Childhood and Early Background
   Finnish Roots
   University of California, Berkeley – Free Speech Movement
   Peace Corps Advanced Training Program and Recruitment
   Co-Chair of Anti-Apartheid Committee
   NBC TV Film: “Angola: A Journey to War”

Peace Corps Assignment to Ethiopia 1967-1970
   Teacher in Gambela
   Reaching Out to Southern Sudanese Refugees – and Getting Funds for a Refugee Hostel
   Invitation from the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement to be Their First Foreign Witness

Southern Sudan – Telling their Story and Providing Relief 1971-1974
   10 Months Walking 3,000 Miles with the Anya-Nya Rebels
   NBC TV Film: “First Tuesday”
   Settling Refugees in Bahr el Ghazal Province through the Sudan
   Sudan Council of Churches – and Meeting His Wife
   1974 Famine Survey – and Plan to Move from Relief to Sustainability

Early USAID Assignments
   Joins USAID as an International Development Intern (IDI) Program 1977
   USAID/Mauritania – Program Office IDI 1978-1982
   Early Arrival and Then a Coup
House or Tent?
Conversion to Project Development Officer
Oasis Development Project
Complex Mauritanian Social Structure – Years to Learn
FSN Demba Ba – Now a World Bank Resident Representative
USAID/Washington – Africa Bureau 1982-1985
Backstopping for Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti
John and Rebecca Garang – helping prepare them for Iowa
Dissolution of 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in Sudan
Birth of Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement – national level goals
USAID/Swaziland – Project Development Officer 1986-1990
South Africa for a Bi-racial Family
TDY to USAID/South Africa – New Black Education Publication
Procurement: Doing Things Right
Swazi Society: Juxtaposition between Traditional and Modern
TDY to Kenya: Cross-border Humanitarian Relief for Southern Sudan
USAID/Guinea – Deputy Mission Director 1990-1992
Conakry and Port-au-Prince
Flood and a Great Executive Officer

USAID/Russia – Program Officer 1992-1995
Opening the Program
Housing Challenges
Embassy Challenges: No Strategy; No FSNs
University of Alaska – and the Russian Far East
Democracy/Governance Work
Economy in Crisis -- $12 Plane Tickets
Connecting with Finnish Roots
Sudanese Ambassador to Russia

USAID/Sri Lanka – Program Officer 1995-1997
Security Challenges and Violence Against Civilian Populations
Central Bank Bombing: USAID Emergency Procurement
Program Reduction Strategy: Focus on Economic Growth
Sri Lankan Private Investment in Haiti
Serving on Personnel Performance Board in Washington

USAID/Senegal – Deputy Mission Director 1997-2000
Consultative Strategy Development
Achieving Host Country Ownership

USAID/Zambia – Mission Director 2000-2003
Pre-PEPFAR HIV/AIDS Programming
Sharing Senegalese Experience with Zambian Official
Multi-Sector HIV/AIDS Strategy – An Agency First
Joint Programming with Japanese (JICA)
Anti-Corruption Programming

Sudan Field Office at REDSO/East Africa – Officer in Charge 2003-2005
- Creating One Management Structure for Four Locations and Multiple USAID Offices: OFDA, FFP, OTI, DA
- Cross-border Work
- Naivasha Negotiations
- Robert Klitgaard Meetings with SPLM/Garang on Wealth-Sharing Protocol and Potential Corruption
- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA - 2005)
- John Garang – Man With a Vision

USAID/South Sudan – Officer in Charge 2005-2008
- Embassy Insistence that Mission Director be in Khartoum
- Death of USAID Officer John Granville
- Darfur-Khartoum-Juba-Nairobi Staffing and Coordination
- Rural Radio Distribution: CPA and Education
- Focus Groups to Define New Government Priorities – Developing Program To Meet Expressed Needs
- Diaspora Skills Transfer Pilot Program
- Dream of South Sudanese Peace Corps Equivalent
- FSN Housing/Land Purchase Program
- 2004 Speaking Tour in South Sudan with John Garang – “You’ll Know Where Their Heart is by What They Do in Darfur.”
- SPLM Leadership Council Visit to Khartoum

2008 Retirement from USAID – and Various Recall or Contractual Appointments
- Embassy – Tokyo Development Counselor 2008-2009
- USAID Bosnia – Mission Director 2009-2012
- Complex Bosnian Governing Structure
- Swedish SIDA-USAID Development Credit Authority Program
- TDY to South Sudan for 2010 Referendum on Self-Determination
- Celebrating South Sudanese Independence via Daughter Fija
- Exceptional Donor Coordination in Bosnia
- USAID/Sri Lanka – Interim Program Officer
- USAID/Zimbabwe – Oversight of Personnel Appraisal Process
- USAID/Haiti – Interim Economic Growth Team Leader

Concluding Thoughts
- Lost Opportunity of Diaspora Program in South Sudan
- Providing Growth Opportunities for FSNs as TCNs

Addendum: Oral history for USIP-ADST Sudan Experience Project

INTERVIEW
Allan, first of all thank you very much for agreeing to participate in the oral history program. If we could start with talking a little bit about where you were born, a little bit about your childhood, and particularly the kinds of things that might have led you into a career in international development.

**Childhood and Early Background**

REED: Sure. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity. I was born in September 1943 in Worcester, Massachusetts. My mother was Marjetta Reed, who came from Finland and was still a Finnish citizen when I was born. She was very sorry that she hadn’t gotten her U.S. citizenship by September 1943, but she became an American in February 1944. She had come for a brief visit from Finland in 1937, but then got caught up with the Winter War when the Soviet Union captured that part of Karelia in eastern Finland where her parents were. She had come to visit her Uncle Emil in Quincy, Massachusetts, who told her “You can’t go back under these conditions” when World War II broke out. She met my father, Edwin Reed, whose parents came from Finland as well, at a Finnish community dance in Massachusetts, and I was born in Worcester. I was there for first seven years of my life, and then we moved to Chicago. We were there for several years. In 1955, my father worked for Norton Company, which made machine tools. They offered Dad a position in Zurich, Switzerland or in Southern California. We all said, “Let’s go to Zurich, so we’ll be close to Finland!” But he opened up a new office in Southern California, and we went to La Habra in Orange County where I ended up going to high school.

**Q: Did you go to a public high school?**

REED: Yes, La Habra High School. I was a decent student—I got an award for the best social studies student in the 12th grade—but I hadn’t paid any attention to applying to universities until it was too late. I wanted to go to the University of California at Berkeley, but by the time I woke up to all the things you had to do to apply, I ended up attending Fullerton Junior College for my first year and then transferred to Berkeley as a sophomore. I graduated in 1965 with a degree in political science.

Berkeley in the 1960s was an extraordinary place because it was not only a supermarket of courses and ideas, but the Free Speech Movement started there. I was very much taken by the ideas behind that movement. I wasn’t arrested at Sproul Hall when the FSM conducted a sit-in in that administration building, but four of us from Orange County, which is a very conservative part of the state, went back to southern California during the break at Christmastime. We had all been well-respected high school students, and we
went on a speaking tour in Orange County to explain to people that the Free Speech Movement was consistent with the American Constitution and our rights of free speech. The FSM, the Free Speech Movement, had really started as a way for students to support the Civil Rights Movement and to provide a venue for opposition to the war in Vietnam. We were even invited on ABC (American Broadcasting Corporation) talk radio in Southern California to explain our situation, and to answer listeners’ questions. We even heard people tell us, “Oh, you’re Communists. Go back to Russia!” But there were also some people who really did listen to what we were saying.

I graduated after only three years at Berkeley. In the spring of 1965, Peace Corps had announced there was going to be something called, an “Advanced Training Program,” or ATP. The idea was that, for four programs, Peace Corps would take students from universities that were in their junior year, bring them for training in the summer of 1965, say for Ethiopia, and then, after initial training, everyone would return to universities for their senior year and graduate. Then, in 1966, those same ATP trainees would return for a second summer of training before going overseas. The four programs were Ethiopia at UCLA, a program for Thailand at another university, a program for Liberia, and I forget the fourth country in Latin America.

Q: So you really then, during your senior year...?

REED: In my senior year I told Peace Corps this is very attractive because the idea of Peace Corps service really appealed to me. I was taken by President John Kennedy’s inaugural address and the idea of service was something that was really interesting to me.

Q: But this extended program gave you an opportunity to do much more study about the countries before you went out as Peace Corps Volunteers (PCV)?

REED: Yes. The idea was that the juniors would come back for their senior year armed with language tapes and the incentive to learn about the countries we would go to, and since we were going to be teachers, do some practice teaching. I told Peace Corps, “If you let me in as a graduate student, I will create a Peace Corps recruiting committee at the Berkeley campus.” Some of the first group of Peace Corps Volunteers were returning, and I thought they could encourage others to volunteer and I wanted them to speak to students. So Peace Corps agreed to let me into the ATP program as a graduate student—the only grad student in the program. There were four of us from Berkeley at UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) that summer who then came back to the Berkeley campus for our senior year. There were some of the other ATP students from the Thailand program and the Liberia program, and I brought them together and said, “Let’s form a Peace Corps committee.” We got applications for the Peace Corps from Washington. We had a table set up at the student union where we manned it every day. We brought in a wonderful film called A Choice I Made, where Peace Corps had made a film about the first volunteers in India. It starts as a black and white film, showing Peace Corps Volunteers coming to their villages or their assigned places, getting to know people, getting to understand what India was about, what their jobs and communities
were about, but the last five minutes of the film was an explosion of color because India is such a colorful place. It just made you want to get up and go there!

Q: [Laughs]

REED: I saw that film a few times a week because we showed it on campus nearly every day. Our Peace Corps Committee brought in Warren Wiggins, the deputy director of the Peace Corps from Washington to participate in a discussion of “Violence and Social Change.” Saul Alinsky came in from the Industrial Areas Foundation in Chicago to participate, as well as David Duncan, the first Green Beret who opposed the war in Vietnam. We put this panel discussion together because Berkeley was a very active campus. There were hundreds of students who came to that, and there were lots of questions. That year, 1,200 Berkeley students applied to the Peace Corps. Peace Corps brought me to Washington to explain to them, “How do you organize a campus-based recruiting program.” I said, “Well, it helps that there is a Vietnam War, and everybody is looking for an alternative form of service.”

After that first summer of ATP training, I did one year of graduate work, not in a degree program, but I took courses in the Education Department and in the African Studies Department. I also used that year not only to get involved in the Peace Corps Committee, but I was co-chair of the Anti-Apartheid Committee out of Stiles Hall in Berkeley. We did a lot of public education about the importance of supporting the ANC (African National Congress) and the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa in the San Francisco Bay area. We also focused on Angola and Mozambique, which were still Portuguese colonies.

One of the most effective public education tools that we used in the Anti-Apartheid Committee was a film that NBC (National Broadcasting Corporation) TV had done called *Angola: A Journey to a War*, where they sent in their Africa correspondent with the beginning of the struggle for independence in Angola. It was a powerful and compelling testimony about why the people of Angola wanted to be free. That film, together with the Peace Corps film, *A Choice I Made*, in India, made me realize the importance of film as a medium of communication, which later became important in my work on South Sudan.

**Peace Corps Assignment to Ethiopia**

In 1966, we had a second summer of training at UCLA. We were divided into two groups. Half the group was living in East Los Angeles in the barrio with Mexican American families. Half of us were living in South Central Los Angeles in Watts, a year after the Watts riots. I lived with a wonderful African-American family headed by Manila Lee who was the first Baha’i I ever met, and I taught in a summer school in Watts. From there Peace Corps brought us to Ethiopia for a summer of training in Alamaya, a college in the eastern part of Ethiopia, before we were assigned to our villages. There was another Peace Corps Volunteer and I who wanted to go to a place called Gidole in southwestern Ethiopia, because it was a very remote village. But Peace Corps said, “No.
We send people there after their second year in country.” This other Volunteer and I were assigned to a place called Dembidolo in western Ethiopia, up on the highland escarpment.

Peace Corps had a wonderful system. At that time, when Peace Corps Volunteers first came, they sent all of us out to our villages of assignment to see what they were like, then we would come back into Addis Ababa to purchase whatever we thought we needed and then go back to our village of assignment. The plane that went from Addis to Dembidolo passed a little village called Gambela before it got to Dembidolo. Most of Ethiopia is up in the highlands. On the western edge of the country, there is a 5,000 foot drop, an escarpment, and below the escarpment is Gambela, which is in a Nilotic area that is really more similar to parts of southern Sudan, but it is technically geographically part of the Ethiopian territory.

As the plane descended into Gambela and this grassy airstrip—they had to chase the cows away before we could land—I was struck by what a strange, different place this is. I met Wubishet Adisow, who was the headmaster of Ras Gobena School in Gambela, at the airport. He asked who I was and what I was doing. I said, “I’m a Peace Corps Volunteer on my way to Dembidolo.” He asked, “What is Peace Corps?” I answered, “We’re American volunteers, and we’re assigned to Ethiopian schools.” He said, “Oh, I wish we had one here. Can I show you the Ras Gobena School here?” I said, “No, I’ve got to get back on this plane.”

So, I went up to Dembidolo, which is a very interesting coffee country town. When I went to the school, the Indian Headmaster said, “Oh, great! We have four Peace Corps Volunteers this year! Nobody’s going to have to work very hard.” I was surprised because I came to Ethiopia as a Peace Corps Volunteer to work, and the Headmaster was saying there wasn’t a great need. On my way back to Addis Ababa, I stopped off Gambela.

Q: Ah, that’s right, because this was your first trip where you were “casing it out,” right?

REED: Yes, and I met Wubishet at the airport. Gambela is such a tiny place. Everyone goes to the airport whenever a plane comes in because it’s a little village. Wubishet said, “Oh, you’re on your way to Addis?” I said, “No, I am here because you wanted to show me Ras Gobena School!” So Wubishet took me in. The school was not even in a building. It was in three old, bombed out buildings from World War II that had been warehouses or something. There were so many students. There weren’t enough teachers. Some of the classes were held outside under a tree. Wubishet was really excited about teaching, but he said, “It is so difficult.” He said, “I really want Peace Corps to send a teacher here. How about you? Would you be willing to come here?” I said, “Well, you know, in Dembidolo they have more than enough teachers. Maybe this makes sense.” He took me to the education office in the governor’s office. They said they would love to have a Peace Corps Volunteer there. I said I would go back up to Addis, talk to the Peace Corps, and see what happens.
Peace Corps was open to the idea, but they said, “You have to go to Dembidolo because that’s where you are assigned now. But shortly we’ll send somebody to go to Gambela to check this out.”

About two months into my teaching time in Dembidolo, India McCanns from Peace Corps staff in Addis Ababa came to Dembidolo. She said, “Let’s go take a look at Gambela.” We went there. She met a couple of students, Anuak students from that area, who, three years earlier, had walked from Gambela for nearly a month up to Addis Ababa and asked to speak to the Emperor, Haile Selassie. The governor of Gambela had an office in Addis. When he heard these Anuak students had walked all the way from Gambela, the Emperor gave them an audience. He asked them, “Why have you come here?” They said, “We have no school in Gambela.” The Emperor said, “Okay, I will fly you back to Gambela, and we will build a school.” This was three years before. After two years, there was still no school. These kids then walked back up to Addis Ababa again, and they said, “We need to see the Emperor.” Haile Selassie saw them, and he asked, “What is it now? “ They said, “You promised us a school, but you haven’t built one!” So then the Ethiopian Government started to build a regular school, Ras Gobena, in Gambela.

When I visited with Wubishet, they hadn’t completed the new school, but they were going to do that for the next school year. India McCanns met these students and realized how hungry they were for education. It took another month-and-a-half to get agreement for my reassignment, but I did get transferred down to Gambela.

When I got there, it was clear there were about 20,000 refugees from the first conflict in Southern Sudan in that “awraja,” that district of western Ethiopia. There was no significant refugee program for Southern Sudanese refugees in Gambela, just as there was no significant refugee program for Eritrean refugees who had gone from Ethiopia into Sudan. Neither the Sudanese Government nor the Ethiopian Government wanted to recognize refugees in their country from their neighbor because neither wanted their own citizens to receive large-scale help in their neighboring country. There were really no programs except for a small scholarship program the All-Africa Conference of Churches out of Nairobi had for southern Sudanese refugees who made it to Addis Ababa.

Gambela is a little village on the last navigable point of the Baro-Sobat River complex that flows into the White Nile at Malakal, going up to Khartoum. Ethiopia’s coffee from the western part of Ethiopia used to be brought down in these 50-kg sacks, down that 5,000-foot escarpment, in the dry season after the coffee season harvest and deposited in these great big warehouses in Gambela. During the dry season the river is very low at that point, but in the rainy season the river becomes deep enough for these Mississippi river-type paddlewheel steamboats to come up river to Gambela and take Ethiopia’s coffee out and ship it out west through Sudan. When the civil war broke out in Sudan in 1955, by the early 1960s, the Anya-Nya rebels had begun to attack the steamboats because that’s how the Sudanese army also transported its troops. Because there was so much coffee lost, coffee exports stopped going down to Gambela, so these coffee warehouses were empty. When I heard that this All-Africa Conference of Churches group on refugee
scholarships was interested in Southern Sudanese refugee students going to schools outside of Addis Ababa, I wrote a proposal to them, because Peace Corps encouraged us as teachers to develop a community development activity in addition to our teaching responsibilities. I drafted a proposal for how much it would cost to rent a warehouse, how much it would cost to get flip flops, tee-shirts and shorts to clothe the refugees, pencils and notebooks, how much it would cost to have two or three meals a day, and I would live in the warehouse with them so there would be no administrative costs, and sent the proposal to the group. They agreed to fund the refugee hostel program. My second year in Gambela I opened up a refugee hostel where over 100 refugees from South Sudan were able to come into the village of Gambela because there was plenty of room in the school. Ras Gobena school welcomed refugees.

Q: So there was no tension with the village in Gambela to taking in the refugees?

REED: No, because they were ethnically South Sudanese; they were Nilotic people. The Anuaks and the Nuers spill across the border between Sudan and Ethiopia, and they are present in both countries. The highland Ethiopians were the administrators and they ran the airline office, the governor’s post office, health clinic, and most of the teachers in the school were highland Ethiopians. They were different ethnically from the Nilotic people of Southern Sudan who were prominent in that Gambela area.

The Peace Corps Volunteer who was with me in Dembidolo came to Gambela the second year, and she opened up a girls’ hostel. We had a way of enabling South Sudanese, both men and women, boys and girls, to go to the school.

Q: So you were doing that in addition to your regular teaching?

REED: I was teaching, yes. My primary Peace Corps assignment was as a teacher. But we got the Ras Gobena school interested enough to develop what they called a “special class.” We built a grass-thatched large room. The Ethiopian school system is conducted in Amharic from Grades 1 through 6, and instruction in English medium only begins in grades 7 and 8. Because the Sudanese government had closed all the schools in South Sudan in the 1960s because they thought educated people became rebels, many of the refugees who came over to Ethiopia may have had 4th or 5th grade education in the Sudanese system, and then their schools were closed. They needed a little bit of catch-up in English and math to be able to come in to the 7th grade in Ethiopia, so we developed this special class. The Ethiopian teachers in the Ras Gobena School, myself, and the other Peace Corps Volunteer taught that special class in addition to our regular courses. If students in the special class passed an exam, they could enter the 7th or the 8th grade.

Q: You were a busy Peace Corps Volunteer!

REED: Yes! I extended for a third year because there was no guarantee that the next Peace Corps Volunteer would take this refugee hostel project on as their community development activity, and I wanted the Ethiopian teachers in the school to be interested
enough to take over the administration of the hostel because then it would be sustainable. And they did, so I’m glad that I spent a third year there.

Southern Sudan – Telling Their Story and Providing Relief

At the end of that time I was invited by the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement—the Anya-Nya rebels—to come in to Southern Sudan with them as their first foreign witness and to try and get some publicity and humanitarian assistance. There is a separate interview that I did with the U.S. Institute of Peace where I go into a lot of detail about that experience.

Q: You spent months doing that -- correct?

REED: I walked for 10 months and 3,000 miles with the Anya-Nya rebels as the only foreigner walking with them so extensively at that time. I was in my twenties then. I’m in my seventies now!

Q: [Laughs] Yes, we will cross-reference that because it’s a fascinating story. It’s important to hear, and it was important to your development and what you did next.

REED: Yes, there’s a lot more to tell there.

Q: So you finished the three years at Peace Corps, and then you spent 10 months…?

REED: In a two-year period I spent 10 months on three different trips in the bush. We did get a medical relief supply going in through Uganda with World Council of Churches-affiliated agencies. A film that I shot for NBC TV was featured in a program called, “First Tuesday,” in September 1971. That was NBC’s equivalent of 60 Minutes. They asked me to make the film when they couldn’t get anybody willing to go into the bush. They taught me cinematography and gave me a couple of Super-8 cameras, which I left behind in Southern Sudan because I trained several Anya-Nya rebels in photography and left them the means of developing their own communications materials.

At the end of that film, in September 1971, NBC was very pleased with it. They had lost their Africa correspondent. The one who did…

Q: The one who did the Angola film?

REED: Yes, he was killed in the Congo the year before. They said, “This Sudan film was so well done, let’s do another one. If it’s as good as the Sudan film, maybe you will be our Africa correspondent.” So I got into an argument with NBC. They wanted me to make a film about Peace Corps in Africa. I love the Peace Corps. Peace Corps was really good to me, even if I embarrassed them by going off with the rebels, but that’s an American story. I said, “No, I want to go spend a couple of months with Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania. He’s a hero in Africa, and we need to understand why this man is right for Africa, at least for Tanzania,” or Tanganyika as it was called then. NBC said,
“Oh, he’s a socialist leader.” I said, “No, we need to understand his appeal.” In fact, there is no tribalism in Tanzania compared to many other countries in Africa because of his visionary leadership. I really wanted that to come out. I also wanted to have him talk about Southern Sudan, because he was very close to recognizing the Anya-Nya Liberation Movement. But NBC said, “No. Peace Corps.” So we argued, Peace Corps, Nyerere. Peace Corps, Nyerere. Finally, I told NBC, “No, I would rather work on Sudan.”

Shortly after that, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement ended that 17-year civil war. I was asked to help settle refugees and organize the reconstruction of schools and clinics through the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC)/Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation(CRR). That decision was the smartest move I’ve ever made because that’s where I met my wife, Ayo. She had come from Harlem Hospital in New York. As an African-American, she wanted to serve on the Continent. She hates paperwork. She got a three-page application from the Peace Corps, and a one-page application from the Church World Service (CWS), and that’s what she responded to. We met on Saturday, October 28, 1972, at 11:30 p.m. in the lobby of the Excelsior Hotel by the banks of the River Nile in Khartoum, which is where the Sudan Council of Churches put all their incoming expatriate staff before we went onto our assignments. She walked right into my life. I’m so glad I said no to NBC!

Q: Very smart decision!

REED: Ayo went to Juba Hospital to be the Director of Nurses for the Southern Sudanese Ministry of Health, and I went to Wau as Deputy Area Coordinator of the SCC/CRR for Bahr el Ghazal Province, one of three provinces of Southern Sudan.

Q: How far is that from Juba?

REED: It seemed like a million miles because the roads are terrible!

Q: [Laughs]

REED: But we used to send each other letters. Ayo would bake me some banana bread, I sent her love letters back with the truck drivers that plied the dirt road between Wau and Juba, and we got married two years later.

Q: Wow, that’s fantastic. So then you worked for two years on the refugee programs, returned refugees?

REED: We did, with returned refugees who had some skills in carpentry and masonry from their time in Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. We formed building teams, and they were used then to reconstruct the schools and clinics that were destroyed during the war. I worked with a Southern Sudanese man named Peter Ring Ajing, who was the Area Coordinator. I was his Deputy. He was a very fine man. He later worked for USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development). He had previously worked for the U.S.
Embassy in Khartoum. He was a civilian at that time, and he worked for Sudan Council of Churches. We worked together for two years.

In fact, the reason that Ayo and I got together was when she arrived in Khartoum, the Ministry of Health was so eager for her to come to Sudan. When she arrived in Khartoum, it was only then that they realized, “We haven’t thought a lot about where she is going to live.” It took the Ministry of Health a month to organize a tent for her to first stay in in Juba. When I arrived a week before her in Khartoum, I was detained at the airport because the Sudanese government did not like the film that I had made for NBC. I also used to go on the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Focus on Africa program a few times and also did a lot of writing and public speaking about the conflict in Sudan.

When I arrived in Khartoum, immigration authorities there said, “You’re not welcome in this country. You can either get on this plane and go to Ethiopia, or you can wait until it comes back, and then you go back to Europe.” I asked if I could make one phone call. I called Bona Malwal, who was the Southern Sudanese Minister of Information in Khartoum. I had seen him in Europe the two months prior. He had then been asked by the church groups, “Is it all right that Allan Reed comes back and works in Sudan, because we know he has done all this publicity stuff.” Bona said, “That’s fine. The war is over.” So I called Bona from the airport and said, “Bona, I’m detained. They’re not going to let me in.” He came to the airport, and he said, “The black list was for the war. The war is over. Let this man in.” But then it took the Sudanese Government a month to give me permission to go from Khartoum to the South. That month is when Ayo was stuck in Khartoum, and I was stuck in Khartoum.

Q: Ahh! Very good!

REED: Serendipity! It was the inefficiency of the Sudanese government that brought us together.

Q: [Laughs] Good! You do owe something to Khartoum!

REED: By 1974, there was a terrible drought that was affecting the Sahel all the way to Sudan. Ezekiel Kodi, the Provincial Governor of Bahr el Ghazal, asked if I would do a famine survey of the entire province—there were only three provinces in South Sudan at the time—all the way from Raga to the Nile, from Aweil down to Tonj and Rumbek, and see if I could assess, with Sudan Council of Church staff, each village’s need, how much food they would require, and would there be a way of bringing food relief in that could be linked to development programs. I did a massive report—in fact I have it here, I can show it to you—where I went from one end of the province to the other and detailed how many sacks of grain would be needed for how many people in this community, what are the key potential development projects, such as wells, reconstructing clinics, developing the school, ox training center so they could plow their fields more easily. It was all put together so it wasn’t just relief, but relief to become sustainable.

