Your browser (Internet Explorer 7 or lower) is out of date. It has known security flaws and may not display all features of this and other websites. Learn how to update your browser.


Getting Kosovo Right: Working to Avoid Another Bosnia

Yugoslavia had long been a simmering caldron of ethnic and nationalist tensions. After the death of Yugoslav strongman Josip Broz Tito, the thin ties keeping the country together began to fray. Kosovo Albanians demanded that their autonomous province be upgraded to a constituent republic. Serbs in turn saw the high autonomy of the provinces and the weakness at the federal level as inimical to Serbian interests.

Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia in 1987 and was able to gain de facto control over Kosovo. In 1990 separatist parties won victories in Yugoslavia’s first multi-party elections and in 1991-92, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed independence. After a string of inter-ethnic incidents, the Yugoslav Wars ensued, first in Croatia and then, most severely, in multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Photo: Reuters)

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) then began agitating for independence in 1995 by attacking Serbian police units and smuggling arms in from Albania. On February 28th, 1998, the unrest in Kosovo escalated to new levels as Yugoslav security forces, responding to a series of KLA ambushes, began attacking villages in the province’s Drenica valley.

Police battled with insurgents but also fired indiscriminately at unarmed civilians during the assaults, setting the stage for a full-scale war that would rage for over a year. Remembering the horrors of the Bosnian War only a few years earlier, the United States and several European countries intervened in the conflict. The coalition first employed diplomacy in the form of the Rambouillet Agreement; however, when the Serbs rejected the accords, NATO resorted to an aerial bombing campaign to convince Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade to cease its atrocities against Albanians in Kosovo.

James Dobbins acted as Special Advisor to President Bill Clinton and the Secretary of State on the Balkans from 1999 to 2001, serving as one of the main points of contact with the Europeans during NATO’s bombing campaign and supervising the international community’s efforts to rebuild and govern Kosovo following the surrender of Yugoslavia. Dobbins reflects on the difficulties of working with the NATO coalition throughout the conflict and the resistance of Russia to cooperate fully with the United States and its treaty allies both during and after the war. He also discusses the role he played in the postwar efforts to maintain stability in the Balkans. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003 and 2004.

Read about the Srebrenica massacreYou can read about Ann Sides’ emotional account of dealing with refugees in Embassy Belgrade and about Richard Holbrooke and the negotiations for the Dayton Peace Accords. Go here to read about the collapse of Yugoslavia beginning in 1991.


“The situation there was deteriorating. There were more human rights violations, more violence.”

(Photo: Fehim Demir/AFP/Getty Images)

DOBBINS: Sometime in I think early ’99 I was asked whether I would be willing to come back and succeed Bob Gelbard as the Special Adviser to the President and Secretary for the Balkans.

The reason for the move had to do with Kosovo. We were moving toward an intervention in Kosovo pretty briskly and, given my experience in previous such circumstances, they wanted me to take that on…. (GIF by Hoshie; derivative by DIREKTOR)

The situation there was deteriorating. There were more human rights violations, more violence. The Kosovars, after pursuing the possibility of peaceful change for a number of years, had moved toward violent confrontation, and a more radical wing of the independence movement had come to prominence, younger, more radical figures who formed the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA, and were beginning to attack Serb facilities and personnel, which led to more savage reprisals by the Serbs.

There had been a number of efforts to stem this. [Special Envoy Richard] Holbrooke and [General] Wes Clark had made several trips to Belgrade to talk to [Yugoslav President Slobodan] Milosevic and given him various ultimatums. And there had been arrangements and agreements, including one that put a group of unarmed observers, a fairly large group of unarmed observers, into the territory. But that wasn’t having any real effect, and the violence was being stepped up. There was increasing pressure on both European and American governments to take a more robust attitude and really to stem the violence.

There had been a long debate in the U.S. government with [Secretary of State] Madeleine Albright and Wes Clark, among others, championing a more robust military option, where others, the Department of Defense, for instance, had been more reluctant to go in that direction. But that had been pretty much resolved by the time I took over the portfolio….

I took over all of the diplomacy. Obviously, the Secretary of State did some of it and the Deputy Secretary of State did some of it, but for the most part I was the principal interface with the Europeans, with the UN, with NATO, with others….

