security documents properly. By the time you get nominated to be ambassador most of us have been working somewhere in the area of 22-25 years. During a career you can run up some. I, in fact, had given myself at least one when I was basically the DCM in my embassy in Bangui. We didn’t have any Marines but I felt it was important when I left a document out and I knew that my secretary had seen it and thought nah, you know what, this is a clear violation, it shouldn’t have happened. So I gave myself one. So they drew the line at ten and frankly it was really more a stick it to Madeleine Albright kind of an effort more than anything else; although we had one person who happened to be in my class and also in that same cadre of nominations who had 22. That’s a lot. But in any case that basically slowed things down. Holds were put on all of these people however many there were, ten, twelve, fourteen. That made us miss some of the target dates when Senate business would clear out standing nominations and they would pass them. So that took us through the August recess and we were just waiting.

So I was over here at FSI studying Lao. I had started to study Lao thinking it would be two or three months and then I would be passed and so I would be headed out to the post in the end of June or July; that didn’t happen. So August recess came and, of course, nothing is going on in August so now we are looking at September. Finally the State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations committee worked out a deal. Marc Grossman was a part of this thing too where they would evaluate these security “violations” in different ways and put in place from then on a point system. And from then on if you had too many points then you would have to wait a period of time to do some sort of penance to have the points reduced; almost like a parking ticket or driving ticket before you could be nominated. As far as the people who were there they looked at each one and they determined that I think in virtually all the cases the infractions had not actually compromised any security and therefore let them proceed. About that time while Neumann was one of my classmates and all of those they kind of moved forward.

About that time Bob Smith was a Senator from New Hampshire. I had gone and met with him and met with his staff because he had a particular interest in POW/MIA issues and, of course, that was one of the important issues for Laos; that is missing American remains in Laos. We had somewhere like 440 unaccounted for people that had been lost in Laos, many more in Vietnam but still that’s a pretty good number in Laos.

Q: A large number, yeah.

HARTWICK: I learned the land mines and the pitfalls and quicksand of dealing with Capitol Hill on some of these issues. It was clear that Bob Smith felt very proprietary about the whole issue of POW/MIA and he was a Republican, he was very unhappy with… I’m sorry I was a nomination of Bill Clinton.
Q: I was going to say you kept talking about George Bush...

HARTWICK: I was a nomination of Bill Clinton and Smith was very unhappy with Bill Clinton and Clinton’s approach to the POW/MIA issue. You will recall that Clinton made overtures to Vietnam in the mid-latter part of the ‘90s to start opening up and resuming our relations with Vietnam and Bob Smith was very unhappy with that. So I was the target of opportunity coming up there as the new nominee going to one of the POW/MIA countries that he was concerned about. While they lifted the hold stemming from security infractions he then imposed a hold on me, specifically just on me. There wasn’t much I could do about it. The whole issue was he was unhappy with the Clinton administration and POW/MIA policy. He didn’t really come out with anything specifically that he wanted in exchange for removing the hold. The way this usually works is they do a hold because they want something and it’s usually a bargaining chip with the State Department or with the administration. That I’ll remove that hold if you do this or this or this. It is usually policy related but not exclusively as sometimes it is actually kind of personal.

Well in my case he never came up with anything he wanted. He was just doing it to stick his fingers, I think, in the administration’s eye. September turned into October. The deputy assistant secretary who was responsible for monitoring and engaging the Senate in the Congressional affairs office (H) called me up one day and called me in. She basically said, “I have to tell you we don’t know what to do about this. Bob Smith doesn’t even return our phone calls, nothing. So you are on your own and if you can think of any way you can get to him by all means do it because we’ve run out of options, we don’t know what to do.” I’m thinking here I am a Foreign Service officer, what do I know about getting into the intricacies of trying to influence individual Senators on Capitol Hill. I felt very abandoned at that point, it was early October. And, of course, the legislative year is running down, the elections in early November were coming up for Bush vs. Gore. So I pulled out all the stops. I started thinking about everybody I knew who was a Republican who might have an association with New Hampshire and I managed to get some friends to help me out. For example I had met Brent Scowcroft and I had a close friend of mine working for General Scowcroft and he was a very kind guy and he wrote a letter to Bob Smith. We reached out to John Sununu who again was another New Hampshire guy and had Sununu write a letter; these were the things I was generating, not the State Department. I really thought for a while maybe this stuff would help, particularly when Brent Scowcroft writes as he was very respected. Well, the bottom line was that week after week kept slipping by. I finally met with his chief of staff and his chief of staff said, “You know frankly we are not motivated to do anything right now.”

Well the way the Senate usually works under these circumstances is when the legislative season really winds down to the very end if there are outstanding holds of all different kinds the Senate leadership usually will start taking those issues up with the Senator’s staff, whomever the Senator is, for whatever reason, not just nominations but other kinds of holds too that don’t rise to great importance but they are slowing things down. This was one of those cases too and there were some other holds on State Department nominees so those basically got cleared up. It whittled down to this last nomination
which was for me to go to Laos that the Bob Smith hold was on. Well in the middle of that the elections happened. It was a very contentious election. It ended up being resolved by the Supreme Court and it went on and on for several weeks. The election didn’t finally get resolved until mid-Decembers. What ended up happening is the Senate leadership and basically all of Capitol Hill, the administration and the two political parties just focused completely on that. In the end, they had to keep the Senate open for a while until all this got adjudicated. They never put pressure on Bob Smith to clear up the hold. So there were still a few outstanding nominations, and on the last day of the Senate, by unanimous consent, which is how the Senate does most of their work, they passed everybody but mine was not put forward because it wasn’t a unanimous consent. We had one hold on it; so that torpedoed my nomination.

So on December 15 I learned my nomination had died because the administration closed down, Congress closed down and there was going to be a new administration coming in, a new Congress coming in January and that was it. I have to tell you I was pretty deflated after having both waited and then engaged for about two and a half months myself doing all that I could to try and get nomination to end the hold. It was one of those lonely moments in the State Department because I realized I’m like damaged goods here; I hadn’t done anything but I’m like damaged goods. You know with the exception of the assistant secretary that put my name forward, Stanley Roth, not one person in the entire State Department ever even called me when that happened. H people didn’t call, undersecretary whoever it was at that time didn’t call, no one called. I was the only one who got torpedoed; it was really a bad feeling, a terrible feeling because I really felt that my career path had suddenly died right there.

Q: But also it must have left you bitter with all the support system in the members of the Foreign Service.

HARTWICK: There were several nominees who had been held for various reasons but were all cleared those last couple of days and went through unanimous consent. Then there was the group of twelve or so as part of the security clearance issue and a lot of them were still hanging round and hadn’t been quite approved until the very end. But among them not one word from anybody. It was just like gone, I was just discarded on the side. It was a very depressing kind of feeling. So that was basically on December 15 when the Senate closed in 2000.

I thought well that’s probably it I mean now what am I going to do mind you I’m not very old I’m only 50 years old but do I want to stay in the Foreign Service. How many more years do I want to hang around? What’s going to happen? I decided I needed to see the DG, it was Marc Grossman, and see what short-term assignment work he could give me. I didn’t want to go back into the system and get reassigned and get a regular full time job again. I was still technically on the books as the office director for PIMBS in East Asia bureau but they had already paneled someone in to replace me and that basically was not something I could go back to.
So EAP gave me an office to sit in. I went to Marc and I said, “You know this has all happened.” He knew it had happened and I said, “Are there some short term assignments you can give me that I might be able to help you out with or whatever?” So technically I then became attached to the DGs office and after a few days Marc called me in and he said “I really need help with the retirees. The retirees are up in arms. They are really unhappy with the Department and I’ve got to get a handle on what is going on with them.” So here I was going from being a nomination as an ambassador, having it torpedoed, and the first thing the DG and the Foreign Service tells me is would you take care of the retirees for me. I wasn’t going to win; my career has really gone down the tubes. Here I am dealing with the poor retirees that’s my latest assignment.

But anyway I jumped into it. I said, “All right” and Marc and I talked about it and I talked to a couple of other people and I got a better sense as to what the problems were. Madeleine Albright was Secretary of State and there was a period then when they started imposing new restrictions for retirees to come into the Department.

Q: I remember something of that nature.

HARTWICK: There were just a lot of very frustrated, angry people coming back to the world of retired Foreign Service people. They all were proud of having worked the U.S. government and as Foreign Service officers all almost to a person but hated the state Department management and that was in essence what I came up against. I had bands of retirees some of them in the DC area, down in Florida, out in California and the ones in the DC area were the most upset about the new restrictions for access to the Department.

Q: I might point out that the Department has a credit union, banking facilities, plus...

HARTWICK: Libraries.

Q: Libraries plus the cafeteria which is sort of a place where cadres might gather together to...

HARTWICK: Absolutely.

Q: ...all perfectly natural and it builds up a sense of corps solidarity.

HARTWICK: There had been I guess a couple of minor security incidents in the building for lax access to the building; not by retirees mind you but nevertheless some security access issues. So the restriction came down from the diplomatic security (DS) people that hence force retirees needed to have a special badge and they were only allowed to go to the first and second floor and a whole variety of restrictions. It was handled very poorly.

So I said, “Let me go ahead and do it.” My father’s a retiree, I knew a lot of people who were retired. I thought, well, I’ll just jump into it and see where this takes us. So I did that work for about three months and I ended up finding it actually quite fun. I met a lot of people that I had known in years past and many of them colleagues of my father, families.
of my father. It was very clear to me that those who were retired felt very divorced from the State Department even though they felt this attachment, as I said, to the Foreign Service. They felt very much cut off and treated poorly by the State Department. So I analyzed as best I could what I thought were the key sensitive problems. I thought how do other organizations with alumni stay in touch with their alumni and do the alumni help those organizations and how do you build on that. Of course the parallel is the university.

You’ve got undergraduates who go to school for several years and then after that they are cut loose from the school and off they go but there is an attempt to stay in touch with them perhaps for donations for a lot of reasons. So I went up to GW University and I said, “How do you stay in touch with your alumni?” I sat down with their alumni office people and they basically showed me this is what we do. We have this big web site, we keep the thing active, we get emails from people, we stay in touch with them as best we can, we send invitations to come to different events if we can and so forth. I thought this is really a good idea and why can’t the State Department do something like that. You’ve got this group out there all these people who live around the United States they talk very fondly about the Foreign Service. They are useful to go off and talk to high schools and talk to universities, helping recruit, they are actually a really good group and they might not be very happy with the State Department but they love the Foreign Service. I said we should be in touch with them more often.

So I fleshed it out a little bit and got some ideas and there were a few other ideas too and I came up with some recommendations and went over and talked to the people in DS a little bit about it. But there was just a bad feeling and frankly Secretary Albright didn’t have a strong reputation in terms of her support for the rank and file.

Q: She really surrounded herself with a coterie of people who are not only memorable...

HARTWICK: No, and not particularly nice. I worked with a lot of them myself already and in a sense this attitude, this frustration on the part of the retirees, was somewhat deserved. But I came up with these recommendations to Marc. One of them was to institute a web-based retirement website that could be interactive with the retirees. I made an effort to see if we could find money in the budget to do some of this stuff and once again typical State Department: there is no budget, you can’t do this, you can’t do that, we don’t have the time. If we came up with this idea and want to implement it someone would have to do it on his or her spare time along with all their other duties. It became clear that it was a good idea but it would take a big much stronger push although Marc liked the idea a lot.

Well I came up with a big retirement report review and recommendations. At the same time I continued to quietly press the system behind the scenes a little bit. Are there any other ambassadorial assignments slots becoming available? Someone said, “Yeah, we have this one slot in Laos that is open.” So I said I happen to speak Laotian, I’d studied it for ten months. But Marc knew about that and my former immediate boss, Skip Boyce, was also mindful of that plus the nomination was basically wide open again. Now we had a new president in George Bush, we had a new Secretary of State, a new Deputy
Secretary of State and a lot of changes had gone on. Then they took Marc Grossman and they elevated him to the new undersecretary position and this was now roughly March/April of 2001. Between Skip Boyce and Marc Grossman they basically approached the secretary and Rich Armitage who was the brand new deputy secretary and said, “We have a situation where Bob Smith torpedoed Hartwick’s assignment, nothing to do with him, it had everything to do with Bob Smith. Marc had told me he had heard that I would never be able to pass the Senate and I said, “I don’t think that’s the case.” I said, I’ve made some feelers myself as I had done some work the previous few months and I had a lot of different contacts on the Hill. I was getting back vibes that I was the object of Smith’s attempt to punish the Clinton administration, he really didn’t care about me at all, and frankly there was nothing I could do.

Anyway I think in late March I got a call from Rich Armitage. He said, “Hartwick where are you?” I said, “I’m down in EAP.” He said, “Get up here.” Yes, sir, so I turned around and shot up to the seventh floor and went into Armitage’s office. He said, “I just want you to know I just called Bob Smith and I wanted to know what the problem was with you and that President Bush wanted to nominate you again. He told me “Oh, if President Bush wants to nominate him then that’s fine with him, no problem.” He said, “So, you better get down there and see Smith and you do whatever you have to do and I don’t want to hear any complaints out of you or anyone else. I want to get this thing done and off the table.” I said, “Yes sir, I’ll do that.” Well I ended up never seeing Bob Smith ever again because he never wanted to see me. He had nothing to do with me. I put in the request, I talked to the chief of staff and in the end never did see Smith. We went right back to the paper work. We had a new administration, new rules, new bureaucracy kicks in, all new people, the DASs, the people in H had all changed over and so forth. So sure enough I had to go through another security clearance starting from scratch, a whole new ambassadorial questionnaire that this time took on four or five new additional pages of questions compared to the one I had just done the year before. The nomination all went over to the Senate as brand new. It had to go through another hearing and finally in late June I was confirmed to be ambassador to Laos along with a handful of other people.

Q: How did you find the language level?

HARTWICK: I knew it would be good value to speak some of the local language. Lao, while it is not a world language at all it would be a challenge. I thought it was a good way of spending my time and I’d also heard from predecessors that the Lao government actually didn’t speak that much English, didn’t speak that much French and I can do both fine in that and it would be very helpful to have some Lao. So I kind of threw my heart into it but remember when I started studying Lao it was the expectation that I would be studying Lao for two to three months and that would be all the time that I had; it was a tonal language, it has a complete different script which is a phonetically based script but you’ve got to learn a complete different script. Then again with tones you’ve got to learn tone markers, you’ve got to learn how to speak and the grammar. If you’d started off and said you were going to study Lao for ten months and you knew you had ten months to work with you would study in a different way than if you started off thinking you had two to three months and that’s all you were going to do. I didn’t start off in a way that
would probably give me a better grounding, for example learning how to read or write in Lao. Lao instructors here had said it is going to take too long; no point, you need to read Lao, you just need to learn some phrases so we will work with some phrases. So we started to do that and by the time I was in there four to five months and it became clear that this hold on me was going to last for a while. I finally said to the instructor: I’m sick of all these phrases I want to get into the meat of the language a little more. I’d like to be able to use this. He said, “All right well then we are going to have to teach you how to read and write.” I said, “Well let’s do it, it can’t be that hard.” And it wasn’t that hard, but it pushed you back like when you were basically in kindergarten. All of a sudden everything you looked at that you and I can see what they are you don’t even think about it in terms of reading and writing all of a sudden you are looking at something that you don’t know what the sound is. You don’t what it pertains to so it was suddenly a challenge and Lao became completely different and I found that to be quite stimulating. I enjoy the language, the books that we are being taught Lao had been written during the Vietnam War time so you had typical FSI scenarios. You start to learn dialogue and grammar based upon those scenarios. The scenarios were war based and the soldier shoots at so and so. It was really a strange thing and they never updated it.

Q: In 1951 I took Russian at the Army Language School and I used to be able to say “take me to your 155 millimeter artillery range.”

HARTWICK: You know exactly what I am talking about then.

The Lao are basically a laid back people unlike the Vietnamese who are very intense. The Lao are really laid back and that is exactly how this program was over there; it was very laid back; but sometimes it is hard to make progress in a very laid back environment. I’d look at these scenarios that I was supposed to be studying and it was like what are these? How does this help an ambassador going out to do his job, this is useless stuff. I don’t want to hear about a rifle or artillery shells. So I’d go home and I decided I’d write out ten scenarios about something I thought would be important for me to do. Like when I go out as an ambassador I’m going to do the following kinds of things and let’s work through a dialogue of twenty exchanges back and forth and then we will go from there; I created my own FSI dialogue system.

As I was learning to read and write I also developed my own phonetic system using English language things with accent marks for tones. We made very good progress and I found a year later when I ended up going to Laos it was immensely valuable to me. I can go out and talk about playing golf on a golf course in Lao; how important is that? The Lao love playing golf. They are Southeast Asians, it’s like it is in their blood. They just love it.

Q: I’m told that the one entree that we’ve been able to have to the very reclusive regime in Burma or Myanmar was golf.

HARTWICK: It was much the same here. The deputy prime minister of Laos was a fanatic about golf. One of the first questions he asked me was do you play golf? And I
said, “Yeah, I play golf.” But I could do this in Lao which was so interesting that is what was so unique.

Q: Let’s talk about 2001 you are going out to Lao. What was the situation in Laos politically and all and what were American interests there when you went out; this was as you got yourself ready to go.

HARTWICK: Well the last little thing about the Lao language and then I will switch over to your question. I decided one of the things that I really needed to do was I knew when I presented my credentials I wanted to be able to make a statement. So I probably worked for three weeks on this statement in Lao. I wanted to be able to deliver it to the president of Laos in an intelligible enough manner that a Lao could understand what I was trying to say which was about ten-twelve sentences with the honorifics of Lao properly positioned talking to the president of the country. You learn a lot from that kind of experience and sure enough when I presented my credentials which was like five days after 9/11 I had this down. I learned some things I needed to say. I had enough Lao then to even talk a little bit about the attack of 9/11 on the United States. It was very, very helpful to have done that; and that segues into your question about 2001.

I was sworn in on the 27th of July. Unfortunately my parents were in New Zealand at the time so they were not available to attend. The notion was that I would complete a lot of my consultations after being sworn in and prepare to go with my wife and family. Putting one daughter in a German language school in Germany, put the other daughter in boarding school in London and arranging for our dog to be shipped and so forth. I would head out and my wife would follow a few days later. She would go visit her mother in Germany and then we would head east all the way to Laos. I stopped off in London for some consultations, I arrived in Bangkok on the 10th of September 2001; had a day of consultations -- that must have been the 11th of September, Bangkok, Thailand, is twelve hours ahead of the United States. I was in my hotel room about 8:30 at night having done all day consultations. I turned on the television. It was 8:30 in the morning east coast time so there unfolded 9/11 before my eyes watching CNN.

I finally got up to Laos the morning of the 13th of September. I think I was as shell shocked as anybody. I was going to my new post and new job with this terrible, terrible attack and tragedy having just happened. We had not had an ambassador there for well over a year. The leadership of that government were all guerrilla war fighters from the Vietnam War time so their relationship with the United States was always a bit arm’s length at best and here I was coming in after 9/11; they whipped me through to get credentials to the president very quickly; like within two days. The deputy prime minister and foreign minister came over to the embassy and we set up a condolence book and all that kind of stuff; it was all happening at warp speed time. I had just arrived and I said, “What are we doing here” and they said we are planning on this, we are planning on that and so forth. I wanted to do a memorial service for the embassy personnel and I wanted to do some sort of public service that involved diplomats and Lao government officials, virtually none of whom I had met yet and have all that. So we ended up having two different services and it was a tense and emotional time.
Here I was in a country where it had suffered at the hands of so much bombing, terrorism and terrible kinds of things and they were actually very gracious, very gracious about it. The deputy prime minister went out of his way to extend condolences to me personally, to my embassy and everybody; he actually did a very nice job.

**Q:** Well let's talk a bit about where stood the Laos government vis-à-vis the United States when you got out there?

**HARTWICK:** We never severed diplomatic relations with Laos, unlike with Cambodia and Vietnam. We maintained relations although we stepped it down to a handful of five or six. We kept a low level maintenance of a diplomatic relationship on-going until really the early ‘90s. Then in 1993, the two governments decided during the Clinton time to go ahead and resume full diplomatic relations at the ambassador level. Now I was arriving in 2001. We had this long hiatus prior to my time because we had no ambassador. There were two years without an ambassador.

U.S. relations with Laos really were shaped quite a bit by the Vietnam War leftovers, which was no trade and shaped a lot by former Lao or Laotian people who had come as refugees to the United States. They played a very, very big role in shaping U.S. relations. As far as the State Department was concerned, we didn’t do very much with Laos. It was not a mainstream country and it wasn’t a big problem either with the one exception: periodically there would be a spike in human rights concerns about treatment of some of the Lao minorities, in particular the Hmong spelled H-M-O-N-G who had been fighters during the Vietnam war.

**Q:** As a matter of fact, when I was in Vietnam you would see Hmong who were rather distinctive. There would be bodyguards outside certain houses in Saigon and you knew those were CIA ranking people because they hired these guys.

**HARTWICK:** They were small people of stature but very tough and known not to like the Vietnamese. They were culturally and ethnically like the Lao and they proved to be quite good warriors and dependable in terms of people who would be fighting against the Vietnamese. The bottom line was that in 2001 the Lao refugee groups, whether they were ethnic Lao or ethnic Hmong in the United States, were really the main groups that cared anything about the relations between the two countries.

You have two different ethnic groups: the Lao and the Hmong. About equal numbers came over after the Vietnam War and just as in Laos the Hmong and the Lao don’t connect that well. And they didn’t connect that well as refugees in the United States so they went to separate places. The Hmong tended to go to the Central Valley in California, Minnesota and Wisconsin and then some smatterings here and there, North Carolina for some of them. The ethnic Lao people tended to go more to the Chicago area, Washington state, also central California, down south in Texas and parts of the south as well as Connecticut so they are spread around. They all shared one characteristic and that was they were very conservative and they were very anti-Communist; the whole reason they
were in the United States is they were chased out and they couldn’t go back and that situation really hadn’t changed. Their bitterness and how they had suffered was pretty extreme but each one differently. The Lao groups by and large were better educated, were worldly, a lot of them spoke French and learned English and had education. Most of the Hmong that came out had nothing. They didn’t speak Lao, they didn’t speak English, they didn’t speak French.

Q: There wasn’t a written language at one point was there?