Q: It would be what they refer to as “Food for Work.”
REED: It was like a Food for Work program. I wasn’t familiar with USAID at that time, but it was that kind of program. The Governor of Bahr el Ghazal was very happy with it. He sent it to Khartoum and Khartoum sent it to Geneva, to the World Council of Churches. The Sudanese ambassador in Switzerland saw it, and he was furious. He said, “There goes Allan Reed again saying Sudan can’t feed itself.” In response, the Sudanese government yanked me out of Southern Sudan and brought me to Khartoum. The Sudan Council of Churches was very sorry, but they said, “Come to Khartoum and we’ll work this out.” Then the Governors of Darfur and Kordofan in the western part of northern Sudan heard about the report I did for the Governor of Bahr el Ghazal in southern Sudan. They came to Sudan Council of Churches and said, “Please let him come and do the same thing!” I said, “I have no problem doing that for the north,” because there was human need as well. But the government in Khartoum said, “We’re not going to let him out of the city.” At that point I said, “Kalas!” (Juba Arabic for, “Finished”) That’s it, done.”

Q: You needed to leave. That’s when you made the decision to leave?

REED: Yes. Ayo in the meantime had been working with the Kenya Ministry of Health as Director of Nursing in the northern frontier district. I went to Nairobi and that’s when we got engaged and we went back to the States.

Q: It was now...?

REED: 1974, the summer of ’74.

Q: So you returned then to the U.S.?

REED: Well, we were planning on getting married in Kenya in July ’74, but we learned that her mother in New York and my father in California were both terminally ill. So we came back to the States. Her mother passed away very quickly in August that year. I went out to California. We got married in New York in December. My father lasted for another year, but I could see there was a need to be there. When I went to Ethiopia, my intention as a Peace Corps Volunteer was to do two years and then come back and go to law school.

Q: I’m sure your parents were very tolerant with your wanderlust and commitment to Sudan and South Sudan!

REED: I realize, now that I’ve got children and grandchildren of my own, what I put my parents through when I sent them a letter in 1969 simply telling them, “I’m going somewhere where there is no post office. I’ll write you a letter when I get out,” without telling them that I was going into the bush. It took three-and-a-half months before they got a message from me, and I’m so sorry for what I did to them!

Q: [Laughs] Your children need to repay you in kind!
REED: [Laughs] Ayo and I ended up going to California. In September, I went to see Jan and Joaquin Sanchez who had been Peace Corps in Ethiopia. They had gone back to Ethiopia when Joaquin was on Peace Corps staff there, and then he was in the Dean’s Office at the University of California, Irvine. Irvine was a new campus at that time. I went just to see them as friends, in Costa Mesa. Joaquin said, “Well, what are you going to do now?” I said, “Well, next year I am going to apply and go to law school.” I just wanted us to be in California to be around for family support as my father was going through a difficult time. Joaquin kind of pushed me. “Why do you want to go to law school?” I said, “Well, that’s what I wanted to do when I went into the Peace Corps.” “But why do you want to go to law school now?” Finally, he said, “Listen.” This was on a Friday in September. “Go speak to Henry Fagin, the dean of the School of Administration. They have a new program there. Just go and talk to him.”

I went and spoke that afternoon with Henry Fagin. They let me into the master’s degree program for public administration that same day. I had graduated from Berkeley, part of the University of California system, and they had nobody with overseas experience. That Monday I started a master’s degree program in public administration. Core courses were at the Irvine campus. It was fairly new, but all the electives that I was interested in were across town at UCLA. At that time—you can’t do it today anymore—you could drive in 45 minutes from Newport Beach to Westwood on the San Diego freeway. I would take development administration, political economy and disaster relief from Professor Jerry Weaver.

Q: UCLA also had a strong Africa Studies department as well.

REED: Yes, they did. I took all my electives at UCLA from Professor Weaver. I ended up showing my film on South Sudan to his class. Jerry got very interested in Sudan, and when I was finished my master’s degree, he asked, “Well, what are you going to do with this now?” I said, “I want to work for the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that I saw do such good work in Southern Sudan.” He said, “You really ought to join USAID.” I said, “I don’t want to work for the government!” He said, “Don’t be stupid. Where do you think the NGOs and PVOs get their money?” I hadn’t thought of that! He said, “Just apply to USAID. Apply to the NGOs, okay, but apply to USAID and see what happens.” So I got invited in to the IDI (International Development Intern) program. I didn’t really expect it, but I joined the IDI program in April, 1977.”

Early USAID Assignments

Q: This is Carol Peasley again with Allan Reed, and we will reconvene. Allan, when we stopped I think it was 1977, and you were just entering into an International Development Intern (IDI) program with USAID. Was it a large class?

REED: There were 15 of us. What I was stunned at—because I intended to come in just for two years, figure out how AID works, then go back to the NGOs—almost all of us were former Peace Corps Volunteers. Gary Alex was an ex-IVS (International Volunteer
Almost all of us had had grassroots, village-level, living and working experience in developing countries that motivated us to come into AID. That’s not what I expected to find. It was thrilling because there were so many like-minded people.

**Q:** What was the composition of this class of 15? When I came in, I came in with a class of 15, and I was the only woman.

**REED:** Oh, no, there were several women in the class, such as Sherry Suggs, Diane Ponasik and several others.

**Q:** Good!

**REED:** It wasn’t quite half and half, but there were some really good women in the program.

**Q:** It was a good representative?

**REED:** Yes.

My first assignment as an IDI was actually in the old Technical Assistance Bureau in Washington. Then I did an assignment, a rotation, in the Africa Bureau. Africa Bureau wanted me to go back to Sudan. After eight intensive years in Sudan, I really wanted to go back to Sudan, but I thought maybe it’s best to have a different kind of experience. I was working in David Shear’s Sahel Development Office, with Hunter Farnham, doing budget work. I got interested in going to Mauritania. It wasn’t an AID mission. It was an AID affairs office to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Not too many people wanted to go to Nouakchott! The reason I wanted to go to Mauritania is because my northern Sudanese friends had always said, “If only the Southerners became Muslims, then there wouldn’t be a problem.” I wanted to test that theory. We ended up going to Nouakchott.

**Q:** You were hired as a program officer?

**USAID/Mauritania**

**REED:** A program officer. Yes. I went to Nouakchott as a program officer IDI. We got there a day early because my wife, Ayo, had been in Senegal before. We took the flight from New York to Dakar, and we were going to overnight in Senegal with our one-year-old child. The airport scene was so mad. They wanted $75.00 at that time to take a taxi to the Place de l’Independence. They were very aggressive taxi drivers. We had all this luggage. I asked if there was a flight to Nouakchott that day, and we decided not to stop over in Dakar. We did return to Dakar subsequently and I got to really love Senegal. But my first impression of Dakar was not good.

So we arrived in Nouakchott a day early.

**Q:** Oh, there was no one at the airport? [Laughs]**
REED: There was nobody from USAID at the airport. Jim Anderson was the deputy director at the time. Jim was very well known. I asked a taxi driver, who said, “Oh, I know where Jim lives.” We showed up at Jim’s house. They gave us this Mauritanian tea. We hadn’t slept for three days before that because we had flown from Los Angeles to New York to say goodbye to Ayo’s family, then flew over to Dakar. Didn’t sleep then. We were exhausted, and Jim plied us with Mauritanian tea, these three glasses of very strong tea, and we couldn’t even sleep that night!

The next day we moved into our house. It was the day after the Fourth of July, and I was supposed to walk four houses around the corner to the AID office complex. We heard all this noise on the AID radio, the embassy radio. We had never been in any country where we had radios like that. There was some squawking about “Can’t get in.” Well, it was a coup d’état that was overthrowing Moktar Ould Daddah. So that’s how we learned about the embassy radio security system. I walked to the office and there wasn’t anybody there, so I walked back home.

We actually ended up four years in Mauritania.

Q: Really? So things sort of stabilized? Who was the mission director? You said Jim was the deputy.

REED: Bob Klein was the mission director. Jim Anderson was the deputy mission director.

Q: Was there a program officer you were working with?

REED: No. I was the IDI program officer. The house that they gave us was a USAID house. Ayo and I had always lived local/local in Ethiopia and Sudan, in very local housing. John Grayzel was our neighbor next door. He was a contractor at the time. He later became a direct-hire. We became lifelong friends with John and Mary Grayzel. Their son, Roland, and our son, Atem, are still good friends.

We were talking about this amazing house that they put us in. After two weeks, we said we wanted to talk to the embassy housing committee. They said, “Oh, yes, we were expecting you,” thinking we were going to piss and moan about the house, which they thought was the worst one in the community. We went to see the housing committee, and we said, “You know, you’ve given us this house. There are glass windows. There’s electricity, air conditioning, furniture, indoor plumbing, a washer and dryer, refrigerator/freezer, and it’s so big! How are we going to get to know Mauritanians? They’re not going to want to come to an ostentatious house like this. We’ve been here two weeks now, and we’ve seen these Mauritanian tents that are really nice, in the Ksar district of Nouakchott. Can we live in a tent?” [Laughs] The housing committee said, “You’re not Peace Corps Volunteers anymore, you’re diplomats! Get back to the house and enjoy it!!”
Q: [Laughs]

REED: So actually a week later, the first vents de sable, the sand storms, came and we were grateful to have windows to close, especially with a baby. We actually did get a Mauritanian tent, and we pitched it in our yard. We did a lot of our entertaining there.

Q: It was probably a very small mission as well?

REED: Yes. There were probably eight or nine direct-hires. More than I would have expected subsequently.

Q: Right. That was probably the height of the program.

REED: Yes.

Q: You were the program officer, but you were a brand new employee. Did you get adequate training? I assume that Jim Anderson had to work very closely with you to help train you?

REED: Jim Anderson was very, very good to work with. Yes. Absolutely. There was a program economist there. What I ended up doing—those were the days when we did PIDs (Project Identification Document) before we do project papers, and Washington reviewed all of them. They didn’t have a design officer. I ended up designing, as the PDO (project development officer), oasis development, vegetable production, rural medical assistance.

Q: So you were doing project design as well as strategy work in the program office?

REED: Yes. I would bring all these documents to Washington for review and approval. Norm Cohen, the Africa Bureau PDO said, “Look, you know you’ve got another year left there as program officer as an IDI. Why don’t you become a “94” (project development officer)? I did, and I spent three more years in Mauritania as a PDO.

Q: As a project development officer instead of program officer? Or did you do both?

REED: I did some program office work the first year. Then somebody else came in as program officer, and I was PDO for the mission. The design experiences were terrific.

Q: Those were the days too…. You said it was an AID Affairs Office so they probably depended a lot on services and help from the regional office in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire?

REED: REDSO (Regional Economic Development Services Office). Yes, in Abidjan. The REDSO office was in Abidjan.

Q: Did that work well, that arrangement?
REED: Yes, it did. But we also got support from AID Washington. In fact, there was no working telephone system in Nouakchott. There were no computers, no Internet—everything was done by cables. It was sometimes kind of frustrating. I remember one time when the second or third time I brought a document whether it was PID or Project Paper to Washington for review. Norm Cohen took me behind the woodshed and said, “You have to stop this.” I said, “Stop what?” We used to send in monthly sitreps (situation reports) about the things that we were doing, and what we were relying on from Washington, what we were relying on from REDSO for support, so we could actually carry out the design and portfolio that we had. There were some changes going on so we weren’t getting much support. I wasn’t trying to rub anybody’s nose in it, but I just laid out all of the things we requested. We asked for this; we never heard from you. We asked for that; we never heard from you. We asked for this; we never heard from you. Norm Cohen said, “Allan, don’t you know when you point out things like that, you really make people feel bad.” I was mortified, because that was not my intention. He said, “You’re absolutely right about everything that you’ve said, but you can sugarcoat how you say it.”

Q: Good lesson learned!

REED: That was a very important lesson learned early on. I really appreciated Jonathan McCabe and Norm Cohen, and the people in the Africa Bureau at that time.

Q: That’s right. At that point in time, it was combined Africa Bureau Development Resources Office with a project wing and a technical wing, and Norm Cohen was the head of the project wing.

REED: The PDO. Yes.

Q: Jonathan McCabe was head of the Sahel Office, I think. I always heard stories about him being a wonderful person.

REED: Yes. He was absolutely wonderful. It was really exciting to do all these designs in Mauritania.

Q: What sort of program did you have in Mauritania?

REED: We had vegetable production, agriculture production, an irrigation program, the Selibaby rural development program. There was a rural roads activity, the RAMS project to collect data for policy and decision making, and rural medical assistance. There was a very innovative oasis development project. John Grayzel was very much involved. He and I designed that. There was a man, Aziz Barada, not far from Selibaby, who was developing oases in a very interesting way. When I brought in the oasis development project paper to Washington for review, we decided to make a film about it. John narrated the film as an anthropologist, and I did the videoing. We thought, “Nobody in Washington really has a concept of what an oasis looks like, so let’s show them one.” We showed the Moorish culture. Everybody really enjoyed it through the initial reviews.
We went to the ECPR (Executive Committee Project Review) meeting with Goler Butcher, who was the Assistant Administrator for the Africa Bureau. When John was explaining about the Mauritania “leisure ethic,” and the film showed this Moorish Mauritanian woman lying down on her mattress, and there were black Mauritians bringing her things, and it was clear that they were slaves, Goler Butcher looked at that and said, “You mean to say we’re going to give our money to THAT woman!” So we had to go back and re-do the action memo to explain that, no, she’s not going to get the support, but oasis development will support everyone in Mauritania.

**Q:** Actually, it’s an interesting question, the degree to which the program there dealt with the issues between the Arab and the African cultures. Was it an explicit part of the strategy to try to deal with those kinds of equity issues?

**REED:** Our strategy included key development support that would benefit the African Mauritians. It was a very complicated society. I think it was really good that John Grayzel was there as a seasoned anthropologist. He really understood the complexities of the caste system in Mauritania. The Haratin were the slave and ex-slave people in Mauritania who often were found in the southern part of the country, but had been slaves for generations.

In 1982, our fourth year, the Mauritanian government, as we were getting ready to leave, finally passed the first law abolishing slavery, but they really never implemented it.

**Q:** Were all Africans enslaved to some degree?

**REED:** No, no, no.

**Q:** Okay. So there was a caste system within the African community as well?

**REED:** Yes. The system was very, very complicated. We worked with somebody in the Ministry of Planning who was one of the few educated Haratine, Hassan Diop, and we did a lot of work with him on developing our programs. He encouraged us to design programs that would benefit the Haratine as well as the broader Mauritanian population. What I realized was that the Southern Sudanese were far more advanced in terms of their thinking about liberation. When some of the early Haratine movements developed, there were situations when there were protests, and because the Haratine spoke Hassaniya Arabic, their owners would protectively say, “Oh, this is going to hurt you.” It was a complicated process for Haratines to develop the consciousness to have an effective political movement. It’s a complex society.

**Q:** It’s interesting. You spent four years there, and I suspect it was a one-tour post because it was a very tough place.

**REED:** Yes. And John Grayzel spent five years there actually.
Q: Five years. You’re talking about the complexity of the environment and the length of time you spent there to really have a better chance of understanding that complexity and this dilemma that existed within AID as to how long people stay at posts. Do you have thoughts about that?

REED: Yes. I think it’s important for us as American AID officers to be in a place long enough to really understand it. Subsequently, towards the end of my regular AID career when I helped to reestablish AID in South Sudan, I was there for five years, but most FSO tours were one year. I came into that situation knowing Southern Sudan. So many people who came in for one-year tours with two R&Rs (rest and recuperation travel) were thinking about where they’re going before they have a chance to get to know the place. Under those circumstances, I think it is so important to have a strong cadre of Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) because they really are the people who have the understanding, the commitment, and the knowledge of what the development needs really are, and we need to listen to that and tap into that. I’ve been blessed to be able to work with some extraordinary Foreign Service Nationals throughout my career.

Q: Was that true in Mauritania? Did you have a good FSN staff, and, if so, what was the composition of the staff? Was that challenging?

REED: That was more of a challenge in Mauritania. I don’t remember how long the AID presence had been there, but there was not a well-developed cadre of Mauritanian FSNs. There was one young Mauritanian who we worked with—in fact I worked on a lot of designs with him—Demba Ba, who was a friend of Jim Anderson’s. He was a high school student. Of all the Mauritanians I met, he had the best capacity to understand how Americans think, so he could explain Mauritania to us in ways it would be understandable to us. He was an invaluable source on design teams when he wasn’t in school. We eventually sent him to Ohio State University for a university program, paid for by USAID. He is now a high official. Now Demba Ba is the World Bank representative to Algeria.

Q: Yes. I’ve met him! He’s a remarkable man! And he’s a product of USAID in Mauritania.

REED: He’s a product of USAID’s education system.

Q: Wow. I hadn’t known that. I didn’t know what nationality he was. Let me ask you something else that I meant to ask when you first said “going to Mauritania.” Did you have French language before you went, or did you have to study?

REED: When I was in high school, I took French through French IV. The last year, Mr. Innis, our high school French teacher—there were three of us who wanted to take French IV, and there was not a quorum for a class—he took his free period, and we would sit around and speak French all that hour. That kind of stuck with me. I took the FSI (Foreign Service Institute) French language-training course and got a 3 before we went to
Mauritania. It was morning classes, so I wasn’t enrolled in a full regular class. I used French in Mauritania.

Subsequently, on my third post when I came out of Swaziland, I expected to go to Uganda and ended up coming to Conakry, Guinea, in 1990. By that time, I hadn’t used French for many years, so AID said, “We want you to go to Conakry as deputy because the mission director is coming in from Latin America and doesn’t have much French. I said, “It’s been seven years since I used my French. Can I go to FSI for brush-up course?” They said, “No, you got a 3. We can’t send you back there, but do you mind going to Villefranche-sur-Mer next to Nice to the Institut de Français for a month?”

Q: [Laughs]

REED: “Aw shucks. Do I really have to?” That was wonderful. In the spring of 1990, on our way to Conakry, that’s where I met an extraordinary man named Robert Klitgaard, who is a world expert on corruption, and I’ve engaged with him on this topic.

Q: Yes, we’ll come back to talking about him. Let’s go back to Mauritania.

REED: Yes.

Q: So you were there for four years, and it sounds like you were doing a lot of very interesting design work and probably there during the height of maximum impact of the AID program in Mauritania over the years. As you were thinking about what you were going to do next, what sort of options were you considering?

REED: Well, I met Norm Cohen at a conference in Senegal in the spring of 1982. He said, “Listen, we really like the PDO work you’ve done. Here are all the programs that are available in Africa.” There were like five of them. He said, “Talk it over with your wife and tell me where you want to go next.” So, I went back to Nouakchott. I think Tanzania was on there and three or four other places. I said, “The one place I don’t want to go is Somalia.” Nouakchott’s the Mogadishu of West Africa. Mogadishu’s the Nouakchott of East Africa. And my wife had worked among Somalis when she ran a hospital in northern Kenya, and she said they were very difficult people to work with. But there were four other really amazing opportunities in Africa.

So I sent this message off to Norm Cohen. A month later the assignment cable came out. We were assigned to Somalia.

Q: [Laughs]

REED: I had just finished designing the rural roads project for Mauritania, and I was bringing that into Washington before we went on home leave/transfer. My first day in Washington, I met Peter Leifert in the hallway. He said, “You know, somebody has the job I really wanted.” I said, “What’s that?” He said, “PDO for Somalia.” I said, “Oh, let’s go talk to Norm Cohen.” I went and asked Norm Cohen, “Why did you assign me to
Somalia?” He said, “Oh, I remember you had written something, and I remember you wrote Somalia.” I said, “Norm, that’s the one place I didn’t want to go! But Peter Leifert here wants to go.” And they needed somebody in Washington to manage the Sudan program, so we did the transfer in one day. From an expectation we were going from one post in Africa to another, we ended up on my only Washington assignment.

Q: Ah! This was in 1982?

AID/Washington – Africa Bureau

REED: In the Africa PD office. Julius Coles was there and later John Heard. My second half of that three-and-a-half year assignment I went to work with Ed Spriggs on the desk as desk officer for Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Sudan. I had both program side and the PD side for those three countries. That was very interesting.

Q: So that was 1982 to 1985?


Q: Right. I went into the Africa Bureau in ’85, in September of 1985, so I just missed you, but I knew of you! So you were working on Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti?

REED: In both offices, on the PDO side and on the desk side. I had a chance to go out to Sudan for extended TDYs (temporary duty assignment). Steve Mintz was in the Khartoum office and so was Carlos Pascual.

Q: Right. As I recall, there was a very bad drought across the Sahel in 1983-84. When I went in 1985, there was a little bit of final work being done related to the drought so you must have been heavily involved with that?

REED: Carlos Pascual had designed a wonderful Food for Peace program. He was a young officer.

Q: Well, he was an IDI in Sudan.

REED: He was an IDI. Yes. He came in to USAID/Washington and he had everybody eating out of his hand as he explained the Food for Peace proposal for Sudan. It was just marvelous to see him at work.

Q: I do recall that there were lots of issues during that period about transportation and Sudan being one of them where there was a lot of support for the transport industry in Sudan. Something about rails as well.

REED: Yes. The rails were a mess. There was a wonderful road that was built into Kordofan.
Q: Ray Love was, I think, heavily involved with that.

REED: Yes. There was also the petroleum initiative. Fred Winch had put that together in a program assistance activity.

Q: I can’t remember my dates on Ethiopian history. Had Haile Sellassie already been done in? So this was the Communist government?


Q: So we weren’t doing a lot of development work?

REED: No.

Q: But we were doing humanitarian work?

REED: Humanitarian assistance. There was a small fisheries program in Djibouti.

When I went to Sudan, I had a chance to see John Garang, who I had met when I traveled in the bush with the Anya-Nya. He had been offered a full Ph.D. scholarship by the University of California/Berkeley after his master’s degree program from the University of Dar es Salaam in 1970-71. It would have paid for everything for a Ph.D. for him, but he went into say goodbye to friends and family in the bush, and everybody said, “We need you here.” So he wrote to Berkeley and declined the scholarship and John Garang joined the Anya-Nya movement. I met him when I traveled in the bush with him. There are some materials in that other interview.

Q: Right. But it’s very interesting. He did his work, and then the Sudanese government sent him off.

REED: They sent him off for long-term training because of his extraordinary ability to mobilize people on issues of self-reliance, which seemed to the Sudanese Government to be a threat. When I joined AID in 1977, John Garang and Rebecca Garang, his wife, and their young son, Mabior (who was a month older than our son, Atem, who has a Sudanese Dinka name) heard we were in Washington. They came and spent Thanksgiving with us for a few days when I was a new IDI. Rebecca had never been out of Sudan, had never been out of Africa. She didn’t speak English. She spoke Dinka and Arabic. November in Washington is much colder than anything she had ever experienced. Mabior had a snowsuit but no diapers. He would get wet and catch cold, so Ayo took Rebecca aside and taught her how to take care of an infant in cold climate because when they were going to Iowa, and it was going to be a lot colder there.

They went off to Iowa. He got his Ph.D. very quickly. She learned English, took a GED (General Education Development) exam, passed it, and was admitted to Iowa State University after she had her second child. She was really smart, just as smart as John Garang. When he arrives in Sudan, he’s an African with a Ph.D. in the army. They don’t
know what to do with him, so they sent off to the ivory tower. They said, “You have a Ph.D. in Political Economy. Establish a master’s program at the University of Khartoum.” He was working with Brian D’Silva. I don’t know if you’ve met Brian?

**Q:** Yes. I do.

**REED:** He’s extraordinary.

**Q:** I had heard that Brian also had been at Iowa State. Had they known one another there?

**REED:** Yes. That’s where they met.

**Q:** Okay.

**REED:** So they worked together. When I came to Sudan on TDY, I met both of them and spent some time with John Garang, including just before the spring break of 1983. He didn’t tell me what he was going to be doing. Then I came back to the States, to the Africa Bureau.

The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement gave political autonomy to South Sudan with its own government. Everything was fine for several years. It was a backwater. It probably would have just limped along that way, but then they discovered oil, and the oil was primarily in the South. President Gaafar Nimeiry said, “You have three provinces. We’re going to create 10 states, and we’ll carve out the oil, and it will be part of the north.” Of course, the Southern Sudanese said, “Well, we’re not saying the oil belongs only to the South, but those people in the oil area are Dinkas and Nuers, they’re not northerners. You can’t say that’s part of northern Sudan.” And they protested. So Nimeiry ripped up the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, dissolved the regional government, established ten states instead of three states - divide and rule - and ultimately, by the spring of 1983, after Nimeiry had imposed Sharia law on Sudan, the former Anya-Nya units in the Sudanese army mutinied in Bor District in the South.

This was in the spring, just as John and Rebecca Garang went down to Bor, where they are from, to cultivate their fields for the spring rains. The Sudanese army told John Garang “You know these ex-Any-Nya folks. Put down this mutiny.” John Garang then went to the mutineers, and they told him, “We’ve bitten off more than we chew. You’re the one who should lead this movement.” Garang said, “I will do that only on one condition. We change the terms of the argument.” The first war, fought for 17 years, was north versus south. The north is two-thirds of the country, two-thirds of the population. The southerners fought to a stalemate. They didn’t win the independence they were fighting for, but they didn’t lose the war, and they were granted the regional government in the Addis Ababa Agreement. Garang asked, “What happened? President Nimeiry shredded the Addis Agreement when it served his own political purpose. Why should we do the same thing again? The argument is not north versus south. We should look at the country in terms of demographics. Two-thirds of Sudanese people are African. One-third
are so-called Arabs. If we are one-third of the population, where are the other half of us? They are the Africans in the north. The Nuba, the Funj, the Fur, the Beja in the Red Sea hills.” He said, “All of these groups are just as disenfranchised as Southern Sudanese. What is needed is a Sudan people’s liberation movement, so that every Sudanese, whether African or Arab, Christian, Muslim, or with traditional beliefs, whether north or south, are all equal Sudanese citizens.” He said, “If you’re willing to fight for a Sudan people’s liberation movement, that’s what I’ll lead.” Well, the Anya-Nya still believed, in their heart of hearts, in independence, but they swallowed hard and said, “Okay, if that’s what it takes.” And that’s how the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) was born.