At the point before our bombing campaign started, the numbers affected were relatively limited. There were a few thousand. There were a number of refugees, and there were probably several thousand internally displaced as well. But the large-scale genocide, ethnic cleansing on a massive scale, which forced more than half of the population out of their homes, and a third of the population out of Kosovo, altogether, began after the bombing campaign and as a response to the bombing campaign.

“The Russians were going to block any Security Council action, so we essentially went to war without going to the UN”

The NATO diplomacy was already fairly far advanced. We were in the concluding phases of the Rambouillet Conference, which was a conference that the French and the British were co-hosting, and the Contact Group, which included the Russians and the French, the British, the Italians, the Germans and ourselves and the European Union were sponsoring.

This conference brought together the Kosovar leaders with the Serb delegation, headed by the President of Serbia at the time, [Milan] Milutinovic, who was a lieutenant of Milosevic’s, in an effort to try to broker an agreement which would allow NATO and NATO forces to go in and police a ceasefire on an agreed basis and begin to build some kind of political framework in which the long-term status can be negotiated.

In the end, the Serbs rejected this. The [Kosovar] Albanians rejected it at first, which infuriated Albright, but eventually they said they could accept the proposals that were on the table. The Serbs opposed them, and it was on that basis that NATO began its bombing campaign….(Photo: Balkan Independent News Agency)

There were some people who thought that the Serbs could be induced to accept this. I think Dick Holbrooke hoped so. I think probably Chris Hill, who was the U.S. principal negotiator at the conference probably hoped so, but I think most of the administration did not think they would, and therefore was looking for an arrangement in which the Albanians would accept it and the Serbs wouldn’t, so there would be a clear sort of casus belli [cause for war], which was why it was very upsetting when the Albanians didn’t accept it either. But, eventually, they were persuaded to accept it….

The Greeks were very opposed to the conflict and to the NATO policy, although they didn’t actively interfere in the alliance’s carrying through on it. Some of the newer members, who had just joined, the Czechs in particular, were also unenthusiastic, and the Italians were pretty weak. But the French, the British and the Germans were pretty strong, and with their support, we were able to keep the rest of the alliance on track….

The UN didn’t have any formal role at this stage. They became important at a later stage when we agreed to give them the leadership role on the civil side of the post-conflict arrangements, and they essentially were asked to govern Kosovo for an indefinite period, so they became quite important at that stage. But at this stage, they weren’t.

The Russians were going to block any Security Council action, so we essentially went to war without going to the UN. So the UN was on the sidelines in the run-up to the war and through the war itself, although [UN Secretary General] Kofi Annan was fairly sympathetic to the war and said things that indicated his sympathy, even though there wasn’t a Security Council resolution….

[The Russians] were apoplectic. They had been supportive to the idea of bringing some kind of resolution to the situation and reducing the violence, and prepared to participate diplomatically, but they were unprepared to sanction the use of force and reacted very strongly when NATO began bombing. The Russian Prime Minister, [Yevgeny] Primakov, was actually on a plane on his way to Washington and he turned around and flew back to Moscow when the bombing started.

“The bombing campaign initially didn’t seem to be succeeding. Indeed, it seemed to be making the situation worse.”

Q: Were there any lessons that you had learned from Bosnia and elsewhere?

DOBBINS: The planning for the post-conflict phase went quite smoothly in the U.S. government because everybody had already done it by that time three different times, in Somalia, in Haiti and in Bosnia, so we all knew each other. We knew what each other’s preferences were. We didn’t have the same arguments all over again. I mean, issues that had been settled one way or another in previous arrangements remained settled, so we had a familiar pattern to apply to this situation.

We also corrected some of the mistakes that we’d made in Bosnia…. [W]e got pretty easy agreement on the civil side that there should be a single individual or a single organization with overall responsibility, in partnership with NATO. And we ultimately agreed that that should be the UN.

There were a lot of other things. For instance, putting in a robust, well-armed, international police force was agreed based on both the positive Haiti model and the negative model of Bosnia, where they hadn’t armed them or given them arrest authority and we had subsequently regretted that. So there were a number of aspects to it that drew on previous experience and made the whole thing go much more smoothly.

The more difficult problem was managing the alliance through the bombing campaign, which initially didn’t seem to be succeeding. Indeed, it seemed to be making the situation worse. That was a very difficult process….