HARTWICK: Right, in fact there was not a written language of Hmong and Missionaries went in and basically codified it.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: The Lao had their own language, but the Hmong didn’t speak Lao. The Hmong and Lao kept apart; the Hmong were mountain people, the Lao were basically for the most part foothills and plains people and lived close to the Mekong River so they really didn’t interact all that much. I quickly found out that they would play a very important role from now on in my relationship.

Q: Just one question on 9/11. Was there any Muslim community that might have been supportive of the attack on the twin towers?

HARTWICK: No, no the only Muslims that really existed in Laos were diplomats. There is no Islamic element in Laos at all. It is either Animist or a little bit of Christian or Buddhist pretty much, that’s all you really have. So the number of Muslim people you could count was probably under 50 in the entire country so it really wasn’t an issue. Not only that, Laos didn’t have representation in the Arab world virtually at all. What you had was Indonesian Muslims, you had Malay Muslims but you didn’t really have Muslims and they weren’t like that at all. They weren’t at all radical, which was actually good. All the kind of key groups you would be nervous about did not exist in Laos. What we did worry about was could Laos be a place where those terrorist cells might go to hide out for a while. It was pretty easy to go in and out of Laos and a little bit of money would allow you to do whatever you wanted in Laos and you could get away suddenly. But nothing like that actually ever came to pass so, in fact, it was pretty good.

What we did have though was a fairly burning issue of two Hmong-Americans that disappeared in northern Thailand right on the Lao border. Laos shares a border with five countries but a very, very long border with Thailand. You have a lot of refugee camps after the Vietnam War for Hmong for the most part. Most of the Lao didn’t go to the refugee camp but a lot of the Hmong did in several different places all on the Thai side of the Mekong River. Up in the northern part is where you had groups no longer living in Laos who wanted to infiltrate Laos again. This is a pretty remote area up there. Thailand has its own pretty relaxed environment and you can do an awful lot with a little bit of payoff here and there in Thailand.
So over many, many years you had infiltrators who might have been Hmong or Lao wanting to come into Laos very often through northern or southern Laos via Thailand. Anyway, these two Hmong-Americans went missing and the Hmong-American community here, particularly the consumer groups, started a real drumbeat that the Lao government had murdered them. So this was one of the things I dealt with when I first arrived. The pressure on Capitol Hill was that the Commie government had done in these Hmong-Americans. So we shouldn’t be doing anything with this government until they come clean and tell what they did with these people. It took a better part of that first year. I did a lot of work on that issue trying to get to the bottom what may have happened to these people, what were they doing there in the first place, what were the other refugee groups in Thailand having to do with them. The FBI and our office in Thailand played a helpful role here too. They started looking into it as well because it basically froze everything we were doing with Laos on Capitol Hill. There was a lot of emotion involved with the Hmong community about these guys. I couldn’t move forward on virtually anything until I at least managed to somehow corral this issue without taking a stand one way or another whether the Lao government was involved or not involved. If we didn’t somehow find some way of containing this issue I wouldn’t be able to do anything else.

Q: What were the infiltrators trying to infiltrate in Laos?

HARTWICK: Well I stated to learn in a very intimate way about some of the fundamental problems that existed in Laos as a result of the Vietnam War and then how they linked to the United States for the most part and Hmong were at the heart of an awful lot of it. The United States took in somewhere in the area of 150 thousand Hmong refugees and about 150 thousand Lao refugees following the war. The Hmong group alone, that 150 thousand, pretty much almost doubled by the time we got to the year 2000 between new people coming and children and all of that so that community was quite significant. Many of them had never given up on the war. They wanted to go back like so many ethnic groups, and that one as much as any group really wanted to return to the land that they love and the life style they knew back in the mountains of Laos. They had left under very difficult circumstances. Many had lived for ten, twelve thirteen years in refugee camps and then they moved to the United States and then they had gone through hell just trying to assimilate in the United States. A lot of the older people by this time they were in their late thirties, forties, fifties and sixties; their life had been totally ruined; they were just completely fish out of water in the United States and they really wanted to go back. One of the sustaining things for the Hmong American community was that some of the leadership, including the famous General Vang Pao, who moved to the United States, said that we’re never going to give up. We don’t want the Lao government to succeed, we want them to fail, we want to go back, we want to have our own homeland somewhere in Laos up in the mountains and we want to be left alone. They threw all of their energy and efforts to advance that long term visionary goal.

So to answer your question what were these two guys doing? One was from Wisconsin, the other was from central California. They were there, as it turned out, with something like $50 thousand in cash. They were trying to smuggle some arms in. It turns out several thousand people living in the mountains had never surrendered. They were living up in
the very austere and remote mountains of Laos and had never given up. Some had given up and crossed the river and left and some went back into the mountains and didn’t give up. They were basically being treated as if they were bandits and they lived almost like animals; they were on the move periodically. The Lao military didn’t perceive them as hard but every now and then they would swoop down and attack. So these tensions were going on.

So when I got there in 2001 that was sort of part of the backdrop. Now we didn’t know much about it but it was real and it was a terrible humanitarian crisis or problem and human rights problem as well. So these two guys were part of that but again it was almost an organized crime element as they dealt with lots of cash. There was a drug aspect to what they were doing. They were infiltrating across the border, they were paying people off. Anyway they disappeared and eventually as best we could we determined they had been murdered by other elements, probably Lao up in the north, for their money and their bodies disposed of. But it wasn’t the Lao government. The Lao government whenever it was accused of anything would just shut down and start denying everything even if what they were denying made no sense. They would deny it anyway. They went into this knee-jerk reaction which played into the hands of all the Hmong groups in the United States saying, “See those liars they did do it and now they are just denying it just as they always do. They have their hands in it” and they would go straight to Capitol Hill. There was a part of Congress that was adamant that the Lao government needed to come clean on what they had done with these bodies. Well we started off like that and it’s really hard to get that turned around. In the end we managed to get enough information and then I came back several times and spoke with the members of Congress and basically took FBI people with me so I would go in and call on members of Congress and say we want to report to you Congressman or Senator; Russell Feingold was very active on this issue.

Q: He is from?

HARTWICK: From Wisconsin.

Norm Coleman from Minnesota was involved and he had just been elected. You had Representative Greene from the Green Bay area was very active. There were quite a few people who were active in this kind of stuff. In central California the Fresno area several people were involved. So I came back on a couple of occasions and went to see all the members and their staff to basically give them as good accounting as we could get between the FBI, our own Intel sources here and there and information from the Thai government about what we felt might have happened. It took about a year to deal with it as best we could. I met with the families of the two guys who were missing but it had become pretty clear they had been up to no good and they were hanging out with some pretty unsavory characters on the Thai side and on the Lao side. Then one day they disappeared when they crossed into Laos and were not heard from again.

Q: Were drugs an issue up there?
HARTWICK: Sure, more in northern Laos, northern Thailand is also near Burma and that’s the golden triangle up there.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: So drugs are always an issue in those areas, quite a bit. But the Hmong were not big traffickers in drugs. Part of the unsavory groups that they were in contact with were doing all kinds of things and that included some drugs. You have a lot of opium being grown but you have methamphetamines being produced in Burma and in northern Laos as well. All of that was part of an illicit trade and money flowing in those parts.

Q: Was China doing anything down there? They have a smallish border with Laos.

HARTWICK: No, not particularly. China’s activities with the Burmese were pretty extensive but with the Lao not very much. You say a smallish border but you can’t even tell when you look at the map of northern Laos and southern China. That is a pretty rugged area of the world out there; it’s remote and you don’t have many good roads in that area, it’s very mountainous, it’s pretty cold in the winter, it doesn’t snow but it’s pretty cold and unpleasant. It’s pretty tough up there. Being the American ambassador in Laos in 2001 there were still so much that had not happened since the Vietnam War and my earlier predecessors had been restricted to not even travel very much inside the country. So I was always pushing the envelope as best I could; I basically made a pledge I would visit every single province in Laos of which I think there were seventeen or eighteen that I did. Way up north that had been an area that had been both remote but also very much controlled by the Pathet Lao bordering with China. So when I went up there on my first trip I don’t think there had ever been an American ambassador up there. We never had an ambassador in Laos until after basically a lot of attention in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s. The Chinese border and up in those areas had never had an ambassador ever visiting, so it was all very interesting.

Q: What about Laos and Vietnam? By this time we had full diplomatic relations with Vietnam but how stood things between those countries?

HARTWICK: One of the legacies of the Vietnam War was that Laos really was very much dependent on the Vietnamese for political connections, less economically but certainly in terms of their political orientation. For guidance they looked to Vietnam overwhelmingly; the entire time I was there that was still the case. The Lao Communist cadres were sent to Vietnam to train and learn about their jobs. They had a mid-level program for their bureaucrats who were sent to Vietnam and lived for a year and were trained to do it the Vietnamese Communist way. That remained very, very important.

Laos was very isolated until really the latter part of the ‘90s. It was done on purpose as the government wanted to be isolated; it didn’t want to be involved with Thailand, it did not want to be involved with the outside world very much. They were still consolidating themselves. Their main window on life outside of Laos looked to Hanoi more than
anything else and, of course, the Soviet Union was still in existence until 1990. They received quite a bit of assistance, some of it from the Chinese, but most from the Soviet Union. After 1990 the Soviet Union went away so their source of a lot of support from that side suddenly just ended. In 2001 it had only been a decade before you had vestiges of that all over the country. They had an airbase up in the central part of the country where you had old MIGs still sitting there; I mean they couldn’t fly anymore but there they were. If you were flying in the airplane you could see them sitting there and it was like what the hell are MIGs doing sitting in the middle of Laos.

If you look on a map you see how mountainous Laos is up in the northern part, a very, very mountainous country; lots of rivers, lots of mountains very hard to drive around, very hard to get around not many roads it’s tough up there. Then you look down the spine between Laos and Vietnam you will also see you’ve got a big mountain chain that goes right down the spine of Vietnam and Laos and that really separates physically Vietnam and Laos; you’ve got a very tough terrain to get by. Then you’ve got the Mekong River area which is all pretty flat and that is where most of the population is. It meant in terms of physical connections with the Vietnamese they just didn’t work that well. It was too hard.

Q: Had there been any effort in that area by say the Chinese as I recall there was talk about the Chinese putting a road through from somewhere to somewhere up in there maybe it went right into Thailand, I don’t know, but was there anything in Laos any construction?

HARTWICK: A very active issue when I was there and continues on today is how do you reduce the isolation of a land-locked country. They don’t have access to the sea and everything they need to get from the outside world you need to cross someone else’s border so it poses a real problem. So one of the things that both the UNDP and the World Bank and the Chinese and others were involved in is how do you open up Laos a bit to the outside world and help out. It’s a laudable thing and part of it might have been opening up the river more, another part would have been improving the lines of communications, the roads that went through and to Laos; so two major projects were one on the river was opening up the Mekong River up here. The Mekong River starts in China. So opening up the Mekong River all the way down between Burma and Laos to make it much more navigable for barges and things which was actually in many ways environmentally a terrible thing but it is one of these things that happens; the Chinese were helping to open that up. Then there was a major road effort from southern China down through Laos into northern Thailand. And then other roads from Thailand across to Vietnam, both North and South, improving those roads so that Laos could actually be a transit country for goods and services between the various competing countries around China.

Q: Okay let’s talk about -- we’ll come to the missing in action in a minute -- but let’s talk about the government and dealing with the government. Who were the major players in the government and what was your estimate of these people?
HARTWICK: The government structure was a throwback to our old days of studying Communist countries and the Soviet Union. You had the Communist Party on the side and you had a Politburo and you had a very hierarchical sort of element of seniority in the Politburo. Then you had a central committee of about 50 people and that government structure was driven by those key elements. You had a parliament but the parliament was basically made up of the central committee members who were elected in a Communist way which is basically they were the ones on the ballot that everyone voted for. So I had to dust off my old political science books from the ‘70s and start reading about Russian systems and Communist systems and so forth and got to studying. I think there were nine in the politburo. By 2001 all but one or two of them were the old guerrilla leaders of Vietnam War time and they tended to be in their eighties and some of them right around ninety. They stayed there pretty much until they passed away. A couple of them did retire or just decided to step down but that usually didn’t happen so it was an important situation for them. So that was the stability of their system and all those jockeying for power going forward trying to position themselves to replace one of these guys who either passed away or stepped down, mostly passed away, out of the politburo; the deputy prime minister was one of these people.

You had the politburo and the central committee and then you had the staffed out government. The ministers were made up of either politburo people or senior level people in the central committee. The central committee was also very hierarchal so you had in terms of people once they got to the central committee and what was their defined rank by the government. In the central committee you could see clearly who were the most important people or who were the ones beholding to the politburo types. You had to study all of that to get a better feeling as to who they were.

The governors of all the various provinces were central committee members for the most part and some of them had been senior central party and some of them actually went on to be in the politburo. That was a different kind of world. It made it easy to study, but getting a chance to see some of these people and meet them and interact with them and the further up you went in the hierarchy and the less educated they were, the more challenging it was to communicate and the less they wanted to see you. Now if they were in the politburo and in the government, some of the key ministers were people in the politburo. You could see those as ministers, but to go see them as a politburo member you really couldn’t do that very easily.

Q: Was there any even smell of entrepreneurship which is apparently enveloping Vietnam; these are very energetic people and their government may still be a rather rigid Communist one but their economy has moved very smartly into the capitalistic world.

HARTWICK: Yeah.

Q: But how about Laos was it at all infected by this?

HARTWICK: No. Some of the communistic dimension of it is in some respects less important than the cultural aspects of the way these different peoples are.
Vietnamese are very industrious, hard-working, particularly in the North, very intense. You’ve got 80 million people living in Vietnam and Vietnam was a 30 percent bigger land mass than Laos; that’s about all. You’ve got 80 million people living in Vietnam; you’ve got five million living in Laos.

Q: Oh my God.

HARTWICK: You’ve got Vietnam living all along the coast so the idea of coastal access is very important. Laos is landlocked. All they’ve got are rivers, they can’t do much, so the motivation and drive we found in Laos was just a very faint shadow of the kind of dynamism you would feel in Vietnam. Whenever I or my staff went to Vietnam we would always come back just shaking our heads in disbelief that just over the other side of the mountain chain you have these unbelievable people, the Vietnamese. They are just going like mad and things are just changing all over the place. In Laos it was so sleepy, so laid back, everything was very quiet. The culture is so laid back, so quiet, so easy going. In so many respects Laos is way behind Vietnam. If you took an evolution of a Communist model economy polity and where it was going Laos was so far behind Vietnam; we would have loved to have seen Laos start to do some of those things. One of my conclusions early on was the United States was trading with Vietnam, the United States was trading with China, the United States was trading with Cambodia what do we do about Laos. The answer was, oh we don’t do it with Laos they’re a Communist government. Hello, why I have to change this. Well, the Lao-American groups, the Hmong groups were so hostile to the Lao government, as many of the Vietnamese were. But what we didn’t have in Laos was you had in Vietnam a big business community which was keen in opening Vietnam up and a lot of interest on the part of the Europeans and others to open up Vietnam. You didn’t have that in Laos. It was a much smaller country, it was landlocked, a smaller population. So the Lao-American groups, the most conservative groups, had managed to stake out that doing anything with Laos was bad, Laos was an evil criminal human rights violating government and we should do nothing with them. Well here we are in 2000, 25 years after the Vietnam War; I mean what better time to start doing things with a country to bring them out of the darkness and into the light is to start to engage them, right? That’s what we are doing with Vietnam, that’s what we are doing with all kinds of places.

So my biggest hurdle was what has to happen to put them back on the most favored nation list for trade and how do we break down some of these barriers which were imposed after the Vietnam War. That ended up being probably the number one thing I spent most of my time on the whole three years I was there: trying to position ourselves so we, the United States, could resume normal relations with Laos.

Q: Well would normal relations go? Let’s say someone waved a wand and you got normal relations. Would it have made much difference in this rather lethargic country?

HARTWICK: Yeah, it would have made a difference. When I got there in 2001 bilateral trade was $8 million both directions all added up, $8 million; I mean the budget of FSI is more than that. That was total quantum 2001 trade in both directions so virtually nothing.
Well so if you multiply that by ten times is it a lot of trade $80 million. No, but in a little country like Laos $80 million trade is a lot and all of a sudden that starts to become something new and different. There I was in 2001 and 2002 and you could tell the people wanted more access, they wanted a better living, they had joined ASEAN in 1997, they were really, along with the Burmese, they were the country bumpkins of ASEAN; you had really the super sophisticated Singaporeans and the Malaysians and then the kind of business savvy Thai and then you had the Indonesians and all that; then you had the real hustling Vietnamese and then you had the poor little Lao and the Burmese and God knows what’s going on with them because of their government. The Lao wanted to really be a part of things, but they were so far behind in terms of economic growth, in terms of capabilities, English speaking, all these factors and you needed to bring them out. Well who is the biggest country on earth and who is the biggest trading country on earth and the biggest economy on earth – the United States. And oh, by the way, there are 400,000 Lao and Hmong people in the United States today who should be a natural bridge to that little country of Laos. Laos is five and a half million people, you’ve got 400,000 from there in the United States. Eight percent of them live in the United States, but you couldn’t do much with Laos because of the illegal structure for trade and the high duties. I will be interested to see in the coming years, but you probably have somewhere near $100 million of trade between the U.S. and Laos today; that’s been in ten years and that’s a pretty significant thing.

So that to me was one of the most important areas that I thought needed a lot of attention. But then the entrepreneurial spirit started to have an access. One, you had people coming from overseas, including the United States, who wanted to do business. Then you had people who could do business in Laos or make things in Laos and had a market to sell it to and a ready group of people in the Untied Stats who basically wanted to market their things, i.e., beautiful Lao silk, some of the handicrafts, are some of the things they can do. You start off small, but with a country like that made up of a lot of small villages it adds up to a lot so that became important.

Q: Was technology beginning to move? For example, were cell phones coming into dominance and that?

HARTWICK: No. Within ASEAN with the exception of Burma, Burma is quite a bit bigger country than Laos, Laos is just about the most backward reflecting its landlocked status. It was really still way, way behind. An awful lot of the modernization efforts that were underway in Thailand and under way in great intensity in Malaysia and Singapore really was only beginning. Yeah, they had cell phones there but the people didn’t have that much reason to call one another yet so all those things were beginning to develop.

The Vietnam War affected virtually everything that we in the U.S. embassy did in Laos during my whole tenure there. You had Hmong people still living in the mountains in the north and the Lao government denied that they existed; the only people who existed up there supposedly were bandits. So you had this on-going game and the Lao government would say we have bandits living in the mountains and they run around and rob and kill people and they are evil, you have to exterminate them. Then we had the Hmong-
American communities saying I have brothers and sisters and uncles that are up in the mountains and they are persecuted by the Lao government and they just want to get to freedom, they just want to be left alone. There were anywhere from four to five thousand living up there in different bands up in the mountains; that’s a human rights crisis frankly. So I spent a lot of time on that how can I work with the Lao government to say the U.S. doesn’t want to give you a hard time but we want to get these people out, we want to get them down and resettled. I just needed to find out what were some of the things the Lao government was doing with these people. The Lao government would deny they even existed, so you can’t say these people don’t exist and, oh, by the way, this is what we are doing to help these people, get them resettled, right. So once you took a position that these people don’t exist then you can’t do anything else but that’s classic Communist government: these people don’t exist and they were doing lots of things to get them resettled.

So I’d drive up to visit some of the outlying provinces where these people were. I would meet with the governor or the deputy governor and I coined the term Forest People. What about the forest people, what efforts are happening? Do you have some people come down from the mountains? Oh yeah, we’ve had quite a few down here, yeah. We want to move them over to this area and we are going to give them blankets, we give them pots to cook food and we try to get them resettled and so forth. But if you talk to the central government, they didn’t exist, they were only bandits. Then I would be sending this back to Washington trying to say the Lao government has this public face but here’s actually what’s going on behind the scenes. And, by the way, some of the Hmong-American groups, who were supporting, were sending money, cell phones, satellite phones to the groups in the mountains telling them hang on we’re still coming, we still want to create our Hmong country somewhere up in the north, don’t give up we are coming to help you. Well this has been going on for twenty-five years and it was very pathetic. There were people who had been born and raised in these camps and have never done any education, they’d never done anything and they kept moving every few months as they’ve had to change places because they became exposed. Trying to get that resolved was big.

Another area was really unexploded military ordinance. Laos was the most heavily bombed country during the Vietnam war because two-thirds of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was in Laos.

Q: We are talking about sort of halfway down North Vietnam.

HARTWICK: …in that area is where the Ho Chi Minh Trail is basically. They would bring goods down the Vietnamese side and cross over into the mountains and come on down and then start to dump goods and arms in South Vietnam and then on through Cambodia into the lower part. That was the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But much of it, almost two-thirds of it, was in Laos. Well we were officially never at war with Laos, we theoretically never had any troops in Laos, and whatever fighting that went on in Laos was between Lao forces against the invading Vietnamese; mind you the Lao fighters were paid for by the CIA. But we bombed like there was no tomorrow for years that Ho Chi Minh Trail. The fact of the Ho Chi Minh Trail is it’s lots and lots of lost trails -- trails
big enough to drive trucks down and you had ten, twelve, fourteen trails all interacting so that if trail B got bombed you could use trail F and G. And then if that got bombed you could move around. You kept repairing. So as a result Laos was the most bombed country on earth at that time; anti-personnel bomblets, five hundred pounders, 200 pounders, all kinds.

Q: Timed bombs too weren’t they?

HARTWICK: Some of them timed, some of them were delayed action. But just an unbelievable amount of ordinance was dropped on Laos for six-seven years. A lot of that is still out there today.

Q: Were we contributing to removing that?

HARTWICK: Well, we arrived in 2001 and you realized what a non-stop problem it was. The politics behind all that were not what you would think. There are so many surprising things as you start to peel the issue back and get into it you realize so many things are not as they appeared. One, the Lao government didn’t pay that much attention to unexploited ordinance. They didn’t really care that much because the places that had all the bombing problems were really outlying areas in the rural section that really weren’t all that important to them. They all lived in the urban area themselves any way; so that just didn’t get a lot of attention from the Lao government.

Yes the United States had helped a fair bit in some of the efforts but we generally have a policy that if you are in a war with the United States that’s not our problem. If we are having to fight a war dealing with your country, it is not our responsibility to clean up all the bombs afterward. That’s your responsibility to clean them up. So we would never admit that it was our responsibility; there was just a little different approach toward the Agent Orange problem in Vietnam and in Laos as well where we did take on a much bigger effort to try and clean some of it up because of all the problems they were having.

Q: Defoliation chemicals sprayed.