**Q:** So it was to create a freer, better Sudan rather than to split the country? That was the intent originally?

REED: Yes, but the war then went on for 23 years, and it was brutal.

**Q:** Yes.

REED: There was at least one to two million people who died in the first war, maybe more than that in the second war. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, ending the first civil war, was patched together very quickly. It did not address the fundamental issues between North and South - for example, it didn’t give the regional government any revenue generating authority – it only stopped the fighting. John Garang led the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations, which were very complex, with a security protocol, a wealth-sharing protocol, a power-sharing protocol, the Three Areas protocol, and the Machakos protocol allowing for a Southern Sudanese Referendum on Self-Determination, and it laid out everything that needed to be addressed.

**Q:** And it was comprehensive, hence the name and that critical factor?

REED: Yes.

**Q:** This was when you were back in Washington and you were going into Sudan in 1983, ’84, ’85 period, and this is when John Garang left his teaching and into leading this effort? During this period, because it was a fascinating period in the Horn of Africa and that part of the continent, did you, from Washington, get involved very much in the interagency process?

REED: I didn’t myself. No.

**Q:** You didn’t. But presumably AID was?

REED: Yes.

**Q:** You were then thinking in 1985 of going back overseas.
REED: Yes.

Q: Were you being drawn to go back to that region?

REED: There were several programs that I was very interested in, but Larry Sayers said, “I want you to go to Swaziland.” Well, I looked on the map. It’s sitting in the mouth of South Africa. We’re a multi-racial family. I had been involved in the anti-apartheid movement. I said, “I don’t think I want to go to Swaziland.” He said, “Talk to Julius Coles and other African-Americans who had been there.” They said, “This really is an extraordinary opportunity.”

So in February 1986, we went to Mbabane, swearing we were never going to go into South Africa, nor to buy any South African products.

Q: By this time you had how many children?

REED: We had three children.

Q: Three children. Okay.

REED: We went to Mauritania with one, and came out with three!

Q: [Laughs] Oh, they were all born in....

REED: Well, Oba was born in 1980. In fact, Ayo went into labor with him in Nouakchott at six months. The midwife at the hospital said, “You will be okay, but you’ll lose the baby if you stay here.” Queenie Andress was the embassy nurse. That was the one day a week where there was a pressurized jet, an Air Afrique DC-8—every other day it was a non-pressurized plane—where it was safe for her to fly to Dakar. We put her in a big, flowing West African boubou to hide her pregnancy. I went up the stars with her and flew to Senegal.

The embassy doctor met us at the airport, annoyed that we had interrupted his Sunday golf game, and deposited us unceremoniously at the Pasteur Clinic. He didn’t even go in. We found out he didn’t go in because he didn’t speak French. There was a Lebanese doctor there. Ayo stayed there for six weeks until she delivered. Oba was still premature. Atem and I would drive down every weekend from Mauritania to visit her in Senegal. Ayo was the Peace Corps medical officer in Nouakchott the year before. She took French training at the Peace Corps training center in Rosso with the Volunteers. Doctor Farrah didn’t speak English, so Ayo tested her French by delivering our son in French, and everything was fine. So Oba came back to Mauritania. Our first daughter, Marjetta (Maija), was born when we left Mauritania in 1982.

USAID/Swaziland – Project Development Officer
Q: So you, Ayo, and the three children arrive in Swaziland, and you’re not going to touch foot in South Africa?

REED: Not going to go to South Africa at all. Chuck DeBose was the health officer, and he was African-American and he told us it was clear we were going to starve if we didn’t buy South African products in Swaziland.

Q: [Laughs]

REED: After about three months, Chuck said you really have to go and see for yourself. He told us about the Johannesburger Hotel in what they called the gray area of Joburg, where you could go in as a mixed family and not be kicked out. We reluctantly went in. I knew what apartheid was, but it had never really hit me how much economics was behind all of that. When we drove from Mbabane to Johannesburg, and we could see the incredible wealth in that country that was under very tight control, that’s when I realized this whole thing was about economics and retaining all of that power in the small hands of a minority. I knew that intellectually before, but that really drove the point home. We told the kids, “We’re going to go into South Africa.” We explained the apartheid system to them. Atem said, “Well, where are we going to stay.” I said, “Well, we have two rooms at the Johannesburger Hotel. Mom and I will be in one room, and you kids are going to be in the other room. It’s going to be connected.” Atem said, “So Oba, Maija and I will be in one room, and you and mom will be in the other room?” I said, “Yes.” “Well, that’s apartheid isn’t it?”

Q: [Laughs]

REED: We actually ended up having extraordinary experiences all over South Africa. We spent time in some of the black townships. We’re members of St. Augustine’s Black Catholic Church in Washington, DC, and they had a sister church relationship with Regina Mundi, the mother church in Soweto. A couple of years later, the year that Nelson Mandela was released, we spent two weeks living in Soweto. I made a video for St. Augustine’s about life in South Africa under apartheid—we were there when Mandela was released—and the role that Regina Mundi played as the mother church. We interviewed Bishop Desmond Tutu. I was in the bus park in Soweto near Baragwanath Hospital filming, and I saw a group of a couple hundred black South African youth jogging, entering the bus park, and as they chanted I almost dropped the camera when I heard what they were saying. They were saying, “Viva Comrade de Klerk.” I asked them, “Why are you saying ‘Comrade de Klerk?’” They said, “Well, we recognize it took two to get to this point. De Klerk and Mandela together.” I thought, “That’s amazing!” When I was involved in the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Berkeley in the 1960’s, I thought liberation would come in the 1970s through the ANC and PAC. It came about non-violently through an extraordinary act on both sides. That was thrilling.

Q: Yes. So the Swaziland experience turned out to be actually an important and wonderful....
REED: Carlos Pascual was the program officer in South Africa. When he went on his home leave or R&R, he asked me to come over from Swaziland on TDY and manage an activity he was putting together. It was a grant to Skotaville Press, which was the only black publishing house in South Africa. There was an ANC affiliation and a Pan-African Congress affiliation, and USAID funded a grant to Skotaville Press, where the text for a book called *What is History* was put together. The ANC and the PAC collaborated, and they produced a textbook that could be used to counteract the Bantu education that did not deal with this kind of social and political understanding. The book focused on the Sharpeville massacre as an event and showed how people can look beyond the controlled press into talking with people who witnessed the events. It was an extraordinary piece of work. They put it together with USAID funding because the USAID program did not deal with the South African government. It dealt only with the NGOs and PVOs.

Q: Right, and I know that they worked very hard to go into the townships and build relationships with them.

REED: I treasured that experience.

Q: *The Swaziland program itself—what kinds of things were you doing there?*

REED: There was a lot of agricultural work, some health programs and education programs. Patrick Fine was there as an IDI, and Susan Fine. I hired her as a PSC (personal services contractor) in the Program Office. She was extraordinary. We put together a strategy, and she did so much of that so well. I encouraged her to join the IDI program.

Q: Right, and they had both been...

REED: Peace Corps Volunteers in Swaziland.

Q: *Peace Corps Volunteers in Swaziland. They were kind of following the Reed model of really knowing countries well.*

REED: They were extraordinary. Leticia Diaz was the education officer. Lili Martella was the agriculture officer.

Q: *Allan, so you are in Swaziland. You were talking a little bit about the program. Are there some highlights about that work you would like mention?*

REED: I did design work in Swaziland. I was head of a joint program/project development office, and Joan Johnson was there as program officer. She was very good. During the time I was there, I had my first experience with a technical evaluation committee. There was a second generation of a very large agricultural program, and the Mission asked me to lead the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). It was a very complex activity with a nine-person TEC - five from USAID and four from the Swazi government, including the university and government officials. We had a really good
contract officer who walked me through the process. He said, “You have to respect all the rules.” It was very clear that this was a system that had a lot of rules to follow. I’m glad that I learned in my first experience to follow those rules because as we started reviewing the many applications that came, the many proposals that came in, one of them included one of the university members as a short-term consultant. I said, “Stop!” I asked the person, “Are you aware that you are listed in one of the proposals?” He said he hadn’t been, but I said, “I’m sorry. You’re going to have to leave the technical evaluation committee and you can’t say anything about this. So I asked the contract officer, “Do we have to start all over again?” He said, “You can replace him.” We went through the complex process. We reviewed many different proposals and came down to two for best and final. The assumption that everybody had was that one of the best and final offers was the implementer of the first generation of this activity.

Q: The incumbent?

REED: So the assumption was, yes, they’re going to win. We developed our questions. Everybody participated and understood their roles.

Q: So they came in to be interviewed, the two finalists?

REED: Yes. And they incumbent firm fell on their face.

Q: The incumbent?

REED: The incumbent. Not completely, but it was so clear that the other company was better prepared and more appropriate for this next generation. That was such a valuable lesson to me. That you do these things right and the system actually works. Every other TEC I’ve ever been involved in, you take the time to make sure you cross the t’s and dot the i’s and you will get the right results.

Q: Right. Now you all had Swazi participation on the panel.

REED: Yes.

Q: That’s often done, but it’s not always done.

REED: Oh, I think it’s important.

Q: I’m wondering your thoughts on that? Was this the first time, or had you earlier in your career…?

REED: This was my first technical evaluation committee (TEC) experience

Q: Okay. But it was the mission’s practice to include the Swazi officials on the selection panel.
REED: The contract officer said, “You can do it all these different ways, but it’s a Swazi program, a Swazi project. They should be involved.” So I said, “I want these four institutions.” He said, “Well, you’ve got to have five AID people then.” I said, “This is going to be unwieldy.” But it worked. It worked.

Q: I agree. I think that’s a very important precedent. It’s not always done where the finalists are asked to come and give presentations so you can really judge. That’s not always done either.

REED: Well, we said, “Please come and let’s talk.” Nowadays, you could probably do it through Skype or something. But at that point, they came in, and they came in very confidently.

Q: Right. So it wasn’t just a paper review?

REED: No, it wasn’t.

Q: That’s important. Was any of the program in Swaziland direct support with government? Did you have any grants with the government that required resource transfers in the government? Not budget support per se, but the degree to which you were working directly with government institutions.

REED: Not so much. The education program was part of that, yes.

Q: Okay. It’s a monarchy, is that correct?

REED: It’s very complex. We were there when the Crown Prince was coronated as King of Swaziland. He became Mswati. His name was Prince Makhosetive. In fact, my wife baked him a birthday cake. She’s a baker. When we were in Washington on that Sudan assignment, she had three little kids at home. I encouraged her when I would come in from the office, take a course or do something. She did cake decorating. She’s a fabulous cook. She ended up going to the Culinary Institute of America in Poughkeepsie, NY for advanced pastry making. We had two kitchens in our house in Silver Spring, and she got kosher certified because it’s primarily a Jewish neighborhood there. She did specialty wedding cakes.

Q: Renaissance woman, your wife!

REED: When we got to Swaziland, she ended up baking a cake for the king.

Q: I know really nothing about Swaziland except one does hear stories about the annual ceremony of the king with his wives.

REED: Yes, the (Umhlanga) Reed Dance.
Q: I’m just curious. Did you all then have a gender prism at all in your program? Were there issues regarding the role of women in the country given that sort of posture at the very top of the country?

REED: The issues there were the juxtaposition of the traditional and the modern, because there is a veneer of modernity in Swaziland. In addition to baking cakes for the king, my wife worked with Project Hope. She was teaching in the Swazi nursing college. USAID had sent a number of Swazi students to the United States for advanced professional health training, but it was not uncommon to find people who had been sent for professional medical training in western medicine to still be involved to a certain extent in traditional medical practices, the traditional medicine the Swazis called “muti.” Traditional medicine was still seen as cures for some conditions, even if it was not sanitary. Politically, Swaziland had a modern economy and a legislature, but it was also a strong monarchy and there were complications in the way society was run.

Q: Yes. Interesting.

REED: In 1988 and 1989, I went up to REDSO Nairobi for design conferences because I was in charge of our mission designs in Swaziland. In 1989, I met Julia Taft, who was there for OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance). She asked me about South Sudan. When I went back to Swaziland, that second conflict in Sudan that had started in 1983 was very serious by the late 1980s and AID was looking for ways to do a cross-border humanitarian relief program. I came back to East Africa on TDY. Julia Taft asked me to come and work with Bill Garvelink to explore options for emergency assistance. We were in Kenya, Ethiopia, and we were going to go into the bush.

Q: In South Sudan?

REED: Into the South through the SPLA (John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement). I had done that sort of thing with Anya-Nya. Somehow our presence got leaked into the East African press, so we were told, “You can’t go inside,” but I was really pleased that at least USAID was trying to do something there.

When I went back to Swaziland in 1990, my time was coming to an end. I really wanted to work Keith Sherper, and I was assigned as his program officer in Uganda. In fact, Keith brought me up to look at the program, select the house and all that, and that was terrific. I went back to Swaziland to finish my tour there, eager to join USAID/Uganda. The Africa Bureau in Washington called and said, “We know you want to go to work for Keith Sherper, but we want you to go to Conakry, Guinea, instead. You can be there as deputy mission director.” I called Keith, and Keith said, “Don’t turn that down. I’d love for you to come to Uganda, but you’d be foolish to turn down the opportunity.” We ended up going to Conakry, and I worked with Bill Kaschak.

Q: Right, yes. I had forgotten that Bill was there with you. I remember in 1985 or so, there had been a coup in Guinea, in Conakry, and a new government had come in, and
there was a lot of optimism and reform. But I suspect by 1990, was it still strong or had it receded?

USAID/Guinea – Deputy Mission Director

REED: It was still complicated. There was a residue of the results of history there. When Sékou Touré encouraged the Guinean people to turn down Charles de Gaulle’s referendum as the only country in their West Africa sphere that voted for independence, the French overreacted. Took everything. Pulled the electric sockets out of the walls as they left. Sékou Touré then turned to the Soviet Union. Everything closed down in Guinea for a long time. It’s a country with enormous agricultural potential, but things festered along. It did not work very well. When Sékou Touré died, we saw what was left of the palace where people had spontaneously just pulled it apart, brick by brick, and left a pile of rubble there, which was quite a testimony.

But Guinea was in pretty bad shape. Byron Bahl was mission director when I got there. He left, and they asked me to come in as an interim before Bill Kaschak came. The USAID office was across the street from the embassy. It was an old, rickety building. Somebody had died falling into the elevator shaft, and there was a corpse there. We had been asking Washington to help us move and that was the last straw. We ended up moving to another facility. Dane Smith was the ambassador. That’s the first time I met Ambassador Smith. He later was ambassador when I was in Senegal.

Q: In Senegal. Yes.

REED: He had been a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ethiopia as well. He was a wonderful ambassador in Conakry.

Q: Can you describe the program a little bit? You were doing…?

REED: We had a Food for Peace program. We had a roads program. There was an agricultural development program. We had a large education activity supporting the Guinean education system, and there was a small health program. Steve Grant was there as the education officer. He was quite good. Conakry was a difficult place to live. Actually, when I got to Port-au-Prince on this last Firehouse (Office of Crisis Surge Support Staff) deployment, I had never been to anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, but Port-au-Prince, Haiti reminded me of Conakry.

Q: It’s a difficult, difficult country obviously, and governance has not been a strong point.

REED: Exactly.

Q: To put it mildly. How long did you stay in Conakry?
REED: As SMG (Senior Management Group officers) Bill Kaschak and I were supposed to be there for two tours. My family and I were getting ready to go home leave-return to post in 1992, when the day before we were getting ready to leave I got a call from Jim Norris, who had been mission director in Pakistan. He was director-designate for the first AID mission to Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union. He called and said, “I don’t have to go through the assignment system. I can pick and choose my team. I want you to come and be the program officer.” I had never met Jim Norris.

Q: I was going to say, how did you know Jim? You didn’t?

REED: I didn’t know him. I said, “Well, I’m about to go home leave-return to post in Conakry.” He said, “Well, I want you to come to Russia.” I said, “Well, when do I have to tell you. At least I need to speak about it with my wife and Bill Kaschak.” He said, “By tomorrow.”

So Ayo and I talked about it. At that point, we had four kids. Fija was born in South Africa. It’s a long story.

Q: [Laughs] Swaziland!

REED: Yeah. Ayo, Fija and I had just had malaria. Fija and I had reasonable cases because we were taking anti-malarial prophylaxis. My wife is allergic to every form of anti-malarial prophylaxis, and she had a pretty severe case. I thought it was only a matter of time before she gets it again, or we get it, or the other three kids get, so we decided to take a malaria break, because there isn’t any malaria in Moscow. I talked to Bill. I said, “Bill, I want to come back here. If I hadn’t gotten this call from Jim Norris, I would be happy to come back to Conakry. I like working with you. I like the program. But we want to take a malaria break.” He said, “I fully understand that.”

USAID/Russia – Program Officer

So we ended up not doing home leave-return to post, but home leave-transfer.

Q: This was 1992?

REED: This was 1992.

Q: So Jim had just been named the mission director?

REED: Yes, but nobody was there in Moscow yet.

Q: Nobody was there yet?

REED: We were all going to arrive in September together as a block. Our eldest son, Atem, had finished the 7th grade the year before in the American school, and there was no 8th grade. The choice the year before this was to send Atem off to boarding school—he
was 13 years old; he was too young, to do home schooling but there is no social side, or to enroll in the French lycée.

When we went to Mauritania in 1978, Atem was one year old. He had just started to speak English. When we got to Mauritania, he stopped speaking. He said nothing for a year. We were getting kind of worried about his development. One day Ayo was in the kitchen, and Atem, at two years old, comes in and says, “Je voudrais jus d’ananas, s’il vous plaît.” She said, “What? Can you repeat that?” “Je voudrais jus d’ananas.” “Can you say that in English?” “Yes, I would like some pineapple juice, please!” He had never heard French before, and he sorted it through his mind until he could get it all out correctly.

Two weeks after that, Ami, who worked for us in Nouakchott, went off early that day. Ayo said, “Oh, I wanted you to come with me to the market because I want to get some okra and the market lady doesn’t speak French. Ami said, “Well, I have a doctor’s appointment, but take Atem.” Ayo said, “Why should I take him?” She said, “Because he speaks Jola.”

Q: [Laughs]

REED: Fast forward to many years later when he finishes the 7th grade in the American School in Conakry. We went to the French lycée. They said, “Atem has to take a French test like everybody else.” When we got to Silver Spring, Maryland, in 1982 after Mauritania, Atem went to Kent Mill Elementary School and saw that nobody speaks French there, so he stopped speaking French. But during R&R in 1992, Atem took French FSI (Foreign Service Institute) language tapes to our Minnesota summer home, studied, and passed the entrance test for the lycée when he came back to Conakry. The director of the French lycée said, “I’m sure he will be out within a month, so just brace yourself for that.” Atem passed 11 of his 12 subjects in French. The one he didn’t pass was physics, but he had never had that in English. The director of the French lycée said, “Any other American kid who wants to come in, they’re welcome.”

As we’re getting ready to go to Moscow, Atem wants to go the French lycée in Moscow. His best friend from Conakry was Belgian. We sent Atem to spend the summer with Jeremy in Brussels, and we would pick him up on our way to Moscow. So that’s what we did. But before then, all of us, including spouses, were given one-month intensive one-on-one Russian language training, not at FSI, but in a separate system. We were three weeks into that and I get a call from the deputy EXO (executive officer) in Conakry. Donna said, “Are you sitting down?” I said, “What happened?” “Well, I have to tell you what happened.”

So, when we left Guinea, we had only one day to throw all of our household effects into cardboard boxes. Donna said, “Don’t worry, we’ll pack you out.” We had a two-story house in Conakry. All the bedrooms and washing machine were upstairs and living room, kitchen, dining room and everything else downstairs. There was a lip between the floor and the stairs that go down, so the floor was three inches below the upstairs stairwell.
There’s no electric power in Conakry, except between two and three every morning. The new mission controller came in, and he had no washing machine in his house, so they came to our house, disconnected the washing machine to put it in the new controller’s house, forgetting to screw the water pipe back on the washing machine. Every night for two-and-a-half weeks, between two and three in morning, the city power came on because they weren’t running the generator, and water came out upstairs until that three inches was full, soaked up to the boxes, seeped through the ceiling floor into rain falling on the boxes downstairs. Donna had to tell us everything was a total mess. We were very sorry about that.

When we got to Moscow, Donna had organized the whole community to take all of our clothes, wash and dry them, repack everything. We had some moldy books, but that’s dedication.

Q: That’s a special executive office!

REED: That’s what happens when you are in a hardship post, and the community comes together. We were so grateful for that community and Donna.

Q: Wow. That’s a wonderful story! How many of you were in that first group that arrived in Moscow?

REED: There were 11 or 12 of us.

Q: Jim Norris was the mission director.

REED: Bob Burke was the deputy. Tom Rishoi was the private sector officer. I was both program officer, democracy and governance officer, and head of an HR (human resources) program where we would send 5,000 Russians a year for short and medium training in the U.S. We all rolled up our sleeves and took parts of the portfolio.

Q: Okay. And there had been people from Washington that had been sort of beginning to put the program in place, is that correct?

REED: The State Department had signed up like $400 million dollars’ worth of grants. The program was mile wide and an inch deep.

Q: Did you have the office...? No, you were at the Change Building initially before you went into Spody, right?

REED: Yes, we were in the Change Building.

Q: Which is on the embassy compound?

REED: Just outside the embassy compound actually, right across the street from the “Church of Our Lady of Perpetual Surveillance!”
Q: That’s right! [laughs]

REED: They weren’t expecting an AID program to come in with officers, so Jim Norris had a place on the embassy compound. The rest of us were housed in hotels around town—the Aerostar, the Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel, until they could put together these prefabricated houses from Pennsylvania, ship them on boats and put them on cement foundations in a place called Rosinka and link them up to electricity.

Q: Did you all live in Rosinka?

REED: Eventually.

Q: Eventually, okay.

REED: But it took about seven or eight months before we moved into Rosinka. We had three rooms at the Radisson. Ayo and I were in one room. Atem and Oba were in another room. Maija and Fija, our daughters, were in the third room with Esther Tozay, the Liberian nanny from Conakry who said, “I want to go to Russia with you guys!” We brought her, and I am so glad we did. She was not a great cook, not a great housekeeper, but she was wonderful with kids.

Q: In the Radisson Hotel for that long?

REED: Yes. We were paying no meals, no laundry, no telephone, but it was $21,000 a month. No discount for U.S. government. I didn’t have to pay it out of pocket, but I’m sure a couple of pennies of my tax money were going into that! It was months before the Rosinka housing was going to be developed. After four months, we looked around and said, “This is outrageous.” So we found a Russian apartment. The Russians had started to privatize housing, and there was a very nice apartment building in the Oktoberskaya section of Moscow, and some Russians living there had privatized their apartment there. For eight dollars in paperwork, the residents of those apartments could privatize them. This family did that for a three-bedroom apartment they had. They moved into the same building, two floors up and they rented us the apartment they now owned, and the embassy agreed—they inspected it—for $3,000 a month as opposed to $21,000 a month in the Radisson. It was furnished. There were Russian rugs on the wall, the furniture and the floor. But it had a kitchen, a kind of a washing machine. It was a Russian experience.

Q: Much easier for the family. Were you the only one with a family, or did other people have families?

REED: Other people had families, but we were the first people to move into an apartment. From there we went into Rosinka when it was ready. After two months, Ayo was coming into the Oktoberskaya apartment lobby one day, and there was this babushka who was the concierge. She asked Ayo, “Why don’t you ever get your mail?” We didn’t know there was mail. There were these drawers that were in the wall. She pulled it out. It
was all in Russian. Ayo happened to read it and saw a utility bill, which included the rent. So, we now understood why they privatized the apartment to get $3,000 a month in rent from us. For one month’s rent that we were paying, or the U.S. government was paying, we calculated how long they could rent their equivalent around the corner—4,025 years because they were paying one-and-a-half cents! I mean housing was free. It was a token amount, which is why we understood people were starting to privatize—because they recognized the new economy.

Q: It’s interesting in Russia because the diplomatic community had to live either on their embassy compounds or in the Russian government-owned housing for diplomats.

REED: This wasn’t a Russian government-owned for diplomats. This was privatized.

Q: No, no, I know. This was privatized. But AID ended up with not everyone living in Rosinka. They also started renting apartments all over the city.

REED: Yeah. Jeanne Bourgault, the democracy officer, was in an apartment on her own.

Q: By the time I got there in 1999, AID was part of the embassy housing pool, so everyone had to live either in Russian government-owned diplomatic housing or out in Rosinka or the other place that was developed, Pakrovsky Hills, near the international school. But it was interesting because AID for a number of years was contrary to Russian foreign ministry policy about foreigners. Did you ever hear that discussed within the AID mission?

REED: No.

Q: No.

REED: All of us were there for three years, and we all left.

Q: So you were there 1992-1995.

REED: 1992-1995. Yes. It was extraordinary the changes we saw during that time.

Q: Okay. So you were the head of the Program Office as well doing democracy work and participant training.

REED: Sending Russians to participant training.

Q: Maybe you could talk a little bit about what the program was in those initial days, and also a bit about the role of the State Department and the Coordinator’s Office and process.