I guess I probably came in maybe six or eight weeks before the actual bombing started, so there had been a lot of planning already underway, and then I took over responsibility for it and carried it forward in cooperation with the NSC [National Security Council] and the Defense Department, and I had a number of Balkan hands working for me….

“It was a five-ring circus”

There were constant alarms and excursions and small fires to put out every day. I mean, it was a five-ring circus. There was the media campaign, there was the military campaign, and there was the diplomatic campaign. There was the humanitarian effort. There were just lots of things going on, and trying to keep all these strands straight and trying to keep everybody moving in the same direction was pretty much what my job was….

There was a lot of uncertainty at the time as to what we were accomplishing in terms of attacking military targets, which had been our initial emphasis. What we know since suggested that indeed we were quite ineffective, that we had not been able to locate or do much damage to military targets, that they had effectively camouflaged themselves and that we weren’t doing much damage on a military basis.

We clearly were damaging infrastructure, and there was a major debate in the administration, which raged throughout the process, as to how quickly we should escalate and how broadly, and the degree to which we should begin to attack more clearly civil targets.

One of the big debates was whether we should destroy the electric grid, for instance, which we didn’t do, but which we were under considerable pressure to do from some elements within the administration, particularly the Vice President’s office.

There was a huge debate within the military structure between the U.S. Air Force on the one hand and General Clark and NATO on the other about the strictures that they were under. The Air Force wanted to escalate the campaign, particularly against Belgrade. The campaign against Belgrade was gradually escalated, but only gradually, and it was an important process of sort of consensus building in the alliance that was necessary before one went too quickly in that direction….

“If the Air Force had had its way, we would have lost the war”

Formally, the targets were picked by NATO, by the NATO military structure. By and large, since the U.S. was providing the dominant component of the air effort, particularly the dominant component of the bombing aspect of the air effort, it was largely a U.S. decision. The targets were reviewed with the President.

The French insisted that they also have in effect a veto over particularly sensitive civil targets, and so those types of targets also had to be briefed to the French, and they had to get their agreement. There was a good deal of unhappiness about that….(Photo: Darko Dozet)

In fact, the restraints were quite sensible ones, and if the Air Force had had its way, we would have lost the war, because there’s no doubt if they had escalated at the speed and extent they wanted to, they would have lost public opinion and split the alliance and the bombing campaign would have at that stage petered out without having accomplished anything….

The debates in the situation room which I participated in were more generic debates about how quickly we should be expanding the bombing campaign and whether or not we should in particular be going after the electric grids or some other things that would disable the society for a fairly extensive period of time if we did it….

It was the typical sort of debate, strains that occur in joint operations, in particular the Air Force’s feeling that if they’re just left on their own, they can win the war by themselves, thank you. It’s the same sort of debates that occurred during Vietnam.

In this case, of course, it was complicated by the fact that lots of other governments were undergoing the same debates, and you had a multinational command structure superimposed on the American one, which had arguments even within itself….

Q: As this was progressing, was there concern on our part about the Kosovo Liberation Army and where it was going?

DOBBINS: Oh, there was a lot of concern, because there were a lot of allegations that they had been engaged in drug trafficking, that they were engaged in political violence against Albanian enemies as well as against Serbs, that they engaged in human rights violations, were politically extremist. As a result, we did deal with them, I dealt with them quite extensively, but we never really saw them as allies and we didn’t provide them any military support and, as soon as the war was over, we disarmed them….

“It was pretty clear, A), the Serbs weren’t going to sign the agreement, and, B), we weren’t going to confine ourselves to that objective even if they had”

Q: When we went into this, did we have a feeling what we wanted to come out of the war?

DOBBINS: Yes, because we had the Rambouillet Agreement, which set up a framework for a government in Kosovo, and a framework for NATO’s involvement, and that sort of provided a starting place. Now, once it was clear that this wasn’t going to be a negotiated solution, the war aims originally were bomb them for a few days and see if they’ll sign this agreement.

After the Serbs retaliated by engaging in a large campaign of ethnic cleansing, it was pretty clear, A), they weren’t going to sign the agreement, and, B), we weren’t going to confine ourselves to that objective even if they had.