HARTWICK: When I came to unexploded ordinance the United States position formally was we are not responsible for the clean-up but from the humanitarian standpoint we did make money available. We did make an effort and we are still doing it to this day but not a lot of money. So when you see Iraq and Afghanistan and a lot of the bombing going on there and anti-personnel stuff I shudder. I know what happened in Laos and here 25-35 years later it’s still a serious issue on the ground for people who are farming, cattle and kids and that kind of stuff. There was a whole industry in Laos made up of villagers in those areas that ran out with very cheap $10 Vietnamese made metal detectors to find metal and dig them up and take these bombs and sell them as scrap metal. If you could actually get the explosive out of that bomb even better because the explosive was worth quite a bit of money. So they would be tinkering with these 30 years buried bombs trying to get the explosives out and guess what. The bomblets were even more insidious because you couldn’t see them and they were just beneath the surface or in many areas they were
on the surface. If little kids picked them up or whatever, a lot of them wouldn’t go off but it only takes one out of ten to go off to get a big bad headache.

When I was there in 2001, and I think the numbers probably haven’t changed a lot, there were between 100-150 casualties every year. The casualties often die because they are out in remote areas and they can’t get any attention; lose an arm, lose a leg, get their stomachs blown up, a whole variety of things, cattle plowing the rice field come up and dig one up and it will blow up and kill the animal, a terrible, terrible problem.

Q: Our missing in action must have absorbed a lot of your time?

HARTWICK: You have the Hmong, people of the forest, and Lao-American and Hmong-American communities involved and that’s one major issue area. The second one was unexploded ordinance, another major issue. I mentioned about trying to restore trade after the Vietnam War. The last but very, very import issue was POW/MIA; they were all related to the Vietnam War. Starting in the late-‘80s getting the first ever team to come in and start to do some of the exploratory work to see if they could find the remains. I knew that this had been going on for several years and I was just one of many ambassadors who were trying to keep it going and I did my best. When I was there the search evolved to having five teams of roughly fifty people on each team come in and spend a month in different areas. They had divided up Laos from north to south and they were systematically trying to explore all the reported MIAs and airplane crashes and then try to investigate them as best they could. New data would be turned up in various places about new prospects to look at. So even though you might have gone from north to south there might have been new information back in the north. And you didn’t have two years when you were looking for something so you wanted to go back. So this was the to and fro you had to do with the Lao government. Once again it was this feeling of the immensity of the Vietnam War that was just everywhere you went, it was just phenomenal.

One of the first things I did I asked the senior Lao leadership have you ever been to one of these excavation efforts. No, they had never been. So I wrote a letter to the defense minister and a letter to the deputy prime minister and a couple other and said, “Please come join us, let us take you and show you what we are doing and so forth.” You’ve got a country as poor as Laos and you get out into the rural areas and we are talking poor; this is really as poor as anyplace in Africa particularly up in the mountains along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and way up in the mountains; we are talking very, very remote areas here. W would come in with these teams of fifty American military personnel and anthropologists who were specialists in looking at this stuff. We would throw up a camp of 25 tents and they would have satellite TV and all the food in there. They would have a squadron of helicopters that we would hire that would fly people in and out to the sites because they are all very remote. An F-4 might have gone down somewhere on that side of a hill about fifteen kilometers on the other side of that mountain. So you form a little base camp and work out of that base camp and every morning a helicopter picks you up, drops you down at that site and you begin to clear the site and begin to look to see if you can find any remains there of people. It’s a very, very arduous and time-consuming and expensive process.
But watching us do what we were doing in this very, very poor country it was just like what do the Lao think of all of this? Twenty-five thirty-five years later we are still looking for remains of people from that war, spending this kind of money to come out there. We would hire the villagers because we needed a lot of village work for cleaning, clearing the area and then inevitably you are not finding things on the surface. You are finding things that got buried due from an airplane crash, which could be anywhere down six to eight feet underground if it were a big engine or something. You could find parts and see what might have happened and ultimately find remains of people, bones, teeth and that kind of stuff. You’d use the villagers to do all the digging and the shifting of water to see if you could find things. It was quite a process.

As ambassador I probably would go visit three or four times a year. I would visit different sites going on. At the embassy we didn’t have a defense attaché although they did get one a few years later. When I was there we had a unit assigned to the embassy headed up by a lieutenant colonel whose job was solely to plan for these four or five times a year visits of the POW/MIA investigation teams. They would come in from Hawaii and fly in to either Thailand or sometimes Vietnam and come in so that was their main responsibility. Then they would all go out in the field and I’d go out and visit them periodically.

We had twice yearly planning session with the Lao government that I would participate in with these teams with the joint task force for full accounting. People would come in and then we would sit down with the Lao government and we would work it out. Every time we would find remains we would repatriate those remains with a formal ceremony at an airport and I would participate with that. The Lao government would formally hand over the remains to me and I would hand them over to the military and then they would put them on either a C-17 or C-130 and fly them out with coffins; they were like baby coffins because the remains might have been two or three bones this size and that would really be it.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: But if they felt they had found enough to declare them as remains they would take them back to Hawaii and then analyze them through DNA or whatever to see if they could actually figure out who it might have been. Every now and then they would come up with bones and it would be chicken bones or something like that. So you had experts who knew all the stuff unbelievably well; these anthropologists were just remarkable.

We had one site I took the deputy prime minister to. At the bottom of what had been a rice field pond they had found a large jet engine. To me as a layman I would think it’s not that difficult. What kind of engine was it and they had quite a lot of data about the airplanes that crashed in the area. One of the experts said to me we need to find that engine. We can’t find any surface parts anymore. They’ve all been collected by villagers over the past two decades and sold as scrap metal so there is nothing really up here. But
that engine is impossible to get out unless you dig it out and no one is going to really do that, not these villagers. But if we can find any remains in the area we will know what airplane. I said, “Well it shouldn’t be all that difficult is it?” He said, “Well we think it’s an F-4 engine and within about five square kilometers four F-4s crashed during that period.”

Q: Good God.

HARTWICK: Four F-4s crashed. He said, “Yeah, imagine an F-4 crashing. They might be coming in about 250-300 miles an hour when it hits. So it sprayed all its parts all over and that engine is buried deep. We have to see which one it is because we would have lost four different crews, two each in the F-4, that’s eight people we would have lost. We can’t tell whose bone it is unless we get a sense of what airplane this engine was a part of. So we really have to dig it up as much as we can. If you find little bits and chards of aluminum this size of an airplane that crashed at 300 miles an hour you can’t identify what it is. You have to really find something that has some numbers on it.” It was really quite a science. Some of these places the crashes were just...you can imagine at the map all those high mountains, that is where the airplanes were crashing. They had been pursuing either foreign aircraft or dropping bombs and get shot down by SAM missiles.

I went with some of my embassy staff to an area of southern Laos. We drove there and walked into the bush where the trail was and there was this big mobile SAM missile sitting there. The tires are all flat, parts had been taken off. It’s been sitting there ever since the Vietnam War. That was what Laos was all about for the better part of three years it was just fascinating to do these things.

Q: What ever happened to Kong Le? I think he was an American-trained Laotian leader on our side that established his troops on the Plain of Jars.

HARTWICK: I don’t recall what happened to Kong Le toward the end. The political situation in Laos in the run up to the Vietnam War was somewhat complicated. You had the Pathet Lao Communists trying to be involved, trying to put pressure on the government to fall so that they could take over. Then you had the Rightist side of the Lao government that tended to support the king. They were all Rightists, they had more connections with the Rightists in Thailand and so forth. Then you had the neutralists and Kong Le was one of the Neutralists. The United States basically didn’t want the country to go Communist. We didn’t have that big a deal between the Neutralists and the Rightists either way, we just didn’t want it to be Communist. So we supported all political efforts to keep a coalition govern in effect that was neutral and that wouldn’t fall and Kong Le was part of all that but he was a bit of a cowboy. In the end, as the Vietnam War grew in intensity and the pressures by the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao grew on the Lao Royal government, a lot of those original divisions of neutral right, left and so forth disappeared. For a long time the government was actually a coalition government and the Pathet Lao held some of the ministries early on in the sixties. But as it got into the late-’60s all of that melted away because the Pathet Lao no longer wanted to participate in the government; they said it was a sham. Chris Chapman said our
embassy at the maximum time just around the time he arrived was about 800 Americans, including wives and children, in Laos. If you ever visit Laos to think we had 800 personnel and dependents there it’s unimaginable and to this day I’m still amazed. Between AID and the defense attaché’s office and the JUSMAG people and all the military stuff and all the CIA in up country is unbelievable. So Kong Le was part of that focal or history of the old coalition government that existed.

**Q:** Okay, today is the 24th of March 2010 with Doug Hartwick. Doug you were in Laos from when to when?

HARTWICK: I was in Laos from September 13, 1001 until approximately the first week of July 2004.

**Q:** 9/11 must have seemed to the Laotian officials something like the other side of the moon.

HARTWICK: They lived in their own world. The Lao government’s reaction was by and large quite sympathetic and quite supportive. From the first couple days I was there they were as supportive as one would want. I mean the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister came over to the embassy to sign the book, they had a supportive public statement. I ended up having a public ceremony in honor of the attacks and the people who lost their lives. Actually, the State Department sent out a small video clip so I presented that. I think I had five or six ministers come to the ambassador’s residence just to basically pay their respects on that occasion. So to me that was actually a good start.

**Q:** We will come to it later on but how stood communications with the Department you were really in the back of beyond.

HARTWICK: Well communications were fine. I think the level of active day-to-day interest was pretty modest in Laos and what you really have are certain pockets in the building that might be paying more attention at any given time than others. For example, human rights office, the religious freedom office, the human rights bureau of the freedom office; and then to the extent that I started making noises and pushes in certain areas that I wanted the Department to do more than you might get the bureau itself, EAP or other parts of the bureau, congressional affairs involved or whatever. I think they were perfectly happy to let me go off and do whatever I was going to do and they would react to it. Of course, I arrived on September 13 so the entire Washington environment was completely fixated on the post 9/11 problems and challenges and terrorism. Laos was not a part of that whole world with almost no Muslim, no Islamic connections. So they were really not a party to most of this.

**Q:** I was just thinking I go back to when President Kennedy early in his administration got on TV with a map of Laos and explained where it was because he and Harriman, he was, assistant secretary for Asian affairs. I mean Laos was the center of their whole attention in that whole area at that time.
HARTWICK: Well it really was the most vulnerable at the time in the domino theory. It was teetering all the time and it had been teetering since the mid-fifties so it was teetering back and forth. When President Kennedy takes over its still tittering and what are we going to do about it? The Commies are on one side, the Neutralists are kind of there, it’s a very weak government itself and we had to do something. That’s how Souvanna Puma who was the head of a coalition government ended up becoming a world known name of all things; it’s hard to imagine. When I was in Laos and reading the history of it it struck me as quite bizarre that it got so much attention considering how little it was and frankly it was even more out of the way then; this was back in the early sixties.

Q: Sure, yeah. When you were there were there any remnants or influence of the royal family at all?

HARTWICK: The Lao royal family; no not really. The king and the crown prince and the queen had all passed away in the eighties and there were members of the royal family still out and about particularly in Luang Prabang but they were running hotels or just known about. The Lao government when I was there in 2003-2004 had been in a bit of a crisis of confidence. There was a general malaise going on among the population. The leadership wasn’t very dynamic. I think they were feeling a bit uncertain about who they were and how people were supporting them and always worried their own legitimacy was perhaps in question. So what we stated to see was a resurgence of Lao political history and then attempts to link the current regime of Laos, the Pathet Lao government, all the way back to the original kings who got Lao nationalism going such as it was back in the 14th century. They tried to draw parallels and links all the way back to the empire, to the kingdom of Lan Xang and the original Fa Ngum, which was the leader. The whole thing was bizarre because it spent 20 years to destroy and stamp out the kingdom and the king including being responsible for his death and the crown prince’s death up in a concentration camp. So here later on now they are starting reestablishing links to Buddhism a bit, a senior Buddhist priest would come and bless their occasions for certain key meetings and public functions establishing these old connections. On the minds of all our government leaders was the intense adoration on the part of the Thai people for the Thai king. The Lao and the Thai are closely related people and they refer to one another as “peanon” which means relative; particularly the Lao as opposed to the mountain people in the back reaches of Laos. So mindful that the Thai had their king and had their deep affection for him on one level and the Pathet Lao with nothing, these old fogey politburo members whom people couldn’t really identify with, and weren’t particularly warm and fuzzy about, there was something missing and that was what was going on.

Q: When you got there what was your evaluation of the personalities and the government?

HARTWICK: The power structure of the government was aside from the power structure of the party. The party like in old Communist systems was apart from the government, but there were a lot of senior party people who ran the government and had minister positions. There were people in the party who in fact had no government positions or had other positions that were not necessarily at the upper levels of the hierarchy of the
government who were in the politburo so therefore by definition the top nine people of the government.

So I set about meeting all the government ministers. There was a certain effort by the government to make sure I concentrated on the government and that I not start messing around with others who are not part of the government because I, as a foreign diplomat, was supposed to deal with the government. But in the end I did my best to meet as many people as I could within the politburo and then the top level of the central committee. The political structure is such that you have a central committee of fifty and then you have the politburo which is on top of the central committee and it is very seniority hierarchal driven. So when they come out in terms of the publication of the party list you can see right on down as to what their pecking order is. So the top four or five in the central committee are very likely, if someone from the politburo drops out, they are going to be the ones moving up. That kind of rapid jump in movement happens but it is less common. So you have a pretty clear idea of who is out there.

Then my task was really whoever is out there how do I meet them if they are not directly in the government? Or is it worth trying to meet them or not? Are they going to be people who are amenable to a meeting with me. So I went through that exercise and that takes three or four months to go through a long list like that to see everybody.

My biggest challenge upon arrival was we had two Hmong-Americans who had disappeared in northern Thailand or northern Laos along the border of the Mekong River. The Hmong-American groups in the United States and members of Congress who listened to them in particular had agitated enough that they had created quite a fuss in the human rights bureau and on Capitol Hill that business as usual was not something we ought to be doing at that time because until the Lao government came clean about what they did with these two missing Hmong-Americans we shouldn’t be doing anything more with the Lao government. Of course that presumed that the Lao government did something with these two individuals and there was no proof that they did anything with these two individuals which was one of the initial things I had to start working on which was well what happened to these two guys? How do we know the Lao government did this and did that?” That one required me to work closely with my embassy in Bangkok, particularly with the FBI office, as well as figure out any other information I could get from wherever it might have come. That took me the better part of six months and it never really was something that got resolved; it was something I gradually built up enough information on understanding of what happened to begin to argue that it was very unclear what happened to these guys that if, in fact, one concludes they probably were killed, who killed them and how they died was quite unclear. And all the people they were hanging around with on the northern Thailand side were some pretty shady characters.

In the end I worked hard at that because until I wanted to do anything else in country I was always going to face that problem and as soon as I’d come up with I want to do this or that they would come back saying wait a minute what about the two missing Hmong-Americans what happened to them? You haven’t done this, you haven’t done that, we are
facing letters from the Hill; we are facing pressure from this group or that group so that ended up being a high priority when I first arrived.

Q: Did you have a permanent grouping of scam artists, bones salesmen, relic’s salesmen as part of the missing in action type concern?

HARTWICK: With respect to missing in action Americans?

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: No, not really. I think if those people existed it would have been prior to my arrival. You have to remember I’m arriving in 2001 late fall. We had a few people who came through that had been coming off and on for years. They were associated with the MIA effort. Some of them, I’m not going to call them crackpots, but some of them believed that they had quite certain information or knowledge that some people were still being held somewhere up in the mountains of either Vietnam or Laos on the border. These people, despite the U.S. government and other organizations being skeptical, they were self-charged to find these people and to liberate them. Some of them had been coming for five, six, eight, ten years almost; every other year they would get up enough money to be able to pay for themselves to get over there and then they would head off into the bush. I thought the last thing I needed was to get another American out into the jungles of Laos and disappear on me; God knows they were targets for various things and a lot of them by that time were in their sixties or seventies. But we ended up never having a problem and luckily they tended to stop by the embassy and I would always see them and talk to them. We tried to give them better information and then really question them about what were they really doing. They needed to be careful and know that people disappeared sometimes out in these parts. But I never really had a big problem with them.

Q: Speaking as sort of this connections businessmen, soldiers or CIA or whatever who married Lao girls and were going back either to see the families or trying to maintain that connection?

HARTWICK: You didn’t have that many people who actually had married Lao women that I was aware of back in those days; undoubtedly there must have been. We had an embassy the size of about 800 people so you can imagine there must have been some connections established and so forth. But that was not a major issue like you would have found in Thailand where you had a big American air base, lots of airmen and other military personnel who married and came back or married and never left and so forth. But we didn’t really have people like that in Laos and I think people who left Laos in those days most of them really never came back. If they did come back they didn’t necessarily come and bother the embassy nor were they a consular issue so that was good.

Lao refugees and the impact on the Hmong as a tribal group in Laos very important. We had 150 thousand Hmong immigrated to the United States as refugees over the period ’75-’90; that’s a big group of people all of them with a direct connection to Laos. They had strong issues and they were quite well connected politically. So it was important for
me to be able to speak authoritatively about the situation for the Hmong, the situation with the Lao government and how they treated the Hmong internally.

Q: Were you there for the tragic hunting incident with a Hmong man who killed six hunters? Do you remember that?

HARTWICK: That was in Wisconsin.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: No, I was already back by that time. I was back thank goodness but that was more of an American issue.

Q: It was an American issue but I was just wondering but it didn’t happen on your watch?

HARTWICK: The Hmong was one of the main issues I dealt quite a bit with. The Hmong tribal group make up about 300-350 thousand people in Laos out of 5 million plus. A large ethnic group. There were others as large, but the Hmong got an enormous amount of attention because that had been the tribal group that the CIA had drawn from for the old “secret army” during the Vietnam War. Many of these had emigrated to the United States as refugees. Several thousand, numbers unspecified, never left but never settled either. They were terrified or refused to subject themselves to the Communist government’s control when the Commies took over in late ’75 and ’76. Laos is a pretty rugged country and several thousands of those people in different groups just went into the mountains and refused to rejoin society. Now they were mountain people so to go back into the mountains doesn’t sound…well it sounds a little more dramatic than it really was, but the fact was they refused to put their arms down and surrender. So when I got there in 2001-2002 there had been books written about these Hmong groups in the mountains, a number of books in fact. There were still perhaps 3-5 thousand in two, three, four, five groups in parts of northern Laos in the mountains that were still resisting, still not willing to surrender. They were armed and living off the land, refusing to lay down their arms and return to a civilized peaceful way. Many, many, many of the American-Hmong in the United States had relatives in these groups and they had stayed in touch over the years. As a result of General Vang Pao and a lot of his lieutenants and other military people and followers who came from Laos to the United States in the late ’70s they had maintained contact with these groups up in the mountains. These groups in the mountains were people led by old guerrilla fighters anywhere from 40-45 to maybe 55. They had women and children and younger people that had grown up in the mountains. So the bands were several hundred different people in different groups and some of them we don’t even know how many but were pretty large. The Lao military was not very strong, not very effective. As long as these bands didn’t cause too many problems they would just leave them up there. They might try to coax them out or set traps for them here and there and maybe by attrition eliminate some of them. But in essence just contain the problem not try to dissolve it completely.
So after several months of my being there I realized that this was actually quite a problem and humanitarian wise was a terrible problem. It was a course of constant friction with the Hmong-American community and the Lao government. It never really finished. It was clear to me that we needed to keep working on that issue to the extent that we could. The Lao government’s position was these people don’t exist and if they exist they are only bandits; they are not a political force. By definition no one in a Communist country opposes the government; it’s a government of the people and the people support the government, end of story. So anyone who doesn’t support the government has got to have something wrong with them and in this case these people were bandits and criminals living up in the mountains.

So trying to have a dialogue with the government about them, even a quiet dialogue, was very difficult. They would have to then accept in this dialogue that these people who are bad bandits actually had traces all the way back to the Vietnam War and would expose a bit of a lie that these people are not supporting the government. So I really had trouble making traction in the beginning, but by keeping regular contact with Hmong-Americans about the problem I was sympathetic to the problem.

I had other groups. One was created while I was there called the fact finding commission. It was a small NGO put together with contributions probably by the Hmong-American community. It generated all kinds of information, some of it true, some not, most of it exaggerated about what was going on in Laos. It detailed alleged Lao government actions against these poor defenseless people who live in the mountains. They put this information around all over the net, they would send it to members of Congress and had a steady drumbeat going on. I couldn’t ignore all this because there were some traces of truth in there but it was going to be exaggerated. There may have been missing parts about whatever happened or they might have just omitted from the discussion. The whole idea was it would help raise money and push the idea among the Hmong population that there was persecution still going on; this led to many different incidents during my period.

A French and Belgium journalistic team sneaked in via Thailand and were joined by a Hmong-American pastor. The three of them made their way up into the mountains of the province of Luan Prabang and north of the city of Luan Prabang ostensibly to meet up with one of these bands, take photos and get the word out about what a difficult life they had and how this was as a result of the Communist government’s persecution of these groups. They sneaked in there and this was the second time as there had been a group earlier who had done it; an American Newsweek journalist had done some of this too and came up with some horrific pictures of what life in these camps was all about. You can imagine they were pretty bad; they really were living on mountain tops and spots with camouflage so you couldn’t be seen too easily but not living in a good way at all.

Anyway this other group who came sneaked up in the mountains and spent I guess a week or ten days with one of these groups. In their attempt to get back out they stumbled across a police or military patrol and the Hmong group tried to get them out. There was a fire fight, a couple people were shot, a Lao government policeman was killed and in the
end they captured the two Europeans and this guy, Naw Karl Mua, and a handful of other Hmong who had been part of that actual original group, were not Americans but had been part of that group and now they were captured. So we have a Belgium, a Frenchman and an American, the American is a Hmong-American but is as American as anyone else is with an American passport, now being captured for one violation to their visa and two being associated with the murder of a Lao policeman. This is not a good situation. I had been saying to the government people all along you’ve got to be doing more. You won’t let me help you, but you ought to be doing more to get these people out. Anyway it ended up being quite a scene. We had the international press coming in because of these two journalists. They were publicizing the terrible situation of these Hmong groups in the mountains, there were photos already being bandied about how difficult the conditions were. They were being held up in Xiangkhoang at this district prison or police place and eventually they were brought back down to Vientiane. The Belgium ambassador was based in Bangkok, the French ambassador and myself in Vientiane and we started putting our heads together to figure out what we were going to do. In the end it was about a three month period. Members of Congress particularly from Minnesota where this Hmong-American was from, members of Congress started writing letters and starting getting all upset. The State Department started getting agitated and everyone was getting agitated. The Lao government announced basically they were going to have a trial. You can imagine this is a Communist country and there was going to be a trial. And how was this going to go down.

