Early Warnings of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
Ambassador Max Waldo Bishop was born in Gravette, Arkansas, grew up in Kansas City, Kansas, and joined the Foreign Service in 1935. The first of Bishop’s many overseas postings was to Japan, serving in Osaka as vice consul and then in Tokyo as a political officer from 1937-1941. In January of 1941, Bishop learned of Japanese plans to launch an all-out assault on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor – eleven months before the devastating attack. While he couldn’t prevent the events of December 7, Bishop’s tireless efforts to warn officials of the imminent attack demonstrate the importance of the Foreign Service as America’s first line of defense.
In January, 1941, the Second World War was in full swing. A few months prior, Japan had recently formalized its alliance with Germany as a part of the Axis powers, and the United States – preserving its official neutrality in the conflict – maintained regular diplomatic relations with Japan. Consequently, when political officer Max Bishop learned of a Japanese plot to attack American soil, he was shocked.
“The Peruvian Minister,” Bishop recounted, “told me that, according to some of his sources – he did not name them and I did not ask who they were – the Japanese planned a surprise, all-out attack on Pearl Harbor, if and when they decided to go to war with the United States.”
Bishop set about verifying the Peruvian Minister’s stunning claim, reaching out to his contacts in the American press who covered Japan. In the absence of an organized intelligence apparatus, Bishop recalled, “you were on your own, and you collected information as best you could.” The press consequently represented some of the most reliable sources of information and verification for American foreign service officers in the field.
After the Peruvian Minister’s tip-off was confirmed by his sources, Bishop informed his boss, Ambassador Joseph Grew, of what he had learned. Bishop remembered how Ambassador Grew then sent a telegram back to Washington “to the effect that his Peruvian colleague had told a member of [the Ambassador’s] staff” of the planned Japanese attack.
“The Peruvian Minister… told me that, according to some of his sources… the Japanese planned a surprise, all-out attack on Pearl Harbor.”
Ambassador Max Bishop
Shortly thereafter, Bishop was sent back to the State Department in Washington, D.C. “Things were getting really hot,” Bishop said, “and Ambassador Grew wanted me back there. Maxwell Hamilton, on the Japan Desk, also wanted a Japanese expert… fluent in Japanese and whatnot.”
Upon arrival in Honolulu enroute back to the States, Bishop spoke with Naval officers stationed at Pearl Harbor. “They told me then that they were flying daylight reconnaissance patrols from dawn to dusk,” but that “the patrols stopped at dusk because, of course, they couldn’t see in the dark.”
For the better part of a year, Bishop recalled feeling like a boy crying wolf, recommending more Naval reconnaissance flights to no avail. Infamously, his fears would be proven correct on December 7, 1941. By Bishop’s own evaluation, “the Navy [was not] as alert at the end of 1941 as they were at the beginning of that year.” Although he was ultimately unable to prevent the attack, Bishop’s work to warn the Navy and other U.S. officials exemplifies the key role that diplomats play in protecting American citizens, both at home and abroad.