So the war aims became more extensive, but they were also limited by the fact that we felt that in the end we would need Russian agreement and a Security Council resolution and other things in order to conclude the war successfully. And so the war aims were evolved in a series of NATO and then EU statements, but they also evolved in the context of an ongoing negotiation, which we conducted in the framework of the G-8 (Group of Eight) about a settlement.

It was that negotiation which I headed the U.S. delegation to that produced the Security Council resolution that formally ended the war….

Q: How did the G-8 work? I mean, were there divisions within this?

DOBBINS: Well, there were the Russians on one side and everyone else on the other, mostly, but there were differences among the Western partners…. [W]e had to work out Western positions and then negotiate with the Russians, and sometimes the negotiations became quite complex. But, by and large, the Western side had a generally agreed set of aims, and getting the Russians to accept them was the objective of the talks….

The Russians were essential for two reasons. First of all, there was a general concern about the direction Russia might take in that timeframe and with NATO expanding, with Russia at that time going through severe economic turbulence. There was a concern that Russia might head off in a quite unhelpful, authoritarian, confrontational direction over the longer term.

There was also a desire that the conflict be concluded in a way that secured full international legitimacy and would require a UN resolution. And, finally, it was felt that the Russians had some influence with Serbia, … but that if we could demonstrate to them that they had lost Russian support, that would be another factor in securing their acquiescence and NATO’s objectives….

I think there were three factors that brought Milosevic (pictured) into agreement, although we still don’t know this, because we found no documents or other statements that give a clear-cut answer as to why he suddenly surrendered at that point.

It rather surprised us that he did, but one assumes it was a combination of the bombing campaign, which was steadily expanding and beginning to attack targets that were more sensitive to the regime and to the populace. Secondly, the fact that the Russians did pull the plug, that they went with [former President of Finland and key negotiator Martti] Ahtisaari and gave him an ultimatum and made clear that they were no longer prepared to support him. And, finally, the third factor was that there was a steadily growing debate in Washington and in NATO about moving onto a ground campaign, which was very controversial.

The President had initially said he wasn’t going to do this, but he was steadily moving toward a recognition that it might be necessary, and there were active considerations underway of moving toward a ground campaign. The Pentagon was still resistant to it, but State was pushing hard for it, the White House was at least open to the possibility. The British were pushing for it. Milosevic presumably recognized that the next stage could be a ground assault and that that might not limit itself to Kosovo and that he might not survive such an effort….

“The Russians suddenly invaded Kosovo without being invited”

I think we were very successful in containing not only cohesion in NATO, but between NATO and the European Union, and within the U.S. government. I mean, we were all over the world and talking to each other.

I remember we were flying back to Washington just after the war and the Russians suddenly invaded Kosovo without being invited, and we’d arrived in Macedonia and we were meeting with Sir Michael Jackson, who was the British commander of the KFOR [Kosovo Force], the [NATO] force that went into Kosovo and was just about to go in. He told us that the Russians had sent a battalion out of Bosnia that was rushing for destination at that point unknown, but probably for Kosovo….

So just sitting there in this airport lounge, we got [National Security Advisor] Sandy Berger on the phone in Washington and then we got [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott on the phone, and he was on a plane having just left Moscow a half hour before and having been told by the Russians that this wasn’t going to happen.

We all talked to Michael Jackson from these different sites, and then Jackson went off and did his work and Strobe Talbott turned his plane around and went back to Moscow. We got on a plane and went to Washington and we got calls throughout the trip to Washington. I kept trying to sleep and I kept getting woke up — the Russians were coming, the Russians weren’t coming, the Russians were already there.

Strobe Talbott had flown back to Moscow, been again promised this wasn’t going to happen. Again, it happened. The Russian Foreign Minister made a statement that they would leave, and then they didn’t leave. This was all sort of as we were cruising across the Atlantic for 10 hours. It was pretty amazing. (Photo: Reuters/STR New)

On the periphery, when Jackson told us about it, he said, “I assume they’re going to go and take the airport,” and there was some discussion about whether we should resist, whether we should put troops in, and he said, “Well, we told the Serbs we weren’t going to be there for three days. We were going to occupy Kosovo in stages, as they left, coming in as they left.

“This would be jumping ahead and going right into the midst of the Serb forces, and it could lead to fighting through misunderstanding or because we weren’t adhering to our part of the agreement.”