Q: Like the thirties in a nutshell.

HARTWICK: So I said to the French ambassador, “I’m going to go up. The trial is going to be taking place in June, I’m going to go up. I don’t know what your intentions are but you may want to come with me.” He said, “Yes, I’m going to come too.” He contacted the Belgian ambassador who came up from Bangkok and the three of us all went up to Xiangkhoang Kwan in this little district place. Xiangkhoang was basically the province in the central part of Laos. Xiangkhoang is really right up in the middle of the plateau area. It had been the scene where all during the Vietnam War some of the worse ground fighting had taken place between the CIA army, mostly Hmong, the Royal Lao army again with the Hmong being the major part of it, against North Vietnamese regulars that were coming down on a regular basis during the dry season from North Vietnam across the mountains into that plain area.

Q: Is that the Plain of Jars?

HARTWICK: The Plain of Jars stands in other areas that were being fought but that’s the Plain of Jars so in fact many jars on that plain were destroyed during the war although many were protected and bombing efforts against the military were done mindful of don’t hit those jars; mind you these jars you could put yourself in it and stand another half of a person in too, they are big and beautiful.

Q: What were they designed for do you know?
HARTWICK: They are associated with burials but they have only general theories or hypotheses. They never found any jars with bodies in them or anything like that but that was generally the view. They are somewhere in the area of 2,000 years old.

Q: During the height of the war it depended on the rainy season and dry season when you would have battles.

HARTWICK: Absolutely. So the Vietnamese would advance in the dry season and their lines of supplies and so forth could be extended on down and they could supply. They were confronted by those Royal Lao army/Hmong army and by the U.S. air force or the clandestine air force. There were no U.S. markings but, in fact, were flying Lao pilots and American pilots flying out from certain bases some of them in Thailand. Then some of the Ford observer airplanes were flying out of a little airstrip up there where Vang Pao lived with his military people up in the northern part about a four hour drive north of Vientiane. Those battles took place basically over the winter period. The rainy season which really began in May-June through September-October got so bogged down that the enemies would withdraw and then the Hmong and the Lao government would reclaim that area; that happened about four or five seasons in a row. You can imagine that’s where unexploded ordinance is everywhere. That’s where Karl Mua and the two European journalists were being tried and the trial itself was quite an experience.

In this court room we had all local Lao government officials, we had a three-judge panel, we had a prosecutor and all of this was done in Lao. Now out of just about everyone there my political officer spoke by far the best, I spoke okay Lao enough to follow what was going on. Then we had the French ambassador and Belgian ambassador and their consular people and we didn’t have a clue what was going on. It was a little hard to translate because we were in a court room where you are not supposed to be whispering all the time. Of course the people on trial, Karl Mua and the two Europeans, didn’t really speak Lao. Clearly the two Europeans didn’t speak any Lao. Karl Mua spoke Hmong; I don’t really think he spoke any Lao either. It was the rainy season so it was foggy and chilly and rainy and muddy and so forth and we went up there for three days for this trial.

Anyway when the judges finished they retired to consult with one another about whether these guys were guilty or not. They reemerged with a ten-page typed verdict in less than an hour; it was like it was already done, what an amazing thing. The international press was there and I was doing my best thinking how are we going to get through all of this. I’ve got to get Karl Mua out; I mean with all due respect he’s as guilty as you can get in terms of getting back in there and getting involved in something he shouldn’t have been involved in. I mean it’s easy for me to say but as an American citizen he clearly put himself at risk getting involved in all of this. They had broken the terms of their visa. Then the issue was were they really involved in the murder of this policeman or not; no one could really substantiate that one way or the other but clearly the policeman was killed and they got captured. The bottom line was I didn’t care about whether they were guilty or not. All I wanted was to get Karl Mua the hell out of town, out of the country the same with the French and the Belgian so we all had a common interest. So they were found guilty. I think one of the journalists was condemned for twenty years and the other
for something bizarre like sixteen years and we couldn’t figure out why one was different than the other. Karl Mua got a fifteen year sentence or something. Not many foreigners are going to survive very easily a fifteen year sentence in a Lao jail. You can survive but you would never be the same that’s for sure.

So then I went back to Vientiane and the whole issue became how we get these people out. To all the people that I knew in government as high level as I could I said, “Look, you don’t need this headache, we don’t need this headache, we need to get this resolved. You’ve now had your trial, you’ve found him guilty, you can show yourselves to be benevolent in all these circumstances. So just fine him or do something and throw all three of them out.” The French were working their traps the same way. We all had different contacts and in the end that’s what happened. All of a sudden I got a call after two or three days and all of a sudden they asked me to come down to the foreign ministry. They wanted me to know that the central committee or the politburo decided that they should be deported from Laos and never be allowed to return again. I was like oh, my God, thank God. I had gone to visit them in prison and my officers had been going to see them and so forth. It was just an example of how for bilateral relations, so many years after the war an issue like sensitivity of the Hmong and Hmong refugees in this country remain still very alive and very troublesome.

Q: Well you know when I was consul general in Saigon in the sixties we would have our people basically criminals or black marketers or something, but they had broken the law, would get in jail and then they would offer a fairly stiff sentence and then they would appear at the embassy and say they were let out but we don’t have a passport and were told to report back at such and such a time. We would give them a passport and arrange for them to work their way out on American cargo ships and they would disappear. We would say be sure to come back and they’d say yes. I mean in a way we were all sort of profiting from this not overly legalistic approach I mean at a certain point it’s not practical to keep a foreigner in your jail they’re a pain in the ass for the jailers.

HARTWICK: Well, that’s true. I told the Lao whether they accepted these Hmong as bandits or people who had never gotten over the Vietnam War and were internal refugees in their own country, it played very, very badly in the international press. The international press and the Hmong groups themselves made it very easy to have the Lao government look like they were humanitarian monsters. Just the pictures alone, not so much that the Lao government was doing things to them, but just the pictures of the camps alone. And sometimes after a skirmish you might have wounded people with no medical treatment or children that might have been hit by a mortar or tripped across a mine somewhere. My God you had some really horrific things and these photos were out there. I said, “You all need to resolve this and we the Americans are prepared to work with you as much as we can but you’ve got to want to get this thing resolved you know.” Even after this whole episode happened the government went back to its same line that these people don’t exist they are just bandits up there. It was an interesting test of one’s ability to try to work through a government that basically refused to acknowledge something even though everybody knew, including all of them, that these groups of people were up there. No matter who I talked to in the senior levels of government,
particularly at the foreign ministry, they would just deny that these people existed; it was very, very frustrating.

From then on I made an effort when I went up country to speak to provincial officials; now some of those provincial officials were on the central committee of the party and some of them weren’t but they were all out of Vientiane; by definition they were out of the provinces. My political officer and I were able to make a lot more headway and get more information about what was going on. We were able to determine there was a Lao government policy to try to encourage these people to come down in their own ham headed way. That if they did come down out of the mountains that they would be given housing, they would be given pots and pans, very basic stuff. Then they’d be resettled in other places in areas away from where those bands were. The Lao government and the provincial officials didn’t want these people who came down from the mountains be advanced picket guards for the people back in the mountains to cause trouble later on. But basically we at the embassy were actually able to establish there was an active Lao government policy trying to get these people to come down. One of their frustrations was people in the forests themselves the leadership, in these various bands, would actively discourage anyone from leaving. They didn’t want their bands to get smaller as that was less clout for them, and there was genuine fear that if they came down from the mountains they would actually perhaps be arrested, possibly even be killed and so forth. But I was able to determine that while there may have been cases of abuse of people coming down from the mountains in the most part there was a government policy that they would not acknowledge and they’d actually try to help these people resettle.

We had one case in 2002. The main road from Vientiane heads almost due north. As you head up into that area you get pretty quickly into the mountains and then the road splits and goes up and continues east up in that area. In 2002 there had been an incident where a bus was stopped by a group of bandits and they basically machine gunned and people were killed on it; they got on the thing and they just started shooting like mad and a couple dozen people were killed, women and children and students. There were two Swiss bicyclists who were doing a bicycle tour through Laos and were right nearby when it happened and they were shot off their bikes and killed. When I arrived in 2001 I was told that traveling on parts of that road were still considered to be too dangerous because of the possibility of guerilla attacks and here was an example from 2002 of what happened. So these were real concerns on the part of the Lao government that these problems put people at real risk. After 2003 and the beginning of 2004 those incidents dropped off a lot. We were encouraged by a report that something like 700 people had come down in one area and had basically surrendered, gave themselves into Lao authorities; 700, that’s a lot of people.

Q: 700. Well did we have...

HARTWICK: It was a big humanitarian issue, what do you do with 700 people in the middle of the mountains? I mean to do it well. So the UN was aware of it, I went to the UN to try and make sure they were involved.
Q: Well we were trying to persuade the Lao government to do this? Did you have any sweeteners that we could put in? Something that we could supply or do something?

HARTWICK: I never got to the stage of having to promise a certain amount. First of all I didn’t want to start promising money I didn’t have. I promised a massive amount of assistance would be forthcoming if, in fact, they started to send signals that they wanted to work with us on this. The problem was I said the Lao government never wanted formally to acknowledge anything. So it made it very difficult for me to go back to Washington and start looking for assistance, which I could have found, when I got the Lao government continuing to deny anything; denying that these Hmong even exist; so it made it much more difficult. I met with the UN high commission for refugees and tried to interest them. There were other groups that were interested but the Lao government just reacted very negative like Amnesty International; they had been associated with lots of very harsh criticism over the decade before and they wanted nothing to do with some of these groups. By the time 2004 summer came the issue was still alive but I felt that there was progress underway. Even though it wasn’t getting a lot of public attention, international attention, the Lao government was finally beginning to act. The message is going from the United States Hmong community, whoever they were, and money and support from some of the groups had reduced down just to a trickle and people were beginning to come out. This is 35 years after the war. That’s a long time afterwards and it was just really tragic.

Q: Well did the Vietnam government play any role in this or the Thai government in this situation as far as helping?

HARTWICK: Not appreciable if at all. I mean I met with the Vietnam ambassador several times trying to urge him to be supportive. You’ve got to remember the Hmong and the Vietnamese had no love lost because the Hmong, among other groups, were part of the Mountain Guards who were opposed to the Vietnamese government. A lot of the Hmong population had resided over the decades in areas not far from the Vietnamese border. Those are tough mountains up there and you have Hmong groups that are on both sides that actually go back and forth. Some of the most sensitive areas of Laos are way up north close to the North Vietnamese border, which is all Hmong area. So with Vietnam’s own problem with the Hmong, and Laos’ problem with the Hmong, there was actually more reason for the two governments to work more closely together and certainly not with the Americans; so that never really went anywhere. I don’t think they were actively encouraging the Lao to do anything but there were reports unverified that the Vietnamese military had sent in squads of some special forces to try to chase down some of these groups. We could never substantiate this stuff. If it did happen there certainly was not a lot of evidence that much came out of it. There were Vietnamese groups in there looking for their own MIAs and remains of people particularly along the Xiangkhoang, Plain of Jars area, where undoubtedly thousands of Vietnamese troops in the course of four or five years died there.

Q: We had B52 blanket bombings of that area too.
HARTWICK: The amount of our ordinance dropped up there was just beyond belief let alone mortars and artillery shells and those kinds of light arms, whereas the Ho Chi Minh Trail received an awful lot of bombing but didn’t have much fighting on the ground during the better part of eight years. Anyway, dealing well with the Hmong people is important. The Hmong-American community in the United States had links to several members of Congress, in California, Minnesota, Wisconsin for example. If they were not supportive of some of the things that I wanted to do then they very much could be in strong opposition if they were listening to some of the most vociferous conservative Hmong-American groups. So things like normal trade relations I wanted to get done if I didn’t have the support of certain members of Congress that I had active opposition on I didn’t go anywhere. So it became very clear to me from a humanitarian standpoint, a consular standpoint and then just linking back to American communities that it was very important to work on these issues.

Unexploded ordinance was one of the four main areas I worked on on a very regular basis that were directly related to the Vietnam War; the Hmong and Hmong refugees was the first one. These are not necessary order of priority but unexploded ordinance was the second, third POW/MIA issues and what needed to be done there, and last but not least reestablishing normal trade relationships between the United States and Laos.

On unexploded ordinance Laos had the dubious distinction of being a heavily bombed country. We bombed Laos, particularly the Ho Chi Minh Trail, for almost eight years. You can imagine how much ordinance was dropped. So the consequence of that was an enormous amount of ordinance all over the ground from the north all the way down to the south. A couple of major passes way up in the northern part allowed them to come across the mountain chain in the Annamite mountains and then down the Lao side. The mountain chain separating Vietnam and Laos is very rugged, a lot of limestone coarse kinds of mountains, very tough to traverse and basically it separated, over the millennia, Vietnam from the plains people and the Lao people or the mountain people of Laos or Vietnam, which basically meant very different cultures, very different populations. But that natural barrier was a logical thing if you want to create a highway to shove goods and troops and everything else down and out of the war zone area. You come across those mountains and you go down through the jungles of Laos on a fairly flat plain area so that’s what kicked off in ’62, ’63, ’64 to start resupplying. The Vietnamese would bring goods, material and soldiers across down Laos and come into the northern central part of South Vietnam and then they would continue on due south down through Cambodia and then into the delta of South Vietnam. In its heyday it was enormous. We called it the Ho Chi Minh Trail but it wasn’t a trail. It was really a series of dirt and in some cases paved areas that were five, ten, twelve different lanes spread all the way across the jungle on the Lao side going down. So at any given time you could bomb three or four of them and knock them out of commission but maybe three, four or five of them were still operating. Most of the material went down at night and it was just like an ants nest of activity all going on down, a phenomenal effort. It would have been impossible for the Vietnamese to run a war effort in the southern part of Vietnam without it. It would have been totally impossible.
Q: By the time you got there they had withdrawn the whole Vietnamese infrastructure, it was gone I assume.

HARTWICK: All you had when I was there was the remnants of what used to be and in most cases the jungle has reclaimed most of these areas. One could go up and wander into the areas that had clear evidence of the Ho Chi Minh Trail or different parts of the trail were there. But it was also pretty dangerous from an unexploded ordinance standpoint; they had dropped so many bombs, antipersonnel bombs, massive heavy 500 pound bombs, 200 pound bombs all kinds of things so you just didn’t wander in those areas. It was pretty tricky. Once I was up there looking at a mining area that was being done by the Australians. We went off into a little village and there in the village was just a two or three month accumulation of scrap metal that people had come and thrown it and then they would sell it to scrap dealers. I have all this stuff at home like North Vietnamese helmets and weapons. It was just everywhere. But what I really meant was that it was a humanitarian crisis when it came to unexploded ordinance in Laos.

One of my foreign service national employees, Suvano, had grown up in the north in a little town called Xam Neua which was really where during the Vietnam War period the Pathet Lao leadership resided; they considered that their headquarters. Suvano was a young man so he wasn’t around at that time but he was born about 1980 or 1975, he can recall running out with his friends and finding these little bommbies and collecting them. They’d throw them back and forth and all kinds of things. He said he remembers them very clearly all around the school areas. They were in the bushes and stuff; so that cleanup effort was underway. I wanted to have the United States help do more on that. We had done things episodically over the years but U.S. policy is such that just because we dropped it didn’t mean it was our problem once it fell; it was their or others problem to clean it up; the U.S. policy was we would help out but we are not taking any responsibility.

Luckily the information from the Vietnam War period about bombing runs and where bombing attacks took place was very, very extensive and as a result of that it helped facilitate understanding what kind of armaments are where and identifying ones. A lot of these things were very rusty and old and you had Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and American stuff all over this area. So I tried to encourage the United States to help more and get more money for that and be supportive. The unexploded ordinance office is called UXO Lao. I would have thought that the Lao government would have been really seized with this issue even though it was thirty years after the war. The truth was it didn’t pay much attention to it at all. There was just not much interest and that was a problem in the rural areas and they just didn’t worry about it very much anymore. I never did very much with the Lao government when it came to that and if anything the Lao government saw this maybe as an opportunity to get more money. They didn’t pay a lot of attention to the delivery system of whether this money was actually getting to anyone helping out. Several different NGOs were involved but not American NGOs to speak of. So the group that ultimately took charge of all of this at partly my encouragement although they wanted to do it as well was UNDP, United Nations Development Program. A Dane came in and took over and he was quite passionate with the issue and he wanted to do more so
he and I worked together and they got more money and a more systematic effort to support some of the activities underway. I visited a scrap yard. It’s just unbelievable, this is 2003-2004. The war finished in ’75 and the battle up in those parts finished in ’73 so all these years later they are still pulling these things out of the ground and selling them.

Laos was so poor that when you have big chunks of metal let alone big chunks of metal that might have an explosive in it that if you could get that explosive out and sell it that would be worth a lot of money. So it was a cottage industry throughout areas of Laos that had never been bombed to go out with little ten or fifteen dollar metal detectors and find where this metal was in the ground, in the forest or wherever it was. Then they would collect it and bring it back and sell it to Vietnamese traders who would come by and buy all the scrap metal. That’s where a lot of the damage happened when I was there of people being blown up as they were often tinkering with a 200 or 500 pound bomb to see if they could get the explosive out of it; take the fuse off, unscrew it, pull it out and if it went boom it went boom. Villagers when they found a big heavy piece of metal they didn’t really want to just give it over to the government they wanted to sell it themselves.

Q: Did our air force show any particular interest in this?

HARTWICK: No not particularly. You asked me about people who might have come back after the war and a number of people came back after the war people who had fought in Laos in particular. Remember we never had any formal military personnel in Laos. I mean formerly the only military people were attached to the embassy and they were part of the defense attaché’s office, they were never ground troops. Even though we did have people who were basically military people paid and assigned to Laos to help out with the war effort they were never running around in uniform and they were actually, if you will, decommissioned to be made civilians and then recommissioned and brought back in the military later on if they wanted to go back in but we never really had military people there. We ended up having people who came through that were part of the famous group referred to as the Ravens. The Ravens were a group of air force pilots trained in Vietnam and had flown missions in Vietnam, mostly advanced foreign observer missions. This involved the capability of knowing what’s going on on the ground and being able to direct either air support for fighting on the ground or air support in terms of just bombing for targets; much of that was done, particularly if there were activities going on on the ground by Foreign Areas Observers, FAOs they called them. Because of the big war effort in Vietnam there were a lot of FAOs fighting in operations in South Vietnam. Then they created a program inviting FAOs, particularly those with a fair amount of experience, with a financial incentive and other kinds of incentives to come to Laos. They would be part of an FAO activity in north central Laos. There they could help support the Royal Lao army and a CIA Hmong army to fight the north Vietnamese. Those people were not allowed to be based in Vientiane. They were not technically military, but they were sneaked in and formed up in this base in north central Laos which is where Vang Pao’s headquarters was. Vang Po was a two-star Hmong general in the Royal Lao army but also the head of the all the Hmong. So those groups of Foreign Area Observers flew pretty slow aircraft that could get very low and were very maneuverable so that they could see on the ground what was going on. They were not used so much for bombing;
they were used mostly just to observe what was going on. Then they would call on the radio and bring in air strikes from airport bases in northern Thailand. There were three or four air force bases in northeastern Thailand which were used by the U.S. air force in a very significant manner for B-52s. The B-52s would take off from Guam, fly across to bomb North Vietnam, land in Thailand, turn around, resupply and fly back. Then you had fighters based in Thailand that would fly missions across to South Vietnam and missions across over Laos firing on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and then in close ground support for troops fighting in northern Laos. All of that was in contradiction to U.S. international commitments because we had agreed in ’62 that Laos would remain neutral. So it was always very hush hush; that was against international law.

The Vietnamese were a party to the 1962 agreements too and they had thousands and thousands of North Vietnamese troops in Laos both using the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in fighting up in northern Laos against those same armed groups. So our justification for doing it was the North Vietnamese was clearly in gross violation of their commitments but we were too. So there was this whole game that played out for many, many years that we were never there in any kind of military way but in fact we were supporting them like mad, the Lao government against the North Vietnamese. The bizarre thing was the Lao government itself was a coalition government that was made up of rightists, neutralists and the Pathet Lao all during the war. So you had a fight going on where the government itself was a coalition government including some Communist ministers of the Pathet Lao. And the Pathet Lao were back there out in the bush joining with the North Vietnamese fighting the military forces of that same Lao government.

But those Ravens, the American pilots, lots of books have been written about them. It was such dangerous work that approximately fifty percent of the Ravens who ever came to Laos never left, they died there. If you go up to northern Laos it is very mountainous. The weather was frequently very foggy, mountainous and rainy and they are flying slow moving, not high altitude aircraft in very challenging conditions. There was no real easy place to land. If you ran out of gas or something happened and you crashed they would never find you. So a lot of people lost their lives, a lot of these Ravens. They were real hot-shot cowboy pilots because they knew it was risky and they went up there and lived a pretty crazy life doing all this kind of stuff during the war. Some of them came back when I was there and some of them had just come back for the first time and in some cases they didn’t want to tell the Lao government who they were, but they wanted to go visit where they used to live but that was still considered to be an off-limits area.

I worked on POW/MIA, which links to the Ravens. We had gotten the Lao government in about 1986-88 to agree to allow American military forensics teams to come in and start looking for missing remains. Missing remains were probably somewhere in the area of between 450-500 Americans who had gone missing over Laos that we had never been able to find their remains and there were 2,000-2,500 in Vietnam but in Laos we didn’t have that many. We had that many when you consider we never even theoretically fought there because of all the bombing going on and airplanes being shot down. So that effort was very much underway when I got there in 2001. So the issue from my standpoint was how do I continue to facilitate it and if the U.S. defense department wanted to expand the
program so we could make faster progress we should be able to do so. The Lao government was always mindful that it didn’t want to go too fast. They wanted more money for their cooperation if they could get it and they didn’t want to disturb things out in the provinces very much; they always warned me that the villagers were still angry after all the years of the war but if you out in the villages there wasn’t an angry person you could ever find; they were so eager to help because they all got paid for doing it. This was like part of the old days. You couldn’t find very many people who were around during the Vietnam War days anyway. They had all pretty much gotten old or died. But I made every effort to get as much support as I could. One of the first things I did was I invited the Lao deputy prime minister and foreign minister and the defense minister, and I tried to get the prime minister but it never worked out, to come out to one of our sites. When I asked all these ministers if you’d ever seen what we do they all said, “No, we’d never been.”; so I wanted to get them to be more a part of it.