REED: That was really strange. Ambassador Tom Pickering later came in, but Ambassador Robert Strauss was there when we arrived. Jim Norris said, “You know,
we’ve got to put some structure to this program. Why don’t you put together a cable and send it back, that we want to develop a strategy.” The State Department would not let us send a cable with the word “strategy” in it. AID strategy, development strategy? No. Strategy is their purview. They did not understand. I think when we first got there—certainly not everybody—but there were people who were wondering, “Why are you coming here and talking to these people who are our enemies?” There was still the Soviet approach. We weren’t allowed to hire FSNs when we first got there. We had a huge portfolio. It took a while to hire FSNs we then had to train in the USAID system.

Early on, Jim asked me to go out to the Russia Far East. They said, “You have to get State Department approval for in-country travel.” He said, “Just go on and get on Aeroflot and go out to Vladivostok.” There was a Congressional mandate to do a grant to an American university that has some contact…

Q: University of Alaska at Anchorage?

REED: That’s right! That’s right.

Q: For the record, that was Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska.

REED: Yes. I went to the University of Alaska, in Alaska, to hold their hand on how to put that proposal together. It was actually very well done.

Q: And I had to go to explain when we didn’t renew for the fourth time!

REED: Going out to Vladivostok, that’s when I realized how big Russia is. If you draw a line from New York through Moscow to Vladivostok, Moscow is halfway there. It was $12 round-trip on Aeroflot!

Q: [Laughs] So you went out to do that early design work then with the University of Alaska?

REED: Well, USIS (U.S. Information Service) wanted to put together an American University. Jim said, “Go out and see what Russian institutions there are there.”

Q: Right.

REED: We saw that, I think it was the University of Portland had some sister university relationship. We didn’t have to start from scratch to build a big American institution. Finally, we ended up supporting the business development training through the University of Alaska. That was fun.

Q: Right. That’s good.

REED: But the Coordinator’s Office…, and Carlos Pascual got involved in that.
Q: He was for a time head of the Program Office for the Europe Bureau in Washington and then ended up going over ultimately to the NSC (National Security Council). I believe the Richard Armitage was the Coordinator at one point, and then Morningstar was the Coordinator?

REED: That’s right.

Q: I know there was a lot of tension between the AID mission and the Coordinator’s Office at various times.

REED: And Jim fielded all that very well.

Q: Right.

REED: That was an amazing time.

Q: Yeah. Obviously the big effort with USAID there was on policy reform and privatization, and the big Harvard contract was a big part of that. But you were there at the early stages of the Harvard contract, and I assume things were going quite well?

REED: Very interesting time there. There was also some very interesting stuff on the democracy and governance side, reintroducing the jury trial system. That was nice to see the progress that was made on that.

Q: You mentioned Jeanne Bourgault, who worked for you. She’s now the head of Internews. Presumably, she was working on independent media at work, which was another important part of the work.

REED: Yes, she was. And NDI (National Democratic Institute) and IRI (International Republican Institute) were active as well. We did some political party training and election observing. Senator John McCain came out and we went around with him to watch the elections. It was heady times.

Q: Right. Because there was an election in 1992, right?

REED: Right.

Q: It must have been quite and experience to be in those very formative years and a lot of Russians probably wondering what USAID was doing there?

REED: Yes. And a lot of Russians were very anxious, especially older Russians who just were taken aback by all this change. That was hard for them. But there was a lot of exploitation about people who had been in the Communist system, then learned how to get control of factories. When we got there, there wasn’t really economic pricing of anything. The example of housing… didn’t make any sense. Twelve dollars round-trip to Vladivostok on a jet couldn’t begin to pay for a bit of the fuel.
As foreigners, we could afford to buy or go or do anything. We used to go to the Bolshoi Theatre for 25 cents. For 25 cents, you have a month pass on the Metro system. That changed by 1994, 1995. But those first two years it was extraordinary because you had people who were making, with PhDs, the equivalent of $17 or $18 a month because they didn’t have to pay for things on the basis of how much the inputs cost.

Q: Wow, a very interesting time! I know that on a personal basis you also used your time there to get in touch with your Finnish roots?

REED: Absolutely! In 1992, my family came to Finland for the first time - I had been to Finland several times before that, but my family had never been there. One of the decision points for us was that our kids understood - maybe they didn’t know exactly where they came from - but they knew they had African-American roots. This now gave us the opportunity to go to Finland and for our kids to explore the Finnish side of their heritage. In September, on our way to Russia, we stopped and explained to my cousins that we were going to Moscow. My great-uncles, who fought in the Winter War against the Soviet Union, said, “Why the hell are you going to Moscow? You have to tell us when you get there so we know they haven’t killed you!” They were very, very anti-Russian, anti-Soviet. Before we finished our assignment, they came and visited us in Moscow. In fact, Uncle Martti Kivimäki then went and visited that part of Karelia in Russia, and they worked with the authorities to find out where they buried the Finns there. That was really nice to see that. In fact, my mother came and visited us in Moscow. We went to Viipuri, Vyborg they called it, and went to her village of Karpila where she grew up. That was a very special time.

Every winter we would take the overnight train from Moscow to Tallinn, Estonia and then the ferry across to Helsinki, or we would take the train through St. Petersburg to Finland and spend Christmas and New Year’s at the family home in Finland. Our kids really got to know and love their Finnish side. In fact, my wife has just written a story called A Finnish Girl with a Chocolate Swirl, about our youngest daughter, Fija, and her exploration of both her African-American and her Finnish roots.

Q: I know that in Moscow at times African-Americans have encountered issues and multiracial families have encountered issues.

REED: Yes.

Q: Was your family spared that?

REED: We weren’t subjected to that, but we know people who were. We also got to know the African student community who were going to Patrice Lumumba University and had some good friends, particularly Liberian friends, there who we are still friends with today.
Q: Yes. You mentioned that initially AID was not allowed to hire Foreign Service Nationals, and I know in Jim Norris’s interview he talks about that a bit. Do you recall how long it took before you were able to? Do you remember who the first FSNs hired were?

REED: I don’t remember exactly when it was. It wasn’t long after we got there, maybe a couple of months. But it was clear we could not manage a program without having support professional staff and support administrative staff. They finally relented and let us do that hiring. We had to teach people how to work the system. Jim Leo was the EXO there, and he was very good.

Q: Probably one of the early criterion was being able to speak English?

REED: Yes. We each had one month of intensive Russian language training. The person who was teaching me was from a university in St. Petersburg, not a linguist by training. We would go lickety-split for six, seven hours a day through all these lessons. He was constantly testing me, and I said, “Why are we going so fast?” He said, “If you get three answers in a row, I know that you know that one right.” I said, “I’m not remembering any of this.” He said, “You’ll get all in Moscow.”

Well, when I get to Moscow, there is this huge program to deal with. No support staff. I wasn’t able to do much language studying there. I’m glad that subsequent groups had more substantial language training. My wife did pretty well. Her language teacher introduced her to her mother in Moscow, and Ayo continued to speak with her and she got pretty good at her Russian language.

Shortly after we arrived in Moscow, I saw the Moscow Times, which was an English language newspaper. In our second month there, I was delighted to see a story of the Sudanese ambassador, who was Southern Sudanese, who I had traveled in the bush with in 1971 when he was a commander of the Anya-Nya in eastern Bahr el Ghazal. I called him up and spoke to him in Dinka and said, “What are you doing here?” He said, “What are you doing here?”

Q: [Laughs]

REED: We got together a few times. I showed him the film that he’s in. It was very nice to have that surprising experience.

Q: Yes, indeed! Something like that, would you have had to advise the embassy about what you were doing?

REED: I told Jim, “Hey, this is an old friend who is the Sudanese ambassador.”

Q: That’s interesting. You mentioned going to Tallinn. I know that one of the early programs that AID did a lot of work on the housing sector, including with the Russian military. Did you get involved at all in that?
REED: Not in that. No.

Q: Okay. Early on, there were a lot of PSCs who came in as well, many of whom had Russian language skills. Did you help with the recruitment of those kinds of people?

REED: No.

Q: It was just all done sort of separately?

REED: Igor Nesterczuk is of Ukrainian background, so he had fluent language, and his wife, Annie, worked in my office as a PSC. Mike McFaul’s wife also worked with Jeanne Borgo in the Democracy Office.

Q: Oh, that’s right. And Mike was with NDI at that time, right?

REED: Yes.

Q: Ultimately going back as ambassador!

REED: That’s right. He was a wonderful person.

Q: Well, that’s good. I’m sure there are other things I want to be asking about on Moscow, but I can’t think of them at the moment. Maybe if I do I’ll come back around to it.

REED: Absolutely.

Q: So you were there three years. Most of the group was there originally...

REED: We were all due to leave three years later.

Q: All due to leave...

REED: A new crop came on regular assignments.

Q: Right. Emmy Simmons then replaced you?

REED: Emmy Simmons, yes, as program officer.

Q: Was there any sort of overlap, or did you guys have any kind of communication on this?

REED: There was a very, very brief overlap. Yes.

Q: And it being such a highly a highly political and quite unique program.
REED: Oh, she’s so good. I have a lot of respect for her.

Q: I was just curious whether there was an extra effort on the part of people to communicate?

REED: And Roger came in as well.

Q: And Roger came in as the deputy.

REED: Yes, as Bob Burke was leaving.


REED: Mmm hmm.

Q: Was Washington talking to you about multiple...?

REED: The Africa Bureau was saying, “Come on back!”

Q: It should be made clear. When you went to Russia, you had been in the Senior Management Group (SMG), and then you left it to go to Russia because of the...

REED: Malaria and the unique experience that offered.

Q: Malaria and the unique experience. Okay. So then you’re back talking with the Africa Bureau?

REED: Yes. I could have gone back to Conakry. We weren’t thrilled about that because of the education system there. Atem did well in the French system. He did one year at the French lycée in Moscow, then one year in the American School, then went back to the States for his last two years of high school. He subsequently got his bachelor’s degree in the California system, and he went to dental school at the University of California, San Francisco. He’s now got his own practice in Albuquerque. He attributes his ability to do well in dental school to the discipline he got from the French system. He didn’t like it at the time, but he said that was the best thing for his intellectual development, the rigor of the French lycée, both in Conakry and in Moscow.

Q: Interesting. How was the experience with the American School in Moscow? Probably not so great?

USAID/Sri Lanka – Project Development Officer

REED: It was okay. Both Oba and Atem then left for the higher grades in the States. Now, instead of going back to the Africa Bureau, there was a very attractive position in Sri Lanka, USAID Sri Lanka, head of the office as a PDO. I applied for that. David
Cohen was the mission director. When I got to Sri Lanka, David said, “I’m glad you’re here, but I wondered, why did you leave an SMG job?” That made him think there must have been something wrong. I said, “David, no. I loved working with Bill Kaschak. I enjoy doing that kind of work, but the circumstances were such that it was right for us to go to Moscow and I had no regrets about that.”

The Sri Lanka program was really an exciting program, although when we got there it looked like the war between the government and the Tamil Tigers was about to end. Unfortunately, it didn’t end. It continued on during our time in Sri Lanka on that assignment. I subsequently went back as a PSC in 2013-14 when there was peace. But the conflict was still raging on in 1995-96. We left in 1997. But the Sri Lanka mission was very, very good.

Q: You were there during probably the worst of the period with security?

REED: Yes. In fact, in 1997, early ’97, our youngest daughter, Fija, was in 1st grade. My mother had come out from California and was visiting us at the time. Fija’s class went on a field trip to the Japanese Fish Gardens behind the Hilton Hotel where they had a lot of goldfish swimming. That’s across the street from the Central Bank when the Tamil Tigers drove their TNT-laden pickup truck into the Central Bank building. There were so many casualties. Thank God it was on the other side of the Hilton Hotel, and kids were shielded from the direct blast. But they saw things you would never want a first-grader to see. The driver was able to get them out.

Q: You and Ayo, when you hear of the explosion and you knew where your daughter was...

REED: No, we didn’t know where she was.

Q: Oh, you didn’t know she was near? Well, that was good. That was a blessing!

REED: My mother and Ayo were at some friend’s house, and they heard the explosion. Somebody said, “That’s a bomb.” So, Ayo and my mother went home, not knowing Fija had been across the street.

Q: I have heard that AID was able to respond very quickly. I wonder if you could talk about that, a little bit about after the bombing?

REED: The whole Sri Lankan social security system was in the Central Bank. Their networks were knocked out. We did some emergency procurement to bring in IT equipment as quickly as possible. We were able to follow all sorts of flexible procurement rules. They were very good to get that in right away. The Central Bank was grateful for that support.

Q: Do you know how people determined that AID had the flexibility it had to be able to act as heroically as it did, so it would be able to respond quickly?
REED: We had some contracting officer support in the region, and they guided the mission. That was such a good response. That was actually 1996. At Christmastime 1996-97, because the conflict was still going on, we got word from Washington that we’re going to have to really reduce the program. They told us 10 days before we had to turn this in. “Redo your strategy and cut your program by 50 percent. Send it to us by the 23rd of December.”

Nishana Fernando, who up to that point is the best FSN I ever met, was working in the PD office. We pulled together a program-reduction strategy focusing mostly on economic growth, moving away from democracy governance, moving away from education and the other sectors. We put that together, sent it to Washington. They actually read it, and just after Christmas they said, “You did such a wonderful job on this. Now cut it another 50 percent and send that to us before New Year’s.” It was like a slap in the face, but we drilled it down again and sent that into Washington. They said, “We are approving your focus on economic growth with a 75 percent reduction in budget.”

Q: The process you went through yourselves to determine that was the highest priority and the most important work for AID to continue to support under those circumstances was economic growth—what was your thought process on that?

REED: Because that’s where you could make the greatest difference. There’s a middle class in Sri Lanka unlike in most other places. They respond enormously to economic incentives. If there isn’t enough money to do some of the other stuff, then that will have a payoff. In fact, fast forward to my time in Haiti. We’re doing employment generation activities in Haiti through the economic growth portfolio. There’s a Sri Lankan company that has located in the Caracol Industrial Park in the north, near Cap-Haitien. I went to visit them. They started out as three brothers in Sri Lanka in the 1980s who pooled their resources with 23 friends. They pooled together $20,000 to start a garment factory in the late 1980s. Today, it’s a $7 billion industry in 119 places around the world. They don’t need our assistance. But what we did through our economic growth portfolio was to subsidize the transport of local Haitians who were offered jobs for the first time so they could be trained in operating machines.

We went to see how they did this. This Sri Lankan company—I was so proud of them and told them I had seen that kind of thing in Sri Lanka and was glad they were taking this kind of incentive. Their corporate philosophy includes integrity, honesty, treating people well, and treating your workers well. They said, “You do that and your business will thrive.” You don’t normally hear that as corporate philosophy.

Q: Right.

REED: They hired people who had never had jobs before, but they gave them dexterity tests because they would be teaching them—it’s a garment factory—to use sewing machines. They wanted to know they had the dexterity to operate that if they were taught that. Before these people went in through the training program, they taught them the
importance of nutrition. They taught them that you are going to be working in a company for the first time. Punctuality counts. They set up bank accounts for them. One of the personal security issues in Haiti is when you go to an ATM machine, you will get robbed, even if you go to an ATM machine in a bank. There are bankers who tell their colleagues outside “Look into the second shoe, third pocket. That’s where they put the money.” The Sri Lankan company opened ATM accounts in the factory for every worker so nobody can see them taking out money. We saw these workers who had never had jobs before doing extraordinarily well. That’s sort of an aside.

Q: No. But showing the strength Sri Lankan private sector.

REED: That’s why when we had to reduce our program in Sri Lanka, we focused on private sector growth. Subsequently, I hired Nishana to come to USAID Zambia, and I’ll tell you that story, and then USAID South Sudan to work with an Ethiopian-American I met in Senegal. They revitalized the Program Office, both in Zambia and in South Sudan. She now has her immigrant visa here in the States.

Q: Actually, if you wouldn’t mind sharing contact information? Is she someone we should try to get her oral history done?

REED: Yes. And there are two other FSNs I will talk to you about as well.

Q: Allan, you talked about the dramatic reduction in the size of the program in Sri Lanka. Presumably there were other changes that had to be made to go along with that?

REED: Yes. One of the saddest parts of that was a reduction-in-force (RIF) of the FSN staff because we were cutting back so drastically in the program areas that we were involved in. That required a significant FSN reduction-in-force. I was asked to lead that process. I worked very closely with the FSN Committee and with the embassy, and we put together a plan where everybody who would be subject to the RIF would have some benefits in terms of outplacement. We didn’t design that system by ourselves. We designed the system with the FSNs. It was very painful because it did result in the reduction of several people.

At the end of the process… I’ve gotten lots of awards from USAID, but the one that meant the most to me was the FSNs giving an award for helping them understand and to design the system they reluctantly had to follow themselves. I’ve always respected Foreign Service Nationals because they are the ones who teach us when we go to their countries how things should be run, what the objectives should be, and how best to apply our resources to that. Engaging them in the FSN RIF process was I think the only way to make that process as palatable as it could be. That was a valuable lesson that I learned from that, too.

Q: In doing this, you had to work very closely with the embassy to assure…. Was the embassy also having to go through a RIF at all?
REED: No. The embassy did not. The embassy wasn’t sure why we were taking the time to go through all this, but we explained to them that we wanted this to be as painless as possible. Ultimately, they did support the way we did it.

Q: Right. That reminds me, because one of the common issues that USAID and the embassy have vis-à-vis Foreign Service Nationals always is that USAID has more high-level professional staff.

REED: Absolutely!

Q: And there are often salary issues with regard to the embassy. Did you see that in Sri Lanka?

REED: No, not so much in Sri Lanka. I know that is sometimes an issue. It took some convincing to get the embassy to understand why we were taking this particular approach, but they came around.

Q: Were you able to travel very much, or was the security situation such that you couldn’t get out to visit areas?

REED: I traveled in the central, southern, and western part of Sri Lanka. Couldn’t go to Trincomalee in the east. Couldn’t go to Jaffna in the north. Those were territories held by the Tamil Tigers.

Q: Did any of your experience having been involved with civil war in Sudan... Did the experience in Sri Lanka affect your thinking at all with regard to Southern Sudan or would your views about Southern Sudan have changed at all because of what you saw in Sri Lanka?

REED: There was a different approach in Sri Lanka. When I traveled with the Anya-Nya during the first civil war, there were no child soldiers. There was a liberation army that was fighting to protect the civilian population. Some of the techniques that the Tamil Tigers developed, including suicide bombings, were unique to them and were not taken up by the Southern Sudanese at all. The indiscriminate imposition of casualties on a civilian population, which was a tactic in Sri Lanka, really bothered me. I recognize that the Tamil people had some very legitimate concerns, but there was a ruthlessness in that conflict that I had not seen in South Sudan. That didn’t mean that I wasn’t sympathetic to the Tamils’ wish for political equity, but I was disturbed by their tactics. But their tactics were not limited to them. There were other atrocities that were committed by other groups in Sri Lanka as well.

Q: Was the AID program at all geared toward the peace process or the negotiations for peace?

REED: When I went back in 2013-14 as the acting program officer for six months, there were a lot more democracy governance activities that had come up, including OTI
(Office of Transition Initiatives) efforts at reconciliation, and there were some really interesting things going on then.

Q: But not when you were there?

REED: But not so much during my initial time in Sri Lanka.

Q: So again you were there 1995 to ‘97, ‘98?


Q: One other question about the timing. You mentioned the RIF. There was also a RIF of USAID direct-hires in Washington. Did that affect anyone in the Sri Lanka mission?

REED: Oh, yes. Yeah. There were some people in the Sri Lanka mission, and one of the IDI guys I came in with was RIF’ed. What I realized and recognized was that it was a huge mistake for USAID to have gone through that, to gut middle management, for the sake of a system that never worked. That was a serious mistake that USAID made because there were some wonderful people who were let go, including a dear friend from Sri Lanka who had come in as an IDI and who just missed not being RIF’ed.

Q: Yes. There were some very good people who were let go.

REED: What I recognized also was that I was going to go back to senior management. We had also just gone through incorporating the annual evaluation form (AEF), at that time a new personnel evaluation system. I asked to serve on the promotion panels in Washington the first year that system had come in, so that I would understand how to put together good staff evaluations and what the system was about. I served on the panel with Jay Smith. There were three of us direct-hire and a public service member.

Q: You were looking at program officers?

REED: Program, yes. We had to read an enormous amount of evaluations. This was at a time when the morale in USAID was in the toilet because of the RIF. But I was inspired by that process, and I recommend everybody who can to do that because what was so clear was that in spite of the difficulties the agency was going through at that time, there were people evaluated who gave their all, and there were people who could describe that very, very well. It was clear who the A’s were. It was clear that the vast majority of people were strong B’s. It was also clear there were folks who needed some help if they were going to stay in. What I came away from that with, as I then went into a deputy mission director position and subsequently had to do a lot of AEF writings, is the importance of taking that whole process seriously.

I developed a system where, for each person that I subsequently evaluated, I would do 12-15, 360-degree interviews. They would all be structured the same way: Part one would be the person’s work objectives and performance measures that are very
specifically spelled out. Part two are the appropriate Foreign Service skill levels that the person at that grade would have to demonstrate. The third section would be unstructured—what do you wish I would have asked but didn’t? I would pose those same questions to all 12 or 15 people for each person that I evaluated so that the baseline would be the same. No matter how well I thought I knew the person I was evaluating, I always learned a lot.

Q: Did you get inconsistencies when you would to 12 or 15 people?

REED: I would then go back and ask why, but generally not. The inconsistencies were so strikingly rare that I really continued and refined that system all through the rest of my direct-hire career.

Q: You intimated that you were surprised sometimes by what you heard.

REED: Yeah.

Q: Was that a reflection that some people could manage up to you better than perhaps they managed with others in the mission?

REED: There were aspects that I had been aware that they were involved in. It was usually positive.

Q: Okay, so it was more positive?

REED: The people that I interviewed, I tried to do face-to-face as much as possible, because that’s less painful for the person providing the feedback. It would be people within the AID mission, people in the embassy, people in the government, people in the implementing partners, people from other donors. Some of the other donors and implementing partners, and even the government, really appreciated being asked.

Q: Right.

REED: April was always a difficult month, but it was well worth doing it that way.

Q: Yes. That’s the way I’m sure it should be working. That’s great.

REED: I got a lot of feedback from subsequent panels saying how clear these evaluations were.

Q: Good. So it helped you in your own writing?

REED: Yes, and that’s why I’m glad that I started off getting into evaluating with being thrown into the pool of looking at them in the 1997 promotion panel. Most of the evaluations were very well done. There were some, not some, there was one in particular
where the evaluator copied what they had written the year before. I mean, you don’t do these things!

*Q:* [Laughs] *No, that’s not an example to follow!*

REED: No. But that’s something I came out of the Sri Lanka mission with—grateful I had that experience.

*Q:* Again, it must have been a not easy experience because you spent so much of your time trying to downsize and consolidate the program. Then when you were moving on from there in 1997, the Africa Bureau got you back.

**USAID/Senegal – Deputy Mission Director**

REED: I was very glad to go to Senegal to be deputy to Anne Williams, who was an extraordinary mission director. When I got to Senegal, they had started putting together new CDSS (Country Development Cooperation Strategy), and they wanted it to be demand-driven. It was so much fun getting involved in that.

*Q:* Right. This was also the era of reengineering.

REED: Yes. They had started before I got there. They had gone and interviewed 200 people all over Senegal. When I got there, they were going to bring these folks in, and I got involved in this with Anne, to a big conference center in Dakar. We would do the whole thing in French. We would explain to the 200 Senegalese gathered at the conference what strategic objectives are. What does a strategic objective look like? How is it put together? And we would provide feedback on what we had heard from them. We said, “Okay, we’re not going to develop the strategic objectives for the new strategy, you are. We will work with you on this.” It was very intensive. It lasted a few days.

*Q:* Who were these people?

REED: They were government officials. They were private sector people. They were NGOs (nongovernmental organizations).

*Q:* Just identified by the mission people that the mission had worked with?

REED: And gone out and interviewed. Villagers. Some people who had never been to Dakar before.

*Q:* Okay, so it was a combination?

REED: It was a huge range of Senegalese society. We took all of this input, and then we developed a mission strategy. It took about four or five months. Before we sent it to Washington, we brought everybody back to Dakar. We told the Senegalese what we had
come up with and asked them, “Did we get it right?” That was so participative. Anne was in her element. She was really good at this. They said, “Yes, absolutely!”

Q: Oh, good!

REED: They said, “We’ve often complained about USAID’s strategies, but we can’t do that anymore because now it’s ours.”

Q: You were reflecting a broad range of viewpoints across the country, but the counterparts you probably spoke with the most were senior government officials? Did they like the results?

REED: Yes, they did! We had some very spirited discussions with them. At the end of the process, we pulled all this strategy together. Woody Navin was in the Program Office. Kifle Negash was the program economist, an Ethiopian-American. It was a large portfolio. When the strategy was put together, Anne then said, “I’m going to take 10 of you Senegalese who helped us identify this CDSS to Washington with me.” They got to Washington, but USAID wouldn’t let them in. She wanted them to participate in the AID review, and this was just too much for the bureaucracy!

Q: Yes, I vaguely recall! [Laughs]

REED: So she sent some of the Senegalese to Arizona to look at natural resource management, some of them to Tennessee to look at health care systems, and I forget where the third group went to look at those parts of the strategy that would be relevant to them. When they came back to Senegal, they formed NGOs.

Q: Hmm. I’ll be darned.

REED: This was the most exciting strategy design process I had ever been involved in. Anne then left, and a new mission director came in, and all that went out the window.

Q: Really?

REED: Yeah.

Q: The new mission director came in and changed the strategy?

REED: He didn’t want to follow that. He was a good development professional, Don Clark. I enjoyed working with him as well, but they were night and day in their approaches.