So I said I thought that … the problem with the Russians was one that should be solved diplomatically, not militarily. Whether Jackson even paid any attention to my remark or whether he came to his own conclusions quite separately, I don’t know, but that is the tact he took and he eventually talked to them….

The Russian military … [was] deeply unhappy with the way the conflict had been ended, the manner in which their diplomacy had been sort of compelled to abandon the Serbs. They were feeling abused and unhappy, and [Russian President Boris] Yeltsin wasn’t providing strong, consistent leadership. The leadership tended to be somewhat episodic, so it was clearly something that was done by the military.

Whether they had gotten Yeltsin’s permission or not, it’s not clear. It’s pretty clear that the Foreign Ministry had no idea what they were doing….

We essentially stifled this by getting all the neighboring states to deny the Russians overflight rights so that the unit couldn’t be supplied. After a few days of recognizing that they had to get their food from the British who were surrounding them, and that they really had no capacity to hold out indefinitely, an arrangement was negotiated and they largely went away….

“There was a desire to let the Russians save face”

Albright and I and [Secretary of Defense] Bill Cohen had to fly to Helsinki and spend two days negotiating with Russian military and the Foreign Minister – the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister were both there  – on what Russia’s sector … and command arrangements would be in Kosovo, which was difficult, but eventually yielded a satisfactory agreement….

There was a desire to let the Russians save face as long as what they were asking wasn’t too inconsistent with NATO’s retaining control of the military operation, including control of the Russian behavior….

It was clear the military were in charge and the Foreign Ministry were just watching, trying to facilitate, but clearly the military was in charge at that point….

Q: After the Serbs gave in, what was your involvement?

DOBBINS: I was in charge of setting, for the United States, of establishing the post-conflict arrangements, the peacekeeping operation and the UN governance, the diplomacy associated with it, getting the refugees back, disarming the KLA, making other arrangements to employ its members. There was a lot to do.

It was at least as busy after the war, and I was responsible for the rest of the Balkans as well, for Bosnia, for Macedonia, for Albania, for Serbia. The focus for the next year became a massive campaign to unseat Milosevic, so I became very active with the Serb opposition, with neighboring states in terms of support for Serb opposition, creating a unified opposition, giving them electoral strategy, providing them material assistance and creating a unified front throughout the region in support of, essentially, regime change in Serbia….

Q: What was the endgame with Kosovo? Were we trying to turn this over to the United Nation and the EU?

DOBBINS: We involved all of the relevant institutions in Kosovo. Basically, NATO was responsible for the military tasks in Kosovo. The UN was in overall charge in the civil tasks and the EU was in charge under UN auspices for Kosovo’s economic reconstruction, and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] was responsible for overseeing elections and other democratic reforms. So we mobilized all of the relevant institutions and gave them roles within an overall hierarchy….

It worked out better than the previous arrangements, because we were able to put them in a well-understood hierarchy, and we were able to devise a division of labor between NATO and the United Nations that made sense.

And there were calculated overlaps in their capabilities in the security area, which tended to be the area where things fell between the stools in the way they had done in Bosnia. There were still difficulties. The civil elements of the mission deployed much more slowly than the military elements, which meant that NATO had to be responsible for policing, law and order issues, longer than it was comfortable in doing and would have liked to do because of the difficulties of deploying adequate civil assets, and that happens in all of these cases….

“The problem wasn’t getting the refugees back. The problem was ensuring that there was adequate food and shelter, and that was a fairly massive effort”

Q: What about the return of the refugees and all this? This must have presented a horrendous problem?

DOBBINS: In some respects. The international community always tends to underestimate the speed at which these people will return home once the situation permits it. In this case, they didn’t have far to go because Kosovo was not that big. They were in camps on its periphery and … had transport, if not cars, tractors. So within a few days, despite efforts by UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and others to discourage them, they got on their tractors and went home.

Of course, some of them suffered from the landmines that had been placed, but by and large, most of them got back very quickly, and many of them found their homes damaged or totally destroyed, but they did get back quickly and began rebuilding their lives. (Photo: Fehim Demir/AFP/Getty Images)

The problem wasn’t getting them back. They did that on their own. The problem was ensuring that there was adequate food and shelter, and that was a fairly massive effort, which UNHCR headed and which was successful….