When I was there we had five visits of search teams a year. There was a whole protocol to follow from north to south that had been negotiated in the previous ten years before I was there of how the United States and Laos would cooperate. By the time I got there they were working in the lower half of Laos. Along with looking for missing remains information was being gathered all over the place, but in particular Vietnam, about where were those possible remains located, what airplanes had been shot down, when, who would know where they might have gone down. So you might have started looking up in the north at confirmed places where people had been shot down. Then a year later you get new information that actually we had looked in the wrong place and we couldn’t find it; it was actually just a half a kilometer somewhere else. So that effort was underway.

One of the areas up north that the Lao government agreed to allow our people to go to was a mountain top called Pupate. In 1967 we sent in a special radar team to set up a highly classified, newly capable radar system that would send a signal beacon for direction from that same northern part of Laos. It was a newly capable item. They tried to set it up as close as they could to the Vietnamese border. Mind you this was in an area pretty much in the Pathet Lao area. The Royal government didn’t really control things up there so we had to put the installation in a place remote enough that it was very difficult for any adversary to sneak up and get you including the North Vietnamese. It had to be close enough to that border to send a signal. That signal beacon was set up in November of ’67 to start sending out a directional beacon that the B52s coming in to bomb North Vietnam could pick up on and come in right over Hanoi and then drop their bombs on Hanoi. Otherwise there were so many clouds and bad weather that they couldn’t even see where Hanoi was. It wasn’t like today when you have a GPS and you know where everything is; they didn’t even know where it was so they would drop bombs and miss all the time and they really didn’t want to do that. One it was less effective and two you would kill a lot of people that didn’t make any sense.

This radar installation went operational in November of ’67 and stayed operational for about five months. It was supplied basically out of Vientiane, out of Thailand and elsewhere but in particular southern Laos by American personnel with airdrops coming in. They would come in and drop stuff for them to supply them. It was so classified and
so new that they had to have only American personnel running the radar itself. They had something like twelve or fifteen Americans up there. They had a lot of observation going on around that area to make sure that they weren’t sneaked up on and attacked. The Vietnamese could tell pretty clearly that all of a sudden the bombs going over Hanoi started to become much more accurate. They smelled a rat. They figured something was going on. They concluded that among other things that there was this thing up in Laos that had been built by the Americans up in the middle of the mountains. They hadn’t been able to get to it but it was involved somehow in this. So they started to do what they could to see if they couldn’t somehow capture it and they started building roads there; there are no roads in this area this is an unbelievably remote area. So our reconnaissance aircraft would go up there and they would start monitoring every other day or so what was going on. A Vietnamese logistical battalion started to build a road all the way into Pupate.

As the story goes, in the end they knew it was a matter of days before they were probably going to be attacked and have to shut it all down. One night they saw that the Vietnamese military was below the mountain but in the front and to the east of where the mountain was. The backside of the mountain was the better part of a 2,000 foot sheer drop cliff. You couldn’t get attacked very easily from the back so they thought the attack was going to come from the front. So all eyes were on the front and as often happens in military deception all eyes were in the front and guess what happened, the Vietnamese came up the back. They sent a special operations team called “sappers” to come up the back of the mountain. They overwhelmed the American operation. Most of the defenses, which were done by Hmong soldiers, were all in the front and in position somewhere away from where the secured installation was because the Americans didn’t want anyone around the installation. The Vietnamese came up, attacked it, four of the Americans got away, eleven of them were killed and they were MIAs. We never got their bodies back.

In 2003 early 2004 I had a chance to go up there, brought in some Lao officials and we all went up there. The Americans began a new check about what happened to the remains because they had gotten new information, found and interviewed people in Vietnam, a couple of the very guys who did the attacks when they were in their twenties and they remembered what they did with the bodies. We learned that these North Vietnamese special commando people, after they killed the Americans, we bombed the place to smithereens once we realized it was overrun. The United States was terrified that they were going to capture the radar and it was highly classified so we just completely leveled the entire place. For the longest time we figured all the bodies must have been lost as a result of all of that but when they found these two Vietnamese guys they basically said, “We killed the guys and we threw their bodies off that cliff.” So while I was there we brought in mountain climbing specialists to repel down this cliff and the different little ledges. At the bottom they found American life support equipment for people who had been killed. But the Lao didn’t want to allow us to do any more than renegotiate an amount of time and we ran out of time on that search to find any remains. So we had to stop operations and they were going to come back in a year or two and the Lao gave them permission to come back again.
There is a book written about it by Tim Castle called One Day Too Long. It’s called One Day Too Long because the plan was to evacuate all the people in that facility probably the next day because it was getting too hot and clearly the Vietnamese military was getting closer and closer so the day too long was that they waited just one more day. Part of the reason they waited one more day was that the air force still wanted them to stay there because it was so important in terms of directing the B52 bombing attacks. The American Ambassador, Bill Sullivan at the time, said he authorized them getting them out of there over the objection of the air force but he said this is going to go down wrong. We aren’t supposed to have Americans up there and we are running a big risk. Well no one really knew about that but all the people who were killed up there were up there.

Q: A bit like the operation in 1763 in Quebec in the Plains of Abraham when Wolf came up the cliff.

HARTWICK: Yeah, exactly right, sneaked up the backside and caught them all napping.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: Why? Because supposedly no one could come up that backside, it was too hard, that’s exactly what happened there. To this day they still don’t quite know how the Vietnamese managed to do that but again that was all area controlled by the Pathet Lao and it was very effective. So that radar installation really only lasted about five months despite all that effort, but when it was working it worked very well. Anyway that book is a fascinating account of all that ended up happening.

The National League of POW/MIA Families was a group that I worked with closely as a result of POW/MIA issues. They were supportive of me and my efforts when I was trying to become an ambassador and I had my challenges with the hold against me by Senator Bob Smith but I worked closely with them. Anne Mules Griffith was the head of it at the time and I worked closely with her throughout that whole period. They came out and they worked closely with the Lao government. They loved the Lao government, they thought the Lao government was doing great things helping find missing remains, but the case of the radar installation in Castle’s book spends a lot of time on the difficulties the families had trying to find out what in heck happened to their loved ones through the American defense department. They got all kinds of not direct information at all because it was still so classified and it became a real cause célèbre; they had to really do a lot of fighting and bitter, bitter feelings.

Q: I ran across a little note that during the Korean War we were sending planes that penetrated Chinese radar and we weren’t supposed to be doing that but we did that and some of these planes were shot down. The families were kept in the dark about where their loved ones were.

HARTWICK: That is exactly the same story, exactly the same story, and it caused a lot of deep bitterness over the decades really. So you can imagine Anne Mules Griffith, I think she lost her brother, she was president of the organization and this was 2001-2004.
All these years later she was still very active and trying to keep the pressure on DOD to keep up the good fight and find missing remains and so forth.

Another incident that concerned two missing travelers outside of Savannakhet in the lower part of Laos who had gone missing in about 1972. One of them was the brother of Howard Dean who at the time was the governor of Vermont and then later on became a presidential candidate. Howard Dean actually came out to Laos. I was in the U.S. at the time. There had been an effort to find the remains of among others his brother and an Australian. This Australian, a journalist, and Howard Dean’s brother had been touring in that area; now what the hell were you doing in 1972 being a tourist in southern Laos? I don’t know what they were doing but they were not part of the military, they were just out there. They got captured by the Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao, handed over to the Vietnamese. The routine generally was whenever there was anyone captured, usually military personnel, but in this case a couple of civilians, the Pathet Lao just handed them over to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese took them back to Vietnam or took them up into northern Laos. Well, in this case, the reports that the joint task force accounting people had been able to get through talking to witnesses was that these two people who had been captured or had been detained were kept in southern Laos for a few weeks. Then as a result of an attack or withdrawal under fire or whatever it was the Vietnamese just basically killed them and threw them into a shallow grave and left.

I visited this one site in southern Laos. We had been there three times before looking for the remains based upon information that they had gathered talking to witnesses of where they thought they had been buried. This was the fourth time and they had new information. You can imagine how time exhausting this is and how much money it takes and effort because basically they are doing anthropological things which is what they really are; they are searching for something that has been missing for 30-35 years in jungle and in the ground. They might as well be artifacts from an archeological dig. They hired each one of these POW/MIA search teams and during my time we had gotten the teams up to being about fifty total people, five groups of ten. Each group of ten would be headed by an anthropologist, basically a forensic anthropologist would lead the effort, not a military guy but a man or woman trained in forensic anthropology to be able to look and find details or traces of things through anthropological search techniques. Anyway in this one area they ended up finally uncovering the shallow grave of these two guys. Basically the Australian and the American were dumped in the grave with their clothes still on head to toe of one another. They both had their clothes on and their bones had all intermingled as you can imagine; there were no more remains left other than their bones and their clothing, but Howard Dean was actually able to identify the shirt that his brother was wearing and they were able to take DNA analysis and confirm beyond a questionable doubt that that was, in fact, his brother that was discovered. The remains were sent back.

We had something like 25-27 remains sent back during my three years and all that work continues on today; it’s a big effort. I worked closely with the commander of the joint task force accounting people and really enjoyed the kind of work they were doing and being supportive. They were very well behaved and they worked under terrible conditions; they basically would go out to a base of operations somewhere out in the field
of Laos and set up out there. For those four weeks that they were there they would hire a bunch of helicopters which turned out to be from a New Zealand company. They were ferried out to their dig sites every day and brought to this little base camp back and forth and back and forth all day with no days off or anything, just work, work, work, work. They would get those 30 days of work done and then they would close up, button up everything and go back to the United States or go off to Hawaii where they are based.

Now the last area I will talk about with regard to things related to the Vietnam War era was the absence of trade relations with Laos. We had suspended our trade relations or had taken Laos off the most favored nation list of trading countries with us I believe it was late 1975 and we did the same with Vietnam. By the time I got there in 2001 the only countries still on this crazy list were only the worst countries we have the worst relations with: Cuba, North Korea, Albania was on it for a while and then here was little Laos. Well Laos was really an anomaly, it was a throwback to the Vietnam War time and it no longer fit on this list. I learned before I went out, in fact, there had been a review of USTR about trade priorities. Someone had included restoring most favored nation relations status to Laos. There was a list of twelve priorities for the Bush administration and number twelve was reestablish trade relations with Laos. Bob Zoellick, who was USTR at the time, supposedly said, what the heck is this on there? Well that’s just one of the things that needs to get worked on and what needs to get finished. One of these outstanding things we need to do. So Zoellick didn’t really dispute it but he just left it there but no one did very much about it.

When I got to Laos in 2001 I learned about that and realized that reestablishing trade relations would end a major element of Laos’ isolation certainly from the United States and even Lao isolation from the world. The Lao government wanted trade relations with the United States. We’d already done it with Vietnam, we’d already done it with Cambodia. It would be very important for Laos economically and it would start making Laos part of the real world. It would demand lots of changes on the part of Laos to behave in a more internationally acceptable way. Anyway, I didn’t need much convincing. Being an economic guy my whole career I thought this made sense and so I set out to make this happen. I benefited by the fact that it was on this USTR list of things that were considered to be done. Getting members of Congress to line up in a way that wouldn’t either oppose it or actually support it was going to be an important challenge something I had to take on. Did Washington interfere very much or did they want to tell me what to do? The answer was no, but when it came to normal relations with Laos I realized, when I called on the Department, that it really couldn’t be bothered with worrying about normal trade relations with Laos. I mean who really cares. I went back to EB and they said, we will be supportive but what do you want us to do? I said, “Well this is something that the Secretary of State along with maybe USTR ultimately can take a position on.” “Okay, on what basis do we really want to do this?” They, in fact, weren’t negatively disposed but they were not going to take any lead either. So I realized pretty early on, certainly after my first year, that if anything was going to happen I was going to have to go back much more frequently. I had to get Lao American groups to be supportive rather than opposed and then get them to weigh in with their members of Congress and overcome opposition by certain members of Congress that were basically
listening to the Vang Pao groups in the United States totally opposing doing anything with Laos under “Communist” government.

So that really is what I set out to do. I came back six, seven times over the better part of two years. I always had a whole range of meetings on Capitol Hill with members of Congress, Senators and most importantly with key staffers because they could really put Laos on the agenda, they could really address some of the issues that needed to be done. It was unusual because the State Department normally doesn’t want FSOs or ambassadors to be dealing directly with members of Congress. But because Laos was not very significant they just didn’t have time and didn’t want to be bothered. So they would send an office director along, or someone else not even from H, usually just someone from the desk to go along and join me and I’d go off and have these meetings. I met with all kinds of people all over the place and I did some presentations and I answered lots of questions from the members of Congress and so forth. I made an effort when I was coming back from Laos to the United States to stop off and visit various major Hmong Lao-American communities in the United States. So I made St. Paul the stopping off point, I made Illinois a stopping off point and I made Seattle a stopping off point. I went a couple times to Fresno in California where you have these big concentrations because those people knew where Laos was and those people were all in touch with their members of Congress; I went to Vallejo, California, as well.

When the Hmong-American groups, particularly conservative groups, got wind that I was both supporting NTR, which they opposed, and coming back and visiting with the communities they started to put on demonstrations. I went to Vallejo, California, which is where George Miller’s constituency is in Congress. We had something like 80 people dress up in military uniforms and do a big demonstration against the town hall meeting I was going to have with the Lao-American, Hmong-American community. They were agitating because I was coming to talk about the situation in Laos and talk about trade relations with Laos and so forth. I’d learned that my predecessor, Wendy Chamberlin, had done some similar things in her outreach efforts and she’d actually received death threats and had gone out there with a bodyguard. So I thought my goodness these people are spun up about this stuff. At the meeting in Vallejo, California, I spoke with the organizers and I said, “Is there any reason why the demonstrators can’t come in?” “Well they are going to cause trouble.” “I hope they aren’t going to cause trouble, it’s going to be embarrassing for them more. Why don’t we just invite them in there?” They said, “You want to do that?” I said, “I don’t feel threatened and I don’t want them to be disruptive but if they want to come in by all means they should be a part of it.” So we went out and we invited them to come in. We had this big tomasha. They tended to be Hmong-Americans and veterans of the old war days dressed up in their uniforms as opposed to all the Lao-Americans and others who were dressed up more like just normal people. It was actually pretty tense but pretty cool.

When I went to St. Paul, about a year and a half later I did a talk at one of the universities near St. Paul, St. Cloud University. The same thing again. They had to bring me in through the back doors because they had a big contingent with a bunch of placards against me by name for what I represented “Down With the Lao PDR”, “Down With
Ambassador Hartwick”, “Ambassador Hartwick Hates the Hmong” all his kind of crazy stuff. I came in and had these meetings and there were lots of people but they had to sneak me out the backdoor as they were afraid I might get into a confrontation. The Hmong could be pretty aggressive when they get spun up; not like the Lao, the Lao are much quieter much more careful but the Hmong could get spun up. So people were afraid that it might result in something like that.

I came to Washington once and there the Lao Veterans of America, which is the name of the Hmong group that was the most active. They had on retainer for some time a Philip Smith who was a lobbyist and an ex-Hill staffer. He was very effective in getting things spun up and calling up these rent-a-crowd types of people who would show up. He would track who I was trying to go and see and he would try to preposition demonstrators against me. At one point there were a few demonstrators on Capitol Hill between the Rayburn Building and one other building, and these guys were standing around there with placards yelling. Then I got back to the State Department and they had assembled a much bigger group.

Q: The C Street entrance.

HARTWICK: On C Street we used to always have demonstrators.

Q: Absolutely.

HARTWICK: At any given time you could have Nepal, you could have a different group. This was my turn. I showed up one day and there were about fifty or sixty people with bull horns and placards and all these Hmong people; actually some of the Lao were there too, but they were anti-war people and they were demonstrating against me and my efforts on NTR. They didn’t know who I was so I walked right through the crowd and I’m looking at them and they didn’t know who I was. You could hear them shouting, literally you go up to the EAP office and you hear them through the windows with their bull horns shouting; it was my one moment of fame.

Q: Did you get anywhere?

HARTWICK: Over the years there had been many people who had happened to visit Laos and knew a little bit about it. Laos was certainly a good example of that. People become attached to this country and the Lao have a way of endearing themselves to you. You feel like you want to help them because they’ve been downtrodden a long time whether they have a poor government or not, they got bombed to smithereens during the war or whatever but there is a lot of reason for sympathy for them. I found members of Congress who were very supportive. You had people who had been supportive of reestablishing relations with Vietnam so I’d consider them probably a friend of getting NTR supported; I’d hope that would be the case. John McCain, I met with him several times, but in the end he never lifted a finger. He’d always said he was going to do something but he ended up never doing it. I met with John Kerry, much the same. He never really got involved; they had other things going on. I at least wanted to meet with
them in case something actually came up before them and they would be supportive and they said they would be. McCain said, “I have not been out to Laos I need to come to Laos.” Well he never did come in the end and in fact no members of Congress came to Laos except until the very end when I finally got George Miller to come.

I had met with Miller and I quite liked him; he was a sympathetic guy and he wanted to be helpful. His staff told me in about 2002 that Miller was going out to Southeast Asia so I fired off a letter to his staff and to him saying, “Mr. Miller it would be great if you could come to Laos.” I finally got a letter back from his chief of staff saying, “Well, he’s going to be kind of busy this time but he’s going to be going to Cambodia and then he will be going to Vietnam. Ironically we are going to have change airplanes in Vientiane, Laos, to get up to Vietnam but he won’t have time to stop overnight.” I thought come on, how can he not have at least a day to stop over. Then I got over my annoyance pretty quickly and said I will do what I can. So I got their travel arrangements from the chief of staff and I went to the Lao official and I said, “Look, I want to do a presentation in the VIP lounge at the airport for this American congressman who is coming through.” They said, “Oh that’s fine, that’s okay, no problem, we’ll facilitate it and so forth.” I said, “He’s a member of Congress, he’s very supportive, he supports NTR.” They said, “Sure, we’ll be happy to do it.” So I literally trotted three or four of my embassy officers and myself out there. We met George Miller getting off the plane and his staff, went into the VIP lounge and did a two and a half hour briefing about Laos and why we needed their support. Miller was great and after that he became even more supportive all along and a year and a half later came back and was actually the only member of Congress to visit Laos when I was there.

Q: So it’s now...

HARTWICK: So I left in July of 2004 and it had not been done. We ran into one major hurdle that I learned in late 2002. Some of the details of what needed to be done before it could actually be put forward as a motion in Congress for a piece of legislation. One of the things was there was no bilateral trade agreement signed between Laos and the United States and as a prerequisite for having MFN you had to have a bilateral trade agreement agreed to and that would go into effect with granting of Most Favored Nations status. So I went over to USTR and there I found very good people working in USTR that were very supportive. John Huntsman, who is now our ambassador to China was the deputy USTR at the time and his predecessor had been a woman named Josette Shiner Sheeran. She went on to be Undersecretary of State for economic affairs and on now she heads up the World Food Organization in Rome. Anyway they were supportive and we strategized about how we could make this all happen. However, it became clear if we didn’t have a bilateral trade agreement, or BTA, signed then I really couldn’t go to Congress and do anything. So I said all right we will get it done. So Huntsman basically told his people we want to get this bilateral trade agreement. In USTR you get down to the bowels and I worked there later on it’s like they are always short staffed, they have a lot of work to do, they don’t really want to get involved in minor kinds of things. Obviously a trade agreement with Laos was in the minor category, but they said alright we will get it done;
we will help you get it done and so forth. I said, “Look, my whole embassy will be poised
to help you out.”

So we had some exchanges back and forth of texts and then we had to get some sort of
final agreement to pin it all down. I told USTR I’m going on leave July 15 of 2003 and I
would like to sign it before I leave and let’s use that as a date to force the Lao to get their
act together to get it all done. They said, “Yeah, fine no problem. Well that sounds like a
good idea.” And so we bludgeoned the Lao to get it all approved in their own internal
processes. I went back to USTR and I said, “Okay, the Lao agree, we are ready to go.”
USTR said, “Well, wait a minute now we have to get internal U.S. government approval
for the BTA.” I said, “Okay how long will that take?” They said, “Look we should be
able to do that in just a matter of days. Who cares, it’s not a very important issue we
should just be able to get it done.” I said, “Well I don’t want to do anything that positions
us so I get embarrassed because I’m going to say we are going to sign it and then we
aren’t going to get it signed. They said, “No problem we will get this done. You go
ahead, it’s all right, you go ahead and tell them we will be able to sign it on this date.” I
said, “All right, I’m going to trust you on this.” This is all through telegrams back and
forth right and a few phone calls. Well it turns out when it went over to the White House
for approval the White House said, “What is this? What kind of agreement is this with
Laos? Where did this come from? We haven’t done anything with Laos in 35 years and
now all of a sudden we are signing a treaty agreement? How come people didn’t tell me
about this?” This is one of the senior directors and he put his foot down and said, “I’m
not approving this until I have someone give me an explanatory memo what this is all
about.” I’m on the phone and I’m calling them and so forth. Well it turns out that USTR
was assuring me this was going to get done. The Lao minister I was working, Sunival
Tonsuilong, said, “Well Mr. Ambassador I’m very excited about this and I’ve got this
done but I want to make sure it is going to happen.” I said, “Well, Tonsuilong I think it is
going to happen, they assured me.” He said, “Well, let’s go ahead and move forward as if
it is going to happen.” I said, “I’ve been reassured it’s going to happen and I’ll get the
final approval.”

So we got a press conference ready and everything organized. we got a room in the hotel
all set up, this is a big deal, the first bilateral trade agreement with Laos since the
Vietnam War. I got a call at seven o’clock in the morning of the day we were supposed to
sign to say, “Sorry the White House won’t approve it. They want a memo and we won’t
be able to do it and it’s just before some sort of recess so it’s off.” So I had to call up the
trade minister and tell this poor guy, “I’m sorry sir but Washington has not approved it
and therefore we can’t sign it.” He said, “You can’t sign it? You know in essence I’ve
gone out on a limb for this.” I said, “I’m so sorry but we can’t sign it. It will get approved
in about three to four weeks but I can’t sign it; they have not approved it.” He said, “Can
you help me?” I said, “I will do whatever you want talk to the press and anyone else on
this thing.” So we went to talk to the press to tell them why we weren’t going to sign
anything that day. I was embarrassed, he was horribly embarrassed and I was thinking
this guy, and it was a Communist government, and he could be in deep kimchi and they
may fire him for this kind of thing. This was a trade agreement with the United States and
I was so furious with the USTR staff for having led me down this thing; I was so furious with them.