Q: It’s a common criticism of AID that new mission directors come in and too often do change things to match their own vision.
REED: Anne Williams had such ownership of that. I was supposed to be in Senegal for five years, but at the end of three years they asked me to move to Zambia as mission director. When I looked at the reality in Zambia, with 20 percent prevalence of HIV/AIDS – while we had a big HIV/AIDS program in Senegal - I went to Colonel Ndiaye, who was head of the Senegalese HIV/AIDS Commission. I said, “Look, I’m going to be going to Lusaka. You have an admirable two percent prevalence rate here in Senegal. They have a 20 percent rate in Zambia. If I can get the Zambians to agree to invite you and we pay for your transport, would you come and talk to them?” He said, “Sure.”

When I got to Zambia, I really hadn’t understood how drastic a 20 percent prevalence rate is. There were more teachers dying of HIV/AIDS than were being turned out by the teacher training colleges in Zambia. It was horrific.

Q: Right. And this was…?

REED: Before PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).

Q: Let’s get the dates here. You were in Senegal…?


Q: Until 2000. Then you went to….

USAID/Zambia – Mission Director

REED: To Zambia as mission director.

Q: To Zambia in 2000.

REED: When I got to Zambia, there was a dysfunctional program office. There was a program officer and a PDO, and they both sort of saw themselves as the police in the mission. It was not a happy place. They were good, decent officers, but sometimes you get that kind of friction with program offices, which should be a support office. They didn’t see themselves that way.

We were supposed to turn in a new strategy for Zambia. I asked Washington for a one-year extension of the strategy because I said we have to do it a different way. Those two left. I called Kifle Negash to come in and be the program officer, and Nishana Fernando, who rescued the Sri Lanka program, to work with him as a TCN (third-country national). They don’t think of themselves as the police. They totally revitalized the program office. Robert Clay was head of the health office.

The embassy in Zambia under the ambassador and the USAID Mission and other USG agencies there had such a close working relationship. The best I had ever seen in all of my time with USAID. I thought it was due to the ambassador. A new ambassador came
and continued in really good fashion. We then developed an HIV/AIDS in the Workplace Commission within the U.S. government where we were able to encourage everybody to get tested. People didn’t initially want to get tested because there was a lot of stigma around HIV/AIDS, but when they got tested, we would give them antiretroviral drugs. My own driver was HIV-positive. His life turned around with antiretroviral drugs.

Q: This was pre-PEPFAR?

REED: Pre-PEPFAR. Yes. Everybody, American and FSNs, were all going through the same training courses in public awareness. The toughest part of my job was to bury my own staff. There were so many of the FSNs in Zambia who died of HIV/AIDS.

The HIV/AIDs Commission in Zambia got me further interested in the idea of the Senegalese HIV/AIDS officials coming to speak with their Zambian counterparts, so we brought them over. I thought all the benefits would accrue to the Zambians, but it was actually mutual because what the Senegalese learned was about village-based treatment systems that the Zambians were supporting, which they didn’t have in Senegal. Of course, the Senegalese taught the Zambians a lot. It was so nice to see that south-south dialogue. That was enriching.

Q: That’s super. You were able to have Senegalese who spoke English, or did you have to have interpreters?

REED: There were Senegalese that spoke English. The Zambians didn’t speak French.

Q: In the mid-1990s, I know when I was in Washington they were doing a lot with the Zambia program. The consultative group meetings for Zambia were always the most interesting because there were so many issues related to policy development programs in Zambia.

REED: We had policy issues there. There was food security needs. They didn’t want to bring in GMO (genetically-modified organism). GMO was a big issue for them. We finally got the ability to buy regionally. Zambia was a good post.

Q: Also as I recall, because Zambia was a bit of a favorite with other donors, particularly during this period the World Bank and other donors were doing a lot of sector reform programs—they had basket funding and budget support, and the U.S. was not able to, although I think the Zambia program was grandfathered for some period of time.

REED: We did not have budget support when I was there. We had trust funds.

Q: Okay. Could you maybe talk about how you managed to do this, to participate with the other donors in these programs?
REED: Yes, we worked with other donors. We participated a lot especially on the HIV/AIDS front. There was also participation on some of the governance issues. There was anti-corruption under Frederick Chiluba. It was a serious issue. We actually got the Treasury Department involved in that as well, so there was embassy, USAID, and Treasury working on anti-corruption issues. Chiluba was supposed to be a breath of fresh air, but he turned out to be a problem as well.

Q: Yes, right, you mentioned trust funds.

REED: Food for Peace trust funds.

Q: Okay, because there was Title I and Title III programs, and then so the local currency you were able to use?

REED: The local currency we were able to use.

Q: So that was used as a form of budget support?

REED: Yes, on the agriculture side.


REED: When Kifle Negash and Nishana Fernando came in to the Mission, we had an extra year to put the strategy together. What we did was the agency’s first multisectoral HIV/AIDS country strategy. Whether the programs were in democracy governance, education and of course the health sector, or on economic growth and agriculture, there was an HIV/AIDS component to every sector program that we dealt with. Washington recognized this as the agency’s first multisectoral approach to HIV/AIDS. The folks that put that together got a nice award.

Q: Very good. Again, this was all sort of pre-PEPFAR, but probably some of the work you did had an impact on it?

REED: Yes, it was pre-PEPFAR. We worked together with the Japanese, collaborating with them not only on HIV/AIDS. There were a lot of corridor issues as trade came down from Congo through Zambia and delays at truck stops, which became HIV/AIDS hotspots. We did a lot of public education on those issues, and the Japanese were involved in that. They also participated in the impregnated bed nets for fighting malaria. The Japanese JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) was very much involved in that, too.

Q: And the British I assume had a large program there?

REED: Oh, yes, they did. Yeah.

Q: And the World Bank, of course.
REED: I expected to stay for five years in Zambia because I came out of Senegal after three years. My first year in Zambia was my last year in Senegal, and then I was going to do two tours in Zambia, but that got interrupted after three years.

Q: This would have been now 2003?

Sudan Field Office at REDSO/East Africa

REED: 2003. Andrew Natsios was very committed and interested to the whole Sudanese peace process. He was aware of my deep involvement and my personal history in Southern Sudan, so he asked if I would come up to Nairobi and establish a Sudan Field Office, from Lusaka to Nairobi, and establish that in Nairobi, manage all of the various aspects of a $400 million program in OFDA, Food for Peace, OTI, and a development assistance portfolio run through different REDSO offices into one management structure.

Q: Right, because there was a lot of work in Sudan, but it wasn’t coordinated. There was no single management unit.

REED: There was no single management. Natsios said, “You come up. Pull that together in Nairobi. Be in Khartoum occasionally to work with Kate Farnsworth on the disaster work in Darfur, but when the peace agreement is signed, you move that operation into Juba, and that will be USAID Sudan in the South.

Q: Kate Farnsworth was in Khartoum?

REED: Khartoum. Yes.

Q: There were some other long-term employees who had been in Khartoum for many, many years?

REED: Yes. But it was all disaster assistance.

Q: It was all disaster assistance, okay.

REED: There was no development programming in the north.

Q: They were supporting the work in Darfur?

REED: In Darfur. I went out to Darfur to see some of the emergency assistance programs they were doing.

Q: But most of what you were pulling together in Nairobi in the Sudan Field Office was primarily for the South?

REED: Primarily for the South, but I had authority in Khartoum as well.
Q: Okay.

REED: The idea was that when peace came, USAID Sudan would be based in Juba. When I got to Nairobi, the American embassy had just had an authorized departure and they were drawing down staff. There had been an attack on a plane in Mombasa, and there were terrorist threats. They were downsizing. I came in and said, “I want to build up!” The ambassador agreed. He understood why. I said, “Cheryl Anderson is the only other direct-hire. For a program this large and this complex, I’ve got to build up staff.” I told him the areas that I needed to hire people in, and he agreed.

Stephanie Funk was the democracy officer in Zimbabwe. When I arrived in Lusaka, our youngest daughter, Fija, had braces installed just as we were leaving Senegal. We get to Lusaka. There’s no orthodontist to do the six-weeks tightening of those things, so every six weeks we would drive from Lusaka to Harare because there was an American orthodontist there, until they finally left when things got bad. I would see Stephanie Funk in Harare. I had seen her when she came out to TDY in Conakry years earlier. She was doing such marvelous work. They were involved supporting Morgan Tsvangirai and the democratic opposition in Zimbabwe, and I think she got detained a couple of times by Robert Mugabe’s people. Stephanie’s such an enthusiastic officer. For Christmas in 2003, I sent her the book, *Emma’s War*, about Riek Machar and his wife, a British aid worker. It’s unfortunately titled because Emma had nothing to do with the war between Riek Machar and John Garang within the SLPM, but it’s beautifully written. I said, “Merry Christmas. Do you want to come to South Sudan and help the SPLM move from being a guerilla movement to becoming a legitimate government?” I think Stephanie had been offered an SMG position, whether it was in Madagascar or Mozambique somewhere. She said, “I’d rather do this.” She came, and she was a spectacular democracy officer for South Sudan.

Q: Based in Nairobi with you?

REED: Yes. I also brought Kifle Negash. I had left Kifle and Nishana Fernando in Lusaka when I came to Nairobi. When I saw how big the program was, I recruited Kifle as the program officer when Cheryl Anderson left and Nishana Fernando to work in the program office. They were both excellent. Just as good as they had been in Zambia.

There was a challenge because we had a core group in Nairobi, including some South Sudanese FSNs, a fledgling presence in Juba, an office Khartoum, an office in Darfur, and we would meet in Addis Ababa as a mission to have workshops together. It was really a challenge trying to manage one team in four locations.

Q: Right. Indeed.

REED: When finally, with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that came in January 2011, we were able to move into Juba.
Q: Well, the CPA was earlier. That was 2005.

REED: I said 2011. Yes, of course. I was thinking of the referendum. The CPA was 2005.

Q: So you were there setting up the Nairobi office, coordinating all of this, mobilizing staff, etc.?

REED: Going into South Sudan in the liberated areas.

Q: That was one of my questions, how often you all were able to go in?

REED: Quite frequently.

Q: By land or plane, or both?

REED: Mostly, by plane. The UN (United Nations) had a World Food Programme system of flights out of Lokichogio in the northeast of Kenya.

Q: Technically, it was a cross-border program?

REED: It was a cross-border program, yes. We provided a lot of food assistance to the World Food Programme. We had support for rural infrastructure so they could deliver food by roads. The REDSO office had been managing a fledgling education portfolio with what they called the SPLM Secretariat of Education and the SPLM Secretariat of Health. Jeff Ashley was in the REDSO office. I got him involved in helping us think through HIV/AIDS issues.

Q: Right. Now, if there had been an education project, it would have started under the regional program in REDSO? Did that then transfer over to you?

REED: All that stuff came in to the Sudan Field Office.

Q: All that programmatic stuff came, so that was part of unifying it all together?

REED: Yes, all of that stuff came into the Sudan Field Office.

Q: And then you wanted to start something on the HIV/AIDS front, so you brought in the REDSO personnel?

REED: Yes. Jeff Ashley was very good at that.

Q: This was 2003?

Q: In all this time, the U.S. is involved with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations?

REED: That’s right.

Q: There is a special envoy at this time from the State Department? Were they in Nairobi?

REED: They were all in Naivasha. I wasn’t involved in any of those negotiations.

Q: Was there somebody in the embassy who was the Sudan contact?

REED: Yes. There were people in the embassy.

Q: Did you have to deal with that individual?

REED: Not directly, no. Occasionally, I would meet with them.

Q: But not directly?

REED: Yes. I was not involved in the negotiations. Brian D’Silva came through quite a bit, and he was a go-between between the embassy and the SPLM on the negotiations in Naivasha.

Q: And probably Andrew Natsios was involved somewhat, and Kate Almquist was involved?

REED: Oh, yes. Kate was Andrew Natsios’s special assistant. When we had a mission director’s conference after I got to Zambia, I went to Washington for that shortly after Natsios was sworn in as administrator. He wanted to meet with every mission director. I think I was one of the first mission directors to meet with him. And I met with Kate Almquist. We talked about Zambia, but then we talked about Sudan. He was then aware of my involvement in Sudan.

Q: Yes.

REED: I went back to Lusaka. A couple of months later, we get the photographs of the new administration. There was President [George W.] Bush. There was Vice President Dick Cheney. There was Andrew Natsios. I looked at that picture. Kurt Popic put it up, the EXO officer. So I said, “Kurt, who is that?” He said, “That’s Andrew Natsios.” I said, “That’s not Andrew Natsios! I just met with Andrew Natsios. He doesn’t look anything like that!” Helen Gunther was the agriculture officer. I said, “Helen, come over here. Who is that?” “It’s Donald Rumsfeld.”

Q: [Laughs] He got the wrong photo!
REED: I said, “Donald Rumsfeld’s picture as Andrew Natsios!” We quickly took that down. The next time I saw Andrew Natsios I told him, “Guess whose picture was on the wall?” He thought that was hilarious!

Q: That’s good! So you weren’t involved at all in the Navaisha negotiations?

REED: No.

Q: Was Roger Winter?

REED: Roger Winter certainly was.

Q: He was the main person that represented Andrew? Did he stop in and talk to you?

REED: Oh, constantly. Yes, almost every time Roger Winter came through I saw him.

Q: You weren’t directly involved, but you were indirectly involved through your discussions with U.S. representatives to the negotiations. Right?

REED: I got involved in Naivasha in this respect, and I come to Robert Klitgaard on this. When I was at the Institut de Français in 1990 getting my French training brush-up on the way to Conakry, I met Robert Klitgaard, who had just published Tropical Gangsters. He was learning French. He is a world-class expert on corruption issues. When I was at that conference, the mission directors’ conference, Natsios had brought Klitgaard in. We renewed our acquaintance there. I told him, “I’m going to be working on South Sudan. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement wealth-sharing protocol involves a billion dollars a year to the Government of South Sudan, and they don’t even have a banking system. I know John Garang is very worried about corruption. If John Garang agrees, and we can finance it, would you come out and talk to these folks?”

I went back to Nairobi, talked with John Garang and said, “We’ve got somebody here. I know you’re interested in the issue of corruption. Would you agree that Klitgaard could come?” He said, “Yes, absolutely.” So Bob Klitgaard came for two weeks. But he said, “I want to bring Thomas Eppley with me. He’ll pay his own way. Eppley has never been to Africa. He’s a private entrepreneur who has done magnificent turnaround of business, and he’s very interested in Africa. Can he come with me on his dime and talk to the South Sudanese about businesses?” I said, “Sure.”

They came, and we traveled to Sudan for two weeks. We went up to the Nuba Mountains into the SPLM-controlled area there. We then went to Rumbek, which is where the western half of the SPLM headquarters was. Spoke to the SPLM Leadership Council in an interactive forum on how to deal with corruption issues. Then when we came out to Kenya, we went to Naivasha where the peace negotiations were going on. John Garang said, “I want to take one day out of this because I want everybody on the SPLM negotiating team to hear what Bob Klitgaard has to say.” Garang introduced Klitgaard to
the SPLM negotiators and said, “We have to talk with him honestly about the things we can’t even imagine we’re going to run into.” That was a very exciting time.

John Garang had an understanding of what the wealth-sharing protocol would mean. He said, “That’s going to be a windfall. We have to be careful not to spend all of that on the military, not to spend all of that on government salaries. We know we have to do some of that, but I want most of that to go into a rural development trust fund because ultimately the oil is going to run out and most Southern Sudanese are agriculturalists and pastoralists. If we focus on a rural development trust fund, that will be sustainable economic growth for South Sudan.” He understood what he was talking about. He wanted Klitgaard to help people realize you have to work through those issues of transparency and anti-corruption and honesty to get to that point.

When he was finished talking with the SPLM at Naivasha, I asked him to come and speak with the donor community.

Q: Klitgaard?

REED: Yes, in Nairobi, about how we should do no harm - how we should do no harm on these issues. That was a very, very exciting time. The following year, when the peace agreement was signed, John Garang was sworn in as vice president of all of Sudan and president of Southern Sudan in July 2005, and, in less than a month, he was dead. That’s a tragedy. That’s a total, total tragedy. He was the Nelson Mandela of Southern Sudan.

Q: Right. He was the man with the vision.

REED: Yes. Salva Kiir was a good man—he’s become less than that now—but he was no John Garang. Nobody was. I think if John Garang had not died, South Sudan would not be in the position that it is today. But that was all lost with his death.

Q: Right.

REED: I digress more than I meant to.

Q: No, no. It’s obviously an important point that I think most people would obviously agree with. Did they ever determine whether or not it was an accident?

REED: That it’s an “accident?” I don’t know what to believe. I don’t buy that it was purely accident, but I can’t say what it was or who did it. I have my doubts.

Q: Let’s just go back. The agreement signed in 2005.

REED: In Nairobi. We went to the signing ceremony. Wonderful.

Q: It was in Nairobi. You were still in Nairobi?
REED: Yes.

Q: The Sudan group is still in Nairobi, but there’s a little bit that’s being done in Juba?

REED: There was a USAID presence that I visited in 1983 when I was working on the Sudan desk in Washington. Bob McCandless had a skeleton office in Juba, which subsequently closed as the second civil war resumed. There were four little houses there on a compound. I visited them when they were nothing but four little houses. They were given over to an NGO to manage, an AID-funded NGO. When it was clear we were going to move the operation into Juba that became the core of the new mission.

Q: At what point did everyone leave Nairobi?

REED: It wasn’t all at once.

Q: It wasn’t all at one time. It was in increments?

REED: Yes. I went in.

Q: When did you go in?

USAID/South Sudan in Juba

REED: In the fall of 2005.

Q: So shortly after the agreement was signed?

REED: After the regional government was established, yes. Now, Natsios had said, “When you go in, it will be USAID Sudan, and you will be the mission director.”

Q: Yes. That’s not exactly what happened!

REED: What happened was, Cameron Hume came in as Chargé d’Affaires in Khartoum. He said, “The mission director has to be in Khartoum.” I told Natsios, “No way. My value to the agency is in the South. I will go up to Khartoum if needed from time to time, but I should be based with my people in the South. That’s were my benefit is to South Sudan and to the agency.” So they decided to name Kate Almquist as mission director. Kate told me, “Oh, we can be co-directors.” I said, “Kate, AID doesn’t work that way.” She was new to mission management. I said, “You can be mission director, and I’m fine. I’m at the end of my career. I don’t care what the title is, I want to work on South Sudan.” She’s brilliant, but when she got to Khartoum, the ambassador just relied on her as practically his DCM (deputy chief of mission). She was so overstretched there. It was difficult. It was very difficult. I think she was put in an unfair position.

Q: Were there any other AID staff that were up there with her? Was Stephanie there, or was Stephanie still in Nairobi?
REED: No, Stephanie was based in the South. She was living in Nairobi, but she was based in the South. When I went in, the EXO came in with me. Eventually, Kifle Negash came in. But there were still several officers who were based in Nairobi.

Q: Who were just coming back, going back and forth?

REED: Coming back and forth. There was a lot of traffic back and forth.

Q: Maybe this was a couple of years later—I’ve lost track of the timing, and the fellow whose name I should know because Stephanie always refers to him—the DG officer who was killed on New Year’s Eve.

REED: John Granville.

Q: Yes, John Granville. He was killed in Khartoum.

REED: He was killed in Khartoum on New Year’s Eve in 2008.

Q: Was he based in Khartoum?

REED: No, he was not based in Khartoum. He was based in the South. He did some marvelous work distributing radios, a lot of rural work, not only in South Sudan, but in the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile, so that rural illiterate people could hear about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and know what they should be able to expect from their new government. He was at a New Year’s party at the British embassy, or some British house, and he and Abdel Rahman, his Sudanese driver were followed. I’m not sure that they knew who they were; they just knew he was an expatriate, and he was assassinated. That changed everything from that time because we had to really curtail the kind of programming and activities that we were involved in.

Q: Was Kate still in Khartoum at that point?

REED: No, no.

Q: No. Okay.

REED: Her successor came in.

Q: It was Pat Fleuret?

REED: Pat Fleuret was mission director there. That assassination really shook people up, justifiably.

Q: Justifiably, right. It was an incredibly complex operation.
REED: Oh, yes, because we had Darfur emergency. We had a development portfolio, emergency programs, OTI, Food for Peace all over the South. We had an office that was still based in Nairobi. Our contracts officer was there. There was still some technical staff there. The controller’s office was there. We were in four locations as one mission.

Q: To make sure this gets reflected adequately, you talked about what John Granville was doing with communications and that you all when you were identifying your priorities for programming, communications was an important part of that strategy.

REED: Part of the democracy governance portfolio. In fact, rural radios…

Q: But is that something that people automatically think of as being important? Maybe you can go back over it a little bit.

REED: Let me go back to Zambia. Kent Noel was an education implementing partner in Zambia, one of the programs that we had in Zambia to deal with the tremendous effect of HIV/AIDS. There where orphaned children who had very little support for school—sometimes their grandmothers were taking care of them. We developed a rural radio education system where using windup radio instruction was given to rudimentary teachers at the primary level for how to teach numeracy and literacy skills at the very basic level in schools, under a tree, where half of the students are HIV/AIDs orphans. That system worked so well that the ministry of education in Zambia then began to incorporate rural radio in their schools.

When I went to Sudan, Inez Andrews was the education officer, and I described Kent Noel’s work with rural radio in Zambia. She brought that to the education portfolio in South Sudan. With the windup radios that the democracy program was distributing, that really took off. John Granville was distributing a lot of those radios. That’s one of the many things he was doing.

Q: You saw that was a critically important part of the democracy governance program?

REED: Absolutely! We also had a very good NDI focus group exercise. They were wonderful the way they did this because with this fledgling government that had been a guerilla movement, they had to learn the ABCs of governance. Part of that is: what do people expect and how can you define expectations? Focus group exercises were done several times by NDI, where they asked what peoples’ priorities were, and that could then be fed into an information system to the government to know people are concerned about access roads, people are concerned about health care, people are concerned about water resources, people are concerned about education. You say you want to do these things, but they don’t see much happening. Our education portfolio was working on teacher training. CARE was trying to physically construct schools, but that’s awfully hard to do. The Government of Southern Sudan, as they were trying to get their feet under themselves, was able to be informed by a focus group process that put them in touch with what people’s needs were. The rural radio system was also a way for the government to
explain to people what the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was and what it meant to them in terms of wealth sharing, power sharing, and what they can expect.

Q: You had a very fledgling government that you were working with.

REED: Yes.

Q: To what degree were you able to really actively consult with them about what the priorities would be for the future? I’m going back to your Senegal example where you all went probably further than most would go in terms of consultation before developing strategy.

REED: Stephanie had a lot to do with developing this. She was really remarkable in her ability to sit and talk with people, whether it’s in terms of the legal reform issues, in terms of the various ministries and their requirements. She listened a lot and developed programs that tried to respond to what their felt needs were. Sometimes they couldn’t even articulate those very well. Part of the problem was with a ministry of finance that was a regional government ministry, it didn’t necessarily understand how it related to all the state governments and their revenue requirements. All of this was absolutely new. We brought in a lot of people who had expertise in these areas of government finance. Ashraf Ghani was one of the consultants, and I met him in Juba.

Q: He was at the Bank then.

REED: Yes. So there were some very good people coming in and trying to talk to these folks about how do you set up a procurement system?

Q: Right.

REED: It was a pretty overwhelming challenge.

Q: I believe that one of the things that you all did was to also look to the diaspora to try to bring them in some way?

REED: Carol, the one single project I have been most enthusiastic about and thrilled was diaspora skills transfer. When I was running around with the Anya-Nya in the first war, I met a lot of diaspora in Europe and the States and saw how they were committed even during those times to supporting what was happening in South Sudan. I saw that many of the teachers in the fledgling school system were Kenyans or Ugandans that were brought in. There was some suspicion of diaspora who would come in as “Johnny-come-latelies” into the new government. So I said, “Let’s put together a diaspora skills volunteer transfer program, but limit it to 100 people to show that it can work—half in education, half in health. Those two social service sectors are what is dearly needed for IDPs (internally displaced person) or refugees to know that it’s safe to come back because their kids will have schools and health.” No controversy about that.
Q: When someone volunteered, for how long did they make a commitment?

REED: I’ll tell you how we developed the program. I saw diaspora who had come back. The chief engineer in the Southern Sudanese ministry of transport had been a diaspora in Britain and had his own company. He came back even before the peace agreement, and he was the engineering designer for the World Food Programme roads program that we had. I saw what happened when someone from the diaspora with skills comes back.

There was a woman in the education sector who had come back from America before the peace agreement and a man as well who were volunteering with the secretariat of education, particularly on vocational education. These two people, as examples of diaspora, I talked with them about how do we structure a program like this? We decided to develop a program where we would go to Europe and America, describe the opportunities there for people to volunteer for up to three months, with a small stipend and housing, to work in health and education in a variety of ways and to see for themselves that there was a peace agreement, that there was a regional government, that there was enormous need.

We started initially by recruiting 10 Southern Sudanese from America and Canada, one representing each of the 10 states of Southern Sudan, and brought them to Nairobi. I went in with them to Juba. They met Salva Kiir. They met Riek Machar. They met the minister of education. They met the minister of health. They saw for themselves, there is a government here. Then we sent them back to the States to encourage diaspora to apply as volunteers.

The first group came in about 10 weeks later. There were 12 or 14 of them that came to Yei, to the agriculture college there, for a one-week orientation. Some of these folks had been away for a long time. They needed to be reminded about boiling water, taking anti-malarials, and how are you going to deal with people. They had a really good orientation, then they went out into their communities. One hundred came in altogether—50 in health and 50 in education. It was inspiring! I would never have dared to suggest that half of them would stay. These are doctors, educators, who had well-paying jobs. Dr. Lul Riak, an epidemiologist from Tennessee, stayed and helped put together the HIV/AIDS Commission for the Government of Southern Sudan, and now he is the community health advisor in the ministry.