Q: After the bombing and the accords that allowed for Kosovo to be in its present form, what about our relations with Serbia? Was this going to be treated as a defeated power…?

DOBBINS: Our original thought was that we would go back to our relationship with Serbia before Kosovo had become an issue, which was not a good relationship, but we had at least had discussions with them. We had diplomatic relations, and we were in communication with them.

The initial thought was we would lift the sanctions – not the sanctions that had been posed by reason of the problems they were making in Bosnia, but the sanctions that related to Kosovo. We were beginning to move in that direction, and then we got a very different signal. I think [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair was the first to realize that this was where we were going, and he called on the President and his staff called the White House.

And Albright, who really had a visceral dislike of Milosevic, was easy to persuade that we had an opportunity to displace Milosevic and that we needed to avoid going back to business as usual:  Keep all of the restrictions on that we had put on as a result of the war and make a concerted effort to overthrow him, using peaceful means, but a wide-ranging set of instrumentalities to build up the opposition, to provide it support, to use the media in all of the surrounding countries in broadcasting into the country, to keep on sanctions and even intensify them, to target the regime with further sanctions, denying them visas, in effect, denying them ability to leave the country and go anywhere.

And so we had a concerted program for nearly a year, which did succeed ultimately in overthrowing Milosevic….

We certainly had effectively sided against the Serbs earlier in the decade in dealing with Bosnia, and then in dealing with Kosovo. But in the aftermath of Kosovo, our effort was to side with the Serbs against their leadership, which we were successful in doing. So I think that whatever hostility we had created earlier began rather to slowly dissipate as a result of our clear engagement on behalf of those people who ultimately did become the government….

“As soon as the war was over, we would switch from protecting Albanians from Serbs to protecting Serbs from Albanians”

Q: What about the idea of keeping Serbs in Kosovo? Once the Kosovars won, we ended up trying to preserve small enclaves of Serbs. How did you feel about that?

DOBBINS: We probably didn’t realize as much as we should have that as soon as the war was over, we would switch from protecting Albanians from Serbs to protecting Serbs from Albanians. We probably should have given some more forethought to it. (Photo: Crown)

I guess our feeling was that the Serbs would mostly flee. In fact, more than half of them stayed, which was a little surprising. They didn’t necessarily stay in their own homes. Many of them congregated in certain areas, so you had these Serb enclaves, many of which were occupying Albanian homes, unfortunately, which exacerbated the difficulty, in several areas around the country. And they organized themselves to defend those areas, and so you had a rising source of conflict between the two communities.

Of course, there were a number of reprisals taken by the Albanians as they came back, in response to the atrocities that the Serbs had committed. But the international community, and this was particularly strongly felt in Europe, felt that it was important to preserve the Serb rights in Kosovo, that we hadn’t fought a war against ethnic cleansing only to see it take place on the other side, and that the test of the Kosovars’ ability to govern themselves would be whether they were prepared to provide a framework in which the Serbs could also live.

So protecting these Serbs, the immediate media attention immediately after the war was over tended to focus on the degree to which NATO was providing adequate protection to the residual Serb population, and that became the news story, was how many Serbs were killed each day, what atrocities were taking place against the Serbs.

The focus of NATO’s activities there very quickly became directed toward the criminal and extremist elements that were threatening the Serb population….

Q: When you looked at the Balkans at that time, was the feeling that the basic population was getting on with their life and there was less interest in this ethnic hatred?

DOBBINS: I think there was a feeling that NATO’s strong positions in Bosnia and in Kosovo had stabilized the region, that in combination with a lot of international assistance you had the so-called “Stability Pact.”

Clinton went to Sarajevo for this big conference that established essentially it was a Balkan Marshall Plan, a reconstruction program for the region as a whole. There was a major U.S. and European commitment to the region, which included ultimately a commitment to bring them both into the European Union and NATO. That allowed the other states of the region to begin to reorient their internal politics and their economic structures toward Western models.

So there was a feeling that Bulgaria, Romania, Albania were all headed in the right direction. Then the success in displacing Milosevic in a largely peaceful revolution, and putting in a reform government, was a definite boost for the region and certainly the administration regarded that as an important accomplishment.