Anyway I went ahead on leave because I was told they are not going to get this done in the next two or three weeks. I went back to Washington as part of my leave and I went in and met with Jim Kelly who was assistant secretary and basically recounting this story. Now they weren’t very much involved. I had called back and spoken to the DAS Matt Daley was the DAS for my area. Matt said, “Look we have a lot of things going on I just can’t worry about this now, I’m not going to be able to solve it for you, sorry.” So I got my own people at the State Department working on this. I made my rounds and I saw Jim Kelly. He didn’t know much about it, he was sorry it all had happened. I went and called on D, the Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage. I recounted this story because Rich was a Vietnam War veteran, had done an enormous amount of investment of his own personal time and effort in the Vietnam refugee issue, he had adopted three Vietnamese children and he was very attached to the whole normalization of relations with Vietnam; so he was interested to hear what was going on with Laos. So I was telling him this story and he just explodes and said, “Why didn’t you tell me about this before?” I’m thinking the ambassador to Laos is going to call up the deputy secretary and complain about this and USTR? I said, “Frankly, you have bigger things to worry about.” He said, “Hartwick this is important this is ridiculous this never should have happened. How could you let this happen, you should have called me.” I said, “I’m so sorry but I didn’t know. I spoke with Matt Daley and he said he wasn’t going to do it so I can’t go over my assistant secretary’s head and go straight to you.” He said, “That is exactly what you should have done.” He said where does it stand now? I said, “Well I’m assured by USTR staff that it’s going to get through the White House. I’ve already gone over and met with the White House people. They looked it over now and said they are going to go ahead and approve it now it’s going to happen.” He said, “Hartwick, you are not going back to Laos until this BTA is approved here. So you get over there and you get this thing lined up and you get it done.” So I said, “Yes, sir.” Well he had people in his meeting there too so the word went out Rich Armitage wants this BTA approval done and it was really helpful. Then I went over to USTR and all of a sudden all the gears started to move and about five days later we had all the approvals done; we had a meeting and it was done and agreed. Then I had to go back and meet with Tonsuilong and tell him I came back with the approval now we can sign, but his enthusiasm for the second signature was somewhat under control.

The first time he had ordered a case of champagne for the press and everything else and in little Laos that is actually pretty remarkable; the second time he was quite willing if I paid the bill for the whole thing which we ended up doing and we signed it. Anyway, that is one of the stories for the BTA that we ended up getting done. Then in the darkness of night in December of 2004, after I had already left and gone on to do other things, and even though some members of Congress were still voicing opposition if it were brought up, it was attached to an omnibus bill in December and was approved by the Senate. So as of something like December 20th, 2004, normal trade relations were reestablished with Laos and off it went. So I was very proud of it even though by that time I had already left.

Q: Is there anything else you should cover in Laos?
HARTWICK: The only other thing I’m going to cover in Laos is some of the narcotics work we were doing.

Q: Okay, today is the 30th of March 2010 with Doug Hartwick and Doug where do we go? We are in Laos still.

HARTWICK: We are in Laos and I recounted how the legacies of the Vietnam War basically shaped so much of what U.S. relations were all about in 2001-2004, which is how I spent a lot of my time. Quickly recounted it was unexploded ordinance, the Hmong community in Laos as well as the United States and their interest, it was lack of trade with Laos and the United States as a result of Most Favored Nation treatment of Laos, and then a fourth area, which was POW/MIA work.

So what I wanted to talk about today was a couple other activities that we actually did do that were not war related at all even though very quickly those four areas sometimes crisscrossed with these issues. Probably the most significant one was narcotics.

Q: Yes.

HARTWICK: Because Laos was and still is, I believe, the third largest grower of raw opium in the world; way behind Afghanistan and a bit behind Burma but nevertheless among the top three.

Q: Were there large pastures or open fields that they could grow the stuff?

HARTWICK: No, you tend to have opium grown in cool climates, they don’t need a lot of rain and they do quite well in the mountains. Now that’s not what happens in Afghanistan and a lot of areas, but in Laos you don’t have any wide open plains. You do have some fallow rice fields and a lot of this was grown in little valley areas on sides of mountains. In fact, it grows very well in fallow former rain fed rice fields of a slash and burn variety. The issue of opium goes back to the 19th century and the British desire and need for opium in China and a variety of other things; this was not a new phenomenon. In fact, it was a pretty old phenomenon in southern China, in Burma, and in Laos and northern parts of Vietnam. So what we the United States were doing, in conjunction with the Lao government, was doing our best to help support the Lao government which I believe was generally trying to stop opium production; that was to provide a development assistance aspect to weaning many Lao farmers from opium. We are really talking about some of the poorest of the rural villagers in Laos who grew opium really not as a mainstay but as a supplemental income basis for otherwise trying to live throughout the year on what rice or whatever products they grew. A lot of the growers of opium tended to be Hmong up in the hills, very poor. It’s easier to grow when they are out of easy sight. The United States had satellite coverage of just about everywhere in the world. So we did have occasional satellite coverage of Laos. You could tell through image analysis and so forth what kind of plants were growing; they weren’t very well hidden.
From my standpoint the work we did in Laos against narcotics was principally two-fold. One was doing it from a development standpoint in the areas known to be prone or where opium continued to be grown, activities that reinforced the government’s efforts to convince the villagers to stop growing opium. I believe Laos prior to when I was there, some years earlier, had tried a somewhat more heavy handed approach but had not gotten very far with the villagers. I think the Lao recognized that having the provincial government officials coming in and slashing and smashing and ruining all the opium fields that had been planted was not a way to earn the cooperation of the villagers. So what they needed to do was come up with a different way of going about it.

So when I was there I found an interesting approach for them to work with us and with other international organizations to come up with a different development or income model to the villagers while trying to convince the villagers that the opium was, in fact, very detrimental to their broad health and their long-term longevity. They would have consultations and negotiations with village elders. They would ultimately have the village elders sign a piece of paper between the provincial government and the village saying that we will not grow opium anymore. So the program that I basically inherited that had been started some years earlier, supported by our narcotics bureau, provided us with pretty flexible monies to do a lot of different activities in the most remote areas where opium continued to be grown.

Road building was a big one, in other words cut roads into villages that were cut off. Laos is a very cut off place when you get up into the mountains; it is not very accessible at all; that was a very welcome activity from the government standpoint. Then we would combine cutting in roads with ag extension types of work, i.e., introduce other kinds of products or ideas that would help the villagers grow something other than opium to get that supplemental income, if they could. To support this one of my officers did nothing but manage those accounts. This included visiting all the time and making sure the money was being spent and working with the Lao government bureaucracy. That was our counterpart in doing this activity and then in turn with the provincial government and counterparts where these projects were underway. The biggest chunk of money was being spent really on road cutting more than anything else.

Q: I would think two things. One you would be running up against drug lords, government people who are essentially drug lords and the other road building would also be a way of suppressing the Hmong as far as the central government was concerned.

HARTWICK: That’s not how I would have characterized it. If there was suppression of the Hmong then it happened a long time before. Now you did have these pockets of people living in the forest but they were moving, they weren’t sedentary.

Q: I wasn’t pointing it out.

HARTWICK: Many of the villages we cut roads into or connected were Hmong, not necessarily but a number of them were. But by and large those characters were very happy to have a road for the first time to get out, get trucks in and trucks out.
the development aspect, you’ve got the detoxification aspect and you have the third aspect which in some ways is more difficult to put your arms around and that was how you strengthen the Lao ability and Lao international engagement on anti-narcotics efforts from a trafficking standpoint. So in a sense roads could help some of that and we did police work with some of the local little groups. So I found myself having a chance to visit all of these places, engaging the local government substantially and significantly on a number of activities, which were important to the government. Unlike unexploded ordinance, which frankly the government wasn’t particularly interested in, they were very interested in part because of the money but they were very interested in the anti-narcotics. It fit in with the Pathet Lao party’s attitude that drugs were bad and drugs were evil for success of the State, success of the people. So they, in fact, were very much behind an anti-drug effort. In that way U.S. interest and Lao interest combined very well. The Lao government did not take a heavy-handed approach. If they had taken a heavy handed approach to this issue then it would have been a much more difficult situation; in other words if we were helping supply the police and the police were burning down the villages that wouldn’t have helped very much at all. But that was not underway, that was not the activity.

Anyway, I found that I could not get AID money beyond a very modest amount that we continued to receive ever year, roughly a million dollars or something for Laos. It was administered out of a regional fund and we had AID officers who would come and visit every few months but basically we did not have a lot of money for that. The narcotics money was several million dollars per year. It gave us the ability to do a lot of activities in conjunction with the Lao government out in the areas where the poorest people lived. It was relaxed and unencumbered with a lot of the AID regulation as long as you administered it right. One of my officers paid a lot of attention to that. The Lao government saw this as a source of money and they all wanted part of the money. They were all busy diverting things that they could so you really had to stay on top of it.

Q: Were there big drug lords or something?

HARTWICK: There were not big Lao drug lords. There were Vietnamese and there were Burmese and there were Thai drug connections, but Laos in the middle of all these countries is not really a major player; it might have been a major grower but that stuff was being taken out. One of the biggest worries we had was what sort of corrupt elements were in the Lao military. If you’d take twenty kilos of opium gum and throw it in the back of a truck with red license plates, which denoted a military vehicle, no one is going to stop that vehicle. No police are going to stop it, no other vehicle is going to try and stop it as they all know one another and no one else is going to stop it; so there was always a bit of concern about that. But we felt that the cooperation with the Lao police and anti-narcotics authorities was developing reasonably well. We were trying to help through training, through some equipment meaning building them a regional center somewhere up in one of the more challenging areas or buying them 25 little motorbikes that would be part of their ability to get around or buying them a computer. We found when I got there that we had bought many different computers for them and they just sat there getting dust. I mean it was one of these classic cases where they don’t get electricity
but once or twice a day, if they even get that. These guys didn’t speak any kind of language that allowed them to sit down at a computer and type out so why we were buying them. That stuff was being thrust on us from various places. A lot of it proceeded when I was there. When I was there I think my officers were aware that we don’t have this money to be spent in a silly way. What’s the point of computers in the middle of nowhere with no electricity?

I learned an awful lot about Laos as a result of being able to travel to all the regions particularly the most remote regions because those are actually areas where we had our anti-narcotics activities. This got me to engage a lot of senior government officials in a good cooperative way that we felt would have longer term benefits. That activity continues today although I understand it’s dropped off quite a bit in terms of narcotics money that was made it available to us. But Laos narcotics growing or the amount of narcotics it grows has dropped off quite a bit too, which has been good. Even in the three years that I was there you could see it going down and that was good.

We supported detoxification efforts. Wherever you have narcotics being grown or trafficked, whether it is methamphetamine or opium or cocaine, you almost always have local addiction problems of those villages and those people who are involved in it and Laos is no different. So you had extremely poor villagers who were, in fact, also addicts. Now addicts were not going to be young teenagers who were out smoking opium on the sly and getting away from their parents as you might find in a Western environment. Here you are talking about people in their forties and fifties and sixties who might have been taking opium from a fairly early age or middle age as a result of toothaches, hunger, fevers or a whole variety of things because opium, like morphine, really provides a lot of medicinal benefits. So in many villages you had actually a large number of middle age and older people who were the addicts. If you are going to work in the village area to control narcotics you’ve got to address the addiction problems of those areas too.

So we were helping support United Nations mobile detox activities; mobile, meaning a detox team would go in trained to work with these villagers for two or three weeks with this specific village, get all of the elders to pull the addicts together. They all mostly wanted to stop and I think their families wanted them to stop; they all recognized that it was a very debilitating problem being intoxicated with opium. But these mobile detox units were difficult. They have some basic things to help address some addict’s problems, but basically they had to just sit there and suffer for about two weeks in detoxing with these specialists. They were there to talk to them and work with them, but they didn’t have methadone or anything like that. They just had to finally get away from it. So you really had to rely on the internal desire on the part of people to want to stop it and we visited several of these. We had some cases of kids who were on opium in part because the mother had been taking opium already for several years and it got into the blood stream when the children were being born, being carried. But it showed how even in the rural society of a little country like Laos how opium had caused a lot of problems.

I came up with an idea that I thought would be both fun and a challenge to publicize the drug issue, work with the Lao government and engage a broader part of the community.
Since I was a runner I said, “Why don’t we have a 6K run, a 3K and a 6K run in Vientiane;” which as far as I know had never happened before. So I got my embassy basically to push this. You couldn’t charge much money. Virtually none, because people didn’t have very much even in Vientiane to buy tickets to be a part of it like you might do in the U.S.; but I had to pay for it in some way. So we had narcotics special funds which were available for publicity against drugs and so forth so we basically used that. So for two years the U.S. embassy sponsored the Run Against Drugs and put on a 3K. We had a 1K walk, a 3K run and a 10K run. It was a hell of an experience trying to put this thing on in Laos where it had never been done before. Our community liaison person took that on as her responsibility along with a lot of other people in the embassy, including me.

Convincing the Lao government to do this with us was already a challenge. I had to go meet with Politburo members to talk about this. It will bring publicity, we get young people of Vientiane; their bigger concern was less the opium and more methamphetamine that was coming in substantially from Burma. So that problem was on the minds of the government as well so the Run Against Drugs notion and publicity around it was really more related to helping strengthen the Lao government’s efforts to publicize and inhibit methamphetamine spread. It took on a life of its own for two years while we did this.

Getting the government to give us permission and trying to get a lot of the basic things done meant the government had to approve everything. We put together a tee shirt and the government had to approve everything about the tee shirt; everyone was so cautious. The way this government works is if it isn’t someone from the very top level making approvals they are terrified to make any kind of decisions; this was the result of top-down authority that had been there for three generations. So we had American and Lao flags crossed on the shoulders; it had to be approved, it had a comical picture of someone on a run right here out here in the front that had to be approved. Every one of these things just took weeks to get done, to get to the right people for them to approve things because they were all afraid of making a decision and getting in trouble with it later.

We were also mindful that you had to start really early with this thing. So I started with the notion in the fall of 2002 for the first one. Once you got into the first week of March in Laos it started to get just damn hot and you wouldn’t want to go out for a run like that. I mean I did but I’d just go running in the morning as it was quite hot and humid. As these weeks kept clicking they would have to approve everything, but it turned out to be very successful. The embassy did a great job. All the locals got engaged in it, we ran around and solicited prizes; one of the attractive things about getting people to participate in the first place was you are going to have a big raffle. I can’t recall if we sold tickets for the raffle but at a very low price. Then we had about forty, fifty, sixty prizes. This was something in Laos that had apparently been done for many years by lots of organizations. They just love their raffles, they loved their getting prizes like that.

I didn’t have a very large embassy, fifteen or twenty people. We sent out invitations to all the diplomatic community, all the business, sent invitations to all the government. Both times my embassy staff were all stunned because we had five or six ministers show up in running togs. It was really a riot, these guys didn’t run but they all wanted to be part of the scene. So the kick off had to be pretty early in the morning, about 6:30, because it started to get too hot too quickly. So if you are going to have the gun go off at 6:30 you
have to get everyone lined up by 6:00 or a quarter to six in the morning: it was really a lot of fun. So we had to figure out where to go in town and I had to get permission for that so I would go in and meet with the mayor and I would say, “You know it would be nice if we go by all the main monuments of Vientiane.” These monuments are some of the craziest places. The runner could enjoy Tat Luang, famous whenever you look at pictures of Laos and Vientiane, in particular, Tat Luang was the big gold covered stupa. Then they have an antiwar memorial, a whole variety of things like that and so we had this little run around. It ended up being a lot of work but a lot of fun and we did that for two years in a row. Unfortunately, my successor didn’t run and she didn’t want to do it so it all just stopped. We had the first annual and the second annual and then I left after that. But that was all narcotics driven.

Q: Then what else were you...you mentioned several other things you were doing sort of non-war related?

HARTWICK: I inherited and supported and continue to support efforts to help rejuvenate silk production in Laos. It had fallen off. It had done pretty well prior to the war but by the time you got into the late ‘80s and ‘90s silk production had dropped off. A lot of the skills had been lost including rearing silk worms, which is where it all starts. You had lots of mulberry plants in Laos but the expertise and skills had been lost. If you ever go to Laos they have very interesting and beautiful silk designs that are quite unique to Laos. So we worked backwards from there to say how do you help stimulate and support silk production, silk rearing and then the spinning of silk and processing. This was AID money that came in and worked through NGOs in country that we supported and it was quite successful. We had areas that had been effected by the war but they were quite suitable for silk rearing and brought in and helped through trainers and instructors to teach them. These were people basically from the western world coming in and living in some of these villages in these places to help teach silk worm rearing; that really meant prevention of disease that would kill the silk worms, how do you extract the silk, how do you process it in a manner that protects the quality.

We did support some of the coffee work in southern Laos; there is a plateau that gets up about 3 ½ - 4 thousand feet high, which is quite suitable for coffee. I was trying to get a project going that would help get Lao coffee into the it free trade or fair trade coffee world. Vietnam next door had just exploded into the whole international coffee market whereas little Laos just had this little area quite suitable for coffee but it was tough to get that done and we didn’t make too much progress there.

Q: Well then what about the Lao army what was that like?

HARTWICK: Well the Lao army was actually pretty pathetic. It was not well equipped, hadn’t been in a long time. Coming out of the Vietnam War they had quite a bit of equipment then but it had long fallen apart and not been kept up. For several years after the war they had maintained pretty good contact with the Soviets in particular that provided a lot of the equipment and then somewhat with the Chinese but much more with the Soviets. By 1990-91 that went away too. I did my best to see what could we start
doing with the military. The minister of defense was a two star who fought during the war and I needed their support on POW/MIA issues but also just wanted to establish relations. I spent a lot of time trying to convince DIA here in Washington to have a defense attaché in Laos or someone who at least came on a regular basis as a defense attaché whether he were part of the embassy of Vietnam or part of the embassy in Bangkok, Thailand. But that also took the Lao government to agree. I found that on the DIA side they were amenable to doing these things, but getting the Lao government to agree to an attaché relationship was a lot more difficult than I thought. When you get a diplomatic mission you have the same issue of military attaché missions and that is there is a reciprocity dimension to it. So if Lao were going to have an American attaché either coming or resident in Laos how are they going to get someone like that in Washington and they felt that was important to them. In the end I made progress but we just never really got it approved; I couldn’t get it over the goal line with respect to the Lao ministry but I made a lot of progress with it. To show you how slow it can be, my second successor, the current Ambassador, Ravic Huso, late last year finally got the overall thing done. I don’t even know as of today in 2010 whether there is an attaché assigned there or not but the approval is all done in principle on both sides and they will have an exchange of attaches. Anyway those are the kinds of small baby steps that you take in trying to rebuild a relationship all these years later.

Q: All right then you left Laos when?

HARTWICK: I left Laos in July of 2004 and I flew to Minneapolis-St. Paul. In conjunction with Congresswoman Betty McCollum the Hmong-American community in St. Paul gave me an award for all the work I did for the Hmong. Then I came to Washington and I began my on-again, off-again career as an economics instructor at the National Defense University at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF).

Q: What was your impression of the Hmong community in Minnesota?

HARTWICK: Well the Hmong community in Minneapolis I got to know quite well partly working with Congresswoman McCollum and through several visits that I made. I found the work getting to know that community was critical to my ability to understand the American Hmong community at large. If you just dealt with some of the groups that came to Washington and made noise they were an emotional bunch. A lot of them had their own political agendas which was partly why they were taking some of the positions they did. When I got to know the St. Paul Hmong community it was really an interesting window into how that community evolved since the ‘80s and early ‘90s into a 2003-2004 modern American new immigrant community. I had a chance to work with a lot of younger people and people who were more or less more Americanized but still very much still clinging to the past. Many of their parents were clinging to the past or had been but they themselves were becoming much more Americanized. Then you had others who eschewed politics, didn’t want to get into that side but they were business people, agriculturalists and farmers and hard workers. Both Lao and Hmong tend to be agricultural oriented; the Hmong very much so. Some of the Lao were more educated and so they didn’t necessarily become agriculturalists, but when I used to visit communities
in Hawaii two-thirds of the vegetables, particularly the Asian style vegetables in Hawaii, were grown by the Lao community. They had been very successful, very entrepreneurial they had excellent operations. When I was in Fresno visiting some of the Hmong communities there, some of these farmers were crackerjack they were doing great stuff, finding a little niche in the market and that is what they would grow. You have a lot of Asians in the Fresno area of all different persuasions and they were buying a lot of the Hmong produce.

St. Paul has become a place where many different refugees have gone in part through some of their religious affiliations or organizations. You really didn’t just have Hmong, you had lots of other groups, Vietnamese, you had Somalis. It was an interesting mix and I learned a lot. Betty McCollum was instrumental in this. I started to establish connections, as she had done with her own constituency, to these locally-based Hmong groups. Some were not politically active in terms of the old war days but politically active in terms of needs for their community. They were receptive to meeting with me, discussing with me and voicing some of their concerns but also interested in opportunities in opening things up with regard to Laos and the old Hmong country. So those were people I could work with. I had to deal with it and try to understand where they were coming from and maybe mitigate some of the concerns of the older aged groups that were very hostile toward the Lao government, understandably. But if I wanted to think about charting a new relationship between the Hmong and the Lao communities in the United States and Laos and facilitating that I had to establish those who had a more open mindset about it. The Lao tend to be younger and better educated and English speakers and almost all of them educated in the United States; some quite effectively as lawyers and doctors even in their thirties already. St Paul was critical on that because that is where I had most frequent visits and I had a good entre through the Congressional office with Betty McCollum and her district staff that worked pretty well. She had a Hmong person on her staff because she had several thousand Hmong constituents. She thought it was important that she have someone who spoke Hmong, who could interact with them and she would get a real scoop on what was going on.

Q: Okay you came back and worked for what the National Defense...

HARTWICK: The National Defense University.

Q: Is this Fort Meyer?