There was a college professor from Texas who had been away for 20 years. He came and counseled the ministry of education. Then he went back to Texas where he said he had to go back to teach again. The Government of Southern Sudan brought Barnaba Marial Benjamin, who was the minister of regional cooperation of the unity government in Khartoum back to Juba where he came to be in effect the foreign affairs minister in the fledgling government of South Sudan. The SPLM, who had 28 percent of the seats in the government of National Unity in Khartoum, called this Texas professor and said, “Could you come back and be the minister in Khartoum?” He said, “But I have these classes to teach.” He told his university, and they said, “We’ll hold your position here as long as you want. Go to serve your country.”
So you had that level, but you also had a nurse that I met from San Diego who was in Malakal Hospital. She brought her mother to take care of her kids in San Diego because she came back to Malakal after her time as a diaspora volunteer. Margaret Juan Lado came back from Portland, Maine, after serving as an education volunteer consultant. When she returned, she established Juba’s first library. What this Diaspora Skills Transfer Program showed me was that if you give people the venue and the opportunity to contribute, and they will come. That’s what I wanted to show.

Q: That’s wonderful!

REED: The tragedy is that program was completed shortly after John Granville’s assassination. I turned 65 a few months later, and so I had to retire from the Foreign Service. (I thought I had to leave. I found out I didn’t have to. If I knew I didn’t have to leave, I probably would have wanted to stay there.) After the assassination, there was so much focus on squeezing down programs and staff. Nobody wanted to move beyond the pilot phase of the diaspora program.

Q: Was this done through a grant with Winrock (International)?

REED: No. AED (Academy for Educational Development), and they did a wonderful job. What I thought was going to happen next was a South Sudan Peace Corps-type program to bring in hundreds of diaspora, giving them the basic kind of training we had as Peace Corps Volunteers to become teachers and let them staff the school system. Congress was interested in that, but then they asked AID to evaluate this program, and they did a perfunctory desk evaluation. I’m sorry, they just didn’t recognize the potential of the program and failed to follow through. They said, “Oh, it’s going to be so expensive to do something like this.” They really missed the boat.

Q: Yes.

REED: When I went back in 2010-1011 to support the Referendum on Self-Determination, and Susan Fine was mission director in South Sudan, a lot of the FSNs who were there knew about the diaspora program. I tried to restore interest in that.

Q: There was something. I was working for a short time after I retired, part-time with one of the NGOs that does volunteer work, so I got a little bit involved with VEGA (Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance), and there was a program that Winrock had.

REED: That’s true.

Q: I think it did involve some diaspora anyway because I remember seeing in the description of it, “diaspora.”

REED: Yes.
Q: So they did try to follow that, but I think it was very modest.

REED: They lost the opportunity. There were some champions in the Government of Southern Sudan. The head of the human resources ministry, the minister of cabinet affairs, minister of foreign affairs and regional cooperation—all three of them were champions of the diaspora. What I said was, as this program was winding down, “You have to create a policy in the Government of Southern Sudan to welcome people back.”

Q: Yes, right. So it was a lost opportunity. They could have made a difference in terms of capacity building if you had been able to expand that instead winding down.

REED: Absolutely. John Marks was working with OFDA there. He understood this very well. Because it was not a big flashy program, I’m sorry that it didn’t sustain.

Q: Just to go back again to timing. You went to Nairobi in 2003?


Q: Then you went in late 2005....

REED: Into South Sudan.

Q: Into Juba. So you were then living in Juba. When did you...

REED: I had to leave in May 2008 because I needed to take the retirement course, and I was turning 65.

Q: Okay. Was John Granville’s death in 2007?

REED: January 1st, 2008.


Q: So it was just months before you left. And that had an effect on people?

REED: It had a real effect. A lot of people were shaken up by that, understandably.

Q: Yes. Right.

REED: The democracy officer in Juba was badly shaken by that.

There was another issue that I wanted to mention, and it has to do with FSNs. A lot of the Southern Sudanese in the Nairobi office wanted to come to Juba to work. Juba was
incredibly expensive. There were some FSNs in the embassy in Khartoum who wanted to come and work. Peter Ring Ajing, who I had worked for in Wau, was on the embassy payroll. He came to Juba and worked with USAID.

Housing was a problem for them. Sometimes you could pay up to $2000 a month for a mud hut, a mud two-room building, which is far more than any of them earned. Housing was a real, real problem. I spoke Vice President Riek Machar, I spoke with the governor of Equatoria, I spoke with the minister of housing, and I said, “Listen. You want a USAID mission here that will be effective. We Americans come and go—our core is the South Sudanese who work in this mission. They’re very good people. They can’t work here if they can’t live here. Can you allow them to buy plots of land where they can build their own houses?” It took over a year, but by 2008 they finally started letting FSNs buy plots of land. They could build whatever they wanted on it. That would allow some sustainability of their employment.

Q: Has there been continuity of the FSN staff since then, or have many of them left?

REED: Some of them have left. There are still people there. You know, I was in Port-au-Prince, and I saw Administrator Mark Green’s first town hall meeting. Carol, I was moved. He talked about the importance of FSNs. He described one of his first trips. It was to Juba. He described meeting the FSNs there who were very, very dedicated, and he named people that I had recruited. He said, “They go home and they tell him, ‘We don’t know who owns the night. We don’t know whether we will even come back the next day.’ But they do.”

Q: That’s an extraordinary situation and commitment of people.

REED: I deeply respect that staff.

Q: We probably need to figure out more ways to make it tolerable for them. Just to go back—the American staff that was going in, because you had a steady increase of people going in?

REED: Constant turnover.

Q: Constant turnover. But there was some kind of housing or a compound in which they lived? Did they have this prefab housing and that kind of thing? Or were they in trailers?

REED: Trailer hutchs that were attached to an area. There were four houses in the compound. There were two or three of us in each house. We each had a bedroom. There were several people who could live in the old houses that were made in the 1980s. Then there were rows and rows of containers. The embassy wanted to use the AID compound. There was an AID compound that had a small office and a warehouse that then became the embassy and USAID office. There was a lot of renovation that was done about that.

Q: You left in the summer of 2008?
REED: I left in May 2008.

Q: At that point, what was the size of the staff in Juba? Would you have had 15 direct-hires, something like that?

REED: Probably closer to a dozen. I don’t remember the exact number.

Q: And then FSNs?

REED: Yes. And PSCs.

Q: And PSCs. Did you still get considerable support from Nairobi from the regional office there?

REED: Yes, the controller’s office and contracts.

Q: So on financial management, you were getting support from there and legal support.

REED: Yes. We didn’t have our own legal advisor.

Q: It was easy getting back and forth from Nairobi?

REED: Yes. Good flights. Teresa McGee eventually came to Juba. She had been our legal support in Nairobi at one point.

Q: Again, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement called for there to be a referendum in six years?

REED: In six years.

Q: So that would be 2011.

REED: In 2011. It was interesting. Before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. It was signed in January 2005. In 2004, after they had been negotiating for a little more than two years, all the complicated protocols that came together to be the CPA, John Garang went on a speaking tour to the liberated areas of South Sudan, and I went with him. We went to towns like Yei, Rumbek, Mundari, Padak. At each location he would explain for hours what all the protocols were that were being negotiated so that people would understand what they were working on. Then he answered every question that people had. These would take hours.

I remember when we were in Rumbek, an old Dinka man asked Dr. John—they called him Dr. John—“Dr. John, you say that six years after the agreement is signed there will be a referendum on self-determination, and we can choose independence or remain united in Sudan.” He said, “That’s right. That’s the Machakos Protocol.” “Why do we have to
wait six years to vote? I know how I want to vote now. Why can’t we vote now?” John Garang said, “Well, it’s six years because we want to give peace a chance. If we were to vote today, we all know which way we would vote. But if we give the North enough time for them to demonstrate they understand, it will be their responsibility to show us why unity is attractive. And if they do that well, then that’s an interesting choice. Maybe six years isn’t even long enough, but let’s give them six years.” The man said, “How do we know then? What should we look for?” In May 2004, John Garang said, “Watch what they do in Darfur. By that you will know where their heart is.”

(Omar al) Bashir was subsequently an indicted war criminal, there was genocide in Darfur, and John Garang was dead within a year. It was no wonder that when they voted, 98 percent of the people voted for independence. That was a genuine expression. He was prescient enough to say, “You’ll know where their heart is by what they do in Darfur.” What they did in Darfur was what they had done for two wars in South Sudan.

Q: Right. But, again, his long-term vision what the hope that there could be a united Sudan in which the rights of everyone were protected?

REED: If he had not died, I wouldn’t be surprised if he wouldn’t have been president of the Sudan.

Q: He was that charismatic?

REED: Yes. Let me tell you another little anecdote. When Stephanie came, we went up to New Site to meet with the SPLM and talk with them about what a democracy program could mean. This was towards Christmas. There was going to be a break. Ramadan and Christmas came at the same time, so they were going to take a two-week break from the Naivasha negotiations. The SPLM Leadership Council was in New Site, which was just across the border from Kenya and Eastern Equatoria. John Garang said, “Okay. You know, I asked Vice President (Ali Osman) Taha”—who was negotiating on behalf of President Bashir—“that we’re going to take a break. Why don’t we explain to people what we’re talking about. There’s a meeting of the opposition groups in the north, in Asmara. Why don’t we go and talk to them and tell them what we’re talking about so they will know there is hope? Because there could also be hope for Darfur peace modeled on this.” Taha said, “I don’t want to have anything to do with that. If you want to do that, go ahead and do it yourself. I’m going back to Khartoum.

John Garang thought, “Okay. Bashir has invited me to Khartoum, but I’m still considered a criminal.” He called his SPLM Leadership Council together, six of them including Anne Ito who was subsequently minister of agriculture, and he said, “I want the six of you to fly to Khartoum and to talk to the Sudanese public about what we’re doing.” They all said, “Well, we’re all going to be arrested! They haven’t given amnesty. How can we do this?” He said, “I’ve arranged for President Qaddafi to give us his presidential plane to fly you into Khartoum.” That’s the kind of brilliance he had! Bashir couldn’t touch them. And they were treated as heroes. They were treated as heroes. There was such excitement
in Khartoum when the SPLM Leadership Council came in and talked to the people of Sudan about what was going on.

But that’s the kind of vision and imagination that he had.

Q: Clearly, a true tragedy.

REED: Yes.

Q: So we’re going to come back because you’re going to be coming back into Sudan later.

REED: Yes.

Q: Unless there is something else you want to say in terms of this process of really creating the AID mission there in a very unique way because there were still the...?

REED: Yes. There were some very, very good people who came to serve in South Sudan. I was really impressed with them.

Q: But recruitment was a constant challenge, right?

REED: Yes. That’s the one thing that I’ve been disturbed about. There were people who did more than one tour there, but for most people to come in and out in a year, and you’ve got a couple R&Rs, in a very difficult working environment, that is kind of hard to sustain, which is why it is so important to have a solid FSN staff and which is why I wanted FSNs to be able to live there and remain committed to South Sudan.

Q: Right. So we’re at May 2008.

Post – Retirement Recall and Contractual Assignments

REED: Yes. I came to Washington to take the retirement course at State Department. They call it job search or something. It’s a spectacularly good retirement program.

Q: But you ended up not retiring! [Laughs]

REED: Well, I was in the middle of that and in September Alonzo Fulgham, who was the acting administrator, called and said, “What are you doing?” I said, “I’m in the retirement course.” He said, “I want you to go to Japan.” I said, “I’d love to go to Japan, but I can’t because the rules say I gotta retire.” He said, “No, you don’t have to retire. We have a recall authority for senior officers when we can’t find a career officer. The guy is leaving Tokyo. He’s the development counselor to the ambassador. The next one is going to come in next year from Paraguay. We’d like you to go there. You can go in under recall.”
So I retired on one day and got recalled the next, so there wasn’t even 24 hours gap. I went to Japan. That was an extraordinary experience because of course Japan doesn’t need our assistance, but I was to encourage them to do more in Africa. They got very interested in South Sudan. I’d worked closely with JICA when I was in Zambia. It was really, really a good time there.

Q: How long did you stay on that assignment?

REED: Ten months.

Q: Ten months. So you were serving as the bridge between officers.

REED: Yes. I went there as development counselor to the ambassador because they first started talking about TDY, and the embassy said, “If someone doesn’t come out with that title, they won’t get through the door with JICA.” So I went there with that title.

When I finished that, I thought I was retiring then, and they said, “Well, we need a mission director in Tbilisi, Georgia, and we need a mission director in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. We ended up going to Sarajevo for what I thought would be one year. It turned out to be three years, until finally they got a direct-hire to come in 2012.

Q: It’s amazing having difficulty finding a replacement for Bosnia.

REED: It was a spectacular mission. It was so much fun working with other donors in Sarajevo.

Q: By then, that’s 2009, what was the program in Bosnia?

REED: When I came in 2009, we had an AID mission in a wonderful separate building. We had to eventually consolidate with the new embassy complex. There was a lot of work on democracy governance. The Dayton Peace Accord ended a horrible conflict, but it set in place a system that is so unwieldy. There are 14 levels of government. At each level, you have a tripartite system, where you have a Bosnian Serb, a Bosnian Muslim, and Bosnian Croat, and the all have equal veto power. Nothing ever gets done, except at the municipal level where there is direct election of mayors. There are still problems to this day. The country is divided into two. There’s the Republika Srpska, which is where the Bosnian Serbs are under Milorad Dodik. There’s the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a federation of Croats and Bosniaks, who are Muslims. There is an enclave up towards the Serbian border, and there are cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and each canton has a parliament. It’s just totally unwieldy.

There are economic growth programs going on. We’re working together with Swedish SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) collaborating on that. We’re collaborating on some very interesting work on municipal governance, which is the one place where there’s the direct election of mayors. I think that is the hope for the country. Let that percolate up somehow.
Q: Right. It’s interesting. Given your experience with Sudan and the changes there, and then going into Bosnia, an interesting contrast!

REED: From not enough government to far too much!

Q: [Laughs] Yeah! Well, at least one would learn some examples of how not to go about doing it.

REED: There are some extraordinary FSNs there. I thought Nishana Fernando was the best FSN that I had ever met—the one in Sri Lanka who came to Zambia and to Southern Sudan—but there is a woman in Sarajevo, Amira Ramhorst. She is a financial sector specialist. She asked one time if she could take Swedish SIDA counterparts to attend a DCA conference in Cairo to let them understand what AID’s development credit authority program is all about. They came back all enthusiastic, so Swedish SIDA and USAID Bosnia put together a multilateral DCA program. Administrator Shah called Amira and I to Washington when the Swedish SIDA director came, and they signed the agency’s first multilateral agreement to DCA programming. She introduced to the banking sector—she’s a financial advisor to the Bank of Bosnia Central Bank—and got them to introduce a deposit insurance system, and is just extraordinarily talented.

When I got this last Firehouse assignment to Haiti, and I worked with the second best FSN I’ve ever met, Marie-Renée Vertus, who manages the DCA portfolio there and who is doing very interesting things with secondary mortgage markets and trying to get the Haitian diaspora to invest in that, I suggested that Marie-Renée Vertus and Amira Ramhorst get together. We wanted to bring Amira to Haiti, but she got into a skiing accident and broke her leg. We were then going to send Marie-Renée to Sarajevo, and she was at the airport the day they closed the airport because of the political strife.

Q: Someday they will get together!

REED: When I left Haiti last week, I made the mission director in Haiti and the mission director in Bosnia promise to continue this because the sparks will fly creatively when you get those two brilliant FSNs together. Benefit will accrue to the agency, both programs and both wonderful FSN officers.

Q: Well, the people who manage the DCA program in Washington should make it happen, if no one else will!

REED: Yes.

Q: That is great. Were you on recall authority when you were Mission Director in Bosnia?

REED: I was a mission director as a recall authority, so nobody had to do an evaluation on me. But I still had to write everybody’s evaluations!
Q: [laughs]

REED: That was very fine. We went through a RIF in Bosnia.

Q: They must be getting close to defining when it closes there?

REED: They weren’t yet when I left in 2012, but I wouldn’t be surprised if that’s coming down the line. When I was there in 2010 as the Southern Sudanese Referendum on Self-Determination was due to come together as the final protocol in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it was supposed to have been developed the year before, and Khartoum just dragged its heels. Nothing was being done. There was high anxiety. Princeton Lyman asked if I could be released from Sarajevo to come and support the AID mission in their approach to this. Bill Hammink was in Khartoum. Susan Fine was in Juba. Michael Eddy was the democracy officer.

Q: I had forgotten Bill was there!

REED: Yes. I came to Washington and got an orientation to what was happening. When I got to Khartoum, while there was such panic in Washington about the situation, I found that USAID did have it together. There was still nervousness about whether the referendum was going to happen or not. The division of labor between USAID and the UN system was that one group would support the development of materials for the registration process, which had to go well, and the other group would develop the training for registrants who would man 4,000 sites, not just in Southern Sudan, but in northern Sudan, in America, and in Europe and Australia because the diaspora overseas could vote as well. They had to develop what the ballot would look like. So many people were illiterate, so a picture of clasped hands was a vote for unity, while “ma salama,” a picture of a hand waving goodbye, was a vote for independence. And then it was written in Arabic and English. Only Southern Sudanese could vote, but they had to develop a system of registration.

Q: So only Southern Sudanese? It was their decision what they wanted to do?

REED: Yes, even if they were Southerners in the north or in the diaspora. They had to develop a registrant’s card with the name, the date, the site, coding number and a thumbprint or signature, and it was embossed. This registration was done in November. Voting took place in January. They had to come back to the same places where they registered at the polling station. Sixty-five percent of those who registered would have to vote, otherwise it would not be considered legitimate. Sixty-five percent of those who registered had to come back to the same place 10 weeks later to vote. Sometimes it was a two-day walk from your village to the voting center. There was some question as to whether even that many would be able to do that.

In the referendum itself, in early January, Kofi Annan was there as an observer. Jimmy Carter was there as an observer. The referendum was widely monitored internationally.
As I mentioned earlier, I was in Malakal observing the governor of the state of Upper Nile cast the first vote, Simon Kun Puoch. He was my best 8th grade student in Gambela, Ethiopia, at the refugee hostel in 1968. I proudly watched the Governor cast his vote! In fact, Jeremiah Changjwok, the refugee student who, when he found out I was going to walk with the rebels in 1969 said, “Don’t go unless I go with you as your bodyguard.” I said, “Jeremiah, stay in Ethiopia and get an education.” He said, “No, you don’t know what you’re getting yourself into.” I probably owe my life to Jeremiah’s good counsel. He subsequently finished his education after we came out of the bush and he became the director of roads and bridges in Upper Nile. He voted in the referendum in Malakal, too.

They all voted for independence. Ninety-eight percent of the South Sudanese voted for independence. Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter, everybody in the European Union said it was free and fair election. When you see that number of people voting the same, you think of North Korea or someplace, but this was a genuine expression of public will.

**Q:** Had there actually been campaigning? Was there anyone arguing for unity, or people really didn’t try to make that case?

REED: Some people in the national party from Khartoum, who were Southerners working in the South, actually said they would prefer to vote for independence. This, I think, was a very genuine expression of the public will.

**Q:** So you observed. You were there and helping in those last stages and got to observe?

REED: Then I went back to Sarajevo.

**Q:** There must have been a lot of celebration after the vote was tallied?

REED: Yes. But when I went back to Sarajevo, my youngest daughter, Fiija, who was born in South Africa, came to South Sudan as the first International Voluntary Health Intern working with a group of Catholic nuns in Western Equatoria. She’s interested in public health. She has her master’s in global health. She compiled a book about their use of traditional medicinal plants and herbs. My wife and I were in Sarajevo. Ayo, who had been director of nurses in Juba, was very nervous about Fiija going to Western Equatoria! Fortunately, in this day and age with Skype, we could see she was under her mosquito net every night in the same place with the nuns, but she dancing at midnight when they raised the flag at independence! I was there vicariously!

**Q:** [Laughs] You were there vicariously, but you weren’t actually there? Was that hard not to be there?

REED: Yes. Yeah. When I left after the referendum, the Southern Sudanese gave me a big South Sudanese flag, which I flew on the balcony of our terrace in Sarajevo, Bosnia, when they voted.

**Q:** That’s good.
REED: When they got independence.

Q: When they got independence on that day.

REED: Fija actually is now monitoring HIV/AIDS programs in 17 countries in Africa, doing mostly in French, and traveling all over the place.

Q: It’s interesting when you go through a career and you say back when you were in South Africa, and it doesn’t sound like that long ago until you say what the kids born during that period are doing now.

REED: It was 29 years ago, yeah!

Q: That was obviously then an exciting opportunity. When you left Sarajevo—that was the last of the recall assignments? Then you signed up for what you have referred to as the “firehouse” program?

REED: No. I didn’t work for about a year. Before I left Sarajevo, I must say, the collaboration with the other donors in Bosnia was extraordinary. We did a lot together with Swedish SIDA, but also the Norwegians, and the Dutch, and the British, and the Germans, and the Czech.

Q: If you were to compare with other places where you’d been, would you put that...?

REED: By far the most.

Q: By far the best.

REED: In fact, we did input into a Washington document on the donor coordination.

Q: Ah, okay! Off the top of your head, are there any lessons that you think would be particularly important that maybe aren’t done effectively?

REED: A lot of this spun out of the international assistance after the terrible war. Because AID had a longer presence there, other donors realized that we had field officers there. Our objectives were often very similar and complementary, so we designed programs with Swedish SIDA. They sat in on our technical evaluation committees. We monitored programs together. Jointly funded them. It worked to everybody’s advantage.

Q: So it may have been in part because other donors came to USAID more than they might have and sought them out?

REED: Yeah. After I left in the summer of 2012, USAID Sri Lanka contacted me in 2013 and said, “Would you come back and head up the program office for a couple of years as a PSC?” I said, “No, I’m not going to give you two years of time, but I’ll give you six
months, and I’ll help you find somebody long term. So, we went to Colombo. I worked with Sherry Carlin, who was very good. It was a difficult relationship with the Sri Lankan government at that time. It looked like AID might not have a long time left there because the cooperation was not good. I recruited a replacement who came in for long term. Nishana Fernando was back working in the program office, and it was nice to be able to work with her again. The program also covered the Maldives. I’m very glad I did those six months.

_Q: Just out of curiosity, were there any sort of aspects of the programs or anything you might have worked on earlier that you saw the results of in the six months?_

REED: Most of the other portfolio had died when everything else was eliminated by AID/Washington at the end of 1996, but now there was a big democracy governance portfolio. There was a very interesting portfolio with OTI that was working for reconciliation after the peace agreement ended that terrible war with the Tamil Tigers. Those kinds of programs were different from what I had seen there before.

_Q: You’ve mentioned OTI a couple of times. I know that OTI operates in different ways in different places. Some countries have worked very effectively, and others where there is an AID mission and OTI is there, it sometimes it works well and sometimes it doesn’t. I was just curious if you have observations?_

REED: There was some initial, I would call it mild friction, when we first set up the Sudan Field Office because there was an OTI officer who didn’t feel she was a part of that. Eventually, that worked out.

_Q: If people work hard enough on the ground, they can make it work?_

REED: You can make it work, if you all recognize we’re all working towards the same thing!

_Q: That’s the simple message!_

REED: Those six months were good. Then last year, the beginning of the year, I was contacted by the Firehouse, which was at that time out of the DCHA (Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance) Bureau. They said, “Would you please consider submitting an application to join the Firehouse?” I did. A month later, I was asked if I could go to Zimbabwe to work with Stephanie Funk and support that mission in their performance evaluation process, because the deputy director was no longer there. Stephanie knew how I approached AEF process from her time in Sudan. That is the best mission I’ve ever seen. This was before Robert Mugabe fell, so it was a very difficult working environment. While I was there, I really admired the way Stephanie handled this. There was a message saying, “There will be no more funding for Zimbabwe.” It came in from Washington. She had to deliver that message to the whole staff. The way she did it was magnificent. She called everybody together, and she said, “I
have to give some bad news, but let’s talk about this.” Everybody’s faces fell when she said, “There is no more funding.” But she reminded people, “We have a very large pipeline. We have a pipeline that will continue to support the programs that we are all working on for a year or more, so don’t despair. That’s what they tell us right now.” She got everybody to pull up their boots, and people thanked her! That’s the kind of leadership she has.

It’s a mission that has many different technical offices, support offices, and monitoring all the AEFs for everybody, I saw what people were doing. I saw how people collaborated, and with the embassy. It is the definition of a country team and an AID mission the way they should be. She was spectacular.

*Q: That’s good for the record!*

REED: I’ve served in a dozen different missions. I’ve never seen a more well run mission than under Stephanie Funk.

*Q: That’s good to hear, especially since I know Stephanie well! That’s wonderful. That sounds like a very productive use of your time. I’m sure it was also helpful for the mission.*

REED: It was thrill to be in Zimbabwe. I had never flown into the country before. I had always driven in from Lusaka. My last week there, we heard that the Firehouse was closing down. Under the new administration in Washington, they were just going to shut the doors. It made no sense to me because it’s such a flexible mechanism.

So my wife and I went off to Finland because we have a home there. In October, I got a call saying, “They didn’t shut the Firehouse down. Do you want to go to Haiti?” So the Haiti mission called.

I’ve always been interested in Haiti because of the African connection, but I had never visited anywhere in the Latin America or Caribbean area, let alone worked in any of those missions. They needed an economic growth team leader. I said, “I’m not an economist. I’m not a private sector specialist. As a mission director and a deputy director, I have supervised people doing that work in Bosnia and several other places, but that’s not my forte. They said, “We just want someone with management experience.” Their U.S. direct-hire economic growth team leader had been transferred to Afghanistan. It would be nine or ten months before they would get a new one, so I would come in and fill the gap. Turns out the person who has been assigned there has only just left Central America, is only just somewhere here at FSI, starting French training from scratch!