HARTWICK: No, it’s Fort McNair. It is a stopping off point for a lot of former ambassadors or senior people who come back to Washington and don’t fit immediately back into the bureaucracy. I was not keen on going on to the Department directly unless I could find the right job and once again I was having trouble finding the right job that I could slip in with. One of the advantages of being the ambassador to Laos was that people didn’t pay a lot of attention to you. The disadvantage is you come back from Laos and people didn’t know what you had done and didn’t really care. So, mindful of what I could do and what I wanted to do, I wanted to maybe go back to EAP in the front office somewhere or do something like that. There was a change of assistant secretaries and the
jobs didn’t quite line up anymore so I went to National Defense University and said I will give that a go. That was going to be a two-year assignment as one of the four or five State Department people there teaching and I was assigned to the economics faculty. I had never taught economics and if I had taught a little when I was in graduate school that was 35 years ago; you are teaching people who are in their forties who are mostly military, some very keen on this and some not keen at all. So my first semester there was trying to figure out how to be an instructor of economics which I myself had not studied in 30 years. So it was a bit of a rude awakening coming back to the Washington area. It wasn’t very demanding and it got me back involved with academics and reacquainted with a Washington environment but not having to do it through the State Department. So I taught some basic economic courses and I taught a course on Southeast Asian relations.

Q: Did you get any feel for the work at the Defense College its approach and its student body?

HARTWICK: I had been with the National Defense University as a student at the National War College back in the early ‘90s, ten years previously. Although I had not been at ICAF, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I’d been over at the National War College right across the street, a similar but different organization.

Now this is 2004 summer/fall. The Iraq War has kicked off at this stage and the picture of what was going off in Iraq was beginning to emerge. I frankly was not very supportive of the whole effort, wasn’t supportive of it at all. You could also see this was the beginning of what was to be a massive effort on the part of DOD and the State Department and the White House to really try to somehow solve what was going to be an extremely, potentially very dangerous, but very difficult set of problems in a near impossible environment. That, of course, is what ended up happening. So in 2004 when I came back I went over to ICAF and there there were people coming out of Iraq already, military people. My desire to want to go back to the Department or work there was out of my control; frankly I was not excited about it.

That first semester went with me trying to feel my way and getting on top of my course work and trying to figure out what was my next step for my career. I applied for some jobs outside of the State Department, outside of government service, to see if I could get them. I was a finalist on a couple of jobs I thought would be of interest but in both cases I was like one of the last two candidates and didn’t get either job so I felt like okay well here I am still in the government. We got into the Christmas time and then the tsunami happened out in Asia. The tsunami affected Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives. There I was at Christmas time watching this unfold and thinking I know all these countries, these are my countries. I didn’t know much about Sri Lanka but I knew a lot about India and I knew certainly a lot about Thailand and Indonesia; I’d spent a lot of time dealing with those countries.

The tsunami hit on the 26th of December 2004, right after Christmas. We started getting little dribs and drabs of information that took us four or five days right up to about New Years and then the pictures started to emerge of Thailand and then more and more
specifics came out. I was at NDU and the U.S. interest in helping out was really beginning to surge at that point. Everyone saying what are we going to do? I felt these are my countries, I know a lot about them; maybe I can be helpful and I was bored frankly at NDU. I wasn’t doing near as much as I’d like to have done. One thing I learned was that in the military when there is urgency of some sort then people get broken out of training assignments like that and they are taken off to do whatever has to get done. So I went over to the East Asia bureau and talked to a couple people and I said, “You know I’m available over at NDU if you need some urgent help that I can provide. I know these countries I know a lot about them, I can be of help here if you need some.” They said, “Yeah, but you are over at NDU.” I said, “Look this is the military here. If the State Department needs me, if you guys need me they will let me go because frankly I’m not working that hard, they can absorb my needs pretty easily across the board.” Two days later I got a call from Assistant Secretary Tony Wayne who said, “Why don’t you come over and we can talk about doing this.” So I did and I ended up temporarily leaving NDU in mid-January. I told them I wanted to come back but I was going to do this on a surge basis to help out on the tsunami reconstruction effort and so that is what I did. Then from mid-January on until August I did nothing but tsunami. I returned to working at the State Department and left NDU altogether. I set up an office getting some personnel that came in to help me out and then seeing what we could do in terms of coordinating the international effort which was very big and involved and what the U.S. was doing. We were one of the lead countries, but not the only one. The UN was doing a lot, the Europeans doing a fair bit. You had the situation with our embassies which were struggling to cope with the very bad situation. So that is what I did for the next six months and I found that to be very rewarding, very, very long hard hours. I had a handful of TDY officers, anyone who was free in the system. I was over to the personnel office trying to find out who might be free and they would give me new names of people. I really didn’t have an office. I had to create an office so I had to get EB to help me find some space and have a few offices. We finally carved this out of some of the space in the State Department. We set about helping coordinate the U.S. effort.

In the initial emergency effort DOD took the lead because they had the military assets and equipment to get out there fast. Very quickly this was supposed to transition toward USAID and humanitarian relief and then hopefully reconstruction -- not just humanitarian relief but help them recover from the tsunami. That money would come from a supplemental coming out of Congress. So we ended up doing a lot of work with Congress. I worked a lot with AID. I was deputed along with an AID colleague to be the two people who went with our two former presidents, President Clinton and President Bush, on their trip in February 2005. So there I was hopping on the airplane with these two eminent former presidents and off we went to visit initially Guam and talk to the military there. Then on to Thailand, then to Ache, Indonesia; the president of Indonesia flew up to meet them; I was a part of that. Then on to Sri Lanka, spent time in Sri Lanka and from Sri Lanka went on to the Maldives, spent a day in the Maldives and then went back. So it was a pretty interesting experience watching those two guys work together and then bringing attention to what was going on and learning what was going on face-to-face and visiting.
Q: The two presidents working together, Clinton and Bush, what would you say they brought to the table and how did it work?

HARTWICK: Well this was the first time to my knowledge certainly in modern times where they pulled two former presidents together and both of them had their own star power, Bill Clinton probably a bit more than George H.W. Bush, 41 and 42 as they referred to themselves. But by bringing attention to the problem and setting up an organization and a web site where money could be donated they helped focus attention in constructive ways. Donations from the public were more managed by the Bush 43 White House. I worked with the ex-presidents somewhat, we helped them work the media, helped them meet with the governments in question whether it was the Indonesians or the Thai or Sri Lankans so we called on the heads of state everyplace we went. Bill Clinton came back and he wanted very much to remain engaged; mind you he was in his late fifties at that point and George H.W. Bush was 80-81. As active as he was, he was a little less eager to keep being as active as Bill Clinton was. Bill Clinton went back and in conjunction with the United Nations they deputed him to be the tsunami coordinator for the United Nations or however they called it.

So I continued to liaison with those offices from the State Department. I spent most of my time frankly keeping on top of but helping shape efforts of the very large supplemental monies that were going to be attached to a DOD supplemental that were all related to the Iraq War. I worked in conjunction with Secretary Rice whom I briefed a couple of times and she deputed Bob Zoellick as her deputy to keep an eye on that. So I kept him informed. I worked closely with Tony Wayne the assistant secretary who worked with me and EAP as well and the South Asian crowd. The shaping up of that legislation on the supplemental was a very intense, very tough exercise. I didn’t know that when I said that I wanted to volunteer to work on tsunami stuff. I didn’t know how much I would be working on but it turned out to be a very important exercise. I got a chance to do a lot of other things that I hadn’t done before and learned a lot about humanitarian assistance that I didn’t know much about before, particularly on crisis management.

Q: How did you find both the Thai and the Indonesian government’s response to this?

HARTWICK: We knew a lot from embassy reporting, but there was nothing like seeing things on the ground. So when I went out with Presidents Bush and Clinton, even though those visits were not more than about a day-and-a-half in each place, you got a sense of the different effects of the tsunami in those respective countries. We started in Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin was the head of government, very powerful. He had a very sophisticated cabinet, we met with a lot of their ministers, we had dinner with them, and one felt that he was a hands-on guy and he was going to make a big difference. Ironically, a year or year and a half later he was thrown out of government and he is still out which is a big surprise because he was reelected shortly after the tsunami; they had an election there and he was overwhelmingly reelected so it was interesting to watch the Thai government.
The tsunami in Thailand overwhelmingly got the largest amount of publicity in the international press partly because it happened at Christmas time. You had a lot of Europeans and a few Americans there for the winter, sunning themselves from the cold of Europe and the cold of the United States. A couple of thousand people went missing, many of them foreigners and you had one heck of a lot of video shots of different parts of the waves coming in and the impact of the tsunami inside the towns and hotels and so forth. To coin a phrase here this “swamped” the international media about the tsunami. We knew that the tsunami was very bad in Indonesia but at first the outlines and how bad it was were not all that clear. It started to come out that off the coast of Sumatra on the northern coast of Ache was much worse but it was not a tourist area; in fact, it was in the area that had been traditionally somewhat troubled in Indonesia...

Q: It was Muslim guerrillas.

HARTWICK: Yeah.

Q: Independence.

HARTWICK: It’s Muslim in general. This area had been resisting the central government of Java and Java’s control of things and they had been having problems for years. The central Indonesian government under Suharto in the old days had been very heavy handed in dealing with what they felt to be disreputable groups causing problems and not being part of the team. So there was a lot of Indonesian military in Ache and there were uneasy relations between the Acehnese and the central government. The northwestern tip of Sumatra and Ache. So the two presidents and I and a small handful of others, I was the only State Department person there, we flew from Guam to Phuket and spent a day, an evening, and a night there. By helicopter we flew up and down the coast to visually inspect what had happened. There had been some economic damage of shrimp farming and so forth that had been wiped out. You had a number of hotel resort areas that had been badly damaged. You had a couple of villages that had been damaged and swamped something like 2,000 persons missing or presumed dead. The next day from Phuket we flew across to Ache and as bad as it was and as terrible as it looked in Thailand it was infinitely worse in Ache; it looked like an atomic bomb had hit. I’d never seen anything like it, none of us had. We were just all of us blown away by the extent of the damage. There we met with President of Indonesia Yudhoyono, who had been elected not that long before himself; he’d only been president for a few months. This was the kind of destruction where you’ve got hundreds of thousands of people missing and presumed dead. I think the final count was somewhere in the area of 200-230 thousand people gone. It’s mind boggling when you think about it and you saw the extent of the physical damage and trying to imagine what that wave must have been like when it came in to do what it did was just nothing but horror and devastation. Anyway, that was a very powerful take away for all of us.

Then we had our American military assets; they actually went from Phuket overnight where we slept. They steamed as fast as they could to get off the coast so they could use our two American helicopters to fly our two former presidents because we couldn’t trust
anyone else’s helicopters, which was understandable. So we flew here and then flew to Ache and then the helicopters met us there and they flew us all around. So the kind of visual that we could get was really nothing short of remarkable.

Indonesia was blown away up in this part of Ache. So we left the next day after having spent that time and we flew up to Colombo…

**Q: Sri Lanka.**

HARTWICK: …Sri Lanka, Colombo, and spent the next day. We met with the president and key cabinet people. This was all in mid-February so we are talking about six weeks after the tsunami had hit. So what you are seeing on the ground in all places is it is no longer the immediate aftermath of it; several weeks had gone by but the ability of local governments to respond and get themselves organized or not was very evident and a degree to which the tsunami had left unbelievable devastation in those countries and then how different it might be from country to country. In Colombo the biggest devastation in Sri Lanka really was the southern coast and the eastern coast area.

One of the aspects about the tsunami that we learned is the impact of the tsunami on the coast is usually very much closely coordinated with what is the slope, what is the degree of steepness of the land mass underneath the water. Because as a big wave hits to the extent that it’s extremely steep falling off into very deep water the wave comes but it doesn’t really build very much and then it builds at the end and sort of finishes. If it is really shallow as that wave comes it starts to build with all that power and gets bigger and bigger because the ground is pushing it up and it starts to really get elevated with the weight behind it being pushed and then its impact is much worse.

So in Thailand it was evident that in places where you had nice beaches and it was quite shallow way out, those are the ones that were hit the worse. If it were kind of deep wherever it was in different channels then the impact might be far less. What we saw then is not quite the same as it was in Sumatra because it was so close at hand that the power of the tsunami, the power of the earthquake, was devastatingly high right off the coast. Even though this area itself is also somewhat shallow it was so close to exactly where the earthquake took place that it was even more powerful.

When you got to Sri Lanka it was the same thing. You saw that wherever the coastline was pretty shallow that’s where it got the strongest hit. Well it turns out that an awful lot of the east and southern coast of Sri Lanka it’s pretty shallow; they have beautiful beaches out there. By the time the wave got here some of the power was dissipated and so overwhelmingly the devastation really only took place approximately the first hundred, hundred and fifty meters of the coastline. Then the wave stopped, water receded and that was it; but again not surprising for a developing country most everybody lives close to the coastline or they live in some of the bigger cities but the bigger cities were on the other side of the island not on this side. So the devastation was all along the coastline of Sri Lanka in a first 100-150 meters from the coastline which is where a lot of people lived so you had lots of villages, lots of houses crushed, lots of people killed. Lots of
fishing boats were destroyed and then the water receded and that was it, it took people with it and it was gone. So the development impact of that was going to be somewhat difficult. You had a lot of people who had their housing destroyed right along the coast.

Then we flew from Colombo to the Maldives.

Q: So on the tip of India to slightly to the...

HARTWICK: Off the southwestern coast of India and slightly southwest of Sri Lanka. This was still enough so that by the time it got to the Maldives there was still plenty of energy and power in this thing. Now the Maldives, another crazy little place, it has pretty beaches but, in fact, the beaches are short and then it drops off because it tends to be an archipelago along there with a lot of atoll islands and so forth; so it is not extremely shallow except you have wherever the islands are coming up then you have beaches around those. But after you get outside the island it just drops down. The highest point of all the Maldives not including the trees is about eight or nine feet high maximum altitude and most of it’s more like two or three feet above sea level. So when a tsunami wave comes through it would not build as I described it might in Sri Lanka or as it did in Thailand. It wouldn’t build to that size but even if it built up six feet it was going to wash over everything in that area. The existence for the Maldivians living in most of those islands is pretty precarious: they are fishermen, they grow a few plants, they deal a lot with tourism and we got a chance to meet the government and talk to the government in some length. They only had one quick smack in the face from the tsunami but it basically washed all over their islands. They have 200 thousand people in the entire country. They lost 30-40 people, a small percentage of their population.

In Thailand we were there six-seven weeks after the tsunami, and the Thai were pretty organized. The government was on top of it as best they could and they were doing a pretty good job. The UN was there, we were trying to be helpful; it had a lot of high profile because you had so many foreigners that had been killed particularly from Sweden and Norway. They seemed to be doing a pretty good job.

Indonesia was still completely blown away by the immensity of the problem. The government was struggling like mad to just figure out how do they get the resources they need and how do they get it up there in a manner to help address the unbelievable problems that Ache felt. Even the Indonesian military had lost several thousand personnel that had been wiped out in the same way; a whole major military camp just disappeared outside of the capital of Banda Ache.

Sri Lanka was quite disorganized with a lot of politics and then unfortunately also troubled by the problem of the LTTE in the north where a lot of the problems were. The government actually had very poor access in those areas without getting into a non-permissive environment. So you couldn’t even get a good picture of what was going on there. By the time six-seven weeks had gone by the population and the government had been able to get past being stunned by its impact and were finally starting to come back and trying to understand okay what do we have to do about it. But there we found the Sri
Lankans quite disorganized and politics and those issues beginning to emerge as a serious issue.

We got to the Maldives and we were all unbelievably impressed with how organized the Maldivians were; they really had their act together. They had a command center for response, they had things computerized, they had made a pretty accurate assessment of where the worse places had been hit and what was needed, the kind of assistance was needed and so forth. We all came away thinking who had heard of the Maldives before and look at these people they are really pretty sharp. They had a lot of young people who were well educated. They were very sharp and on top of what needed to get done. They were led by a president who had been, by international reputation, a tyrannical guy. He had been president for 25 years and always found reasons for putting off elections. Yet it was pretty clear he had a lot of really good people working for him and they knew what they were doing.

For the rest of my time working as a tsunami coordinator I worked closely with our embassies in question. We had to tailor our assistance the best we could in terms of what could the countries absorb. How could we make sure that the funds were managed in an accountable way, particularly Indonesia which had a terrible reputation for mismanagement and corruption and yet they were the worse hit; the biggest amount of resources needed to flow to Indonesia. By the time we got there in mid-February Indonesia was inundated with NGOs from around the world, just coming in from every which way trying to help. But you can imagine most of them didn’t have a lot of expertise in Indonesia and a lot of them didn’t have any expertise in what they were getting into. They were all tripping over one another. The government was still trying to get control of what the hell they should be doing. It was fascinating but also scary to see what was happening on the ground in a matter of weeks in a place with everyone wanting to be helpful but people dismissing the Indonesian government’s legitimate questions about what are you going to do? What is your expertise? How are you going to help? It just got overtaken by events and by the time we got there in late-February they were beginning to contain this problem. A lot of the NGOs were coming in to the U.S. embassy, into the Canadian embassy, into the European Union and so forth complaining the Indonesians were not letting them come in and do good work, if you will. And yet you could appreciate the Indonesian government’s challenge in trying to manage that, trying to get on top to make sure this was going to be done in an intelligent way that worked; it was no small task. You had a bit of that also in Sri Lanka but Indonesia by far was the worse.

Anyway, I went back and from then on I did a fair bit of work on Capitol Hill working among the different U.S. government agencies in terms of how do we parcel this all out. I found working with USAID in Washington very challenging; the bureaucratic warfare and animosity toward the State Department was palpable. It was so frustrating because I had worked with AID people overseas for much of my career and I had a lot of respect for the people in the field. In fact, the people we met in the field out there, particularly in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, were AID professionals and just superb. They were really committed people and when I got back to Washington the bureaucratic fighting I had to
do with the AID Washington bureaus involved in this stuff was just mind boggling. It was really an exercise in great frustration to deal with it and the game playing that takes place.

We coordinated with the United Nations, we coordinated with the World Bank, with the Asian Development Bank, all those had big aspects of how do we help all those countries recover from the tsunami. So you can see it becomes a very big and complicated exercise. But I went out there with Bob Zoellick in May because he had not been out there. We went to not quite the same places although we went to some of the same places including Ache. Actually, Ache was the main one I went to when I was with Bob Zoellick. It was heartening when we got there in May to see how at least the population had finally started to come out of their unbelievably shell-shocked position. You literally saw people when we were there in February just still wandering around as if they had not a clue what life was about any more; people out in the areas where we stopped and visited and talked to people they were just crying. It was very, very moving. So when I got back there with Zoellick it was good to see that a lot of that had gone away and that there was some semblance of recovery and tent cities coming up and activity underway and so forth. You got a sense they were finally getting beyond it.

Anyway, I went back to Washington after that. When June/July came around I realized I could keep doing this job for the next year but what is my job now? My job was supposed to be a temporary coordinator for all this stuff. The supplemental was approved, the money was divided up. Pretty quickly it was clear to me that the State Department, whether it was EAP or the Economic Bureau, or East Asia Bureau or South Asia Bureau they wanted me to continue on because none of them wanted to keep an eye on it themselves; they didn’t want to be bothered with it. So I finally went to Tony Wayne and I said, “Look I don’t think there is any purpose for me to keep doing this anymore, it ought to go back to the bureaucracies to manage this. I don’t need to be doing this anymore.” I was losing staff because people’s TDYs were running out. They were going somewhere else and I didn’t want to get into bringing new people in who didn’t know anything about the issues and so forth.

I went back to National Defense University during the beginning of the fall semester of 2005. I had missed the spring semester and now was doing the fall semester of the next academic year. By that time there had been a change of State Department personnel at the NDU so I was designated as the senior State person at ICAF. I got a bigger office and I had some consulting responsibilities with the senior management of NDU, with the various generals who control things. So then I began my second year with them after having missed six months. Then I taught a course on humanitarian assistance, war on Southeast Asia and basic economics, as I did before.

Q: So we’ll pick this up the next time when you are with U.S. trade...

HARTWICK: USTR and go to the U.S. Trade Representative Office.
Q: All right today is the 12th of April 2010 with Doug Hartwick. Doug where did we leave off?

HARTWICK: Well we left off when I was finishing up my second stint at National Defense University and then I was going to transfer to U.S. Trade Representative’s office.

Q: When was this?

HARTWICK: This would have been the fall of 2005 and then I started with USTR in 2006.

Ashley Wills contacted me and said are you interested in working as the assistant USTR ouster, as they call them, a terminology of that agency, to be in charge of South Asia. To me it was an excellent opportunity to get back into South Asian issues because I had spent ever since 1997 pretty much all my time on Southeast Asia and in particular Laos. Then with the tsunami work also Southeast Asia and so forth. I interviewed there with the deputy USTR, Karan Bhatia, who was Indian by name but basically born and raised in the United States. He and I hit it off quite well and they offered me the job. So in late or mid-January I showed up for work. The office of USTR is the building across the street from the old executive office building. USTR was headed up by Rob Portman who had been a Republican Congressman and a friend of the Bush family including President Bush 41 and a very personable guy. I interviewed with him as well and we talked and basically the portfolio was all of South Asia but the center of gravity of the office was India trade issues. I spent in the end a little over a year and a half at USTR and the challenge for India in that office was that it was in the last year and a half of negotiations for the WTO and the Doha Round. Unfortunately, the Doha Round has never been completed and it boiled down to the United States, the Europeans, the Brazilians and the Indians pretty much at various odds on different parts on the overall package. But the Indians really positioned themselves almost as the bête noir of the WTO Doha Round as far as USTR was concerned.

Rob Portman was a politician and he actually established a good rapport with his Indian counterpart, Kamal Nath. I think if Portman stayed on there might have been a better basis for finding an accommodation with India; even though India had staked out a very tough position for the United States to accept no matter what.

Q: I thought India was I’m not sure what happened was beginning to change its attitude. Was this the early days?

HARTWICK: No, India had begun to change its attitude but there are some areas that are no go for India even with its changed attitude. One in particular is the general area of trade and agriculture. The vast source of votes for the Congress Party tends to be in the rural sectors of the economy particularly in the north. Indian rhetoric over the past decades hasn’t changed all that much particularly when it comes to agriculture goods and services. The position is that the poor people need to depend upon agriculture and they
can’t be overwhelmed by cheap imports and therefore their livelihood destroyed. India in many respects is a world leader in a variety of different agricultural products. If India were to reform itself it would probably take advantage of its ability in the agricultural area to really exploit the international market. That was never their rhetoric and that was never their attitude. It was always walling off the outside world in the area of agricultural trade in particular.