*Q: Starting? Oh, there’s going to be a gap!*

REED: The last thing I did in August in Port-au-Prince was to chair a tech committee to recruit a U.S. PSC to fill the gap between the end of August and when the direct-hire comes. That was a very, very interesting time to be in Haiti.
Q: Yes. I think you mentioned when we were talking earlier, I know that an important priority has been on the job creation front to do with some of the industrial estates.

REED: Yes. They’re doing wonderful things in that respect, especially in the garment sector.

Q: That’s great. Maybe let’s sort of step back for a minute—again, as you edit the transcript, you can add elements to this—and ask a couple sort of concluding questions.

First, since so much of your career was devoted to Sudan—not just your career, so much of your life has been devoted to Southern Sudan and to the issues there. Obviously, from the USAID platform, you were heavily involved in multiple ways. I’m just curious, in retrospect are there any lessons learned or things you think AID might have been able to do differently and that might have had an impact? There may not be. I’m just sort of curious. It’s an open-ended question.

REED: I think of the diaspora program that I mentioned. AID lost a tremendous opportunity to have a tremendous impact on the education and health sectors by not building on what clearly was proven to be a terrific model and to take it beyond that short-term volunteer phase to support the creation of a South Sudanese peace corps, because diaspora from South Sudan would respond to that. I think that was a sad lost opportunity.

Q: Right. And it might have had a real impact in building the kind of strength that you need in the governance sector.

REED: Absolutely!

Q: We talked a little bit about the length of tours and getting to know countries and all that. I suspect AID as a whole might have benefited if they had been able to have people, in general, stay a longer time?

REED: Absolutely. Absolutely. I think over the 40 years that I’ve been with AID, I think we’ve garnered a better appreciation for Foreign Service Nationals and how they can play the role of TCNs and give them the opportunities to grow professionally. I think the way we started off with FSNs is too restrictive in terms of recognizing what they have to offer.

Q: Right. And you obviously provided those kinds of opportunities to FSNs.

REED: I tried to, yes.

Q: That’s another important lesson. Any final thoughts?
Again, Allan, I’ve really enjoyed the chance to talk to you about all this and the really incredible career you’ve had. In and out of Sudan, Russia, Bosnia and Zambia, Swaziland, South Africa. It’s really quite an extraordinary career. Thank you very much for sharing.

REED: Thank you, Carol. I have always admired you in your career and your contribution to USAID. I’m glad that we’ve had the chance to sit and talk together.

Q: Thank you. Thanks a lot. We’ll stop this for now, but look forward to more discussion afterwards. Thank you.

REED: Thank you.

Addendum

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Sudan Experience Project

Interview # 49 – Executive Summary

Interviewed by: W. Haven North
Initial interview date: December 14, 2006
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The Interviewee is currently the USAID Director for Southern Sudan and Deputy Mission Director on assignment in Juba. He has a long personal history with Sudan going back to 1966 when he was with the Peace Corps in Gambela, Ethiopia on the border with Sudan where he assisted the many Sudanese refugees who had settled there. Subsequently, he traveled over 3000 miles in Sudan filming for NBC and doing research on conditions in southern Sudan for the World Council of Churches.

He traveled with the Anyanya Movement and Dr. John Garang. He was well acquainted with Dr. Garang and Garang’s his views, work, and vision for Sudan. Garang’s view was that Sudan is an Afro-Arab country; the way to solve the issues of the south and the other disenfranchised groups (the Nuba, the Funj, the Fur, the Beja and the Nubians) is to recognize the rights of all citizens of Sudan to equal treatment in a secular democracy. His vision, brilliance and articulation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) issues were important to the negotiation of the issues between the North and the South. He believed that the CPA would bring peace and stability; it was important for the people learn how to make
government transparent and accountable. He was active in promoting and explaining the CPA among the southern community.

The importance of dealing with corruption was promoted by the work of Robert Klitgaard, an authority on the subject; Klitgaard traveled in southern Sudan holding seminars on corruption.

The worldwide attention on Darfur has led to the feeling that the South is proceeding adequately because it has its peace agreement. There are serious issues of commitment to the implementation of the CPA on the part of the Khartoum government, such as the North/South boundary issues.

On the prospects for the CPA and Sudan, the interviewee is hopeful because the foundations are well laid; the need to emphasize the importance of adhering to the implementation and not giving up is critical for the country. If the CPA can work in the South, then it can give confidence for the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Eastern Peace Agreement. The world community should continue efforts to support the South and its development; the levels of expectations are enormous; the constraints to development are also enormous re infrastructure, governance and capacity.

The interviewee concludes that the outcome of the referendum will be overwhelmingly in favor of an independent Southern Sudan. “I cannot honestly remember any single southern Sudanese who has ever said anything else other than that. This means that Doctor John’s exhortation to the North to understand its responsibility to very assertively demonstrate why unity should be attractive was not just to say it, but to live it.”

The fundamental lesson learned has been the importance of putting everything on the table no matter how long it takes, and not to do so in a rushed fashion. The CPA is a magnificent document and provides the way forward. Important issues are the challenge of the “three areas,” and dealing with capacity, governance, and southern infrastructure.

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Sudan Experience Project

Interview # 49

Interviewed by: W. Haven North
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Q: Tell us about the work you are doing and your association with Sudan and particularly with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

A: I am here as the director of USAID for Southern Sudan and I am also the Deputy Mission Director for USAID Sudan. I have taken up my assignment in Juba a little over three weeks ago, but I have been involved with settling up what was called the Sudan Field Office of USAID in Nairobi since November 2003. Up to that point I was Mission Director in USAID Zambia, based out of Lusaka. In 2003, as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was in the process of being negotiated, and it looked like there would be a successful resolution of the agreement, Andrew Natsios, our Administrator of USAID wanted to bring the various spigots of USAID assistance to Sudan, particularly to the South and to the transition areas, under one management structure. He has been exceptionally committed to Sudan and the issues that are facing this country. By 2003, Sudan was already the largest USAID program in all of Africa. Most of the assistance was humanitarian assistance.

Darfur had not reached the level of crisis that it is today, but there was, even back then, assistance to Darfur. But there was a major humanitarian assistance program to Southern Sudan through the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an enormous Food for Peace (FFP) program. There was the beginning of an Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program. All these were under the rubric of the DCHA funding. There was also a significant Development Assistance program (DA) that had been run out of what was called the Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO) in Nairobi, which is now USAID/East Africa. There were assistance programs in education, in health, in economic activities and some support for infrastructure and fledgling support for democracy and governance, preparing for the transition of the Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to the Government of Southern Sudan.

So all of these were managed independently of each other. In preparation for eventually re-establishing a full USAID mission in Sudan, Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator, wanted to bring them all into one management structure, based in Nairobi, in what was then called the Sudan Field Office. We could not call it a mission because we were outside Sudan, even though we were managing programs from Nairobi in Sudan.

This came at the time when there was an authorized departure in Kenya in 2003. (There had been an incident with the attempted shooting down of an Israeli airliner flying out of Mombasa; there was an attack on a tourist hotel on the Kenya coast, following, several years previously, the embassy bombings in Kenya. Because of the continued concerns about security under those conditions, there was an attempt to reduce the American footprint, which had been significant, in Kenya.) The impetus to create a Sudan Field Office based in Nairobi while everybody else was reducing the size of its staffs was a contradiction that we had to deal with. In the first tranche of people there, in terms of U.S. direct hire, were only two, myself as the director and another official came in as the first program officer.
In fact, the peace agreement took longer to negotiate than we had anticipated at that point. There was belief that by 2004 the peace would be negotiated, and there would be the opportunity to move into Sudan. It took place a year later and so we have been in the process of moving in.

I was asked to take on this assignment, because my personal history is a long one that goes back to 1966. I went to Ethiopia as a Peace Corps volunteer in the summer of 1966, and I ended up being assigned as a teacher in Gambela in western Ilubabor province, as it was called at that point. There were about twenty thousand refugees from Upper Nile, from the first civil war that went from 1955 to 1972. When I went to Gambela as a teacher, my assignment was to work as the first Peace Corps volunteer in that area, at the Ethiopian government school, which went up through the eighth grade. Grades one through six were taught in the Amharic language. I was the English instructor for those lower grades. We had four students in grade seven, where English became the language of instruction; we had no students at all in the eighth grade. There were many, many southern Sudanese who were refugees in the Gambela district who really wanted to go to school.

Gambela is the last navigable point on the Baro-Sobat river complex, which flows into the White Nile at Malakal. During the dry season Gambela was at the bottom of a 5,000 foot high escarpment, because of Ethiopia’s mountainous and enormous plateaus. Ethiopia’s coffee from the western provinces would be harvested in the dry season and brought down by either human porters or donkeys, down that escarpment and deposited in very large coffee warehouses that were in Gambela in the dry season. Then in the wet season, when the river would rise sufficiently to allow these great paddle wheeled Mississippi River-type steamboats to come up from Malakal, they would take the coffee out. During the first war, the Anyanya War that ran from ’55 to ’72, by the early 1960s the Anyanya was attacking the steamboats, so Ethiopia stopped exporting its coffee out through Gambela. In one sense, Gambela became kind of a ghost town, except for the presence of many, many refugees.

At that point there were Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and there were also Ethiopian refugees in Sudan. Neither government wanted to officially recognize the presence of refugees from the other country in their state, because each did not want to have a large UNHCR program that recognized there were issues that forced people to leave. So there was not a great response, in terms of UNHCR programs, at that point that could assist refugees in Ethiopia — Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia. But the All-Africa Conference of Churches out of Nairobi was interested in supporting Sudanese education needs in Ethiopia. They had a modest scholarship program in Addis Ababa but that was problematical in some senses, because it was difficult for southern Sudanese to go to school in Ethiopia, given the reception that they often faced in Ethiopia at that point. As I learned about the All-Africa Conference of Churches’ interest in supporting education for southern Sudanese, I wrote to them and made a proposal that they rent one of these coffee warehouses and I would turn it into a hostel for the southern Sudanese. They approved the program. Peace Corps had no objection, as long as my primary responsibility as a
volunteer was to teach; the Ethiopian education ministry was happy with my performance as a teacher. Peace Corps volunteers are encouraged to engage in community development activities, so this was what I did.

I moved into the warehouse with about 150 southern Sudanese. We had two big rooms. We got some burlap sacks and stuffed them with elephant grass to make mattresses. I had sufficient funds to buy everybody a tee shirt, shorts and pair of flip-flops and school notebooks, and we had money for food. Living with the refugees in the hostel, I was with these folks for 24 hours a day, because I taught them during the day and administered the hostel. I ended up actually extending for a third year in order to encourage the Ethiopian teachers at the school to take over the administration of the hostel, because the hostel was not a Peace Corps program; it was an independent program. In fact, the Ethiopian teachers did take over the management of the refugee hostel. That was in 1969.

As I was completing my Peace Corps service, I was approached by the southern Sudanese from the Anyanya movement, the equivalent of the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLA) in the first conflict, because many of my students were members of the Anyanya. Some of them had been wounded during the conflict; they came out to Ethiopia to seek medical treatment and in recuperation they took advantage of the fact there were educational opportunities there, because schools had been closed for several years in southern Sudan. So everybody was hungry for education.

They asked what I was going to do, now that I was completing my Peace Corps service and I said I planned to go back and try and go to law school in the States. I was asked if I would come inside, into the bush with the Anyanya, to travel with them, walk with them, in Upper Nile and be a witness to what was going on in the conflict and then be able to provide publicity and to get some humanitarian assistance.

When I finished my Peace Corps service, unbeknownst to the Peace Corps, instead of going directly back to the States I spent ten weeks walking with the Anyanya movement in Upper Nile, from the Gambela area almost to Malakal. I saw terrible things: villages that were destroyed by Egyptian MiG jets, cattle camps that had been raided, the ragtag guerilla army in training. I had my personal camera with me; I took pictures and on my way to the States I stopped in Europe, I went to Geneva to the Red Cross, to the World Council of Churches, to any organization that I thought would listen and told them what I had seen.

At that time, in 1969, the civil war in Nigeria was going on between eastern Nigeria, which called itself Biafra, and the Nigerian federal government. The World Council of Churches had launched the first large-scale ecumenical cross-border humanitarian assistance program. They turned a road into Uli airstrip and brought in significant amounts of humanitarian relief, because Biafra was a humanitarian catastrophe. But they recognized that what was going on in southern Sudan was at least equally as serious, except there was very little that was known. Biafra got the world’s press attention, because it was accessible and people responded to the need for humanitarian assistance there.
The World Council of Churches said they were interested in finding out the feasibility of doing something in Sudan. They asked if I would go back into the bush and do an assessment of the Anyanya movement and their willingness and capability of fairly and equitably distributing humanitarian relief supplies. They also asked me to go to Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and what was then called Zaire, to work through the national Christian councils of those countries to ask them to approach their ministries of foreign affairs to find a government that would be willing to turn a blind eye, to look the other way, if a humanitarian relief program could be launched. But because I am an American and the United States has a member agency in the World Council of Churches, which is Church World Service (CWS), the World Council of Churches asked, since I was going back to the States with my return Peace Corps ticket anyway, if I could go through New York and Church World Service would do a contract with me. So I came back to the States and went to CWS. While there I also approached NBC-TV.

Before I went to Ethiopia as a Peace Corps volunteer, I was chairman of the anti-apartheid committee when I was at the University of California at Berkeley as an undergrad and we did public education about liberation issues in southern Africa in the San Francisco Bay area. One of the most effective tools to raise peoples’ awareness and consciousness of what was going on in southern Africa was an NBC-TV film that they had made called Angola, A Journey To A War, where they had sent in one of their Africa correspondents at the beginning of the liberation struggle that the Angolans launched against Portuguese colonialism. It was a very powerful and compelling film. I went to the producer of that film and I said, “I know that you have done this sort of thing before, because I used your film to teach people about these kind of issues in southern Africa. Here is what is happening in southern Sudan. Why not you do the same thing there?” And NBC became interested in doing a film, so they asked if I would be the go-between, between NBC and the Anyanya movement.

So I contacted the Anyanya and said, “Listen, you want humanitarian assistance and you want publicity. Do you agree that I can come back and assess your situation, to see if it is feasible to launch a humanitarian assistance program and will you answer these questions honestly and straightforwardly for the World Council of Churches? Do you agree that I can bring NBC-TV to do a film?” And they said, “Yes, that is why we asked you come in the first place. So the answer to both questions is “please come back as quickly as you can.”

NBC’s Africa correspondent had actually been killed the year before in Congo, so they did not have an Africa correspondent anymore. When they asked around the various film crews they could not find anybody who wanted to take on this assignment, so they asked me if I would do the film. I had never even seen a movie camera, this was before videotape, incidentally, so I said, “Thank you for asking but I cannot do that, because I do not know anything about cinematography.” There was a program in those days on NBC called First Tuesday, which was network television, before CNN, network television’s first attempt at a news magazine documentary kind of format; it was two hours on the first Tuesday of each month and they had six, seven or eight different eclectic documentary
topics. Subsequently CBS came up with Sixty Minutes, which was that kind of format, shortened to one hour, on a weekly basis. But first Tuesday was NBC’s attempt at doing this.

I do not remember what they had said their experience was with a domestic group, where it would have been very intrusive for them to have sent a film crew to do the story of whatever this American group was and so they trained some people from that group in Super 8 photography. Super 8 cameras are kind of like instamatic movie cameras, where you just pull the trigger and you do not have to worry about gadgets and stuff. So they showed me a Super 8 camera. It did not have a sound capacity but they said, “When you film with a Super 8 camera, here is a little tape recorder. When you pull the trigger for the movie camera, set the tape recorder on the ground and get the background noise and we will assemble all this together.”

So they gave me half a dozen rolls of film and said, “Go out to New York City and shoot some movies, see if you have an eye for a camera.” So I went out to Central Park where there was an anti-Vietnam War demonstration and I filmed that. I brought the film to NBC and they looked at it and said, “Okay, you are kind of a natural photographer. Do not use the zoom lens too much, because when you use it quickly it is blurry. Do not pan the camera, because that is also hard to follow. But other than that your technique is pretty good.”

So they gave me two cameras and two tape recorders and a ticket back to Africa. I told the church groups about the concurrent film that I would be making for NBC, but I did not tell NBC about the concurrent research for the World Council of Churches, because you do not want to publicize a cross-border humanitarian relief program unnecessarily. So in 1970 I went in through Uganda, after going to Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire on behalf of the church groups. I spent about another ten weeks walking from central Equatoria, up near the Uganda-Congo-Sudan border into central Equatoria, crossed the Nile and went to Joseph Lagu’s headquarters. He was the head of the Anyanya at that point, in 1970.

And what I saw in Equatoria province was very different from Upper Nile. Upper Nile was flat flood plain, pastoral Nilotic cattle camps, people involved in transhumance. Equatoria was much more forested, more tropical, sedentary agriculturalists, mountains, beautiful area but very different from the experience in southern Sudan that I knew between Gambela and Upper Nile. While I was there, I met the commander for Bahr el Ghazal and he invited me to travel with him to Bahr el Ghazal. I had run out of film at that point and said I had to go back to New York, but, if I can convince NBC to let me come back, I would love to go up to Bahr el Ghazal, because, as he described it, I could understand that it was more similar to Upper Nile.

So when I went back to New York NBC wanted to make a film with the footage that I brought back from Equatoria, but I asked them, “Please let me go back once more, because I will bring some footage that will be even better than this.” I spent five months in 1971, walked from where Congo and Uganda and Sudan meet, near Aba, all the way, almost up to Abyei. Altogether in those three trips, I walked about three thousand miles.
The Anyanya had no vehicles, as the SPLM/SPLA did, so everything was on foot. As we went up to Bahr el Ghazal, the Anyanya attacked the railroad line and I showed them blowing that up.

When I brought the film footage back, NBC assigned a professional editor to work with me. It was hard, reducing all those hours and hours of footage down to 15 minutes, but that is the primetime television time that I was allotted. My film was shown in September 1971 for 15 minutes. It showed what life was like for the civilian population on the run. We did, by the way, get a cross-border humanitarian relief program, mostly involving medical supplies, through Uganda.

Q: What precisely were you filming?

A: Everything that I saw. What life was like for the civil population where the southern Sudan provisional government in the bush tried to provide simple social services, whether it was a school under a tree where kids are drawing with their finger in the ground or fledgling medical emergency services or these illegal markets that the Anyanya set up or the courts that they tried, using traditional legal systems, to provide some sense of order; and then the Anyanya itself. I was in some conflict situations with them. I showed them blowing up the railroad in Wau, showed them in training, showed their interaction with people, with the civilian population, a helicopter that they had shot down from the Sudanese Army. It was all from a southern Sudanese perspective, because I had no visa when I went in. From the perspective of the Sudanese government, I was in the country without a visa, but I was traveling with the Anyanya and under their protection for the nearly a year that I was with them.

NBC loved the film. They said, “Listen, let us do another film” because they had no Africa correspondent. They said, “If the next film turns out like this one, you have got a job as our Africa correspondent.” I got into an argument with them, because they wanted to do a film about the Peace Corps in Africa and I love the Peace Corps. I recruited for the Peace Corps for a year before I went overseas as a volunteer. I organized a Peace Corps recruiting team on the Berkeley campus, where we had 1200 people apply that year from Berkeley for the Peace Corps. I extended for a year in Ethiopia. They agreed with the work that I did with refugees, even though the embassy had said Peace Corps volunteers should not be involved in that. Peace Corps told the embassy as long as the Ethiopian government is pleased, then they are pleased. So I think very highly of the Peace Corps. But that is an American story. I told NBC I would rather go and spend a couple of months with Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, who is an African hero that people in the United States did not really understand and know enough about him to recognize what a heroic figure he was in Africa. Now, thirty years later I understand Julius Nyerere’s economic policies maybe were not the best thing for Tanzania, but he was still a hero; he should have been heard loudly and clearly by us in the United States.

So NBC and I argued about that and before we could conclude that the Addis Ababa peace agreement came in February 1972. Because of my experiences working with refugees and because of the unique experiences I had in the bush with the Anyanya, the
World Council of Churches asked if I would go to Bahr el Ghazal, to Wau, to help resettle refugees and help organize the reconstruction of schools and clinics that were destroyed during the war. I told NBC thanks but no thanks. Having seen Sudan in conflict, I would much rather help them in this time of peace, since peace finally came.

Obviously that was the right move, because I met my wife in Sudan. She had been a nurse in Harlem Hospital, in the emergency ward, wanted to serve on the continent. She does not like bureaucratic forms; when she wrote to the Peace Corps, the application was four pages long. Church World Service was one page, so she filled that out. We met in October ’72 in Khartoum as I was stuck there for a month before they would let me go back down to the South. She was stuck there for a month, because when she arrived the Ministry of Health in Juba — she was going to be the matron of Juba Hospital — was so eager for her to get there they had not even thought where she was going to live. It took them a month to organize a tent. So we met during that month, we were both stuck in Khartoum. I am glad I said no to NBC News and came to Sudan.

I was in Wau from 1972 to 1974, during that postwar emergency relief and rehabilitation period. That was a time when peace first came to Sudan at the end of the first conflict. I had the good fortune of being in Sudan at that time. It was thrilling to see peace after 17 years of conflict, where there had been one and two million people who perished during that civil war. There was the second war that started in 1983.

Q: Let us talk about the beginnings of the CPA negotiations. What led to the being of the CPA?

A: Let me back up, because it is important to understand what the Addis Ababa peace agreement achieved and what it did not, and the objectives of the Anyanya conflict and the SPLM approach to the same issues, because it is all part of the same fifty years of history between North and South. The Addis Ababa agreement ended the conflict. It established a regional government in the South. But it was negotiated very quickly. The subsequent peace agreement that became the various protocols that formed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement after the second war took a great deal of time to negotiate and issues were identified and hammered out in far greater detail than they were in the Addis Ababa agreement.

The Addis agreement established a regional government, but it really did not deal with economic issues. There was not any real revenue generating authority that the regional government had. They relied on handouts and allowances from Khartoum, which I guess was okay until they discovered oil.

Several years after the peace agreement was signed in 1972, by the mid-Seventies, after I left in 1974, oil was discovered in the South and President Nimeiri’s response to that was to try to redraw the borders between North and South. He carved out the area where the oil was in Unity state and said, “This is now part of the North.” The southern Sudanese said, “Maybe that is not completely ours, but you cannot just redraw the borders like that,
because, the borders at January 1, 1956, when independence came, were clearly defined and Unity is in the South, it is not in the North."

So they protested and in response Nimeiri shredded the peace agreement. Then, he eventually dissolved the regional government and, of course, people protested that. He slapped on sharia as the basis of law in Sudan and things went from bad to worse. By 1983, when the mutiny at Bor took place, very clearly things had deteriorated in the years since independence. John Garang, whom I had met as an Anyanya officer, a junior officer, late in the first civil war, was a very high-ranking officer in the Sudanese Army, from Bor himself.

When I was in Wau, during that two year post-conflict cooling off period, one of the major differences between the Addis Ababa agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was that the Addis agreement saw the integration of the Anyanya into the Sudanese Army, whereas the Comprehensive Peace Agreement at least during the interim period recognizes two standing armies and joint integrated units, but the SPLA and Sudanese Armed Forces are equally Sudanese military. That was not the case in the Addis agreement. But they also recognized it would be pretty hard to completely integrate immediately, so there was a two year cooling off period. For example, in Wau, which was then capital of Bahr el Ghazal, the Sudanese Army units from the North were on the northern side of the city and 12 kilometers south of Wau, at a place called Busseri, an old Catholic mission station, were the Anyanya units.

At Busseri, there were schools and clinics that were destroyed during the war, so the Sudan Council of Churches had organized reconstruction teams and we were repairing those facilities. I would go down to Busseri every Friday to make the payroll and I would see John Garang there. I had met him before the war ended and so we would talk for a couple hours every Friday when I went there. I remember one time he said, “Next time you come to Busseri you are going to see a difference here.” I said, “What are you talking about?” He said, “You’ll see next Friday.”

The subsequent Wednesday, before the next Friday, there was a very bright full moon and in the middle of the night, when you could see clearly, John Garang and the other junior officers there, who were very disturbed by the fact that for each former Anyanya rebel soldier staying at Busseri, there were probably 15 to 20 extended family hangers-on who came to eat. They were lingering there because the Anyanya people were being given food handouts by the Sudanese Army, north of Wau. The people came as extended family to benefit from that. John Garang was upset by this, because, he said, “There is peace. There is no reason for people to be here. They can go back and cultivate their own fields. That is what they should do.” But nobody was doing that, so he and the other junior officers woke people up, got them out in the fields, pulled these weeds up to prepare the fields for cultivation in the morning. In the morning people were saying, “We did not come here to work. We came here to eat. If we have to cultivate fields, we might as well go back to our own areas and plow our own fields.” That was his point. And they did; they left and the Sudanese Army saw what was going on.
Garang got each of the Anyanya units that remained there with the soldiers to compete to see which unit could grow the best yields of sorghum in these fields that they could now cultivate. So they pulled him out of there because they thought that he was being a rabble-rouser and sent him somewhere else. Wherever they sent him he did something like that, because he is a charismatic person. He was concerned about issues of self-reliance with people working for themselves. So they moved him all over the South and wherever he went he did something like that. Finally, they ended up moving him to the North and he did that there, too. By 1977, they ran out of places to move him.

When I had first met John Garang, after he had just joined the Anyanya movement in 1970, he had been offered a full PhD scholarship to go to the United States, I believe it was Berkeley and he had come into the bush to say goodbye to friends and family and they told him, “Oh, you are going to go off and be an educational refugee and we will never see you again. We need people like you here in the bush.” He heard that. So he wrote to the university and said, “I appreciate the scholarship but I cannot accept it. There is something I have to do.” And he joined the Anyanya movement.