With other kinds of trades, goods and services of manufactured goods and so forth, they had come full circle. They had been reducing their tariffs steadily over the previous ten years, unilaterally bringing them down. They could see the benefits and stimulation from their own economy and the influx of investment coming in because trade was no longer a dirty word in India; but the area of agriculture still was problematic. That really was the crux of the problem, I think, when it came to WTO negotiations. On the manufacturing front there was a combination in the area of trades and services where we could have worked something out in all likelihood; but in the area of trade and agriculture there just seemed to be no basis for discussion.

Rob Portman was the USTR for the first six, seven months that I was there. Then he was asked by President Bush to go head up the office of management and budget, OMB. So he departed and they requested that his deputy be elevated to USTR, Susan Schwab. Basically it was a well-known policy kind of person to the Republicans and it had various seniors’ jobs and so the USTR has two deputies. They had Kamal Bhatia and another deputy, Susan Schwab. They picked Susan to be elevated as USTR. She was a woman dealing with Kamal Nath, the Indian minister. I think she had in her previous career a number of frustrations with India as well. I found that she took over her new job with a lot of burden and that was to try to finish up the WTO Round. She had approximately a year and a half of the remaining part of the administration and the negotiations in the WTO were not going very well. I tried to work with her as best I could; but the way the negotiations team in USTR worked was the boss, Susan Schwab, looked to her WTO team as the basis for all the discussion. Those of us in different regional offices frequently had some difficulty in trying to either weigh in or be helpful to her because she tended to look to her team. Her team had spent many years of dealing with the Indians and felt quite frustrated by the Indian negotiators. So I found increasingly my job at USTR always trying to break into the either the WTO to be helpful to Susan Schwab or at least to increase in her mind that India is not just about the WTO negotiations, but that there are actually a number of bilateral issues of significance that she needed to really be paying attention to.

I could sense that once she took over and settled in that India was a frustration to her no matter what. I had that feeling when you sat around the staff meeting table every time her eyes would focus on me they would sort of narrow down and they would get piercing; I became the personification of problems of India whether I liked it or not. Anyway, it took some of the fun out of it, but I did have a good trip with her. She and I went to India in April of 2007 to basically meet with the Indians on WTO and bilateral issues and to do our best to at least make progress on the bilateral or the WTO context. I urged her to get out of Delhi at least one day so we could go somewhere else in what basically is a very
big country. What tends to happen so often is everyone visits Delhi and spends a day and a half or two days and then they leave again; I was pleased that she responded to that. We set up a program for her to go to Kolkata in West Bengal which is basically a Communist controlled state out of the 17 or 18 states of India. It was a successful visit and interesting visit as it gave a different perspective on a lot of the Indian issues. We spent almost our whole time in the agricultural sector out in West Bengal, visiting Pepsi Cola, visiting a potato chips factory, visiting a small village that grew different kinds of crops, and meeting with the chief minister and so forth. I think it left for Susan Schwab and USTR a better image in India about her engagement in India and I think she had a different take away from that.

But it was useful to me having spent years in India previously to come back to USTR and then take over the India portfolio. My boss in the senior leadership of USTR was Karan Bhatia, the deputy, who was responsible for this area. So he and I took several trips there and to me again it was pleasurable to get back involved in India issues. The Bush administration and the President himself had taken a significant interest in his relationship with India. You had an effort on the part of the Bush administration to get beyond what had been a long-standing major hurdle over India’s role with respect to nuclear proliferation and all that was going on about the time that I took it over. It was actually a pretty exciting time despite a lot of unhappy partners around the world we, the United States, had as a result of the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. In India you had a country that was actually pretty positively inclined toward President Bush and his administration. Bush was taking on what had been a major stumbling block to India’s relationship with the United States; India’s efforts to be a more significant world leader. It remained still ostracized as a result of the nuclear embargo. They never signed the NPT and had been outside the nuclear suppliers club in other areas. So President Bush came and I had a chance to be there physically. I didn’t go with the entourage but I was there along with Karma Bhatia when President Bush came. You could feel the excitement in the Indian government and a lot of Indians that our new relationship was emerging.

Q: On the agricultural side did the issue of the genetically modified whatever they are items come up the Franken food or was that...

HARTWICK: That has not been a significant issue from a bilateral standpoint. It was much more an issue between the United States and the Europeans.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: It was also an issue that found itself into the WTO context for exactly the same reasons. With respect to India the issue there was less the biologically modified dimension of it as opposed to some of the products that were ag related products. For example, pesticides or seeds that had been genetically modified for growing cotton and other kinds of products that, in fact, were very popular in India but were expensive to buy. There was great interest from Indian farmers to be able to replicate those genetically modified seeds and grow them without having to pay the higher cost for buying the seeds. So in a sense there are trade issues there but they were really more in the area of
intellectual property rights protection and less in terms of concern of biological modification of the things and so forth. So for India that was not a big issue for us; there are plenty of other issues but they are more the classic core issues of high tariff or prohibition of certain kinds of imports. Unfortunately, from my standpoint it is an area with India that traditionally had been frustrating. Even though I’ve been away from India for ten years it was just as clear as day that India on that front in those areas had not modified a heck of a lot.

But it was enjoyable, despite the differences with the WTO, to watch our bilateral relationship emerge in a much better stronger footing during that period while I was there. It is kind of what induced me in the end to think about leaving government and go ahead and join the private sector in working with Lockheed Martin. It was a good opportunity for me to leave government after 30 years. One important area of trade still to be done was going to be the area of defense trade. So that’s, in fact, what I ended up looking at to do.

Q: So you did that when?

HARTWICK: I did that in the summer of 2007.

Q: Okay, let’s talk about the aero defense business with Lockheed Martin wasn’t it?

HARTWICK: Ah huh.

Q: What were the issues and what were you doing?

HARTWICK: It would have been my first experience in working in a private sector company. Lockheed Martin is 145 thousand people so this is a big company. I was intrigued about the opportunity for me to be their corporate head in India in a country that I knew was opening up to the West much more, that also had a very healthy defense budget. It’s been traditionally very dependent on the Soviet Union and then later on the Russians for much of its defense armaments. I thought this would be an area where American companies in general and in this case Lockheed Martin could do very well. I didn’t go into it with a lot of knowledge about the defense industry, whether in India or the United States, and how it works, or that Lockheed Martin, a defense manufacturer of all different types of products, does its business almost exclusively with government. So you don’t really have business relationships, or very little, unless you are talking about partnering with someone to try to get a contract from government. So I was squarely in the middle of helping Lockheed Martin continue to work out a relationship with the Indian government in an area where Lockheed had not been present before in India to speak of. What I realized not long after I got there the first three or four months was the challenge to me professionally far greater was trying to understand how this company worked or didn’t work with respect to India rather than interacting with the Indians which was pretty straightforward; I’d had a lot of experience working with Indians but I had no experience working with Lockheed Martin.
Q: What did you find? What were the problems or issues you saw dealing with Lockheed Martin?

HARTWICK: My biggest weakness was knowing nothing about Lockheed Martin. I came on board there late October and was asked to be ready to be out there representing Lockheed Martin the first week of January. Of course there is a Christmas holiday season there as well, right? So what became pretty evident is by the time I got ready to go I had a very poor grasp of how does Lockheed Martin operate. It’s one thing to know about oh we make this and we make that and we make the third thing and the fourth thing, but what’s important in doing business for Lockheed Martin or what are their touch points? What are the things they don’t want to get near at all and why and all those kinds of issues. I, being so new to the company, and new to the private sector, and new to the defense area, I found that to be by far the most challenging. Of course you don’t learn about those issues until you are actually out there in the field trying to have a better understanding.

The second area was I didn’t know people really in the company; I knew very few people. The way a company like this operates is while you have the corporate office and the corporate officers who work at the headquarters, if you will, you have major business areas that comprise the company overall. It is those business areas that really take decisions about whether they want to invest resources or pursue bid opportunities. The corporation office itself doesn’t make those decisions; they are all made by the different business areas and sub-business areas. Now unfortunately from my standpoint I didn’t know virtually any of those people, because I was being hired by the corporation. I did most of my training at the corporate level. So I had slowly but surely got to meet some of those people as they would come to India to either pursue business opportunities or to inform themselves or to explain to the Indians what they did in anticipation of maybe pursuing something. But that’s a long slow process. What I concluded in the end after a year and a half with Lockheed was that a company of this nature, of which there are several companies, but speaking of Lockheed Martin that it was much more risk averse than I anticipated. The level of bureaucracy involved for any kind of decision-making was far more extensive than I’d ever realized. It was quite a bit more complex than I’d ever realized in terms of the various players and individuals and entities that become involved in a decision process for investing money or for going for a bid or for just assessing whether a contract is worthy of being signed or not signed and so forth. I started to conclude that the way defense companies do business it takes them so long to get used to a market and that pursuing business in India was going to be a very slow process for Lockheed Martin; getting them acclimated to what India was all about, and pursuing business opportunities in a way that would make Lockheed Martin a known creditable entity in India would probably need to be measured in five to ten-year developments, not in two or three year movements.

There were other things that I didn’t realize until I got in. When you are in government you have a certain amount of access and familiarity with government officials and activities you might want to do to get to know government officials. When I came into the private sector actually so much of that was completely different. First of all the Indian
government held you in quite a different light because you did not represent the United States, you represented a single company. That put you in a very different much lower level, if you will, vis-à-vis dealing with the high-level Indian officials. The nature of defense business in India is very controversial in terms of the number of big kickbacks or special fees that were paid. There were basically corruption things. Indian officials were always very leery of doing very much with anyone from the private sector, be that person from any private sector, or even worse from the foreign private sector. So I found that much more challenging than I ever anticipated which was to establish relationships and work with senior Indian officials or work with Indian service officials. I did and it worked fine, but it was not as near satisfying as it had been when I worked in government where I felt I could get good access and regular access all the time.

Q: How firmly imbedded was the Soviet/Russian airplane business I mean it had been going on for decades? Were the Indians trying to get out from under or what?

HARTWICK: In a broad strategic way one could say that the Indians in years past and decades past from a political standpoint the government benefitted from having a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union and then later on Russia. The Russians wanted a geo-strategic partner of sorts in India in that region to counterbalance the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and China’s relationship with Pakistan a little bit. Back in the ‘70s and the ‘80s and the ‘90s India also did not have much foreign exchange nor did the Soviet Union. So the Russians made available to India a lot of armaments, a lot of product whether it was airplanes or tanks or radar systems, ships, at extremely favorable prices. These were negotiated not on a foreign exchange basis but on a Rupee/Ruble basis. The exchange rate was something a bunch of diplomat sat down and negotiated and worked out and made that the basis for whatever arms agreement. So in the end the Indians benefited enormously from this relationship because it was able to supply its large army and air force and navy with equipment from the Soviet Union without having to use scarce foreign exchange. Back in the ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90s they actually didn’t have very much foreign exchange.

As a result of that, if you look at any of Indians major services you see an enormous amount of Soviet equipment still in operation today. In the air force I think something like 85-87 percent of its fixed-wing aircraft were Russian origin; that’s a lot and that reflects decades of this going on. But in the middle of the 1990s and beyond Russia became privatized and the Communist Party of Russia gave way to a different sort of political system. Russia joined the real world in terms of its own economic connections to Europe, to the United States and elsewhere. The whole idea of a walled-off Soviet economy based upon a series of exchange rates to Rubles vis-à-vis foreign currencies changed. The Russians went on to foreign currency as their basis for international trade; so the special deal for India went away. As a result of that, they started to price their equipment to the Indians, along with others, but in particular to the Indians on a dollar basis and a foreign exchange basis. They were trying to price their aircraft so that perhaps they could sell them but also that they could get a good return on them. So the very special deal that existed in the ‘90s, and the ‘80s and the ‘70s and the ‘60s disappeared very quickly and then you were talking real money. The incentive for the Indians to
continue to use and buy Russian equipment based on the advantage they received from precious time had disappeared. So if you are going to spend $50 million on a jet aircraft, whether it’s Russian or French or American or somewhere else, you were going to spend $50 million no matter what. So let’s start comparing the aircraft; there is no advantage to buying the Russian aircraft; not in terms of a price advantage. So that, of course, had shifted the whole entire business of armaments purchase.

It was on that basis that I think Lockheed Martin and Boeing and other companies in the United States were there. With respect to Lockheed Martin, one of the first deals done between the United States and India of a significant nature was India buying six C-130 aircraft from the United States.

Q: These are transporters.

HARTWICK: These are transporter aircraft, something that the Indians had wanted for many, many years but either had not been able to afford or were not likely to get export approvals for a lot of what they wanted on the airplanes from the United States. So 2008-2009 some of those hurdles were finally overcome and that was the period I was involved. As I look back, I think both Lockheed and other companies continue to pursue what they see as opportunities but I realize that India’s share of Lockheed’s international business and Lockheed’s appetite for taking on Indian risk was going to be quite modest. In fact, a lot of their getting to know the Indian market ended up being a lot of wheel spinning. When you came back to the business units involved, many of them simply did not want to take the risk to pursue an Indian opportunity compared with something in the U.S. market that from a risk standpoint was a lot more tolerable to them. That was an interesting experience for me understanding how big business particularly this kind of business operates. It assisted me in learning much more about risk and much more about contract terms and how critical those are to companies and what unbelievable stumbling blocks they can be when doing business in the third world.

Q: Well you left Lockheed Martin when?

HARTWICK: I left Lockheed Martin last year in 2009.

Q: By the way who makes the C-130?

HARTWICK: The C-130 is built by Lockheed Martin; the business unit area is called the aeronautics division of Lockheed Martin.

Q: I might say that the C-130 has a history that runs from certainly the 1960s at least up thru the present. Either we have the Libyan 130s that are sitting there...

HARTWICK: What Lockheed Martin makes now is called the C-130J or Super Hercules and it’s the most advanced model on the market today. They started back in the late ‘50s making C-130s. I guess they must have started with A, B, C, D or whatever. I don’t know
how many thousands of C-130s they’ve made during that whole period but you can count them in the thousands.

Q: It’s one of these peculiar things that at one point it was a big political issue because the air force thought they had enough and Congress said keep making them for the appropriate money because it was down around Atlanta and there was a constituency to build the things. Then later on they all of a sudden caught fire again and these basic transport are all over.

HARTWICK: Yeah, that’s quite right. The C-130J program ironically was at a point when the U.S. air force was telling everyone they actually didn’t feel like they needed any more of those kinds of aircraft. They were not particularly interested in another generation of C-130 type aircraft. They were going to buy the C-17 from Boeing, which is a jet aircraft and quite a bit larger, could haul more they didn’t really need a C-130. That was prior to the Iraq War, prior to the Afghan War, and a lot of running around that the air force has done in very challenging places where more sophisticated jet aircraft simply can’t go very well. So Lockheed found a partner in Rolls Royce with support from the British government to take the C-130H model and upgrade it. Upgrading these kinds of things costs billions of dollars to do just the investment in the technology to make it work. So Lockheed went ahead with the British government and Rolls Royce to come up with the C-130J which had a completely transformed cockpit, much more modernized cockpit, it had a completely computerized payload delivery system in the belly of the aircraft and it had upgraded twenty percent more horsepower per engine in the turbo-prop engines in this case built by Rolls Royce. That became the new C-130J and even in the beginning the air force said, “Thank you very much we are not particularly interested.” So the first purchaser of the C-130J was the British air force and then the story goes on after that. They started marketing internationally, again it is a transport aircraft, so it’s not highly sensitive and we, Lockheed Martin, stared to have some success in marketing it. Finally the U.S. air force came around and realized that having some more advanced models may be advantageous to the U.S. air force and the U.S. Marines. So they started to sell a few copies to the U.S. government, to the air force and marines and then came the Iraq War and Afghanistan War. These aircraft have become so valuable so capable in those challenging environments. Now, the air force, as I heard from the aeronautics people at Lockheed Martin, they’ve really done a complete about face and have now decided they need quite a few copies of the C-130J.

In any case India had wanted a C-130 model of some sort since the ’80s but had never been able to one afford it or to get permission to get it. So with this friendlier moment between India and the United States and between the U.S. military and the Indian military on many different fronts, it was possible to have the Indian air force get at least an intro model of 6 C-130Js. Now those are still not in India; they are being built and will be ready for delivery starting in February or March of 2011.

Q: Did you feel any pressure, competition from the Russians?
HARTWICK: The way the Russians operated in India during my tenure there was built upon the fact that they had decades of experience working with India. However, they weren’t doing the same face-to-face or head-to-head combat we felt, competitive combat, like the other American companies and even the Europeans were doing. They had lots of long-standing relationships with the Indian air force and others that often you didn’t see very much about them but they were very much active there.

Another group that was very successful in the last ten years up until when I got there and remains today was the Israeli defense forces; again very, very active in establishing relationships with India and successful in getting themselves up to about a billion dollars a year in defense business with India far exceeding what the United States was doing. Israel is a pretty small country so far and away Israel’s biggest international customer for defense product is India after all these years. But both Russia and the Israelis often you didn’t see them around very much. They operated in their own quiet but active ways.

While I was there the Russians were competing for one of the fighter aircraft competitions which Lockheed Martin was also competing for as was Boeing. There was a lot of news about India’s purchase of a used but being refitted Russian aircraft carrier. India had negotiated very strenuously back in 2004-2005 for this aircraft carrier at a time when the Russians were really hurting for money. India had gotten away with a very, very attractive deal for about $800 million to both purchase this old aircraft carrier and have it retrofitted. During my tenure in India with Lockheed Martin, the news was full of stories and deep unhappiness that the Russians said, “There is no way. We may have worked out a contract with you but there is no way we can retrofit that aircraft carrier for 800 million dollars.” They kept informing the Indians what the new price had to be. In the end it turned out to be somewhere in the area of 2.5 billion dollars as opposed to $800 million. So the Indians had to cough up a significant increase in the cost of that overall contract.

So the legacy of the Soviet Union and Russia as India’s number one arms supplier was very good for the bilateral relationship for the Russian armament industry, but you couldn’t help but feel that that was an era of the past and that the future would look very different. India now has money, India wants the best high technology. If the Russians really wanted to compete on that front they would have to compete in a technological manner that would show that their equipment was on a par with that of the United States or the Europeans.

I was there with Lockheed on the ground for a little over a year and a half. In the end we decided it was a tough time, I think, for me trying to understand the company and what it wanted out of me and how I fit into their overall game plan. Being someone who worked for the corporate office, as opposed to the individual business area, as I came to learn really had some unique challenge. There was not very much authority that those working for the corporation itself had as compared to those working in the business areas in terms of command and resources and in terms of the decision-making power. In the end we decided it made sense for Lockheed to scale back a little bit. It was an opportunity given my own personal situation and so forth to return to the United States. So I stayed on with
them for another six months and then I returned and then completed that work last December.

Q: Just maybe the last what do you think about where India is going and what’s your impression because India and China seem to grab the headlines but in some ways China seems to have more problems than India. I don’t know.

HARTWICK: Well I think India is a massive country as is China but it is organized in a very different manner than currently China is and as some would suggest disorganized. In some ways they are organized much more like the United States. You’ve got the centralized government but you’ve got state governments and I think India in the next 25-30 years will be looking to establish itself as an international global leader and not just a regional power. I think there is a lot of hard work that comes with that in terms of just your own mindset of how do you fit into the rest of the world; I think China struggles with that too. For India it just takes time to develop an appreciation of how your country and your leadership fits into the world as opposed to not just focus on just what you need and want. I think we are seeing that process play out now as we have in the last three or four years and I suspect over the next decade or decade and a half a lot of that will be going on. What is India’s role in the world? What is India’s role in terms of peace and security around the world as opposed to just its neighborhood? What is India’s role vis-à-vis terrorism? What is India’s role as the largest democracy in the world? What is India’s role in respect to human rights around the world? These are the kinds of issues in the United States we have been grappling with for a long time; India hasn’t been. They might have been grappling with these issues from a very self-focused way, I don’t want to say self-centered, but a self-focused way or expanding a little bit by looking at the Pakistani border and how that relates to them. But they really have not had a world view to speak of. I think what we are going to see is India’s economy continues to grow as India’s embrace of international trade and international investment continues to grow. It will be increasingly a world player with its own perspective in terms of how they fit into the world, what sort of leadership they can provide. I don’t think we really know yet; it is too early to say.

Again, a bit like China, but very different from China. I think the rivalry between India and China will itself play a role in shaping what India does and how it perceives itself and how it relates to the United States and the Europeans. But there have been enormous changes just how India relates to Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia have really evolved over the last twenty years. I think it bodes well for India and I think President Bush in the mid-2000s got it right. I think there is a basis for a much closer relationship with India but it’s never easy because almost anything with India is a challenge. For that reason we have to keep trying because they are going to be a natural partner for us in many, many respects. Economically a good fit for us, politically a much better fit for us. We share some of the same frustrations with one another from our own bureaucracies and our own feeling that we need to be taking the leadership and India is beginning to feel more and more as a country that deserves to be a leader.

Q: We do tend on both sides to preach to each other.
HARTWICK: Absolutely that’s another part of it.

Q: Yeah.

HARTWICK: So that partner needs to grow up a bit and it is evolving; I think it is evolving in a pretty good way. But where does that leave India by the year 2025 or 2030? Like China they have an enormous amount of problems at home too. But they’ve managed their economic situation increasingly better over the past two decades and some could argue doing a lot better than we do. As a result of that, they are beginning to accumulate wealth and beginning to gain in self confidence that was sorely missing when I was there in the ‘80s and even the ‘90s. There was very little confidence the Indians had in themselves or in their government or in how they fit into the world. That’s changed dramatically. There is a much greater sense of confidence in where they are going and where they think they can go and what they can achieve. I think that alone gives them a much stronger footing when they enter the international arena.

The WTO example is a case where playing an important leadership role in the WTO also brings in a number of responsibilities that they have to look way down the road in terms of where WTO is going to be going. I think that is where Indian negotiators and ultimately the Indian ministry in charge of this I thought fell quite short because it fell back on we have to protect our ag sector at all costs. Well they have to look a bit beyond that just as the Americans need to look beyond protecting its ag sector too in some respects. But India never really rose to the point. It hurt them not at all to see the WTO flounder and ultimately go nowhere. It didn’t hurt them politically because India’s masses believed in India’s government rhetoric: that they are protecting the India ag sector. In fact, from a reasonable longer-term perspective, by holding its own ag sector and making it less competitive internationally, it’s not really helping their ag sector.

Those are the areas I think we’ll be seeing a lot of change in the next 25 years in India.

Q: Okay, well Doug I want to thank you very much.

HARTWICK: Good.

End of interview