When the Sudanese Army could not find any more places to move him around, they said, “Didn’t you want to get a PhD at one point?” And he said, “Yes.” So they said, “Well, let us send you off for long term training” and he went to Iowa State University and he got his PhD there. That was the same year that, in 1977, I joined USAID. He heard that we were in Washington, so and he and Rebecca, his wife and their firstborn son, Mabior, came and spent Thanksgiving with us. Our firstborn also has a Dinka name. He is now in his last year of medical school in University of California San Francisco (UCSF).

Rebecca at that point spoke no English. She had never been out to Sudan or out of Africa. And Mabior was a couple of months older than our firstborn, but Washington in November is pretty cold and my wife could see that she was not sure about how to take care of a baby in a cold climate. She showed her pointers. We had a good time with them. They went on to Iowa, where it was a lot colder than Washington and during the short time they were there he got his PhD. They had another child. Rebecca learned English, took courses to get a GED high school equivalency and was admitted to Iowa State University herself. Just as smart as he was. They were an amazing couple.

When they came back in the early Eighties to Sudan, now the army had this southerner who also had a PhD and they did not know what to do with him. So they sent him to work at the University of Khartoum, to set up a masters degree program in political economy and he worked there with Brian D’Silva. He and Doctor John were putting together this masters degree program in political economy in the spring of 1983. John and Rebecca were going to go down to Bor, where they were going to prepare their fields for cultivation and, in fact, Brian and his wife were going to go with them, as well. At the last minute they could not. When John went down to Bor, the Bor mutiny took place and he was asked by the Sudanese Army to try to quell this thing. Former Anyanya units were very upset and had taken up arms. Doctor John approached them and they said to him, “We bit off more than we could chew. You are the only one with the smarts to think this
thing over. Take up the leadership of the movement.” And he said, “On one condition: we change the terms of the argument.”

The Anyanya War, which he was part of, had been a war of liberation, for the establishment of an independent black African southern Sudan, separate from the North. They did not achieve that. They fought to a stalemate and the result was the Addis Ababa agreement.

He said the terms of the argument needed to be changed. He said the issue is not really North versus South. If it is the North versus the South, the North is a larger portion of the country, has greater population. It would be difficult for the South to completely win that argument. He said, “So, therefore, what we do is look at the demographics of the country; 61 per cent of the Sudanese are Africans, 39 per cent are so-called Arabs. Sudan is clearly not an African country; it is not an Arab country, it is an Afro-Arab country. If 61 percent of the country is African and the South is only a third of the country, where are the rest?”

He looked to the Nuba Mountains, to the Nuba people, to the Funj in southern Blue Nile, to the Fur and he was saying this in 1983, to the Fur in Darfur, to the Beja in the Red Sea hills, to the Nubians up near Egypt. He said, “All of these are African peoples who are just as disenfranchised as southern Sudanese. If their issues in the other parts of Sudan are as serious as the issues in the South, the way to resolve all of these issues is to recognize the rights of all citizens of Sudan to equal treatment in the country. So secular democracy is what we should be fighting for and that will ensure southern Sudanese, as well as all African peoples in the North, as well. So if you want me to lead the movement, this is what we will fight for a new Sudan. This did not resonate brilliantly among the Anyanyas, who were strongly separatist, but he said, “This is the only condition under which I will take over the movement” and so they swallowed hard and said, “Okay, that is what we will fight for.”

And in fact, the concept of a New Sudan is what is behind the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The leadership and the vision and the brilliance in laying out all the various protocols that together came to form the CPA are due to his vision of Sudan and his ability to articulate these issues in a fashion that enabled them to be negotiated as they were.

Q: Why do you think the North decided to negotiate?

A: By that time, I was in Zambia when they did the Machakos Protocol. I heard about it and I was amazed that, in fact, that was negotiated and agreed. That was the principle behind the CPA, i.e., the recognition of the right of self-determination, which Khartoum had never recognized, up to that point. Because the SPLM was not defeated, because they had fought this thing to the stalemate that it was at, the realization by Khartoum, that given what was happening internationally and given the strength of the SPLM movement and the SPLA as an army, they had to do something. When they came to the principles of the Machakos Protocol that gave enough confidence to move forward and develop the security protocol, the wealth sharing, the power sharing and the transition areas protocols.
as well. I wondered at the time, when I was in Lusaka and heard the news about the Machakos Protocol, why they were talking about six years from the negotiation of what became the Comprehensive Peace Agreement through the interim period to where the referendum would be held. I thought, “Why not just start off with that and let people choose?”

In fact, in May-June of 2004, little more than six months before the signing of the CPA, when most of the protocols had been almost completely negotiated, and you could see what shape this agreement was going to be taking, Doctor John traveled to SPLM-controlled areas. I traveled with that group and observed as he held these enormous public meetings in town squares of each of these towns and explained in great detail what each of the protocols that had been negotiated up to that point were; what all the provisions were. He explained for a couple of hours in each place all of this, so that people understood what the SPLM was negotiating on their behalf. He declined a translator. As so many Sudanese are capable of, he would start a sentence in English, the middle of it would be Arabic and the ending would be Dinka or another local language and the syntax would not miss a beat; it would be perfect and then he would say the same in mixed languages, so that everybody understood the points that he was making.

He answered questions. Every question that people had, he answered very thoughtfully. He also used that opportunity to explain the transition that people were going to have to go through; the transition that people would go through as they went from war to peace; the transition of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement as it went from being a guerilla movement to being a legitimate democratic government; the transition that people would have to go through.

His words were just amazing; he challenged people to recognize that they needed to learn how to hold the government accountable to them. He said, “We have been fighting in a struggle; it has been a military struggle, but the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is going to bring stability and peace and a peacetime government. It is so important that people learn how to hold that government accountable to them, because it must be a transparent government; that they have to deal with issues of corruption, because there were so many examples all around them in neighboring countries and even in the North of the lack of transparency, of corruption. With the wealth sharing provisions, southern Sudan is going to benefit greatly from revenues from their oil resources and their other resources, and they have to be very vigilant to ensure they do not fall into the trap of corruption. The North needs to do this, as well. It is not enough for the South to insist on clean government, because if the South tries to do that and it is not dealt with in the North, that would bring everything down.”

He said the North has an additional responsibility, and he talked about the referendum. He said, “There will be a vote six years after the regional government is established in southern Sudan, a vote on self-determination. We all know which way the vote will go if the vote were held today, but in order for there to be a choice, the responsibility that Khartoum has is to make unity attractive. They must understand that it is their responsibility. We are doing our part, but they have to make unity attractive because, if
they do not, the result of the referendum will be a foregone conclusion. One of the first litmus tests of whether they understand that challenge is what they do in Darfur.” This was in the spring of 2004, two and a half years ago. It was very, very perceptive. The CPA reflects so much his vision of what Sudan could be.

**Q:** Are you familiar with how the negotiations actually were carried out and the atmosphere?

**A:** I was not involved in the negotiation process at all. I was managing the USAID program out of Kenya. The negotiations were taking place in Naivasha. I visited Naivasha a few times.

**Q:** But do you have any sense of how the negotiations were carried out and what was the influence of the different groups?

**A:** I know that the IGAD process and our own government was very supportive of helping people think through the issues and persisting until they came up with what was finally accepted, but I was not involved in any of those kinds of meetings. The only time I spent any time in Naivasha was in the spring of 2004, before Doctor John’s speaking tour around the liberated areas of the South that I mentioned. I arranged to bring Robert Klitgaard to Sudan. Robert Klitgaard is a world-class expert on corruption. He has written books like Tropical Gangsters, Corrupt Cities, Fighting Corruption. I met him in France in 1990, between my Swaziland and Guinea-Conakry assignments, where I went for one month of French language brush-up. He was in the same class I was. I had not seen him in 2003, when I went to a USAID Mission Directors’ conference in Washington. Andrew Natsios invited Klitgaard to come and speak to the Africa Mission Directors.

I had lunch with him and talked to him about Sudan, which he had never had an experience of, and asked him if he would be interested in coming and talking to the SPLM, because I knew they were concerned about issues of corruption. He said he would be, so I approached Doctor John and said, “Listen, this guy is willing to give you two weeks of his time and he is an amazing resource. Would you want him to come here?” So Klitgaard came and I traveled with him in southern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains. He held an interactive seminar for a few days in Rumbek with the Sudan People Liberation Movement leadership council. Then he came to Naivasha, and I attended that session with him. We did not really get into issues of CPA negotiation, but Klitgaard engaged the SPLM negotiators in the importance of trying to set up transparent systems and to prepare for the issues that they would face on the side of corruption. Subsequently, he also held a session in Nairobi, I asked him to come and speak to the donors where we also invited the SPLM to come and hear how we describe these same kinds of issues amongst ourselves when we address the issue of how do you program assistance in a way that will do no harm when faced with these issues.

**Q:** Do you have any sense of the acceptance of these remarks by the SPLM?
A: Oh, yes. It was something that resonated with people, because they understood the importance of the issue to John Garang. There are issues that the southern Sudanese are facing now, and I am sure that there will be lots of temptations as they do have, compared to most countries coming out of conflict situations, far more resources than others in similar circumstances would have. But, yes, they listened and they certainly were engaged; they stimulated Bob Klitgaard’s thinking as well.

Q: Let us turn to the implementation of the CPA. What is your understanding of how things are going or not going?

A: There are some fundamental issues here. Certainly, with the enormous tragedy of Darfur, there is, rightfully so, worldwide concern about what is happening in Darfur. But I am under the impression that with so much attention on Darfur there is perhaps the feeling that “Oh, the South is okay. They have a peace agreement. What we really need to focus on is Darfur.” Certainly the human tragedy and the scale of need for humanitarian assistance and access and all of those issues have to be addressed. But what people might fail to understand or sufficiently appreciate is how critical it is that the CPA works, because there are some serious issues of commitment, commitment by the North to proper implementation of the CPA. The CPA has spelled out many things that have to be done on a timetable and systematically and seriously.

Some fundamental issues include the delineation of the border between North and South, which was very clearly laid out before the British left on January 1, 1956. There are so many provisions of CPA implementation where what is the North and what is the South has to be clearly laid out. As I described, Nimeiri tried to say that the borders between North and South were changed with the Unity province being in the North, the basis for determining what the oil revenues are depends on where the oil wells are. Where oil is developed and exploited in the South, that forms the fifty per cent share that the Government of Southern Sudan should get. But if the border keeps going further and further south and more and more oil fields are determined to be in the North, that affects the foundation of the wealth sharing provisions.

There is supposed to be a census that takes place, actually the pilot census was supposed to be last month with the full census in 2007, in advance of elections and in advance of the referendum. If the border between North and South is not delineated, how do you determine who you count in southern Sudan and who is not in southern Sudan? There does not seem to be any swift concern for addressing that issue.

The redeployment of troops, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to the North and SPLA to the South, what is North and what is South, if the border has not been defined? That is such a fundamental issue.

The CPA set up the Abyei Boundaries Commission and its findings were to be accepted. The findings of the Commission have not been accepted, because there is oil in Abyei. Because there is a referendum that Abyei itself will go through, concurrently with the referendum that the rest of southern Sudan will go through in 2011, there is concern about
what happens if Abyei decides to join the South and what happens if the South decides to
go for independence. So the North has not accepted the Abyei Boundaries Commission
report.

There is the whole question of how the wealth sharing should function. Another provision
of the CPA was that either the Government of National Unity Ministry of Finance or
Government of National Unity Ministry of Petroleum Resources would be SPLM’s.
President Bashir said, “I don’t think so, neither of those. The National Congress Party
(NCP) will retain both of those.”

I was in Khartoum very early this year and I went to mass at St. Michael’s Cathedral and
Salva Kiir, who is a devout Catholic, came to mass and at the end of it he spoke to the
congregation. This was at a time when it appeared that neither the Ministry of Finance nor
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources would go to the SPLM, and he said to the
congregation, “Let us not return to war over this particular issue. Actually, while that is
what the CPA says, we also know that the National Petroleum Commission is going to
have oversight responsibility and that is where we can ensure that our interests are
protected. People should not take to the streets, if it looks like we are not going to get
either of these ministries that the CPA promised us.”

That was eight or nine months ago, and they only just are starting the National Petroleum
Commission now. Let us see how it is implemented. Southerners had no access to
fundamental information on how oil is exploited, the wells’ production, the sales. They
just have to take the North’s word on it. This does not give one a lot of confidence that
these things are being handled in the way that they are supposed to be handled. As you
look at these fundamental issues in terms of implementation of the CPA, there is cause
for concern.

The week before last in Malakal there were terrible incidents, security problems, between
other armed groups and the SPLA; there were many, many people killed in Malakal and
many more injured, both civilians and military. In the CPA, it states very, very clearly that
by January 9, 2006, 11 months ago, the “other armed groups” that were neither SPLA nor
Sudan Armed Forces had three choices: they could disband and disarm, lay down their
arms and become civilians; or they could join the SPLA; or they could join the Sudan
Armed Forces. There were no other choices, except those three. The people who initiated
this conflict in Malakal are clearly backed by the Sudan Armed Forces and Salva Kiir
went to Malakal. He has laid down an ultimatum that these remaining “other armed
groups,” these militias that have been the proxies for Khartoum’s military for some time
have until January to disband or the SPLA will do it for them. He has laid this out very
clearly to President Bashir. It should not have come to this. They should have done this in
January of this year, not January 2007.

It is a very serious concern, because there is continuing insecurity in the South. Now there
is talk about, oh, it is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that has been causing the
problems in and around Juba. But there is growing concern and appreciation that it might
not really be LRA, but it might be these “other armed groups” that are supported by those
powers in the North that do not want to see the Comprehensive Peace Agreement succeed. Because the concern is if implementation is not going to go forward, if all of these steps and measures that are laid out as markers in the implementation of the CPA do not go forward, there might not be a referendum. There is precedent for that.

The role of Abyei is one example. It is one of the transition areas in the current Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but the history of Abyei goes back a long way. Abyei is north of Warab state, north of Bahr el Ghazal, it is part of Southern Kordofan, but it has been part of Southern Kordofan, because before independence the British had a quasi-referendum. They did not let the people vote, but they let 11 chiefs of Ngok Dinka—all the other Dinka peoples in Sudan are in the South—decide, as independence was approaching, are you going to be part of Kordofar or are you going to be part of Bahr el Ghazal? Eight of them, eight of the eleven, elected to be part of the South but the paramount chief, who is Francis Deng’s father, had more authority than the other chiefs and he and two other chiefs voted to be part of the North.

Shortly after independence when all the factors that led to the creation of the Anyanya Movement and the frustrations of the South that were articulated in that first conflict, there were many people from Abyei who became part of that Movement. In fact, some of the intellectual leadership of the Movement came from Abyei, because Abyei, the Ngok Dinkas are not northerners, they are southerners and they want to have their rights, too. The Addis Ababa agreement itself, in 1972, included a referendum where the people of Abyei would be allowed to choose. Of course, that referendum was never held. But with the recommendations of the Abyei Boundaries Commission not being accepted, Abyei has no functional government. At least in Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains area and in southern Blue Nile, there is a functioning government that the SPLM and the NCP are partners in, but they cannot even agree on the foundation of that in Abyei. And so it is not just a little backwater issue there, but one that could a spark that will, if not resolved.

**Q:** Some people are saying that one of the mistakes of the CPA was that it did not include the other groups, it was just a North-South exchange. What do you think about that?

**A:** Since I have moved here, it is such a delight to be living in Juba. Managing this program from...although Nairobi is closer to Juba than Khartoum is, it is a world of difference trying to be there and function here. The other day I went to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. There was a political party training. USAID was not doing the training, but we were invited to observe that. There were several other political parties that were part of the session there, not just the SPLM. Each of their representatives spoke and they appreciated the opportunity to have some political party training. But every one of them, including southern Sudanese who were NCP members, talked about their support for the CPA. It was very inspiring, whether they are the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP) people, United Democratic Front (UDF), FANU, the Southern Sudanese Democratic Forum (SSDF), every one of them talked about their support for the CPA, even if they were not involved in the negotiations itself, including the southern Sudanese who is an NCP member. It was inspiring to hear that. They did not say, “Oh, this does not
belong to us.” There was ownership of the CPA by the southern Sudanese themselves. I was very pleased to hear that.

Q: What do you see as the way forward? One can get very pessimistic about prospects.

A: I am normally a very optimistic person. I am not necessarily an optimist about this CPA implementation, but I am hopeful because the foundations are there; the CPA is laid out very well. It is a matter of trying to emphasize the importance of adhering to the implementation, even if, take two steps forward, one step back. Not give up on it, because it is not only important for the South but it is critical for the rest of the country, as well.

Q: And would it help resolve the Darfur situation?

A: If it can be shown that the CPA can work in the South, it can give confidence that whatever weaknesses there are in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the Eastern Peace Agreement (EPA), that if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South can be demonstrated to work with commitment by both sides, then that will demonstrate that this is the way out.

Q: What can be done to move it forward, to make it work?

A: The world community, our own government and others that are supporting the South, should continue our efforts to do that. It would be a mistake to assume this is all working and we do not have to continually see what is happening, to try and provide support.

We have structured our assistance to try and address those issues that are threats to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Certainly, the level of expectations here is enormous. People have been through fifty years of conflict and so their sense of entitlement, that we have been through such suffering that now we should be rewarded for this in some way, is an impediment. One, because it is unrealistic; the constraints here are enormous. However we define what our strategic objectives are, in the aid sense, the fundamental issues here are infrastructure, governance and capacity.

Q: You are talking about the South, now?

A: The South. In all of those areas the levels of investment that are needed are enormous; but if we can show the benefits of peace by addressing incrementally what can be done in each of these areas… Providing, for example, support to key ministries: finance, labor and public service, legal affairs and constitutional development and supporting the concept of a 200 day action plan, where each of the government ministries defines what they can realistically expect to accomplish in 200 days and then invite people to hold them accountable to that, where there can be some confidence that schools can be rebuilt and infrastructure can be built, in most cases roads, not reconstruction but built, because they have deteriorated so badly over time. If this can be demonstrated, it can help people recognize, yes, it might take longer to do all these things but something is being done.
Q: Is there some progress being made?

A: Yes, there is. I was in Juba thirty or forty years ago. In some cases it looks the same, but there is a vibrancy now that was not here a year ago. The market is flourishing. There are some security issues here that everyone is concerned about. While Salva Kiir is not being the kind of leader that John Garang was, he is an honest man, a good man and one who is well respected. The marker that he has laid down about the importance of addressing the security concerns, I hope and pray that his definition of “January things with the ‘other armed groups’ have got to come to a stop,” if that is adhered to that will be a very, very big step forward, because without security this whole thing is going to be a tragedy.

Q: My impression is that there are problems with the northern leadership not wanting to let the CPA work. Is there some role for the international community that can bring some pressure to bear that would move it along?

A: I know that our former Administrator has been in Sudan. I have not seen any reports on how his talks have gone but I am glad that he came back. I hope he has made some headway on this. I believe that he was in Malakal earlier this week. So he must be engaging on these issues. I cannot see that from here, but I am very pleased that he came here.

Q: Is there anything we have not touched on?

A: I just want to mention one aspect of the program that I have some hopes about and that is getting the diaspora involved in coming back here.

Q: Who are you referring to?

A: The southern Sudanese who have been trained or gained experience while they have been away, whether it is the near diaspora in East Africa or the diaspora from the United States and Australia. We have a pilot program going, just started in June last year. We have brought back altogether, at this point, about 84 volunteers. They have come from anywhere from one to three months. A large number of them have already extended. Some of them have come back. I met one of them at the training center in Yei where we had a week’s orientation. He is now the Minister of International Cooperation in the Government of National Unity. He went from being a volunteer diaspora, dealing with education issues in southern Sudan, to minister in the national government. There is another who was in the fourth group in September. He is now the Minister of Education in Junglei state. These folks are like the tip of the iceberg, in terms of people who want to come back, whether they are from the United States, Australia or Kenya, to come back and help to rebuild. The way that I have seen them absorbed and embraced is very hopeful, because not only do they bring the skills that they have acquired when they have been overseas but they also bring a different attitude.

Q: Is there anything that can be done to prepare for the elections?
A: The elections will come in 2009. Certainly, there is political party training, the establishment of voter rolls. There is an urgent need for communications here. With the enormous rate of illiteracy, we are trying to expand the distribution of radios, getting windup and solar powered radios widely dispersed in the countryside so that messages of this new government can get out to people.

I will give you just a couple of technical areas where the importance of messages is critical. There is going to be a currency conversion in January, where a new Sudanese pound will be issued and people will be given a few months in 2007 to bring in their dinars and their old Sudan pounds to convert them. There has to be a public education campaign about that, because when you mess with people’s money they need to know and have confidence in what you are talking about. The census itself needs a public education campaign, because traditionally, particularly among the pastoral people, you do not tell people how many kids you have, that is culturally not an accepted idea, but if a census is to mean anything it has to count everybody and people need to be encouraged to cooperate with that. Those are two technical areas where communication is needed.

What I have seen here, also, in my few weeks in Juba now, is how critical it is for the Government of Southern Sudan to get its vision articulated and widely disseminated, so that people understand, in fact, what is the CPA, why it is relevant to them and what the Government of Southern Sudan is trying to do to implement that. That is an enormous task. We, in USAID, have a role to play. There are other donor partners here as well, and we need to collaborate with them and ensure that we are all providing our assistance in the most effective way possible.

It is a thrill to be here; although I may have my questions as to how committed both sides are to the CPA and its implementation, the chance to see people trying to recover from a half century of conflict is a privilege and an honor to be here.

Q: What do you think the outcome of a referendum might be, or is it too soon to know?

A: It will be overwhelmingly in favor of an independent southern Sudan. I cannot honestly remember any single southern Sudanese who has ever said anything else other than that, which means that Doctor John’s exhortation to the North to understand their responsibility to very assertively demonstrate why unity should be attractive, not just to say that but to live that. That means taking the implementation of the CPA seriously and it means taking the South seriously. That is where I am not an optimist. I am hopeful that if the SPLA in the elections down the road between now and the referendum can continue to articulate Doctor John’s vision for Sudan, then, that political message might be recognized as not just a southern point of view. If that happens, then I think there is a lot more hope.

Q: Is there anything the international community can do to further that vision?

A: They can provide capacity, training and resources for them to address these issues.
Q: Looking back over this long perspective you have had of the situation and maybe it is implicit in what you have already said, what would be some of the lessons of experience that you have had that stand out, or things that should have been done or not been done, that worked or not worked that might be relevant to other conflict situations?

A: The fundamental lesson of 1972 has been the importance of, no matter how long the negotiation takes, put everything out on the table. Do not try to do this in a rushed fashion. I have enormous respect for Dr. John Garang. There was a leader in the first conflict, Joseph Akwon Oter, who was the commander of the Anyanya in Upper Nile.

He is the one that got me involved in all of this and encouraged me to go into Upper Nile in the 1960s. He had the same kind of vision as Doctor John. I met Akwon for the last time just a few weeks before the Addis Ababa agreement. I met him by chance in Nairobi, on his way back into Upper Nile. He died a few weeks after that, just before the Addis Ababa agreement. I do not know what he would have thought about the Addis agreement as it was finally negotiated. I suspect he would have not been so pleased with it, because it did not deal with all of these issues. I am so sorry that he lost his life before the peace agreement was signed. In fact, I gave his name, Akwon, as my son’s middle name. What they were able to achieve through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was going through every single issue of conflict between them, whether the security protocol, sharing wealth, sharing power, the implementation details, which one might think were too detailed, but, in fact, because Dr. Garang understood the importance of getting everything down, that is why there is some hope.

One can be optimistic or pessimistic about whether it will be implemented, but, as it is negotiated, it is a magnificent document and it provides the way forward. So not to be rushed into resolving the issue, even if it takes two to three years to negotiate it. It is better to take that time. That is the single lesson I would say I have seen from this, having seen the Addis agreement and having seen the CPA. I hope and pray that it remains a guiding light for the Sudanese to find their way out of this wilderness they have been in for such a long time.

Q: Anything else stand out for you, at more operational levels?

A: The challenge in those three areas that I mentioned. The need to deal with capacity, especially since there have been generations lost without education. To recognize the importance of governance, not just the transformation of the SPLM, but the whole panoply of issues, including corruption, around governance. And in the southern Sudan, the importance of infrastructure, where you have such an enormous, enormous country where you essentially have no roads, no way of communicating and the importance of serious investment in infrastructure. John Garang had a vision for what the infrastructure in southern Sudan should look like and his wife, his widow, who is an amazing person, is trying to carry that forward. When he passed, she stepped forward and told people not to go to war over his death. She said when she closes her eyes she does not see him, she sees his vision for New Sudan. To hear this amazing woman have the strength of character to
take that kind of viewpoint and bring comfort to people and give them a voice to move on is amazing. She understood what he was trying to do in terms of infrastructure and how important all that was.

Q: Do you have any observations on the Darfur situation, because that is disrupting a lot of the implementation process?

A: Yes, I had visited Darfur once, early in the year. I do not have the kind of experience and perspective on Darfur that I have for southern Sudan. So I do not have a lot to contribute about that, but as John Garang saw the centrality of the marginalization of people outside of Khartoum as the central issue that defines the weaknesses in this country, that is where the relevance of the CPA and the relevance of the dream of a New Sudan is to both Darfur and to the east, as well as to the transition areas. One must not forget the Nuba, the Funj, the people of South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile, as well. Either Sudan will deal with this, or it will be an island of wealth in Khartoum and misery in the rest of the country that will eventually effect even Khartoum.

The investment that is going on there, in Khartoum, is absolutely amazing. I first visited Khartoum in 1968 and it is being transformed there in a way that you would never know everything else that is going on in Sudan, in Darfur, in the east, in the South, compared to what is going on in Khartoum. But that cannot be sustained if war resumes, because the oil will be affected by all of that. So there has to be attention to this.

End of interview